MORAL SUBSIDY: THE ORIGINS OF INFLUENTIAL EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN US NATIONAL SECURITY POLITICS

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CHAD MICHAEL LEVINSON

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Dedicated
to my parents
for all the times
they ordered too much
so that I could bring home
the leftovers
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I argue that interest groups gain influence in national security politics by proving a “moral subsidy”—legitimating third-party endorsement of the president’s national security agenda. I deduce this claim from three assumptions: 1) interest groups gain influence by providing legislators with information about the consequences of their choices, and by educating constituents about policy changes and the actions of their representatives, 2) as argued in the “two presidencies” thesis, the executive initiates national security policy, and 3) the public pays little attention to foreign affairs. In most issue areas, interest groups have influence over both policy-makers and the public, but in national security politics the informational advantages they have over thinly-staffed legislators vanish when faced with the massive national security apparatus in the executive. However, they retain, even expand, their influence over the public, whose weak prior knowledge and beliefs make them susceptible targets of propaganda. The White House uses this public support to exert leverage over Congress to pass the President’s agenda. I describe the legal and political constraints that motivate the executive to recruit extra-governmental organizations (EGOs), elaborate upon the concept by offering four main types of moral subsidy, and explain why the public relations campaigns in which they collaborate take on a distinctly moral inflection. I test these claims using a multi-methods approach. I present quantitative evidence that stronger congressional opposition to the president yields greater access to executive branch Federal Advisory Committees in national security affairs. I conduct a series of survey experiments investigating whether the proposed mechanism works as politicians intend. I construct an analytic history of moral subsidy in practice from the interwar years to the collapse of the Soviet Union. I also offer an argument about how EGOs use the access they gain to consolidate their influence, and explain how this practice has led to the emergence of a coherent network of powerful national security EGOs that I call the “credibility cartel.”
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The following is an excerpt from a “Frontline” interview with Ahmed Chalabi, conducted in Baghdad in 2003, discussing the recent overthrow of the Iraqi regime (Public Broadcasting Service, 2003).

**FRONTLINE:** Many people [in the U.S.] who supported the war no longer do.

**CHALABI:** Yes.

**FRONTLINE:** They feel that they were suckered.

**CHALABI:** Yes, probably.

**FRONTLINE:** They say so.

**CHALABI:** Okay, I mean, I don’t—

**FRONTLINE:** Well, I mean, you know, half the people now feel that the war wasn’t justified on the grounds that it was argued for.

**CHALABI:** Okay.

**FRONTLINE:** Do you feel any discomfort with that?

**CHALABI:** No. We are in Baghdad now.

The glib response to the final question might anger an American viewer familiar with Chalabi’s history. He had been a proponent of Saddam Hussein’s overthrow by the United States for over a decade. An exile of Hussein’s brutal regime, Chalabi had presided over the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which had lobbied three presidents to do exactly what President George W. Bush had just done: invade Iraq, conquer its capital, and depose its leader. On the surface, the INC seems the archetypical special interest, hijacking the ship of state for its own narrow purposes. Chalabi managed to gain access to the top echelons of US decision-making, and was seen by many as the leader of the true Iraqi government, first in exile and then as a prospect once Operation Iraqi Freedom was to have liberated the country and established a democratic regime (Roston, 2009; Bonin, 2012).

The INC is far from only organized special interest that has seemed to exert undue influence over foreign policy. In the 1930s, the Nye Committee in the Senate investigated the widely-believed claim that the munitions and banking industries pressured President Wilson into joining the US in
World War I, while isolationists accused British and Jewish propaganda for growing public support for US involvement in World War II. Two decades later, President Eisenhower famously warned of the undue influence of the “military industrial complex” in his farewell address. More recently, the Iraq War was attended by cries of “no blood for oil.” Ethnic lobbies have taken criticism for strategic mistakes by US policy-makers (Bachrack, 1976; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). All of these diverse examples form a common critique, that the root of US foreign policy blunders often trace back to the practice of lobbying — non-governmental actors gaining access to policy-makers and persuading them to make decisions contrary to the interests of the broader public. Whether by inducing government officials to take action they otherwise would have avoided, or by preventing the consideration of certain choices, lobbying raises the spectre of special interest pressure leading to costly wars of choice.

A brief review of lobbying activity surrounding the Iraq War of 2003 should give such critics pause. Table 1.1 shows the percent change in lobbying expenditures by foreign policy lobbyists during the relevant years. The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) and Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) mandate the reporting of these expenditures by all private actors, identifying the contacts between their representatives and government officials. The data are made public through the Senate Office of Public Records with additional information provided by the Center for Responsive Politics.¹ Though crude, these data offer a good proxy for the effort expended by outside organizations seeking influence over decision-makers through lobbying. Overall, there was a secular increase in expenditures across all policy areas every year from 1998 to 2010. In foreign policy, this trend mostly holds, except for two years in which it appears that foreign policy decisions were under-lobbied, and two years in which they were over-lobbied. These deviations from the central tendency challenge the notion that the Iraq War was substantially caused by the efforts of special interests through the means most closely associated with the conventional wisdom, and may even imply that this particular military adventure created a demand for additional lobbying, reversing the causal process.

¹Available online at www.opensecrets.org.
If variation in these expenditures followed the conventional logic — lobbying is a demand driver in a buyer’s marketplace for public policy choices — we would expect September 11, 2001 to act as a kind of opening bell. More than any other single moment in US history, this day signaled the coming of radical change in national security politics. Lobbyists should have swarmed the offices of government to get a piece of the inevitable action. The following year was dominated by debates over Iraq’s purported development of weapons of mass destruction, its government’s alleged collaboration with Al Qaeda, and the promotion of President Bush’s proposal that the US finally pursue regime change without constraint (Kaufmann, 2004). The Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) came to a vote in the senate in October of 2002, and its passage helped pave the way to war.² As with September 11, the debate over the AUMF should have been a call to action for national security lobbyists. Instead, 2002 saw the opposite — a substantial drop in the

²The bill was one of two under consideration. The bill that passed called for United Nations involvement and the renewal of the stalled weapons inspections that had been put in place following the Gulf War of the early 1990s. War was therefore not an immediate consequence of the October vote, but UN involvement did not ultimately prove the constraint that some hoped it would be. Either way, it was the primary subject of congressional debate during the 2002 midterm elections.
percent increase in expenditure by foreign policy lobbyists.

The first full year of the occupation that followed coincided with an above-normal increase in lobbying, as did the set of policies President Bush labelled the “surge” in 2007. Finally, after the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in 2008 that set the terms of US military withdrawal, President Obama’s entry into the White House — another potential call to action for lobbyists seeking to influence policy direction under the new Democratic administration — foreign policy lobbying expenditure actually decreased by nearly five percent. It seems that lobbyists withdrew while they learned which direction the new administration would take. One could suppose that the overall reduction in expenditure at moments of opportunity meant that some groups found themselves locked out of the process, leaving more influence for those that remained, and at a cheaper price. Under this logic, however, some prior selection mechanism would have to determine which groups would have access, and the responsibility for the war would then go to whomever made those decisions.

If lobbying does not lead to foreign policy misadventure, what role do interests groups have in national security politics? One possibility is that they help carry out policy in territories about which they have critical local knowledge. The INC itself had received start-up funding from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under President George H. W. Bush, and remained influential after Bush was defeated in his 1992 re-election bid. Chalabi and his contacts both in-country and among the exile community were supposed to provide the government with a means of building an effective opposition to Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian rule in Iraq and forging relationships with other countries in the region. In 1994, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake wrote,

As a signal of our interest in a democratic Iraq, the Clinton administration also supports the objectives of the Iraqi National Congress, the exile organization that represents a broad spectrum of religious, secular and ethnic communities. The INC has recently broadened its base, established facilities in northern Iraq and deepened its ties with neighboring Arab governments that share the twin goals of maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity while promoting representative and benign governance in Baghdad (Lake, 1994).

This publicly-expressed belief in the value of the INC never paid out, and by the time of the AUMF
vote in 2002, the CIA and the State Department had long since lost all faith in Chalabi’s ability to deliver anything but propaganda on behalf of his own political ambitions, to be realized after the US toppled the Hussein regime (Dreyfuss, 2002).

A better explanation for the rise of the INC must re-orient the target of their influence. Interest groups do not only lobby government, they also engage in public relations campaigns, known by some as “outside lobbying” (Kollman, 1998). On closer examination, it becomes clear that Chalabi and his associates succeeded more in persuading people outside of the national security apparatus than inside, and those in the latter group who pursued the same goals did so on the basis of common cause. Fawaz Gerges, director of the Middle East Center at the London School of Economics, gives credit to Chalabi to providing a convincing narrative to the national security establishment, but admits that “[m]any American politicians wanted to be convinced” (Synovitz, 2013). Indeed, prominent journalists credit Kanan Makiya, author of two books and scores of articles on the Hussein regime, and fellow leader of the INC, with persuading them to support the invasion. Peter Beinart of the New Republic admits, “[I] made that disastrous decision ... because Kanan Makiya did” (McKelvey, 2007). But they were not working on their own. Not only did administration officials promote the INC to the public, they set up intelligence offices in the Department of Defense to counter the criticism of Chalabi and his associates coming out of the CIA and State Department (Dreyfuss, 2002). The INC acted in concert with the administration. Haney and Vanderbush (1999) and Vanderbush (2009) show that the INC acted as a collaborating partner in a marketing campaign for regime change.

The INC represents little more than a salient example of a strategy that the White House has developed systematically since the 1930s. This practice has given rise to a particular species of interest group that is both formally separate from yet also deeply integrated with the state — the extra-governmental organization (EGO). Since the inter-war period, this often overlooked public-private partnership has produced a network of influential EGOS in national security politics, which I call the “credibility cartel.” Constrained by politics and statute in their capacity to produce and distribute propaganda, presidential administrations since Franklin Roosevelt have enlisted EGOS
to help mobilize public opinion in support of the president’s national security agenda. The White House out-sources what it cannot do itself to third parties, whose ostensible independence from government enhances their credibility and makes them effective policy advocates. Their testimony amounts to a “moral subsidy” for an administration suffering from a deficit in its capacity to persuade the public. Groups that provide moral subsidy gain access to professional, political, and informational resources that help them enhance their status and develop constituencies. Presidents supported by these groups expand state capacity for action and extend their own individual legacies beyond their term of office. Over the course of the Cold War, administration-aligned EGOs became a critical complement to the national security apparatus in government.

What are the origins of influential extra-governmental organizations in US national security politics? One way to approach such a question would be to ask when do groups get the policy they want? The premise behind this formulation harkens back to James Madison’s “mischiefs of faction”—wherein well-organized groups mobilize to capture some segment of the government at the expense of the broader national interest. However, this ignores an equally important problem. Interest groups are the means by which civil society constrains government autonomy, for which reason the US courts have interpreted the first amendment to protect the right of freedom of association. Eliminating such groups would limit the opportunity for democratic participation and permit government itself to run wild. Inquiring about the origins of influential interest groups sheds light on both of these issues.

I argue that, far from constraining the government, outside groups in national security politics extend the capacity of the state to undertake ambitious projects. They produce and distribute pro-intervention propaganda that the government itself cannot, for legal and political reasons. In national security politics, the most important interest groups are those that enhance rather than constrain executive power. Over time, some groups gain influence independent of their original benefactors in the executive. They may stoke public resistance and encourage congressional opposition to thwart presidential ambitions. But they have little power to force an administration to take action against its better judgement. They can harass a president like Jimmy Carter pursuing détente,
manipulate Lyndon Johnson into building an unfeasible missile defense system, or issue sanctions against South Africa against the wishes of President Reagan. They may gain policy victories over the administration when presidents are especially weak (Carter and Johnson) or the policy has a robust domestic constituency (South Africa and Reagan), but the greater share of durable power comes from collaboration. Having origins in previous White House initiatives, their defining interests arise not from a faction among society, but from the agenda of a past administration.

1.1 The Context

The current argument challenges several prominent arguments in the scholarly literature. Reiter and Stam (2002) claim that democracies have a better record of success in fighting wars in part because the marketplace of ideas empowers the polity to reject ill-conceived plans for military adventurism. I show that an executive bent on pursuing war can manipulate the marketplace by deploying many of the same tools that corporations use to sell junk food. Fearon (1994) and many others that have followed in the “audience cost” tradition, argues that democratic leaders tie their own hands by making threats from which they cannot back down lest their public punish them for betraying their word. I take the position that the US public pays substantially less attention to communication among state leaders than to the propaganda the president remains able to distribute despite legal and political prohibitions against these activities. The manner in which the domestic audience engages with national security politics yields many more benefits than costs for the US executive, and provides a range of options for manipulating public opinion beyond simple handcying.

This project joins an emerging branch of international relations scholarship pursuing a fundamental re-evaluation of how democratic constraints operate in national security politics, and how policy-makers circumvent such limiting factors as public opinion and domestic institutions. Saunders (2016) argues that leaders use their advisors’ individual public reputations strategically, emphasizing or de-emphasizing particular cue-givers in order to manage public opinion. Schuessler (2015) shows how leaders use their powers of information management to deceive the public into
supporting wars. This paper reveals another means by which the White House cultivates power: by engaging civil society as public relations partners. I argue that interest groups enhance the power of the state in national security politics, a radical departure from the belief that they act as veto players in foreign policy (Milner, 1997; L. L. Martin & Simmons, 1998; J. Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Mansfield & Milner, 2012). This work also applies and revises Christensen (1996), by situating civil society organizations at the center of his “mobilization model.”

In addition to pushing the international relations literature in a new direction, I extend the American political development scholarship. Prior work has examined the role of civil society organizations in cultivating political constituencies, which I build upon with a focus on national security. Dan Galvin, also in reference to American Enterprise Institute (AEI), shows how Republican presidents have mobilized outside organizations for the purpose of party-building (Galvin, 2009). Steven Teles demonstrates how such organizations have helped build the conservative legal movement from the 1970s onward (Teles, 2010). This paper argues that prominent think-tanks have been used for purposes other than party-building, and not only by Republican presidents. I show that this kind of practice has helped foster a movement in national security politics, as Teles shows that it has done in judicial politics.

This work offers a fresh perspective on C. Wright Mills’ “power elite” and Michael Glennon’s “double government” (Mills, 1956; Glennon, 2014). Mills’ thesis identifies a network of powerful economic and military actors who control political decisions without regard for democratic principle. Glennon argues that “Trumanites” (un-elected professional bureaucrats) as opposed to “Madisonians” (elected representatives serving the people) dominate the national security establishment. Both authors claim that these powerful actors work behind the scenes, unobserved by the public and unaccountable to the state. I show that the covert governing structures these scholars propose hide, if at all, in plain sight, and depend in large part on White House support.

Finally, I challenge both the theory and empirical interpretation of interest group involvement in the US war in Vietnam given by Jack Snyder’s “Myths of Empire,” which argues that private groups gain influence in late-industrializing non-democracies, which permit the formation of in-
dustrial cartels that use their leverage to encourage imperial over-expansion (Snyder, 1991). I argue that interest groups derive influence from their ostensible political independence, and that the White House uses them to help further administration goals when its ambitions encounter public resistance and congressional opposition. Snyder argues that the Vietnam War happened because of a “transitory cartelization” among factions within government. I show that a cartel, durable and formally of the private sector, did indeed have a hand in the war, but one that dealt in credibility, not commerce.

The current paper represents a departure from the most common approaches to questions about interest group power, which tend to focus on what others have called the first and second faces of power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974; Gaventa, 1980). The first face reflects Robert Dahl’s famous definition, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957). Applied to interest groups and national security, such a conception would have private actors forcing policy-makers to wage war, and many have made such accusations in the past, whether for oil in the Persian Gulf or for the sake of the munitions and banking industries during World War I. The second face entails controlling the agenda, taking certain options out of consideration. E. E. Schattschneider states, “the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power” (Schattschneider, 1975). Along these lines, interest groups exert influence by preserving the status quo and enforcing inaction by policy-makers. Instead of taking either of these perspectives, I reverse the causal arrow and show how policy-makers use outside groups to help expand and express the power of the state. They operate in the realm of the third face of power, to get B not only to do what A wants, but to want it as well. Presidential influence works through interest groups, upon the public and by extension upon Congress, to build constituencies that share the administration’s national security world-view.

1.2 Influence Requires Access

This dissertation may disappoint those seeking an explanation of various foreign policy decisions in which interest groups either succeeded or failed in getting their way or bullying decision-makers
into pursuing policies running counter to the nation’s interests. It does not purport to explain the outcomes of policy contests, as those surely depend upon many factors that can neither be observed nor controlled for in many of the most important cases. A perfectly valid research design could, however, attempt to do so with a carefully chosen sample that might substantiate the claim that interest groups get their way under certain conditions but not others. Instead, I have chosen to look closely and why interest groups might have certain competitive advantages, the conditions under which those advantages grant them access to government, and the degree to which they have done so in fact. In short, this dissertation relies on the premise that access to power is a fundamental pre-requisite to influence.

The chief executive has substantial legal authority to manage outsider access to the policy apparatus without consulting Congress, especially on matters of national security. By controlling the conventional channels of public access to the bureaucracy, the White House removes one of the central mechanisms of legislative oversight. According to Matthew D. McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), Congress installs virtual “fire alarms” throughout the administration, so that groups or individuals can alert officials to problems either created or ignored by government programs. Rather than provide discrete substantive solutions to political conflicts, the legislature establishes administrative procedures that embed the contemporaneous terms of contestation within the agencies they create. They “stack the deck to benefit favored political interests” (Matthew D. McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987). Whenever a president creates an agency unilaterally, he and his advisors alone determine the constituencies, interests, and information channeled by procedural mandates. In matters of national security, the president as both chief executive and commander in chief enjoys wide latitude in structuring the policy apparatus, creating institutions that serve some interests and not others.  

[3] The creation of the Department of Homeland Security presents an interesting counter-example, wherein President Bush wished to continue with the White House Office of Homeland Security he had created. In a rare instance of congressional resistance, Senator Joe Lieberman led the effort to require Senate approval of senior personnel by creating a cabinet-level department. Three factors may help explain this anomaly. First, Senator Lieberman had strong executive branch ambitions, one of the few reasons why legislators would insert themselves into security politics. Second, the homeland focus of the agency made it more salient for the US public. Third, President Bush announced his support for Lieberman’s plan the day that Coleen Rowley testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the opportunities missed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to pursue the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called “twen-
The Administrative Procedure Act safeguards the public’s access to policy information, but national security is largely exempt from its requirements. The act mandates that all rules and regulations be published with sufficient opportunity for public comment prior to implementation, along with the “method by which [agency] functions are channeled and determined” (“Administrative Procedures Act,” 1946). Section 552, subsection b explicitly states that the president may exclude national defense and foreign policy activities by Executive order; he need not consult Congress nor any other authority to grant protected status to agencies whose secrecy he wishes to protect. Moreover, intelligence operations are excluded from the act automatically. If the public or Congress wants this information released, it must fight against a claim of executive privilege or wait for unauthorized leaks by disgruntled personnel.

The president controls access to the national security apparatus by staffing its agencies without interference from rival political actors. Political appointments to bureaucratic positions are among the most important tools for controlling administrative agencies, and presidents often have acted unilaterally in creating sub-cabinet national security offices that do not require congressional advice and consent (Wood & Waterman, 1991). As long as they do not exceed the discretionary budget of White House operations, many advisory boards, presidential commissions, and agencies operate independently of the legislature. In staffing these offices, the White House and the FBI have untrammeled authority to grant security clearance to new appointees, and to assign access to compartmentalized information. Once “read in” on a program, an individual’s clearance may be re-instated with relative ease even after a substantial lapse. Presidents rarely have security policy personnel forced upon them, and even temporary assignments tend to bring the same people into the process when the need returns.

tieth hijacker” of the attacks of September 11, 2001. The accommodation to Congress came at a moment of political weakness for the president.
1.3 The Audience

When we re-orient our examination of interest groups to focus on their value as propaganda partners, we also shift our understanding of the targets of their influence. Many studies of interest groups have looked at their power over principle decision-makers (Ferguson, 1995; McConnell, 1966; Grossman & Helpman, 2001; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007; Narizny, 2007). I propose that interest groups become more powerful after the big decisions have been made, and the targets of their influence are those whose consent is required for the principals to get their way. They must help convince congress to allow a national security program to go forward, and the most effective way to do so is to persuade the public. This poses a direct challenge to those who offer “domestic audience costs” as an explanation for executive behavior, or the “marketplace of ideas” as an explanation for why democracies win wars (Fearon, 1994; Reiter & Stam, 2002; Reiter, 2012, 2013). The executive has an effective tool for managing domestic audiences and the marketplace of ideas — propaganda.

Propaganda has proven effective at shifting opinion over security actions. Public support provides value for the president in three ways, legally, politically, and strategically. First, it helps clear any formal legal hurdles to implementing the proposed policy. Second, it gives the president political leverage that extends beyond security policy. Third, it improves the prospects for strategic mission success. Conversely, failing to secure public support imposes serious costs on all three counts.

Legal Value. Presidential dominance over security policy is not absolute. While Congress often allows the president leeway over national security issues, the formal powers of the legislature remain substantial. Propaganda has congressional compliance as one of its goals. It is a form of “going public,” which has become an increasingly popular way of demonstrating to recalcitrant legislators that following the president’s lead serves their own political interests. This tactic amounts to “[f]orcing compliance from fellow Washingtonians by going over their heads to enlist constituents’ pressure” (Kernell, 2006, pg. 2). A Congress made compliant in this way is more
likely to delegate discretionary authority to the executive and to appropriate the required funding.

**Political Value.** Involvement in foreign wars is one of a small number of issues that regularly affects the electoral fortunes of the president. Along with racial issues and social welfare issues, public perception of how well or poorly the president has used the nation’s military power has a significant impact on presidential electoral outcomes (Rosenstone, 1983). Shaping these perceptions becomes critical for politicians seeking re-election. Whether trying to secure his own second term, to boost his party’s representation in Congress, or to firm up his own legacy, the president has a strong political incentive to use propaganda to boost the approval of his national security agenda.

**Strategic Value.** A public that supports military involvement is more likely to support the policies necessary to make it work. The armed forces have an easier time recruiting and retaining personnel for popular wars. A supportive public more readily accepts the rationing of materials and supplies necessary for the war effort. The morale of soldiers on deployment improves when the public shows strong support for their mission. From full-on military engagement to involvement far short of war, public support signals the resolve necessary to carry a mission through and the credibility to fulfill promises and threats.

### 1.4 The Landscape

Raw numbers of mobilized organizations cannot on their own tell us all we wish to known about the balance of influence, but they do provide two useful pieces of information. First, the issues around which groups mobilize give a sense of the priorities that motivate group association. Second, and more directly relevant to this analysis, a raw numerical summary shows us the relative group diversity among those issues, showing concentration or diffusion, directing attention toward one set of problems or another. A large number of organizations in a given area implies an environment in which the government may be overwhelmed by private demands. In emergency situations that require decision, this might cripple the executive’s initiative and make the nation vulnerable to
foreign hostility. In more deliberative situations, this empowers the state by providing a multitude of potential third-party allies. On the other hand, a small number of organizations may imply a concentration of power and the formation of cartels. The following overview of the interest group environment reveals an issue profile that one would expect based on a conventional understanding of grand strategic interests, the geography of security conflict, and US demographics and military history. At the same time, it shows a much sparser environment within the domain of non-trade foreign policy than among other policy domains. This raises the spectre of cartelization and the prospect of a constrained policy space.

This summary is based on a data-set provided by the Policy Agendas Project at the University of Texas at Austin, one that is commonly used in the interest group politics literature. Since 1956, Gale Research has collected information on non-profit organizations registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), publishing the Encyclopedia of Associations in most years through present day. The Policy Agendas Project has collected information contained in the Encyclopedia into a single database, and coded the policy “topic” that each organization pursues as its primary mission.\(^4\) Figure 1.3 shows the total number of associations broken down by major topic category in the year 2005, as determined by the researchers at the Policy Agendas Project. “Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce” tops the list, followed closely by “Health,” with over twenty-eight hundred groups in each category.

Despite its importance, whether measured by its share of federal government activity or any number of normative standards, security policy interest groups represent a small minority of the overall organizational environment. The state’s capacity to use violence is most directly implicated in the categories of “Defense” and “International Affairs and Foreign Aid,” and these amount to roughly ten percent of the overall population. Figure 1.3 shows these two categories over the span of thirty-five years. The raw count of security policy organizations increases dramatically between

\(^4\)The data merged with the Encyclopedia of Associations were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here.
Figure 1.2: Associations by Topic, 2005

Source: Policy Agendas Project
1980 and 1990, then levels off and retreats a bit. This corresponds with a similar increase in the total number of organizations in the database during the same period, so the proportion of security policy organizations remains low. It fluctuates between 10.4 and 8.4 percent, and was near the bottom of this range in 2005. It shows no apparent change in response to the two major exogenous foreign policy shocks in this time frame, the end of the Cold War and the onset of the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT).

**Figure 1.3: Foreign Policy Associations, 1970-2005**

![Bar chart](image)

To get a tally of non-trade foreign policy organizations, we want a a subset of these groups that deal specifically with security-related issues. Which groups to include in the category of national security requires some choices. The “Defense” topic clearly belongs in the universe of security policy categories, but the “International Affairs and Foreign Aid” topic includes many groups that are only indirectly related to the question. Interest groups operate not only within the specific topic of defense, but around its perimeter as well. They seek to influence diplomacy, human rights issues, US response to intra-state violence abroad, and a host of other missions. The Encyclopedia of Associations organizes its collection by “subjects” representing another level of distinction among
organizational missions and the policies they seek to influence. Taking only the associations in the Policy Agendas Project topics of International Affairs & Foreign Aid and Defense, in 2005 there were 1515 that fit the description of non-trade related foreign policy associations. To give that figure perspective, recall from Figure 1.2 that each of the two top domestic policy categories have nearly twice that number.

**Figure 1.4: Non-Trade Foreign Policy Associations by Subject, 2005**

![Bar chart showing the distribution of non-trade foreign policy associations by subject in 2005.](Source: Policy Agendas Project)

These categories are still too general to evaluate whether the attention of these groups follows a set of imperatives that match those of the international strategic environment. Using keywords provided by the Policy Agenda Project researchers along with mission statement details, I have created a deeper sub-classification system I call the “focus” of an organization. This allows me to determine where a group’s policy priorities lie. As shown in Figure 1.5, the vast majority of non-
trade foreign policy groups fall into one of four categories: 1) groups relating to specific policy issues or international institutions, 2) membership organizations for military personnel, veterans and military-historical preservation, 3) identity-based organizations (religion, ethnicity, and gender), and 4) organizations supporting policies pertaining to specific national or regional geographic entities.

Figure 1.5: Non-Trade Foreign Policy Associations by Focus, 2005

According to Federalist 10, a sparse domain is cause for concern. It promotes concentration of power, inviting cartelization that brings mischief in the form of over-expansion. It also undermines the conception of democratic pluralism described in Dahl (1961) and Truman (1971) by reducing the competition over policy influence to a select few. Nordlinger (1981) argues that a sparsely-populated environment is one in which the state may be constrained, compared to a dense one in which officials may easily pick and choose their allies among the myriad available societal actors. This, however, does not imply that a sparse environment, and a constrained executive, is desirable. As Krasner (1978) argues, in line with Snyder (1991), that an executive unburdened of parochial

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5 Madison (2001, orig. 1787), argues that the “mischiefs of faction” can be countered by creating a broad franchise across many interests, so that cross-cutting cleavages inhibit the accumulation of plurality power.
interests may more easily pursue the national interest.

The preceding summary of the population of associations in the US directs us to consider the domain of security policy as vulnerable to this kind of concentration of influence – and to do so, we must look deeper into the mechanisms of political influence. We cannot draw strong inferences from these data alone. First of all, the number of organizations does not simply point to relative concentration of power, but also to a demand among the population for representation on a given issue. Beyond that, there are extra-governmental actors that the Encyclopedia of Associations does not include. Most importantly, we must examine the processes by which interest groups gain access to policy-makers and influence the public. I argue, contrary to Lowi (2010) and McConnell (1966), that the resource separating the influential from the marginalized is not material wealth but political information, which makes them attractive partners for a presidential administration.

1.5 Definitions

The main focus of the present analysis is the influence of interest groups in US security policy beginning with World War II until the onset of the GWOT. During this time, the US built the worldwide intelligence-gathering apparatus upon which the theory depends, and enjoyed the freedom to roam granted any state that achieves regional hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001). Several terms are sufficiently complicated to merit more detailed discussion.

Security Policy. I define security policy as government action that primarily and intentionally affects the application of or defense against military force by the US or its partners. Obviously, this includes the deployment of US military assets or personnel. Military aid in the form of weapons or tactical training is also included without much controversy, as are the prohibition or selective authorization of arms sales and other military technology. The military-industrial complex is excluded because it has a separate instrumental logic in its central role in the production of US power capabilities. International trade policy is a more delicate matter. Any given trade might profit the US, so a military motive might be incidental. On the other hand, economic and industrial prosperity
form the basis of military power, so any given trade might improve a partner’s security situation. In order to separate economic and security transactions, I distinguish between policies that yield an economic profit for the US from those that incur loss, and trade with partners that are at peace from that which involves parties in a military conflict. Costly trade with partners at war are included. Profitable trade with partners at peace are excluded. Mixed cases require individual attention, but trade that profits the US is treated with suspicion.

**Interest Groups.** Under the strictest definition, an interest group is a formally constituted entity that exists for the primary purpose of facilitating member-to-member association and collective action. Business firms, for instance, are not themselves interest groups because their primary function is to seek financial profit from the provision of goods or services. Chambers of Commerce, on the other hand, qualify because they provide a venue for firms to discuss their shared interests and act as a collective body.

I base my definition of interest groups on the following definition of interests provided by the authors of a central sociological text on US governance:

> It is at the intersection of public policy and the wants and values of private actors that we discover interest. What we call the interests of the groups are not simply valued conditions or goals, such as material riches, moral well-being, or symbolic satisfaction. It is only as these are affected, potentially or in fact, by public policy, by the actions of authoritative public officials, that the valued ends are transformed into political interests that can be sought or opposed by interest groups (Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, & Salisbury, 1997).

This provides four rules of inclusion to identify interest groups that fall within the scope of the theory. First, the groups must be legally private actors. Many studies include militaries in the category of interest group, but this project does not. In the US, the subordination of the military to civilian authority is sufficiently strong to create serious tautology problems. One of the goals of the current project is to demonstrate the control presidents have over interest groups, and including military institutions would make the task too easy.\(^6\) Second, nothing in the theory or concepts requires that

\(^6\)In some parts of the research, military actors will be compared to interest groups, but as a point of reference to
the official group membership consist of more than one individual, only that the group in question has managed to solve the free-rider problem. Third, the interest in question may include material, moral, or symbolic rewards. This allows the inclusion of ethnic groups, corporations, trade associations, moral action committees, single-issue advocates, and general pressure groups. Finally, the group must seek to exert influence over policies that must be carried out by public officials in order to have effect.

I also apply two rules of exclusion to limit the scope of inquiry. First, political parties and their subsidiaries are not considered interest groups. This is often a fuzzy distinction, and many interests groups become closely associated with a particular party. Second, journalists are excluded except under two conditions. If they separately hold membership in an organized interest group, they are included as long as they can claim to speak for that organization. Also, since individuals are included in the analysis, executive or management level journalists (publishers and managing editors, for example) fall within the scope of inquiry – they have the editorial authority to speak for the media outlets in which they publish.

Influence. I conceive of influence in two parallel ways. First, interest groups exert influence over the public in a manner that reflects the so-called “third dimension of power” as discussed in Lukes (1974), Gaventa (1980). The first dimension of power entails forcing another to choose something they would not otherwise choose (Dahl, 1957). The second is the power of agenda setting, limiting the options over which another may choose (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). The third is the power to persuade by shaping the norms and values of another.

This may include the study of social myths, language, and symbols, and how they are shaped or manipulated in the power processes. It may involve the study of communication of information – both of what is communicated and how it is done. It may involve a fo-

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7The literature on collective action includes the “wacky billionaire” solution, where a single motivated individual pays the cost of a public good so that he may enjoy it himself without excluding the community at large. Hardin (1993) tells the story of Howard Hughes’ purchase of a local televisions station so that he could watch westerns and war movies in the middle of the night.
cus upon the means by which social legitimations are developed around the dominant, and instilled as beliefs or roles in the dominated (Gaventa, 1980, pg. 15).

Through the distribution of propaganda, interest groups shape the values of the public, building constituencies in support of certain policies.

The second way in which I conceive of influence concerns the control of information. The distribution of information throughout the political system is a key element in the theory I develop. In security policy, the executive has vastly greater access to information than members of Congress or interest groups. This is not necessarily true in the case of many domestic policy issues. For instance, the government employs vastly fewer farmers than those mobilized among the agriculture lobby, and these practitioners have substantive knowledge about farming that policy-makers do not. Since the federal government has historically held a monopoly on the practice of international diplomacy, intelligence, and military action, the executive branch has enjoyed an information advantage over other political actors. By assisting the government in its propaganda efforts, the most successful interest groups are able to place personnel within the bureaucracy and on civilian advisory committees. Once there, they are able to shape the information that reaches top policy-makers, even the president. This form of influence is similar in many ways to regulator capture.

### 1.6 Propaganda in the United States

The US government has not had an easy time maintaining an official agency responsible for security-related propaganda targeting a domestic audience. The Committee on Public Information (CPI) managed the task during World War I, and it promptly ceased domestic operations upon the termination of hostilities in Europe. The Office of War Information (OWI) was created to maintain public morale during World War II, but was disbanded at the end of the war, having struggled throughout its existence to secure stable funding from Congress. The legislature has frequently used the power of the purse to limit the ways in which the executive could make the case for overseas military

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8The GWOT has seen a rise in the outsourcing of both military and intelligence operations to private contractors, so this advantage may be disappearing.
involvement to the American public. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 established powerful tools for public diplomacy, but prohibited their use for domestic propaganda. The Boland Amendment prevented the Reagan administration from using official resources for its public relations campaign against Central and South American Communism. The legislative authorization for escalation in Vietnam likewise prohibited domestically-targeted propaganda by the Johnson administration.

The objection to official propaganda stems in part from its perceived anti-democratic character. Freedom of the press remains an essential component of democracy because the body politic requires open information in order to evaluate public choices. Whether selecting policies directly or the delegates responsible for making decisions, the demos must know the facts and principles of an issue so they may engage in constructive debate, making good ideas better and rejecting those that lack merit. Propaganda works not to inform in a comprehensive manner, but to propagate a faith, an allegiance to a choice already made. Its purveyors seek adherents, not critics helping to improve upon a proposition. Some democratic peace theories, for instance, propose a “marketplace” that protects the nation from misguided adventurism by weeding out bad ideas, and propaganda violates the principle of intellectual competition (Reiter & Stam, 2002; Reiter, 2012). More generally, it puts a heavy government thumb on the scales that people use to weigh critical policy information. For these and other reasons, US government has foregone the development of official domestic propaganda institutions.

Non-official propaganda, on the other hand, is protected by the freedoms of association and speech. Three Supreme Court decisions, Buckley v. Valeo (1976), Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2013), stand out as primary assertions of the rights of private actors to spend money on political persuasion, and most groups operating under these precedents use public relations techniques that would be labelled propaganda if employed by the government. They craft messages that advocate a single correct way of thinking, demonizing opponents and rallying the faithful to the cause.

Not only is extra-governmental propaganda more permissable, it is often more effective at persuading the public of the virtues of a chosen policy. There are psychological and political rea-
sons for this. Social scientists have long argued that opinion formation and vote choice derive from social context; whether a person believes a message depends as much on its messenger as its content. Partisan affiliation and trust strongly motivate reasoning and opinion formation on policy matters, including national security (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Bartels, 2002; Jacobson, 2010). Edward Bernays, nephew of Sigmund Freud and a pioneer in bringing psychoanalytic techniques to bear upon consumer advertising, demonstrated the power of third-party testimonial in swaying the public mind (Tye, 2002). Enlisting outside experts makes an argument appear authoritative and disinterested. Bernays, considered by many to be “the father of public relations,” brought this and many other insights into the political domain, where partisanship exacerbates the problem of gaining and preserving trust.  

Political competition amplifies all manner of biases that inhibit civil dialogue and rational debate. Third parties stand outside partisan politics, and their testimony can penetrate certain prejudices that presidents cannot.

Seeing the effectiveness of extra-governmental organizations, presidents have sought their assistance when building public support for security policy initiatives. The utility of public relations is greatest where no natural constituency exists behind a given policy. Much as with the introduction of a novel consumer product, demand for getting involved in a foreign crisis must be generated by marketing. This stands in contrast with many aspects of domestic policy, where the motivating crisis already imposes suffering upon the electorate. In the absence of an attack by a foreign power (state or non-state actor), the American public feels little pain from foreign problems. To get their attention, policy initiators must dispatch an independent sales force. Testimonial by extra-governmental organizations ranks among the most effective marketing tactics.

9 The Eisenhower administration enlisted Bernays expertise in a range of situations, from domestic public relations to inciting a coup d’état in Guatemala.
1.7 Plan of the Dissertation

Chapter 2: Theory of Moral Subsidy. I argue that interest groups gain influence by providing a “moral subsidy” — legitimating third-party endorsement of the president’s national security agenda. I deduce this claim from three assumptions: 1) interest groups gain influence by providing legislators with information about the consequences of their choices, and by educating constituents about policy changes and the actions of their representatives, 2) as argued in the “two presidencies” thesis, the executive initiates national security policy, and 3) the public pays little attention to foreign affairs. In most issue areas, interest groups have influence over both policy-makers and the public, but in national security politics the informational advantages they have over thinly-staffed legislators vanish when faced with the massive national security apparatus in the executive. However, they retain, even expand, their influence over the public, whose weak prior knowledge and beliefs make them susceptible targets of propaganda. The White House uses this public support to exert leverage over Congress to pass the President’s agenda. I describe the legal and political constraints that motivate the executive to recruit EGOs, elaborate upon the concept by offering four main types of moral subsidy, and explain why the public relations campaigns in which they collaborate take on a distinctly moral inflection. I also offer an argument about how EGOs use the access they gain to consolidate their influence, and explain how this practice has led to the emergence of a coherent network of powerful national security EGOs that I call the “credibility cartel.”

Chapter 3: Appointments to Federal Advisory Committees. The theory of moral subsidy implies that the executive grants access to interest groups when it needs help with a political strategy to secure congressional consent and that the White House prefers to minimize public awareness of this collaboration. To validate these implications, I conduct a large-n analysis of Federal Advisory Committee (FAC) appointments between 1997 and 2012. FACs are officially authorized bodies through which agents of the executive branch solicit the advice of select members of civil society, representing business firms, the academy, voluntary associations, and other parties. These data are especially useful, since they identify both the issue areas that the committees address and the
extra-governmental affiliation of committee members, allowing me to test hypotheses about the conditions under which interest group members secure appointments to national security FACs. The results comprise three core findings. First, validating the data against one of my core assumptions, Congress involves itself significantly less frequently in the establishment of FACs that address issues of foreign policy. Second, in keeping with the idea that moral subsidy works by protecting the perceived independence of interest groups, their members rate of appointment decreases as individual FACs attract greater media coverage. Third, among those FACs that engage issues of contentious geopolitics, such as nuclear weapons, grand strategy, and the structure of international order, interest groups gain greater access as opposition party power increases in Congress. I argue that this supports the premise that the executive enlists the participation of interest groups when it most needs help with its political strategy.

Chapter 4: Combining Source and Framing Effects. This chapter tests the central mechanism of the theory of moral subsidy by way of a controlled online survey experiment. It follows in the tradition of the political psychology literature on source effects, which recognizes that the identity of an endorser influences the respondent’s acceptance of a persuasive message. Subjects were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system, and were randomly assigned to one of thirty treatment groups, representing a fully-crossed design of five conflict scenarios and six possible endorsers (including a no-endorser control group). Each was asked to read a vignette describing a proposed military intervention by the US, then asked about their support for the policy. Within conflict scenarios, the text of the vignette varied only with respect to the identity of the endorser, which included President Obama, interest group and military representatives, and a prominent member of the opposition party. Results show that Republicans, in scenarios involving newer and more salient conflicts, respond significantly more favorably to interest group representatives than to the president. Among Democrats, the same holds true when comparing responses to a Republican endorser, but the effects are smaller. These results provide support for the proposition that moral subsidy works as predicted in a controlled laboratory setting.
Chapter 5: History of The Credibility Cartel. This chapter presents an analytic history of moral subsidy in practice, showing how a set of state and extra-governmental institutions developed over the course of several decades beginning in the inter-war period. Groups that formed with the purpose of helping President Roosevelt mobilize public support for US involvement in World War II proved the concept of extra-governmental collaboration. Constrained by political considerations and legal prohibitions against directing official propaganda at domestic audiences, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower recruited veterans of these interventionist public relations campaigns to promote the reconstruction of Europe, Soviet containment as laid down in NSC-68, and the explosion of public diplomacy programs that accompanied the “New Look.” These extra-governmental organizations helped forge the “Cold War Consensus,” and when this broke down in the late 1960s, President Nixon turned again to the very same groups to muster public support for Anti-Ballistic Missile development and Vietnamization. Under President Reagan, the White House held regular outreach meetings with outside organizations friendly to the administration’s agenda on missile defense and the Central American anti-communist campaigns of the 1980s. The archival record reveals a remarkable continuity among these groups with respect to personnel, funding, and organizational design across decades of US history, and provides robust confirmation of the theory of moral subsidy. Groups that executives recruit for public relations campaigns use the material and social resources to which they gain access to solidify their distinctive influence in national security politics. They re-emerge whenever the country contemplates a substantial change in policy and dominate the marketplace of persuasion, forming what I call the “credibility cartel.”

Chapter 6: Conclusion. The final chapter of the dissertation summarizes the argument and how each empirical chapter contributes to its validation. The large-n analysis of Federal Advisory Committee appointments establishes a minimum degree of generalizability for core aspects of the theory. The survey experiment show that the core mechanism works. The analytic history shows moral subsidy in action over the course of several decades, and tracks the emergence of the credibility cartel. I also reflect on the consequences of my scope conditions, definitions, and research design
choices, paying particular attention to the issues these choices have prevented answering. I close the dissertation with a discussion of future research building on the current study, and the ethical ambiguity of moral subsidy.
CHAPTER 2
THEORY OF MORAL SUBSIDY

Some interest groups come to play key roles in the domestic political struggles over the direction of foreign affairs, remain influential over time, and expand their reach to cover a range of international conflicts. Others remain in the background, influencing security policy on the margins but never clearing the barriers separating the government and the governed. Still others never manage to gain any measurable influence. It is this variation, between long-standing, effective policy influence on the one side and marginalization, stasis, and disappearance on the other, that this dissertation explains. The outcome of interest comprises two aspects: the collaboration between interest group affiliates and executive policy-makers, and the development of constituencies supporting a set of ideas regarding matters of national security.

I argue that security policy interest groups gain durable political influence by assisting presidents in propaganda efforts aimed at winning support for military involvement abroad. By helping craft and carry out the domestic public relations strategy for a national security program, interest groups become administration partners. This collaboration persists through the implementation of a program. As agencies expand their capacities to accomplish new goals, they seek staffing resources and consultation from the organizations that have helped the executive achieve political success through the dissemination of ostensibly non-governmental propaganda.\(^1\) I call this form of assistance “moral subsidy,” and it provides the best explanation for variation in the degree and durability of interest group influence in US national security politics. Over time, groups that morally subsidize the administration’s initiatives are able to shape the policy apparatus and build constituencies around a set of preferences; they help define what government institutions do and what the public considers the morally correct position. As with professional associations generally, they develop a set of ideational norms, in this case regarding grand strategy, that practitioners must

\(^1\)Political success entails improving public support for the administration’s position, securing legal consent – passive or affirmative – from the other branches of government, and improving the competitive position of the party in the White House. It is not necessary to muster majority approval for a policy, but rather to mobilize support by increasing the number of ‘favorables’ and the salience of the policy among this group, while simultaneously demobilizing opposition in an equivalent fashion.
follow to maintain standing in the epistemic community.

This project joins a small but growing body of scholarship that treats interest groups, especially in security policy, as government partners rather than avaricious predators or noble antagonists. Vanderbush (2009) examinations the ethnic lobbies that helped the government market its policies toward Cuba and Iraq. Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) discusses “instrumental responsiveness” — the test-marketing of political rhetoric by official staff and interest groups to determine the argument most likely to influence public opinion. It applies a logic similar to that found in Kollman (1998), but adds to it the notion that interest groups engage in public relations efforts in collaboration with the administration. In the academic study of political institutions, one finds a broad body of research into government bureaucracies, non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations, international organizations, and so on. The present work introduces the concept of the extra-governmental organization. extra-governmental organizations (EGOs) exist outside the official boundaries of government, but with substantial state involvement in their operations. They extend the state’s capacity for action when political and legal constraints prohibit the internal development of certain capabilities. They are an out-sourcing option when the job cannot be handled in-house. Although there have been important contributions to this topic, none has provided a systematic theory on the subject of interest groups in US national security politics.

The key difference between the present theory and most of the alternatives involves the assumption of interest group independence from the state. Theories that seek to explain the effects of pressure by outside actors upon policy-makers tend to take it as given that the groups and government have distinct sources of political power. Interest group pluralists believe that independent organizations constrain the autonomy of the state in ways that protect the rights and liberties of the public (Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1971). As long as interest groups come in sufficient variety and numbers, the complex arrangement of cross-cutting cleavages will prevent the concentration of political power with a faction that threatens democratic governance (Madison, 2001). Skeptics of pluralism argue that not only have dominant factions emerged, they have built service to their own parochial interests into burgeoning state institutions (McConnell, 1966; Lowi, 2010). Statists have countered
that the state in general and the security apparatus has managed to maintain its autonomy, and rather than threaten the liberty of the public this has served to protect the national interest from the undue influence of faction (Krasner, 1978; Nordlinger, 1981). Despite their theoretical, normative, and empirical disagreements, these camps all maintain the separation between state and interest group, assuming their constitutive independence from one another. Special interests succeed or fail in altering the course of public policy. The state follows its own initiative or obeys the demands of outside organizations. Either way, the state is one thing and the group another.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section builds the theory, identifying key assumptions and spelling out the internal casual mechanisms. The next section elaborates the central concepts upon which the empirical examination depends. The theory introduces some novel terminology, and the conceptual elaboration demonstrates that these labels refer to important, concrete, and systematic phenomena in the politics of US security policy. It also provides structure for anticipating what kind of extra-governmental organization should provide the most effective moral subsidy and stand the best chance of attracting White House favor. Finally, the chapter will lay out the important implications of the theory and discuss the empirical strategy for the remainder of the dissertation.

2.1 Theory

I make three assumptions about the distribution of political power and information from which I deduce a distinct and coherent set of expectations about why the White House collaborates with interest groups and how they become influential in US national security politics. These assumptions are 1) the president dominates national security policy, 2) the president has superior information about national security issues, and 3) absent overt provocation, the public pays little attention to foreign affairs. These features of the security policy domain make it difficult for interest groups to conduct meaningful surveillance but increases the effectiveness of propaganda. This inhibits their ability to influence a policy-leader’s decision to intervene, but improves their ability to help the administration sell its policy to the public. Assisting the government in this way, they gain access to
political, professional, and informational resources that help them build influence, and they develop constituencies among the public loyal to their position. Similar to professional associations in other fields such as law, medicine, and accounting, they establish a system of norms that practitioners must follow to remain an epistemic community member in good standing (Abbott, 1988, ch. 2).

First, the president leads on foreign policy and Congress follows (Wildavsky, 1966, 1989; Moe & Howell, 1999; Schlesinger, 2004; Canes-Wrone, Howell, & Lewis, 2008). Even under the most restrictive conditions, the executive remains the chief policy initiator. It sets the agenda and enjoys substantial first-mover advantage, especially on matters involving the military. Despite the legislature’s obligations under the Constitution, Congress has abdicated much of its responsibility for decisions to venture abroad. The primary governing statute on national security matters prior to the Patriot Act of 2001 was the War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973. Passed to constrain an embattled President Nixon, the act also formalizes a 60-day grace period for any military deployment, mandating only that Congress be informed within forty-eight hours. Since its passage, no president has met with any congressional response stronger than a non-binding censure. The Patriot Act extends executive autonomy further. Congress typically constrains the executive and empowers interest groups by mandating that certain constituencies have access to specific parts of the executive branch, but the Administrative Procedures Act exempts sensitive national security agencies (Matthew D. McCubbins et al., 1987). According to Alexis de Tocqueville, such presidential dominance is the natural condition of government. “It is chiefly in foreign relations that the executive power of a nation finds occasion to exert its skill and strength,” he writes (Tocqueville, 2000). Given this institutional structure, the question of influence over security policy must focus principally on the executive.

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2 Presidents are not given absolute autonomy over security policy. They face constraints under certain conditions, but they remain the initiator and driver of security policy in the overwhelming majority of cases. See Ripley and Lindsay (1993), Lindsay (1994), Howell and Pevehouse (2007) for a review of the constraints Congress places on presidential autonomy over defense policy, and T. Mann and Ornstein (2006) for an argument that presidential policy dominance extends beyond the foreign policy domain.

3 Congressional action over the Iran-Contra affair was not pursued under the authority of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR-73), but under the Boland Amendment, which explicitly prohibited US military aid or involvement in Nicaragua, or the expenditure of executive resources to promote such intervention. The case represents one of the few examples of a Congress actively working against a sitting president on national security matter.
Second, since the chief executive sits atop a vast information-gathering bureaucracy, interest groups seeking to influence foreign policy find it difficult to provide the president with novel technical information. Even if intelligence originates within the ranks of interest groups, it is typically routed through and vetted by government agencies. Rarely will it arrive unmolested on the desks of upper-echelon policy-makers. Modern executives have deep resources for gathering political information as well, and any organization must have a vast membership base in order to provide polling data surpassing the capabilities of a White House political team. This distribution of information weakens interest group involvement in pre-decision surveillance. Put another way, interest groups cannot easily manipulate national security decision-makers into pursuing a military adventure.

Third, the US public generally resists ambitious foreign policy, and what preferences it does express arise from weak prior beliefs and knowledge (Canes-Wrone, 2006). Ongoing conflicts or injustices abroad rate low on the average citizen’s docket of problems for the government to solve. This is not to say that the people have no position on foreign involvement, only that their stated preferences change more easily than they do on issues pertaining to domestic policy, where their own interests are more clearly defined and therefore more stable (Milner & Tingley, 2015). This further diminishes the pre-decision surveillance role of interest groups, but strengthens their position with respect to post-decision propaganda, since weaker predispositions make persuasion easier. While members of the mass public may oppose foreign entanglements, they may be drawn into supporting interventionism by the coaxing of politicians and other elites. In all, ex ante public inattention leaves the initiating decision on security policy to the president, but creates opportunities for interest groups to become involved when the time comes to build support for a chosen policy.

By simple process of elimination, the present theory argues that the structure of national security politics renders ineffective all of the sources of information-based interest group influence except propaganda and public relations. Surveillance is handled by the massive intelligence and defense

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4As a baseline, the US public does not reward unprovoked bellicosity. Presidents Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush may be remembered for the wars in which they involved their nation, but they both campaigned on anti-interventionist platforms. One of Wilson’s slogans was “he kept us out of war.” Bush promised to eschew the “nation-building” policies of his predecessor. Still, opportunities for threat inflation abound (Kaufmann, 2004), and even if the public has no innate thirst for war, it can be so moved by motivated policy entrepreneurs.
bureaucracy, which prefers to pull its own fire alarms. Polling and focus group research offers little insight into a public that pays scant attention to foreign affairs. Compliance training and certification do not play a large part in national security policy because missions are carried out by US personnel in the military and diplomatic services, and the targets of security policy are mostly foreign countries and non-state actors abroad. Propaganda and public relations, on the other hand, become more important because these tools work better upon preferences based on weak prior beliefs.

I argue that presidents recruit interest groups to help sell a national security agenda to the public. As a consequence, the groups that collaborate with the White House become powerful actors in national security politics. This collaboration comes about under certain conditions. First, the president’s agenda must be ambitious; it must require special authorization or appropriation by the legislature. Second, it must face public resistance or congressional opposition (or both). J. Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu (2009) call both of these “SUIN” causes, which stands for “a [S]ufficient but [U]nnecessary part of a factor that is [I]nsufficient but [N]ecessary for an outcome.” When these conditions obtain, the executive has incentives to recruit interest groups to provide third-party public relations support. Because the White House has already chosen the agenda, it seeks out groups that agree with its policy choice, and because their challenge involves persuasion, it seeks out groups that have have credibility. In causal terms, these are jointly necessary conditions. Groups that meet these conditions may collaborate with the government as EGOs, producing and disseminating propaganda more effectively than the government could manage within the constraints of law and politics.

The key to interest group influence is information, consisting of four types, defined by two

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5In the nineteenth century, the demands of war were often met by voluntary associations, which provided medical services, personnel, and other logistical assistance to the state militias that comprised the national army — or armies, during the Civil War (Skocpol, Munson, Karch, & Camp, 2002). The establishment of a federal army initiated by the Dick Act in 1903 obviated the need for such material assistance by private sector organizations. There was a great deal of public civic participation in the two World Wars, but these mostly served the needs of morale maintenance. During the Cold War, private citizens and organizations were indeed enlisted to help with foreign assignments, but almost exclusively in the service of public diplomacy — the preferred term at the time to describe foreign propaganda.
Figure 2.1: Argument

EXECUTIVE RECRUITMENT
Ambition ∧ (Resistance ∨ Opposition)

↓

EGO COLLABORATION
Agreement ∧ Credibility

dimensions, content and direction (Truman, 1971; Hansen, 1991). Technical information refers to the substantive details of public policy. Political information relates to the preferences of the constituency. Additionally, the information stream flows both ways — inbound and outbound — in relation to policy-makers. The four resulting types of information appear in Table 2.1. Inbound technical information entails surveillance of the environment to identify problems that require a government remedy and notify officials when the need arises. McCubbins and Schwartz call this the “fire alarm” model of political accountability, in contrast to the “police patrol” model, which requires active monitoring by the government (Matthew D. McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). Inbound political information entails probing the populace to discover their preferences over public policy, conducted through opinion polling and focus group studies. Outbound technical information includes compliance training and certification for stakeholders whose interests are directly impacted by new laws and regulations. Interest groups host seminars, give conference presentations, and publish materials that inform businesses and other interested parties how best to comply with policy changes. Outbound political information entails propaganda and public relations, sometimes called “outside lobbying” — marketing a set of policy decisions in order to persuade the public of their virtues (or vices) and reward (or punish) the responsible parties (Kollman, 1998; C. Mahoney, 2007; Hall & Reynolds, 2012).

Interest groups have influence over members of Congress because legislators represent their constituents over a broad range of issues, but have little time to gain expertise in most of them. Groups provide a “legislative subsidy,” lending valuable information-intensive labor to represen-

6The analytic framework presented here follows upon prior literature, but much of the terminology is original.
Table 2.1: Types of Interest Group Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Inbound</th>
<th>Outbound</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>Compliance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fire Alarms</td>
<td>Certification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Polling</td>
<td>Propaganda</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Focus Groups</td>
<td>Public Relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

tatives with busy schedules, diverse issue portfolios, and meager staff resources, by sharing their expertise on matters of policy and public opinion, going so far as drafting substantial portions of bills under consideration (Hall & Deardorff, 2006). With respect to the inbound direction, this leverage depends on interest groups’ informational advantages over policy-makers. Knowing the techniques of farming, for example, helps determine how to achieve desired crop yields. Understanding public opinion requires a superior polling operation in the policy-maker’s constituency, and its importance depends on the degree to which the public cares about the issue. In the outbound direction, the need for public buy-in shapes interest group influence. For compliance training to matter, the policy must require that the public have a complex and critical role in its implementation. Marketing remains important as long as political power depends on public support. In domestic policy, providing information services in all four of its forms has helped to build powerful lobbies in the domains of agriculture policy, gun ownership rights, reproductive rights, and a host of other areas.

2.2 Mechanism

The need for third-party propaganda arises from the nature of the policy domain, the institutional structure of democracy in the US, and long-standing legislation. Security policy involves foreign populations, complex strategic considerations, and violence. Despite its prominence, the presi-
dency suffers from structurally induced trust deficits. Partisanship causes many to doubt the president’s credibility as a witness. He is not authorized to speak on behalf of foreign populations. The evidence he offers is subject to political constraints from which other actors remain free. The importance of these deficits varies from case to case, but they routinely hamper the executive’s ability to command public support. EGOs help overcome these deficits by providing moral subsidy.

The advantage the president has in foreign policy does not give him absolute procedural autonomy. He must secure congressional consent, and the key to this is public support. Members of Congress may come to Washington as true believers in a cause, but they stay in government only so long as they secure re-election. This “electoral connection” forms the basis of contemporary scholarship on the US Congress (Mayhew, 1974). The White House enlist EGOs when it needs help mobilizing the public as a lever against congressional resistance. There are also legal reasons why the White House cannot undertake a national security propaganda campaign on its own. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 prohibits the targeting of “public diplomacy” information at a homefront audience. The administration has the legal right to take its case to the public directly, but it often runs a deficit in its balance of trust. “Going public” through speeches and press conferences often fails, for reasons stemming from the president’s general popularity and the administration’s standing on a specific issue; no president since Eisenhower has come to power on the basis of national security credentials. More creative methods, namely propaganda, often prove effective, but the law bars the executive from using them in national security politics.

Figure 2.2 stylizes the executive’s decision to recruit EGOs. The White House decides whether to pursue an ambitious or cautious approach to some foreign situation, which may entail the deployment of US combat personnel, the provision of armaments, economic support to influence the alliance choices of foreign nations, or some other action short of full-scale war. If the administration chooses caution, the decision tree terminates with a minor intervention, defined as anything the administration may pursue unilaterally either by virtue of some existing statutory authority or

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8Smith Mundt was amended in 2013 to bring it up to date with modern information technology, many say with the effect of rendering it obsolete.
because it remains within the scope of WPR limitations. Next, the administration assesses the state of public opinion on the intended policy. If the public supports the president’s agenda, then Congress weighs in. Granting consent clears the way to major intervention. If the public resists, or if Congress stands in opposition despite popular support, the president enlists the collaboration of EGOs, which help propagandize the public in order to secure or strengthen their support, which exerts leverage over Congress to deliver its consent.

This sequence of decisions is not the only possibility, but I argue that it is the critical path to influential interest group participation in national security politics for three reasons.\(^9\) First, the public is a necessary step in these, but not all, executive policy decisions. Some policies are the result primarily of bargaining between the executive and Congress, with public input factored in as a secondary concern (Neustadt, 1991). Bargaining does occur in national security politics, but ambitious programs require public input. They are simply too newsworthy, too dramatically accessible, too fit for public consumption for the government to succeed in circumventing the populace. Second, the public comes before Congress because it is generally more persuadable in matters of national security (Kernell, 2006; Canes-Wrone, 2006). Persuasion by “going public” is another possible

\(^9\)The term “critical path” is borrowed from Kuromiya and Fuller (1982), defined as the longest chain of events necessary to achieve an outcome.
means for the administration to achieve its goal, but the legal and political constraints placed upon the executive weaken its effectiveness. Finally, even with public support, congressional consent is not automatic. Public support is a primary motivator of congressional acquiescence, but there are several reasons for congressional opposition even when the public favors a policy. Members of Congress may have individual reasons to oppose a policy, and might not fear electoral punishment in their own districts. They may seek executive office, and flexing their foreign policy muscles is a good way to prove their capabilities (Mayhew, 1974). When such members hold important gatekeeper positions, as chairs of congressional committees in the national security domain, they are especially effective opponents. More generally, congressional opposition to national security proposals varies systematically with the presidential party’s power in the two chambers (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007). This mechanism reveals the most important factors to observe in a policy contest: White House ambition, public resistance, and congressional opposition. When these are present, we should expect to see EGO collaboration on propaganda campaigns aimed at mobilizing public support for the sake of securing congressional consent.

2.3 Presidential Liabilities

“The power of the Presidency is the power to persuade” (Neustadt, 1991). This view represents much of the early presidential scholarship in political science. I join a growing number of presidency scholars who argue that the literature over-states the efficacy of presidential persuasion, who focus on institutional and structural constraints that shape and channel the power of the White House (Skowronek, 2003; Howell, 2003; M. J. Dickinson, 2005; Edwards, 2006; Canes-Wrone, 2006; Lewis, 2008). The chief executive is neither a dictator nor a charismatic cult leader. Especially in the domain of foreign policy, there are several important sources of authority deficit from which the president routinely suffers. These are 1) the ubiquity of partisanship and political competition, 2) uncertainty regarding the anticipated gains from the proposed intervention, 3) questions of presidential character, and 4) the fact that foreign intervention often involves killing and dying.
2.3.1 Partisan Competition

The president is by far the most prominent political figure in the US, but that hardly implies universal support among the population. Many domestic constituencies consist in the majority of people who have voted against the sitting president and against his party in every election of their adult lives. President Obama lost twenty-two states in 2008, and twenty-four in 2012. In 1984, Republican incumbent Ronald Reagan won over ninety-seven percent of the electoral college vote, in one of the most lopsided elections in history. He lost only Washington, D.C. and Minnesota, the home state of his Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale. Even so, Reagan won just fifty-nine percent of the popular vote, leaving at least thirty-seven million voters dissatisfied with his victory. In a majority-rules democracy, there is always a great deal of popular opposition to the president.

In addition to substantial popular opposition, the president faces inter-party competition in the legislature. Eight of the last twelve presidents have faced an opposing-party majority in at least one house of Congress for at least part of their tenure. Compared to parliamentary democratic systems, the separation of powers in the US system provide important opportunities for opposition party obstruction. Though Congress has mostly abdicated its constitutional responsibilities over the management of foreign policy, divided government does tend to slow down presidential pursuit of foreign intervention (T. E. Mann, 1990; Lindsay, 1994; Howell & Pevehouse, 2007). Even though presidents succeed more often than not in passing their foreign policy agenda, they face resistance under divided government.

2.3.2 Uncertain Gains

Senator Arthur Vandenberg famously suggested that “politics stops at the water’s edge,” by which he meant that the country’s political factions share a common set of interests, that the nation presents a united front in times of war, and that foreign policy should be a non-zero-sum game with respect to domestic political constituencies. One party’s gain should not imply an equal measure of loss suffered by another. Unlike domestic policy, wherein the state frequently redistributes resources among various competing actors, where the granting of rights to one group implies deprivation to
another, foreign policy tradeoffs (at least in theory) create divisions not within the US, but between the US and other countries. In an ideal political world, there exists an optimal policy solution that benefits the domestic whole.

Vandenberg’s optimism notwithstanding, finding the optimal policy solution is no trivial endeavor. Scholars (and policy-makers) have identified at least eight plausible grand strategies that the US can pursue, with substantial variation in the associated force structure, goals, threats, and suggested responses (Art, 2004). In the years leading up to World War II, isolationism had strong and vocal proponents, while President Roosevelt preferred and pursued a policy of offshore balancing (Cole, 1983). Throughout the Cold War, proponents of selective engagement competed with containment supporters (Gaddis, 2005). The collapse of the Soviet Union created an opportunity for neo-conservatives to promote a grand strategy of dominion (Krauthammer, 1990), while others saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to pursue something closer to cooperative security or regional collective security. Others still see offshore balancing as the most appropriate orientation toward the international system (Layne, 1997, 2007; Pape & Feldman, 2010). Clearly, no firm consensus exists on how best to secure the interests of the U.S.

Very few cases of proposed involvement since the beginning of the twentieth century have dealt with clear security threats. The US far exceeds any of its American neighbors in terms of power, and sits on the other side of over a thousand miles of ocean from both Europe and Asia. Since the Civil War, the only deaths US civilians have suffered at home due to foreign invasion occurred on December 7, 1941 and September 11, 2001. In neither case was the survival of the state at risk. Admittedly, many millions of citizens felt their lives were in danger after September 11, and the Bush administration capitalized on this fear in their efforts to garner support for the invasion of Iraq (Kaufmann, 2004). The obvious security gains expected from most US military involvement have been minimal. Likewise, contemporary warfare does not yield the same scale of

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11Offshore balancing does not preclude becoming actively involved. It does mean that the state will pass the buck to others that have more at stake, so long as they are able to survive. See Mearsheimer (2001) for a discussion of buck-passing and balancing.
material gains as it did in the past. Gone, for the most part, are the wars of plunder, and the costs of conquest often outweigh the gains. Moreover, negotiation, compromise, and cooperation are far more efficient means of reaping material benefits from the international environment (Fearon, 1995; Ikenberry, 2001). The public has little reason to expect immediate profit from most proposed military involvement, either in the form of material reward or increased security.

The US being a secure state without substantial material incentives to invade other countries, other reasons must obtain if a president wishes to convince the public to support military intervention. Even when victory seems assured, war is risky and costly. Soldiers must leave their families for extended tours of duty. Any mission risks escalation, however limited its original aims (Mearsheimer, 1983; Clausewitz, 1989). The public must be compensated for these costs and risks, and without material or security benefits, some other type of value must stand in as a substitute. Moral reasoning can overcome this particular source of deficit (Stoker, 1992).

### 2.3.3 Presidential Character

Since Watergate, says the conventional wisdom, the US public has lost faith in its public servants. A brief look at public opinion data shows a steady decline in the proportion of respondents who say they trust the federal government, but beginning in 1964, not 1973 (Rosenstone & Hansen, 2002). If the US electorate is polarized, as many argue, the two parties divide the public more over affective attachments to representatives, as opposed to ideology or policy (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Hetherington, Long, & Rudolph, 2015). In fact, the mistrust of elected officials is deeply ingrained in the American civic ethos. As Madison writes in Federalist 51,

> If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary... A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions (A. Hamilton, 2001, Fed. 51).

In both the design of government institutions and the participation of the public in democratic processes, people must guard against the self-interest of office-holders. The president, above all
others, represents the persona of government, whose virtue bears the constant scrutiny of a watchful public.

In particular, the public must guard against the potential for political self-dealing inherent in the marshalling of forces for war. Two items in particular give reason to level a skeptical eye upon the raised banners of armed conflict: the diversionary war thesis and the rally-around-the-flag effect. Although research on these subjects has yielded mixed empirical results, they identify a plausible way for presidents to seek individual political advantage. The diversionary war thesis states that leaders will take their countries to war when domestic political conditions become difficult. Some argue that these wars are deliberate strategies to distract the public attention from personal scandal\(^{12}\) or to take the public mind off of economic recession (Levy, 1989; Richards, Morgan, Wilson, Schwebach, & Young, 1993; Fordham, 2005). Even without political trouble at home, presidents might use foreign policy to boost their approval ratings in advance of an election or an important domestic policy battle, since the benefits to the White House of being at war extend beyond the national security domain (Howell, Jackman, & Rogowski, 2013). They seek the benefits of the rally effect, whereby the country unites in support of their commander in chief after an attack on the US has occurred or troops been deployed (J. Mueller, 1970; Iyengar, 1987; Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Lian & Oneal, 1993). Again, research on these effects has produced mixed results, but the belief in their efficacy is common enough for the public or rival political elites to mistrust the president’s motives for war.

2.3.4 Killing and Dying

Military involvement requires special moral motivation because it involves killing and dying. Both private citizens and elected officials become more sensitive to casualties, and more suspicious of wielding the sword against others, when no clear security threat presents itself. This caution is especially evident among families of service members and veterans (Feaver & Gelpi, 2005). Those

\(^{12}\) Barry Levinson’s 1997 film *Wag the Dog* depicts a team of presidential aides staging a phoney war to draw attention away from a story involving sexual impropriety in the White House, widely seen at the time as a commentary on President Clinton’s personal peccadillos and his interventionist foreign policy.
who face the reality of warfare are most reluctant to support intervention without a clear cause. As with most groups, US citizens probably care more about dying than killing, but the latter causes suffering among soldiers as well. Even drone operators, safely located thousands of miles from the war zone, have reported high levels of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (R. Martin, 2011). This problem may seem obvious, but it bears repeating, especially to distinguish security issues from most other politics. It is hard to imagine a protest of “not in our name” over trade protectionism.

2.4 Forms of Moral Subsidy

There are four important tactical variants of moral subsidy, which yield distinct expectations about which groups have the opportunity to participate, their motives for becoming involved, and their effectiveness. These four variants are: 1) endorsement from people connected by common cultural identity with a victim population on whose behalf the president proposes to intervene, 2) instrumental anthropological and cultural intelligence that assists in strategic planning, to mitigate harm to populations in the target territory and improve the efficiency of military operations, 3) rhetorical translation by policy experts into a language that reflects the normative beliefs of the community, and 4) the laundering of sensitive information, enabling public discussion of intelligence the origins of which must be kept confidential or at least unofficial.

2.4.1 Expert Translation

In the debate over whether the US should use military force to topple Saddam Hussein, the administration’s argument foundered temporarily on the anticipated costs and benefits of full invasion. Military leaders gave wildly different estimates of how many troops the mission would require, leading to some public embarrassment for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the allegedly premature retirement of Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki when the four-star general stated that the invasion would require roughly triple the invasion force that the secretary wanted. In addition, the public had few means of assessing the prospects for stability and prosperity in a post-Hussein
Middle East. In clarifying the strategic imperatives of intervention, the administration’s argument relied in large part on the public testimony of experts from various Washington think-tanks, including the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and the Brookings Institution. Among the most prominent was Kenneth Pollack, who held top positions at CFR and Brookings. A little over a month before the invasion, New York Times columnist Bill Keller wrote, “Pollack, the Clinton National Security Council expert whose argument for invading Iraq is surely the most influential book of this season, has provided intellectual cover for every liberal who finds himself inclining toward war but uneasy about Mr. Bush” (Keller, 2003), referring to Pollack (2002). There are many other examples of persuasive assistance by think-tank analysts during this period, but Pollack’s is among the clearest.

The public and its elected representatives often need cognitive shortcuts to keep complex issues straight and simple (Downs, 1957; Mayhew, 1974). The public’s relative inattention to world politics creates a significant gap between its initial understanding of an international crisis and the information necessary to settle on a policy choice. At the same time, both elected officials and private citizens generally remain unaware of the often idiosyncratic language and logic of security analysis, a lexicon that on its own often fails to clarify the underlying issues. The analysis of war, like most intellectual pursuits, is brimming with terms of art — simple labels for complex ideas and phenomenon. These terms and phrases represent heuristics that facilitate communication and debate among scholars, analysts, and policy-makers. Moreover, the discipline’s theories about the origins of war typically do not rate very highly in the public debate. We do not, according to the official story, engage in “balancing” against a “peer competitor,” as in Mearsheimer (2001). Nor do we act to prevent the rise of a “status-revising power,” as in Gilpin (1983). Instead, we do battle against the “evil empire,” as in Reagan (1983), and the “axis of evil,” as in Bush (2002). This all implies that substantial latitude exists for framing the terms of public debate over foreign policy.

13 For example, take the grand strategies of “collective security” and “cooperative security” described in Art (2004). While they seem nearly synonymous, they imply very different goals with respect to optimal military capacity. Collective Security keeps the peace by building up military capacity as a deterrence against aggression, or to guarantee the ability to deny any attack. Cooperative Security keeps the peace through coordinated, simultaneous, multi-lateral reduction of arms, with the purpose of avoiding escalatory spirals into full-scale war.
Interest groups, especially issue-advocacy organizations and think-tanks, use this opportunity, their rhetorical skills, and their status as issue experts to translate the terms of a foreign policy issue into a language that is both approachable and persuasive — and typically moralistic in tone.  

Expert translation is best rendered by those with appropriate credentials, rhetorical skills, and robust institutional support. This includes think-tanks, pressure groups, and research institutes. The possession of formal credentials lends credibility to the expert spokesman. Rhetorical skills help turn complex and obscure analytic models into memorable and easily digestible terms, not necessarily as superficial as “sound bites,” but often close to it. Institutional support enables the speaker to reach a broad audience, and if necessary to coordinate with government officials. Members of these organizations might just as easily work in government, and often do when their favored political party holds the White House. However, their value in providing moral subsidy derives from the credibility that comes from maintaining a plausible independence from the current administration.

Expert translation helps solve the problems of uncertain gains and partisan competition. First, it provides an easily understood value calculation. It goes beyond material utility, laying out the costs and benefits in moral and symbolic terms that render the costs as necessary sacrifices in the pursuit of clear benefits to the nation’s security and virtue. The act of translation re-writes the logic in a language the public understands. Second, it elevates the debate above typical partisan politics. This does not mean that the debate resembles the so-called “marketplace of ideas” by improving the quality of analysis and increasing the chances of reaching the optimal decision as argued by Reiter (2012). Rather, it simply improves the rhetorical tone and inhibits the use of ad hominem attack. The testimony of these witnesses carries weight equivalent to their status achievements, rendering ineffective attempts by partisan opponents to silence the message by tarnishing the reputation of the messenger.

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14 Many of the terms discussed here were created and used by government officials and their aides, not interest groups. The state can, of course, be skilled in propaganda. Including these examples demonstrates that the government values such terms, and any party that can assist them in this regard will be valued accordingly.

15 Academic institutions and the military industrial complex may provide this type of information as well, but are scoped out of the present study.
2.4.2 Cultural Intelligence

Since the advent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), US military involvement has been directed toward areas in the so-called “third world.” During the Cold War, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) deterred open hostility between the two superpowers. Instead, proxy conflicts characterized bipolar security competition, mostly in areas of the world where the US had less experience than it did with the major powers of Europe and northeast Asia. In 1950, the National Security Council (NSC) drafted NSC-68, a document outlining the strategic imperatives for the US in its efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Rather than choose a few “selected strongpoints,” the authors argued that “the emphasis rather would have to be on perimeter defense, with all points along the perimeter considered of equal importance” (Gaddis, 2005, pg. 89). This meant that the US would commit to deploying security resources to areas of the world with which it had little experience. This is not meant to imply that the US was a stranger to imperialism in these areas, only that its understanding of these nations was under-developed. When the European powers rapidly de-colonized, the weight of perimeter containment grew heavier still. This created demand for location-specific expertise to help navigate unfamiliar social terrain, and interest groups stepped in to meet the need. Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), Citizens for America (CFA), and Iraqi National Congress (INC) are a few prime examples of organizations that stepped forward to assure the public that US interventions in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Iraq would succeed. Clearly, these assurances did not always anticipate the outcome.

“Conducting military operations in a low-intensity conflict without ethnographic and cultural intelligence is like building a house without using your thumbs,” begins a 2006 report published by the US Army.16 “[I]t is a wasteful, clumsy, and unnecessarily slow process at best, with a high probability for frustration and failure” (Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, & Smith, 2006). Going to war without sufficient knowledge of local culture creates troubling inefficiencies of a very different

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16 The report itself describes the Human Terrain System, which the Army was assembling with the intention of embedding teams within forward-deployed units in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their explicit purpose was to foster an understanding of the local culture in order to supplement the military’s combat-related expertise and enable a more productive relationship between the occupation forces and local populations.
sort than those that might have bothered Robert McNamara’s bean counters during the Vietnam War. Whereas “body count” was the primary metric of efficiency under McNamara and General Westmoreland’s “search and destroy” strategy, under a “hearts and minds” campaign, the proximate goal is to avoid unnecessary loss of life. The ultimate goal is to convince the local population that US forces are the party best able to provide for the community’s security. Anticipating this, interest groups offer strategically valuable cultural guidance intended to minimize loss of innocent life and property.

Cultural intelligence affects the execution of military operations in a variety of ways. Knowledge of local practice helps determine when, where, and with what personnel a mission should work best (or worst). Recognizing that a crowd gathered in a public square firing rifles into the air is a wedding party and not a hostile militia force helps avert tragedy. Mistakes in this regard inspire moral outrage among most witnesses to war and sour relationships between a foreign military and local allies, making political momentum impossible to sustain (Huggler, 2004; Engelhardt, 2008). Religious scripture frequently proscribes warfare during certain holidays, but often identifies certain dates as especially conducive to honor and victory in combat. Complicating matters further, strategic actors manipulate the expectations of their enemies by playing on naive understandings of local cultural practices. With the Tet Offensive, North Vietnamese forces broke a cease-fire agreed upon for the lunar new-year, exploiting their enemy’s belief that they would treat the day as sacred and refrain from fighting. Egypt and Syria took advantage of a similar misapprehension when they embarked upon the Ramadan / Yom Kippur War (Hassner, 2010). Lest anyone be under the impression that this violates core western values, recall that George Washington used the cover of Christmas to cross the Delaware River and catch the Hessians by surprise. Both sacred and secular social practice can mean any number of things when it comes to military planning. A deep and subtle understanding of the target state’s culture is a boon to any successful campaign.

Two types of people possess the kind of background necessary to provide moral subsidy in the form of cultural intelligence: ethnic groups and scholars of the region in question. Academic anthropologists have much of the information necessary to provide the subtle understanding of
culture required for operational planning. Furthermore, then often have professional connections to populations in the target country. However, they prove less effective at delivering this kind of moral subsidy, for several reasons. First, compared to relevant ethnic groups, they have a less developed personal connection with the territory and its people. Second, academic anthropologists are seldom organized for political action. Finally, insofar as they are organized, they mostly object to participating in military missions. The American Anthropological Association was reluctant to sanction participation in the Human Terrain System project known as “Minerva” because of possible conflicts with the association’s code of ethics (Peacock et al., 2007).

Ethnic group members tend to have the personal and professional connections, the cultural knowledge, and the motivation to provide such information. First generation US citizens often have family in their parents’ home country, and if the particular state of international affairs has allowed it, they also may have traveled within the land of their ancestry. Immigrants, of course, have formative experience in the territory. With some variation among groups, and with some loss among the first and second generation, ethnic community members retain the linguistic, religious, and cultural identities of their family. Even without personal connections with local inhabitants, they have the skills to interpret cultural behavior and communicate in the native language with neutral locals, defectors, and collaborators. Finally, they share many of the motivations that groups have for providing moral subsidy in the form of victim endorsement discussed above. They might well want the intervention to succeed, and certainly hope to mitigate harm to their brethren in the homeland.

Cultural intelligence is useful to presidents burdened with the killing and dying and the uncertain gains liabilities. It promises to lower the casualty count among a target country’s population by collateral damage, mis-targeting, and poor tactical planning; I make no argument that this promise is reliably fulfilled. It also purports to reduce casualties among US forces by maximizing strategic efficiency. It allows the president to claim that the proposed mission will result in fewer “friendly” deaths. In addition to strategic and tactical efficiency, ethnographic information can support an argument over the political outcomes of a military struggle. It can explain the president’s vision
of the post-conflict situation, both within the target territory and between the target country and the US in the future. It can persuade the public that economic or security benefits will result from promoting the ascendence of a particular indigenous sub-group, without giving the impression of self-interest on the part of affiliates of that faction.

2.4.3 Victim Authorization

Perhaps the most straightforward form of moral subsidy involves the authorization of a military action by a party that shares a cultural identity with an oppressed or vulnerable population abroad. This common identity allows the domestic third party to claim moral standing to speak on behalf of a victim population. The message conveyed in this arrangement is that the decision to intervene is taken not only on their behalf, but also at the request of a party whose heritage, kin, and culture face degradation or eradication at the hands of an enemy. One of the two founders of the INC was Kanan Makiya, an Iraq-born academic whose two books on Hussein’s regime made the moral case for his overthrow, pleading for his co-nationals’ liberation from tyranny (Makiya, 1989, 1993). He became a prominent proponent of both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and advocated for Hussein’s forcible removal throughout President Clinton’s tenure.

Victim authorization entails a reversal of the common perception of appeals by interest groups in domestic policy. When unions work to block passage of a trade agreement that threatens to reduce demand for domestic labor, their motive is viewed as one of narrow self-interest. Their request for consideration elicits accusations of foul play and unwarranted special pleading. Unless they can claim to have earned a special right to public resources through national service, domestic-policy oriented constituencies have a difficult time securing preferential policy treatment (Skocpol, 1995). When the policy in question entails humanitarian intervention, however, accusations of self-interest are blunted by the fact that a community’s survival may be at stake. At the very least, few people begrudge the right to plead for one’s life or the lives of one’s family.

The political value of victim authorization arises from these two notions: that the group has standing to speak on behalf of an intervention’s ostensible beneficiaries, and that the public accepts
the group’s motive for making the plea. There are three specific types of persuasive assistance victim endorsement provides: 1) putting a familiar face on the victims, 2) granting permission to expose victims to increased risk, and 3) providing moral cover for strategic motivations. Each of these helps solve a particular problem relating to the public’s substantive opposition.

First, humanitarian interventions enjoy less support among the US public than military engagements aimed at promoting national security. Casualty sensitivity is higher, and the willingness to dedicate unlimited resources is lower, when the country’s survival remains assured (Feaver & Gelpi, 2005). Victim authorization helps to put a human face on the victims, particularly one which, by virtue of its current residence in the US, looks strikingly more familiar than more distant peoples. It closes the gap between the distant “other” and the public by demonstrating that the victims are represented by US persons. It generates empathy, and implies a tradeoff between risking the lives of soldiers and allowing innocent civilians to suffer.

Second, interventions risk placing the victim population in even greater peril than the status quo. Whether as a direct result of US military strikes, or by virtue of the enemy escalating his oppression in response to US involvement, humanitarian intervention can backfire. Although explicitly banned by international law, rulers often hide behind human shields, whether by relocating civilians to military targets or emplacing weapons in civilian locations. Despite technological advancements in targeting and ordnance to avoid civilian casualties, “collateral damage” occurs with substantial frequency. US military involvement introduces new sources of danger for the beneficiary population. Victim endorsement gives the president permission to take this risk.

Third, the public might not believe that an intervention has legitimate humanitarian aims. Serving neither national security nor altruism, an intervention may instead benefit a narrow material interest. “No war for oil” was a common refrain among the opposition to the Iraq War. Interest groups can provide a moral cover story. Victim endorsement changes the subject to one that reflects the public’s belief in its national virtue. It casts the US as the hero in a noble cause, instead of the bestower of narrow parochial profit. Many among the public may yet remain cynical about the victim-endorser’s motives, as certain isolationists did in the 1930s, accusing British and Jewish
interests of trying to push the US into World War II. Still, survival beats material gain as a motive for influencing national security policy.

Primarily, ethnic communities take on the role of victim authorizer. More broadly, the relevant ethnic groups include immigrant communities comprised of individuals who have left their country for a variety of reasons. There are various legal definitions of refugee and exile that this project does not necessarily follow, but these groups are included. Exile populations have a vested interest in the politics of their home country, namely the goal of overturning the ruling regime. Immigrants who have sought economic opportunities in the US sometimes develop similar interests over time. Whether resulting from a change in their own fortunes, or by virtue of events such as revolution or foreign occupation, history sometimes alters the relationship between diaspora communities and the home country. In any case, if the US is set to embark upon an intervention, those who claim the target territory as their place of origin will seek to influence the debate.

Several other types of interest group might serve as victim endorser. Faith-based organizations see co-religionists in other parts of the world as members of the same spiritual family. Broader ethnic groups often see national distinctions as less important than shared linguistic or historical experience more broadly conceived. Both pan-Arab and pan-Latino groups have managed to organize and form political action committees, for example. Gender and transgender advocacy organizations frequently lobby on behalf of those who face oppression under illiberal cultural regimes. However, many of these groups are mobilized around a human security discourse, which renders them reluctant partners at best in most military endeavors. The US polity contains a variety of moral action oriented organizations that offer to speak on behalf of vulnerable populations abroad.

Determining the effectiveness of these organizations at providing this type of moral subsidy requires a bit of balancing. On the one hand, ethno-nationalist organizations have a stronger claim on the right to speak for a foreign population. They often have direct individual connections, through family or personal history, whereas ethno-linguistic or religious groups share a more abstract common identity. On the other hand, many religious or gender organizations have a greater degree of cultural similarity with the domestic audience, making them seem more credible sources of infor-
mation. In all, these other organizations might be persuasive, but the further removed they are from the proposed beneficiaries of intervention, the less their efforts qualify as victim endorsement.

Victim endorsement compensates for the killing and dying problem and the presidential character question. When the proposed mission is supposed to aid a foreign population, it helps to have a representative of that community attest to the necessity of the intervention — since any use of force entails killing people living in the target territory. These prospective dead are either innocent victims, their oppressors, or overmatched defenders of a just resistance. A victim endorser can confirm the suffering of an oppressed population and provide the president an authorized invitation to intervene even if it means killing in order to achieve the stated goal. It can also appeal to the soldier’s commitment to self-sacrifice on behalf of the downtrodden. When the public suspects the president of having selfish motivations for engaging in a foreign intervention, the victim endorser serves as an applicant for protection by the US military. It puts a face other than the president’s behind the plea to deploy force. Especially when the president’s suspected personal motivation is to avoid scandal, it replaces one form of public drama with another, and satisfies a public desire for comprehensible human narrative.

2.4.4 Information Laundering

The US government possesses vast stores of information regarding foreign states, non-state groups, international non-governmental organizations, corporations, and other actors relevant to international affairs. Much of this information is obtained through confidential sources and methods, the disclosure of which might prove politically inconvenient. Various statutes have restricted the ability of the executive to engage in domestically targeted information campaigns. In some instances, information is simply fabricated. Much like a criminal organization looking to mask the origin of its money by moving it through legitimate front companies, the government sometimes launders information through third parties, releasing it to domestic non-governmental actors with the understanding that they will in turn make it public. Doing so allows the government to make its case without burning its assets or undermining its legal authority.
There are three reasons to launder intelligence. First, a great deal of it remains legally classified. US intelligence agents operate under various degrees of official and non-official cover. The Directorate of Operations is the branch of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responsible for running actual missions, infiltrating foreign governments and criminal organizations, sabotaging weapons production, conducting espionage and interrogation, and conducting “wet-work” operations — a euphemism for operations involving the use of deadly force. These agents’ officially acknowledged positions, if they have any, are often with the Department of Commerce, Energy, State, and even ostensibly private companies. The methods they use for gathering information, from basic tradecraft to signals intelligence technology, are closely guarded secrets. They recruit foreign citizens to assist with human intelligence and turn foreign spies into double-agents working for the US. The state must guarantee the secrecy of agents and collaborators. If the government wants to use information gathered from these sources to promote the case for a coercive foreign policy, it must claim an alternative origin that is both credible and independent of classified intelligence operations.

Second, the methods for gathering intelligence are sometimes illegal, or at least politically scandalous. The last decade saw an unusually open (if not always frank) discussion of the use of what Bush administration officials and supporters preferred to call “enhanced interrogation techniques.” Although debate continues to this day on the legality, ethics, and effectiveness of such techniques, agents within the CIA behaved with what lawyers might call “consciousness of guilt” when they destroyed videos made during interrogations. In addition to direct involvement by US personnel and hired contractors, the US has engaged in “extraordinary rendition,” the official term for transporting prisoners to foreign countries where they are more vulnerable to torture under alternative legal regimes. While the revelations of these practices did not bring down a government or stop a war, it was something any administration would have preferred to avoid.

Third, the intelligence itself might be inaccurate. In promoting or protecting their foreign policies, most governments have shown themselves willing to engage in deception, and even outright lying, with its own public as the most credulous audience (Mearsheimer, 2011). In promoting the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration offered several lines of argument that inflated the
threat to the US posed by Hussein’s regime (Kaufmann, 2004). By the time the inaccuracy of these claims was proven, the mission was well underway. Getting caught in a lie, while far from fatal, is worse than getting away with it. As a hedging tactic, an administration can cite a third party as the source of invented information, and that party’s credibility will suffer the damage if the inaccuracy is discovered.\(^\text{17}\) Leaders can try to deflect responsibility for bad information by laundering it through other actors.

Three types of organization are effective at laundering information for an administration: foreign governments, technology experts, and ethnic groups. Other governments have their own intelligence services and share information with the US. If they feel secure enough to reveal information without compromising their own classified intelligence assets, they can serve as credible sources. Technology experts from think-tanks and military contractors ostensibly possess the knowledge and expertise necessary to evaluate obscure and ambiguous data, rendering them credible authorities. Finally, ethnic organizations can use their social contacts in the target territory to provide plausible witnesses to weapons programs, military planning, and other valuable intelligence.

Intelligence laundering is played as a kind of trump card, and helps overcome the deficits created by questions of presidential character and the challenge of political competition. First, using the power of the office to advance selfish goals betrays the solemn oath taken by the president. It is a form of official corruption. By facilitating the public revelation of hard intelligence, the administration can show that it has not conjured a phantom enemy to distract the public from official wrong-doing or mismanagement. Second, partisanship hinges on the notion that one group of politicians cannot be trusted with the operation of government. Strong national security stewardship demands the protection of classified sources and methods, and any violation of this obligation raises a storm of partisan controversy. Few actions taken by members of the second Bush administration caused as much polarization during his two terms as the revelation of the Valerie Plame’s position at the Central Intelligence Agency. When the information kept secret under these conditions was finally revealed by the administration, it was a powerful example of how information can be laundered through other channels.

\(^{17}\)In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush credited the British government with the discovery of Hussein’s alleged attempts to acquire uranium from Niger, and several commentators subsequently defended Bush’s claim by noting this.
2.5 Propositions

When a president wants to pursue an ambitious program of national security but faces opposition in Congress and the public at large, he has the option to enlist the assistance of third parties who produce and distribute propaganda when his own powers of persuasion falter. When he chooses this political strategy and succeeds, the selected interest groups thrive, while others do not. When groups have preferences in agreement with the president’s and credibility endowments that help overcome the administration’s persuasion deficits, they can provide a moral subsidy that helps secure public support and congressional consent. Those EGOs that the president enlists for this purpose gain access to the national security apparatus and develop constituencies in support of their position.

The empirical strategy pursued in the remainder of the dissertation breaks the theory down into five testable propositions. First, administrations turn to extra-governmental organization for the purpose of solving a political problem, as opposed to making a policy choice. This implies a specific condition under which administrations will more likely seek the assistance of interest groups, namely when they face greater opposition from political rivals. I test this proposition using a large-n analysis of Federal Advisory Committee appointments, showing that the probability of a committee seat going to an interest group representative increases as the power of the president’s party in Congress decreases.

Second, in order to gain access to scarce and valuable political resources, interest groups must provide the administration with some value. The theory of moral subsidy proposes that extra-governmental collaborators principally serve their administration benefactors by persuading the public where the president or presidential aides cannot. I test this claim using a controlled survey experiment designed to detect source effects — differential responses to the otherwise similar policy endorsements varying only with respect to identity of the endorser. Results show that Republican
self-identifiers respond significantly more favorably to interest group representatives than they do to President Obama when assessing a proposal to intervene in a foreign conflict.

Three further propositions follow from the theoretical exposition above, that ambitious projects require more extra-governmental support than cautious ones, and that administrations will collaborate with groups they agree with and that have enjoy a substantial degree of perceived credibility on matters relevant to the issues at stake. The remainder of the empirical section of this dissertation presents an analytic history of the national security politics in the US from the inter-war years to the end of the Cold War, confirming these three claims and lending further support for the first two. Using within-case variation among organizations and across phases of major national security initiatives, I validate the proposed mechanism, that ambitious presidents facing public resistance and congressional opposition exploit the persuasive benefits of extra-governmental propaganda, recruiting like-minded organizations with established credibility. Together, these empirical chapters provide strong support for the theory presented here. Moral subsidy provided by extra-governmental organizations, themselves recruited by various presidential administrations, has helped create a credibility cartel in US national security politics.
CHAPTER 3

APPOINTMENTS TO FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

The theory of this dissertation describes a mechanism by which interest groups gain influence in national security politics in the US. This mechanism has two purposes, 1) to describe the conditions under which opportunities arise for interest groups to become influential, and 2) which groups best compete for these opportunities. The current chapter contributes to the first purpose of the episodic mechanism. It offers the generalizable proposition that opportunities for interest group access increase as the president’s party power in Congress decreases. As presidents face a larger and more unified opposition, they turn to extra-governmental organizations (EGOs) for political assistance. I demonstrate this through a statistical analysis of appointments to Federal Advisory Committees (FACs), venues established within the executive branch to facilitate the communication of ideas between private citizens and government officials. These committees purport to aid in the formulation of policy, but the implications of this chapter reveal a political purpose to their operation in the domain of national security.

FACs have a number of distinct roles in governance. They are a means by which the legislature exercises control over the bureaucracy by shaping the “flow and content of information” to executive branch agencies, specifically by granting access to interest groups (Balla & Wright, 2001). Legislators create them in order to maintain political control without specific legislation to determine a definite policy outcome (Matthew D. McCubbins et al., 1987). FACs also provide an opportunity for the executive to reward loyal members of Congress with administrative roles after their resignation or electoral defeat (Palmer & Vogel, 1995). They bolster the reputation of executive branch agencies and help secure passage of new regulatory proposals (Moffitt, 2010; Lavertu & Weimer, 2011). In contrast to the more contingent access granted to lobbyists, or the episodic influence gained through public commentary, “federal advisory committees facilitate the permanent institutionalization of linkages between interests and the national executive” (Petracca, 1986). This linkage may grant durable influence to outside groups, or it may provide an opportunity for policymakers to coopt potential rivals and fend off political threats to executive autonomy (Derthick,
In the domain of national security, Amy Zegart argues that administration-convened *ad hoc* committees work as promised, collecting information necessary to make important policy decisions (Zegart, 2004). The current paper proposes a very different role for interest groups and national security FACs. It shows that interest groups enjoy greater access when the president is politically weak — namely when the opposition party is ascendent in Congress. This speaks to a distinct mechanism of interest group influence. Their role is not so much to provide the government with policy-relevant information about the international environment, but rather to solve a domestic political problem and help the administration overcome legislative resistance to its national security agenda.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds in four sections. It first situates the theoretical and historical context of the puzzle, and establishes core definitions and the scope of analysis. Next, it deduces a theory of interest group influence based on the literature on interest groups and executive-legislative contestation over foreign policy in the US. Then, it tests the core proposition of the theory using data on appointments to Federal Advisory Committees from 1997 to 2012. These data are particularly useful because they identify the extra-governmental affiliations of committee members, their connections to different types of private organizations. They support the claims that the president’s political strength significantly affects the executive’s decision to seek moral subsidy from extra-governmental actors. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the broader context in which the study is situated.

### 3.1 Gilt by Associations

The US executive has legal and political reasons to enlist outside help for public relations in national security politics. Any state facing the need to mobilize its public for war (or policies that risk war) might naturally turn to propaganda, but Congress has tied the executive’s hands in this regard ever since the perceived excesses of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) during World War I. It took the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor to allow President Roosevelt an official propaganda unit, the Office of War Information (OWI), and even then the agency’s budget and
autonomy were limited. When the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 authorized the State Department to pursue a robust public diplomacy program, it also prohibited distributing the materials within the homeland. Similar restrictions have been attached to various pieces of legislation such as the Dworshak Amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1952, the Boland Amendment that forbade the Reagan administration to conduct public relations efforts regarding the Contras in Nicaragua, and in 1967 when the Johnson administration wanted to use government-produced propaganda films to counter the burgeoning public opposition to the Vietnam war. Outside organizations provide a conduit through which the administration may launder public relations information to the public without running afoul of these legal restrictions.

Extra-governmental organizations provide more than legal cover for intervention-minded administrations, they provide political cover as well. Their ostensible independence allows them to escape the partisan suspicion that any identifiably political actor would face. Research has shown that the partisan divide among the American public has less to do with policy disagreement than it does a personal mistrust of those who identify with the opposing party (Hetherington & Husser, 2012; Iyengar et al., 2012; Hetherington et al., 2015). Third party testimony improves the prospect of garnering support from the president’s partisan opponents among the public by circumventing this animosity.

Outside groups have other credibility advantages. The can also legitimize administration policy. Organizations representing ethnic affiliates of populations in the intervention’s target territory can purport to authorize the use of military force in a humanitarian context. Expert national security analysts can lend credence to a moral argument for a decision that both risks the lives of American

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1The OWI’s freedom of action was so limited that the government organized an external consortium of advertising professionals in the formation of the War Advertising Council, which handled much of the creative work as well as production and distribution of materials. It survives today as the AdCouncil, and continues to produce public service announcements for government priorities, though rarely connected to national security.

2In 2013, legislation relaxed these prohibitions in recognition of their obsolescence in the age of the internet.


4Although in the case of the Contras, administration officials faced legal action for their role in funneling information through various extra-governmental organizations.
soldiers and makes them responsible for killing others. Area specialists offer the promise of a more effective intervention based on expert knowledge of the social and cultural terrain. All of these advantages provide a credibility boost to an administration working with outside organizations to make the case for intervening abroad.

The conceptualization of interest groups employed in this study both conforms to a commonly-used definition in the US politics and political sociology literatures and captures the centrality of credibility discussed above. It takes a legal approach: interest groups are formally-constituted legal entities, incorporated as not-for-profit organizations, pursuing public policy goals. In this sense, “labor” as a general class does not qualify as the subject of analysis, but particular labor unions do. Similarly, for-profit firms are not interest groups, but the associations they form in order to influence public policy certainly are. They need not engage in lobbying in order to qualify; indeed, many associations reject lobbying as a tactic in order to avoid the transparency requirements such activities entail. The exclusion of for-profit firms restricts the scope of analysis to organizations that enjoy credibility advantages without the taint of obvious profit motive, but also scopes out most of the so-called “military-industrial complex,” which operates on its own logic. Many not-for-profit organizations have a core mission unrelated to politics, such as universities and medical institutions. These also are not interest groups, although many organizations that might otherwise qualify (think-tanks, research institutes, etc.) represent themselves in this manner. These borderline cases prove instructive when individually scrutinized, but for the purposes of this study they are primarily considered as separate from interest groups proper.

I argue that the executive enlists the aid of extra-governmental organizations less to gather policy-relevant information or analysis than to improve its public relations standing on national security and overcoming congressional opposition to its agenda. This implies that access is granted to outsiders when they can help the administration achieve its national security objectives, and that interest groups wield power over the public and Congress, but not the executive. These propositions

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5Such promises often go unfulfilled.

6The empirical analysis that follows makes direct comparisons between associations and institutions (and firms), so that the distinctions among them are given the appropriate attention.
are deduced from the literature on information in interest group influence, the dominance of the executive branch in national security affairs, and the relative inattention paid by the US public to international politics.

Contrary to much of the conventional wisdom, the political science literature suggests that the principal tool of interest group influence is neither money, nor blocs of voters, but information (Truman, 1971; Hansen, 1991; Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, & Snyder, 2003). Outside groups use their informational advantages over legislators within a given policy domain to gain access to the decision-making process. They trade in two types of information. First, by focusing on a narrow range of issues, they develop a level of technical policy-relevant expertise that remains out of reach of the typical member of Congress, who has limited staff resources and a broad portfolio of issues to which she must attend. Second, groups dedicated to the furtherance of a policy agenda become savvy to matters of political strategy, understanding both the landscape of Washington, DC, and the public beyond the Beltway. Their advantages allow them even to provide a “legislative subsidy,” the information-intensive labor involved in drafting bills and amendments to achieve desired policy outcomes and political advantage for cooperative legislators (Hall & Deardorff, 2006).

Two assumptions provide a basis for deducing how interest groups operate in US national security politics. First, the executive branch, in particular the president, has the initiative in matters of national security (Wildavsky, 1966, 1989; Moe & Howell, 1999; Schlesinger, 2004; Canes-Wrone et al., 2008). If interest groups are to maintain their influence in national security politics, they must prove themselves valuable sources of information to policy-makers in the executive. Second, the national security apparatus has at its disposal means of gathering technical, policy-relevant information beyond anything outside organizations could reasonably muster. In contrast with congressional offices, with their limited personnel and diverse responsibilities, the president is served by thousands of agents dedicated to the analysis of foreign conflicts and potential threats to national security and an advisory staff within the Executive Office of the President. Together, these

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7See Krehbiel (1992) for another solution to the information overload problem in the US Congress, the committee system.
two assumptions reveal the loss of interest groups’ informational advantages, rendering one facet of their influence, the exchange of technical information, ineffective.

The ultimate goal being legislative approval and appropriation of funds, the importance of interest groups depends on the strength of congressional opposition. Howell and Pevehouse (2007) show that opposition party power in Congress reliably predicts how much legislative constraint the president faces in matters of national security. By this logic, the theory proposes that interest group access negatively correlates to presidential party power in the legislature. The remainder of this paper provides systematic evidence that this relationship is a significant factor in explaining the degree of influence obtained by extra-governmental organizations in US national security politics.

### 3.2 Federal Advisory Committee Database, 1997–2012

According to the General Services Administration (GSA), the first FAC aided President Washington during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. Recognizing the prospect, real or merely perceived, of undue special interest influence, President Obama first discouraged in 2009 the appointment or re-appointment of federally registered lobbyists to FACs, then formally banned them a year later. Still, representatives of major corporations, trade associations, labor organizations, and various other interest groups continue to populate FACs on a regular basis. In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Advisory Committee Act, so that “the Congress and the public should be kept informed with respect to the number, purpose, membership, activities, and cost of advisory committees” (Federal Advisory Committee Act, 1972). The act requires that the executive regularly report a range of data on FACs to the GSA. Beginning with the year 1997, these data are available for public download. I conduct the empirical analysis of the present paper using a dataset of my own construction based on these data.8

The FAC database has two important virtues that distinguish it from other sources. First, it identifies the extra-governmental affiliation of committee members on a systematic basis. Other

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8Data are available in Microsoft Access format at http://facadatabase.gov/downloadcenter.aspx. Data are available through 2014, but the current analysis only covers the period ending with 2012.
data typically identify either the external affiliation or a person’s issue area within government, but not both. Lobbying disclosure data tell us the clients on whose behalf government contact is made, but offer little or nothing about the substance of the contact or the contact target’s position within government. Employment data tell us the governmental role an agent occupies, but privacy law censors most information about the prior external affiliations of bureaucratic employees. Second, even if one were able to discover past affiliations of government personnel, FAC data tell us the contemporaneous external affiliations. One need not assume that employees remain faithful to the goals entailed in past affiliations.

These features permit testing the core proposition of the theory, that interest groups enjoy greater opportunities for influence when they are in a position to help the administration overcome political opposition. The data are not precise enough to identify specific policy initiatives, such as a planned military intervention, and determine which one motivate the enlistment of extra-governmental organizations. However, they do allow us to observe general conditions that increase the demand for political assistance. While the presidency enjoys substantial autonomy in national security politics, Congress asserts itself more actively when the party in opposition to the president holds greater unified power in the legislative branch. The following analysis demonstrates that interest group access to national security FACs increases as the president’s party loses power in Congress.

The data include every Federal Advisory Committee outside of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Reserve for each year in which they were convened, listing the name, parent agency, and each appointed member for each year in which they served. This allows analysis at the committee and member level. At both of these levels, the database includes attributes that facilitate testing the theory of moral subsidy. The results support the proposition that the executive enlists affiliates of credibility-enhancing groups to counteract the president’s political weakness.

### 3.2.1 Dependent Variable

**Organization Types.** This analysis seeks to explain the determinants of interest group appointments to FACs. To measure this outcome, I determine the type of organization with which each
appointee is affiliated outside of his or her role on the committee. These data were derived from
the member-level Occupation or Affiliation variable discussed below. They reflect the corporate
form the organization takes. In this categorization, associations are generally membership groups
that provide a service to their members or by their members to a target population. Relief organi-
zations, trade associations, labor unions, professional associations, and associations of government
employees are all in this category. Second are profit seeking firms that manufacture goods or
provide professional services, from manufacturing and engineering to staffing and management
consulting. Third, government officials at the federal, state and local, tribal and territorial, and
international levels are in the same organization type. Military, active duty, education and training,
and retired or family-relations are a separate category from civilian government. Finally, I include
a category, separate from associations, for institutions. Some, such as academic institutions are
easy to tell apart. Policy research institutions, on the other hand, are often difficult to distinguish
from issue advocacy associations. I have made a judgement call based on a review of the corpo-
rate materials available online, classifying as policy research institutions any group with exclusive
recruitment that produces quasi-scholarly literature on a broad range of topics, and as issue advoc-
cacy associations any group with a narrow policy agenda and an open membership policy. Interest
groups are most closely related to associations in this framework, with institutions capturing some
of the concept as well. Attention is also paid to firms, which many associate with special interests,
but I do not. They also employ the vast majority of private citizens.

3.2.2 Independent Variables of Interest

Presidential Party Power. To provide a measure of presidential weakness, I calculate the power
of the president’s party in Congress, tracking how much effective legislative resistance the ex-
ecutive faces in the implementation of policy. The measure takes into account the size of the
president’s co-partisan caucus or conference in each chamber and the unity with which each votes

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9I use the same adapted version of the LPPC scores used by Howell and Pevehouse (2007), based on Brady, Cooper,
and Hurley (1979).
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</tbody>
</table>

on legislative proposals. For each chamber, Equation 3.1 determines the Presidential Party Power value. \( \Phi \) represents the party size by percentage of members in each chamber, and \( \Theta \) represents their party unity score, a function of the number of “party unity votes” — those roll calls wherein at least half of each party opposes at least half of the other — and the proportion of party legislators voting faithfully with their party’s majority. Subscripts indicate reference to the president’s party and the opposition.

\[
PresPower = \frac{\Phi_{\text{pres}} \times \Theta_{\text{pres}} - \Phi_{\text{oppo}} \times \Theta_{\text{oppo}}}{100}
\]  

I use party membership and role-call voting unity data provided by Howard Rosenthal and Keith Poole.\(^{10}\) I merge the member and committee data with presidential party power values based on the fiscal year of the committee-year assignment and the two-year span of the convened Congress.

**Global Power Politics.** Among the subset of FACs that operate in the domain of national security — identified by the “interest area and category” data described below — only some are of international geo-political importance. Many of them, by contrast, deal with issues that do not implicate security competition among countries. Some, for example, deal with human resources issues such as gender and racial discrimination within the armed forces — primarily domestic political issues playing out within the military — that are less ambitious than those dealing with nuclear weapons,

---

\(^{10}\)Available at www.voteview.com.
grand strategy, and the balance of international power.\textsuperscript{11} I have coded national security committees as belonging to the power politics category or not, as a measure of FAC involvement in ambitious projects.

### 3.2.3 Committee Attributes

**Interest Area and Category.** The committees are identified by the GSA as having one or more “interest areas” — designating the policy issues the FAC intends to address. These one hundred sixty six interest areas are grouped into forty-one “interest categories” including Food and Drugs, Transportation, and Science and Technology, for example.\textsuperscript{12} Among these are two categories that bear upon national security policy, labeled National Defense and International. The core of my analysis focuses on FACs related to two categories, labeled “National Defense” and “International” — dealing with five interest areas, International Programs, Studies, and Diplomacy, International Law, International Organizations, International Economic Policy, National Security and Defense, 

\textsuperscript{11}This in no way implies that these issues are less important, only that they do not reflect presidential ambitions in the scope of activity of interest to this study. See Appendix for a list of the issue area categories that are included and excluded from the Global Power Politics group.

\textsuperscript{12}See Appendix for a full listing of interest categories. Committees may have more than one interest area and category. One committee, the Proposal Review Panel for Information and Intelligent Systems, has twenty eight associated categories of interest.
and Overseas Security Issues.

### Table 3.2: FACs by Foreign Policy Interest Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Category</th>
<th>Committees</th>
<th>Committee-Years</th>
<th>Appointments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>7,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Diplomacy</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>6,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Trade</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>13,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Foreign Policy</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>20,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Foreign Policy</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>4,707</td>
<td>374,939</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Committee Function.** The database indicates one of seven “committee functions” for each FAC in a given fiscal year. Committee functions can change from year to year, but rarely do. These attributes indicate what kind of recommendations or advice the FAC expects to produce — major policy changes, scientific program advice, grant-making recommendations, and others. I confine my analysis to Non-Scientific Program Advisory Boards, National Policy Issue Advisory Boards, and Special Emphasis Panels.

**Establishment Authority.** Each committee-year has indicated an “establishment authority,” in one of four possible categories. Committees may be authorized by law, where Congress has granted explicit permission to the executive to convene a committee. They may be mandated by statutory authority, created by an act of Congress that cannot be ignored by the executive. They may be created under agency authority alone — many agencies have broadly delegated powers to convene committees as necessary. Finally, they may be created by presidential order. I include committees of all four such designations in the analysis.

### 3.2.4 Member Attributes

**Appointment Type.** For each year a member sits on a committee, the data indicate her appointment type to indicate by whose recommendation she came to serve. A plurality of FAC members...
are already employees of the federal executive, and so serve on an *ex officio* basis, noted in the database as Federal Employee Member. Other appointment types include Agency (invited by but not already employed in the executive), Congressional, Presidential, Judicial, or Other. The vast majority of appointments are made at by the agency to which the FAC is assigned.

**Occupation or Affiliation.** The data include the current occupation or professional affiliation for each member appointed to each committee, a point of critical interest to the current analysis. In the database provided by the GSA, this field has over 136,000 variants — clearly entered as free-form text, and too many to code in their entirety. This nearly always includes the organization, agency, or corporation that employees the appointee, and often includes the position the appointee holds in that organization. There is little uniformity or order imposed on this aspect of the data. After filtering on Interest Category and Establishment Authority as described above, I reviewed each of the remaining distinct affiliation descriptions and coded them on the basis of forty-seven possible affiliation types of my own devising. These data allow me to code the “organization type” variable above.

### 3.2.5 Control Variables

I include a package of control variables that might affect the composition of FACs. Presidents with low public approval ratings may use FAC appointments to bolster the administration’s image in a particular policy domain, in this case global power politics. The number of interest categories that a FAC addresses could have an impact on the appointment of interest groups, especially if the purpose of extra-governmental membership is to facilitate elite coordination and log-rolling. Committees originally established during wartime might have stricter rules about extra-governmental eligibility. FACs established by legislative action might offer the executive less agency in the employment of

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14 There were roughly four thousand remaining distinct affiliation descriptions. See Appendix for a random sampling of 50 affiliations and a full listing of affiliation types.

15 Zegart (2004) calls these FACs “political constellation committees” — their purpose being to “foster consensus among competing interests.”
committees for political purposes. FAC composition might vary in relation to the importance of the committee, measured by the number of days a committee meets, the costs of convening the committee, or whether it earns any coverage in the news media.\textsuperscript{16} Presidents in the first years of their term might need less external political help, one of the benefits of a honeymoon period. Political considerations are more salient in election years, which might yield greater interest group access than non-election years. Presidential election years might be especially active. There may be systematic differences between the two major parties. Finally, the Global War on Terror might affect the chances that extra-governmental organizations gain access to FACs.

3.3 Congressional Disinterest in National Security

Congress authorizes and mandates a great deal more FACs than the executive branch. This makes sense, given the role of civil society in helping monitor the bureaucracy by pulling “fire alarms” and holding the government accountable (Matthew D. McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). In the domain of national security, however, I assume that the administration has a freer hand. One of the theory’s core assumptions is that the president enjoys a great deal of autonomy in foreign policy, relative to domestic policy issues such as health care, crime, and taxation. If this is the case, and if FACs establishment conforms to this general tendency, then we should see a significant difference between the rate at which Congress involves itself in the authorization of these committees. Moreover, if we are to trust these data, we stand to gain by validating them against well-established precepts regarding elite political behavior.

I validate the data against the working assumption that Congress remains passive on matters of national security by testing the hypothesis that the establishment authority for a FAC is less likely to indicate a congressional mandate, or even consenting authorization, when it deals with national security issues. Table 3.4 shows the number of committees\textsuperscript{17} cross-tabulated over establishment

\textsuperscript{16}I use a dummy variable for whether the New York Times mentions the committee by name during the time-period of each observation.

\textsuperscript{17}Actually, committee-years, which weights recurring and long-running committees more heavily than short-lived FACs.
authority and whether it addresses national security issues, as indicated by having a “National Defense” or “International” interest category.

**Table 3.3: FACs by Establishment Authority**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment Authority</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency Authority</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>1480</td>
<td>1810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized by Law</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory (Congress Created)</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>4111</td>
<td>4380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>719</td>
<td>6867</td>
<td>7586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This summary suggests that Congress indeed takes a more hands-off approach to establishing FACs in areas of national security. While the number of congressionally-mandated FACs exceeds those established by the president, the most prolific creators are executive branch agencies. Moreover, the proportion of security to total FACs created by Congress is far below the overall percentage. Only six percent of all congressionally mandated FACs are concerned with national security, compared with over nine percent of committees overall. The proportion is even lower for committees established under congressional consent to executive initiative, at just over two percent. National security FACs are just under twenty percent of all committees established by the executive without any legislative involvement (eighteen percent for agency-established committees and twenty-one percent for presidential committees). Though the legislature authorizes more foreign policy FACs overall, the difference is marginal even though congressionally-authorized committees...
account for well over double the number as the executive. Test statistics confirm that the difference in foreign policy attention significantly varies between the two branches, with Congress directing about fourteen percent of its FAC-related effort toward foreign policy, compared with double that figure for the executive.

**Table 3.5: Indicators of FAC Interest in Foreign Policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Count of Committee Interest Areas in Each Category (Poisson)</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Involvement</td>
<td>−1.39***</td>
<td>−1.11***</td>
<td>−0.25**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Authorization</td>
<td>−1.64***</td>
<td>−2.19***</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory Mandate</td>
<td>−1.46***</td>
<td>−0.96***</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Directive</td>
<td>−0.62**</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.76***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established in Wartime</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
<td>0.60***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Interests</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−2.64***</td>
<td>−2.55***</td>
<td>−2.57***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald $X^2$</td>
<td>481.95***</td>
<td>527.27***</td>
<td>670.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>339.43***</td>
<td>330.42***</td>
<td>719.78***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5310</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Excluded establishment authority category in second model is agency self-authorization. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

More detailed statistical analysis reveals even more about the politics of FAC authorization in matters of foreign affairs. I model the count of foreign policy interest areas as a function of which type of authorization has established the committee and a vector of controls including the total number of interest areas and whether the committee was established during wartime, according to the belief that war shifts power to the executive across policy domains (A. Hamilton, 2001; Howell
et al., 2013). The results clearly confirm that the “Two Presidencies” thesis operates through the authorization of FACs. Modeled using a binary variable for legislative establishment, the effect is significant and negative, as expected, for all three types of foreign policy issue area, security, diplomacy, and trade, with the largest effect on security and the smallest on trade FACs. Separating the independent variable into the four separate categories (with agency self-authorization excluded), the results hold true for security issue areas and diplomacy, but not trade issues. The controls work as expected.

Table 3.6: Foreign Policy Impact on Legislative FAC Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Establishment Authority</th>
<th>Legislative Authorization</th>
<th>Statutory Mandate</th>
<th>Presidential Directive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Security</td>
<td>−4.12***</td>
<td>−7.56***</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Diplomacy</td>
<td>−4.81**</td>
<td>−1.26***</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Trade</td>
<td>2.25***</td>
<td>1.13**</td>
<td>3.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush Presidency</td>
<td>−0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton Presidency</td>
<td>−0.46*</td>
<td>−0.19</td>
<td>−0.58*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Party Power</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>−0.29</td>
<td>−0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−0.79***</td>
<td>0.92***</td>
<td>−1.92***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald X²</td>
<td>250.53***</td>
<td>250.53***</td>
<td>250.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5310</td>
<td>250.53***</td>
<td>250.53***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The current study is agnostic with respect to causal direction, whether the authorizing branch causes variation in foreign policy interest or the assigned basket of issue areas makes a FAC more interesting to Congress. In either case, the authorization is a matter of choice for the legislature.\textsuperscript{18} Both causal explanations are possible and find support in the data. Table 3.6 shows the results of a multinomial logit regression of foreign policy interest category on the resulting establishment authority for all foreign policy committee-years.\textsuperscript{19}

The excluded reference category is Agency Self-Authorization. Congress is significantly less likely to assume authorization of FACs dealing with issues of national security and international diplomacy, but more likely to authorize foreign trade committees. They are much less likely to mandate agencies to convene national security committees, slightly (but significantly) less likely in diplomacy, and slightly (but significantly) more likely in trade. The only detectable difference between presidential and agency authorized committees is that the president is significantly more likely to authorize trade FACs. Included controls contribute relatively little to sorting out the data, with some significant effects coming from either the Clinton administration or the Global War on Terror.

\subsection*{3.4 Results}

The results indicate strong support for the hypothesis that interest group access increases as presidential party power decreases. At the committee level, the correlation between interest group appointment counts and presidential party power is negative and significant. Likewise, the probability of an association affiliate securing an appointment to a national security FAC is also negatively and significantly correlated with presidential party power. Results are robust to a variety of model specifications and substantively important. Within an historically normal range of values on presidential party power, the predicted probability of such an appointee being affiliated with an

\textsuperscript{18}Within committees, interest areas are invariant across time, but the establishment authorization may change from year to year.

\textsuperscript{19}See appendix for the results of a series of poisson regressions of establishment authority on interest categories, with a distinct set of controls.
interest group increases from roughly twenty-five to seventy percent for party power in the Senate, and from thirty to just over sixty percent for party power in the House of Representatives.

In order to test the core hypothesis of the theory, I first regress presidential party power (PresPower) interacted with a dummy for global power politics (PowerPol) and a vector of controls on the number of association-affiliated appointees (Λ) within the various committees over time.\(^\text{20}\)

\[
\Lambda_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{PowerPol}_i \times \text{PresPower}_t + \beta_2 X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}
\]  

I use a negative binomial panel model to track variation in appointment-counts within committees across years, accommodating over-dispersion in the dependent variable (\(\bar{\mu} = 3.01, s^2 = 23.99\)), with random effects to allow for time-invariant controls. A Hausman specification test without control variables yields a \(X^2\) of 0.48 and a \(p\)-value of 0.993, failing to reject the null hypothesis that the fixed effects coefficients are not systematically different than the random effects coefficients.

The results support the hypothesized determinants of interest group selection for Federal Advisory Committee (FAC) appointments. As shown in Table 3.7, FACs that address issues of global power politics see a significant decline in association-affiliated appointments when the president’s party power increases. Few of the control variables yield significant results. Presidential approval behaves in the opposite manner as presidential party power, increasing the number of interest group appointees to global power politics committees as the president’s ratings improve. Republican presidents have a higher rate of interest group appointees, and the number of interest categories might produce a slightly higher rate as well. I argue that these findings taken together support the proposition that the executive seeks interest group assistance when it is politically weak with respect to Congress, but has opportunities to mobilize the public as leverage against the legislature.

To show that the revealed relationships are particular to this kind of organization, I run the same model for affiliates of institutions and for-profit firms.\(^\text{21}\) Institutional members move in opposition

\(^{20}\)In this model, I use the average PresPower across the two congressional chambers.

\(^{21}\)The fully-specified model was run for each value on the dependent variable. Results presented only include items of interest for the sake of simplicity of presentation.
Table 3.7: Interest Group Access to FACs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>σ</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Power Politics (PowerPol)</td>
<td>−0.14</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>−1.09 → 0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Party Power (PresPower)</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.20 → 2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PowerPol × PresPower</td>
<td>−2.42</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>−3.77 → −1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-day Approval Margin (AppMarg90)</td>
<td>−0.34</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>−0.69 → 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PowerPol × AppMarg90</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.35 → 1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Interest Categories</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>−0.00 → 0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established in Wartime</td>
<td>−0.21</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.697</td>
<td>−1.27 → 0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established by Legislature</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>−0.42 → 1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Meeting Days</td>
<td>−0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>−0.00 → 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost, ln $US</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>−0.04 → 0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYTimes Coverage Dummy</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>−0.19 → 0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Presidential Year</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>−0.24 → 0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
<td>−0.12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>−0.26 → 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td>−0.11 → 0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican President</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.01 → 0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>−0.28 → 0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>1.20 → 5.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression (Panel: Committee by Year).

These results suggest a few more things. First, while the model does a good job of making sense of association-affiliated appointments, it does little to help bring order to the data regarding institutions and firms, suggesting different logics governing access to these kinds of organizations. Second, the Global War on Terror seems to have no effect on appointments to FACs across organization-types. Third, there does seem to be a difference between the two parties when it comes to appointing association-affiliates and institution-affiliates, with Republican presidents selecting more of the first and fewer of the second. Fourth, groups established in wartime may offer greater opportunities for access by for...
Table 3.8: Interest Group Access in Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PowerPol × PresPower</th>
<th>PowerPol × AppMarg90</th>
<th># Interest Categories</th>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Republican President</th>
<th>Wald X²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASSN</td>
<td>INST</td>
<td>FIRM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−2.42 ***</td>
<td>0.80 ***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>−0.12</td>
<td>0.12 *</td>
<td>43.25 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>30.61 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.19 *</td>
<td>−0.39</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>−0.16 **</td>
<td>27.26 *</td>
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Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression (Panel: Committee by Year).
Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

profit firm affiliates. Finally, the number of interest categories has no significant relation to the kind of occupations chosen for FAC membership.²²

Moving from the committee level down to a member-level analysis further confirms the proposition. I run a series of panel logit regressions with the reduced set of control variables, and the substantive results hold. The larger number of observations with member appointments as the unit of analysis allows more precise estimates and comparisons between the two houses of Congress. Since government and military members give us no insight into the strategy of extra-governmental appointment, they are excluded from the logit analysis. In this setting, a slightly different reduced form model yields additional information.²³ Once again, a Hausman test validates the use of random effects ($X^2 = 2.04$ and $p$-value = 0.361 for Senate values of PresPower; $X^2 = 0.37$ and

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²²The $\alpha$ level for significance is 0.05. At an $\alpha$ of 0.10, the coefficient on the number of interest categories is significant but small.

²³Various specifications are available in the Appendix. The core substantive finding remains significant and substantively consistent across models.
Table 3.9 shows that the president’s political strength negatively correlates with probability of interest group appointment to global power politics FACs.\textsuperscript{24} The effect is larger, but slightly less efficient in the Senate compared with the House of Representatives. Legislative involvement in the establishment of committees is likewise negatively associated with interest group membership, as are election years. Republic administrations are more likely to appoint association-affiliated

\textsuperscript{24}For brevity’s sake, only interaction terms are reported here, although main effects were included in the estimation.
personnel. Little can be inferred from this model applied to institution-affiliates, but employees of business firms appear to gain greater access to the Senate under greater presidential party power.

In order to facilitate a more intuitive interpretation of these results, I generate graphical representations of the predicted probabilities of association-affiliated appointments over a normal range of values on PresPower. Random effects are held at zero, and independent covariates are set at means for continuous variables and modes for binary variables. The results are compelling. They reveal a substantively important increase in the probability of interest group access to the executive as the president faces greater and more unified opposition in Congress, with a more pronounced effect in the upper chamber. Figure 3.2 shows that moving from a Senate PresPower value of .2 to −.2 predicts an increase in probability from just over .2 to .7. PresPower in the House predicts an increase in probability from about .3 to .6 over the same range.

Figure 3.3 plots the predicted probabilities for nine historical moments of interest. At the low end of presidential party power, Gerald Ford faced a post-Watergate Congress in 1975 that included a veto-proof Democratic majority in the House and a filibuster-proof opposition in the Senate, elected three short months after his inauguration. George H. W. Bush faced Democratic majorities in both chambers in 1991 as he waged war against Iraq. 1995 pitted Bill Clinton against Newt Gingrich’s Contract with America. In 1983, Ronald Reagan held office under a divided legislature as his administration pursued the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and anti-Communist interventions in the Americas. The most recent data place Barack Obama near the center of the range in 2014. George W. Bush’s Republican party held both houses, but by modest margins in 2006 when he announced the “Surge” in Iraq, just before the Democrats reclaimed Congress decisively. In 1993, prior to the Contract With America, Clinton’s party had a majority in both houses, as did Jimmy Carter’s in 1978. At the high end of the range, Lyndon Johnson’s enjoyed a large filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and House Democratic Caucus of roughly the same proportion.

\(^{25}\text{For this plot, I use the 2-chamber average of PresPower.}\)

\(^{26}\text{Carter began his presidency with a filibuster-proof Senate majority, but lost both members of the Minnesota delegation and one from Mississippi during the course of 1978. Hubert Humphrey passed away in January, and the other two resigned.}\)
Figure 3.2: Predicted Probabilities (95% CI)

Senate

House of Representatives
The results presented above show that the core proposition holds in both a committee and member-level analysis. However, the model specifications used in the analysis invite possible criticism for their implementation and interpretation of interaction terms. Interactions themselves are fairly uncontroversial, but Braumoeller (2004) argues that interacting two separate variables against the same term requires including a third-order interaction among all three and the implied lower-order effects as well. I see no theoretical reason to interact Presidential Party Power against Approval Margin, as I believe they work independently of one another, and including third and additional second-order interactions would substantially obscure interpretation. However, I include Table A1 in the Appendix as a revised model with only the interaction between Global Power Politics and Presidential Party Power (excluding the interaction of Global Power Politics and Approval Margin), and the results are substantially unchanged.

Additionally, Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2016) argue that multiplicative interaction models rely on assumptions that do not always hold, such as linearity of interaction effects. I also include
Table A2 in the Appendix as a revision of the model without interaction terms, using a segmented sample that includes only observations with values of Global Power Politics equalling one. The results hold, as they do with variants of the model using fixed instead of random effects. Altogether, these exercises in robustness demonstrate that the results reported in this analysis do not arise from any particular modeling choice, and hold under a variety of specifications.

3.5 Discussion

The preceding analysis sheds light on an important but under-explored area of national security politics in the contemporary United States. Federal Advisory Committees provide an avenue by which interest groups gain access to the institutions of governance. The data compiled on FAC appointments between 1997 and 2012 provide strong support for the theory’s core proposition. Associations find their affiliates appointed to national security FACs in greater numbers when the president is politically weak. These findings help makes sense of why President Johnson declined to seek outside help while escalating the war in Vietnam, while President George H. W. Bush sought the help of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in order to muster support for regime change even after swiftly defeating Iraq on the field of battle.

The analysis does not provide answers to several important related questions. First, it remains possible that associations are brought in for other reasons. The administration may be using FAC appointments as a side-payment, a way to induce elite civil society buy-in for its policies, rather than mass public support. FACs, in other words, could be venues for log-rolling. If that were true, we might expect the number of interest categories to be positively associated with access. Still, the lack of significance on that coefficient in the regression results does not negate this possibility.

Second, national security politics is not the only domain in which the president may use extragovernmental organizations as partners. The scope conditions applied here may be relaxed to discover similar or distinct patterns of behavior in other policy areas. Not only can the interest category condition be relaxed, so also can the restriction on committee function. Still, the current study makes an important targeted contribution, and these scope conditions help to minimize
causal heterogeneity that may demand more complex analysis and detailed data than are presently available.

Finally, though Federal Advisory Committees are important for interest group access to power, there are others means for achieving influence. Further research into these data, merged with data on lobbying, campaign expenditures, and public commentary under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), might lead to further important discoveries. Administrations also involve interest groups in ways that fall outside the purview of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) or Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA), and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). Administrations faced with strong opposition both in Congress and among the public may choose a venue with less scrutiny and oversight. Vice President Dick Cheney, for example, was alleged to involve Iraqi National Congress founder Ahmed Chalabi in the meetings of his energy task force in 2001 (Suskind, 2004; Montgomery, 2005). During President Reagan’s administration, the White House Office of Public Liaison held regular message-planning meetings with hundreds of interest group representatives under the auspices of the Outreach Working Group on Central America (Clines, 1984). Understanding the full scope of collaboration between the White House and extra-governmental organizations will require a multi-faceted research approach that extends beyond Federal Advisory Committees. Still, the current study show that there is a systematic relationship between the president’s political fortunes and the fate of interest groups in national security politics.
CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF MORAL SUBSIDY

The theory of moral subsidy proposes that interest groups gain influence by providing ambitious presidential administrations with third party legitimation for proposed national security interventions. Chapter 2 of this dissertation lays out the deductive logic that implies this proposition, based on the importance of information in the literature on interest groups (Truman, 1971; Hansen, 1991; Hall & Deardorff, 2006; Hall & Reynolds, 2012), the dominance of national security politics by the executive (Wildavsky, 1966, 1989; Moe & Howell, 1999; Schlesinger, 2004; Canes-Wrone et al., 2008), and general public inattention to matters of foreign policy (Canes-Wrone, 2006; Kernell, 2006; Milner & Tingley, 2015). Chapter 3 demonstrates that administrations regularly avail themselves of the institutional structure of the executive to enlist the participation of interest groups in national security politics, with the goal of overcoming congressional opposition. The current chapter approaches the puzzle from a behavioral perspective. It asks whether we have reason to believe that the tactic of enlisting interest groups works.

The next chapter addresses whether ambitious presidents seeking consent to intervene internationally have sought the assistance of interest groups in waging propaganda campaigns. An analytic history shows that administrations facing public resistance and congressional opposition have long cultivated collaborative relationships with outside organizations for the purpose of gaining credibility and skirting laws against official war propaganda aimed at a domestic audience. It further shows that, whether or not their assessments accurately reflect the reasons for public support and congressional consent, politicians believe that moral subsidy has been an effective tool of public relations in national security politics.

The behavioral perspective allows us to examine another important piece of the overall puzzle. If we know that the White House is barred from engaging in certain activities — in this case national security propaganda at home — it will seek other means of achieving the same goals. If there are reasons why members the public will be unresponsive or hostile to a message delivered by the White House it will find an independent messenger to deliver the appeal. However, simply because
the president has reasons to pursue a course of action, we cannot assume that it will work. Indeed, politicians engage in many activities about which the political science literature has cast a great deal of doubt, particularly surrounding electoral campaigns (Sides & Vavreck, 2013). Nevertheless, it matters to our understanding of interest group influence in national security politics whether their endorsement of administration policy helps persuade voters, or whether people simply believe that it does so. In either case, administrations have reason to collaborate with them, but in the latter case they get less value in return than they imagine.

The experiment focuses on the support of those who are inclined to oppose the president, in this case conservatives, Republicans, those who voted against the incumbent in 2012 (the experiment was conducted in 2014), and those who are dissatisfied with the administration’s performance in office. It evaluates responses to two sets of questions: whether subjects identified as being in opposition to the president find a proposal persuasive, and whether all subjects believe the proposal would be persuasive to a typical conservative Republican. The first question directly measures the effectiveness of moral subsidy on the individual. The second question does two things. It gives us a sense of people’s beliefs regarding persuasive messages. Do people have cause to think that third-party appeals are more effective than direct appeals by the president? In this regard, we must remain cautious about applying these lessons directly to policy-makers, who are the theoretical subject of interest in the broader theory. They may have a different perspective on persuasive strategies than lay people, a problem of external validity that limits the inferences we can draw from laboratory research in many cases. Asking how people expect the typical conservative Republican

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1 The current presidential election, between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton will undoubtedly provide a useful case for those seeking to understand the importance of competitive campaigns. One reason offered for the lack of significant campaign effects is that most years pit two roughly equivalent campaigns against each other. In the current campaign, one side is choosing — or perhaps is being forced to choose — a non-traditional strategy. In short, if Trump under-performs fundamentals-based forecasting models, this would provide some support for the proposition that structural aspects of campaigns matter. If he over-performs the models, one might argue that candidate-based mobilization strategies matter. If the fundamentals models accurately predict the outcome, this might support the notion that campaigns and candidates matter very little. In short, this election may provide rare variation on independent variables of interest to scholars of political campaigns, and much needed leverage over these questions.

2 Of course, many dissatisfied voters may be more liberal than the president rather than more conservative. In order to deal with conceptual problems such as these, I use a composite index for opposition to the president, based on all four of these self-identified characteristics. This is discussed further in the section on data.
to answer also gives us a sense of how an appeal shapes subjects’ expectations about a policy debate. Since the earliest studies of US voting behavior, scholars have argued that choice is highly socialized (Berelson et al., 1954). When it comes to political choices, people often go along to get along. Answers to this question inform us as to how the administration’s communication strategy will affect those expectations.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds in five sections. First, it briefly explains the basics premises of source and framing theory in political psychology. Next, it describes the research design, the structure of the experiment and the process of recruiting test subjects. It then provides a summary description of the survey sample, including basic demographic information and data regarding the primary characteristics of interest. Then it analyzes the findings of the experiment, showing mixed results in support of the theory. It concludes with a discussion some of the shortcomings of the experiment, offering ways to improve the design for future productive research.

### 4.1 Sources and Frames in National Security Appeals

The current study follows in two aspects of the traditional of the experimental political psychology literature, source effects and framing effects. First, source effect theory proposes that the identity of a would-be persuader influences the respondent’s acceptance of a message. The content of a message often will not suffice to convince its target due to a deficit of trust. Second, framing effects influence a respondent’s acceptance of a proposed military intervention by casting it in a particular light, by narrating it from a certain perspective. In the case of the policy domain of interest in the current study, proposals are presented either as humanitarian missions or national security requirements.

#### 4.1.1 Source Effects

The premise behind source effects is simple. The persuasiveness of a message to a particular subject depends upon who delivers the appeal. The logic is that of the advertising testimonial, whereby
the purveyor of a product or service tells a perspective consumer, in essence, you do not have to take our word for it. Instead, their sales pitch is delivered by another, someone either with prestige and fame, or someone more humble whose perspective gives him credibility. The practice is old, but some say that it was perfected by Edward Bernays, nephew of Sigmund Freud and a pioneer in bringing psychoanalytic techniques to bear upon consumer advertising (Tye, 2002). Enlisting outside experts makes an argument appear authoritative and objective. Bernays, considered by many to be “the father of public relations,” brought this and many other insights into the political domain, where partisanship exacerbates the problem of gaining and preserving trust. In the literature on persuasion in political science, it gets at a critical element of John Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample framework (Zaller, 1992). In order to accept a piece of information, the recipient must trust its source.

A great deal of scholarly work has been done on the subject of source effects (Wilson & Sherrell, 1993; Pornpitakpan, 2004). Newscasters and former representatives are considered more trustworthy than current representatives and candidates for office (Andreoli & Worchel, 1978). With careful research design, scholars have been able to detect variation in support for militant groups in Pakistan based on whether they have been endorsed by trusted political actors (Bullock, Imai, & Shapiro, 2011). In the domain of US national security politics, source effects matter a great deal, since the public relies so heavily on external sources of information, given their less frequent involvement in foreign affairs. So, while the public may respond rationally to events on the international stage (Page & Shapiro, 1992), the information it receives passes through mediating elites (Bersin, 2007). In the case of the Iraq War, where the public fell prey to the administration’s inflation of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime (Kaufmann, 2004), the effect of partisanship on the acceptance of information had a significant effect on public opinion (Gaines, Kuklinski, Quirk, Peyton, & Verkuilen, 2007; Paolino, 2015).

Source effects offer an opportunity for interest groups to assist politicians. Although conven-

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3 The Eisenhower administration enlisted Bernays’ expertise in a range of situations, from domestic public relations to inciting a coup d’état in Guatemala.
tional wisdom has “special interests” at a disadvantage on matters of credibility and public trust, they at last stand a chance of escaping the taint of partisan politics. Moreover, the ease of incorporation in the US allows third-party partners of the administration the freedom to brand and re-brand themselves as the need arises. For example, take Dean Acheson, Secretary of State for most of President Truman’s second term. Acheson was a leading member of no fewer than five different organizations between 1939 and 1969, helping presidents with their public relations strategy regarding US entry into World War II, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the New Look under Eisenhower, the Vietnam War, and the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile program. Interest groups offer their representatives as the credible third party that can induce source effects.

4.1.2 Framing Effects

Framing effects have also received a great deal of attention in the political science literature, especially in the study of political media. The idea behind framing is that any issue may be articulated in different ways, evoking different sets of values, beliefs, referents, and premises. It is a means of providing a narrative perspective. In deploying a particular frame, the agent of persuasion carefully selects the semantic content describing a problem in order to induce responses that benefits her. The framer may construct an understanding of an issue by deploying symbols, metaphors, and forms of reasoning accessible to the subject, or by choosing a particular mode of narrative. For example, news stories about individuals living in poverty may be easier for audiences to process than those with detailed macro-economic data, but they also induce a less robust set of reactions about public policy choices (Iyengar, 1987). The frame designates what aspects of a problem stay in the picture, and have an important effect on public opinion (Druckman, 2001b).

Frames can differ in many ways, over the the opportunity for gain or loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), on whether they alter perceptions of issue content or salience (Nelson & Oxley, 1999), and on the propriety of risk-taking strategies (Mittal & Ross, 1998). Framing studies have approached a wide range of issue areas, including government spending (Jacoby, 2000), international trade (Hiscox, 2001), and civil rights (Fine, 1992). In the domain of national security, the
one of the most prominent framing choices distinguishes between military operations that primarily serve to protect US security interests and humanitarian goals, with a variety of findings that vary in terms of the goals of the research and the conclusions they reach (Feaver & Gelpi, 2005; Berinsky & Kinder, 2006; Boettcher, 2004; Boettcher & Cobb, 2006, 2009). Generally speaking, the US public responds more favorably, and is willing to risk more in terms of “blood and treasure,” when the security frame is used, rather than the humanitarian frame.

The current study uses the humanitarian / security framing distinction as well, but to highlight the opportunities each presents to interest groups and the value they provide ambitious executives. Particularly, the analysis looks at the interaction between source and framing effects. Few scholars have examined both in conjunction, although previous studies have linked frames with party identification, a form of source effect (Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010). One such study suggests that only certain actors may effectively deploy frames, and that political elites face serious constraints in this regard (Druckman, 2001a). Interest groups, by their independence, may break through these limits. The goal here is to determine how precise the persuasion strategy must be in order to influence public opinion. Specifically, the effectiveness of an interest group source should depend on the type of intervention the administration proposes. Think-tank analysts presented as national security experts should exert greater influence over security-framed interventions, while representatives of ethnic organizations should produce better results in the context of humanitarian interventions.

## 4.2 Survey Design

The experiment proceeds in six stages of a survey questionnaire. First, consent to participate the “Military Policy Opinions” survey is confirmed. Second, pre-treatment questions ask for basic demographic information, including citizenship status (binary), age, gender (binary), current or recent (last twelve years) military service by the respondent or a close friend or family member, highest level of educational attainment (binary), race (as defined by the 2010 US census, with the option to select multiple identifications), political party affiliation (seven-point Likert scale), liberal / conservative ideology (seven-point Likert scale), voting preference in the 2012 presidential
election (Obama, Romney, and None or Other), and level of satisfaction with President Obama’s performance in office (seven-point Likert scale). Third, as treatment, the respondent reads a short vignette describing a proposed military intervention, attributed to the “Associated News Service” — a fictional organization. Fourth, post-treatment questions ask for the respondent’s level of agreement (five-point Likert scale) with five statements expressing support for the proposal, that the vignette made a strong case to intervene, that the mission will make the US more secure, that it is the moral thing to do, and that it is among the most important issues facing the US. Fifth, the survey asks two factual questions to validate the respondent’s attention to the treatment, and allows the respondent to provide free-text feedback on the survey. Sixth, the survey de-briefs the respondent, explaining the broad purpose of the experiment.

The pre-treatment questions were devised for two purposes. First, they give a broad picture of the survey sample population, to reveal any inconsistencies that might affect the results. Although a nationally-representative sample would be ideal, it is not strictly necessary for providing an initial approach to the question. Second, and more importantly, it helps sort the subject pool by their opposition to or support for the president. This is a critical element of the proposition. The president has less need for third party legitimation with his own supporters. Where interest groups really matter, according to the theory of moral subsidy, is among the president’s opponents. No single measure of opposition paints the whole picture, however, so the analysis uses a composite measure of opposition, using a simple averaging of the three Likert-scale measures: party, ideology, and dissatisfaction with the president’s performance. In order to perform a comparison of means, which is the target statistic, a binary opposition category is created. All those below the mid-point in the composite score are considered the president’s supporters. All those above the mid-point are his opposition. Those who fall on the mid-point are sorted into categories based on their preference in the 2012 election; those who expressed a preference for the president fall into the supporter category, and all others into the opposition.

The treatment strategy is a fully crossed six-by-four design, yielding twenty-four randomly-assigned conditions over two dimensions, scenario (frame) and source of attribution. Table 4.1
shows the full set. The first dimension varies the frame of the treatment across four conflict scenarios. The first scenario proposes military intervention to assist the rebel forces battling against their government in Syria. This was intended to suggest a mixture of humanitarian and security concerns. Second, a purely humanitarian scenario is suggested in a fictional Angolan civil war in which many people are suffering from poverty and exploitation by militias. Third, a primarily security-related scenario is presented in which the US is considering more forceful intervention against China on behalf of Taiwan. Finally, the design includes another security scenario involving a possible US intervention to defend Ukraine against Russia.

### Table 4.1: Treatment Conditions

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The second dimension varies the source among six possibilities, a control group, the current president, a prominent partisan opponent, a lobbyist for an ethnic organization tied to the territory of conflict, a think-tank analyst specializing in national security affairs, and a high-ranking military
officer. The president’s appeals should yield less support among conservatives, Republicans, the dissatisfied, and those who voted against him than the control condition (no attribution). A partisan opponent is included for two reasons. First, it provides some symmetry to evaluate the responses of the president’s supporters. Second, enlisting the support of partisan opponents has historically been a tactic used in the practice of moral subsidy. In 1940, FDR’s Republican opponent for president, Wendell Wilkie joined forces with the Fight for Freedom Committee, a pro-intervention group that collaborated with Roosevelt. In 1947, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg joined the Committee for the Marshall Plan, a pro-administration advocacy group working to pass the European Recovery Act. Thus, interest groups often serve as a vehicle for bipartisanship. The ethnic lobbyist is given the occupation of heart surgeon and the title “Dr.” in order that he will have a similar social status as the other sources. Names vary across conflict scenarios to evoke the nationality of the country in question. The think-tank analyst is also given the title “Dr.” to indicate the achievement of a doctoral degree, and confer an equivalently high social status. Finally, the military officer is given the rank of Admiral in the US Navy, and the same name as the think-tank analyst.

Post-treatment items present statements about support for the proposal, the strength of the case, the security benefits of the mission, the morality of the intervention, and the importance of the issue to the US. Respondents are asked each of these questions three times. The first time, they are simply asked to evaluate each statement and indicate the extend to which they agree or disagree. The second time, they are asked to answer as if they were the “typical liberal Democrat.” Finally, they answer on behalf of the “typical conservative Republican.” Only the first and third set of responses are used in the current analysis. In addition to the individual items, a composite average is calculated across all five.

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4 Senator John McCain was chosen instead of Mitt Romney because the latter was, at the time, out of the public eye. McCain still served as a prominent hawk in the Senate.

5 See Appendix for the full survey questionnaire.
4.3 Data

The survey was administered online using the Qualtrics survey system, and subjects were recruited via Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) program. Though not ideal, MTurk provides a cost-effective means of recruiting subjects for experimental research, superior to convenience samples such as those often available on university campuses (Mason & Suri, 2011; Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015; Huff & Tingley, 2015; Levay, Freese, & Druckman, 2016; Antoun, Zhang, Conrad, & Schober, 2016). The system functions by advertising micro-payment piece-work to a pool of participants who choose from among a list of “jobs” on the website. The title of the project was listed as the “Military Policy Opinions” survey. Respondents were paid $0.20 for a completed survey; incomplete work was not compensated. Respondents were restricted to voting age residents of the US. Each scenario yielded about 230–250 participants, 978 completed surveys in total. Scenarios were fielded as separate MTurk “projects” for logistical purposes, but respondents were not able to take participate in more than one. The surveys were fielded in March, 2014.

The sample population’s demographics are summarized in Table 4.2. Gender skews substantially toward self-identified male subjects at just over 70%. 39% claim to have served in the US military or to have a close friend or family member who did in the past twelve years. Race and ethnicity is close to the national average with respect to White or Caucasian self-identifications (83%), but Black or African American and Hispanic or Latino(a) are both under-represented at 7.6% and 5.4% respectively. All other single-ethnicity categories are close to the national averages. There are fifty respondents identifying with more than one racial category, which might explain why two major racial or ethnic groups are under-represented but the white or Caucasian category is close to the national average. The modal educational attainment is the bachelor’s degree, with some college

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6 Respondents were given a link to the Qualtrics project site. At the end of the survey, they were given a randomly-generated fifteen character alphanumeric code and returned to the MTurk page, where they would enter the code to receive payment. All code entries were verified by me personally.

7 Since the surveys were fielded within weeks of one another, concerns over systematic differences between scenarios in terms of recruit characteristics are of minimal concern.
### Table 4.2: Demographic Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self, family, or friend (past 12 yrs.)</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race &amp; Ethnicity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White or Caucasian</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or African American</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic or Latino(a)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American or Alaska Native</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asian</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Ethnic Identification</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Racial or Ethnic Identification</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some High School</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GED</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Diploma</td>
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<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College, No Degree</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associates Degree</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors Degree</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters Degree</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional or Doctorate Degree</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

but no degree a close second. Age skews rather young, with a median of thirty years of age and a mode of twenty-six.

Disposition toward President Obama matters a great deal more to the theoretical proposition under examine here than other demographic categories. Gender, race, education, and military affiliation may have an affect on the overall level of support for military intervention, but nothing in theory says that these characteristics will influence susceptibility to third-party persuasion relative to appeals made by the president himself. In contrast, the theory makes a clear prediction that those who are disposed to oppose the president will respond negatively toward his appeals relative
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Party Identification

Figure 4.2: Distribution of Ideology
Figure 4.3: Presidential Performance Satisfaction

Figure 4.4: 2012 Presidential Preference
to other sources. In the sample, party and ideological self-identification skew toward the Democratic and liberal end of the scale. Democratic identifiers represent just under 45% of the sample, compared to 33% and 22% for independents and Republicans, respectively. Ideology has a more pronounced bias toward the liberal side of the spectrum with 52% compared to 26% for conservatives and 22% for self-described moderates. In contrast, a 52% majority of respondents report dissatisfaction with President Obama’s job performance, compared to 37% who report satisfaction and 11% who remain neutral.

**Figure 4.5: Disposition to President Obama (Composite Index)**

The composite index of the three Likert-scale measures of disposition toward President Obama — party, ideology, and satisfaction — has a much more balanced distribution, which appears close to normal. The mean value of the index, with the same range but with nineteen discrete values instead of seven, is 3.82, very near the mid-point value of 4. The standard deviation is 1.4, and the curve appears roughly uni-modal. Of the 80 respondents with a composite value of 4, half express a preference for President Obama, 4 for Romney, and 36 for Other or None. The half who express a preference for the incumbent are grouped with those respondents whose disposition is to the left.
of the mid-point; those who preferred a challenger (or did not have a preference) are grouped with those to the right of the mid-point. This produces a binary disposition variable, with 56% in support and 44% in opposition.

**Table 4.3: Treatment Distribution (# Respondents)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>167</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[19]</td>
<td>[17]</td>
<td>[21]</td>
<td>[17]</td>
<td>[74]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Obama</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[13]</td>
<td>[17]</td>
<td>[24]</td>
<td>[24]</td>
<td>[78]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator McCain</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[17]</td>
<td>[14]</td>
<td>[23]</td>
<td>[21]</td>
<td>[75]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Lobbyist</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[17]</td>
<td>[15]</td>
<td>[14]</td>
<td>[10]</td>
<td>[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinktank Analyst</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[19]</td>
<td>[10]</td>
<td>[20]</td>
<td>[17]</td>
<td>[66]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Admiral</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[21]</td>
<td>[18]</td>
<td>[23]</td>
<td>[16]</td>
<td>[78]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[106]</td>
<td>[91]</td>
<td>[125]</td>
<td>[105]</td>
<td>[427]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 shows the distribution of respondents into the twenty-four treatment groups. Figures in square brackets indicate the number of opposition respondents in each treatment group. The Syria scenario was the first project completed with a total of 250 initiated surveys. Based on the rate of non-completion in this scenario, subsequent runs for the remaining scenarios were adjusted to yield a target of about 250 completed surveys. This explains the lower respondent count in Syria scenario. Randomization within scenarios appears to have functioned fairly well, although there are some differences in the proportion of opposition respondents between scenarios. The largest within-scenario discrepancies are the smaller proportion of opposition respondents in the Angola scenario across all source treatments, the Angola / Think-tank Analyst group, and the Russia / Ethnic Lobbyist group. Smaller levels of opposition-respondent under-representation appear in
the Syria / President Obama group, the Angola / Ethnic Lobbyist group, and the Russia / Ethnic Lobbyist group. Overall, the combined Ethnic Lobbyist and Think-tank Analyst groups are under-represented by about 25% and 12% respectively. This under-representation of opposition in these groups is unfortunate, given that these are the primary treatments of interest in the analysis, and will reduce the efficiency of the estimates regarding their effects.

4.4 Results

Overall, results are mixed, but have some promising aspects. Presented here are results for two sets of responses, those that reflect opposition respondents’ own reactions to the proposed interventions (SELF reactions), and all respondents’ beliefs about the reactions of the typical conservative Republican (CONREP reactions). Results are reported for all five reaction items and a composite average for all items. All p-values reflect one-tailed significance tests of the hypothesis that the group mean is greater than the mean for responses to appeals made by President Obama. For SELF reactions, the China scenario produces the best results. In the Syria and China scenarios, CONREP results are very promising. These findings should be considered preliminary, and justify further research.

4.4.1 Syria

Syria has been a long-standing rival (if not enemy) of the US, a Russian (nee Soviet) client, an autocratic state in a region of great national security concern, and a Ba’ath Party dominated regime like that of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. It also has a long history of oppression toward its own minority populations. In 2011, a civil war began in the midst of a three-year drought, a conflict that continues to this day. At the time of the survey, the civil war itself remained the major focus of American attention, especially the tactics of the Syrian government toward its own people, which likely included the use of chemical weapons. At the time, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria had yet to establish itself as a major player in the country. The base vignette text, with no source
The United States should consider taking military action against the country of Syria. Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad has repeatedly shown contempt for the rules of the international community by sponsoring terrorism, violently suppressing democratic movements, and using chemical weapons against his own people. Syria’s civil war has already crossed the border into Lebanon, and currently threatens to spread to Jordan, an important ally of the US. An intervention by the US would prevent an international crisis. It would liberate the people of Syria, whose tyrannical government has repressed them brutally since the current uprisings began. The Syria scenario was included as a case with elements of both humanitarian concern and national security implications.

References to President Assad’s brutality and contempt for international norms, his suppression of democracy, and the proposed aim of liberating the Syrian people frame the intervention in humanitarian terms. The support of terrorism, the use of chemical weapons, the potential for creating instability in Lebanon and Jordan, and the prospect of international crisis all frame it as a national security issue.

As shown in Table 4.4, none of the SELF reactions significantly vary relative to those made in response to presidential appeals. On the question of the issue’s importance, a case may be made that the presidential appeal raise the issue salience, even among his opposition. P-values of .97 and .98 in one-tailed tests support the opposite claim, that appeals by the ethnic lobbyist and navy admiral reduce the salience of the issue. On the other hand CONREP reactions produce fairly strong evidence that the treatments have the expected effect. Senator McCain’s appeals produce a significant positive change across all items. The ethnic lobbyist produces significant positive effects on most items, with the exception being the question of the proposed mission improving US security, where it just misses meeting the significance threshold ($\alpha = .05$). There is some support for the Think-tank analyst treatment effect, but only with a relaxed threshold ($\alpha = .1$).
### Table 4.4: Comparison of Means — Syria Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Con-Rep</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I support the proposed military action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Barack Obama</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattributed Source</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator John McCain</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbyist, Ethnic Organization</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst, Policy Institute</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral, US Navy</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The article makes a strong case for military action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Barack Obama</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattributed Source</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator John McCain</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbyist, Ethnic Organization</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst, Policy Institute</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral, US Navy</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The proposed military action will make the US more secure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Barack Obama</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattributed Source</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator John McCain</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbyist, Ethnic Organization</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst, Policy Institute</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral, US Navy</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The proposed military action is the moral thing to do</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Barack Obama</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lobbyist, Ethnic Organization</td>
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<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst, Policy Institute</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral, US Navy</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>This conflict is one of the most important issues facing the US</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Barack Obama</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattributed Source</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
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<td>Senator John McCain</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbyist, Ethnic Organization</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst, Policy Institute</td>
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<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral, US Navy</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composite average across items</strong></td>
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<td>Analyst, Policy Institute</td>
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<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral, US Navy</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.2 Angola

The American public likely knows very little about Angola. Located on the Atlantic coast of Africa, a continent most respondents likely view as a place of poverty, famine, and internal violence, but with little in the way of security implications for the US. For these reasons, it was chosen to represent a plausible scenario for an unmixed humanitarian intervention. Security studies scholars may recall the Angolan Crisis of 1975–75, wherein the newly independent former colony of Portugal became a Cold War battleground, with the US and the USSR each supporting separate local militias fighting to claim power. Even at the time, the broader US public saw little importance in the outcome of the conflict, and the anti-Apartheid movement succeeded despite a partnership between the South African government and the US-sponsored National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. In 2014, the US public surely saw little security importance in a posited conflict in Angola.

The United States should consider sending troops to keep the peace in Angola, located on the Atlantic coast of southern Africa. The former Portuguese colony has been tormented by internal struggles for power as well as suffered from violence spilling over from civil wars in neighboring countries. Local militias have exploited the people’s extreme poverty and monopolized Angola’s wealth of mineral resources such as diamonds, gold, and nickel. US troops could help maintain the fragile peace established in 2002 after over a quarter century of brutal civil war. Furthermore, the US presence would help boost the effectiveness of the strong Catholic missionary presence working within Angola to alleviate the people’s suffering.

Poverty, exploitation of natural resources by militias, brutality, and human suffering all evoke humanitarian needs. The proposed US goal is the maintenance of a fragile peace and promotion of religious missionary work. Please note that the conflict portrayed in the vignette is entirely fictional.

None of the SELF reactions reveal a significant source effects for any of the third-party appeals. CONREP responses reveal some of the expected effects, though only for Senator McCain. The most significant effects are in the support for the military action and the importance of the issue. The effect carries into the composite reaction as well. Among all the tested scenarios, the Angolan evidence is the weakest. The lack of effect in the SELF reactions may be a result of the small
Table 4.5: Comparison of Means — Angola Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Con-Rep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I support the proposed military action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Barack Obama</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattributed Source</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
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<td>3.36</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst, Policy Institute</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
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<td>Admiral, US Navy</td>
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<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The article makes a strong case for military action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Barack Obama</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.47</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator John McCain</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbyist, Ethnic Organization</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst, Policy Institute</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
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<td>Admiral, US Navy</td>
<td>3.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>The proposed military action will make the US more secure</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Barack Obama</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator John McCain</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbyist, Ethnic Organization</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst, Policy Institute</td>
<td>2.30</td>
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<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Senator John McCain</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>This conflict is one of the most important issues facing the US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Barack Obama</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
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number of opposition respondents in that category, but the lack of effect in the CONREP reactions indicates that the scenario itself may not resonate with the respondent audience. More work is required to rule out the effectiveness of moral subsidy in purely humanitarian interventions.

### 4.4.3 China

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of China quickly became the most important prospective development in the domain of geopolitics and US grand strategy. After forty years of bipolarity, the Soviet collapse left the US alone as the world’s sole superpower, but with over a billion people and a modernizing economy, Chinese hegemony in East Asia quickly became a very real prospect (Mearsheimer, 2001). The US has guaranteed the security of many less powerful countries in the region, including South Korea, Japan, and the island of Taiwan, which retains formal independence despite the mainland government’s claims over the island. The intention for this scenario is to portray a critical security issue with some balance of humanitarian consideration. Please note that although the vignette represents a plausible scenario, there was no immediate crisis involving China at the time.

The United States should do more to contain the expansion of China and defend its neighbors, especially Taiwan and Japan. The communist Chinese government has claimed the right to govern Taiwan for decades, despite local hopes for establishing a democracy. The Taiwanese people should be free to choose their own political future, rather than remain under the thumb of an autocrat government in Beijing. Expanding military aid could make the difference, and tip the balance of power in the region in favor of this important ally against a rising threat to US influence. It would convince China to halt its efforts to expand its power, and prevent another Cold War before it could begin.

Invoking the prospect for Chinese expansion is meant to trigger a sense of national security threat, as are the threats to neighboring countries, the balance of power, and especially the prospect of a renewed Cold War. Humanitarian concerns also make their way into the scenario, which mentions the prospect of democracy and the fall of autocracy. The balance of information should remain in favor of national security.
### Table 4.6: Comparison of Means — China Scenario

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**Composite average across items**

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Overall, the results for the China scenario are the strongest among the four. Moral subsidy appears to have a significant effect on SELF reactions, especially in the claim that the article makes a strong case for military action. If the significance threshold is relaxed ($\alpha = .1$), Senator McCain is an effective third-party advocate across all reaction items. The Navy Admiral is effective in the first three items, and in the composite. The CONREP reactions are even more consistently effective. Nearly all of the third-party appeals improve respondent reactions across all items and in the composite.

4.4.4 Russia

Despite the end of the Cold War war between 1989 and 1991, Russia remains one of the primary antagonists to the US in geopolitics and international security. During the Cold War, the Soviets were, of course, the only rival superpower in a bipolar world. After the collapse, the countries enjoyed a brief period of amicable relations, which faded as the new Russian oligarchy took form and Vladimir Putin rose to power. At the time of the experiment, Russia had been very much in the news, following the Sochi Olympics and, of course, its seizure of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine. The scenario is intended to evoke, primarily, concerns over national security, with little humanitarian content.

The United States has threatened to punish Russia for seizing territory from its neighbor to the west. The Crimean peninsula is recognized as Ukrainian territory, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has acted in violation of international law by claiming Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. Despite the international community’s unified condemnation of interference in Ukrainian sovereignty, Russian agents have manipulated elections and intimidated the population. Many have questioned the legitimacy of the recent referendum in Crimea to join the former center of the Soviet Empire. Responding to such aggression is one of NATO’s top priorities, and the United States’ leadership is critical to enforcing stiff sanctions against the regime in Moscow.

The repeated use of the word territory is intended to frame the conflict in geopolitical terms, as is the reference to sovereignty, aggression, and the references to the Soviet Empire and NATO. The
Table 4.7: Comparison of Means — Russia Scenario

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manipulation of elections and the intimidation of the Ukrainian population are modest humanitarian cues, but the frame remains primarily one of national security.

Results for the Russia scenario are weak. None of the SELF reactions are significantly different in the third-party appeals than the presidential appeals, unless you relax the significance threshold ($\alpha = .1$), whereupon the think-tank analyst and naval officer are significant in the strong case item. In the CONREP reactions, only Senator McCain’s appeal makes a consistently significant difference. In the items relating to the strength of the case, the security benefits of the operation, the morality of the proposed action, the importance of the issue, and the composite measure, the Senator’s endorsement improves the respondent agreement rating ($\alpha = .05$).

### 4.5 Discussion

This chapter has provided a test of one of the core propositions of the theory of moral subsidy: that third parties are an effective alternative to the president when making appeals to the public in favor of military interventions abroad. Though derived from the logic on interest groups, executive power in foreign policy, and the distribution of information about national security, it also comports with two strands of research in political psychology. Source and framing effects are well-established phenomena. This theory applies these twin logics to using interest group representatives as surrogates for the president when seeking support for intervention.

The experiment in this chapter has produced sufficient preliminary findings to justify pursuing the matter further. There are substantial weaknesses in the current study, however, both in the survey sample and the research design. The problems with the sample are several. First, the demographics of the sample population skew toward younger males, who may have a set of ideas about national security policy distinct from the general population. While this study does not seek to gauge public opinion per se, and thus does not require a nationally representative sample, it is possible that this particular demographic has more fixed ideas about these issues. This would make it harder to induce differences in their responses. Second, respondents were paid very little money for their time, and their attention to the survey may have suffered as a result. The treatment may not
have achieved full exposure. Third, the sample under-represents conservatives and Republicans, precisely the segment of population that the theory proposes moral subsidy would most likely affect under a Democratic administration. In order to balance the population, the composite included variables, namely presidential performance satisfaction, that might not be appropriate. Alternative specifications yielded too few respondents in the opposition to achieve sufficient statistical power. Finally, the respondents self-selected into the experiment knowing it was about “Military Policy,” which may have attracted subjects with idiosyncratic prior attitudes and beliefs.

There are several research design problems as well. First, there are perhaps too many different types of third-party source. The inclusion of the navy admiral, for example, does not speak directly to the question, but serves only as a useful reference point. Also, since the president represents the default source for an administration proposal, the no-attribution group is unnecessary. The presidential source is, functionally speaking, the control group. Second, using different conflict scenarios as variation on the framing is problematic. It adds additional variation, such as salience in the current news media, that potentially confounds the results. Syria, for example, had itself been much in the news, and many Americans would be weary of yet another US intervention in the Middle East (or some would be more favorable as supporters of fighting the Global War on Terror.) The Russia scenario was happening virtually in real time as the survey was fielded. The Angola scenario, on the other hand, may have been too far afield from reality to strike a chord. Finally, there may simply have been stronger and weaker cases among the scenarios.

Future versions of this experiment will make several changes to fix each of these problems. The China conflict will be the sole scenario used. This has two virtues. First, it is unlikely that the potential for conflict between the US and the China will disappear given the former’s status as the most powerful country in the world and the latter’s current and potential growth. Second, it is also unlikely that open combat between the two countries will break out in the foreseeable future. In other words, it will likely remain a latent conflict, ideal for hypothetical inquiry. Instead of varying the frame using different scenarios, the next design will follow the example of Berinsky and Kinder (2006), where the frames are distinguished by the order in which the information is presented. This
holds constant the strength of the argument while allowing variation on the framing. Lastly, the next survey should use a superior recruiting tool than MTurk, allowing for both a representative sample and one with better demographic data, especially with respect to partisanship and ideology. The number of different sources will depend on the size of that sample, using the current study as a power test to determine the target treatment group size.

The results of the experiment, especially with respect to the China scenario, do lend some support to the broader theory. In particular, the reactions of the respondents, speaking as if they were the typical conservative Republican, show that moral subsidy has the ability to induce changes in people’s perceptions of national security politics. It shows that people believe that third parties can be more persuasive than the president, if not to themselves, then at least to others. Perhaps this belief guides the administration’s strategy when mounting a public relations campaign. It also might make the respondent more susceptible to future persuasion, if he or she believes that other people support the president’s agenda. In either case, the current study demonstrates the potential for productive future research.
CHAPTER 5
A HISTORY OF THE CREDIBILITY CARTEL

Previous chapters support individual propositions internal to the theory of moral subsidy. Experimental research supports the premise that outside groups have certain advantages in persuading the public to support military intervention. Large-scale patterns of access to executive branch agencies shows a structural relationship between presidential power and interest group influence. In this chapter, I present an historical account of extra-governmental propaganda collaboration to demonstrate that this practice has attended the most important national security programs since World War II. Beginning with President Franklin Roosevelt’s efforts to more deeply involve the US in support of the Allies against the Axis powers, re-emerging as part of the early Cold War, adapting to the new political realities wrought by the Vietnam War, and continuing through the collapse of the Soviet Union, a coherent set of extra-governmental organizations (EGOs) have assisted most presidential administrations achieve their ambitions. In doing so, they have established themselves as the credibility cartel, shaping the discourse of national security politics.

In the existing literature, Snyder (1991) offers the most important general theory of interest groups in the politics of national security. He argues that late industrialization concentrates economic power, which produces cartels that readily form log-rolling coalitions to coerce the state into pursuing policies that undermine the common good. They do so by promoting false beliefs about the international security environment, myths that lead to over-expansion and self-encirclement.1 Snyder further argues that democracy guards against cartelization, log-rolling coalitions, and the belief in self-defeating myths. Empirically, the anti-Communist war in Vietnam would seem to undermine Snyder’s logic, since the US industrialized early and has a democratic regime type, both of which are supposed to inhibit cartelized politics. However, he argues that the sharing of power between the executive and small number of congressional committees makes possible a transitory form of cartelization, which explains the belief in several of the common myths of empire (Snyder, 1991).

1Such myths include the notion that defense is easier at greater distances from the homeland, that enemies are easily defeated “paper tigers,” that losses and victories lead to more of the same, and others.
Snyder’s argument has a strong foundation, but applying it to the US case requires a good deal of *post hoc* theorizing, and the idea that cartels survive only briefly presents serious conceptional difficulties. The theory of moral subsidy suggests three straightforward corrections to his logic, resulting in a very different explanation of interest group involvement in American imperial intrusion into southeast Asia during the Cold War. First, he overstates the role of Congress in crafting national security policy. Rather than engage in log-rolling negotiations with congressional committees at the planning stage, the executive crafts its own agenda then mobilizes public support, which exerts leverage over representatives and senators.\(^2\) Second, he overstates the informational advantages that imperial commercial enterprises gain from experience in the “hinterland” (Snyder, 1991, pg. 35). The historical evidence presented in this chapter follows the parallel growth of EGOs and the executive’s own official intelligence gathering capabilities, which quickly surpass those of any independent private organization.

Third, he writes, “unless more credible sources like the press or the state can be bought or co-opted, the group’s propaganda may be discounted as coming from an obviously biased source” (Snyder, 1991, pg. 37). This ignores the public mistrust of official propaganda that often makes third parties more credible than the state, rather than less. It also overlooks the ease with which outside groups can present themselves as independent authoritative voices. Furthermore, co-optation does not represent the only means by which government and interest group preferences might align. The executive has a powerful incentive to recruit and cultivate EGOs, and more than sufficient means to do so. Since the inter-war years, most presidential administrations have pursued just such a strategy, which has concentrated persuasive authority among a coherent set of national security interest groups. By no means transitory, US national security politics has at its core a credibility cartel.

The remainder of this chapter presents an analytic history that validates the theory of moral subsidy and explains the origins of the credibility cartel, using primary source material from nearly

\(^2\)This does not rule out some degree of bargaining or strategic avoidance on the part of executive policy-makers, anticipating public resistance or congressional opposition.
a dozen separate archives and secondary source histories as well. It divides the time period between the interwar years and the fall of the Soviet Union into four phases: World War II, the early Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the late Cold War. The first phase comprises the true origins of the cartel, which begins with three closely-related organizations, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDA), the Fight for Freedom Committee (FFC), and the Council for Democracy (CFD), which collaborated with President Roosevelt to mobilize support for deeper US involvement in the war against the Axis Powers. In the second phase, these groups re-emerged under new names, but with many of the same personnel, funding sources, and organizational plans, in order to help implement the Marshall Plan, the national security program outlined in National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68), and President Eisenhower’s “New Look.” During the Vietnam War, the cartel’s fortunes inversely map onto the popularity of the war. In the final phase, the relationship between the cartel and the White House became standard operating procedure, and a close affiliate of the Republican party. The cartel helped promote the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program, and reprised these roles under President Reagan, promoting the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the administration’s anti-Communist agenda in Latin America.

5.1 Analytic Narrative Framework

The primary methodology of this chapter is analytic narrative. It deviates from more traditional historical narrative by virtue of its reliance on deductive-theoretic logic. While it would be naive and dismissive to suggest that contemporary historical scholarship ignores theory, the principal model involved in most historical research is contingency. One thing happens because of some proximate prior event, with strong causality, though limited severely by time, contact, and communication. I do not abandon the principle that sequence matters a great deal. Indeed, an important aspect of my theory relies on the notion that earlier events have a profound impact on later ones. What distinguishes the analytic historical approach from the historical narrative perspective is that the causal pathway cannot be expressed properly in the metaphor of the chain, one link perfectly dependent on the next for its impact. It follows a more complex model than pure contingency.
In some research traditions, agency dominates. Whether “great men” or plain folk, people convert their will and intention into action. In other traditions, agency recedes as structure comes forward. The individual behaves as the broader forces of constraint and coercion dictate. Rational choice theory — where analytic narrative was first formalized in the discipline of political science (Levi, 2004) — follows the first tradition and wrestles with the problem of aggregating individual actions into coherent macro-visible forms, acknowledging that institutions interact with interests to shape outcomes. Historical materialism begins with the premise of the second tradition, and struggles to articulate a description of authentic behavior that we may only imagine, embedded as we are in the institutions that create, shape, and destroy individuals. The current chapter recognizes the virtues of both traditions, and borrows from each. It acknowledges the power of “superstructure” — the firmament of ideas given not by natural law but by those who wield influence. At the same time, it accommodates the liberal indeterminacy of utility-seeking self-interest, rejecting any presumption of teleological progress toward some prescribed end.

As fully described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I propose a causal model whereby presidential administrations pursue extra-governmental propaganda collaboration under a certain set of conditions. Presidents may be either ambitious or cautious. If they are cautious, they seek limited intervention, defined as policies that they have sufficient discretion to pursue unilaterally. If they are ambitious, they seek public support for their proposed intervention. If the administration faces public resistance or congressional opposition, they recruit EGOs to collaborate on mounting a propaganda campaign. The administration uses whatever public support it can muster as leverage over Congress. Congress may yet oppose the administration, requiring additional public support and stepped up propaganda efforts. In the absence of public resistance and congressional opposition, EGO collaboration should not occur. When the president’s ambitions include an organized program of foreign propaganda, EGOs that have proven themselves capable partners should help conduct public diplomacy campaigns. The administration selects groups on the basis of policy agreement and credibility. Groups that are either too militant in their position, or insufficiently so, should be marginalized. Credibility depends largely the group’s ability to maintain a plausible im-
age of political independence from the administration. Other factors include occupational status, social prestige, and mission-relevant expertise.

Table 5.1 summarizes the episodes under review in this chapter. The first two columns list the cases and episodes in the narrative. The second group of four columns show the values on the independent variables: presidential ambition (Amb), public resistance (Resist), congressional opposition (Oppo), and a mandate to produce foreign propaganda (FProp). The EGO column lists which organizations figure prominently in the analysis. In this column, items in parentheses represent organizations that the administration marginalizes, and items in square-brackets are official government agencies or individuals. The two right-most columns indicate whether the listed EGO is in agreement with the president’s agenda and whether it has its own independent credibility.

All episodes have presidents with ambitious national security plans. In a sense, then, ambition is a scope condition of the current study. Otherwise, the cases offer full coverage across the various combinations of the episode-level variables, and some coverage of the variation among EGO characteristics. Credibility varies little in the archival record. Occasionally, groups reach out to the administration offering their assistance, only to be rejected for reasons consistent with the current theory. However, the goal of this analysis does not include creating a comprehensive survey of all available interest groups and sorting them into successes and failures. Instead, it aims to explain the reasoning behind the administration’s choices to collaborate with, marginalize, or fight against particular groups. It validates the proposition regarding credibility, for instance, by showing the importance to policy-makers of maintaining the fiction of EGO independence.

The history begins in the 1930s, after Nazi Germany had begun its conquest of Europe and Japan had begun its occupation of China and Manchuria, but before the attack at Pearl Harbor. Despite being elected twice already, and enjoying a Democratic majority in both chambers throughout his presidency, FDR faced both public resistance and congressional opposition to deeper US involvement in the European crisis, especially in the Senate and from rival organized interests, chief among them the America First Committee (AFC) headed by Charles Lindbergh. Roosevelt turned to three EGOs to help make the case for abandoning isolationism, the CDA, the FFC, and the CFD,
Table 5.1: Summary of Extra-Governmental Collaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Episode</th>
<th>Amb</th>
<th>Resist</th>
<th>Oppo</th>
<th>FProp</th>
<th>EGO</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Cred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>Quarantine</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FFC</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CFD</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pearl Harbor</td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>[OWI]</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(AFC)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Early Cold War</td>
<td>Marshall Plan</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AAUN</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NSC 68</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>[PSB]</td>
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<td>CPD</td>
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<td></td>
<td>New Look</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>(AAUN)</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NCFE</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>Americanization</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(CEPD)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disenchantment</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>[VIG]</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnamization</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>[COLSON]</td>
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<td>CPF</td>
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<td>AWP</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
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<td>AEI</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(AEWC)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late Cold War</td>
<td>ABM &amp; SDI</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>CCSA</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>ASC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Contras</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>[WH/OPL]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Y</td>
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headed by leading figures in media, law, and society. After Pearl Harbor, many of these leaders became officers in the Office of War Information (OWI), the principal propaganda bureau in the US government, with a mandate to produce both foreign and even some domestic propaganda. Given restrictions on the latter, however, the War Advertising Council (AC), a private association of communications professionals, served as a partner in producing and distributing much of the domestic material. The America First Committee (AFC) fared poorly, its credibility severely damaged by the perception that it had sympathized with the Nazi regime with which the country was now at war.

From the early years of the Cold War during which the consensus in favor of militarized containment of Soviet Union was built, I next examine three separate episodes. First, President Truman’s efforts to secure authorization and appropriations for the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe met with opposition from both the public and Congress, which tried unsuccessfully to reduce the scale of the program. In response, Truman aides re-convened their old allies from the CDA to form the Committee for the Marshall Plan (CMP). Next, the ambitious program of Soviet containment outlined in NSC 68 required a substantial increase in military expenditures, to which end consultants to Truman’s National Security Council (NSC) actually resigned their positions to found the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). The American Association for the United Nations (AAUN) was originally a close affiliate of the administration, but fell out of favor when it disagreed with the administrations hard-line stance on the nature of the Soviet threat and the capability of the UN to provide a venue for cooperation between the world’s two remaining great powers.³ President Eisenhower had a somewhat easier time of it, both because his “New Look” program required less in the way of new spending on arms and because he enjoyed a relatively collegial relationship with Congress for most of his two terms, either by virtue of its majorities being of the same party or for his deft avoidance of partisan conflict during divided government (Skowronek, 2003, pp. 46–47). He maintained his relationships with the EGOs with which Truman and Roosevelt

³The American Association for the United Nations (AAUN) was originally the League of Nations Association (LNA). The group was led by Clark Eichelberger under both names.
had collaborated, and had a strong warrant to pursue foreign propaganda through the United States
Information Agency (USIA), the official propaganda organ that the president and his closest ad-
visors managed through the newly created Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Leaders of the
credibility cartel were instrumental in the design and activities of each of these agencies.

The Vietnam War represents the middle years of the Cold War, spanning three presidencies,
and is presented here as a single case.4 In 1965, when President Johnson began the escalation and
“Americanization” of the war following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, he did so with both congres-
sional consent and public support. At that point, he and his closest national security aides were
confident that they could manage the task of mobilization without serious help from EGOs, going
so far as to decline an offer of help from the Committee for an Effective and Durable Peace in
Asia (CEDP) and the very people who had collaborated with Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.
By 1967, the public had become disillusioned with the war, and congressional Democrats showed
signs of abandoning their party leader and president. The Johnson administration made an abrupt
shift on the matter of extra-governmental collaboration, and worked covertly with the Committee
for Peace and Freedom in Vietnam (CPF) to keep the public and Congress on his side, an effort that
failed. President Nixon had no easier time with the problem of Vietnam, though his fortunes in the
White House depended less upon its success. He faced a Democratic Congress with several key
members working hard to bring an end to the war, which Nixon fought to extend. To this end, he
worked closely with the Americans for Winning the Peace (AWP), the American Security Council
(ASC), and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) — funneling tens of millions of dollars in pri-
vate money into the latter organization — in order to defeat the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment
aimed at putting an end to Nixon’s program of “Vietnamization” and bringing US troops home
immediately. Anti-war senators organized their own EGO, the Amendment to End the War Com-
mittee (AEWC), for the same reason that administrations seek outside help, and the difficulties they
face reveal the advantages interest groups have in national security politics when they partner with

4US involvement in Vietnam begins before Johnson, of course, as early as Eisenhower. In the first decade, however,
the American role in the conflict was mostly restricted to CIA and military advisors, with a nearby naval presence to
provide support.
the executive instead of Congress.

I conclude the analytic narrative with a brief review of the late Cold War, a time of dissensus, though not over whether to pursue a robust internationalism, but how. EGO collaboration continues to follow from the same conditions, resistance and opposition, in exactly the national security areas over which the two parties disagree. President Nixon enlisted the Citizens Committee to Safeguard America (CCSA) and the American Security Council (ASC) to help sell the Safeguard ABM program. President Reagan did the same with respect to selling the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and trying to overcome opposition to his program of military aid to the Contras in Nicaragua and his broader anti-Marxist efforts in Central America, using both the ASC and the Citizens for America (CFA), among many other organizations. To facilitate these efforts, Republican presidents made a particularly important institutional change affecting the relationship between the executive and EGOs. President Ford created the White House Office of Public Liaison (WH/OPL), with the explicit mandate of providing a venue for communication between the president’s advisors and interest groups. The NSC also created the State Department Office for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean (S/LPD) to promote the “Reagan Doctrine” in Central America.

In all cases of EGO collaboration, I show that the recruited groups help to provide one or more of a particular type of moral subsidy to compensate for specific liabilities in the administration’s capacity to persuade the public or bargain with Congress. I draw from the conceptual elaboration presented in Chapter 2. To review, there are four potential categories of liability: 1) the ubiquity of partisanship and political competition, 2) uncertainty regarding the anticipated gains from the proposed intervention, 3) questions of presidential character, and 4) the fact that foreign intervention often involves killing and dying. Likewise, there are four types of moral subsidy: 1) endorsement from people connected by common cultural identity with a victim population on whose behalf the president proposes to intervene, 2) instrumental anthropological and cultural intelligence that assists in strategic planning, to mitigate harm to populations in the target territory and improve the efficiency of military operations, 3) rhetorical translation by policy experts into a language that reflects the normative beliefs of the community, and 4) the laundering of sensitive or restricted
information, enabling public discussion of intelligence the origins of which must be kept confidential or at least unofficial. The combination of liability and subsidy type will inform the selection of organization for recruitment. Given the prohibition against official propaganda, most cases will involve information laundering; given the shortage of public attention paid to foreign affairs, uncertainty over gains will burden most presidential initiatives.

In summary, the empirical strategy in this chapter applies the following framework to primary and secondary historical sources. To explain the decision by the administration to recruit EGOs, I show that each episode meets the scope condition of presidential ambition and that variation in public resistance, congressional opposition, and a warrant to conduct foreign propaganda reliably predicts variation in collaboration. I offer evidence revealing that perceived group credibility and policy agreement influence the choice of extra-governmental partner. Given the nature of policy domain, the persuasive difficulties that administrations face will fall into a limited set of categories; given the structural-informational role of interest groups, they will provide a particular type of propaganda assistance to ambitious presidents, which I call moral subsidy. The result is the growth of influence over national security politics by a coherent community of EGOs, the credibility cartel.

5.2 World War II

The credibility cartel has its origins in the interwar years. President Roosevelt’s ambitions for involving the United States more deeply in the growing crisis in Europe, and in the ongoing conflict in east Asia met with both public resistance and congressional opposition. FDR’s attempts at persuading the public and striking various bargains with Congress proceeded in concert with the propaganda efforts of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDA), the Fight for Freedom Committee (FFC), and the Council for Democracy (CFD). The leaders of these organizations were visible public figures and intellectual leaders in their communities, and Roosevelt used their credibility to good advantage. After the president’s failed Quarantine Speech, the administration worked with these EGOs to rescind statutory neutrality, enact the cash-and-carry provisions of the 1939 Neutrality Act that allowed the sale of arms to combatants in Europe and Asia, make
the “Destroyers for Bases” deal that transferred much needed naval warships to Britain for its fight against Nazi Germany, and deliver massive amounts of military and civilian-use goods to the Allies through the Lend-Lease Program. After Pearl Harbor, the need for extra-governmental support faded, as public resistance and congressional opposition disappeared with the surprise attack by Japan and the declaration of war by Germany.

5.2.1 Quarantine

After World War I, the United States largely demobilized its military. It had intervened late in the war, and although it largely escaped the devastation that fell upon the major belligerents on the continent of Europe, it had seen enough of the carnage wrought by modern warfare. The victorious Allies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean convened organizations of scholars, political and military leaders, and public intellectuals to study and understand how European civilization had descended so quickly into mass slaughter, among them G. Lowes Dickinson, who had identified the core of the problem in the logic of international anarchy (G. L. Dickinson, 2007, orig. 1916). The proposed solution was the League of Nations, championed by Woodrow Wilson. The US public rejected this internationalist agenda, and retreated into isolationism, a grand strategy that many believed made sense for a country far removed from the great power competitions in Europe and Asia (Russett, 1972).

The Great Depression, along with the rise of Progressivism in the American midwest, strengthened the constituencies opposed to foreign involvement based on the belief that military spending would reduce welfare provision. Additionally, much of American, and especially the Great Lakes region from which the progressive movement emerged, had a large contingent of ethnic Germans — the largest ethnic group in the United States by nationality throughout much of American history. This made it extremely difficult for President Roosevelt to succeed in bringing the US into the war, as he thought necessary (Trachtenberg, 2006; Schuessler, 2010, 2015). The rise of Nazism re-awakened the interventionist mandate, and FDR worked for years to get the US more deeply involved in assisting the Allied Nations in both theaters of war, collaborating with several of the
organizations that had failed to win support for the League of Nations. This time, however, they succeeded up to a point, whereupon the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor rendered their efforts unnecessary. This collaboration laid the foundation upon which the credibility cartel was built, in terms of personnel, policy orientation, and a template that informed its organizational progeny for decades to follow.

Ambition

According to the popular history of World War II, war was forced upon the American people by Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. In fact, the Roosevelt administration had been working to get the US more deeply involved in the war on behalf of the Allies. Overt policies such as the Lend-Lease program and the exchange of US destroyers for British Caribbean and north Atlantic naval bases were clear signals that the US objected to Axis expansion. Still, the administration’s efforts to help the Allies extended beyond these policies, as Roosevelt worked to muster public support for whatever US involvement might become necessary in his mind.

While Roosevelt was never an isolationist himself, he initially laid low on the issue of intra-European conflict. His concern grew as he observed Hitler’s appetite for expansion, beginning in 1936 with the remilitarization of the Rhineland, increasing in 1938 after the annexation of the Sudetenland and Austria, accelerating in 1939 upon the invasion of eastern Europe, and skyrocketing in 1940 with the conquest of northern Europe and France. FDR had supported the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1936, which had imposed a ban on all sales of arms by US companies to belligerents in wars between nations. His alliance with the isolationists weakened in July, 1937, when he refused to invoke the Neutrality Act’s embargo provisions in response to Japan’s invasion of northern China, keeping open China’s lifeline (Cole, 1983, ch. 16). His “Quarantine Address” signalled a clear break with his former political partners.

[I]f we are to have a world in which we can breathe freely and live in

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5 China had roughly one one-hundredth the native industrial capacity of Japan in 1937, while Japan’s was robust and growing quickly. See the National Material Capabilities Database for details, originally published in conjunction with Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972).
amity without fear – the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure.

The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality (Roosevelt, 1937).

He never even mentioned Germany or Japan, but he named his previously supported policies and former domestic allies, neutrality and isolationists, as newly made antagonists.

**Resistance**

The task of getting the public to support taking steps that risked full US entry into the war was made especially difficult by three factors. First, the public’s experience with World War I had soured their appetite for European intervention. Second, the work of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) had been too effective for its own long-term good.

Long before the United States had joined that conflict, the American people had been subjected to intensive propaganda, much of it from abroad, particularly from Great Britain. Once the United States had become a belligerent, the burden of telling Americans what to think passed to the government... The propaganda worked so well that it aroused intense public criticism of its anti-democratic implications and the false perceptions and hysteria it had produced. Resentments were kept alive in the thirties by anti-war literature which left Americans feeling ill used by propagandists, foreign and domestic (Steele, 1985, pp. 83-4).

Third, the political coalition upon which Roosevelt had built his power objected to deeper US involvement. Comprised largely of New Deal Democrats and Progressives, his public relations team rejected any program that would syphon funds from domestic welfare spending, and war mobilization threatened to do just that (Lavine & Wechsler, 1972; Steele, 1985).

Charles Lindbergh maintained the public face of isolationism. Perhaps the second most popular person in the country (presuming FDR was the first), Lindbergh’s landmark solo flight across the Atlantic and the infamous murder of his infant son had earned him the public’s admiration and
sympathy. His family moved to England in 1936 to find some privacy from the American press, and he was tasked by the US military to assess the European situation, including the status of the German air power capabilities. By his appraisal, joining the Allies would be a dangerous proposition for the US. Between Lindbergh’s public credibility and Senator Gerald Nye’s political position, the isolationists held fast through most of the 1930s.

Opposition

The congressional forces opposing FDR were formidable. Senator Gerald Nye (R-ND) sat on the Republican Committee on Committees, the party organ responsible for deciding whom to place on authorizing committees in the Senate. Nye had presided over Senate Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry from 1934–36, convinced that special interests had bullied President Wilson into joining the US in World War I. A staunch isolationist, he packed the Foreign Relations Committee with powerful allies among the progressive bloc, including Arthur Vandenberg, Bob LaFollette, Jr., Hiram Johnson, Henrik Shipstead, and Arthur Capper. He joined them on Foreign Relations in 1940 (Cole, 1962, pg. 168). From this position, these senators fought successfully to keep the embargo against providing arms to any combatant country in the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937, but failed in 1939 after Roosevelt had hit upon a winning domestic political strategy and the Nazi threat was too clear to ignore.

Collaboration

After the Quarantine Speech, public resistance made Roosevelt recant, but this signaled a shift in political strategy, not a change in preference. “Though for the time being he shelved his plan, the President remained firmly convinced that the United States, in its own interest, could no longer stand wholly aloof from the world crisis” (Langer & Gleason, 1952, pg. 24). Indeed, this tactical retreat showed how much the president needed help selling the public on national security policies. William Allen White and Clark M. Eichelberger responded to the Quarantine speech, and the public reaction against it, by organizing first the Committee for Concerted Peace Efforts and eventually the
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDA) to help shift opinion in FDR’s favor. White himself believed assisting the Allies held the best hope for containing Germany without requiring US entry into the war, nevertheless he saw US assistance to Britain as a necessity (Olson, 2013, pg. 131). FDR’s 1937 speech, though itself unsuccessful in persuading the public, prompted these extra-governmental partners into action. White wrote to Roosevelt upon stepping down from the committee in December of 1941, “[f]rom the days of your first quarantine [sic] speech up until this minute you have handled this foreign question with dignity, with vision, with courage and high patriotism.” Since that public announcement, they worked together — though their collaboration remained quiet — to get the US more deeply involved in helping the Allies, though often cautiously, stealthily, in increments calibrated to avoid out-running a reluctant public (Trachtenberg, 2006; Schuessler, 2010, 2013; Trachtenberg, 2013; Schuessler, 2015).  

In the four years between his Quarantine Address and the attack on Pearl Harbor, FDR pursued a measured strategy of increasing aid to the allies, with the help of three main extra-governmental organizations, the CDA, the Fight for Freedom Committee (FFC) — itself a spinoff of the CDA also known in its early days as the Century Group, and the Council for Democracy (CFD). Though formally separate, they collaborated closely with each other and their personnel rosters overlapped considerably. Their ranks included William L. Clayton (who became a high level State Department official under Roosevelt and Truman), C. D. Jackson (one of President Eisenhower’s closest aides), Allen Dulles (future Director, CIA), Dean Acheson (future Secretary of State), and John Foster Dulles (future Secretary of State), among many others with notable future careers as national security policy-makers. Together these groups formed the core of what would become the credibility cartel.

Their task was to execute a political strategy for winning over opponents of intervention, primarily by stoking public opinion. Once the public supported deeper involvement, Congress would

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6 Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library (FDRL), President’s Personal File (PPF), PPF 1191 (X-Ref’s, 1944–45) – 1211, Box 1, White, William Allen, Letter from William Allen White to FDR, July 11, 1941.

7 The question of FDR’s desire to involve the US in World War II is the subject of debate. See Reiter (2012, 2013) for a rebuttal to this argument, and Kaiser (2013) for a position in between, though far more supportive of the former.
Roosevelt had known that the public was the key to winning over the legislature. “His practice... was to appeal, not to the good sense of Congress, but to that of the country at large” (Langer & Gleason, 1952, pp. 5-6). He was extremely hesitant to get too far out in front of mass opinion, to the point that his extra-governmental partners became frustrated with his caution. After a meeting with FDR in August of 1940 during which the president remained non-committal on the Destroyers for Bases program, several members of the Century Group recognized that their best path forward was to find bipartisan support for the policy, to overcome the president’s persuasion deficits by enlisting the support of the Republican nominee for president.

Under the circumstances the Century Group thought its only remaining recourse would be to help solve the problem by approaching Mr. Willkie and in the meanwhile to arouse public opinion to the point where the President would feel safe in going ahead (Langer & Gleason, 1952, pp. 747-8).

Roosevelt’s reticence was not a matter of policy disagreement, but the product of a cautious political calculation by a third-term president facing a re-election campaign, and he needed help neutralizing this potential political vulnerability.

As the three groups formed the core of the propaganda program, they worked to mobilize public support and to define the question in a way that drew divisions not between parties, but between the executive and the legislature on the one hand, and between patriotic interventionists and perfidious isolationists on the other. A telegram from Courtenay Barber, Jr., head of the Chicago branch of the FFC, to several recalcitrant members of Congress reads loud and clear.

If you do not vote approval of the administration stand... the ‘breach of faith’ will not be with the draftees but with the majority of the people of this country who look to you for legislation guaranteeing the present and future safety of the United States.8

The staff of the CFD consciously chose the role of propagandist.

[T]he first choice is whether the Council should be a “propaganda” agency, seeking to form and influence opinion and behavior primar-

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8University of Chicago Library Special Collections Research Center (UCL-SCRC), FFC Records, 1941–1947, Box 1, Folder 16, Telegram from Courenay Barber, August 11, 1941.
ily on a national scale, or a “social action” agency, applying social and political pressure through mass membership and local organizations. The staff feels that we should be an opinion-forming agency.\(^9\)

The CDA for its part had the “Emporia Gazette” — the newspaper outlet of its chairman, William Allen White, perhaps the biggest small-town journalist in US history — a man who commanded national attention while cultivating a local authenticity that made him eminently credible with the public (Johnson, 1947).

The FFC continued to work with Willkie, and to demonize the isolationists in Congress and the media.\(^10\) They maintained close contact with the administration.

The new group maintained close ties to the White House; its top leaders were in daily touch with [Roosevelt speechwriter] Robert Sherwood, whose wife worked as a volunteer in Fight for Freedom’s headquarters, and other members of FDR’s staff. At the request of [FFC Executive Chairman] Ulric Bell, press secretary Steve Early authorized White House typists to compile mailing lists for the organization from names and addresses of interventionist letters sent to the president (Olson, 2013, pg. 324).

Their Chicago branch organized a boycott of the Chicago Tribune, and worked to establish a rival newspaper that supported intervention, circulating a petition that read, “[w]e want a new morning newspaper that will oppose Hitler, expose un-Americanism, support our government. We want a newspaper devoted to the Truth.”\(^11\) FFC also established a “First to Fight” contingent comprised of the youngest men of fighting age, to show they had the support of those who would pay the greatest price for US involvement.\(^12\) They gave the argument for interventionism a broad public appeal, and a legitimacy that any propaganda coming from the White House could never have. Several weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Archibald McLeish — one of the architects of US psychological warfare — personally expressed the government’s gratitude to CDA and FFC for its

\(^9\)Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEL), CD Jackson Papers, Box 42, Council for Democracy - Angell, E. 1945 (2), Report to Ernest Agnell from the Staff of the Council, November 26, 1941.

\(^10\)UCL-SCRC, FFC Records, 1941–1947, Box 4, Folder 1, Voices for Freedom.

\(^11\)UCL-SCRC, FFC Records, 1941–1947, Box 4, Folder 5, Petition Protesting against the policy of the Chicago Tribune.

\(^12\)UCL-SCRC, FFC Records, 1941–1947, Box 4, Folder 1, What is the Fight for Freedom.
service to the nascent war effort.\textsuperscript{13}

5.2.2 Pearl Harbor

The surprise attack at Pearl Harbor all but eliminated both public resistance and congressional opposition to full American involvement in World War II, and any lingering doubts were put to rest by Adolph Hitler’s declaration of war against the US on December 11, 1941. The EGOs that had helped make possible FDR’s incremental advances toward US involvement no longer needed to whip up public sentiment, and so were formally disbanded.\textsuperscript{14} Many of their top personnel entered government service in roles similar to those they had held as extra-governmental partners. Still, even in a time of war, Congress placed limitations on the government’s ability to undertake a domestic propaganda campaign, so the extra-governmental channel remained open.

Ambition

Roosevelt’s efforts to overcome isolationism and neutrality had taken years of concerted effort and careful planning and collaboration with outside organizations. He had traded away warships to Great Britain in exchange for a string of naval bases in the North Atlantic. He had secured authorization from Congress for the delivery (without immediate payment) of millions of tons of materiel to the Allies. But as important as those programs were, he now embarked on the most ambitious program of his — and possibly any — presidency. The US now had to raise and equip an army, push the Japanese navy back across the Pacific, and liberate western Europe from Nazi occupation. Roosevelt and his general staff originally intended to hold Japan in place in order to focus on Europe first, as outlined in the “Plan Dog” memo, but victories at the battle of Midway and the Coral Sea, along with the developing stalemate between Germany and the Soviet Union after the failure of Operation Barbarossa, made the full rollback of the Japanese naval forces a more

\textsuperscript{13}UCL-SCRC, FFC Records, 1941–1947, Box 1, Folder 4, Letter from Denison Hull, December 22, 1941.

\textsuperscript{14}When many of their top personnel moved into government propaganda positions, some of the remaining members merged to form the Citizens for Victory, but they never received much attention from the administration.
attractive plan. In either case, the demands on the American economy, industry, and populace would be unprecedented.

Resistance

Whatever resistance to US involvement in the war remained on the morning of December 7, 1941, it all but disappeared with reports of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. The general public accepted the activation of the newly-instituted universal male military conscription, rationing of goods deemed necessary for the war effort, and a massive government intrusion in the private sphere of social activity. Moreover, the organizations that had opposed intervention closed their doors, and many of their leaders not only backed down but volunteered for military and government service.

Opposition

Congressional opposition to the war vanished as well. On December 8, the Senate voted unanimously to declare war against Japan, and the House had one lone vote in opposition.\(^{15}\) Senators Nye, Wheeler, LaFollette, Johnson, Vandenberg, and the entire Progressive bloc approved the resolution. They permitted the creation of the the Office of War Information (OWI), which took over from the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) that had been created by executive order in October, 1941.\(^{16}\) Still, they limited the OWI’s budget rather severely considering the situation. As early as the summer of 1943, Republicans in Congress managed to cut the agency’s budget “down to the bone” as a means of putting an end to what remained of the New Deal information programs (Sparrow, 2013, pp. 74–5). So, while congressional opposition to US involvement in the war had all but disappeared, its distaste for official government propaganda had grown no weaker.

\(^{15}\)Jeannette Ranking, a self-identified pacifist and the first woman elected to the US Congress, voted against the declaration. Steadfast, she had also voted against war in 1916, during her first term in office, separated by over two decades from her second term.

Foreign-Targeted Propaganda

World War II required a massive public relations campaign to create and maintain a sense of unity both among the Allied nations generally, and especially between the United States and the countries of Western Europe. Britain had suffered German bombing of its cities under the Blitz of 1940–41. Nearly the entire continent remained under Nazi occupation until 1943, when the Soviet Union began to roll back the German advances on the Eastern front and the US invaded Italy. The bulk of Western Europe remained occupied until the following year, when the Allied forces landed in Normandy on June 6. In the meantime, and during the difficult winter of 1944–45, the US government broadcast a carefully crafted message of US-European unity, enlisting the aid and effort of various private organizations to translate its message into target languages and apply professional public relations techniques to the task (Wall, 2008, pg. 139–155). A great deal of internal debate surrounded the question of how much the various official information agencies — the OWI, the Voice of America (VOA), and even the Library of Congress and bureaus within the Treasury Department — would hew closely to “the truth” or enhance the facts with techniques of persuasion devised by social scientists, advertisers, and Hollywood film-makers (Koppes & Black, 1977; Winkler, 1978; Koppes & Black, 1990). In either case, the government did not simply let the events of the war speak for themselves.

Collaboration

With the public and Congress on board with the war, the administration had less need for the kind of assistance that the CDA and its sibling organizations had provided. However, there were two reasons why the credibility cartel did not simply fade away. First, the demands of war mobilization required a massive public relations effort, and many of the EGO leaders had proven their effectiveness at crafting persuasive messages and organizing propaganda campaigns. These skills were much in demand in the OWI and the various executive branch agencies that proliferated during the war, not only for the sake of foreign-targeted propaganda, but also for the purpose of managing recruitment, labor relations, industrial production, selling treasury bond sales, and rationing raw
materials. Among those who made the transition from EGO leadership to government during the war, C. D. Jackson — front-man for the Council for Democracy (CFD) prior to the war — became an agent of both the OWI and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Jackson would remain an influential member of the Credibility Cartel under President Eisenhower, as both the head of the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), which organized private fund-raising efforts for Radio Free Europe, and as a member of the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Robert Sherwood and Elmer Davis, both members of the CDA were brought on to lead the OWI as well, along with dozens of others who had worked in both the CFD and the Fight for Freedom Committee (FFC) (Olson, 2013, pg. 450).

The second reason why the cartel remained important through World War II is the surviving opposition to public propaganda agencies and the limitations that Congress had placed on executive agency funding and freedom of action. In order to compensate for these restrictions, the administration collaborated with a professional association of advertising and public relations professionals. The War Advertising Council (AC) grew out of a loose collection of advertising agencies opposed to the liberal agenda of the New Deal, but formally incorporated in 1942 and worked cooperatively with the Roosevelt administration, a relationship enabled by their agreement over US involvement in the war and the importance of home-front public service messaging (Griffith, 1983, pg. 390). The organization survives to this day as, simply, AdCouncil, although its public service announcements no longer operate in the domain of national security so explicitly. During the Eisenhower administration, the Advertising Council worked closely with C. D. Jackson and the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) on promoting the president’s foreign policy agenda.

One important pre-war interest group did not make the transition into the propaganda campaign of the war effort. The America First Committee (AFC) did not for the obvious reason that it had opposed any policy that risked involving the US in the war. At this point, not only did they disagree with the president, but their credibility had suffered terribly as the standard-bearers of American

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17 See Sparrow (2013) for a thorough review of the ways in which World War II promoted executive branch growth for the sake of public relations.
isolationism. Now that the US had been attacked, their cause was hopeless. Charles Lindbergh in particular was *persona non grata* to the administration, and the Army Air Forces denied his request to re-instate his commission (Olson, 2013, ch. 28). William Benton, having been less prominent in the America First movement than Lindbergh, and perhaps more politically adept in his dealings with the administration, made the transition from isolationist to interventionist, and became a fixture of American national security public relations efforts for years to come. But the organization itself, and its goals, never recovered. Isolationism made a short-lived comeback during the early Cold War, and an even stronger one as part of the broader opposition to the Vietnam War, but never again dominated US national security politics.

5.3 Early Cold War — Forging Consensus

While the size of the armed forces shrank considerably after World War II, President Truman retained a set of global security commitments that bore little resemblance to US posture in the interwar years. As the contours of the post-war global political order began to take shape toward the end of the 1940s, the US government rebuilt its national security apparatus to fulfill its new role as a great power in the emerging bipolar structure that would define the next four decades of world politics. The National Security Act of 1947, and its amendments in the following several years, reorganized the armed forces, merged the national security cabinet departments into the Department of Defense, and created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Council (NSC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Despite prior hopes that the demonstrations of military power at Hiroshima and Nagasaki would render war irrelevant, and despite the promise of peaceful international cooperation entailed in the formation of the United Nations, the US entered the 1950s with a greatly expanded capability to gather foreign intelligence, threaten its geopolitical adversaries, and engage energetically in national security politics.

Alongside the growth in military and intelligence capacity, the early Cold War created opportunities for extra-governmental collaboration with newly formed agencies responsible for public diplomacy, psychological warfare, and propaganda. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 authorized
the creation of several propaganda agencies throughout the executive tasked with stabilizing US alliances and preventing the rise of communism among western nations (Osgood, 2006, pg. 37). With Congress still wary of establishing an official state apparatus of domestic propaganda, the law prohibited the new agency targeting US audiences with their public relations messages, declaring “no funds authorized to be appropriated to the United States Information Agency shall be used to influence public opinion in the United States.”\(^{18}\) Nothing, however, prevented members of the administration pursuing the same extra-governmental strategy as FDR had used in the late 1930s. The law even encouraged the propaganda agencies to enlist the aid of non-governmental organizations in its operations abroad (Osgood, 2006, pg. 230).

Three major national security programs describe the contours of the early Cold War, each providing important opportunities for testing and refining the practice of interest group recruitment and moral subsidy. First, the Marshall Plan rebuilt Europe, in order to prevent the continent from embracing the promise by Soviet Communism to provide a respite from poverty, as many countries threatened to do. To this end, former members of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDA) and its partners re-convened to establish the Committee for the Marshall Plan (CMP). Second, NSC 68 articulated an aggressive posture with respect to containing Soviet expansion, through military buildup and, when necessary, confrontation with the USSR and its client states. Several members of the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, which had assembled NSC 68, resigned their official posts to team up with EGO leaders to create the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). Finally, the “New Look” policy of President Eisenhower scaled back military expenditures, but ramped up the psychological warfare programs begun under Truman, recruiting members of the credibility cartel to run propaganda operations abroad and, within the constraints of the law, domestically. Among Eisenhower’s most trusted advisors, C.D. Jackson — of the World War II Council for Democracy (CFD) — took a position on the OCB, which was established in order to knit together the proliferation of national security programs into a cohesive whole, and to extract maximum propaganda benefit from their implementation. Jackson also ran

\(^{18}\) 22 USC Sec. 1461-1a
the Crusade for Freedom (CFF), a domestic public relations campaign tasked with raising money for Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America (VOA). The power of the cartel was so great that one of its leaders, Tracy Voorhees, was quietly given the task of designing an entire agency of the US executive, the USIA, which remained active for half a century. Altogether, this period involves a robust growth in propaganda aimed at foreign audiences, but fairly strict constraints against directing the same persuasive campaigns at the US public. The credibility cartel assisted the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in both the foreign and domestic faces of the government’s national security public relations efforts, and developed its influence in the process.

5.3.1 Marshall Plan

The European Recovery Program, also known as the Marshall Plan after Secretary of State George Marshall, delivered the contemporary equivalent of $120 billion to European nations in the aftermath of World War II. Some see it as an historic act of humanitarian generosity on the part of the United States, others as the very embodiment of enlightened self-interest. It knitted together the economic fortunes of Western Europe and the United States, and help lay the groundwork for many of the security alliances that helped the US wage and eventually win the Cold War. It was an ambitious policy that required massive appropriations. It faced a resistant public concerned with high taxes and prices on goods and a Congress controlled by the opposition party, which saw an opportunity to expand its domestic political power. To solve this problem, the Truman administration collaborated with the Committee for the Marshall Plan (CMP) to mobilize public support, winning passage for the plan, punishing the president’s opponents, and empowering the Credibility Cartel.

Ambition

World War II left Europe in ashes. Afraid that the social welfare promised by Soviet communism would prove too attractive to the poverty-stricken nations whose economies could not recover on their own, the Truman administration decided to undertake a massive recovery effort. As made clear in an internal memorandum, the “[p]urpose of Marshall plan is to enable Europeans to have
minimum of economic well-being necessary to ensure that they do not go communist.”

The European Recovery Program ultimately provided over $12 billion in aid under the political leadership of Secretary of State George C. Marshall, and not only succeeded in preventing western European defection to the Soviet sphere, but also helped facilitate the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Though newly empowered by the Smith-Mundt Act to attach a promotional message to every pledged dollar of foreign aid, the same statute prohibited the domestic marketing campaign the administration needed to mobilize domestic opinion in support of the appropriations necessary to meet its promises. As Nicholas Cull writes, “[i]t was the informational equivalent of posse comitatus, the law forbidding domestic deployment of the US military, and touched similar nerves” (Cull, 2010, pg. 40). The war had muzzled the isolationists in Congress and among the public (indeed it had converted more than a few), but interventionists in government still needed outside help convincing the country that the US should not retreat back into fortress America and let Europe fend for itself.

Resistance

Public resistance to the Marshall Plan was less a matter of pushing back against it, less a matter of saying no, than it was a reluctance to prioritize the problems of Europe or to comprehend the complexity of the economic crisis. According to public opinion polling at the time, domestic economic issues dominated the attention of US citizens, such as the cost of living and inflation, while foreign policy issues such as the growing hostility with the Soviet Union and the prospect of further war lagged far behind. Even during the Paris Conference of 1947, during which time the outlines of the plan were frequent front-page news and the talk of Washington, most Americans were unfamiliar with the basic shape of the proposed program (Behrman, 2008, pg. 115). This goes beyond the congenital reluctance of the public to bother itself with foreign affairs. Few could escape learning of the devastation in Europe, so many of its citizens having just helped fight a war there. On top

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19Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (HSTL), Dean G. Acheson Papers, Box 4, Committee for the Marshall Plan - Correspondence - 1947-1948 (2 of 3), Attachment to Memorandum to Mr. Stein from William P. Bundy, January 6, 1948.
of that, the Secretary of the State had lent his voice and his name to the project in a highly public fashion, giving a high-profile speech at Harvard University’s commencement ceremony in June, 1947. Nevertheless, Marshall’s speech not only failed to muster public support or even awareness, it triggered no public action on the part of his own department (Wala, 1986, pg. 250).

There seem to have been two basic problems for the administration that hampered its efforts to mobilize public opinion. First, the program itself was complicated by nature. The problem in Europe was not merely the lack of resources — food, medicine, etc. — but the complete devastation of its economic machinery. “[W]hile the people could understand and support humanitarian relief, the complicated logic of rebuilding entire economic systems was beyond the vast majority of the public” (Bonds, 2002, pp. 59–60). Second, the administration had to abide by statutory restrictions against domestic propaganda, and so could not pursue exactly the kind of simplifying messaging campaign that was needed for the situation. Public support for the program lagged, because “the State Department’s efforts had been handicapped by severe restrictions on public information activities,” with Marshall himself receiving a warning from an Indiana Republican that “the department would not be allowed to ‘propagandize’ the American people” (Bonds, 2002, pg. 59). Congress remained steadfast in prohibiting officially-run public relations campaigns, and the public resisted the Marshall Plan in the absence of a coordinated, persuasive marketing effort in its favor.

Opposition

Congressional opposition arose from three sources, and the formidable Senator Robert Taft led the efforts to reduce the scope of the program substantially. First, the price-tag was staggering, and even the program’s allies balked at such an expenditure. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who was among the leading proponents of the Marshall Plan among Republicans did not initially believe the number when he first learned of it, and he “called ... to confirm the $18 billion figure, which he termed absolutely impossible” (Bonds, 2002, pg. 19). Second, Congress, as it often does for the sake of its members’ individual re-election prospects, followed the lead of its constituencies. “Congress seemed to reflect the uncertain mood of the public, with only about half seeming to be
in favor of European aid” (Bonds, 2002, pg. 85). Finally, the President’s own standing with the Republican-controlled Congress was a liability; the relationship between Truman and the Republicans in the legislature was acrimonious, and this hampered his willingness to mount the bully pulpit and leverage his prestige in support of the plan. Moreover, his partisan opponents saw an opportunity in the 1948 election, to unseat him and have their party hold both elected branches of government for the first time in decades.

[T]he first session of the Eightieth Congress closed on a note of bitter conflict between the Republicans and the Administration and its supporters. A presidential election would be held in 1948, and the Republicans smelled victory... Everything was fair game, and every issue would be highly partisan (Bonds, 2002, pg. 25).

Truman’s political strategy for the Marshall plan involved insulating it from this political rivalry. When White House Counsel Clark Clifford recommended putting the President’s own name on the plan, as opposed to Secretary Marshall’s, “[t]he President overruled Clifford with the observation that a ‘Truman Plan’ would have no chance at all with the present Congress” (Bonds, 2002, pg. 28).

Collaboration

The Committee for the Marshall Plan (CMP) was founded to solve the administration’s public relations problems. Dean Acheson had been Undersecretary of State until he resigned in June of 1947, at which time he helped form the CMP. He took little credit in his autobiography, opting instead to preserve the fiction that it emerged out of private initiative.

By midsummer 1947 an organization had been formed to gain popular and legislative support for the Marshall Plan. This was so uniquely and typically American that it deserves a bit more than passing notice. What made it so was, first, that it was privately organized and second, that it supported a policy for which the Government was also seeking support. Many private organizations, in the United States and elsewhere, protest, sometimes against Government action, sometimes against social or economic disadvantages. But few organize privately to support Government and fewer still to support policies or measures not directly beneficial to themselves or to the group (Acheson, 1969, pg. 240).
Acheson’s resignation from the State department and the nearly simultaneous formation of the CMP is no coincidence. Members of the administration recognized that securing congressional consent required public support, and Acheson himself saw that “educating the public” was the way forward. However, with the prohibition against domestic propaganda, government agencies could not do the job. Secretary Marshall himself, “trust[ing] the traditional model of representative government,” was wary of the idea, and for a time “proceeded in the sanguine assumption that once the public understood they would support the program,” while “[l]ess optimistic men began to look for alternative methods of deriving public support” (Bonds, 2002, pp. 59–60). Among these pessimists, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Benton had himself enforced the propaganda prohibitions, but participated in the decision to outsource the education campaign. “Nevertheless, plans were drawn up in his office outlining a propaganda organization, seemingly independent of, but responsive to, State Department suggestions and advice” (Wala, 1986, pg. 248–9). Marshall relented, and the CMP, “directed by administration policy was set in motion” (Bonds, 2002, pg. 76). As one of the leaders of the CMP, the now privately employed Acheson worked with his own successor at State, Robert M. Lovett, on the very public education campaign he had sought and been denied as a government official.

They promptly went to work producing pamphlets and creating an ostensibly apolitical public relations materials in favor of administration policy. They distributed pamphlets such as “The Marshall Plan or Else” by Livingston Hartley, former Washington, D.C. Director of the CDA, and “Who’s the Man Against the Marshall Plan?” — a none-too-flattering portrait of a typical administration opponent. Their rhetorical strategy reflected an understanding that each audience required its own type of persuasion, with the broader public demanding the starkest, most moralistic tone. Acheson revealed his strategy in a letter about an address he delivered at an elite public affairs forum,

I heard a great number of comments that the general scheme which I

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followed — that is, the Commonwealth speech which tried to explain the fundamental economics of Western Europe and did not try to plunge people into humanitarian ecstacies and fright of communists — helped clarify the matter.\textsuperscript{21}

This contrasts starkly with the mass appeal they made, printed in large block letters, “STOP STALIN NOW,” explaining further that “Stalin can win his great gamble only if we betray our best interests — if we stand supinely by and permit the free people of Europe to go down one by one for lack of our economic aid to their recovery.”\textsuperscript{22} When addressing Congress, they took a mixed approach stating, “[p]assage of the bill [with reduced funding] would undo the good work that has been started in Europe and would be a blow to international trade and our own national security.” With attention to the effects of party loyalty, they arranged for Senator Vandenberg to visit Chicago and make a speech to fellow Republicans and persuade them against isolationism.\textsuperscript{23}

By all accounts, the collaboration between the Truman administration and the CMP worked as intended, solidifying public support for the Marshall Plan and even imposing political costs upon the Republican party for its opposition. Not only did public awareness of the plan and its broad outlines improve between the Summer and Autumn of 1947, so did the public’s assessment of the program’s virtues. “In mid-November, roughly two-thirds — 64 percent — of Americans had heard of the plan; 56 percent had a favorable impression and 17 percent had an unfavorable impression” (Behrman, 2008, pg. 134). Members of Congress either went along with the plan or risked losing office. The bill passed in late March and was signed on April 3, 1947. Senator Taft, who had led the opposition, eventually voted for the bill (at a slightly reduced price-tag to allow him and his allies a bit of face-saving), but many who remained opposed to the Marshall Plan were voted out of office in the mid-term elections that following November (Hitchens, 1968, pg. 54). With the help of the CMP, the Truman administration not only overcame the opposition that threatened the

\textsuperscript{21}HSTL, Dean G. Acheson Papers, Box 4, Committee for the Marshall Plan - Correspondence - 1947-1948 (1 of 3), Letter from Dean Acheson to John A. Ferguson, December 17, 1947.


\textsuperscript{23}HSTL, Dean G. Acheson Papers, Box 4, Committee for the Marshall Plan - Correspondence - 1947-1948 (2 of 3), Letter from Laird Bell to John H. Ferguson, January 14, 1948.
European aid package, they used the plan’s newfound popularity against their partisan rivals, and the Democratic party retook both houses of Congress [support].

A Critical Case of Disagreement

At this time, the rift between the two factions of FDR’s extra-governmental coalition began to widen. Freedom House, created by Eleanor Roosevelt, Wendell Wilkie, and others in the leadership of the Fight for Freedom Committee (FFC), promoted democracy through international institutions. Clark Eichelberger, who had been among the first to rally to Roosevelt’s side after the Quarantine Speech, had helped organize the CMP, but grew disillusioned with the group’s militant public rhetoric. He wrote a letter to CMP Executive Committee Chairman Robert Patterson

I am very much disturbed at the heading “Stop Stalin Now” and most of the text of the newspaper ad which has been sent around for our views.

The text under the heading is reminiscent of a famous ad run some years ago entitled “Stop Hitler Now.” But the circumstances are very different. Germany was then at war with the Western world. To use this same play on words at this time in an ad in support of the Marshall Plan, to my way of thinking, verges on war mongering.\textsuperscript{24}

Eichelberger preferred the liberal-institutionalist approach, promoting the United Nations (UN) as a world governing body, a cause to which he dedicated the remainder of his career. This choice alienated him from President Truman and subsequent administrations. Acheson, meanwhile, saw the UN as ineffectual due to Soviet intransigence, testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,

[t]he United Nations would, it was planned, go forward from this start on the basis of principle and organization which would bring to the settlement of international questions the conscience of mankind and the justice of laws and procedures which dealt equally with the strong and the weak.

\textsuperscript{24}HSTL, The Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 2, Photostatic Copies of Correspondence in the Files of Clark M. Eichelberger, Letter from Clark M. Eichelberger to Judge Patterson, February 13, 1948.
He adds, “[i]t is now plain that the Soviet Union does not intend to join in the task.” This split anticipated the direction of US national security politics over the following several decades, empowering Acheson, C. D. Jackson, and others who favored what would become known as the “Cold War consensus” while Eichelberger’s various organizations lagged far behind their erstwhile colleagues in terms of constituency development and access to the national security apparatus.

Eichelberger had been a founding member of the credibility cartel, having helped establish both the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDA) in the Interwar period and the CMP. He was also a leader of the American Association for the United Nations (AAUN). He had enjoyed a great deal of access to the Truman administration, if not the president himself. However, a rift between Eichelberger’s faction and the CMP was opening up over the Cartel’s emerging militancy regarding the Soviet Union and Truman’s vision of the UN as an instrument of power to be wielded against his Cold War adversary (Accinelli, 1985, pg. 356). From this point forward, Eichelberger’s influence declined substantially. This divergence of preferences among CMP factions serves as a miniature experiment in the importance of EGO-administration policy agreement to the influence of interest groups in national security politics. Beginning in precisely the same position, those among the CMP whose policy preferences remained in aligned with the administration remained much more influential in national security politics than those who favored a less aggressive approach to confronting the Soviet Union.

5.3.2 National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68)

More than any single document, NSC 68 articulated the principles upon which Truman administration militarized the Cold War. It called for substantial increases to expenditures on weapons, bases, and preparedness, in order to defend the Western Hemisphere, protect US allies in Europe and Asia, contain Soviet expansion, and even (under some interpretations) degrade the USSR’s existing military capabilities. It justified its findings by warning of the growing Soviet threat of

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25HSTL, Papers of Clark M Clifford, Box 4, Economic Cooperation Administration - Committee for the Marshall Plan, Statement of the Honorable Dean Acheson Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 28, 1948.
military superiority, going so far as to warn of the possible contingency of an attack on vital US security interests.\textsuperscript{26} It was even more ambitious than the Marshall Plan in many ways, calling for substantial militarization that was both expensive and provocative to the Soviet Union. It faced higher levels of public resistance, at least in the minds of its administration boosters, and congressional opposition that was based less on partisanship than on the fact that particular members who occupied strategically important committee assignments objected to its premises. However, the credibility cartel was ready to take up its role as extra-governmental collaborators, this time as the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD).

Ambition

Although NSC 68 itself did not specify how much the proposed policy changes would entail, the study group that produced the report discussed approximate figures. Implementation would require tripling the defense budget on the lower end of the estimated range, from $13 billion to $35–$50 billion annually (Casey, 2005, pg. 660). In addition to the upfront costs, it would signal a significant change in grand strategic thinking, a shift from the more modest approach to containment suggested by George Kennan in his famous “long telegram” of 1946, to a more comprehensive and aggressive program that identified a much greater scope of territory that the US should commit to defending (Gaddis, 2005, ch. 2 and 3). The report’s proposals were sufficiently ambitious that they gave Truman himself pause. Initially hesitant — though not opposed in principle — the administration only fully got behind NSC 68 after the outbreak of the Korean War (Jervis, 1980, pg. 563). Whether the Korean war itself caused greater administration adoption of NSC 68 or whether intra-executive politics generated the necessary support is a matter of some debate, particularly by Fordham (1998, ch. 3). In any case, few would question the fact of the plan’s ambition.

While primarily focused on building up military capabilities, NSC 68 also included a mandate for psychological warfare, more politely known as public diplomacy. NSC 68 made clear that the

president’s national security team believed that the ideological conflict mattered a great deal in the unfolding Cold War. “There is a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin.”27 This was a recapitulation of National Security Council Report 4 (NSC 4), which concluded

> the present world situation requires the immediate strengthening and coordination of all foreign information measures of the US Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of its objectives and to counteract effects of anti-US propaganda.28

Whether or not the council accurately assessed the importance of ideology and attitudes, these beliefs made their way into the recommendations as the Information Program.

> The primary effort will be directed at creating, in the areas and the nations of most critical importance to the achievement of national objectives of the United States, (a) popular and governmental confidence and resolution in support of the shared interests of the peoples of the free world, and (b) psychological resistance to the further expansion, whether by overt or covert means, of the influence of Soviet Communism... The peoples of the Soviet Union and its satellites, as well as the peoples of the most vulnerable areas of the free world, are primary targets of this psychological offensive.29

The plan called for in increase in funding and activity for the VOA through the “Campaign for Truth” program, already in effect. The emphasis on propaganda would prove beneficial in the long-term for organizations that could prove themselves able public relations collaborators.

**Resistance**

The planners of NSC 68 anticipated public resistance from the start. “These [concerns] stemmed from a basic conviction that a sustained military buildup ran against the grain of what Americans had traditionally been prepared to accept,” especially during times of ostensible peace (Casey,

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27 HSTL, Papers of Harry S Truman, President’s Secretary’s File (PSF), Box 180, Meetings - 55 - April 20, 1950, NSC 68, April 14, 1950.

28 HSTL, Papers of Harry S Truman, PSF, Box 177, Meetings - 4 - December 17, 1947, NSC 4, December 9, 1947.

29 HSTL, Papers of Harry S Truman, PSF, Box 182, Meetings - 75 - December 14, 1950, NSC 68/3, December 8, 1950.
Officials who supported the plan feared that the democratic processes that governed the country would dampen the prospects of a robust armament program without a similarly robust public relations campaign (Bernhard, 1997, pg. 561). It is difficult to assess the public’s actual response to NSC 68, since it was a classified plan. However, since this extra-governmental collaboration reflects a strategic decision by administration members, their perception of public resistance suffices to validate the current theory. The framers of NSC 68 expected that convincing the public would require a coordinated campaign of persuasion, and they acted according to those beliefs. There was a very real possibility that the public would favor negotiating peaceably with the Soviet Union, especially on atomic weapons limitations, with 68 percent expressing support for such ideas in some opinion polls (Casey, 2005, pg. 659).

Opposition

Few members of Congress had any notion of the details contained in NSC 68, yet many of them took positions that the administration knew ran contrary to the plan. Senators Brien McMahon and Millard Tydings, both fellow Democrats, supported the peaceable approach they felt would help them win re-election. The problem was more severe than merely two senators standing in opposition; they occupied important strategic positions within Congress. McMahon was chair of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and Tydings chaired the Armed Services Committee (Casey, 2005, pg. 660). These were exactly the congressional committees that NSC 68 would rely on to increase the atomic weapons capabilities of the US and expand its armed forces. The House of Representatives also presented problems, in that “most legislators were clearly in a stingy mood,” however the chair of the House Armed Services Committee and the chair of the Armed Services Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee shared the belief that the US at that time were incapable of meeting the Soviet threat (Casey, 2005, pg. 658) The elections of 1950 did not strengthen the administration’s hand, as the Democratic majorities shrunk by fifty-six members in the House and ten in the Senate. Truman’s party still held both chambers, but by very thin margins.
Collaboration

The CPD operated just as anticipated by the theory of moral subsidy, as an EGO seeking to persuade the public to support the administration’s agenda, in order to pressure Congress to follow along, all while maintaining an air of independence from politics. Their statement of objectives began,

[t]he Committee on the Present Danger is a non-partisan, non-political group of private citizens. It was formed late last year because of the deep conviction that the United States and its democratic way of life are gravely threatened by Soviet aggression.\(^30\)

A memorandum from 1952 described the CPD and a few other groups “as channels of education and leadership in this country,” but notes little coordination among them, and hesitated to recommend more systematic liaison.\(^31\)

In contradiction to the claim that the CPD was non-political and that its members were mere private citizens, they were led by many of the very people who had participated in the drafting of NSC 68. Much like the Dean Acheson’s departure from the State Department just prior to his formation of the Committee for the Marshall Plan (CMP), several of the plan’s architects became leaders in the CPD. Under the direction of Paul Nitze, the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff had engaged a number of private-sector consultants, among them Chester Barnard and James Conant. Both men became leaders of the CPD, with Conant as its founding chairman (Sanders, 1999, pg. 45). They were joined by Tracy Voorhees, who had been Assistant Secretary of the Army, and resigned his post and became the CPD’s vice-chairman. These were hardly independent, apolitical private citizens; they were the very authors of the policy the now set about to promote. Their claims of independence served only to protect their credibility and to permit them to engage in information laundering.

\(^{30}\)HSTL, Papers of William L Clayton, Box 92, Committee on the Present Danger Folder 1, Committee on the Present Danger, April 5, 1951.

\(^{31}\)HSTL, Papers of Harry S Truman, Staff Member and Office Files (SMOF), Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), Box 2, 040 Centralizing Paramilitary activity, Memorandum for Mr. Sherman From William Korns, June 4, 1952.
5.3.3 New Look

When President Eisenhower took office, his administration did not disagree with the overall goals of its predecessor. Both presidents saw the Soviet Union as an existential threat that must be contained. They did, however, disagree on the means by which to achieve this. As outlined in NSC 162/2, the “New Look” for US national defense policy signified a dramatic shift away from conventional military methods toward a greater reliance on nuclear deterrence and psychological warfare (Huntington, 1961; Gaddis, 2005). Both of these facets of Eisenhower’s grand strategy gave EGOs opportunities to enhance their influence.

Ambition

The ambition of the New Look was two-fold in nature. First, it called for a substantial change from the status quo in terms of spending. In its conception, the new strategy was designed to reduce defense spending overall. What came to pass was not merely a reduction in the defense budget, but also a qualitative change in what the government bought and built. Never has the phrase “more bang for the buck” had so literal a meaning. Re-orienting US defense strategy around the idea of “massive retaliation” meant building more and varied nuclear weapons and upgrading their delivery systems. The doctrine called for abandoning any notion of proportionality in response to Soviet expansion, ruling in the use of nuclear weapons even in the context of a conventional Soviet assault. Under Eisenhower, the US developed the first intercontinental jet bombers, the first Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and tactical nuclear weapons to be used in the field as a replacement for conventional forces (Powaski, 1997, pg. 102–4).

The second facet of the New Look’s ambition entailed its political strategy to unite the western nations within the US sphere of influence under a common idea of collective defense. The US would provide the nuclear umbrella and strategic leadership while Europe and Asia would hold fast at the front lines. South America must, under this plan, remain free of communist infiltration, and the domestic public at home must not fall into complacence, a realistic danger given the reduction in expenditures and military recruitment. The nuclear strategy had a very clear implication that
made the political side of the war inseparable from the military: civilian territory would become 
the battlefield. The logic of mutually assured destruction had not yet fully coalesced, but launching 
a nuclear strike against Soviet cities — as the doctrine of massive retaliation called for — risked a 
response in kind. To keep the publics of the US and its allies in line, the New Look entailed broad 
propaganda campaigns and targeted covert operations to maintain political unity around American 
leadership.

Resistance

The character of the military strategy produced a distinct form of public resistance to the New 
Look. Shifting from a conventional to a nuclear strategy had two principal impacts in this regard. 
First, it required rallying around a military strategy that could not be easily observed. Conventional 
forces involved large number of personnel in uniform, deployed to active war zones with events 
that could capture the public’s attention. The New Look relied on nuclear deterrence and covert 
missions, which by their nature remained obscure, unavailable for use as mobilizing factors. Sec-
ond, nuclear, psychological, and covert warfare involve the civilian population directly. Nuclear 
weapons targeted cities, as covert and psychological operations took place in civilian spaces with 
agents who wore no uniform. In this case, the public was not called upon to support a tax increase 
and answer the call to service in the armed forces. They needed, according to the administration, 
to adopt a new and more robust conception of the “American Way” of life. In order to convince 
Americans that they stood on the front lines of the Cold War, and to accept that role, the government 
would need to engage in “a complex and ongoing process of constructing a domestic consensus on 
America’s core values” (Wall, 2008, pg. 243).

Opposition

In this episode, congressional opposition was minimal. Eisenhower’s Republican party held ma-
jorities in both chambers during his first term, during which the New Look got underway. At 
first, there was a movement within the Democratic opposition to seek to undermine the program.
“Democrats challenged the New Look budget on January 2 [1954], saying that the cuts in the army and navy risked national security and played into Russian hands,” but they relented without seriously opposing the plan, or even investigating the plan’s strategy (Foyle, 1999, pp. 171–173). In June of 1954, the New Look became law as part of the defense budget for fiscal year 1955, largely as Eisenhower had originally proposed it.

Foreign-Targeted Propaganda

After the massive increases in military expenditures of the Truman years, President Eisenhower shifted toward a greater reliance on nuclear deterrence as opposed to open conflict, a program that came to be known as the “New Look” (Huntington, 1961; Gaddis, 2005). The New Look signaled a shift in emphasis from conventional to psychological warfare, in addition to the buildup in nuclear capabilities. Kenneth Osgood writes “because the Soviets were unlikely to initiate a suicidal world war, the brunt of the Cold War effort should be directed at besting the Soviets in the political and psychological fields” (Osgood, 2006, pg. 71). This re-balancing of priorities manifested itself in a re-configuration of the official national security apparatus, and further improved the position of the credibility cartel, whose leaders found themselves at the center of the new institutional arrangement.

With the turnover to the new administration, as with many inter-party transitions, a series of government re-organization committees were formed. Among them, the Committee on International Information Activities (CIIA), also known the Jackson Committee after its Chairman William H. Jackson, convened in the first weeks of President Eisenhower’s term to assess the state of international public relations efforts by the US. They recommended two important changes pertaining to propaganda. First, the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) should be abolished and replaced by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), with an expanded mandate that explicitly integrated psychological warfare with policy coordination across agencies. This elevation of status for the political war began the re-balancing that characterized the New Look. Second, the USIA was established within the State Department, having a permanent representative on the OCB, with the
mandate of improving the public image of the United States abroad.\textsuperscript{32}

The role of the OCB, as envisioned by Chairman Jackson and the rest of the CIIA, went well beyond that of the PSB.

The Committee conceived of the new Board as the executive arm of the NSC, charged with the timely and coordinated carrying out of approved policy and also with assuring that each action is so executed as to make its full contribution to the particular climate of opinion which the United States is seeking to achieve in the world.\textsuperscript{33}

Not only had the OCB retained its responsibility to manage psychological warfare, its mandate stated that inter-agency coordination and NSC policy implementation inherently involved public relations. No aspect of the Cold War would proceed without attention paid to the propaganda value of a mission. Over the course of Eisenhower’s presidency, the OCB came to occupy a increasingly central role in the national security apparatus. As the NSC itself grew into a coherent policy-making body with its own staff, the head of OCB earned full membership in the council. Its official brief pertained only to foreign public opinion, still enjoined by Smith-Mundt from targeting a domestic audience.

Collaboration

The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) had begun the Eisenhower administration in a cautious manner, but they soon found themselves at the apex of the New Look’s public diplomacy apparatus. They knew their role — to wait until the president made a decision, then to promote it if they remained in agreement. In a letter to William Clayton in April of 1953 discussing urban defense programs, Tracy Voorhees writes,

\begin{quote}
our thinking has been that it is better for our Committee not to take any active position until the situation has clarified itself as to what the Administration will do. If President Eisenhower should decide
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{32}The Voice of America (VOA) was subsumed under the USIA’s jurisdiction. For a comprehensive history of the USIA, see Cull (2010).

\textsuperscript{33}DDEL, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 22, Jackson, William H (2), Memorandum for the President, November 2, 1954, pg. 4.
against such an effort, we could not be effective to bring it about. If he should decide to do it, and Congress should fail to support him as to funds, we might have a real function.\textsuperscript{34}

The president himself knew the importance of third-party support in the government’s psychological warfare campaign. As Osgood writes, “Eisenhower believed that for propaganda to be effective, the hand of the government must be carefully concealed,” recognizing that “viewpoints presented by seemingly independent voices would be more persuasive” (Osgood, 2006, pg. 77).

Applying this same logic to the home audience, using surrogates would not only be legal, it would also prove more effective. This proved especially advantageous to credibility cartel leaders C.D. Jackson of the World War II Council for Democracy (CFD) and Voorhees of the CPD. Jackson had led the CFF, a CIA-supported EGO that raised money for the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), which itself supported the operations of the Voice of America (VOA) (Osgood, 2006, pg. 31). He had a seat on the Committee on International Information Activities (CIIA), which recommended the creation of the USIA and the OCB. When this plan was implemented, Jackson also became a member of the OCB, and served as liaison to the Advertising Council, through which the administration laundered its domestic propaganda. Begun as the War Advertising Council under FDR, this association of advertising and public relations firms ran campaigns that encouraged Americans to attend church (or synagogue), to conserve natural resources, and donate money to CARE, all for the sake of countering the threat of the presumably anti-theistic communist ideology at home and abroad. It had campaigned for Jackson’s CFF in 1951, and the relationship proved durable.\textsuperscript{35} When they held their annual meeting in 1953, one observer reported that Jackson “quarter-backed the proceedings.”\textsuperscript{36} Voorhees, for his part, though only listed as “of counsel” to the CIIA, headed the group that planned the organization of the USIA.\textsuperscript{37} Few acts entail greater

\textsuperscript{34}HSTL, Papers of William L Clayton, Box 92, Committee on the Present Danger, Letter from Tracy Voorhees to William Clayton, April 22, 1953.

\textsuperscript{35}DDEL, James M Lambie Jr Papers, Box 1, ADVERTISING COUNCIL 1953 Correspondence, Report of Crusade for Freedom Campaign for 1951, January 15, 1952.

\textsuperscript{36}DDEL, James M Lambie Jr Papers, Box 1, ADVERTISING COUNCIL White House Meeting 1953, Cherry Blossom Time in Washington, March 31, 1953.

\textsuperscript{37}DDEL, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 21, International Information Service (1), Report on Op-
influence than designing a government agency, and this one remained in operation for nearly fifty years.

5.4 Middle Cold War — Vietnam

The consensus forged in the first decade or so of the Cold War produced one of the worst misadventures of US national security policy, the Vietnam War. This section does not seek to explain why Presidents Johnson decided to escalate US military involvement in Southeast Asia. Others have come before me in droves to offer explanations. Fighting against communist encroachment is supposed to have established credibility for the threat that the US would respond in force to Soviet imperialism. If communism took hold in Vietnam, the dominoes would topple and soon Japan — the economic powerhouse of Asia — would fall into the enemy’s orbit. LBJ feared that the militant rhetoric of Barry Goldwater — his hawkish Republican opponent in the 1964 election — so the president jumped up an incident in the Gulf of Tonkin to justify escalation, preempting Goldwater’s accusations of weakness. For the purposes of the current analysis, I remain agnostic over these proposed explanations for why Johnson chose escalation.

My interest in the case arises from its status as a juncture between consensus and dissensus. Whatever the reason policy-makers in the executive chose to pursue escalation, they operated on the basis of widespread domestic political agreement that the Soviet threat demanded a robust response, which included the conventional military option in the so-called geo-political “periphery” of the Cold War. The demise of the consensus happened as early 1965 — just as the escalation went into effect, or as late as 1968 — with the disaster that was the Democratic presidential campaign. Either way, the Vietnam War was a principal cause of the political chaos. The Democratic party re-grouped quickly, without ever losing control of Congress. It now carried a strong anti-war contingent allied with its newly-integrated civil rights wing, and an anti-colonial element. Dissensus set in, and would remain until the end of the Cold War.


erations of International Information Administration, July 31, 1953.
Fittingly, the Vietnam War also reveals critical evidence for the current theory. During the early stages of the escalation, the war was popular among the public and reliably supported by Congress. Under these circumstances, the White House declined an explicit offer of help by the credibility cartel. Later, when the public became disillusioned with Vietnam and congressional support faltered, the administration turned right back to the strategy of extra-governmental collaboration. Then, facing tremendous public resistance and congressional opposition, President Nixon assigned Charles Colson — one of his closest (and most infamous) aides — to the task of orchestrating an extra-governmental public relations campaign in support of Vietnamization — the process of transferring power to the government in Saigon without admitting failure or undertaking anything resembling a precipitous withdrawal. Indeed, Nixon expanded aspects of the military campaign during this time. In so doing, the Nixon administration’s Vietnam public relations strategy helped lay the foundation for the structure of extra-governmental national security politics that persists today.

Ambition

Prior to 1964, US involvement in Vietnam remained relatively small, consisting mostly of “advisors” to the government of South Vietnam fighting against the Viet Cong and the People’s Army of Vietnam (NVA), in an effort to thwart the advance of communism in southeast Asia. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the Johnson administration sought and received consent for a substantial escalation both in scale and character — an “Americanization” of the conflict. In the space of two years, US troops presence in Vietnam grew by an order of magnitude, from under twenty-five thousand to over three hundred fifty thousand. Operation Rolling Thunder began in March of 1965, adding a sustained and brutal bombing campaign to complement the ground forces now in country. In 1968, the administration responded to the Tet Offensive at first with further escalation, reaching over half a million American troops at the height of the war. Nevertheless, the US failed to convert tactical and strategic victories following initial NVA advances into political victory, and President Johnson joined a growing movement among the public and the Democratic party in their disenchantedment
with the conflict. He all but declared the war lost, halted the bombing campaign, and declined not only Army Chief of Staff William Westmoreland’s request for an additional two hundred thousand troops, but also the opportunity to run for re-election as President of the United States. In 1969, however, newly-elected President Nixon re-energized the military mission in Vietnam, though with an eye toward transferring the American portion of the burden onto the South Vietnamese. Vietnamization explicitly served the purpose of denying US defeat and covertly served to enable an expansion of the bombing campaign into Cambodia. Though troop levels had decreased significantly since their peak in 1968, they did not return to pre-Americanization levels until 1972. When the South Vietnamese government finally fell in 1975, US military presence in the country was negligible. Despite falling off in 1968 and 1972, at the beginning of each phase of the war, Americanization, disenchantment, and Vietnamization, presidential ambitions ran high.

Resistance

During the early years of the Vietnam War, there was little public resistance to LBJ’s escalation. The Gallup Organization and the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) both revealed levels of support for the intervention above sixty percent in July of 1965 (Berinsky, 2009, pg. 21). The Harris Poll showed that the proportion of people who supported the war was well over double that of the proportion in opposition (J. E. Mueller, 1973, pg. 56). By 1967, those polls revealed a very different situation, and the disenchantment phase of the war set it. Public disapproval exceeded approval toward the end of the year, and the antiwar demonstrations that had been numerous but scattered in 1966 became a full-blown mass movement, reaching 100,000 strong at a single rally in New York in April, and a demonstration that saw antiwar protestors storming the Pentagon (J. E. Mueller, 1973, pg. 31). Although press coverage remained one-sided in favor of the war, antiwar stories began to close the gap, which had previously lagged behind prowar stories at a rate of four to one (Zaller, 1992, pg. 187). By the beginning of Nixon’s presidency, public resistance to continuing the war had become one of the defining characteristics of American politics. By 1970, the balance of media coverage had inverted, with more than twice as many stories against than for the war.
Public opinion had inverted as well, with the Harris Poll showing more than twice as many people expressing opposition as support, and support in the 1971 Gallup poll dropping to thirty percent, roughly half of what it had been in 1965. The antiwar movement was in full swing, with people burning their draft cards in public displays of civil disobedience.

Opposition

Congressional opposition followed roughly the same pattern as public resistance, but with a good deal of lag time. At the beginning of the Americanization phase following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, congressional authorization for President Johnson to pursue escalation passed unanimously in the House of Representatives and received only two votes against in the Senate. LBJ’s Democratic party held majorities that could withstand the filibuster in the Senate and a veto-override in the House of Representatives, and enjoyed the highest presidential party power rating since the peak of FDR’s domestic political power in 1938 — a high point that has not been matched since. During the disenchantment phase, Congress largely remained loyal to Johnson, but paid a political price, with substantial electoral losses that brought their majorities under sixty percent in both chambers by the time Johnson left office by his decision not to run for re-election. The Vietnamization phase saw president Nixon facing those smaller Democratic majorities, now in the opposition party.

The Democrats controlled the agenda in Congress, and they used it to challenge Nixon’s efforts to remain involved in Vietnam until he could declare some form of victory. Future presidential candidate George McGovern co-sponsored an “amendment to end the war” in 1970. He and his allies even convened their own EGOs — to support the initiative, which would have reduced funding for the military deployment in Vietnam well below Nixon’s proposed policy. Nixon was able to overcome this opposition, but not without considerable effort, going so far as to request from his legal counsel a plan to prosecute McGovern’s EGO for tax code violations. Colson suggested

By some measures, President Obama has exceeded LBJ’s power. Particularly, Obama has had a greater rate of legislative successes than Johnson. The measure I refer to relies on opposition party numbers and voting unity in Congress.
that it was inappropriate for senators to engage the services of outside interests to lobby their own colleagues. He wrote, “I want to raise some questions, both ethical and legal, about the efforts paid for by a group of Senators to bring public pressures to bear on their colleagues.” Trying to persuade Nixon that his political rivals had run afoul of the law, writing,

Mr. President, we have here with the “Amendment to End the War” Committee more than just a matter of income and outgo. We have also the question of lobbying, not alone as an ethical matter, but also as to whether the laws on lobbying are being closely adhered to.\(^{39}\)

Nixon’s legal counsel rejected the plan, but the fact that Colson floated the idea suggests how much the odds are stacked against outside groups with goals that conflict with the White House, even those with strong congressional support.

Collaboration

The patterns of collaboration between the White House and EGOs across the three phases of the Vietnam War illustrate clearly the proposed causal mechanism. In the early, Americanization phase, the public and Congress were on board, so the administration had little cause to enlist the assistance of outside groups for the purpose of a public relations campaign. As the public and then Congress became disenchanted with the war, the Johnson White House decided to seek extra-governmental persuasion help. Finally, facing a fully mobilized antiwar movement and a faction of Congress dedicated to ending the war without pursuing Nixon’s Vietnamization program, the president and his political aides expended enormous effort in recruiting and funding EGOs that agreed with their cause.

In the Americanization phase of the Vietnam War, the episode provides not only a “dog that didn’t bark,” but one that made as if to bark, only to be hushed by its master.\(^ {40}\) In 1965, James

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\(^ {39}\)Richard Milhouse Nixon Library (RMNL), White House Special Files (WHSF), SMOF, Charles W. Colson, Box 31, Amendment to End the War Committees - Others (3 of 5), Draft Memorandum for the President.

\(^ {40}\)The phrase is a commonly-used reference to the Sherlock Holmes story, “The Adventure of Silver Blaze,” where a dog’s silence on the night of a crime reveals that someone familiar to the animal was a person of interest to the investigation.
Conant, member of the Committee for the Marshall Plan (CMP) and head of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), approached Douglass Cater, Special Assistant to the President. Cater reported that Conant “believes that a new committee could be very important at the present time,” describing plans for “[a] distinguished non-partisan group, limited in number, which should deliberately keep an arms-length relationship to the Administration,” while remaining “basically in tune with the Administration,” and having “access to professional public relations counsel.” Conant is describing exactly the kind of group that a president should recruit under the right conditions: prestigious, politically independent, and in agreement with the White House. The administration hesitated to accept the offer of help from Conant’s organization.

National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy summarized the case against collaborating with the group, representing the views of Jack McCloy, one of Johnson’s “wise men” of foreign policy. “McCloy’s point,” writes Bundy, “is that you [LBJ] have done such a good job of pulling public support together that it might be unwise to go ahead.” McCloy himself had communicated to Bundy that he felt that due to a recent presidential press conference, “the success of which has been rather largely advertised throughout the country ... that gradually there is a emerging a solid basis of support of the President’s position.” He continues, “my impression is that the attitude generally is one in which the President can take real confidence.” He further refers to a consultation with former Secretary of State Robert Lovett, alongside whom McCloy had himself been a member of the CPD, confirming his reluctance to go ahead with Conant’s plan. Despite these mis-givings, McCloy joined Conant as a member of the group, convened under the leadership of another CPD member Arthur Dean, calling itself the Committee for an Effective and Durable Peace in Asia (CEDP). McCloy did not, however, recommend that the administration collaborate closely with the organization. Within the administration, Douglass Cater remained an enthusiastic proponent of collaboration, but his support was insufficient to make it a priority.

41 Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL), White House Central File (WHCF), ED, Box 15, 7-9-65–7-28-65, Memorandum to the President from Douglass Cater, July 20, 1965.

42 LBJL, WHCF, ND, Box 216, ND 19 CO 312 (7-31-65–8-5-65), Letter from John M. McCoy to McGeorge Bundy, July 29, 1965.
The situation changed dramatically by 1967, as the public soured on the war. The administration now recognized the importance of assembling a team dedicated to the management of public opinion on Vietnam. Walt Rostow oversaw the creation of the Vietnam Information Group (VIG), an informal assemblage of top personnel from national security bureaus across the executive branch, meeting regularly to plan the administration’s persuasion strategy. The coordinator for the VIG, Harold Kaplan, described the purpose of the group, by arguing that “American public opinion has become the ‘X factor’ in the entire Vietnamese equation,” and that “[w]e have long felt the need of a focal point which would coordinate our judgments on key PR issues and constitute a repository of the basic data.” Kaplan argued that the office needed to be situated in the White House, a clear indication that political centralization was of paramount importance. He further argued for “discretion” so that the press would not interpret the VIG as another Office of War Information.

A frequent item on the VIG’s agenda was a presentation by a member of the newly formed Committee for Peace and Freedom in Vietnam (CPF) led by Senator Paul Douglas, another alumnus of the World War II CDA. Where the CEDP had failed to secure a collaborative position with the Johnson administration, the CPF succeeded. This was not much of a loss for the CEDP, however, since several of its members simply migrated to the CPF. James Conant, at the invitation of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. — previously the Ambassador to South Vietnam and then Ambassador at Large — took some persuading, but moved to the new EGO. Waiting for his answer were Bundy and Jack McCloy. In a memorandum of conversation, Cabot Lodge wrote,

Dr. Conant told Lodge that he had decided that he would be “very glad to join the Committee.” Conant added that Lodge had convinced him that certain previous doubts which he held were not well founded and authorized Lodge to make this fact known to McGeorge Bundy and John J. McCloy.”

McCloy himself took more persuading, because he believed that his membership in the CEDP would render his participation in the new group redundant, and he did not want to dilute his prestige


by repeat appearances on EGO letterhead. “I am always reluctant to have my name spread around on broadsides in any event,” he wrote in response to Cabot Lodge’s invitation, “it is something you may be justified in doing two or three times in a lifetime, but not intermittently.”

Of course, Cabot Lodge himself could not be a member, as he was a government official, and maintaining the appearance of political independence remained critical.

Richard Nixon entered office having defeated a Democratic party that had foundered in 1968, following Johnson’s decision to decline a re-election bid, and a tumultuous primary campaign that witnessed an assassination of a major candidate and riots at the convention. Though victorious in the election, Nixon faced serious public resistance and congressional opposition. In defense of the president, Charles Colson — Special Assistant to the President for public liaison — helped organize and set the agenda for various pro-war EGOs, including the AWP, a pro-Vietnamization group that was consciously modeled on the citizens committees of the 1930s and 40s. The emulation of the original credibility cartel was clear. Vice President Spiro Agnew addressed the group in January, 1971, tying the current crisis to the past:


> ... Not only did this private sector initiative provide the support needed for America and its allies to emerge victorious in World War II, but it also established the pattern of bipartisanship which has sustained America in the cause of freedom and peace through the 1950’s and the 1960’s despite the crises of the cold war and the great trials of Korea and Vietnam.

Just like CDA in 1940, the administration tried to keep the relationship between AWP and the administration covert. Maintaining the group’s independence was critical to its usefulness. Having been rejected in his request for Nixon to meet with the membership of AWP, Colson writes

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46 RMNL, WHSF, SMOF, Charles W. Colson, Box 36, Americans for Winning the Peace (II) (2 of 2), Draft Remarks by Vice President Agnew, January 11, 1971.
I understand the major objection to be that Presidential involvement will destroy the group’s independence. I, of course, agree that if it lost its autonomy it would be virtually useless to us...

If this meeting were the launching for such a group, then I would completely accept the argument that a Presidential appearance would make it too much our creature. The fact is, it is in being and operating...

Rightly or wrongly, these people consider themselves important; all of them have been recruited, as was the case with the “William Allen White Committee” on the basis that the President needs them.47

Not only did Colson acknowledge the group’s heritage, he admitted to the administration’s recruitment of its members and dependence on them. The AWP was largely a creation of Colson’s office, and he secured its operating funds as well.48

As with the AWP, Colson and others in the White House were assisting other pro-administration organizations with fund-raising and public relations. The ASC had formed in the late 1950s, and was running a campaign called “Operation Alert” that caught the administration’s attention.

Messrs. Colson and Dent both agree that Operation Alert is supporting our candidates in a productive way...

I have talked to Pat O’Hara about Jack Mulcahy’s involvement, and learned that he (Mulcahy) will be giving the program some support...Morever, it is well understood that henceforth O’Hara will keep in close touch with Colson concerning all such support actions contemplated.49

The ASC’s purpose in conducting the campaign was to combat the Amendment to End the War Committee (AEWC) and threaten the electoral chances of its congressional sponsors.

President Nixon is greatly handicapped in trying to meet this threat because a large, highly organized coalition of Republican and Democratic Congressmen is working to reduce the US defense budget and to surrender in South Vietnam...

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US Senators is promoting the “Amendment to End the War” to terminate all US military operations in South Vietnam...

It is vitally important that the American voter be told both 1) how desperate our strategic situation is becoming and 2) which candidates for Congress in 1970 are working for unilateral disarmament and for surrender in Vietnam.50

True to the propositions of the present theory, the ASC public relations campaign was aimed at leveraging public opinion against the re-election motivations of members of Congress. The White House collaborated with EGOs to promote Vietnamization and argue against precipitously ending the war. It secured legislative consent by enlisting ostensibly independent EGOs to corroborate its claims and deliver moral subsidy.

Perhaps the most significant of the Nixon administration’s recruits to the ranks of collaborating EGOs was the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). The organization had existed since 1947, but had up to that point remained a minor player in Washington politics. Colson saw its potential and elevated it to prominence. In 1970, he wrote to the President, “AEI still suffers from the fact that it is not well known. It is difficult to convince people of the importance and relevance of its work.”51 The effort to cultivate extra-governmental support had been a broader campaign within the administration, seeing a well-developed private-sector liberal establishment as a barrier to Republican progress.

An in-house group of people preferably outside the Administration should be directed to quietly undertake a study of the top twenty-five Foundations in this country; to identify both their leadership and power structure, and to indicate which are friendly, which are potentially friendly, which can be brought around to support projects we feel the country needs; adversaries. In addition, an inventory should be taken of all smaller foundations (AEI and Stern), which are ideologically and clearly pro or con our point of view.52

Having named AEI specifically, Colson set about to secure a durable financial foundation for the

50RMNL, WHSF, SMOF, Charles W. Colson, Box 34, American Security Council (1 of 2), Operation Alert — Phase 1.


group, and he succeeded.

Colson recognized the importance of maintaining the appearance of independence between the group and the government, writing “Obviously anything we do will carry enormous risk,” warning of the consequences “should evidence of any of our activities surface.” They need not, despite such appearances, remain completely independent of the administration.

It will be possible, if it is desired, for us to assist the A.E.I., indirectly, on both the short- and long-range proposals. Specifically, we could orchestrate certain White House and Administration personnel into those meetings to be held around the country.”

Colson and AEI collaborated to launder information that the administration wanted the public to believe, and the group’s credibility depended on maintaining a veneer of political independence.

Since this time, AEI has remained among the most prominent of Washington think-tanks. It has a broad portfolio of issues that it attends to, and has gained a good deal of independence from any one administration, though it remains a conservative, Republican organization. The origins of its power lay in helping the Nixon administration achieve his goals regarding Vietnamization in the early years of his presidency. When asked to explain why the AEI deserved the largess Colson bestowed upon them — to the amount of tens of millions of dollars toward an endowment coordinated by the White House — he explained his faith in AEI to Larry Higby, assistant to Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman. Presenting Higby with a sample of AEI’s work, Colson wrote,

[a]while ago you asked what programs AEI was undertaking that would be particularly helpful to us. The attached may have already come to your attention, but it is a good example of how AEI can be quickly responsive to hour needs. While this is written to present both sides of the the argument, it clearly is slanted our way and was useful to our supporters in the closing days of the Hatfield-McGovern fight.

Facing public resistance and congressional opposition to President Nixon’s Vietnamization pro-

53RMNL, WHSF, SMOF, Charles W. Colson, Box 31, American Enterprise Institute - III (2 of 2), Memorandum to HR Haldeman, through Jeb Magruder, from Dan Hofgren, Re AEI and Related Special Fund Raising Efforts, February 13, 1970.

gram, Chuck Colson recruited EGOs to provide propaganda assistance, just as aides to Presidents Johnson, Eisenhower, Truman, and Roosevelt had done before him when the need had arisen. The Nixon White House consciously evoked the memory of FDR’s pro-intervention collaboration with the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDA) prior to Pearl harbor. Their tactics further echoed the public-private partnerships that made possible the Marshall Plan, the consensus of the Cold War, and the Americanization of the conflict in Vietnam.

5.5 Late Cold War — Dissensus

The Vietnam War had brought down a Democratic president, but the party remained strong in Congress, adapting to the new reality that its voter base now contained a strong antiwar contingent, along with a social justice component that opposed western imperialism. Since they could plausibly (if not convincingly) blame Nixon’s downfall on Watergate rather than the Vietnam War, the GOP’s general position on national security had less reason to change. Going forward, the consensus that had characterized the Cold War up to that point no longer held. This led not to a split between internationalists and isolationists, however, as was the case in the years prior to World War II. Instead, both parties retained strong contingents supporting robust US involvement in foreign affairs, but diverged on ideas regarding the appropriate means. Broadly speaking, those in the Democratic party favored cooperative institutions, arms control, and humanitarian aid to developing nations, while those in the Republican party favored a continuation of the military approach, providing armaments to smaller nations facing Soviet expansion, and enhancing US nuclear capabilities (Oldfield & Wildavsky, 1989, pg. 56).

During the 1970s, the Republican party’s dominance of the credibility cartel grew, while remnants of the hawkish contingent of the Johnson administration split between what would become a centrist wing of the Democratic party and the emergent neo-conservative movement. The Ford administration created the White House Office of Public Liaison (WH/OPL) to take up the respon-

\[55\text{In many important ways, Watergate and the war were related, but the party could plausibly deny that connection and proceed without serious revision to its national security agenda.}\]
sibilities of Charles Colson, who had pled guilty to obstruction of justice charges in relation to the Watergate scandal and the administration’s response to the Pentagon Papers. The WH/OPL would provide the institutional means by which Republican administrations would manage their collaborative relations with the emerging ecology of conservative think-tanks, pressure groups, and other civil society organizations. Ford himself had little time in office, and his presidency had few ambitious national security projects on the scale of his Republican counterparts during the late Cold War. Still, his administration continued with a program of extra-governmental collaboration. Despite the disastrous way in which Nixon’s presidency had ended and Ford had assumed power, conservative civil society continued to evolve and accumulate influence.

On the Democratic side of the partisan divide, the national security establishment split from the leadership of its party and sided with the credibility cartel. The primary voters nominated George McGovern (of the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment to the End the War) in 1972, and détente proponent Jimmy Carter in 1976. When Carter won the presidency, the cartel moved quickly, re-activating the dormant Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) just a week after the election. Hawkish Democrats held with the cartel instead of the president, including Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, one of Carter’s opponents for the nomination and mentor to Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, two prominent neo-conservative national security counselors to President George W. Bush. Peter Rosenblatt, who had been a White House information warrior under LBJ during the Vietnam War, joined the resurrected CPD. Carter’s presidency, like Ford’s, was substantially less ambitious in its international agenda (as conceived in the current argument) than many other presidents, and his relationship with the credibility cartel was unabashedly hostile. His administration sought to extend strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union and boost international commitment to humanitarianism and human rights. The cartel opposed him aggressively, forming a “Team B” national security advisory committee outside of government to challenge his agenda. With his defeat in 1980, many of the CPD and Team B members became deputies and assistants in the Reagan administration’s departments of State and Defense, and in the Executive Office of the President (EOP).
The Reagan administration represents the maturation of the conservative transformation that credibility cartel took under Nixon. The financial support that Charles Colson had arranged for AEI not only ensured the survival of the one organization, it provided a model for many others. Morton Blackwell, who became a staffer in the WH/OPL described the method for empowering the conservative elements of civil society in a campaign memorandum in 1980. “We identify existing organizations which tend in our direction ... [and] make special efforts to boost the careers of our friends within these groups.” Republican party operatives diligently cultivated a loyal cadre of EGOs to turn “a footdragging impediment on the march toward socialism [into] a movement on the offensive which seeks out every opportunity to win, not just battles, but the war.”

Two national security policy initiatives illuminate the strategic decision to collaborate with civil society on domestic national security propaganda. The first of these, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), began under Nixon as the Safeguard ABM program and developed into the SDI in the 1980s. Charles Colson worked with two groups in particular on its ABM program, the Citizens Committee to Safeguard America (CCSA), whose leaders included Dean Achenson and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and the American Security Council (ASC). Team B, the CPD, and the ASC carried the program through the intervening years, and found a willing partner in the WH/OPL after President Carter’s defeat. The second illustrative policy initiative, Reagan’s Central American anti-communist campaigns, culminated in the Iran-Contra scandal. It shows that even when an administration fails to secure congressional consent for its agenda, the EGOs that collaborate with the White House can reap substantial benefits. Again at the center of the public relations effort, the ASC helped the government coordinate the pro-administration information campaign through the WH/OPL’s Outreach Working Group on Central America. Despite the administration’s failure to secure consent and the controversy that arose from its efforts to circumvent the legislatures clear statutory prohibitions, the network of civil society constituting the credibility cartel emerged from the episode stronger and more unified than ever.

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56 Ronald Wilson Reagan Library (RWRL), SMOF, Morton Blackwell Files, Box 1, American Security Council and Coalition for Peace through Strength, A New Right Foreign Policy Offensive, October 29, 1980.
5.5.1 Safeguard ABM and SDI

President Nixon inherited the Sentinel ABM program from his predecessor, which itself was a response to reported Soviet advances in missile defense systems. Sentinel was primarily a population-protection system, designed to defend against “countervalue” nuclear weapons aimed at US cities. Nixon renamed the program Safeguard and altered its strategic purpose. Instead of defending against countervalue weapons, Safeguard would be a shield against Soviet “counterforce” capabilities aimed at the United States’ own nuclear arsenal. The systems used the same land-based technology, but differed in their geographic deployment. Safeguard would operate in remote locations; Sentinel would have deployed in fifteen major metropolitan areas in the contiguous United States, plus one each in Alaska and Hawaii. The administration was keen on developing the program, both for its primary stated purpose — establishing an alternative to Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) — and to use as leverage over the Soviet Union in the two superpowers’ negotiations over strategic arms limitations. The public, which had previously supported Sentinel, resisted Safeguard and the program’s supporters in Congress demanded that the administration work to improve the program’s image. Charles Colson again took a lead role in collaborating with the credibility cartel on a public relations campaign. President Reagan’s proposed SDI involved a variety of technologies, including submarine and space-based platforms, blurring the distinction between counterforce and countervalue, at least as far as basic technology determines a weapon’s effective use. Both Nixon’s and Reagan’s programs met with some combination of opposition and resistance, prompting collaboration with EGOs. The government spent about $6 billion on Safeguard, and more than $200 million on SDI.

Ambition

The Johnson administration only reluctantly went along with the Sentinel program, giving in to congressional and public pressure after China revealed it had a working hydrogen bomb. The concept of BMD among US defense planners predates the deployment of Soviet ballistic missiles themselves. The technology did not advance far enough for serious consideration until Lyndon
Johnson’s presidency. Still, LBJ’s Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stood as the principal opponent within the national security establishment (Mitchell, 2000, pp. 6–9). He remained unconvinced of its merits for two reasons. First, he believed in the persuasiveness of a deterrent retaliatory threat. Second, even if hypothetically feasible, the countervalue defense system under consideration at the time needed to work perfectly in order to have strategic value, and the system never approached that standard. For the president himself, the program did not have sufficient value for him to challenge McNamara. Johnson eventually initiated the deployment of Sentinel on a limited basis in 1967 (Baucom, 1992, ch. 2).

The Nixon administration showed a great deal more enthusiasm for missile defense than its Democratic predecessor. Three months into his presidency, Nixon issued a “Statement on Deployment of the Antiballistic Missile System,” which announced the switch from countervalue to counterforce deployment, and urged Congress to include the necessary appropriations in the budget for fiscal year 1970.57 Whereas the Johnson administration only went forward with a limited rollout in response to pressure from members of Congress, their constituencies, and the program’s financial beneficiaries, the Nixon White House pushed for a full deployment of Safeguard under very different political circumstances.

Whether or not the administration had reason to believe that the ABM program, now Safeguard, would work, they saw its development as leverage against the Soviet union in the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) talks that were getting underway. An internal White House memo from the time begins plainly, “The US Safeguard ABM program and its on-going momentum are the most important leverage the US has in persuading the Soviet Union to enter a SALT agreement.”58 Whether technical or political, Nixon and Kissinger had their reasons for building Safeguard.

Reagan’s ambitions for missile defense had become evident well before he ascended to the presidency, and his vision did not remain tethered to the earth. He sought to weaponize space (with “defensive” weapons, at least) and make use of recently developed high energy laser-beam tech-


58 RMNL, WHSF, SMOF, Charles W. Colson, Box 26, ABMSafeguard (II) (3 of 4), Safeguard and SALT.
nology. It was included in the Republican party platform. During the 1980 presidential campaign, Reagan’s national security advisory team “reportedly told Republican congressional leaders that the space-based laser project would be one of the new administration’s top priorities” (Pratt, 1990, pg. 80). Not only did he allegedly believe in the wisdom of ballistic missile defense, he saw the program as a way to spur the Soviet Union into a technological arms race that heavily favored the US. It became part of his broader strategy to spend the Soviets into submission. Although he waited until 1983 to make a major announcement on the program, the delay arose more from political caution than policy disagreement (Baucom, 1992, pp. 139–140).

Resistance

Nixon would not have needed help from EGOs without a substantial drop in public and congressional approval over the concept of BMD. Sixty-nine percent of respondents to a NORC survey supported building an ABM system in 1966 (Graham & Kramer, 1986, pg. 126). By March of 1969, public support had weakened substantially. According to a Harris poll, although a plurality (48%) approved of Nixon’s decision to build Safeguard (with 27% reporting “Not Sure”), the poll also found substantially more support (47%) for peaceful arms control than Safeguard itself (29%) (Graham & Kramer, 1986, pg. 129). Public support would continue to fall.

Sentinel was also plagued by NIMBY-ism (Mitchell, 2000, pg. 6), which explains a lot about why the public turned so sharply against it once deployment got underway.59 Since it was a population-protection system, it was located in populated areas, suburbs of major US cities. Images (some real and others fabricated by the program’s opponents) of preparations to install missile batteries near residential areas provoked a strongly negative public reaction, inverting the program’s previous support. Instead of Seattle, Chicago, and Boston, Safeguard would begin deployment in Grand Forks, ND, with a population just under 40,000 in the 1970 census (Paxton, 2016, pg. 672). The small number of people affected so directly by Safeguard would avoid widespread NIMBY-
ism, but the administration still faced an uphill climb before Safeguard would secure public support.

In addition to this reversal among the general public, the scientific community rallied in opposition to ballistic missile defense on the basis of the technology’s feasibility problems (Halsted, 1971; Carter & Schwartz, 1984, pp. 340–342). They publicized their criticisms of the technology in news media, and lobbied members of Congress to oppose the administration. Even the engineers leading the research and development operations believed the program could not work. NSC staff member Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., describes to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger the objections Bell Laboratories had to continuing on the project.

Bell Labs, the principal contractor for the Safeguard system, has apparently decided that Safeguard is not worth building. The President may be facing a major embarrassment in connection with this disaffection...

I gather from their statements that Bell is now presenting its desire to get out in terms of an unwillingness to continue to be associated with a program which cannot technically perform the missions the Government claims it will accomplish.60

The credibility cartel would help the administration counter the skepticism leveled at the program by the scientific community.

In the early years of the Reagan administration, just as the president was rolling out his plans for developing a space-based missile defense platform, public opinion was decidedly mixed, and very sensitive to the ways in which the questions were framed (Russett, 1990, pg. 532). Most people surveyed, in various polls, supported the development of a “defensive” system to intercept ICBMs en route to their targets in the United States. At the same time, nearly as many believed that it would escalate the arms race, both terrestrially and in orbit. Seventy-two percent of respondents agreed that “such defensive systems” could lead to “new and frightening space wars.” Solid majorities believed it would make the Soviets less willing to negotiate arms reduction treaties and that it would “increase the arms race.” At the same time, they supported “developing such defensive weapons” and favored plans “to protect the US by destroying any incoming missiles.” But they objected to

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60 RMNL, NSC, Box 841, ABM System, Memos & Misc, Vol IV (1 of 3), Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from Laurence E. Lynn, April 14, 1970.
“spending billions of dollars on the program” (Graham & Kramer, 1986, pp. 129–130). These poll results all describe the state of affairs in April of 1983, just after President Reagan announced the program in his so-called “Star Wars” speech.

Opposition

Sentinel had won the support of a bare majority in Congress, but there had been a focused opposition among prominent liberals in the Senate, such as William Fulbright, Al Gore (Sr.), and Edward Kennedy (Carter & Schwartz, 1984, pg. 340). Despite the turnover in the White House, the increase in opposition among members of Congress did not simply arise out of reflexive partisanship, with members rejecting in a Republican what they had approved in a Democratic president. It reflected in part an adherence to a set of ideological beliefs about the threat of communism and the technological challenges involved in building the system (Doty, 1972; Bernstein & Anthony, 1974). But it also revealed a political calculation on the part of Congress. The biggest problem for the administration was not congressional disapproval of the project on its merits, but rather their reluctance to go along without public support.

Without public opinion behind the issue the Administration will have to go through more hair-raising tests on national security. There must be nuclear frankness that will make politicians ignore the pressure they feel. “The public needs convincing more than the senate.”

...the President noted he wants a full dress public (not just Senate) educational campaign planned and launched now.\(^{61}\)

This provides direct validation of the proposed causal mechanism, which states that public support conditions congressional consent. Though members of Congress may sometimes vote their conscience, they more reliably vote with the aim of pleasing the public.

SDI reached a level of public support in 1983 sufficient for Reagan to begin promoting the program, but it was not enough for him to comfortably use the public as leverage over a divided Congress. His party held on to its control over the Senate in the 1982 mid-term elections, extending

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\(^{61}\)RMNL, NSC, Box 840, ABM System 1-70 - Vol. III Memos and Misc (1 of 2), Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from Jeb Magruder, January 20, 1970.
its advantage from fifty-three seats to fifty-four (later fifty-five, when Democrat Henry “Scoop” Jackson, a long-time BMD proponent, passed away and was replaced by Republican Daniel Evans as Senator from Washington state). The House was a different story. The opposition increased its hold on the lower chamber from fifty-three to ninety-nine, restoring the Democratic party to a decades-long position of House dominance that had briefly been interrupted by the Republican electoral wave of 1980. Though Reagan managed to secure large appropriations for SDI, the program faced systematic, ideologically-driven opposition well into his second term (Lindsay, 1991).

Collaboration

The White House sought assistance from several quarters, chief among them an EGO called the Citizens Committee to Safeguard America (CCSA). The CCSA had started out in 1969 as the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, but in fact was an outgrowth of the Committee on the Present Danger, the very group that had taken over from the Committee for the Marshall Plan in order to promote President Truman’s Cold War policy. Its connections run through former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a member of both groups. Along with Henry Cabot Lodge, former senator from Massachusetts and ambassador to several important posts over several of presidential administrations (the United Nations, South Vietnam, and West Germany), Acheson served as a mentor and figurehead for the organization, doing very little of the material work but allowing his name to lead the masthead. Both men had been involved in the Committee for Peace and Freedom in Vietnam (CPF), the EGO that collaborated with President Johnson to promote the Vietnam War after the conflict’s luster had faded in 1967.

Colson’s main contribution to Safeguard’s public relations campaign was to launder the administration’s argument through the CCSA, the ASC, and AEI. He coordinated strategy and directly participated in raising funds for the private organizations. The EGOs placed advertisements in newspapers, held conferences, gave speeches on television, and in one critical example of moral subsidy at work, Cabot Lodge published an article in the Reader’s Digest in support of the Safeguard program, entitled “A Citizen Looks at ABM.” However, Lodge was not the actual author of
the piece. Colson wrote it, and even bragged about doing so among his White House colleagues. As Al Haig writes, “Chuck Colson is writing a way-out article on ABM which will be signed by Cabot Lodge.”62 This elder statesman put his name on a piece of propaganda written by a top White House aide. The deception with respect to authorship demonstrates either an acknowledge-
ment of the illegality of the act under Smith-Mundt, or the added value of a respected third party provenance. Either way, the CCSA gave the White House a superior outlet than it had on its own. They laundered information to provide moral subsidy.

The American Security Council (ASC), which had played a central role in the campaign to boost public opinion on Vietnamization, also worked in collaboration with the Nixon administration on promoting Safeguard. Some would say that the ABM - ASC connection makes a good deal of sense, from the perspective of material self-interest on the part of the organization’s members. It has been described as “the soul if not the heart of the military-industrial complex,” with leading members drawn from many of the top defense contracting firms (Sanders, 1999, pp. 223–226). Western Electric, Bell Labs’ parent company, had members on the ASC, but they departed when Safeguard’s technical feasibility problems caused them to pull out of the project. ASC’s primary role in the collaboration was a project they called “Operation Alert.” Among other activities, they conducted massive polling campaigns — though their results and scale call into question the scientific validity of their methods. They claimed a goal of two million respondents across the US, and reported a pro-Safeguard response of 78–93%.63 They kept the administration apprised of their efforts through Colson, and helped put pressure on specific members of Congress, as the administration required. President Nixon credited them with clearing a path for Safeguard’s authorization.64

ASC and one of its most prominent members, retired US Army General Daniel O. Graham, continued to promote BMD and other hawkish national security programs through the GOP inter-

63RMNL, WHSF, SMOF, Charles W. Colson, Box 34, American Security Council (2 of 2), News from Operation Alert, September 23, 1970.
64RMNL, WHSF, SMOF, Charles W. Colson, Box 34, American Security Council (2 of 2), Draft Letter to John M Fisher.
regnum of Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Graham was a Team B participant as well. ASC launched
the Coalition for Peace through Strength (CPS) to promote a substantial strategic arms buildup
as early as 1978, and Graham himself was an advisor to Reagan’s presidential campaigns in both
for a space-based missile defense research program that he would come to call “High Frontier.”
Through High Frontier, ASC and CPS built a substantial base of organized support for SDI, with
ties to organizations overseas and among the conservative think-tank movement in DC. By 1986,
the program itself had gotten underway, and the EGO support coalesced around it. In a 1986 memo,
staffers on the WH/OPL and NSC request the production of a five-minute video featuring President
Reagan to be played at a dinner for the group. It explains,

The Coalition for SDI (CSDI) is an outgrowth of General Daniel
Graham’s High Frontier but has since expanded enormously. It now
consists of over 170 member organizations, including religious, pub-
lic policy, ethnic, defense, and other groups, both in America and in
Japan and Europe.

Graham continued to champion SDI through these organizations, organizing “seminars in every
major metropolitan area to get the word out.” SDI may never have delivered on its promise to
provide “mutually assured security,” but it helped build the conservative EGO network into a major
influence in US national security politics.

5.5.2 Contras

The dissensus that characterized the late Cold War on the question of nuclear armament strategy also
found its way into debates over US national security policy in the western hemisphere. President

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65RWRL, SMOF, Morton Blackwell Files, Box 1, American Security Council and Coalition for Peace through

66RWRL, SMOF, Morton Blackwell Files, Box 4, Coalition for Peach through Security, Letter to Mr. E. Feulner
from Francis L. Holihan, July 31, 1982.

67RWRL, SMOF, Max Green Files, Box 25, Strategic Defense Initiative - I (1 of 8), Schedule Proposal, February
20, 1986.

68RWRL, SMOF, Max Green Files, Box 26, SDI - III (2 of 2), Letter to Colleagues from Daniel O. Graham, October
15, 1986.
Reagan saw the existence of communist regimes within the Americas as a threat to US regional hegemony. Decades after the Kennedy administration failed to engineer an ouster of Fidel Castro in Cuba and successfully rebuffed Soviet efforts to station nuclear weapons on the Caribbean island, many Democrats had come to accept leftist regimes in Central and South America, but Reagan’s GOP had not. Within the first year of his administration, the White House had begun working on regime change efforts in various Latin American countries that had come under the control of leftist governments (many of them lawfully elected and popular at home). Their primary focus landed on Nicaragua, where the “Contras” had rebelled against the Sandanista government. Public resistance and congressional opposition led the administration to collaborate with the credibility cartel, and even though they failed to secure congressional consent, the conservative EGO network continued to evolve and gain influence. The Iran-Contra scandal represented a temporary political setback for the cartel, many of whose members continued to exert influence during the Clinton administration and returned to power full-force under President George W. Bush.

Ambition

The Reagan administration began covertly supporting the Contras at least as early as December, 1981. The president issued a directive to the CIA ordering it to provide support in the form of clothing, food, small arms, and other necessary supplies, while interdicting weapons and supplies bound for the Sandanista government. As the conflict between the rebels and the regime grew, the limitations of covert action made the status quo untenable for the Reagan administration, and it sought a broader remit for aid to the Contras. At the same time, the “Reagan Doctrine” began taking shape, asserting the a mandate to promote democratization — of a particularly US-friendly flavor — throughout areas that the president viewed as geo-strategically vital. This included Central America. Achieving Reagan’s aims (legally, at least) demanded US involvement on a scale that would normally require congressional consent.
Resistance

Reagan encountered substantial resistance and opposition to aiding the Contras among the US public, never finding a majority in support of providing military aid to the rebels against the Nicaraguan government. In fact, the number of respondents opposing such aid typically doubled that of the number in favor, when polled by the Washington Post and New York times. And despite being among the most popular presidents of the twentieth century, Reagan’s direct appeals to the public failed to alter this situation (Bowen, 1989). Public support for the administration’s Nicaragua policy foundered in the low twenties, as a percentage of respondents to public opinion polling, for most of his presidency, even prior to the revelations that led to the Iran-Contra scandal. It reached a peak of just 35% in 1986 (Sobel, 2001, pg. 103).

Opposition

Whether responding directly to public sentiment or by virtue of their own private reasons, Congress took the unusual step of prohibiting the executive from aiding the Contras, or even dedicating resources to making the case for helping them, through a series of legislative acts collective known as the Boland Amendment. Not only could the administration no longer provide material support to the rebels, the State Department was barred from engaging in public relations on behalf of the proposal, a constraining step beyond the normal prohibitions against national security propaganda. These restrictions were among a series of uncharacteristically robust national security actions taken by Congress, resulting in a “stalemate” that “reflected congressional rather than presidential priorities” (Scott, 1996, pg. 152). The administration went ahead with its plans despite these legislative prohibitions.

Collaboration

The administration took extreme measures to circumvent the prohibitions laid upon it by Congress. While the administration may not have succeeded in gaining legal sanction for its Contra aid pro-
gram (and went ahead with it regardless), it was a culmination of sorts for the credibility cartel and the practice of moral subsidy during the Cold War. Some of the information laundering efforts undertaken by the executive were deemed illegal by the investigators of the Iran-Contra affair. Under the auspices of the State Department Office for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean (S/LPD), a State Department agency created by order of the NSC and headed up by Otto Reich, the administration took advantage of moral subsidy. “In its campaign to persuade the public and Congress to support appropriations for the Contras, the office used Government employees and outside contractors” (L. H. Hamilton & Inouye, 1995, pg. 34). The Comptroller General of the US General Accounting Office (GAO) uncovered a memo from Reich to Secretary of State George Schulz describing the collaboration between S/LPD and the Citizens for America (CFA).

Citizens for America has been carrying out a public education campaign on Central America... Our office has a very good working relationship with Citizens for America and has provided CFA with a great deal of information.

According to the Comptroller General, this violated the prohibition of the use of federal funds for promoting the Contra cause.

The administration engaged in a great deal of activities within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) that appear entirely legal. Specifically, the WH/OPL established a regular meeting between administration staff and representatives of EGO supporters of the president’s agenda, called the Outreach Working Group on Central America. Faith Whittlesey managed the effort from the government’s side, alongside Morton Blackwell and Otto Reich (among several others). On the extra-governmental side, the list of invitees included the ASC, AEI, and dozens of other conservative movement organizations. The campaign for the Reagan Doctrine’s application to Central America also brought together elements of the Christian conservative religious organizations and the so-called “Israel Lobby.” This coalition of organizations would dominate national security politics well beyond the end of the Cold War, and contributed substantially to the public relations

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effort to invade and occupy Iraq in 2003. Despite failing in its efforts to secure public support and congressional consent for providing aid to the Contras, the credibility cartel’s transformation to neo-conservatism was now complete.

5.6 Discussion

The history described above provides strong support for the core propositions of the theory of moral subsidy, and explains the origin and subsequent development of the credibility cartel. FDR needed help motivating the public to support US involvement in World War II, but his Quarantine Speech failed to do the job. So, third parties organized themselves into citizens committees, and collaborated with the White House to undertake an orchestrated campaign of propaganda. This proved the concept of moral subsidy. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations adopted these methods, and recruited personnel from FDR’s extra-governmental allies, who brought with them the template that had worked to get the US to abandon neutrality in the 1930s. President Johnson first refused, then sought extra-governmental support as public opinion and Congress turned against the war. Nixon did much more of the same. In the latter years of the Cold War, the Ford and Reagan administrations had institutionalized the nexus of government and civil society, making moral subsidy standard operating procedure.

This was the shape of national security politics when the Soviet Union collapsed, and the credibility cartel’s legacy survived beyond the conflicts that created it. Perhaps this helps to explain how the West’s triumph in the Cold War never yielded the promised “peace dividend.” Instead, the US and its allies continued to pursue aggressive national security policies. Our “unipolar moment” was defined by those whose credibility derived from their ability to motivate the public, and by extension Congress, to favor force and confrontation (Krauthammer, 1990). Despite the end of the Cold War, US forces remained in place roughly where they stood facing down the Communist bloc in eastern Europe and its proxies in east Asia. NATO continues to expand despite losing its founding purpose, creating tension in the region (Mearsheimer, 1990, 2014). Military expenditures continue to account for over half of all discretionary spending. Prominent politicians and security
analysts treat every last non-state militant force as if it poses a threat equivalent to the Third Reich or the USSR. The real mystery, however, is not simply the persistence of these policies, but the durability of their popularity. The current argument suggests that this pathology relates to the fact that few credible authorities had been cultivated, with sufficient executive care, around the premise of restraint in the seventy years since World War II.
In May of 2016, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform convened a hearing about the Obama administration’s public relations campaign in support of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the official designation of the Iran nuclear deal reached in 2015. Two weeks prior, the New York Times Sunday Magazine ran a profile, written by David Samuels, about Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication Ben Rhodes, who appeared to boast about creating an “echo chamber” of pro-JCPOA voices in the political media (Samuels, 2016). Many critics of the deal, and of the Obama administration more generally, condemned Rhodes and the tactics he describes in the article. US Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-UT) invited three such critics to testify before the committee, Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Michael Doran of the Hudson Institute, and John Hannah of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Rhodes declined to appear, citing executive privilege. The three think-tank representatives testified, each of them voicing outrage at the administration’s policy and its political tactics.

Rubin complained that “the Obama administration operated behind the scenes to sell its Iran deal to the American people.” Hannah echoed this charge, saying that “[Rhodes] engaged in certain deceptions about what the administration was really up to.” In Doran’s words, the White House had surreptitiously organized and deployed “a network of surrogates among NGOs and think tanks who provided the media with seemingly independent verification” of the administration’s claims and arguments in support of the deal.¹ Without ever conceding that he had engaged in any deception, Rhodes had admitted, according to Samuels, that the “onslaught of freshly minted experts” had worked in collaboration with the White House. “They were saying things that validated what we had given them to say” (Samuels, 2016).

Samuels characterizes Rhodes’ public relations campaign in support of the Iran deal as “inno-

¹US House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, White House Narratives on the Iran Deal, May 17, 2016.
“But the preceding chapters show otherwise. Its use of social media may have broken new ground, but not its use of interest group surrogates. In fact, it reproduces a common feature of national security politics: the recruitment of like-minded, credible extra-governmental organizations (EGOs) by ambitious administrations facing public resistance and congressional opposition. Of all people, the witnesses at the Oversight Committee hearing should have known this. Rubin’s organization enjoys such prominence that the placard displaying his credentials to the committee members and the C-SPAN cameras reads, simply, “Michael Rubin, AEI.” They have become prestigious enough that their acronym suffices to identify them, and they achieved this through the same process that these witnesses now challenged. Members of the Nixon administration, on the president’s request, coordinated a fund-raising effort on behalf of AEI in 1970 that transformed a little-known research institute into a political powerhouse. According to reporting by Knight Ridder Newspapers, Hannah had himself served as liaison between the Bush administration and the Iraqi National Congress (INC) during the White House’s campaign to mobilize support for the Iraq War in 2002 (Landay & Strobel, 2005). He had played a central role in the collaboration described in the first pages of this dissertation. In marketing the JCPOA, the Obama administration created this “echo chamber” by mobilizing and empowering EGOs, just as presidents had done straight back to Franklin Roosevelt, using the same means by which Rhodes’ accusers had promoted their own national security agenda.

6.1 Summary

The INC, and its leaders Ahmed Chalabi and Kanan Makiya, were presented to the US public as the legitimate voice of the suffering Iraqi people. Beginning just after Operation Desert Storm, three successive presidential administrations packaged the organization as a government in exile, which busied itself with providing US officials with information about the Hussein regime and forging relationships with dissidents in-country that would help topple the dictator and build a democratic state with substantially reduced costs. Within the US government, Chalabi’s reputation looked very different than his public image. His intelligence about the Iraqi regime’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) programs proved unreliable, as did his connections with indigenous allies and the prospects for stable post-occupation governance. Nevertheless, he remained a prominent partner of the Bush administration as it embarked on Operation Iraqi Freedom. His influence, and that of the organization he represented, arose out of the propaganda value they provided.

This dissertation argues that, like the INC, national security interest groups gain influence most effectively by providing an extra-governmental outlet for pro-administration public relations. It offers a necessary correction to the study of interest groups that focuses only on the ways in which they exercise the first and second faces of power, in which they compel policy-makers to do what they otherwise would not, or prevent decision-makers from considering revisions to the status quo. It reveals the third face of power, the ability to induce changes in preferences, by reversing the direction of and shifting the target of influence. Instead of looking for instances when outside groups exercise power over the state, it shows the conditions under which EGOs enhance the power that the state holds over the public. It challenges dominant theories of international relations that rely on “domestic audience costs” and the “marketplace of ideas,” showing that presidential administrations have powerful tools for manipulating the information environment and circumventing democratic constraints on matters of national security.

The logic relies on information-based theories of influence, and applies three straightforward assumptions about national security politics to deduce the core proposition that groups thrive when they can offer propaganda assistance to ambitious presidents. In accordance with much of the US politics literature, interest groups gain access to the policy-making apparatus when they can provide technical or political information to decision-makers, or help officials market policy decisions and inform public constituencies about their role in policy compliance and implementation. Assuming three things eliminates all but one of these four aspects of information transmission. First, the president dominates foreign policy, relative to Congress. Second, the executive has superior intelligence-gathering capabilities compared to rival political actors within and outside of government on matters of national security. Together, these two assumptions virtually eliminate the prospect of interest groups providing additional value in the transmission of technical informa-
tion. Third, the general public pays little attention to foreign affairs. This reduces the amount of political information outside groups can provide to the administration, and simultaneously renders the public more susceptible to propaganda campaigns.

I call the provision of third-party testimony on behalf of administration policy “moral subsidy.” Distributing public relations information through third parties allows the administration to circumvent political and legal constraints, preserving its reputation for ethical behavior and avoiding criminal liability. Moral subsidy takes four main forms. Ethnic organizations, such as the INC, can authorize military action on behalf of the victims of the administration’s foreign antagonists, rendering an intervention as a humanitarian effort and legitimizing the use of force. Outside groups can provide expertise that translates complex national security issues into more easily digestible moral and patriotic appeals. Nationality-based associations can deliver cultural intelligence, with the promise — frequently unfulfilled — of rendering any military action more effective at lower cost to innocent life. Finally, outside actors provide a conduit for laundering information the official release of would expose the administration to legal sanction.

The executive needs propaganda assistance under a specific set of conditions. First, its must have a sufficiently ambitious national security agenda that it requires congressional authorization or appropriation. The president may pursue a cautious strategy unilaterally, but not an ambitious one. Second, if the public resists the administration’s proposal, the administration should respond by engaging in a public relations campaign. Such campaigns work more effectively, for legal and political reasons, with the collaboration of civil society. Public support gives the administration leverage over Congress. Third, the amount of leverage the president requires depends on how much opposition she faces in Congress, either by virtue of the partisan composition of the legislature, or for reasons stemming from particularities of the policy proposal. Securing congressional consent allows her to pursue major national security programs.

I test the theory using three distinct methods. First, I conduct an observational analysis of executive appointments to Federal Advisory Committees (FACs). Using an original dataset based on a data provided by the General Services Administration (GSA), I analyze all non-governmental ap-
ointments to FACs from 1997–2012. I identify the type of organizational affiliations of committee appointees, including business firms, cultural or academic institutions, and not-for-profit associations. The last of these represent interest groups. I offer two core findings. First, in support of the assumption about executive dominance in foreign policy, these data show that addressing national security issues reduces the involvement of congress in the establishment of FACs. Second, I show that presidential party power in Congress has a significant negative relationship with the access to national security FACs granted to not-for-profit association representatives. When the opposition party holds more seats and votes with greater unity, the executive appoints interest group affiliates with greater frequency.

Second, I examine experimentally the proposition that third-parties more effectively communicate a national security appeal than the president himself. In a series of online surveys fielded using Qualtrics and with subjects recruiting through the Amazon Mechanical Turk program, I show that interest groups may indeed provide valuable surrogacy effects. After providing a limited amount of basic information about party identification, ideology, prior presidential vote choice, and demographics, each subject reads a randomly assigned vignette about a proposed national security intervention. Vignettes vary across four real-world conflict scenarios and the identity of the person making the proposal. Results show that in a hypothetical scenario involving mainland China and Taiwan, respondents who oppose the current administration respond more favorably to appeals made by interest group representatives than to the president. Third party policy endorsement helps the administration overcome public resistance.

Finally, I provide an analytic history of extra-governmental public relations collaboration in major US national security politics beginning in the interwar period and continuing to the end of the Cold War. I show that the national security establishment in government developed in parallel with an extra-governmental contingent that I call the “credibility cartel.” The cartel’s access to government varied over time, according to the proposed conditions. When President Roosevelt faced public resistance and congressional opposition to deepening US involvement in World War II, he turned to extra-governmental public relations collaborators. President Truman did
the same with respect to the Marshall Plan and the policies outlined in National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68). President Eisenhower elevated the cartel’s influence when he needed their assistance with foreign-targeted propaganda. In the early years of the US war in Vietnam, President Johnson declined to work closely with the cartel, not requiring their assistance as the public and Congress supported the administration’s policy of escalation and “Americanization” of the war. Later, when the war became unpopular, Presidents Johnson and Nixon again recruited EGOs to help with public relations. Nixon politicized the cartel, exploiting the collapse of the Cold War consensus for partisan gain. He and President Reagan worked ever more closely with the cartel over missile defense policy and other ambitious national security programs when they required help securing public support and congressional consent.

Altogether, the dissertation makes two important, related contributions to the political science literature. Primarily, it illuminates a previously under-acknowledged facet of interest group involvement in national security politics. It re-orientates the direction of influence from one in which the groups exercise power over decision-makers to one in which organizations work with the state to exercise power over the public and veto-players holding rival positions in other branches of the US government. It recognizes that interest groups gain influence when those who hold power want them to have it. In doing so, it makes a second major contribution to the literature, from the perspective of executive power. It shows how the presidential branch can circumvent democratic constraints in national security politics. Over decades between the interwar period and the end of the Cold War, successive administrations took advantage of the moral subsidy provided by extra-governmental collaboration, and in doing so helped create the credibility cartel.

6.2 Discussion

The general category of organization under scrutiny here has many names. Among them, the one most commonly used as a pejorative is “special interest” — a term that connotes narrowness, exclusivity, and contravention of the common good. That a group has the ability to overcome the collective action problem does not imply that it has any rightful claim to the privileges of influence.
Organizations do not survive on ethical correctness, but on material factors. At the most basic level, larger groups often remain latent, while smaller groups succeed in policing its members against the tendency to free-ride. Groups whose leaders have the resources to provide selective incentives to rank-and-file members have greater political power, as do leaders with a surplus of resources that they can spend on their own political goals (Downs, 1957; Salisbury, 1969). The importance of resources in the maintenance of collective action turn imbalances of wealth into self-perpetuating power disparities. In these senses, interest groups are a potential threat to democracy.

On the other hand, imbalanced power relationships do not begin with interest groups, and the right of association can protect those without position. The nature of representative government, the process of election itself, elevates some citizens over others. “The fundamental fact about elections is that they are simultaneously and indissolubly egalitarian and inegalitarian, aristocratic and democratic [emphasis in original]” (Manin, 1997, pg. 149). Elites inevitably emerge, and those with talents applicable to political success need not have the virtues anticipated by proponents of democracy. The freedom to organize without government sanction often stands as a bulwark against this self-inflicted tyranny. For this reason, the First Amendment to the US Constitution protects the freedom of assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Not only is it fundamental to the practice of American democracy that the people remain free to organize, they must also enjoy the right to engage in lobbying. The right to form interest groups protects the democratic elements of representative government against its anti-democratic aspects.

Still, the necessity of the right of association does not guarantee its virtues, and concerns over special interests in US politics date back to the founding. In Federalist 10, James Madison warns of the emergence of factions, “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community” (Madison, 2001, pg. 43). There are, in Madison’s estimation, only two ways to prevent factionalization in a body politic: “by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence” and

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2The Supreme Court has subsequently interpreted the Bill of Rights as protecting the freedom of association as stemming from the First Amendments protections of assembly and speech.
“by giving to every citizen the same opinions.” The first solution is abominable, and the second Madison dismisses as impossible.

Having abandoned any hope of banishing faction from US politics, Madison seeks to limit its consequences. He proposes a two-part remedy for the “mischiefs of faction.” First, build a republic (in contrast to a direct democracy), in which those representatives to whom the public delegates governing authority may exhibit such a “love of justice” that their voice “will be more consonant with the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves” (Madison, 2001, pg. 46). However, Madison would hardly entrust good governance to the moral virtues of men. Recall his oft-repeated message, “if men were angels, no government would be necessary” (Madison, 2001, Fed. 51). Representatives are susceptible to corruption, so a second feature becomes necessary: that the republic and the franchise be large.

Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in union with each other (Madison, 2001, pg. 48).

If factions must emerge, let them come in such diversity that none can establish an organized constituency large enough to capture the government and act against the national interest.

Twentieth century liberal theorists agree that free civic engagement enables society to constrain and control the state, but they disagree about the virtues of interest groups and their impact on US governance. The pluralists argue along the lines of Madison’s prescription for containing the “mischief of faction” in Federalist 10 — that a large republic with varied organized interests gives rise to cross-cutting cleavages that prevent the accumulation of power among a narrow section of the polity (Madison, 2001). They see a balance among competing interests, each would-be faction holding appropriate influence over its own domain. Together they constrain the state from pursuing its own goals without accountability to the public it serves (Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1971). Other liberals challenge this optimistic assessment, arguing that the unequal distribution of resources systematically favors select groups. The same processes that constrain the state in a balanced en-
vironment propel some groups into a position of great advantage when the government expands its capacity, by serving select interests, but not the needs of the common good (McConnell, 1966; Lowi, 2010).

Statists, such as Eric Nordlinger, argue that in a democracy where societal and state interests diverge, the state remains autonomous, free from serious constraint by civil society. Even in a pluralist’s ideal, where interest groups are various, plentiful, and mobilized, the public official can not only navigate the interest group environment freely, he can re-shape it to his own benefit.

To say that civil society is composed of a plethora of groups and potential groups, fluctuating in size, with diverse, cross-cutting and off-changing interests, is to underscore the weak structure of the demand group universe, one lacking in clarity, coherence, and stability. It is a societal context that offers public officials many chances to maneuver among and between groups, evading, deflecting, and impeding the effective deployment of their resources by highlighting group differences or shared interests, broadening or narrowing group conflicts, playing off rival groups against one another, or encouraging or discouraging the activation of potential groups (Nordlinger, 1981, pg. 155).

In the “distorted liberal state” where imbalances in social and material capital allow certain groups to capture aspects of the governing apparatus, the state stands at least on equal footing to society, if not dominant. Bureaucracies in these “cozy little triangles” become dependent upon interest groups in order to function, but the relationship is reciprocal. “To the extent that public officials have nowhere else to turn for societal support than to the specialized groups whose interests fall within the scope of their authoritative responsibilities, the advantaged groups are also exclusively dependent upon particular public officials” (Nordlinger, 1981, pg. 163). Yet these represent the hard cases for the state, wherein the preferences of empowered societal actors are both durable and divergent from its own. Its autonomy is even greater when society shares its views, or when society’s views can be remade to resemble those of the state.4

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3 Nordlinger’s theory is self-consciously empirical, not normative. His work is not necessarily an endorsement of state autonomy.

4 Nordlinger’s framework identifies three types of autonomy, assuming that the state has the capacity to translate its preferences into authoritative action. Type I is where state and societal preferences diverge. Type II is where
The problem of interest groups, then, has two facets: undue influence by narrow factions and the state’s ability to commandeer civil society for its own aims. The more commonly expressed concern involves the first, especially regarding issues of national security. I argue that the second facet presents the greater problem, both because it expands state capacity beyond intended limits and because it helps endow certain groups with the very power attributed to them by those who focus on the first. I propose that we further re-orient our view of the relationship between interest groups to acknowledge their contiguity with government operations. This is the intended purpose of labeling these groups “extra-governmental organizations.” It recognizes the non-official capacity in which they operate, but rejects the implication that they operate independently. In the study of international relations theory as it pertains to security, the bulk of scholarship conforms to the statist position. The realist tendency to adopt the unitary actor assumption relegates domestic societal actors to the margins; their interests remain subsidiary to the pursuit of state survival (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). Democratic peace theorists recognize internal competition for control over policy. They also highlight the primacy of regime type in determining a state’s behavior, subsuming domestic rivalries under the unifying framework of self-governance. Democracy represents a method of creating a unitary state actor from a population comprised of rivals. Factions may oppose an action taken by the state, but the regime’s popular and institutional support protect it from internal sabotage. In order for the transparency of the democratic processes to make contracting commitments credible, spoiler factions must not subvert those processes (Lipson, 2005). In order for democratic norms to span state boundaries and create unifying transnational goodwill, they must first unify domestic factions (Russett, 1995). Theories of economic interdependence as a pacifying force treat the interests of states and their domestic constituents as non-divergent, the wealth of each accruing to the other (Ikenberry, 2001). Those theorists who recognize the constraining influence of domestic actors tend to see it as a way for the executive to gain leverage over foreign powers (Putnam, 1988; Fearon, 1995). In these arguments, the state uses its functional lack
of autonomy as a strategic tool. To varying degrees, realists, liberal institutionalists, and rationalists all accept some degree of state-centric logic.

State autonomy over foreign policy depends on three primary factors. First, the mutability of public opinion when it comes to national security crises favors the state. According to Nordlinger, “[t]ype II state autonomy,” where the state takes deliberate action to shift society’s divergent preferences toward its own,

is seen as no more than an unusual occurrence [outside of national security issues]. When it does obtain it is due to the confluence of uncommon and uncommonly propitious circumstances, such as an exceptional measure of unity within the state on the need for an immediate response to a national security threat (Nordlinger, 1981, pg. 100).

Such threats create the conditions that make possible Madison’s second prospect for the eradication of faction, which Madison himself thought impracticable – homogenization of opinion, which must be cultivated by the state. With faction eliminated within the national security policy domain, the state has no organized societal force to constrain it, and remains autonomous.

Second, political control over foreign policy is concentrated in the White House and the State department, “which are relatively insulated from corporate power,” according to Krasner (1978).

In practice, as a consequence, public officials have usually been able to resist private pressures to take actions that were not perceived as furthering the national interest. Central decision-makers have been able to carry out their own policies over the opposition of private corporations, providing that policy implementation only required resources that were under the control of the executive branch (Krasner, 1978, pg. 18).

The executive’s capacity to resist outside pressure arises from its institutional cohesiveness, especially among foreign policy bureaus, compared to the fragmentation of power in Congress (Krasner, 1978, pg. 64-5). Fragmentation is only part of the reason for executive insulation from interest group pressure. Additionally, the information asymmetries that give outside groups leverage over legislators is reversed in the context of executive politics. No private organization can match the US executive’s intelligence-gathering apparatus for scope and size. The inability to provide the ex-
ecutive with novel information makes it difficult for outside actors to manipulate the president into making a decision. Cohesiveness and the distribution of information work together to inoculate the executive against outside influence.

The third factor upon which state autonomy depends highlights a major contradiction among statists regarding the impact of ecological density or sparsity. According to Wildavsky (1966), a major proponent of the idea that the state remains autonomous in foreign policy, one of the central reasons for executive dominance in this domain is the shortage of interest groups capable of challenging the president.

Opinions are easier to gauge in domestic affairs because, for one thing, there is a stable structure of interest groups that covers virtually all matters of concern. The farm, labor, business, conservation, veteran, civil rights, and other interest groups provide cues when a proposed policy affects them. Thus people who identify with these groups may adopt their views. But in foreign policy matters the interest group structure is weak, unstable, and thin rather than dense (Wildavsky, 1966, pg. 10).

This sparsity, according to Wildavsky, liberates the president from potential interference. However, this logic does not necessarily follow. As recognized in Nordlinger’s discussion above, factional variety offers executive agents a broad array of options in forming extra-governmental partnerships. Density, then, may lead to greater executive autonomy, while sparsity limits the state’s freedom of action whenever it relies on assistance from the private sphere. Ultimately, whether a sparse interest group environment constrains or empowers the president depends on the extent of existing groups’ alignment with White House preferences. The fact that the presidential branch has helped promote the most important interest groups means that this relatively sparse environment should not constrain the executive, so long as the current president’s national security agenda remains consistent with the prior administrations that engaged in a strategy of exploiting moral subsidy.
6.3 Future Directions

The preceding chapters have sought to open a new path toward understanding the role and influence of interest groups in US national security politics. However, it suggests several important questions that require further research to answer. First, it reveals a surprising degree of continuity among organizations across time. The current episodic theory requires an additional, serial mechanism to explain the credibility cartel’s consolidation of influence over time. Second, it emphasizes the growth of influence among a set of organizations in a state with expanding power and an increasingly interventionist foreign policy. How, then, should one anticipate the demise of the credibility cartel, especially in the context of power transitions in the international system? Third, it focuses entirely on the United States, but all democratic leaders, regardless of the specific institutional regime, operate in a system designed to distribute rather than concentrate power. In a comparative context, how do leaders elsewhere summon the initiative, energy, and decision demanded by national security issues despite the constraining effects of democracy?

6.3.1 Explaining Continuity

The theory of moral subsidy helps to explain the emergence of the credibility cartel, but even so, the degree of continuity within this network of EGOs is remarkable. Figure 6.1 traces a small fraction of the connections among EGOs over time, specifically the top leaders of the organizations. A comprehensive network analysis would likely reveal even greater continuity, but the inter-connectedness at the leadership level already strongly suggests a systematic logic shaping the national security interest group environment.

While the Interwar years witnessed the Credibility Cartel’s first political victories of the twentieth century, it had begun the period with failure. Clark M. Eichelberger’s League of Nations Association, which formed out of the merger of the American Association for International Cooperation and the League of Nations Non-Partisan Committee in 1923, was unsuccessful in its efforts to promote US participation in the intergovernmental organization. However, in response to Roo-
Figure 6.1: Timeline

[Diagram not fully legible due to image quality]

[...] Internal Government Agency
(...) Marginalized EGO

AAUN: American Assn for the UN
AC: (War) Advertising Council
AEI: American Enterprise Institute
ASC: American Security Council
AWP: Americans for Winning the Peace
CDA: Cmte to Defend America
CEDP: Cmte for Effective and Durable Peace
CFD: Council for Democracy
CFD: Citizens for Victory
CMP: Cmte for the Marshall Plan
CPF: Cmte for Peace and Freedom
LNA: League of Nations Assn
NCFE: National Cmte for a Free Europe
OCB: Operations Coordinating Board
PSB: Psychological Strategy Board
USIA: United States Information Agency
sevelt’s Quarantines Speech, Eichelberger and several others, William Allen White in particular, re-grouped as the Committee for Concerted Peace Efforts. Renamed the Committee to Defend America, it partnered with the Council for Democracy and the Fight for Freedom Committee to assist FDR in drumming up support for US involvement in the war, and began a process of political development that continued, more or less, beyond the end of the Cold War. It offered an organizational template for extra-governmental organizations, and a model for subsequent presidential administrations to follow when they found themselves constrained by law and politics to pursue their international ambitions. More concretely, in the transfer of funding and personnel from one episode to the next, they create a nearly unbroken chain between the Interwar period and present day.

None of the three major EGOs of the Interwar period remained active during the war itself, though many of its members gained substantial access to the propaganda machine that they had helped give cause to create, the Office of War Information (OWI). Elmer Davis, who was made head of the Office of War Information (OWI), had been an original Century Group member, as had Herbert Agar, became the head of the OWI’s London office. Other members of the group who went on to prominence included Dean Acheson, John McCloy, Robert Lovett, Robert Patterson, and several other of the so-called “Wise Men” of national security (Olson, 2013, pg. 450). C. D. Jackson, one of the Council for Democracy (CFD) leadership, held various positions in the OWI and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and went on to even greater prominence in the Eisenhower administration.

Eichelberger and Acheson led the effort to reconvene the citizens committee they had joined in support of FDR’s interventionism. The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDA) provided the organizational template and the leadership personnel for a new EGO to help smooth the passage of President Truman’s recovery program. At least half a dozen members of the Century Group, the informal name for the leaders of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDA) and Fight for Freedom Committee (FFC) during the interwar years re-emerged as members of the Committee for the Marshall Plan (CMP) — and several that did not were already
in the State Department. Before settling on the final name, they had circulated a list that included “The Committee to Defend America by Aiding Europe” and nine other suggestions with the only differences being the replacement of “defend” with synonyms such as “protect” and “preserve” and several others. In membership, organization, and mission, it was a continuation of the same EGO as in its previous incarnation; the credibility cartel was more than a transitory force in US national security politics.

James Conant, who founded the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) to help muster political support for the yet-classified policies of NSC 68, had strong connections to both the credibility cartel and the Truman administration. He had been a member of the CDA and the CMP, was the president of Harvard University, which hosted Secretary of State Marshall for the announcement of the proposed European Recovery Program (ERP). He had also served as a consultant to the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. Specifically, he had helped draft NSC 68. Just as Dean Acheson had resigned his position in government to lead the extra-governmental CMP, Conant stepped away from his role as government consultant to run the CPD.

President Eisenhower’s shift of emphasis away from conventional military means, toward nuclear and psychological warfare, gave the credibility cartel perhaps its best opportunity to participate in national security politics. Though prohibiting the executive from engaging in national security propaganda domestically, the legislature had authorized the creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) to run foreign-targeted public diplomacy programs. The President’s Committee on International Information Activities (CIIA), which had recommended the new propaganda agency, also suggested turning the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), which President Truman had created by executive order, into the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), charged with maintaining a consistent messaging strategy and extracting the maximum public relations value for the US in its programs overseas. In the meantime, the Eisenhower administration would get its message out domestically through the Advertising Council, which began as the War Adver-

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5Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (HSTL), The Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1, Correspondence, 1947-1962, Letter from Hugh Moore to Fred McKee, September 8, 1947.
tising Council during World War II as an extra-governmental means to publicize information that the OWI could not. Again, the credibility cartel was at the center of these developments. C. D. Jackson, veteran of the OSS, OWI, and leader of the pro-intervention EGO during FDR’s efforts to involve the US more deeply in WWII, had worked with General Eisenhower prior to and during the 1952 presidential campaign on a project called the “Crusade for Freedom,” in conjunction with the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), which raised awareness and funds for Radio Free Europe, a program that would soon fall under the control of the USIA. Jackson assumed a role on the OCB and coordinated administration-approved publicity campaigns with the Advertising Council. Tracy Voorhees, another veteran of the CMP and CPD, designed the basic structure of the USIA itself.6

The credibility cartel remained cohesive during the US war in Vietnam. Though initially rebuffed by President Johnson, the group’s leadership continued the efforts that trace back to the interwar years under President Roosevelt. Paul Douglas, who led the Committee for Peace and Freedom in Vietnam (CPF) during the disenchantment phase of the Vietnam War, had been a member of the CDA. James Conant, who had been a member of the CMP headed up the CPD, which had among its leadership Arthur Dean, who lent his name to the Committee for an Effective and Durable Peace in Asia (CEDP), the group that President Johnson kept at a distance when the Vietnam War was still popular. Dean Acheson and Arthur Dean both joined Americans for Winning the Peace (AWP), one of the EGOs that President Nixon recruited to help promote Vietnamization.

When Nixon needed help mobilizing support for the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program, he turned to two organizations, the Citizens Committee to Safeguard America (CCSA) and the American Security Council (ASC). The CCSA had as its honorary co-founders Dean Acheson and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Acheson, of course, had been a leading member of the cartel since before WWII. Cabot Lodge had been as well. Indeed, he helped persuade James Conant to join the CPF during the disenchantment phase of the Vietnam War, after the LBJ administration had re-

buffed Conant’s offer to provide moral subsidy during Americanization. The other organization that helped with the Safeguard program was the ASC, which had also aided the Nixon administration in defeating the Amendment to End the War. The ASC continued to promote missile defense over the next decade, and was a chief collaborating proponent of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

ASC also took a primary role, alongside the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), in promoting US intervention in Central and South American during the 1980s. They organized the Coalition of Peace Through Strength, the extra-governmental partner to the Outreach Working Group on Central American run by the White House Office of Public Liaison (WH/OPL). Though they ultimately failed to secure congressional consent for their anti-Communist agenda in Latin America, they succeeded in building cohesive networks among various think-tanks, religious and ethnic organizations, and other types of interest group. The credibility cartel, which began in the early years of World War II, ended the the Cold War as a cohesive political movement and a powerful force in US national security politics. Such continuity requires further explanation, and the following sections offer some informed speculation in that regard.

Relaxation of Assumptions

In its static form, the theory of moral subsidy predicts that interest groups possessing certain credibility endowments and supporting policies in agreement with the president become influential by assisting the White House with propaganda. They maximize the prospects for political success by stoking public opinion, which exerts pressure on members of Congress to accept the president’s proposals.\(^7\) EGOs that provide moral subsidy gain access to the professional, informational, and political resources of the national security apparatus. Their affiliates use these resources to build constituencies among the public. The theory is based on three assumptions. First, as discussed above, the president initiates security policy. Second, the executive has informational advantages

\(^7\)Maximizing the prospects for political success does not guarantee policy achievement. It merely improves to the greatest extent possible the chances of congressional consent and the likelihood of electing candidates who support the policy (and removing those who do not.
over Congress and interest groups in this policy domain. Third, the public has weak prior preferences on matters of foreign policy. Together, these factors provide an explanation for why some EGOs become central to the security policy establishment, while others remain marginal.

Introducing longer-term temporal dynamics complicates the theory, but moral subsidy continues to provide an explanation for why some EGOs remain influential well beyond the crisis that originally prompts the executive to enlist their assistance. The complication arises from the fact that the outcome of moral subsidy alters the initial conditions that determine which groups gain access; two of the assumptions that drive the theory must be relaxed, but in ways that yield additional advantages for previously enlisted EGOs. First, gaining security clearance narrows the information gap between them and subsequent administrations. As long-time collaborators with the national security establishment – often alumni of state security agencies – EGO leaders often have technical information on par with a newly elected president. In some cases, they took part in the collection and analysis of the information on the president’s desk. Second, building constituencies strengthens the prior preferences of the general public. Simple bayesian logic dictates that a public is less easily persuaded by new information after years, even decades, of effective propaganda. Enlisted EGOs become more capable of directing national security politics away from the preferences of subsequent presidents if their administrations attempt to reverse previously subsidized initiatives.

Path Dependency

Recruitment brings immediate rewards to EGOs, such as prestige, but collaboration with the government yields further advantages. When the White House runs deficits in its ability to persuade on matters of national security, it seeks recruits for a collaborative propaganda campaign. Interest groups that agree with the president’s agenda and have their own sources of credibility provide a moral subsidy to the administration. Two mechanisms help them use this collaboration to build and consolidate influence over time. First, they gain privileged access to important professional, political, and informational resources. Second, successful propaganda builds constituencies committed to the agenda that the EGO and the administration seek to promote. Together, these create
path dependent dynamics that turn selected groups into broadly influential political actors.

**Figure 6.2: Serial Mechanism (Path Dependency)**

Paul Pierson, adapting Arthur (1994), highlights four characteristics that generate the increasing returns that explain path dependency (Pierson, 2000), and moral subsidy produces all four. These are high set-up costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations. The costs of establishing an effective network of EGOs are high, not because they require plentiful material resources, but because the most important resources are closely held by the administration. Access to those resources help collaborators overcome startup costs. Rivals, for example a bloc of senators, may attempt the same strategy, but the White House has better information, and the institutional hierarchy within the executive provides superior resolution to the collective action problem than the within-chamber egalitarianism of a bicameral legislature. Access to resources also allows groups to learn both about the effective use of propaganda and how to navigate the complexities of national security issues, using information that the administration shares with few others. Political resources and constituency development facilitate coordination among groups, which produces non-zero-sum relations among established EGOs and helps to build a self-supporting network. Finally, as constituencies develop, expectations of political outcomes adapt to a new environment of public opinion, giving would-be challengers cause to support rather than oppose a set of poli-
cies. Through access to resources and constituency development, path dependency enables EGOs to develop and consolidate their influence in national security politics.

Associational Professionalism

Another explanation for the robust continuity among EGOs depends on the idea of associational professionalism. Sociologist Andrew Abbott documents how civic associations, particularly those organized by and around particular professions, have served as a means to claim exclusive jurisdiction over performing particular forms of skilled labor (Abbott, 1988, ch. 3). Lawyers, physicians, pharmacists, psycho-therapists, and other specialists have consolidated their market position by imbuing their training, standard operating procedures, and best practices with social value that limits eligibility to those with certain professional and educational pedigree. Professional associations develop a system of norms that members in good standing must follow, in this case beliefs about grand strategy. Milton Friedman argues that formal occupational licensure enables professional practitioners to limit competition and thereby extract inflated profits (Friedman, 1968, ch. 9). The credibility cartel may or may not have extracted such material profits from their position, but they have exercised substantial influence over the world-view of the national security establishment.

This suggests an avenue of further inquiry: to what extent have the EGOs of the credibility cartel sought to establish a system of credentials that prohibits or permits discursive participation by national security policy advocates? The associational professionalism among national security experts appears less formal than that for veterinarians, hair-dressers, and accountants, but a parallel set of credentialing academic institutions has arisen alongside the EGOs that form the credibility cartel. During the interwar years, the same intellectual movement that produced the League of Nations Association (LNA) also created university research programs like the Committee on International Relations (CIR) at the University of Chicago under the leadership of Quincy Wright. The first of its kind, CIR inspired dozens of other universities to create similar programs granting degrees in International Relations. Further research will examine more closely the relationship with

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8In the spirit of full disclosure, the author of this dissertation should note his current employment by CIR.
these credentialing institutions and the extent to which EGO affiliation has served to promote a system of associational professionalism that limits the perceived eligibility to participate in national security politics.

### 6.3.2 The Possibility of Collapse: A Power Transition Approach

The feedback effect that emerges as a result of moral subsidy depends on the continuing salience of the security challenges that initially motivate a president to enlist EGOs, but certain factors inherent to national security politics make EGOs difficult to dislodge even in a changing international environment. The disappearance or defeat of an enemy resolves that particular conflict and renders obsolete the advantages gained by the EGO since the problem for which they offer a solution no longer plagues the president. This is the case in domestic policy as well, where the expected recurrence of an issue is one of two principal determinants of access (Hansen, 1991).

Two factors distinguish national security politics on the matter of recurrence. First, the public’s relatively meager attention to world politics creates opportunities to frame new events as extensions of previous conflicts. It was remarkably simple for the George W. Bush administration to persuade the public, with little evidence, that Saddam Hussein had collaborated with Osama bin Laden, or for previous administrations to make Hussein a security priority by comparing him to Joseph Stalin. The ease with propagandists can insert new conflicts into old frameworks makes it likely that EGOs will persist in their influence once they have gained access. Second, the international system provides a greater potential for surprise events, exogenous shocks that may at any moment alter the president’s preferences or break through the existing propaganda regime and generate an unmediated public response.

Three factors affect the opportunities and challenges EGOs face when the international threat environment changes. These are magnitude – whether a threat is major or minor, direction – whether it is a new emerging threat or an old threat collapsing, and the pace at which the change is taking place – which is affected by the first two. Table 6.1 summarizes pace as determined by...
magnitude and direction. Major threats emerge gradually.\textsuperscript{9} Military power depends on economic productivity, technology, and population, all of which change slowly. Alliances form and dissolve in response to changes in the balance of power and a reading of intentions based on long-term state behavior (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Mearsheimer, 2001). Weak enemies do not become strong overnight, and powerful allies do not alter their allegiances arbitrarily.\textsuperscript{10} Power rarely survives regime change intact, so strong allies tend not to emerge as dangerous enemies after a revolution. The acquisition of nuclear weapons shifts the scale of a conflict dramatically, but it does not turn allies into enemies. Minor threats do not fade gradually, for the simple reason that they do not have very far to fall. Any reduction of power or amelioration of intention can zero out a minor threat. They may emerge suddenly – by the same logic – or they can emerge gradually, though the difference matters little to a great power like the US. Major threats may fade gradually, as when a great power loses its advantages due to relative population loss or other form of internal balancing by rivals. They can also disappear suddenly, as when an enemy economy collapses, its people stage a revolution, or it loses a major war.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Direction</th>
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<th>Minor</th>
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<td>Emerging</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collapsing</td>
<td>Gradual or Sudden</td>
<td>Sudden</td>
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Table 6.1: Threat Change in the International System

These three factors of change make EGO influence sticky under conditions of collapsing or minor threats, but EGOs are only repealed or replaced slowly and rarely, as a new major threat emerges. Sudden changes offer the possibility of surprise exogenous shock, but such changes only occur as minor powers revise their status or as major powers collapse. Minor power revisions of-

\textsuperscript{9}“Major” threats involve great powers, states that possess enough military capability to plausibly fight a war with the most powerful state in the system (Mearsheimer, 2001). “Gradually” refers to processes that take years or longer. “Suddenly” refers to changes that occur over the course of weeks or months.

\textsuperscript{10}At the end of World War II, the US and Soviet Union both knew that the fall of Germany would spell the end of their alliance, and the division of Europe into spheres of influence was not militarized until well into the Cold War. Instead, much of the early military engagement occurred in the minor satellite conflicts.
fer entrenched EGOs to extend their influence by inserting new emerging conflicts into the larger framework of geopolitical competition with rival great powers. Major power collapse gives influential EGOs the chance to claim credit for victory and transfer its prestige to influence over any number of global situations, especially those minor conflicts it has managed to re-interpret as elements of the broader great power struggle. Among the possible exogenous changes in the international threat environment, only great power emergence, which happens gradually, can reliably topple an entrenched network of EGOs. The informational advantages the EGOs have gained, and the constituency they have built, become irrelevant just as the administration enlists new EGO partners in support of a different security policy program to meet the challenge of a substantial emerging danger.

6.3.3 The Comparative Context

The theory presented in this dissertation involves four sets of political actors, the administration, civil society, Congress, and the public. The US system of governance explicitly pits two of these actors against one another in a struggle for power. The influence of interest groups, in this theory, depends on the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. The potential for different political parties each to control a constitutionally-empowered branch of government opens up a space for outside groups to occupy. Even with co-partisan legislative support, the president’s political incentives often deviate from those that motivate members of Congress, who serve their own constituencies and must survive their own election schedules. EGOs help ambitious presidents compel congressional acquiescence, using the public as leverage.

Exploring this subject in a comparative context would serve two purposes. First, if varying the institutions of democratic governance were to produce a different outcome with respect to civil society participation in national security politics, this would further strengthen the current theory. If, for example, something similar to the credibility cartel were to emerge in a parliamentary system, that would undermine the theory’s causal logic. Approaching the subject in a comparative context would also serve to answer a fundamental tension in democratic national security politics. Democ-
racy, by design, disperses political power. At the same time, emergency requires unity in decision. In the US, civil society helps resolve the tension between democratic dispersion of power and the executive energy demanded by national security.

6.4 The Ethical Ambiguity of Moral Subsidy

This dissertation has not focused its attention on the religious organizations that have participated in the various collaborative public relations campaigns that administrations have conducted over the years. Seldom have they taken a central coordinating position in these efforts, but religious EGOS and religion itself have often played supporting roles. The Roosevelt-era Council for Democracy had as one of its rallying cries, the phrase “A Fighting Faith.” CD Jackson, of the Eisenhower administration, helped coordinate the implicitly Christian, “Crusade for Freedom” as well as a “Moral Re-armament” program with explicitly religious thematic content. Dozens of aid organizations during the early Cold War had direct connections to US churches and other religious organizations. Henry Luce, CD Jackson’s boss at Life Magazine, was raised by Presbyterian missionaries in East Asia, and helped persuade president Eisenhower to begin US covert efforts to thwart the spread of communism in Indochina, leading eventually to the Vietnam War. Religious organizations, primarily Christian and Jewish, were plentiful among the EGOS that regularly attended the Reagan administration’s Outreach Working Group on Central America.

Religious organizations were especially effective as agents in the field; the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) and United States Information Agency (USIA) employed EGOS in foreign propaganda efforts, often in the context of relief programs. The term “moral subsidy” was first used by a sociologist of Christian missionaries at the end of the nineteenth century, who described them as providing “a moral subsidy to commerce” (Dennis, 1897). Missionaries would literally propagate the faith, establishing a common moral language between their home culture and the so-called ‘periphery.’ This would make it easier for commercial interests to gain a foothold so far removed from the metropole.

The relationship between religious organizations and ambitious presidents seeking a broad na-
tional security mandate carries an inherent tension in US democracy. On the one hand, the separation of church and state makes too close a connection bad for both parties. Many citizens expect freedom both from religion in public policy and from government meddling in affairs of faith. Others, of course, want the opposite, but the separation remains intact for the most part. On the other hand, religion and national security politics might not be wholly separable, especially when the president’s ambitions meet resistance and opposition. In such cases, the White House regularly stokes fear through threat inflation and the securitization of public policy. Faith may counteract this anxiety, or give it a context in which politicians may more easily shape public response. Future research in this area should examine the social-psychological relationship between fear and religion in national security affairs.

There is another inherent tension in the practice of moral subsidy, between providing strategic value and possessing ethical virtue. Victim authorization may be a post hoc rationalization for going to war, but the exile community supporting the intervention has a legitimate stake in seeing their lands liberated from tyranny, their family rescued from oppression, and their children able to return safely home. Cultural intelligence, though often over-sold or misused, stands a non-zero chance of mitigating harm. Expert translators may be skilled manipulators, but the public does require assistance interpreting complex choices pertaining to distant conflicts. Finally, intelligence laundering sometimes hides the evidence of criminal activity on the part of the government, but it also protects people who risk their lives for the security of their country, and signals the government’s intentions to its own public.

EGOs subsidize the moralism of the administration’s marketing campaign, not the morality of its policy agenda. They serve to improve the appearance of legitimacy, and have instrumental political value for the administration they support. It is in the nature of propaganda to play upon moral sentiments. With little experience with security issues, the mass public requires a framework for structuring opinion, and moralism proves broadly accessible. Fear is a natural tool of the war-minded leader, as the common practice of threat-inflation shows (Kaufmann, 2004), and moral suasion works as an effective counterpart. Propaganda campaigns use fear and moralism as
complements in a unified persuasion strategy, with a particularly religious aspect in the US. The deployment of moralism has lasting effects on EGO influence, boosting its longevity. A constituency built on moral commitments has passion that does not easily fade, but persists beyond the scope of their original context.

The theory recognizes the political importance of moral reasoning, but in a particular way that does not imply any value as a guide to ethical behavior. From the perspective of a policy initiator, it is a strategic tool. For the president, it is a powerful instrument of state-building, allowing the executive to husband political power and enhance the capacity of the government to undertake ambitious projects. For interest groups, it represents an opportunity to step inside the process of governing, to become a functioning limb of the state. The moral justification they provide authorizes only the policy itself, but these extra benefits arise in addition to the initial reward of having their preference satisfied. Moreover, the treatment of morality as a resource, subject to transaction, as a value that one party can transfer to another, fits poorly into conventional conceptions of virtue based on consequence, intention, or motivation. There is no reason to expect principled foreign policy to be a product of moral subsidy. It serves sinners and saints at the same window.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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APPENDIX: CODING, ROBUSTNESS, AND QUESTIONNAIRE

A Supplement to Chapter 3

A.1 Interest Categories

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A.2 Committee Functions

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A.3 Affiliation Types, Organization Types, and Resource Types

| Association - Civic and Recreational | Firm - Consumer and Retail |
| Association - Environmental         | Firm - Energy and Natural Resources |
| Association - Ethnic                | Firm - Food and Beverage |
| Association - Government            | Firm - Health and Pharmaceutical |
| Association - Issue Advocacy        | Firm - Investment and Insurance |
| Association - Labor                 | Firm - Legal |
| Association - Military and Veterans | Firm - Logistics and Security |
| Association - Political             | Firm - Manufacturing and Engineering |
| Association - Professional          | Firm - Media and Entertainment |
| Association - Relief and Service    | Firm - Other |
| Association - Religious and Moral Action | Firm - Public Relations and Strategy |
| Association - Trade                 | Firm - Shipping and Trade |
| Firm - Agriculture and Chemicals    | Firm - Management Consulting and Staffing |
Firm - Technology and Telecommunications
Firm - Travel and Hospitality
Government - Federal Executive
Government - Federal Judiciary
Government - Federal Legislature
Government - Foreign and Intergovernmental
Government - State and Local
Government - Tribal and Territorial
Institution - Academic
Institution - Cultural
Institution - Grant Making
Institution - Medical
Institution - Policy Research
Institution - Religious
Institution - Social Welfare
Institution - Technical Research
Military - Active
Military - Education and Training
Military - Retired and Family
Other - Independent
Other - Unknown

A.4 Global Power Politics Issue Areas

**Included**
- Armed Services
- Culture and Heritage
- Environment, Law, and Aid
- Nuclear Issues
- Security Strategy
- Technology and Procurement

**Excluded**
- Business and Trade
- Education and Training
- Homeland
- Human Resources
### A.5 Alternate Specifications for Member-Level Analysis

#### Table A1: Member-Level Panel Logit (without second interaction)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>PowerPol</td>
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<td>3.02**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.94)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PresPower</td>
<td>2.29*</td>
<td>2.80*</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PowerPol × PresPower</td>
<td>−6.35***</td>
<td>−7.86***</td>
<td>−3.96***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
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<td>−0.26</td>
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<td>(0.24)</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Established During War</td>
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<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established by Legislation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(1.21)</td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
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<td>−0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td>Cost (ln $)</td>
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<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
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<td>NYTimes Coverage</td>
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<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New President</td>
<td>−0.46**</td>
<td>−0.38*</td>
<td>−0.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
<td>−0.13</td>
<td>−0.11</td>
<td>−0.11</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
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<td>Republican President</td>
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<td>0.81***</td>
<td>0.82***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>−0.34</td>
<td>−0.52***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−4.63**</td>
<td>−2.75</td>
<td>−5.84***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnσ²u cons</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.88*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PresPower</td>
<td>−4.37**</td>
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<td>−3.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(1.44)</td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
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<td>Approval Margin (90-day)</td>
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<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
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<td>−0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established During War</td>
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<td>−0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.75)</td>
<td>(1.95)</td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established by Legislation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.45)</td>
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<td># Meeting Days</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost (ln $)</td>
<td>−0.47**</td>
<td>−0.61***</td>
<td>−0.38*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New President</td>
<td>−0.69*</td>
<td>−0.66*</td>
<td>−0.69*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
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<td>0.18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican President</td>
<td>1.63***</td>
<td>1.52***</td>
<td>1.68***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
<td>−1.07***</td>
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<td>−1.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>6.53*</td>
<td>8.06*</td>
<td>5.54*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.88)</td>
<td>(3.14)</td>
<td>(2.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insig2u cons</td>
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<td>0.70</td>
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<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
B Supplement to Chapter 4

B.1 Survey Questionnaire

Pre-Treatment Questions

Q1 Are you a US citizen?
   • Yes
   • No

Q2 What is your gender?
   • Male
   • Female

Q3 What is the highest level of education you have received?
   • Some High School
   • GED
   • High School Diploma
   • Associate’s Degree
   • Some College, no degree
   • Bachelor’s Degree
   • Master’s Degree
   • Professional or Doctorate Degree

Q4 What racial/ethnic groups(s) do you belong to?
   • Black or African American
   • White or Caucasian
   • Hispanic or Latino(a)
   • Native American or Alaska Native
   • Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
   • East Asian
   • South Asian
   • Middle Eastern
Q5  Have you or a close friend or family member served in the US military in the past 12 years, including currently active service members?

• Yes

• No

Q6  Here is a scale of political views from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q7  In terms of the two major political parties in the US, how would you characterize your own party affiliation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q8  Regardless of your party affiliation or political views, which Presidential candidate did you prefer in the most recent election?

• Barack Obama

• Mitt Romney

• Other Candidate or None

Q9  Regardless of which candidate you preferred, how satisfied are you with the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Screen 1: Introduction to Experiment

We would like you to read a news story about a US military policy issue, and to answer a series of questions about your view of the situation. Please read the passage carefully, and answer the questions as accurately as possible. You will not be able to return to the page once you have advanced to the next one, so you will not be able to proceed for at least 30 seconds – but you may take as much time as you need. You may take notes if you wish, but it should not be necessary.

Screen 2: Experimental Treatment

[RANDOMLY DISPLAY 1 OF THE FOLLOWING 24 PARAGRAPHS]
The United States should consider taking military action against the country of Syria. Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad has repeatedly shown contempt for the rules of the international community by sponsoring terrorism, violently suppressing democratic movements, and using chemical weapons against his own people. Syria’s civil war has already crossed the border into Lebanon, and currently threatens to spread to Jordan, an important ally of the US. An intervention by the US would prevent an international crisis. It would liberate the people of Syria, whose tyrannical government has repressed them brutally since the current uprisings began.

According to President Obama, Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad has repeatedly shown contempt for the rules of the international community by sponsoring terrorism, violently suppressing democratic movements, and using chemical weapons against his own people. The President says that Syria’s civil war has already crossed the border into Lebanon, and currently threatens to spread to Jordan, an important ally of the US. President Obama is confident that an intervention by the US would prevent an international crisis. "It would liberate the people of Syria, whose tyrannical government has repressed them brutally since the current uprisings began," said the President in a recent press conference.

According to Senator John McCain, the 2008 Republican candidate for president and current ranking member of the Armed Services committee, Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad has repeatedly shown contempt for the rules of the international community by sponsoring terrorist organizations and violently suppressing democratic movements domestically. The Senator says that Syria’s civil war has already crossed the border into Lebanon, and currently threatens to spread to Jordan, an important ally of the US. Senator McCain is confident that an intervention by the US would prevent an international crisis. Furthermore, “it would liberate the people of Syria, whose tyrannical government has repressed them brutally since the current uprisings began,” said McCain in a recent press conference.

According to Dr. Shiraz Najari, a Syrian-born heart surgeon at Johns Hopkins University Hospital and spokesman for the Society for a Free Syria (SFS), Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad has repeatedly shown contempt for the rules of the international community by sponsoring terrorist organizations and violently suppressing democratic movements domestically. Najari says that Syria’s civil war has already crossed the border into Lebanon, and currently threatens to spread to Jordan, an important ally of the US. Dr. Najari is confident that an intervention by the US would prevent an international crisis. Furthermore, “it would liberate the people of Syria, whose tyrannical government has repressed them brutally since the current uprisings began,” said Najari in a report recently published by the SFME.

According to Dr. Simon Peterson, an expert on...
military affairs from the non-partisan Institute for Global Stability (IGS), Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad has repeatedly shown contempt for the rules of the international community by sponsoring terrorist organizations and violently suppressing democratic movements domestically. Peterson says that Syria’s civil war has already crossed the border into Lebanon, and currently threatens to spread to Jordan, an important ally of the US. Dr. Peterson is confident that an intervention by the US would prevent an international crisis. Furthermore, “it would liberate the people of Syria, whose tyrannical government has repressed them brutally since the current uprisings began,” said Peterson in a report recently published by the IGS.

**[CONDITION 6: SYRIA / MILITARY OFFICER]** The United States should consider taking military action against the country of Syria. According to Admiral Simon Peterson of the United States Navy, Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad has repeatedly shown contempt for the rules of the international community by sponsoring terrorist organizations and violently suppressing democratic movements domestically. Peterson says that Syria’s civil war has already crossed the border into Lebanon, and currently threatens to spread to Jordan, an important ally of the US. Adm. Peterson is confident that an intervention by the US would prevent an international crisis. Furthermore, “it would liberate the people of Syria, whose tyrannical government has repressed them brutally since the current uprisings began,” said Adm. Peterson in a report recently published by the Navy.

**[CONDITION 7: ANGOLA / CONTROL]** The United States should consider sending troops to keep the peace in Angola, located on the Atlantic coast of southern Africa. The former Portuguese colony has been tormented by internal struggles for power as well as violence spilling over from civil wars in neighboring countries. Local militias have exploited the people’s extreme poverty and monopolized Angola’s wealth of mineral resources such as diamonds, gold, and nickel. US troops could help maintain the fragile peace established in 2002 after over a quarter century of brutal civil war. Furthermore, the US presence would help boost the effectiveness of the strong Catholic missionary presence working within Angola to alleviate the people’s suffering.

**[CONDITION 8: ANGOLA / PRESIDENT]** The United States should consider sending troops to keep the peace in Angola, located on the Atlantic coast of southern Africa. According to President Obama, the former Portuguese colony has been tormented by internal struggles for power as well as violence spilling over from civil wars in neighboring countries. The President has said that local militias have exploited the people’s extreme poverty and monopolized Angola’s wealth of mineral resources such as diamonds, gold, and nickel. Obama is confident that US troops could help maintain the fragile peace established in 2002 after over a quarter century of brutal civil war. Furthermore, “the US presence would help boost the effectiveness of the strong Catholic missionary presence working within Angola to alleviate the people’s suffering,” said President Obama in a recent press conference.

**[CONDITION 9: ANGOLA / REPUBLICAN]** The United States should consider sending troops to keep the peace in Angola, located on the Atlantic coast of southern Africa. According to Senator John McCain, the 2008 Republican candidate for president and current ranking member of the Armed Services committee, the former Portuguese colony has been tormented by internal struggles for power as well as violence spilling over from civil wars in neighboring countries. The
senator has said that local militias have exploited the people’s extreme poverty and monopolized Angola’s wealth of mineral resources such as as diamonds, gold, and nickel. Senator McCain is confident that US troops could help maintain the fragile peace established in 2002 after over a quarter century of brutal civil war. Furthermore, “the US presence would help boost the effectiveness of the strong Catholic missionary presence working within Angola to alleviate the people’s suffering,” said McCain in a recent press conference.

[CONDITION 10: ANGOLA / ETHNIC LOBBYIST] The United States should consider sending troops to keep the peace in Angola, located on the Atlantic coast of southern Africa. According to Dr. Charles Kalanga, an Angolan-born heart surgeon at Johns Hopkins University Hospital and spokesman for the Society for a Free Angola (SFA), the former Portuguese colony has been tormented by internal struggles for power as well as violence spilling over from civil wars in neighboring countries. Dr. Kalanga has said that local militias have exploited the people’s extreme poverty and monopolized Angola’s wealth of mineral resources such as diamonds, gold, and nickel. Kalanga is confident that US troops could help maintain the fragile peace established in 2002 after over a quarter century of brutal civil war. Furthermore, “the US presence would help boost the effectiveness of the strong Catholic missionary presence working within Angola to alleviate the people’s suffering,” said Dr. Kalanga in a report recently published by the SFA.

[CONDITION 11: ANGOLA / THINK-TANK ANALYST] The United States should consider sending troops to keep the peace in Angola, located on the Atlantic coast of southern Africa. According to Dr. Simon Peterson, an expert on military affairs from the non-partisan Institute for Global Stability (IGS), the former Portuguese colony has been tormented by internal struggles for power as well as violence spilling over from civil wars in neighboring countries. Dr. Peterson has said that local militias have exploited the people’s extreme poverty and monopolized Angola’s wealth of mineral resources such as as diamonds, gold, and nickel. Peterson is confident that US troops could help maintain the fragile peace established in 2002 after over a quarter century of brutal civil war. Furthermore, “the US presence would help boost the effectiveness of the strong Catholic missionary presence working within Angola to alleviate the people’s suffering,” said Dr. Peterson in a report recently published by the IGS.

[CONDITION 12: ANGOLA / MILITARY OFFICER] The United States should consider sending troops to keep the peace in Angola, located on the Atlantic coast of southern Africa. According to Admiral Simon Peterson of the US Navy, the former Portuguese colony has been tormented by internal struggles for power as well as violence spilling over from civil wars in neighboring countries. Adm. Peterson has said that local militias have exploited the people’s extreme poverty and monopolized Angola’s wealth of mineral resources such as as diamonds, gold, and nickel. Peterson is confident that US troops could help maintain the fragile peace established in 2002 after over a quarter century of brutal civil war. Furthermore, “the US presence would help boost the effectiveness of the strong Catholic missionary presence working within Angola to alleviate the people’s suffering,” said Adm. Peterson in a report recently published by the Navy.

[CONDITION 13: CHINA / CONTROL] The United States should do more to contain the expansion of China and defend its neighbors, especially Taiwan and Japan. The communist Chinese
government has claimed the right to govern Taiwan for decades, despite local hopes for establishing a democracy. The Taiwanese people should be free to choose their own political future, rather than remain under the thumb of an autocrat government in Beijing. Expanding military aid could make the difference, and tip the balance of power in the region in favor of this important ally against a rising threat to US influence. It would convince China to halt its efforts to expand its power, and prevent another Cold War before it could begin.

[CONDITION 14: CHINA / PRESIDENT] The United States should consider greatly expanding its military aid to the island nation of Taiwan to help them gain independence from mainland China. According to President Obama, the communist Chinese government has claimed the right to govern Taiwan for decades, despite local hopes for establishing a democracy. The President has said that the Taiwanese people should be free to choose their own political future, rather than remain under the thumb of an autocrat government in Beijing. Obama is confident that expanding military aid could make the difference, and tip the balance of power in the region in favor of this important ally against a rising threat to US influence. Furthermore, “it would liberate the Taiwanese Christian community, whose religious freedom has been stifled under the communist regime,” said President Obama in a recent press conference.

[CONDITION 15: CHINA / REPUBLICAN] The United States should consider greatly expanding its military aid to the island nation of Taiwan to help them gain independence from mainland China. According to Senator John McCain, the 2008 Republican candidate for president and current ranking member of the Armed Services committee, the communist Chinese government has claimed the right to govern Taiwan for decades, despite local hopes for establishing a democracy. The senator has said that the Taiwanese people should be free to choose their own political future, rather than remain under the thumb of an autocrat government in Beijing. Senator McCain is confident that expanding military aid could make the difference, and tip the balance of power in the region in favor of this important ally against a rising threat to US influence. Furthermore, “it would liberate the Taiwanese Christian community, whose religious freedom has been stifled under the communist regime,” said McCain in a recent press conference.

[CONDITION 16: CHINA / ETHNIC LOBBYIST] The United States should consider greatly expanding its military aid to the island nation of Taiwan to help them gain independence from mainland China. According to Dr. Steven Chiang, a Taiwanese-born heart surgeon at Johns Hopkins University Hospital and spokesman for the Society for a Free Taiwan (SFT), the communist Chinese government has claimed the right to govern Taiwan for decades, despite local hopes for establishing a democracy. Chiang has said that the Taiwanese people should be free to choose their own political future, rather than remain under the thumb of an autocrat government in Beijing. Dr. Chiang is confident that expanding military aid could make the difference, and tip the balance of power in the region in favor of this important ally against a rising threat to US influence. Furthermore, “it would liberate the Taiwanese Christian community, whose religious freedom has been stifled under the communist regime,” said Dr. Chiang in a report recently published by the SFT.

[CONDITION 17: CHINA / THINK-TANK ANALYST] The United States should consider greatly expanding its military aid to the island nation of Taiwan to help them gain independence
from mainland China. According to Dr. Simon Peterson, an expert on military affairs from the non-partisan Institute for Global Stability (IGS), the communist Chinese government has claimed the right to govern Taiwan for decades, despite local hopes for establishing a democracy. Peterson has said that the Taiwanese people should be free to choose their own political future, rather than remain under the thumb of an autocrat government in Beijing. Dr. Peterson is confident that expanding military aid could make the difference, and tip the balance of power in the region in favor of this important ally against a rising threat to US influence. Furthermore, “it would liberate the Taiwanese Christian community, whose religious freedom has been stifled under the communist regime,” said Dr. Peterson in a report recently published by the IGS.

[CONDITION 18: CHINA / MILITARY OFFICER] The United States should consider greatly expanding its military aid to the island nation of Taiwan to help them gain independence from mainland China. According to Admiral Simon Peterson of the US Navy, the communist Chinese government has claimed the right to govern Taiwan for decades, despite local hopes for establishing a democracy. Peterson has said that the Taiwanese people should be free to choose their own political future, rather than remain under the thumb of an autocrat government in Beijing. Adm. Peterson is confident that expanding military aid could make the difference, and tip the balance of power in the region in favor of this important ally against a rising threat to US influence. Furthermore, “it would liberate the Taiwanese Christian community, whose religious freedom has been stifled under the communist regime,” said Adm. Peterson in a report recently published by the Navy.

[CONDITION 19: RUSSIA / CONTROL] The United States has threatened to punish Russia for seizing territory from its neighbor to the west. The Crimean peninsula is recognized as Ukrainian territory, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has acted in violation of international law by claiming Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. Despite the international community’s unified condemnation of interference in Ukrainian sovereignty, Russian agents have manipulated elections and intimidated the population. Many have questioned the legitimacy of the recent referendum in Crimea to join the former center of the Soviet Empire. Responding to such aggression is one of NATO’s top priorities, and the United States’ leadership is critical to enforcing stiff sanctions against the regime in Moscow.

[CONDITION 20: RUSSIA / PRESIDENT] The United States has threatened to punish Russia for seizing territory from its neighbor to the west. According to President Obama, the Crimean peninsula is recognized as Ukrainian territory, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has acted in violation of international law by claiming Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. The President has said that despite the international community’s unified condemnation of interference in Ukrainian sovereignty, Russian agents have manipulated elections and intimidated the population. Obama has questioned the legitimacy of the recent referendum in Crimea to join the former center of the Soviet Empire. “Responding to such aggression is one of NATO’s top priorities, and the United States’ leadership is critical to enforcing stiff sanctions against the regime in Moscow,” said President Obama at a recent press conference.

[CONDITION 21: RUSSIA / REPUBLICAN] The United States has threatened to punish Russia for seizing territory from its neighbor to the west. According to Senator John McCain, the 2008
Republican candidate for president and current ranking member of the Armed Services committee, the Crimean peninsula is recognized as Ukrainian territory, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has acted in violation of international law by claiming Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. Senator McCain has said that despite the international community’s unified condemnation of interference in Ukrainian sovereignty, Russian agents have manipulated elections and intimidated the population. McCain has questioned the legitimacy of the recent referendum in Crimea to join the former center of the Soviet Empire. “Responding to such aggression is one of NATO’s top priorities, and the United States’ leadership is critical to enforcing stiff sanctions against the regime in Moscow,” said Senator McCain at a recent press conference.

[CONDITION 22: RUSSIA / ETHNIC LOBBYIST] The United States has threatened to punish Russia for seizing territory from its neighbor to the west. According to Dr. Kristof Lazarenko, a Ukrainian-born heart surgeon at Johns Hopkins University Hospital and spokesman for the Ukrainian Solidarity Council (USC), the Crimean peninsula is recognized as Ukrainian territory, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has acted in violation of international law by claiming Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. Dr. Lazarenko has said that despite the international community’s unified condemnation of interference in Ukrainian sovereignty, Russian agents have manipulated elections and intimidated the population. Lazarenko has questioned the legitimacy of the recent referendum in Crimea to join the former center of the Soviet Empire. “Responding to such aggression is one of NATO’s top priorities, and the United States’ leadership is critical to enforcing stiff sanctions against the regime in Moscow,” said Dr. Lazarenko in a report recently published by the USC.

[CONDITION 23: RUSSIA / THINKTANK ANALYST] The United States has threatened to punish Russia for seizing territory from its neighbor to the west. According to Dr. Simon Peterson, an expert on military affairs from the non-partisan Institute for Global Stability (IGS), the Crimean peninsula is recognized as Ukrainian territory, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has acted in violation of international law by claiming Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. Dr. Peterson has said that despite the international community’s unified condemnation of interference in Ukrainian sovereignty, Russian agents have manipulated elections and intimidated the population. Peterson has questioned the legitimacy of the recent referendum in Crimea to join the former center of the Soviet Empire. “Responding to such aggression is one of NATO’s top priorities, and the United States’ leadership is critical to enforcing stiff sanctions against the regime in Moscow,” said Dr. Peterson in a report recently published by the IGS.

[CONDITION 24: RUSSIA / MILITARY OFFICER] The United States has threatened to punish Russia for seizing territory from its neighbor to the west. According to Admiral Simon Peterson of the US Navy, the Crimean peninsula is recognized as Ukrainian territory, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has acted in violation of international law by claiming Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. Adm. Peterson has said that despite the international community’s unified condemnation of interference in Ukrainian sovereignty, Russian agents have manipulated elections and intimidated the population. Peterson has questioned the legitimacy of the recent referendum in Crimea to join the former center of the Soviet Empire. “Responding to such aggression is one of NATO’s top priorities, and the United States’ leadership is critical to enforcing stiff sanctions against the regime in Moscow,” said Adm. Peterson in a report recently published by the Navy.
Screen 3: Support, on behalf of self

Listed below are several statements regarding your own preferences about the proposed military action. Please indicate the degree to which you yourself agree or disagree with each statement by selecting the appropriate number on the scale next to it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I support the proposed military action</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The article makes a strong case for military action</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proposed military action will make the US more secure</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proposed military action the moral thing to do</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This conflict is one of the most important issues facing the US</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[RANDOMIZE ORDER OF SCREENS 4 AND 5]

Screen 4: Support, as Liberal Democrat

Now imagine you are answering ON BEHALF OF THE TYPICAL LIBERAL DEMOCRAT in the United States. Please indicate the degree to which the TYPICAL LIBERAL DEMOCRAT would agree or disagree with each statement by selecting the appropriate number on the scale next to it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I support the proposed military action</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This conflict is one of the most important issues facing the US</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Screen 5: Support, as Conservative Republican

Now imagine you are answering ON BEHALF OF THE TYPICAL CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICAN in the United States. Please indicate the degree to which the TYPICAL CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICAN would agree or disagree with each statement by selecting the appropriate number on the scale next to it.
Screen 6: Treatment Validation

In order to help us measure the clarity of the passage, please answer the following questions.

Q25  Please select the country that was the subject of the article.
- Syria
- Angola
- China
- Russia

Q26
- Senator John McCain
- A heart surgeon at Johns Hopkins University Hospital
- A US Navy Admiral
- An expert in military affairs at a non-partisan institute
- President Barack Obama
- None of these people were quoted in the article

Screen 7: De-briefing

Thank you for your responses. We would now like to take a moment and explain some more about the purpose of this part of the survey. We are interested in learning how credible different kinds of political figures are with the public when it comes to advocating for military action. You read a passage about one of four possible crises, all of which are based on real-world situations. We wish to inform you that the possibility of US military action has been exaggerated for the purposes of this survey.
of this survey, and that general support for each of these proposed actions is normally very low. Furthermore, some of you were given information that was attributed to either President Obama, Senator John McCain, a representative of an ethnic lobby, an analyst of a military think-tank, or an Admiral in the US Navy. With the exception of the President and Senator, all of these individuals are fictional, and any resemblance to actual persons is entirely accidental. In some cases, these people were said to represent organizations that are also fictional. In the cases where the President or the Senator was depicted, we assure you that he has not to our knowledge advocated the degree of military commitment that has been expressed in this part of the survey, nor has he made the statements expressed in the passage.