Get Off My Woodlawn:
Community Organizing in Woodlawn in Response to the Obama Presidential Center

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Abstract

Community organizing has often been used in the City of Chicago to advocate for local interests. Woodlawn, a neighborhood on the South Side of Chicago, has a particularly rich history of organizing in order to achieve policy change and elevate the voices of community members. In 2020, recent organizing in Woodlawn has largely been focused on responding to the Obama Presidential Center, which is slated to be built within neighborhood bounds. This paper seeks to understand organizing in Woodlawn in response to the Obama Presidential Center in two ways: first, by aligning the actions and philosophies of various organizations and stakeholders with Kristina Smock’s theoretical models of organizing, and second, by situating those actions in their historical context through comparisons to the actions and philosophies of The Woodlawn Organization in the 1960s.

Based on data collected from interviews with organizers and stakeholders and from observations of those organizations’ meetings and actions, this paper argues that the CBA Coalition has relied on Power-Based methods, while the Network of Woodlawn, the Obama Foundation, and the University of Chicago have relied on Community-Building methods. Further, this paper argues that the CBA Coalition’s organizing is largely in line with the Power-Based organizing of The Woodlawn Organization in the 1960s, although modern organizers have learned some valuable lessons from past shortcomings. I end with concluding thoughts and recommendations for the future of organizing in Woodlawn in response to the Obama Presidential Center.
Acknowledgements

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Introduction

The City of Chicago has a long history of community organizing. In fact, Chicago is often considered to be the birthplace of grassroots, ground-up action to further local change.\(^1\) From Saul Alinsky to Barack Obama, notable Chicago figures have organized members of their communities in response to unjust policies and proposals.\(^2\) Organizers and community members have found success in achieving change in a wide range of policy areas, including housing, education, and transportation.\(^3\) The history of organizing in Chicago is substantial and well-recorded, which is a testament both to the city’s rich organizing tradition and to the robust literature on the subject.

Chicago is not only a city with a robust tradition of community organizing – it is a city of neighborhoods, in which community organizing develops and thrives. Although there are 77 officially designated community areas in Chicago,\(^4\) this paper will center around one of these in particular: Woodlawn.

Woodlawn is located about seven miles southeast of the Loop, the heart of downtown Chicago.\(^5\) It includes parts of Jackson Park, the neighborhood’s most substantial greenspace, and the southernmost parts of the University of Chicago campus.\(^6\) It is home to approximately 23,000 residents, about 83% of whom are Black.\(^7\) The median household income in Woodlawn is


\(^{2}\) Ibid.

\(^{3}\) Ibid.

\(^{4}\) *City of Chicago Community Areas* (City of Chicago, 2016).


\(^{6}\) “City of Chicago Community Areas.”

\(^{7}\) “Community Data Snapshot: Woodlawn, Chicago Community Area” (Chicago Metropolitan Agency, June 2019).
approximately $25,100, whereas the median household income in the City of Chicago is approximately $52,500.\(^8\)

Like the broader City of Chicago, the Woodlawn neighborhood also has a long and rich history of community organizing. Woodlawn residents have powerfully and frequently engaged in grassroots strategies to advocate for change in their community.\(^9\) While Woodlawn is home to a variety of community groups, its most prominent player in these movements has often been The Woodlawn Organization (TWO).\(^10\) These movements have typically focused on policies and issues relating to housing, development, and public schools, and have played a substantial role in negotiating and protecting the rights of Woodlawn residents.\(^11\)

After decades of organizing in Woodlawn, there is now a new issue on the agenda: the Obama Presidential Center (OPC). The OPC is set to be located in Jackson Park, within the Woodlawn neighborhood.\(^12\) It will occupy 20 acres of land, or the equivalent of 15 football fields.\(^13\) The OPC will include a museum, public gathering space, athletic center, and library, and will be operated by the Obama Foundation.\(^14\) According to the Obama Foundation, the OPC will bring community engagement, jobs, and economic stimulus to Woodlawn and other surrounding communities:

The Center will be a new landmark for the South Side and an economic engine for the city of Chicago. It will draw hundreds of thousands of visitors every year, creating

\(^8\) “Community Data Snapshot: Woodlawn, Chicago Community Area.” See the Background section for more on the current state of Woodlawn.
\(^9\) “Woodlawn.” See Background section.
\(^10\) Ibid.
\(^11\) Ibid.
\(^13\) Laurel Chen, UChicago Against Displacement organizer, at the CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In on 11/16/2019.
\(^14\) “The Obama Presidential Center.”
thousands of new jobs on the South Side, while giving new life to Frederick Law Olmsted’s\textsuperscript{15} vision of a cohesive, walkable, and iconic Jackson Park. But most importantly, it will be built with direct feedback and engagement with our community.\textsuperscript{16}

The University of Chicago has had an active and supportive role in bringing the OPC to Woodlawn. For one, it was the University that placed the initial bid for the Obama Foundation to build the Center in Jackson Park.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, it was the University that opened up the possibility for the OPC to come to Woodlawn. Moreover, the University has been quite enthusiastic about the prospect of having the OPC as a neighbor. When it was announced that the OPC will be located in Woodlawn, University of Chicago President Robert Zimmer stated:

We are deeply appreciative that President Barack Obama, Mrs. Obama, and the Barack Obama Foundation selected Chicago’s South Side as the home for the Obama Presidential Center, a decision that creates major opportunities for the South Side and the city of Chicago… We believe opening the Presidential Center will mark a watershed moment for the South Side and the city, serving as a catalyst for economic and cultural opportunities as well as community programming.\textsuperscript{18}

However, other members of the Woodlawn community disagree with the assessment that the OPC will strictly bring opportunity to all who live on the South Side.\textsuperscript{19} Many Woodlawn residents worry about rising rents, displacement, and gentrification. In response to these

\textsuperscript{15}Architect of Jackson Park.
\textsuperscript{19}“Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) for the Area around the Obama Center,” Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) for the area around the Obama Center, accessed November 3, 2019, http://www.obamacba.org/.
concerns, some Woodlawn residents have launched organizing efforts to voice their objections and protect their rights and neighborhood in the face of development.

Debates around the Obama Center are still unfolding, and the impacts of the organizing tactics and strategies undertaken in Woodlawn remain uncertain. However, an examination of these initial organizing efforts in relation to the theoretical literature on organizing and to the history of organizing in Woodlawn can nonetheless be informative. Scholars have suggested that it is important to consider the context in which organizing occurs when analyzing community movements.\(^\text{20}\) Thus, the community’s history, and, when relevant, past instances of organizing, can have significant impacts on later instances of organizing. While there exists substantial scholarship in both of these areas, there does not exist any published work that examines how organizing in response to the Obama Center fits into the broader history of organizing in Woodlawn or into existing models of community organizing.

As a result, this paper sets out to fill these gaps in the literature on Woodlawn and community organizing. It attempts to place organizing efforts in response to the Obama Center in the context of the history of community organizing in Woodlawn. In doing so, this paper seeks to determine how current organizing aligns with or departs from previous instances of organizing in Woodlawn. It also seeks to locate current organizing efforts within the existing literature on community organizing, classifying their approaches in relation to generally accepted models of organizing.

With these goals in mind, this paper sets out to answer the question *How, and for what reasons, have members of the Woodlawn Community organized in response to the Obama Presidential Center?* In answering this question, this paper also confronts a related question: *What impacts have resulted from efforts by members of the Woodlawn Community to organize in response to the Obama Presidential Center?* Given that ground has not yet been broken on the OPC, the answer to the second question will be addressed more tentatively and provisionally, acknowledging that further developments may influence organizing approaches in new ways.

The answers to these questions have the potential to be deeply meaningful for both members of the Woodlawn community and for future scholarship on organizing in Chicago. My analysis and recommendations can help Woodlawn organizers to evaluate their efforts and, if necessary, shift their techniques in order to better achieve their aims. As a result, the findings of this paper have the potential to have a substantial impact on the lives and wellbeing of members of the Woodlawn community and to contribute to our knowledge of a significant and prominent case of community organizing.

This paper is divided into six sections. Following this introduction, I offer a background discussion on the history and current state of Woodlawn. Next, I present an overview of the scholarly literature on the subject, including scholarship on models of community organizing. I then I outline the methods used for data collection and justify my qualitative approach. In the following section, I delve into the heart of my data analysis and findings. I divide my data analysis section into five subsections, which correspond to the various tasks of this paper: (1) Classifying Community Organizations, (2) CBA Coalition: Power-Based Organizing, (3) Network of Woodlawn: Community-Building Organizing, (4) Whose Community?: The Institutional Stakeholders, and (5) Learning from the Past. I then end this paper by offering my
concluding thoughts, as well as several policy recommendations based off of my findings and discussion.

**Background**

*Woodlawn in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s*

To understand the dynamics of Woodlawn today, we must first start with the dynamics of Woodlawn in the mid-20th century, which was a pivotal time for the neighborhood’s development. A significant moment in Woodlawn’s history came in 1948, when the Supreme Court ruled that state enforcement of racially restrictive covenants violated the 14th Amendment.\(^{21}\) Now effectively illegal, these racially restrictive covenants had previously prevented property owners from allowing Black people to rent or live in their properties.\(^ {22}\) Without these covenants in place, Black people began moving into various Chicago neighborhoods to which they had previously been denied access.\(^ {23}\) Woodlawn was one such neighborhood.\(^ {24}\)

Prior to 1950, Woodlawn was a majority-white neighborhood.\(^ {25}\) In the ten years between 1950 and 1960, the racial composition of Woodlawn underwent significant changes as Black

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\(^ {23}\) “Woodlawn.”

\(^ {24}\) Ibid.

people moved in and white people moved out. In 1950, 86% of Woodlawn residents were white. In 1960, 86% of Woodlawn residents were Black.

Newly Black Woodlawn faced a handful of significant problems that were largely due to systematic discrimination and racism. Among these instances of discrimination were practices like redlining, in which primarily Black residents of Chicago were denied loans and other services. In addition to these systematic efforts at discrimination and segregation, Black residents of Chicago also faced interpersonal discrimination, as white residents used violence, intimidation, and vandalism to deter Black people from settling in certain areas.

These discriminatory practices had significant and long-lasting effects. The first significant issue faced by Black Woodlawn residents as a result of these practices was that of housing. Although racial covenants were no longer permissible, landlords still found ways to discriminate against Black tenants and provide them with lower quality housing. In 1960, 31% of housing in Woodlawn was considered either “deteriorating” or “dilapidated.” In East Woodlawn (the area in which the Obama Presidential Center is slated to be built) that number was nearly 50%. As a result of redlining, Black Woodlawn residents had limited capacity to access the resources and services that were necessary to improve these conditions. Further, those with access to sufficient resources, such as lenders or the City, readily turned their backs on neighborhoods like Woodlawn, refusing to make improvements to declining housing.

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Chad Broughton, “Towards an Understanding of Gun Violence in Chicago.”
30 Ibid.
31 “Woodlawn.”
32 Winling, “Origins of the University Crisis.”
33 Fish, Black Power/White Control.
34 “Woodlawn.”
conditions. In *Black Power/White Control*, perhaps the most significant piece of scholarship on Woodlawn during this time period, John Hall Fish describes the state of Woodlawn during this historical moment:

By 1960 Woodlawn ranked among the least desirable ten out of the 75 community areas in seven major indices: family income under $3,000, male unemployment, substandard housing units, juvenile delinquency, public assistance, illegitimate births, and infant mortality. Statistically, Woodlawn had become just another slum.  

The second significant problem faced by newly Black Woodlawn was the University of Chicago, Woodlawn’s northern neighbor. The University had a history of supporting urban renewal efforts that harmed Black residents. In the University’s neighborhood, Hyde Park, previous urban renewal actions had driven out or away pre-existing and potential Black residents. As a result, only 38% of Hyde Park residents were Black in 1960.

Black Woodlawn residents worried that similar urban renewal efforts could harm the community to which they only recently gained access. These worries were warranted; the University had its sights set on a mile-wide piece of land in Woodlawn for its newest expansion efforts.

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36 At the time of writing, the current count of Chicago neighborhoods is 77, according to the City of Chicago.
38 Winling, “Origins of the University Crisis.”
39 Ibid.
40 Winling; Fish, *Black Power/White Control*.
41 Winling, “Origins of the University Crisis.”
42 The South East Chicago Commission (SECC) was tasked with completing the urban renewal efforts in Hyde Park, parts of Woodlawn, and Kenwood, the neighborhood directly north of Hyde Park. See Fish, *Black Power/White Control*. 

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area of University interest and dominance.” Residents, however, feared that the University would not stop at 61st Street; in 1960, future lead organizer of The Woodlawn Organization Nick Von Hoffman claimed that the “University of Chicago will gobble up the whole area to 67th Street.”

Facing the threat of the University and widespread feelings of powerlessness, several of the most active organizations in Woodlawn turned to famed organizer Saul Alinsky and the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) for help. After the organizations’ consistent outreach and requests for assistance in responding to the University’s plans for expansion, as well as an offer of $50,000, Alinsky agreed to begin working in Woodlawn. He described Woodlawn as a neighborhood that has been under the control of structures of power that were not based in the community. In order to fix this problem, Alinsky argued that it was essential to reconfigure existing power structures through the use of democratic organizations. These organizations would involve widespread community participation and would represent the community’s interests. Further, Alinsky relied on the hostilities inherent to an unequal balance of power to embolden residents to use confrontational tactics. By relying on these more combative methods,

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44 Fish, Black Power/White Control 32.
45 Including the United Woodlawn Conference (formerly two different groups, United Woodlawn, Inc. and the Neighborhood Conference), the South Side Community Committee, Woodlawn Block Club Council (which was mostly focused on opposing the United Woodlawn Conference), a Ministerial Association, and the Woodlawn Businessmen’s Association. See Fish, Black Power/White Control.
46 After this initial offer, Alinsky and the IAF received further grants to support their work. See Fish, Black Power/White Control.
47 Fish, Black Power/White Control.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
Alinsky believed that residents would be more able to advance their interests and vision of community.\footnote{Ibid.}

Alinsky and the IAF saw a change in their role in Woodlawn with the consolidation of five groups – the Pastors’ Alliance, the Woodlawn Block Club Council, the United Woodlawn Conference, the Woodlawn Businessmen’s Association, and the Knights of St. John – into The Temporary Woodlawn Organization (TWO).\footnote{Ibid.} True to its name, the organization was intended to be short-lived, and was created in response to the announcement of a new proposed city ordinance.\footnote{Ibid.} The ordinance would allow the University to begin in earnest its urban renewal plans for the northernmost part of Woodlawn.

These organizations feared that these changes would be a “clearance” effort rather than “rehabilitation,” in which Woodlawn residents would be displaced from their homes and neighborhood.\footnote{Ibid.} In light of these concerns, the groups decided to band together as TWO. They hoped that doing so would allow them to negotiate with the City and University to ensure that the ordinance would have a rehabilitative effect on Woodlawn, and that the creation of affordable housing would be included in the ordinance. The groups chose to retain the IAF as TWO’s technical consultant.\footnote{Ibid.}

With advice from the IAF and Alinsky, TWO took on the University of Chicago as a target of its campaigns.\footnote{Ibid.} They circulated flyers that cast the University in a negative light and gave speeches about the intentions of the University to expand into their neighborhood.\footnote{Ibid.} These

\footnote{51 Ibid.}
\footnote{52 Ibid.}
\footnote{53 Ibid.}
\footnote{54 Ibid.}
\footnote{55 Ibid.}
\footnote{56 Ibid.}
\footnote{57 Ibid.}
efforts helped TWO’s coalition building efforts, allowing them to mobilize Woodlawn residents against a common enemy. Soon, the organization had renamed itself “The Woodlawn Organization,” (TWO) and its meetings saw hundreds of attendees gather to advocate for their community.58

TWO’s leadership was largely comprised of leaders from four of the five original organizations that had gathered as The Temporary Woodlawn Organization, and was headed by Reverend Arthur M. Brazier.59 TWO’s executive committee and organizers worked on the organization’s strategy, while its large numbers of supporters worked to carry out actions.60 Within months of its inception, TWO had substantial, broad support among community members and was seen as a forced to be reckoned with by the University.61 Over the course of the 1960s, the organization took advantage of widespread resident involvement to launch job-training initiatives, advocate for tenants, hold their own “Freedom Ride” that registered over two thousand Woodlawn residents to vote, and redevelop Baby Skid Row, a block that was previously home to more than twenty liquor stores and bars.62

Each of these campaigns focused on situations in which residents were disempowered within the community. Campaigns like job-training initiatives, tenant advocacy projects, and voter registration efforts all provided Woodlawn residents with access to basic needs and skill sets that would allow them to more fully participate in social, economic, and political life.

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid. It should be noted that the very presence of Baby Skid Row can also be traced to discriminatory practices such as redlining. These practices kept vice districts like Baby Skid Row out of predominantly white neighborhoods, leaving them to be a blight on Black communities. See Broughton, “Towards an Understanding of Gun Violence in Chicago.”
Campaigns like the revitalization of Baby Skid Row served to address perceived disorganization within Woodlawn and to make the community safer and more desirable for those who lived there. Subsequently, these campaigns worked to provide residents with the power that TWO and other members of the Woodlawn community saw as having been denied to Woodlawn by those who did hold power, such as the City or the University.

TWO also continued to work on the University-proposed City ordinance to carry out the South Campus urban renewal plan. In 1962, TWO proposed its own plan for the development of South Campus, which emphasized the participation of Woodlawn residents in creating and carrying out the plan.\(^{63}\) TWO’s plan also involved a move from a “renewal” effort to a “rehabilitation” effort, which would more genuinely address neighborhood problems.\(^{64}\) When the plan received no acknowledgement from the University or the City, as well as no agreement to negotiate over this plan from the University, TWO was stuck.\(^{65}\) While they could respond to opposition, they could not respond to silence, and TWO saw this plan as essential for achieving the creation of more affordable housing in Woodlawn.\(^{66}\)

Therefore, TWO decided to try to reopen discussion over the University’s original proposed ordinance.\(^{67}\) When they faced difficulties in achieving this, the organization brought 700 members of the Woodlawn community to City Hall to put pressure on then-Mayor Daley.\(^{68}\) Within days, Mayor Daley, TWO, and the University had met to discuss the plan.\(^{69}\) They agreed upon several terms for the ordinance, including representation of TWO on planning committees,

\(^{63}\) Ibid.
\(^{64}\) Ibid.
\(^{65}\) Ibid.
\(^{66}\) Ibid.
\(^{67}\) Ibid.
\(^{68}\) Ibid.
\(^{69}\) Ibid.
a shifted timeline for the plan in which affordable housing would be constructed before any clearance occurred, and a four million dollar grant from the City to fund affordable housing in Woodlawn.\(^{70}\) In exchange for allowing the plan to move forward, TWO achieved two major concessions from the University and the City: the construction of affordable housing on Cottage Grove Avenue (the street that served as the western border of the South Campus plan) and the representation of TWO’s interests in any future plans for the community.

Although simply participating in the negotiation process was a success for TWO, many of the terms agreed upon were not actually carried out in full. For example, project delays meant that affordable housing was not fully constructed at the time of clearing and demolition efforts.\(^{71}\) Further, when affordable housing was constructed, the per-unit prices were ultimately higher than previously anticipated, resulting in a continued deficit of truly affordable units.\(^{72}\) However, the fact that the housing was indeed constructed was a huge victory for TWO, as “a [B]lack community actually planned, developed, and built a major housing complex,” which had previously seemed to be an impossible feat.\(^{73}\)

In his analysis of TWO, John Hall Fish identifies three traits that were common to TWO’s campaigns. First, TWO relied on residents to raise the issues that the organization would address.\(^{74}\) These residents would be heavily involved in achieving their desired outcomes by participating in the confrontational tactics adopted by TWO.\(^{75}\) TWO leadership also sought to identify the issues that would be most important to residents to take on as organization

\(^{70}\) Ibid.
\(^{71}\) Ibid.
\(^{72}\) Ibid.
\(^{73}\) Ibid 77.
\(^{74}\) Ibid.
\(^{75}\) Ibid.
campaigns, although ultimately final decisions as to campaign selection were indeed made by TWO leadership.\textsuperscript{76} Second, in their confrontational tactics, TWO targeted groups or organizations that Woodlawn residents felt did not care about them.\textsuperscript{77} They directed actions like protests and sit-ins towards institutional stakeholders who they believed had ignored their needs.\textsuperscript{78} Third, TWO’s goals were twofold: to bring about a “we-did-it’ attitude” and to negotiate with the targeted group or organization to uphold “the dignity of the Woodlawn residents.”\textsuperscript{79}

\textit{Woodlawn in 2020}

In the current moment, Woodlawn faces many of the same problems it faced back in 1960, including threats to housing, jobs, and stability. Currently in Woodlawn, there are 214 acres of vacant land, 30\% of which is owned by the City of Chicago.\textsuperscript{80} In addition, there are 300 privately-owned vacant buildings in the neighborhood.\textsuperscript{81} The median household income in Woodlawn is less than half of the median household income throughout the broader City of Chicago.\textsuperscript{82} Eviction rates in Woodlawn are the highest in the Chicago.\textsuperscript{83} In Woodlawn, 70\% of residents are considered “very low income” by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Devondrick Jeffers, STOP organizer, at the CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In on 11/16/2019.
\textsuperscript{81} Dr. Byron Brazier, Network of Woodlawn organizer, at the 1Woodlawn Quarterly meeting on 1/23/2020.
\textsuperscript{82} “Community Data Snapshot: Woodlawn, Chicago Community Area.”
\textsuperscript{83} Laurel Chen, UChicago Against Displacement organizer, at the CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In on 11/16/2019.
Development and 62% of households are rent-burdened. Moreover, poverty in Woodlawn is divided along racial lines; 97% of residents in subsidized housing are Black.

Nonetheless, Woodlawn has many assets, making it a desirable and pleasant place to live. For example, within neighborhood boundaries, Woodlawn boasts four schools and several transit routes. Woodlawn also contains Jackson Park, which spans 330 acres on the east side of the neighborhood. It is within Jackson Park that the Obama Presidential Center (OPC) is slated to be built.

Subsequently, Woodlawn is also facing an additional problem: the potential for gentrification and displacement. Thus far, Woodlawn real estate values have already increased; in the year after the announcement that the OPC is to be built within the bounds of Woodlawn, there was a 23% increase in home values. In fact, in 2017, Woodlawn was the neighborhood with the third highest home value increase compared to its broader city in the entire county. In their 2019 report on affordable housing in Woodlawn, researchers at the University of Illinois at

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84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Dr. Byron Brazier, Network of Woodlawn organizer, at the Woodlawn Quarterly meeting on 1/23/2020.
87 Ibid.
88 Some groups, such as CBA Coalition members, see gentrification and displacement as an inevitable effect of the Obama Presidential Center if other measures are not put in place. Other groups, such as the Network of Woodlawn and the University of Chicago, do not agree with this forecast. See Analysis for a further discussion on these matters.
89 Laurel Chen, UChicago Against Displacement organizer, at the CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In on 11/16/2019.
Chicago remarked that “even though the Obama Center construction has not started, real estate interest and investment has already begun to take the area into [a] new direction.”\(^9^1\)

No one I interviewed disputed or questioned these predictions of economic growth and stimulation in Woodlawn in the coming years. There were disagreements, however, over the impacts that this growth and stimulation will have on current residents of Woodlawn.

**Literature Review**

**Gentrification and Displacement**

Much of the current organizing in Woodlawn concerns issues of gentrification and displacement. Gentrification occurs when high income individuals and families move into lower-income areas, often as a result of increased housing supply through development.\(^9^2\) These gentrifying individuals and families tend to be white and college-educated.\(^9^3\)

When gentrification occurs, most scholarship suggests that the result is often the displacement of long-time residents.\(^9^4\) For example, in her study on gentrification in New York City from 1898 to 2002, Kathe Newman found that between 8,300 and 11,600 residents were displaced.\(^9^5\) Scholars who assert that gentrification brings about physical displacement cite

\(^{91}\) Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Involvement, “Protect · Preserve · Produce: Affordable Housing and the Obama Center” (University of Illinois at Chicago, August 2019).

\(^{92}\) Jackelyn Hwang and Jeffrey Lin, “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Recent Gentrification?,” *Cityscape* 18 (2016).

\(^{93}\) Ibid.


gentrification’s impact on housing as the primary force behind this displacement. As higher-income tenants enter the neighborhood, rents increase, forcing out those who can no longer afford to pay the costs for housing in their neighborhood. In addition to the hardship of moving, displacement can also bring negative psychological effects. For example, those who are displaced must leave behind their preexisting, neighborhood-based social networks, which can cause emotional and psychological distress. These negative effects can be especially impactful for already-vulnerable populations, such as the elderly.

The link between gentrification and displacement, however, is contested by Jackelyn Hwang and Jeffery Lin, who suggest that gentrification does not spur physical displacement. Instead, they argue, gentrification brings about cultural and political displacement, in which political power changes hands and the preferences of the neighborhood shift. Lance Freeman also contests the claim that gentrification brings about physical displacement. His study suggests that the amount of movement out of gentrifying neighborhoods does not differ significantly from that out of non-gentrified neighborhoods.

Vicki Been provides additional reasons to doubt the link between gentrification and displacement. She cites the difficulty in actually identifying and measuring displacement as a

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97 Levitt, “Gentrification Is Making Us Sick: Envisioning Healthy Development without Displacement.”
99 Ibid.
100 Hwang and Lin, “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Recent Gentrification?”
reason to question the accuracy of reports of displacement.\textsuperscript{102} For example, she states that there is limited data available to track the movement of people from neighborhood to neighborhood, particularly due to concerns about privacy and confidentiality of that data.\textsuperscript{103}

Additional scholarship on gentrification and displacement suggests that displacement can occur in waves, rather than all at once. This scholarship differentiates between “direct displacement” and “secondary displacement.” Direct displacement occurs during the gentrifying period, in which there is an influx of new residents into the community.\textsuperscript{104} Following that period, additional community members can still find themselves forced out of their neighborhoods during the process of secondary displacement.\textsuperscript{105} This process largely occurs as a result of increased housing costs, such as rising rents and taxes as property values increase.\textsuperscript{106} Other driving forces for secondary displacement can include tense or hostile social interactions between new and pre-existing residents and the closure or relocation of small businesses.\textsuperscript{107} These causes of secondary displacement are less often considered in the literature and litigation surrounding displacement, as they are more removed from the initial wave of displacement that occurs immediately following gentrification.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{102} Vicki Been, “What More Do We Need to Know About How to Prevent and Mitigate Displacement of Low-and Moderate-Income Households from Gentrifying Neighborhoods,” n.d.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
Community Organizing

One response to gentrification and the threat of displacement is community organizing. Community organizing involves assembling residents or stakeholders of a neighborhood or region in order to advocate for a common, locally-based goal. According to Robert Fisher, a professor of community organization at The University of Connecticut School of Social Work:

It is not so much [economic] prosperity or depression at the national and local level that leads to radical neighborhood organizing, but rather external pressures on traditional communities and a breakdown of the routines of daily life that make people more receptive to activism and alternative organizations.

In this way, community organizing techniques have been deployed to address topics such as tenant’s rights, pollution, education, and public safety. These techniques have been just as diverse as the issues that they address, ranging from petitions, to working within the judicial system, to strikes.

Partially as a result of this wide range of issues and techniques with which community organizing groups involve themselves, many scholars have put forth formulations of models for

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community organizing. These models attempt to distill community organizations to their core elements in order to present ideal types. Although scholars have articulated a large number of different models of organizing, many of these models share common characteristics and respond to similar historical conditions.

Therefore, this paper will present several subsets of notable organizing models. These models have been grouped by their shared characteristics, with special emphasis on the conditions and contexts that prompt organizing efforts. These groupings bring to light the various similarities and connections between different authors’ models of organizing.

Models of Organizing: An Overview

Models in the first subset emphasize a lack of social organization within their communities and aim to address this dysfunction.113 These models are often referred to as “social planning” models and have their ideological origins in the late 1800s, during which sociological theories on social organization featured prominently.114 In the early 1900s, changes in the social sciences also contributed to the emergence of these models; data-driven research gained prominence, and these fields saw an increased emphasis on social service provision.115 An important early example of these models of organizing is the settlement movement, which aimed to provide housing and social services to low-income individuals.116

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113 Sites, Chaskin, and Parks, “Reframing Community Practice for the 21st Century.”
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
Philip Rothman and Kristina Smock each put forth a model that takes a social planning approach to community organizing. Rothman’s aptly named Social Planning model\textsuperscript{117} utilizes data-driven methods to address specific problems.\textsuperscript{118} Under this model, community participation is often eschewed in favor of the expertise of professionals.\textsuperscript{119} Similarly, under Smock’s Civic model, community issues are believed to be the result of community instability and social ills.\textsuperscript{120} They often rely on bureaucratic structures to increase interactions between fellow community members, as well as between community members and local governments, so that public organizations and services can address community problems.\textsuperscript{121}

These models’ reliance on experts, pre-existing structures, and empirical data can contribute to more efficient and effective service provision. However, these models can be bogged down by the influence of interest groups and the fiscal limitations of public and/or private budgets.\textsuperscript{122} Further, and perhaps more significantly, these models may suffer from the disconnect between theory and practice; what may appear efficient and effective at the centralized planning level may not turn out to be so when implemented at the local level.\textsuperscript{123}

Models in the second subset are all Alinskyite in nature. That is, they relate to Saul Alinsky’s conceptions of power and community, as well as his work in the Back of the Yards neighborhood on the West Side of Chicago and with the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF). Alinskyism itself has roots in the civil rights and labor movements of the 1900s, as well as in

\textsuperscript{117} Also referred to as “Social Policy.”
\textsuperscript{118} Rothman, “Approaches to Community Intervention.”
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Smock, \textit{Democracy in Action}.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Rothman, “Approaches to Community Intervention.”
\textsuperscript{123} Sites, Chaskin, and Parks, “Reframing Community Practice for the 21st Century.”

The first element is that social change is spurred by a professional organizer. These well-trained individuals are uniquely suited to tackle the various roadblocks and difficult decisions inherent to community organizing. Although they facilitate democratic structures within their organization, they are ultimately responsible for a large proportion of their organization’s work and outcomes.

The second element is that the community organization should be democratic in structure. Despite the need for professional organizers, the ideal Alinsky-style organizer will “work from behind the scenes and work themselves out of a job by training ‘indigenous leaders’ in the skills of community organizing.” This allows for communities to exercise self-determination.

The third element is an emphasis on power. Alinskyite organizations believe that in order to truly benefit the community, they must gain political, economic, and social power.

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124 Ibid.
125 Fisher, *Let the People Decide: Neighborhood Organizing in America*.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid 53.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
The fourth element is the use of “creative and militant” strategies and methods.\textsuperscript{133} Under the Alinsky model, power must be won by any means necessary.\textsuperscript{134} This often results in the use of combative, non-traditional tactics.\textsuperscript{135}

The fifth and final element is the practicality of the organization and a lack of ideology.\textsuperscript{136} Alinsky thought that ideological organizations were necessarily at odds with the democratic structure he was seeking to implement.\textsuperscript{137} Thus, under Alinskyism, community organizations must develop their own goals and philosophies instead of having goals or philosophies imposed upon them.\textsuperscript{138}

Both Rothman and Smock have also put forth models of organizing that have modified, updated, and built from Alinskyism. Rothman’s Social Action model is based in the belief that power and resources are unequally distributed in society and aims to redistribute these resources to disadvantaged groups.\textsuperscript{139} Organizations using a Social Action model often rely on techniques that are militant, confrontational, and grounded in social justice ideals.\textsuperscript{140} Due to their limited material resources, those following a Social Action model often rely on manpower to turn out large numbers of people for community actions.\textsuperscript{141} Similarly, Smock’s Power-Based model is based on belief that community issues are the result of the lack of community power in politics

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid 54.  
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{139} Rothman, “Approaches to Community Intervention.”  
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
and decision-making. They often adopt more confrontational techniques to put pressure on those with power and aim to change how goods and services are distributed.

These models’ reliance on trained organizers, confrontational tactics, and mobilizing large numbers of people can allow community members to operate successful movements in the face of powerful opponents. However, due to these organizations’ reliance on conflict as a means of sustaining their organization, organizational longevity may be difficult to achieve under these models.

Models in the third subset emphasize the role of intracommunity resources in developing the community. These models have been influenced by the approach of United Nations in post-World War II international development, as well as by sociological theories and works focused on rural communities. They gained popularity in the 1960s along with discussions surrounding national self-determination.

Again, both Rothman and Smock have presented models of organizing that align with this approach. Rothman’s Locality Development model emphasizes community involvement in setting and achieving goals. Under a Locality Development formulation, community members become leaders and determine the course of the organization. This model also emphasizes the education and development of organization members. Similarly, Smock’s Community-Building model is based in the belief that community issues are the result of poor community

142 Smock, Democracy in Action.
143 Ibid.
144 Sites, Chaskin, and Parks, “Reframing Community Practice for the 21st Century.”
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Rothman, “Approaches to Community Intervention.”
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
infrastructure.\textsuperscript{150} Community-Building organizations aim to be seen as the community’s legitimate representative.\textsuperscript{151} Under Smock’s model, however, these organizations often use government partnerships as methods of strengthening the community and as avenues for change.\textsuperscript{152}

These models’ emphasis on mobilizing and developing pre-existing community resources can allow community members to have more control over and involvement with their own development. However, this emphasis on process means that progress may be slow to achieve,\textsuperscript{153} and that organizations must strike a balance between developing their own abilities and remaining accountable to their communities.\textsuperscript{154}

Models in the fourth subset take a significantly more radical approach to community organizing. Rather than working within pre-existing structures – whether those be power structures, community structures, or government structures – these models aim to make fundamental changes to both social conditions and to community members’ conceptions of those conditions.\textsuperscript{155} They recognize that other models of organizing have limited ability to effect the radical changes that they seek to produce.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{153} Rothman, “Approaches to Community Intervention.”
\textsuperscript{154} Sites, Chaskin, and Parks, “Reframing Community Practice for the 21st Century.”
\textsuperscript{155} Smock, \textit{Democracy in Action}; DeFilippis, Fisher, and Shragge, \textit{Contesting Community: The Limits and Potential of Local Organizing}.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
James DeFilippis, Robert Fisher, and Eric Shragge, as well as Kristina Smock, have presented models of organizing that align with this view. DeFilippis, Fisher, and Shragge’s Radical/Revolutionary model attempts to bring about true structural change in order to alter the very foundations of social relations. These organizations also use community-centric rhetoric and rely on their communities for the setting of their work. Similarly, Smock’s Transformative model is based in the belief that community issues are the result of underlying institutional problems. Organizations using this model often attempt to bring about ideological change in order to alter both individual conceptions of social structures and institutions, as well as actual, on the ground conditions of social structures and institutions.

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157 DeFilippis, Fisher, and Shragge also present four other models of “community mobilization” that are tied to the historical, social, political, and economic contexts of organizing: Reactionary, Conservative, Adaptive/Reformist, and Opt-Out. Under the Reactionary model, organizations attempt to revert their communities back to a prior state of being. Under the Conservative model, organizations work toward the preservation of a community’s status quo, opposing changes to the community’s social, political, and economic conditions. Under the Adaptive/Reformist model, organizations work toward the preservation of some, but not all, of a community’s status quo, focusing their attention on “gross inequalities,” while preserving other aspects of the current state of the community. Under the Opt-Out model, organizations seek to insulate themselves in their communities by emphasizing their local community and attempting to remove themselves from broader, less localized social relations. See DeFilippis, Fisher, and Shragge, *Contesting Community: The Limits and Potential of Local Organizing*.

158 Smock also presents one other model of organizing: the Women-Centered model. Under this model, community issues are seen as the result of insufficient attention to women’s and family issues. They often forge intimate relationships between members of small groups in order to develop women’s leadership skills and to represent their interests. See Smock, *Democracy in Action*.

159 DeFilippis, Fisher, and Shragge, *Contesting Community: The Limits and Potential of Local Organizing*.

160 Ibid.

161 Smock, *Democracy in Action*.

162 Ibid.
These models’ willingness to challenge foundational issues presents the possibility for more deep-rooted, long-term change than other models of organizing.\textsuperscript{163} However, these lofty goals are often very difficult to achieve, and thus, actual results may be lacking.\textsuperscript{164}

\textit{Toward an Examination of Contemporary Organizing in Woodlawn}

After a careful examination of the literature, it is clear that there exists substantial scholarship on the history of organizing in Woodlawn, a common issue around which people organize (gentrification/displacement), and on models of organizing. What is lacking, however, is a synthesis of these topics. This paper will attempt to do just that: situate the current organizing movement in Woodlawn in its historical and scholarly context in order to understand how, and for what reasons, members of the Woodlawn community have organized in response to the Obama Center.

\textbf{Methods}

\textit{Background}

The idea for this project was born in my dorm room, on the fourth floor of a University of Chicago residence hall on the corner of 60\textsuperscript{th} Street and South Ellis Avenue. My building is located on one of the northernmost blocks of the Woodlawn neighborhood, but exists within the sphere of academia and privilege that surrounds the University of Chicago. Despite my mailing address, I had had very limited experience with the Woodlawn neighborhood before beginning this project. I’d occasionally grab coffee at Robust, a sizeable café on 63\textsuperscript{rd} Street and South

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
Woodlawn Avenue, meet a friend at Daley’s on 63rd Street and Cottage Grove for breakfast, or pick up some groceries at the Jewel Osco on 61st Street and Cottage Grove. I may have been living in Woodlawn, but I certainly was not experiencing much of it.

On the day I first started thinking about this project, I had been reading an article published by the University’s student newspaper, The Chicago Maroon. The article was about the ongoing movement toward a Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) to protect the interests of residents of Woodlawn and other nearby neighborhoods once the Obama Presidential Center has been built and opened. After reading about the concerns shared by Woodlawn residents and their attempts to address these concerns, I became increasingly interested in how my Woodlawn neighbors were responding to development on their doorstep. That interest has since grown into this project.

In this paper, I attempt to answer the research question: How, and for what reasons, have members of the Woodlawn Community organized in response to the Obama Presidential Center? and What impacts have resulted from efforts by members of the Woodlawn Community to organize in response to the Obama Presidential Center?

Implicit in these questions are two assumptions. First, these questions assume that there have been actions that can be described as “organizing” in Woodlawn. Second, these questions assume that these organizing actions have been sufficiently cohesive to warrant analysis as unified rather than individual actions.

Both of these assumptions are justified. Regarding the first assumption, news coverage of such activities in Woodlawn almost exclusively refers to these actions as “organizing.” In interviews, publications, websites, and other formats which provide direct quotes from those participating in such activities, participants refer to their own actions as “organizing.” Regarding
the second assumption, there exist numerous named organizations, which consist of dozens of individual members, who have organized in response to the Obama Center. Moreover, many of these organizations are also members of a coalition, formed to unite several organizations in their response to the Center.

In attempting to answer these research questions, this project will rely on Kristina Smock’s models of community organizing, as outlined in her 2006 book *Democracy in Action: Community Organizing and Urban Change.* Building from classic models of organizing and from her own observations, interviews, and case studies, Smock’s book provides a comprehensive and modern way of categorizing types of community organizing. Smock’s work has been praised by her peers for its methodology and its fair evaluation of the various models of organizing that she puts forth.

My project follows a similar methodology as that employed by Smock: interviews and observations. During the interview phases of my data collection, I adopted a semi-structured interview method. For each interview, I asked subjects a general set of questions in order to establish baseline, crucial information. Beyond that, I relied on an outline of generalized questions which could be adapted and made more specific as the interview progressed. This allowed me to maintain conversational flow and allowed the interview subject to guide our conversation.

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165 Smock earned her Ph.D. in sociology from Northwestern University and has taught courses on urban studies and social theory at both the undergraduate and graduate level. Smock is the principal consultant of Kristina Smock Consulting, a government and nonprofit consulting firm, whose specialties include community engagement and organizing. See “About,” Kristina Smock Consulting, accessed November 10, 2019, http://www.kristinasmockconsulting.com/about.

During the observation phases of my data collection, I attended relevant community events and meetings. There, I took notes regarding the programming, speeches, and conversations that took place, but did not interact with other attendees except to make small talk. Given that participants may filter what they say in interviews in ways that they do not in other settings, this method allowed for more genuine and organic data collection to supplement the interviews I conducted.

This observation and semi-structured interview method is the most commonly used and accepted method in the literature on community organizing. Notable community organizing scholars, including Jack Rothman and Kristina Smock, rely on this method to conduct their own research. This method allowed me to take a qualitative, people-based approach in order to best allow community members to drive this project and have their voices captured accurately and completely.

Data Collection and Processing

I conducted nine 30 to 90 minute interviews in person and over the phone.\textsuperscript{167} My interview subjects can be categorized in one of two ways: representatives of the University of Chicago or community organizers. In deciding who to interview, I looked for stakeholders in the Woodlawn community who were actively involved in either the development of the Obama Center, and/or the community response to the Center. I reached out to the Obama Foundation, but they immediately declined my interview request. Given that I was unable to interview anyone associated with the Foundation, I relied heavily on their published materials and press releases to supplement my data collection. Although this method of selecting interview subjects

\textsuperscript{167} See Appendix One for a table of interviews and events.
may omit some of the perspectives of Woodlawn residents who do not fall into one of the above categories, it allowed me to ensure that all participants would have substantial knowledge of and involvement in my project’s areas of interest.\textsuperscript{168}

In deciding which questions and topics to discuss with my interview subjects, I had three main goals: first, to gather background and contextual information, second, to gain insight into the answers to my research questions, and third, to provide room for the interview subject to discuss any additional matters that they felt to be important or relevant. With these goals in mind, I began each interview with a more structured series of background questions to understand the interview subject’s current work and involvement with the Obama Center and the Woodlawn community. As we spoke, I made note of any topics or details that I wanted to discuss further. During the next phase of the interview, I probed further on any details or topics that seemed to be of particular importance or relevance for my research. Although I relied on my interview outline to structure this part of the interview, the second phase consisted largely of follow-up and clarifying questions.

\textit{Applied Methodology}

In the data processing phase, I relied on audio recordings of my interviews and written notes from observations. All interviews were audio-recorded with the permission of the interview subject, then transcribed on my computer using Otter.ai, a free online service. Following the software transcription of my interviews, I manually edited and verified all generated transcripts. In the observation phase of my data collection, I took detailed, hand-

\textsuperscript{168} Prior to reaching out to potential interview subjects or attending events, this study was approved by the University of Chicago Social and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board (IRB) office and had been issued the protocol number IRB19-1732.
written notes during all events, which I manually transcribed on my computer. Once all
transcriptions were completed, I conducted a preliminary analysis of my data in order to identify
major themes that be used to compare organizing activities to the models put forth by Smock.
Following the identification of these themes, I manually coded interview transcripts to reflect if
and when each theme was discussed in each interview. This coding method allowed me to
preserve the exact words of my subjects, while creating a tool for thematic analysis and
comparison to Smock’s models.

Given these methods, the results of this project should be understood as a robust analysis
of the organizing methods used within the Woodlawn community in response to the Obama
Center. However, since this project applies a general typology of community organizing (put
forth by Smock in *Democracy in Action*) to a specific situation (organizing in Woodlawn in
response to the Obama Center) and sets it in a specific historical context (Woodlawn’s
relationships with outside developers), the extent to which the results of this project are
generalizable is limited. The results of this project can perhaps best be thought of as a case study
of a particular community organizing effort taking place in a specific moment in Woodlawn.
However, this project can nonetheless provide valuable policy recommendations for those
involved in this situation, while also providing an interesting point of comparison for similar
instances of community organizing in response to outside development. Further, given the high-
profile nature of the OPC and the large amount of media coverage surrounding it, this case may
be particularly important for future scholarship on community organizing.

**Analysis**

*Classifying Community Organizations*
As mentioned, disagreements over the impacts of economic changes are just one factor separating the various players who have organized in response to the Obama Presidential Center (OPC). Different groups also have different ideas and interpretations of “community.” Thus, partially as a result of the way that they conceive of community and the types of economic impacts they anticipate, these groups have also responded to the OPC with different plans and methods. The following sections will address the three major types of responses: those from the Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) Coalition, those from Network of Woodlawn,\(^{169}\) and those from institutional stakeholders, including the University of Chicago and the Obama Foundation. In addressing each group’s response, I will also align that response with one of the models of organizing put forth by Kristina Smock.\(^{170}\) Once these organizing techniques and philosophies have been described and classified, I then situate the response of the CBA Coalition in its historical context by characterizing the techniques and philosophies of The Woodlawn Organization (TWO) during the 1960s using Smock’s models of organizing.

**CBA Coalition: Power-Based Organizing**

The Community Benefits Agreement Coalition is comprised of five member organizations who have collectively advocated for a CBA\(^{171}\) as a way to mitigate the problems they anticipate occurring as an effect of the Obama Presidential Center. The five member organizations are Black Youth Project 100 (BYP100), Kenwood Oakland Community Organization (KOCO), Southside Together Organizing for Power (STOP), UChicago Against

\(^{169}\) Also known as IWoodlawn.  
\(^{170}\) See Literature Review and Methods sections for more on Kristina Smock’s models of organizing.  
\(^{171}\) As will be discussed, the Coalition has shifted their strategy to advocate for a city-wide ordinance that would accomplish much of what the original CBA set out to accomplish.
Displacement, and the Westside Health Authority (WHA). In addition to the five member organizations, the Coalition also has 22 ally members, who take on a more support-based and less active role in advocating for a CBA. The two founding organizations, STOP and KOCO, have often taken on a particularly large role in the Coalition.

Each CBA active member and ally member organization has a similar outlook on the future of Woodlawn and the other areas surrounding the Obama Presidential Center if certain measures are not taken. I spoke to Devondrick Jeffers, a housing organizer for STOP, who explained the problem to me:

So right now, we are in a housing crisis. In the past, y’know, for generations before us, it was pretty much a common practice to turn 18 years old and turn to your parents and say ‘Look, I’m moving out. I’m gonna step into adulthood.’ Right now, as it stands, as a generation across the country, you’re staying at home much longer, right. And it’s not that we don’t want to get out though, it’s that housing is unaffordable, right? Nobody coming out of high school is making $1,100 [per month]. So in a neighborhood like Woodlawn, where you have a school like Hyde Park High School, that has a graduating class of let’s say 150 students, that’s 150 new adults who want to start their lives in their own apartments, in their own housing. And they can’t do it in a neighborhood where they grew up, in the neighborhood where they went to school, made friends, know all the cool restaurants, know all the cool stores, they can’t even start their lives. So for me, that’s like the root of gentrification, right? The young people who grew up in the neighborhood can’t remain in the neighborhood. That’s a problem. So that’s one. Two, for mostly our elders, who are homeowners, who have come into full ownership of their homes and have to pay for property taxes, who have a set income, who can’t afford to maintain the property taxes, or can’t afford to maintain the, you know, the upkeep of their homes. That’s an issue.

Other members of the Coalition also expressed concerns about gentrification and displacement. At a Coalition forum on “stopping displacement,” an organizer for KOCO told attendees that a predicted 3,500 to 4,500 people will be displaced from Woodlawn as a result of

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172 “Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) for the Area around the Obama Center.”
173 Ibid.
the OPC.\textsuperscript{175} Woods Wiser, a UChicago Against Displacement organizer, discussed how this displacement might occur.

Our position is that there's a decent chance that this, this development along with UChicago's developments, will make the general area, Hyde Park/Woodlawn, a more attractive place for a more affluent group. And in that process, more affluent people will try to move in, it will become just, like, a more desirable location to be in terms of housing, which it hasn't been in the past. And in that process, the overall cost of housing will go up – is our worry. And that people who've been living on lower incomes will have to move out as a result of that. And especially, there's a big worry about a lot of retired folks who, I mean at this point, they're not going to get a big boost in income from any jobs that come and so they're kind of relying on the fact that their rent is going to be about the same over time, as opposed to going up. And that's definitely something that I think we've seen too, we started to see that – the effects of it is that people are moving more into Woodlawn. And I think it's definitely most acute in the regions near UChicago's campus\textsuperscript{176} and eventually near where the Obama Center will be. So that's kind of been our position.\textsuperscript{177}

Moreover, the CBA Coalition takes issue with the supposed economic benefits that many other groups, such as Network of Woodlawn and the University of Chicago, believe will come to Woodlawn as a result of the OPC.\textsuperscript{178} Although Coalition organizers do not contest that the OPC will bring economic benefits, and do not seek to prevent the OPC from being built in Woodlawn, they doubt that those benefits will actually reach those who already live in Woodlawn, who are primarily low-income and people of color.

Given these circumstances, the Coalition first turned to a community benefits agreement (CBA) in attempt to take control over the future of Woodlawn. A CBA is a contract between a private developer and the representative(s) of a community.\textsuperscript{179} Charles Perry, an organizer for

\textsuperscript{175} KOCO organizer, at the STOP Forum on Stopping Displacement on 1/27/2020.
\textsuperscript{176} In northern Woodlawn.
\textsuperscript{177} Woods Wiser, UChicago Against Displacement organizer, in conversation with the author on 11/14/2019.
\textsuperscript{178} See Introduction for a description of the potential economic benefits of the OPC, including job creation, tourism, and economic and cultural stimulus.
\textsuperscript{179} Woods Wiser, UChicago Against Displacement organizer, in conversation with the author on 11/14/2019. A copy of the CBA development principles is provided in Appendix Two.
WHA, explained the purpose of a CBA quite succinctly: “It’s a community benefits agreement. It means the community benefits from it.”\(^{180}\) In other words, CBAs put in place various legally-binding guidelines to ensure that any economic stimulus that results from outside development actually reaches preexisting community members.

After the Obama Foundation refused to negotiate over the CBA, the Coalition switched its tactics to advocate for a city-wide ordinance, referred to as the “CBA housing ordinance” or “CBA ordinance,” that would put in place many of the measures that the original CBA sought to implement.\(^{181}\) The ordinance is legally-binding and would apply to any development that occurs within a set radius\(^{182}\) around the OPC.\(^{183}\) It was introduced to the City in July 2019 by Alderman Jeannette Taylor and Alderman Leslie Hairston, who represent Woodlawn and Hyde Park, respectively.\(^{184}\) At the time of writing, stakeholders are reviewing the most recent draft of the ordinance, which was presented by the City of Chicago Department of Housing on February 25, 2020.\(^{185}\) Although the original CBA addressed a broad range of issues, the current CBA ordinance only contains provisions relating to housing.\(^{186}\)

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\(^{180}\) Charles Perry, WHA organizer, in conversation with the author on 1/29/2020.

\(^{181}\) Ashli Giles-Perkins, BYP100 organizer, at the CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In on 11/16/2019. A copy of the CBA ordinance, as proposed by the Coalition in 2019, is provided in the appendix.

\(^{182}\) At the time of writing, the actual size of this radius is up in the air. The Coalition is asking for a 2-mile radius around the OPC, while the current version of the ordinance includes a much smaller distance.

\(^{183}\) Charles Perry, WHA, in conversation with the author on 1/29/2020.

\(^{184}\) Ashli Giles-Perkins, BYP100 organizer, at the CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In on 11/16/2019.


\(^{186}\) Jawanza Malone, KOCO organizer, in conversation with the author on 12/18/2019.
In advocating for the CBA, and now, for the CBA ordinance, Coalition members have adopted a variety of strategies and tactics. These can be separated into two main types: educational/awareness-raising and protest-based.

Educational/awareness-raising strategies and tactics aim to inform community members about the nature of the CBA ordinance and to teach them how to get involved. They include, for example, teach-ins, during which Coalition members walk community members through the specific provisions of the CBA ordinance. Educational/awareness-raising strategies also include canvassing efforts, in which Coalition members travel around Woodlawn and adjacent neighborhoods to speak to individuals and groups about the CBA ordinance. STOP housing organizer Devondrick Jeffers described educational/awareness-raising strategies as “a full marketing campaign,” including “a lot of flyers, phone calls, door knocking… social media, newsletters, [and] email blasts.”187

Protest strategies and tactics have two main goals: to influence public officials and other powerful actors and to increase and maintain visibility through media attention. Protest strategies usually consist of rallies that are “directed at specific targets,”188 in which Coalition members gather in large groups at relevant events, such as City hearings and meetings. During these rallies, Coalition members tote signs adorned with slogans including “Protect Affordable Housing,” “Stop Displacement,” and “Still Praying / Still Fighting for the CBA.” As a result of these rallies, Coalition members and the CBA ordinance typically garner media attention and may be able to sway City officials to increase their support for the ordinance.

187 Devondrick Jeffers, STOP organizer, in conversation with the author on 1/17/2020.
188 Jawanza Malone, KOCO organizer, in conversation with the author on 12/18/2020.
The techniques and philosophies of the CBA Coalition align with Kristina Smock’s conception of the Power-Based model of community organizing. Organizations using a Power-Based model show reliance on widespread resident participation, use of confrontational tactics to put pressure on decision-makers, and an emphasis on achieving a seat at the negotiation table. All of these elements are found in the actions and philosophies of the CBA Coalition.

The first element of the CBA Coalition that aligns well with Smock’s Power-Based model is the use of widespread resident participation. In Smock’s Power-Based model, this widespread participation is essential in overcoming power imbalances and achieving the ultimate goal of the redistribution of power and resources. Smock writes:

Because low-income and working-class residents typically don’t have access to traditional sources of power – such as money – their most important resource is their numbers. Thus the most effective way to address the community’s problems is by bringing together large numbers of residents to pressure economic and political powerholders to concede to their demands.\(^{189}\)

Therefore, not only is the use of significant manpower a telltale sign of the Power-Based model, but it is also essential for the success of the model.

This emphasis on the involvement of large amounts of people is clearly present in the approach and organization of the CBA Coalition. Public Coalition-run meetings regularly draw over 100 attendees,\(^ {190}\) all of whom are actively recruited to take on a larger role in advocating for the CBA ordinance. In an interview, Devondrick Jeffers, a housing organizer for STOP, explained the importance of manpower in the CBA campaign:

\[\text{W}e\ look\ at\ power,\ we\ look\ at\ the\ four\ ways\ that\ power\ is\ accumulated.\ \text{So}\ you\ can\ have\ a\ ton\ of\ money.\ \text{You}\ can\ use\ violence.\ \text{You}\ can\ have\ a\ good\ idea.\ \text{Or}\ you\ can\ have\ a\ ton\ of\ people.\ \text{We}\ don’t\ have\ a\ lot\ of\ money\ and\ \text{we’re}\ not\ gonna\ use\ violent\ tactics.\ All\ we}\]

\(^{189}\) Smock, *Democracy in Action* 14.

\(^{190}\) Jawanza Malone, KOCO organizer, in conversation with the author on 12/18/2019.
have are good ideas and we got our people. Right, so we have to look at like, how people move elected officials, how can people move foundations or universities?\textsuperscript{191}

The answer? By relying on confrontational tactics, thus aligning with an additional element of Smock’s Power-Based model. Smock explains that Power-Based community organizations rely on “conflict and confrontation… to achieve real change.”\textsuperscript{192} Their methods are aggressive and serve to intimidate the stakeholder who they are trying to influence.\textsuperscript{193} By relying on visible displays of power, such as large gatherings and rallies, Power-Based community organizations put pressure on and demonstrate to institutional stakeholders that they are to be taken seriously, and perhaps, even feared.\textsuperscript{194} They ask direct questions of public officials and remain firm in their actions and message, even if stakeholders are not initially responsive or even push back against the organization.\textsuperscript{195}

Using conflict and confrontation to put pressure on public officials is a crucial element of the CBA Coalition’s methods. As discussed, CBA Coalition members rely heavily on protest strategies and tactics, which directly aligns with the Power-Based model’s emphasis on conflict and confrontation. For example, they use rallies to “show them [the City] that community residents are demanding that a CBA ordinance be passed as it stands.”\textsuperscript{196} Here, both the language used by organizers and the actions of organizers are strong and forceful; they are not merely making a request for City action, but rather, uncompromisingly insisting that the City take action

\textsuperscript{191} Devondrick Jeffers, STOP organizer, in conversation with the author on 1/17/2020.
\textsuperscript{192} Smock, Democracy in Action 15.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{196} Devondrick Jeffers, STOP organizer, at the CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In on 11/16/2019. Emphasis added.
and “send[ing] the Mayor [and the City] a message.” Further, these rallies are very visible, both to institutional stakeholders and to the media.

As a result of these methods, the CBA Coalition cannot be ignored and is more able to hold institutional stakeholders accountable. If institutional stakeholders do not respond to what the Coalition wants, these confrontational methods allow Coalition members to “tarnish the[ir] reputation… [or] “get in the way of some profits,” perhaps by slowing down the development process or forcing concessions. The Coalition makes these consequences clear; during a march and rally against displacement in which community members stopped traffic in the Loop, the Coalition Twitter account tweeted “IF WE DON’T GET IT SHUT IT DOWN.” This rhetoric is simultaneously forceful and ambiguous, indicating to institutional stakeholders that the Coalition is willing to go quite far in achieving their goals, thus inspiring fear among these stakeholders as to what this might entail.

For CBA Coalition members, these confrontational methods are necessary for achieving the type of change for which they are advocating. According to Woods Wiser, an organizer with UChicago Against Displacement, [D]irect action… was how it had to happen. You know, basically in terms of direct actions, the reason we do those is because first we’ll come up with what we want and then we’ll say, here’s what we want. We’re happy to talk about it, negotiate, kind of work things out. Usually, the person who we’re trying to talk to will be like, ‘no,’ usually it’s like a ‘no’ or a fake ‘yes.’ We’ve had a lot of fake ‘yesses.’

197 KOCO organizer, at the STOP Forum on Stopping Displacement on 1/28/2020.
198 Devondrick Jeffers, STOP organizer, in conversation with the author on 1/17/2020.
200 Woods Wiser, UChicago Against Displacement organizer, in conversation with the author on 11/14/2019.
By “fake ‘yesses,’” Mr. Wiser references the history of distrust among Woodlawn community members and outside developers. He recalls the many times when the community believed that these developers, including the University of Chicago, would work together with community members to engage respectfully with the community. In reality, however, these developers often engaged in dubious negotiations (sometimes with community organizations) and did not follow these paths to respectful development. Mr. Wiser continued by explaining the importance of confrontation tactics to prevent against “fake yesses”:

> And so, our tactic is, if someone’s not being very responsive to what we’re saying, we will do an action that is basically designed to put pressure on them, basically raising awareness by getting in the press.\(^{201}\)

This confrontational, pressure-based strategy is also demonstrated in the Coalition’s approach to City meetings. For example, prior to a City meeting in which a survey on the housing ordinance would be conducted, the Coalition held a community forum in which attendees were given a list of specific questions to ask at the meeting.\(^{202}\) These questions were designed to force City officials to provide a direct response to Coalition questions and to address the concerns that the Coalition had with the current state of the ordinance.

These strategies, as outlined by Smock and demonstrated by the CBA Coalition, are in furtherance of the redistribution of power.\(^{203}\) According to Smock, Power-Based organizations seek to “win a seat at the negotiating table”\(^{204}\) and to “build residents’ power to fight for their

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201 Ibid. Emphasis added.
202 For example, “Will there be a 30% set aside of affordable housing for all new housing that gets developed on private land? They have a higher set aside up on Milwaukee [Avenue] on the north side, if it’s good enough for the north side it should be good enough for the south side.” Quote from “Come to the Woodlawn Open House on Thursday to Tell the City What You Think” (CBA Coalition, January 28, 2020).
203 Smock, Democracy in Action.
204 Ibid 14.
interests.” If achieved, these changes alter the balance of power in the community and redistribute resources to previously-disadvantaged community members.

Subsequently, relying on the power of large groups of people and of applying pressure through confrontation help to further the CBA Coalition’s goal of the redistribution of power and resources. The CBA Coalition organizers with whom I spoke often voiced a desire to have a greater say in the future of their community. Ashli Giles-Perkins, an organizer for BYP100, told me that her organization is fighting for a community that is “self-sufficient and self-sustaining.” STOP housing organizer Devondrick Jeffers told me that he sees the CBA ordinance as “a step for getting community members more control over the community.” Charles Perry, WHA director of community organizing, explained that his role is to “organize [his] people to speak up for themselves… [and show people] that they have power.”

In this way, the Coalition’s ultimate goal – the CBA ordinance – is well-aligned with the theory of power and goal of redistribution of power that is essential to Power-Based organizations. As previously discussed, the purpose of the CBA ordinance is to ensure that outside developers are held accountable to the community and that the community reaps the rewards from economic development. The ordinance inscribes community members in the decision-making process for determining the future of their neighborhood, allowing them to have a voice in how resources are distributed.

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205 Ibid 157.
206 Ibid.
207 Ashli Giles-Perkins, BYP100 organizer, in conversation with the author on 12/18/2019.
208 Devondrick Jeffers, STOP organizer, in conversation with the author on 1/17/2020.
209 Charles Perry, WHA organizer, in conversation with the author on 1/29/2020.
210 Woods Wiser, UChicago Against Displacement organizer, in conversation with the author on 11/14/2019.
Therefore, due to the CBA Coalition’s emphasis on mass participation, use of confrontational techniques to put pressure on institutional stakeholders, and goal of changing power structures, the actions and philosophies of the CBA Coalition can be classified as Power-Based organizing.

Network of Woodlawn: Community-Building Organizing

Network of Woodlawn, often also referred to as 1Woodlawn, is a community organization based at Woodlawn’s Apostolic Church of God. It is led by Dr. Byron Brazier, son of TWO leader Arthur M. Brazier, who died in 2010.211 The organization describes itself as “a comprehensive community building collaborative model which uses a ‘four pillar approach’ to addressing community needs.”212 The four pillars are economic/community development, safety, education, and health.213 Network of Woodlawn is advised by a board of stakeholders that includes TWO, The University of Chicago, Woodlawn East Community And Neighbors (WECAN),214 and the Preservation of Affordable Housing (POAH).215 For organizational purposes, the Network of Woodlawn is divided into four geographic quadrants, designed to better address the unique concerns that the various subdivisions of Woodlawn face.216 Each

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213 Ibid.
214 Interestingly, WECAN is also an ally member of the CBA Coalition.
216 Dr. Byron Brazier, Network of Woodlawn, at the 1Woodlawn Quarterly Meeting on 1/23/2020.
quadrant has its own leader, who is responsible for running periodic quadrant meetings and organizing quadrant projects.\(^{217}\)

Unlike the CBA Coalition, Network of Woodlawn does not believe that the primary effects of the OPC will be gentrification and displacement. Although they do indeed acknowledge the risk for displacement, on a whole the organization focuses on the potential for positive economic growth rather than for negative impacts. Put differently, Network of Woodlawn seeks to capitalize on the economic stimulus brought to Woodlawn by the OPC, whereas the CBA Coalition seeks to protect against potential harm brought to Woodlawn by the OPC. One Network of Woodlawn member, Cassandra Guice, told me that any residents’ worries about negative effects were quelled after “enough research” was done about the impacts of the OPC, which persuaded them that they should not fear the Center.\(^ {218}\)

Following from the economic effects of the OPC foreseen by Network of Woodlawn members, the organization has chosen not to advocate for a CBA or the CBA ordinance as a response to the OPC. Rather, Network of Woodlawn has embraced the potential for economic revival and has crafted a plan that will capitalize on the influx of capital into and increased attention surrounding Woodlawn in the near future.

To accomplish this, Network of Woodlawn commissioned three econometric studies\(^ {219}\) that were conducted by the City of Chicago Department of Housing and are now published on

\(^{217}\) Ibid.
\(^{218}\) Cassandra Guice, Network of Woodlawn organizer, in conversation with the author on 1/24/2020.
\(^{219}\) Interestingly, the CBA Coalition has also relied on similar studies (for example, University of Illinois at Chicago Voorhees Center’s “Protect · Preserve · Produce: Affordable Housing and the Obama Center” by Janet Smith), which have come to similar conclusions.
the 1Woodlawn and City of Chicago websites. These studies allowed the organization to identify and “understand [their] own value, not be told it by someone else.” Each of these studies examined the impact of economic investment on Woodlawn and show economic growth as well as the potential for resident displacement. In light of their studies’ findings, Network of Woodlawn is working to design various concepts for the development of Woodlawn in collaboration with the Montana State University Architecture department. The department spent several months working in conjunction with the Network of Woodlawn to create and pitch project proposals ranging from community squares geared toward retail sale to towers with art production facilities at their bases.

In advocating for these proposals, Dr. Byron Brazier primarily worked within the organization of Network of Woodlawn, rather than within the community at large. He and his son, Byron Brazier, Jr., who also holds a leadership position in the organization, held separate meetings with the Network of Woodlawn Board, community stakeholders, and community members to discuss the various concepts. Most, but not all, attendees at the community meeting had prior affiliation with Network of Woodlawn.

The techniques and philosophies of Network of Woodlawn align with Kristina Smock’s conception of the Community-Building model of community organizing. Organizations using a

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220 Dr. Byron Brazier, Network of Woodlawn, at the 1Woodlawn Quarterly Meeting on 1/23/2020.
221 Ibid.
223 Michael Everette, Architecture Professor at Montana State University, at the 1Woodlawn Quarterly Meeting on 1/23/2020.
224 Ibid.
225 Dr. Byron Brazier, Network of Woodlawn, at the 1Woodlawn Quarterly Meeting on 1/23/2020.
Community-Building model show a goal of economic investment in the community, active collaboration with community groups and stakeholders, and an emphasis on being recognized as a valid representative of their community. All of these elements are found in the actions and philosophies of the Network of Woodlawn.

According to Smock, “Community-Building practitioners believe that the fundamental problem facing urban neighborhoods is their lack of internal capacity to address their own needs.”\(^{226}\) They emphasize the erosion of economic infrastructure as one of the primary issues faced by their communities. As a result, their solutions work to “rebuild the community from within by mobilizing its assets and connecting it to the mainstream economy.”\(^{227}\)

This closely aligns with the approach taken by Network of Woodlawn. In their discussions with the community, they emphasize Woodlawn’s economic potential, citing the neighborhood’s various amenities as reasons for investment.\(^{228}\) Their proposed solution centers around revitalizing the economy of Woodlawn by taking advantage of the stimulus brought by the OPC. Moreover, this approach ties Woodlawn to the broader City of Chicago by establishing “cultural destinations” to which tourists and city residents would travel.\(^{229}\)

The Community-Building model put forth by Smock also emphasizes active collaboration with other groups and actors. Community-Building organizations tend to “build broad collaborative partnerships of diverse neighborhood ‘stakeholder’ groups, including nonprofits, businesses, residents’ associations, and government.”\(^{230}\)

\(^{226}\) Smock, Democracy in Action 17.
\(^{227}\) Ibid 33.
\(^{228}\) Dr. Byron Brazier, Network of Woodlawn, at the Woodlawn Quarterly Meeting on 1/23/2020.
\(^{229}\) Ibid.
\(^{230}\) Smock, Democracy in Action 33.
This element too is found in Network of Woodlawn’s organizing philosophy and approach. Collaboration with stakeholders is a vital aspect of Network of Woodlawn. Their conceptual plan for the development of Woodlawn, designed by Montana State University students, is only one example of this. In addition, as previously discussed, Network of Woodlawn regularly consults with a stakeholder board of ten different organizations. In fact, one University of Chicago administrator I interviewed, the University of Chicago Executive Director of Community Development, Alyssa Berman-Cutler, told me that she is one of the stakeholder board members. In addition, Network of Woodlawn often collaborates with organizations like the Woodlawn Chamber of Commerce, the Woodlawn Family Church, and the Chicago Police Department. Interestingly, the majority of these stakeholders are affiliated with the City or the University, which could have an impact on the types of solutions put forth and methods used by the organization. This effect might be even more significant in this specific case, in which the City and the University are major institutional stakeholders.

Finally, in Smock’s conception of the Community-Building model of organizing, the organization aims “to be recognized as the legitimate representative of the community as a whole.” In doing so, they present a “shared collective vision” of how the community should proceed.

I also found this to be true in Network of Woodlawn’s approach to community organizing. At the Woodlawn January 2020 quarterly meeting, the Brazier family’s clout and

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232 Cassandra Guice, Network of Woodlawn organizer, in conversation with the author on 1/24/2020.
233 Smock, Democracy in Action 33.
234 Ibid 96.
reputation in the community, and by extension, their organization’s clout and reputation in the community, was palpable. For example, in introducing a vote on the proposed development concepts, Dr. Brazier said, “I assume that we have a consensus on moving forward. So everyone that wants to move forward, raise your hand.” Before actually taking the vote, Dr. Brazier signaled to attendees how they should respond. Their response was nearly unanimous, demonstrating the sway that Dr. Brazier had over community members.

Network of Woodlawn leadership also relied on the language of unity to demonstrate their desire to be seen as the legitimate representative of the community. In the same community meeting, Dr. Brazier told community members that “if anyone’s gonna change Woodlawn, it’s gonna be us.” In doing so, he also appealed to the common vision that Kristina Smock outlines as one of the characteristics of the Community-Building model. When I spoke to Malcolm Williams, a former quadrant leader in Network of Woodlawn, he told me that the majority of time he spent in Network of Woodlawn meetings was spent discussing “what we desire, what we want,” but that there was “never really a plan to implement” those things. By having these conversations about values, Network of Woodlawn leaders attempted to bolster their legitimacy as community representatives who understand and take care of the needs of the community.

However, this also may point to a disconnect between Network of Woodlawn leadership and its general membership. For one, it seems that Network of Woodlawn does not always follow through with taking action, even after spending a significant amount of time discussing

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235 Dr. Byron Brazier, Network of Woodlawn, at the 1Woodlawn Quarterly Meeting on 1/23/2020.
236 Ibid.
237 Smock, Democracy in Action 96.
238 Malcolm Williams, Network of Woodlawn organizer, in conversation with the author on 1/20/2020. Although Mr. Williams is no longer a quadrant leader, he is still an active member of the Network of Woodlawn and regularly attends their meetings.
visions for the community’s future. As Mr. Williams indicates, this could certainly result in frustration among the organization’s general membership. Additionally, it seems that Network of Woodlawn may provide limited opportunity for members to think and act independently from leadership. As demonstrated by the example of the unanimous vote at a Network of Woodlawn quarterly meeting, organization leadership has significant sway over the general member population.

Further, Network of Woodlawn leadership has taken active steps to quiet members’ criticism about the organization and its actions. For example, after presenting the Montana State University proposals for development, Byron Brazier Jr. opened the floor for questions. One woman voiced concerns that Network of Woodlawn was prioritizing the wrong kind of development. Speaking from her experience of having difficulty accessing affordable necessities in Woodlawn, the woman stated that the organization needs to focus on building things like grocery stores and laundromats, rather than “things [she] can’t even afford.”

Byron Brazier Jr. immediately diffused the situation, prompting the audience to clap until the woman returned to her seat. He then decided to cut the question and answer period of the evening short.

In light of these considerations, it is unclear the extent to which the Community-Building model can be accurately applied to the Network of Woodlawn general membership, given that they are afforded limited opportunity to influence the organization and have their views heard. However, we can indeed characterize the model of community organizing adopted by Network of Woodlawn leadership, which is ultimately the driving force of the organization’s actions and official stances on issues related to the OPC. Therefore, due to Network of Woodlawn’s leadership’s emphasis on economic investment, reliance on community partners, and goal of

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239 Network of Woodlawn member, at the Woodlawn Quarterly Meeting on 1/23/2020.
establishing legitimacy through a common vision, the actions and philosophies of the Network of Woodlawn can be classified as Community-Building organizing.

*Whose Community?: The Institutional Stakeholders*

The story of organizing in Woodlawn in response to the Obama Presidential Center would not be complete without a discussion of the philosophies and actions of the University of Chicago and the Obama Foundation, the two major developers working in Woodlawn. Although the Obama Foundation declined my request for an interview, I was able to gather some data from the materials published by the Foundation and from an interview with Alyssa Berman-Cutler, the Executive Director of Community Development at the University of Chicago.

Interestingly, the conception of community and general approach embraced by both the University of Chicago and the Obama Foundation have aligned well with those embraced by the Network of Woodlawn. Like the Network of Woodlawn, the University of Chicago and the Obama Foundation emphasize economic investment, collaborate with community groups, and seek to be recognized as legitimate representatives of Woodlawn, therefore following a Community-Building model of organizing.240

Economic investment in Woodlawn is a primary focus for both the Obama Foundation and the University of Chicago. According to the Obama Foundation website, the OPC will “creat[e] jobs and driv[e] economic opportunity here in Chicago.”241 Under the Obama Foundation’s statement of guiding principles for the OPC, the third principle listed says:

240 See the previous section, Network of Woodlawn: Community-Building Organizing, for more on this.
241 “The Obama Presidential Center.”
We will **serve as an economic engine for the South Side**, attracting private investment, strengthening the local climate, and creating shared prosperity to help our neighbors build wealth.\(^{242}\)

Under the OPC’s statement on economic impact and jobs, the Foundation also states that:

The OPC is expected to bring $3.1 Billion in economic activity to Chicago. We will leverage this investment to support local business and encourage additional investments in the area, layering and focusing them for impact.\(^{243}\)

Similarly, as both a partner of the OPC and its own entity, the University of Chicago seeks to make economic investments in Woodlawn and surrounding communities in order to revitalize the area.\(^{244}\) Alyssa Berman-Cutler discussed “impact investing” with me in her office at Levi Hall, the University of Chicago administrative building:

We are thinking about whether some impact investing might make sense. And so that would be, you know, a big financial shift for the University, and thinking about how we use our investment dollars to be able to make some of these investments. The couple of things we’re struggling with there is, first of all, prying money out of the University. Secondly, figuring out what gap exists in the current marketplace that we would uniquely need to fill. So there is a lot of fairly low-interest money, loan money, out there in the community between the various nonprofits and CDFIs\(^{245}\) – we don’t need to compete with them. We are never going to be so high risk that we’re coming in with a much higher risk profile than some of these entities. And we don’t need significant returns, but we want to be able to get our money back, so we’re not really interested in just making grants.\(^{246}\)

Here, Ms. Berman-Cutler makes a distinction between the types of investments made by the University and those made by other actors. In Woodlawn, University uses loans as a means of extending its influence by making long-term investments. On the other hand, other actors use loans as a means of accruing profits and are less interested in carving out a sphere of influence

\(^{242}\) “Our Commitment to Our Neighbors.” Emphasis included in original quote.

\(^{243}\) Ibid.

\(^{244}\) Alyssa Berman-Cutler, UChicago Office of Civic Engagement, in conversation with the author on 11/25/2019.

\(^{245}\) Community Development Financial Institutions.

\(^{246}\) Ibid.
by making a long-term investment. This, coupled with the statements of the Obama Foundation, demonstrate that both the Foundation and the University recognize their ability to leverage financial resources to make economic investments in the community in order to spur favorable community development.

Further, both the Obama Foundation and the University of Chicago work closely with community partners in their work. Under the Obama Foundation’s statement of guiding principles for the OPC, the second listed principle states that the Foundation “will partner with and strengthen existing community-based organizations.”247 Existing community partners for the Foundation include the Chicago Public Library, the Gary Comer Youth Center, and the Lakeside Alliance.248

Community partnerships are also a crucial aspect of the University of Chicago’s approach to and philosophy on community. Alyssa Berman-Cutler described forming community partnerships as “a key part” of her office’s mission, stating that “everything we do is in partnership with local community organizations.”249 Ms. Berman-Cutler also told me about the community development working group that had recently been convened by her office, in which 60 “leaders from [the University’s] neighborhood organizations” issued a report250 and

247 “Our Commitment to Our Neighbors.”
250 This report was provided to me in my interview with Ms. Berman-Cutler and is cited in the Conclusion and Policy Recommendations section of this paper.
recommendations on community development.\textsuperscript{251} These recommendations focus on business
development and purchasing, employment and job training, and housing.\textsuperscript{252}

Finally, both the Obama Foundation and the University of Chicago work to establish their
legitimacy as community representatives. Throughout the Obama Foundation’s published
materials on the OPC, there is a substantial emphasis on Barack and Michelle Obama’s
connection to the South Side of Chicago. Jackson Park, the park within Woodlawn where the
OPC will be built, is referred to as being “blocks away from where [Barack Obama] began his
career, where [Michelle Obama] was raised, and where – together – they made their home.”\textsuperscript{253}
The South Side is also referred to as the area that “President and Mrs. Obama have called home
for so long.”\textsuperscript{254} From their language, it is clear that one of the Obama Foundation’s goals is to
establish that the Obama family’s connection to the South Side is both existent and legitimate in
order to subsequently establish the Obama family as valid community representatives of the
South Side.

In addition, the University of Chicago too aims to be seen as a valid community
representative of Woodlawn. For example, in my conversation with Ms. Berman-Cutler, she
described the University’s relationship with Jewel Osco, the grocery store that opened in
Woodlawn in 2019. Prior to the opening of this store, Woodlawn was\textsuperscript{255} considered a food desert

\textsuperscript{251} Alyssa Berman-Cutler, UChicago Office of Civic Engagement, in conversation with the
\textsuperscript{252} University of Chicago Office of Civic Engagement, “Community Development Working
\textsuperscript{253} “The Obama Presidential Center.”
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{255} Although the past tense is used here, many residents of Woodlawn still do not have full
access to fresh, affordable food. See “Jewel-Osco Officially Opens in Woodlawn,” \textit{The Chicago
Maroon}.
because many residents had at best limited access to fresh, affordable food. In late January 2020, “a venture connected to the [U]niversity [of Chicago]” purchased the Woodlawn Jewel-Osco.

Although the University had not yet completed the purchase at the time of my conversation with Ms. Berman-Cutler, she nonetheless used it to allude to the University’s perspective on its legitimacy as a representative in Woodlawn. She stated that “we think that we would be a better owner [of Jewel-Osco] than some land bank fund from New York.” By contrasting the University with a non-locally-based developer, Ms. Berman-Cutler seems to be attempting to enhance the legitimacy of the University as a community representative in the eyes of the public.

Therefore, due to Obama Foundation’s and the University of Chicago’s emphasis on economic investment, collaboration with community groups, and desire to be recognized as legitimate representatives of Woodlawn, the actions and philosophies of the Foundation and the University can be classified as Community-Building organizing.

Learning from the Past

In addition to the economic, political, and social context of organizing in response to the Obama Presidential Center, it is also important to consider the context of the history of organizing in Chicago, and more specifically, in Woodlawn. The actions and philosophies of The

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Woodlawn Organization (TWO) in the 1960s are helpful points of comparison when analyzing and evaluating the actions and philosophies of the CBA Coalition. Both organizations faced similar problems, and both relied on Power-Based methods and conceptions of community to address them.259

First, the types of issues faced by the original TWO of the 1960s and by the CBA Coalition are quite similar. In the early 1960s, Woodlawn residents worried about urban renewal campaigns bringing outside development into their neighborhoods and forcing community members out.260 They focused their efforts on securing resources for the community and ensuring that it remained a home for Woodlawn residents. Now, in 2020, CBA Coalition-aligned Woodlawn residents worry about urban renewal campaigns bringing in outside development (the Obama Presidential Center and subsequent economic stimulus) and forcing community members out (gentrification and displacement). Like the TWO of the 1960s, the Coalition has also focused their efforts on securing resources for the community and ensuring that it remains a home for Woodlawn residents.

Moreover, TWO, like the CBA Coalition, used Power-Based methods and conceptions of community. In the 1960s, they relied on widespread resident participation and confrontational tactics, and attempted to win a seat at the negotiation table, which are hallmark characteristics of Kristina Smock’s Power-Based model.261

TWO’s use of widespread resident participation and confrontational tactics went hand in hand. The organization made use of large turnout at events like demonstrations and marches in

259 This is perhaps an intuitive link, as Power-Based organizing and Alinskyism are often used as synonyms for one another. See Literature Review and CBA Coalition: Power-Based Organizing sections for a more in-depth discussion of Power-Based methods and philosophies.
260 Fish, Black Power/White Control.
261 Smock, Democracy in Action.
order to demonstrate their power and persistence to stakeholders like the University of Chicago or the City. For example, in 1963, the organization sent 700 community members to City Hall in order to force negotiations between the City, TWO, and the University regarding the University’s plan to expand into Woodlawn. A 1961 TWO march drew 600 community members to draw attention to retail fraud and dishonesty among businesses on 63rd Street. These actions therefore became nearly impossible to brush aside, as it was clear that the organization had mobilized the support of the community.

Further, these methods were intended to redistribute the balance of power within Woodlawn in order to give community members a more active role in determining the future of their community. The example of TWO’s interactions with the City and the University regarding the University’s South Campus plan illustrate this point well. Throughout these interactions, TWO repeatedly and successfully called for negotiations with these parties in order to ensure that their goals would be achieved in the ultimate outcome. As a result of these negotiations, TWO ultimately was able to build an affordable housing development, Woodlawn Gardens, and to have its interests represented in the process.

Therefore, we can classify the TWO of the 1960s as a Power-Based organization. Perhaps more interestingly, though, this would indicate that Power-Based methods have had a history of success within Woodlawn, and thus, may again prove successful in the future.

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262 Fish, *Black Power/White Control*.
263 Ibid.
265 Fish, *Black Power/White Control*.
266 Ibid.
However, we must also consider the lasting legacy of TWO in addition to its successes in the 1960s.

This legacy, while largely positive, does include some shortcomings and contentious decisions. For one, the decision to negotiate with the University did ultimately allow for the University’s expansion into Woodlawn. Given that many members of the Woodlawn community blame the University for problems within their neighborhood, this history remains relevant and informs the actions of Woodlawn residents, as well as their perceptions of TWO. When I spoke with Charles Perry, an organizer from WHA, he told me that “those people at the University of Chicago, they created this monster.”267 The position expressed by Mr. Perry is widespread among people in Woodlawn and in other South Side communities – that the University’s actions have driven the segregation and decline often found in these neighborhoods. When I spoke with University of Chicago Executive Director of Community Development Alyssa Berman-Cutler, she explained to me:

It remains tricky. What I say to people is, you know, this is not ancient history. You go to meetings and people say, ‘You seem nice, but you guys tore down my house.’ So, this is very, very recent.268

Here, Ms. Berman-Cutler echoes the sentiment expressed by Mr. Perry, but speaks from a different perspective. She reiterates that Woodlawn residents blame the University for intruding into their neighborhood. Moreover, this demonstrates that the impact of these actions is very personal for Woodlawn community members, and certainly does not diminish overtime. This also reinforces this paper’s assertion that the current organizing movement in Woodlawn should

267 Charles Perry, WHA organizer, in conversation with the author on 1/30/2020.
be analyzed as part of the long tradition of organizing in Woodlawn, including the historical relationship between Woodlawn residents and outside developers.

However, there are a handful of significant differences between 2020 and 1960. First, the dynamics between groups are different. During the beginning years of TWO, one of the organization’s goals was simply to be recognized as a legitimate organization and representative of Woodlawn.269 For example, in addressing the University’s urban renewal plan for the northernmost end of Woodlawn, one thing at issue was the “recognition of [the newly-formed] TWO as the bargaining agent for Woodlawn.”270 Due to the organization’s young age, TWO first had to be acknowledged as legitimate before it could begin to impact institutional stakeholders.

On the other hand, the CBA Coalition started off with at least a baseline level of legitimacy and recognition. Although the Coalition itself was new, its member organizations had already been established as powerful and respected organizations in Woodlawn and surrounding communities. Moreover, their actions saw widespread resident support; according to Ashli Giles-Perkins, BYP100 organizer, “Chicago residents overwhelmingly vote in support of a non-binding referendum for a CBA ordinance.”271

Perhaps as a result, CBA Coalition organizers have thus far needed to make fewer concessions to institutional stakeholders like the Obama Foundation or the City of Chicago. Whereas TWO controversially bargained with the University of Chicago,272 among other actors,

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269 Although this would typically indicate alignment with a Community-Building model of organizing, the other philosophies and actions of TWO demonstrate that TWO should be considered a Power-Based or Alinsky-style organization.
270 Fish, Black Power/White Control 33.
271 Ashli Giles-Perkins, BYP100 organizer, at the CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In on 11/16/2019. In February 2019, about 88% of Chicago residents voted in favor of the ordinance, and about 92% of residents living in the 5th, 4th, and 20th Wards, which include Hyde Park, Kenwood, and Woodlawn, voted in favor of the ordinance.
272 See Background section.
in order to achieve its goals, the CBA Coalition has merely shifted its focus (from the CBA to the CBA ordinance) in order to work toward achieving its goals.273

The other significant difference between the organizing in Woodlawn in the 1960s and that occurring now is that CBA Coalition organizers have certainly learned from the past. The main takeaway? That to create lasting change, it is essential for the solution to be in writing and legally-binding.

Ebonée Green, an organizer for BYP100, explained that “[w]hen we don’t get the city to agree to something in writing, then they make things up as they go.” 274 The sentiment Ms. Green expressed is both rooted in historical memory and shared by many other organizers. As discussed,275 in the days of TWO, the University and outside developers did indeed encroach on the Woodlawn neighborhood, confirming residents’ fears. This happened partially as a result of negotiations with TWO organizers, during which TWO permitted the expansion of the University in exchange for the construction of affordable housing and a seat for TWO at the negotiating table.276 Today, CBA organizers continue to fight for exactly these two things.

Numerous CBA Coalition organizers expressed to me the importance of “getting it in writing.” At the CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In hosted by the Coalition, University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration (SSA) Professor Bill Sites told the audience that the “theme” of the CBA and CBA ordinance is “put in in writing.”277 He stated that by

273 However, it should be noted that organizing in response to the OPC is still ongoing at the time of writing, and it is unlikely that the Coalition will be able to entirely avoid compromise.
274 Ebonée Green, BYP100 organizer, at the STOP Forum on Stopping Displacement on 1/28/2020.
275 See Background section.
276 Fish, Black Power/White Control.
277 Bill Sites, UChicago SSA Professor, at the CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In on 11/16/2019.
“chang[ing] the rules a little bit, … community organizations [w]on’t have to repeatedly mount the[se] kinds of campaigns.” 278

Both the CBA and the CBA ordinance would accomplish this goal, given that a CBA is a legally-binding contract and an ordinance is a legally-binding citywide piece of legislation. In fact, when I asked STOP housing organizer Devondrick Jeffers why the CBA was the best way to address possible changes to Woodlawn as a result of the OPC, he told me:

We needed something to guarantee. We didn’t wanna leave without a promise, we didn’t want to leave it at a nod and a wave, we needed this in writing… Looking at the legally binding part of it, I think, as a philosophy, I can organize – try to organize – to a point of policy change, right. Otherwise, you know, you’re left with a promise between two parties, and what happens, y’know, when the promise is broken, right? Then there’s no standard, no legal standard. So I just looked at that part, right? We want something that we can take to court if the promises aren’t being kept, because we can bring in a third party, to make sure you do what you said you were gonna do.

Thus, the CBA and CBA ordinance were not just haphazard choices made by the Coalition; they were strategic decisions grounded in the history of Woodlawn, chosen deliberately to avoid the mistakes and betrayals they had seen time and time again.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

In spite of the rich body of literature on both community organizing and on the Woodlawn community, there is a dearth of scholarly work that unites these two fields in the current historical moment of organizing in response to the Obama Presidential Center. This paper attempts to explain both the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of the various responses to the OPC in Woodlawn. By grounding my analysis in the current social, political, and economic conditions in Woodlawn, the historical facts and memory of Woodlawn, and scholarly models of organizing, this paper provides an in-depth look at one moment in the history of organizing in Woodlawn.

278 Ibid.
While many other neighborhoods are unfortunately too familiar with gentrification and displacement, the specific context of Woodlawn may limit the applicability of this analysis to other neighborhoods facing similar threats.

Future work could expand the scope of this paper by revisiting these research questions after the completion of the Obama Presidential Center. Additional research might also search for instances of cooperation between groups using different models of organizing to learn more about effective strategies for collaboration and successful community organizing.

Although the case-study approach taken in this paper certainly has limitations, it can nonetheless provide potential avenues for effective policy change in Woodlawn. This paper proposes two such avenues for effective policy change: one for Woodlawn community members, designed to help them advance the most robust policies in the most persuasive ways, and one for institutional stakeholders, designed to further both their own interests and the interests of the Woodlawn community in mutually beneficial ways.

This paper’s first recommendation recognizes that Woodlawn community members have not yet reached their various end goals in organizing in response to the OPC. Therefore, it seeks to suggest both the content and manner of achieving an end goal that will appeal to all members of the Woodlawn community.

This paper recommends that community groups and organizations in Woodlawn join forces in using Power-Based methods to advocate for a CBA ordinance. This recommendation might be more accurately reframed as three overlapping recommendations – (1) for the community groups and organizations in Woodlawn to join forces, (2) for these groups to use Power-Based methods, and (3) for these groups to collectively work for a CBA ordinance – and therefore these three sub-recommendations will be addressed one at a time.
This paper recommends that the community groups and organizations working in Woodlawn join forces. In speaking to and attending the events of CBA Coalition organizers and Network of Woodlawn members, it becomes clear that these seemingly unaligned groups actually want the same thing: self-determination for the people of Woodlawn. CBA Coalition members see binding legislation that redistributes resources as the path to self-determination. On the other hand, Network of Woodlawn members see economic investment as the path to self-determination.

At first, it may appear insignificant or random why these organizations have developed such different ideas about what self-determination looks like. However, if we are to trace these pathways to self-determination to their roots, it becomes clear that they are a result of how these organizations conceive of problems within their community. To CBA Coalition organizers, the root of community problems has to do with community members’ lack of power and unequal access to political resources. To Network of Woodlawn organizers, the root of community problems has to do with a lack of economic investment in the community. Both organizations’ solutions naturally follow from their conceptions of the origins of community problems.

Therefore, an intermediate policy recommendation is for the CBA Coalition to reframe the discussions they have with hesitant or disagreeing community groups, including the Network of Woodlawn. Coalition members should recognize what is important to other community groups and appeal to those issues. They should explain how their solution, the CBA ordinance, will help to bring about the solution that other groups envision – including economic investment that benefits community members.

However, it is important to acknowledge that there are inherent challenges that come with merging organizations that rely on different models of organizing. According to Kristina Smock,
one such challenge has to do with the different conceptions of community that drive each organization. She states that “in some cases the logics of different models are incompatible, making integration difficult, if not impossible.” This fact is reinforced by the analysis of Bill Sites, Robert Chaskin, and Virginia Parks, who argue that “it should be recognized and respected that the basic models often espouse disparate principles,… strive toward distinctive ends,… and focus on different strategies,… and that these differences, while not entirely zero-sum, are not fully compatible either.”

Although these potential pitfalls should certainly be considered, there is reason to believe they would not significantly undermine the potential for the Coalition and Network of Woodlawn to successfully work together. For one, the nature of the Coalition is such that it is comprised of many individual organizations who maintain their own individual character and philosophies while working with one another under the umbrella of the Coalition. For example, BYP100, a Coalition organization, centers itself around the needs of queer women of color and espouses a queer feminist philosophy. Although providing a robust classification the model of organizing used by BYP100 is outside the scope of this paper, it would appear that BYP100 leans more towards Smock’s Women-Centered model than the Power-Based model. Therefore, it would not be out of the question for Network of Woodlawn to retain its original character while working with the Coalition and using Power-Based methods.

Further, we must recall that the classification of Network of Woodlawn as a Community-Based organization is based in the actions and words of its leadership, and there is reason to

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279 Smock, Democracy in Action 259.
280 Sites, Chaskin, and Parks, “Reframing Community Practice for the 21st Century” 533.
281 Ashli Giles-Perkins, BYP100 organizer, in conversation with the author on 12/18/2019.
believe that organization’s leadership is disconnected from the general membership.\textsuperscript{282} Given the frustrations expressed by Network of Woodlawn members, the general membership actually may be especially open or willing to join forces with the Coalition. In fact, the concrete actions taken by the Coalition may be especially appealing to Network of Woodlawn members, who have expressed frustration about their organization’s emphasis on discussion and conceptual plans over action.

Although this does not entirely alleviate concerns over incompatible conceptions of community, it does indicate that this solution is more viable than initial concerns would suggest. This is particularly true because the leadership of Network of Woodlawn has prevented their general membership from making their conceptions of community known to the public. Therefore, it is entirely possible that their conceptions of community would indeed be better aligned with Power-Based models. Even if this is not the case, frustrations about a lack of concrete progress within the organization may drive Network of Woodlawn members to be willing to work with those who have different conceptions of community, as BYP100 has, in order to achieve more tangible results.

Once these groups have joined, they should continue to use Power-Based methods to argue for a CBA ordinance. To understand this recommendation, we again turn to the work of Kristina Smock. In \textit{Democracy in Action}, Smock describes the benefits and limitations of her various models of organizing.

The two major benefits of a Power-Based model of organizing are that it “[b]uilds strong organizations” and “[i]mpacts public decision-making.”\textsuperscript{283} Both of these benefits are significant

\textsuperscript{282} See Network of Woodlawn: Community-Building Organizing section.

\textsuperscript{283} Smock, \textit{Democracy in Action} 249-250.
for the success of both these recommendations and for achieving the goal of self-determination. The Power-Based model’s ability to create and maintain a strong organizational structure and membership will be crucial in maintaining momentum, should groups like Network of Woodlawn merge with the Coalition. Further, given that the ultimate goal of the Coalition (and, hypothetically, the Network of Woodlawn, if they are to merge with the Coalition) is to pass City legislation, it is essential that they are able to influence City officials and their decisions.

Moreover, the limitations of the Power-Based model are of less concern for those organizing in response to the OPC. The primary limitations of the Power-Based model are that there is a “[l]ack of genuine deliberation” and that it does not produce “structural change.”\(^\text{284}\) The issue of lack of genuine deliberation refers to the potential for members of the community to have little actual input in the operations of Power-Based organizations.\(^\text{285}\) The issue of lack of structural change refers to the potential for Power-Based organizations to both accept and reinforce existing political structures, rather than seek to overturn them in more revolutionary ways.\(^\text{286}\)

First, regarding the issue of lack of genuine deliberation, there is reason to believe that the Coalition has actually been quite proactive in mitigating this limitation and has in fact taken intentional steps to involve genuine deliberation in their meetings and decision-making. When I spoke to Tadeo Weiner-Davis, a member of the CBA Coalition and a PhD candidate at the University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration (SSA), he told me that at every Coalition meeting, people “weigh in on what they think or how they think we should proceed”

\(^{284}\) Ibid 250.
\(^{285}\) Ibid.
\(^{286}\) Ibid. See Literature Review section for more on models of organizing that do attempt to create this radical change.
and that decisions are truly made collectively.\textsuperscript{287} Moreover, the Coalition often holds community forums and meetings, at which community input is explicitly solicited and genuinely considered. While we cannot necessarily ensure that these behaviors will continue in the future, especially if the ordinance is passed, this does alleviate some of the concerns around the issue of genuine deliberation.

Second, the issue of lack of structural change, while certainly significant, seems to be less of a concern for both the Coalition and the Network of Woodlawn, as well as for their members. In fact, proposals from both the Coalition and the Network of Woodlawn actually rely on existing political, social, and economic structures for success. Moreover, these proposals\textsuperscript{288} are the result of discussion and input from community members, indicating that both the organizational leadership and the general community\textsuperscript{289} are willing to accept this limitation. Therefore, the issue of structural change also appears to have a minor impact on the success of future organizing.

The benefits of the Power-Based model are not significantly outweighed by the limitations of the model in this context, and certainly outweigh the limited benefits of the Community-Building model. The two major benefits of the Community-Building model are that it “[b]uilds the community’s institutional capacity” and that it allows for “[c]omprehensive neighborhood planning” in which interconnected problems are addressed.\textsuperscript{290}

\textsuperscript{287} Tadeo Weiner-Davis, in conversation with the author on 2/26/2020.
\textsuperscript{288} At least those from the Coalition, with which the Network of Woodlawn would, in this proposal, join.
\textsuperscript{289} Given in February 2019, about 88% of Chicago residents voted in favor of the ordinance, and about 92% of residents living in the 5\textsuperscript{th}, 4\textsuperscript{th}, and 20\textsuperscript{th} Wards, which include Hyde Park, Kenwood, and Woodlawn, voted in favor of the ordinance, according to Ashli Giles-Perkins, BYP100 organizer, at the CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In on 11/16/2019.
\textsuperscript{290} Smock, Democracy in Action 250-251.
First, the nature of a Coalition organization should already provide the first benefit, and therefore fully adopting a Community-Building model should have limited additional impact here. The second benefit, however, is a bit more powerful. Although the original CBA did indeed address interconnected problems, the current CBA ordinance only pertains to housing. Despite this, it is also important to consider that housing is, by its nature, an interconnected problem. For example, access to housing makes individuals more able to hold down a job, which allows for the income that provides for things like childcare and education. Thus, although the Community-Building model may be better suited than the Power-Based model to solving interconnected problems, the use of the CBA ordinance nonetheless should make headway on addressing these issues.

Given these considerations, it would be most conducive to the Coalition’s and the Network of Woodlawn’s goals if they were to join together under the Power-Based model of organizing.

The final element of this recommendation is for the joined groups to advocate for a CBA ordinance. This recommendation is grounded in history. As discussed, “the community has learned a lot”291 from decades of interactions with outside developers. A legally-binding solution has the unique ability to hold developers accountable in a way that mere negotiations and collaboration cannot. Further, the CBA ordinance’s comprehensive scope and attention to widespread and baseline issues enable it to create a foundation for further change and positive development, if Woodlawn residents so choose. Importantly, this change and development would occur through self-determination, given the decision-making power afforded through the CBA

ordinance process to Woodlawn residents. Therefore, the CBA ordinance is a strong choice for creating self-determined, lasting progress in Woodlawn.

Additionally, this paper recommends that the University of Chicago and the Obama Foundation endorse the proposals of the CBA Coalition and that the City of Chicago commit to enacting these proposals in a city-wide ordinance. As discussed, the CBA ordinance proposed by the CBA Coalition is a robust and effective means of ensuring community autonomy and protecting against issues of and relating to gentrification and displacement. Further, it has the potential to achieve the diverse goals of the various individuals and organizations in Woodlawn.

More importantly for the institutional stakeholders, however, is the fact that endorsing and enacting these proposals advances the goals and interests of each stakeholder. As discussed, there is a widespread feeling of distrust in Woodlawn of the University of Chicago and the City of Chicago, largely due to the history of development in Woodlawn. Therefore, advocating for and committing to a legally binding agreement would allow these entities to make significant strides in mending this relationship and showing goodwill to the people of Woodlawn.

For the University, this could result in a much more productive relationship with their Woodlawn neighbors. The University recognizes that there is an issue of distrust of UChicago among South Side communities. In fact, in the report given to me by University of Chicago Executive Director of Community Development Alyssa Berman-Cutler, the Community Development working group recommended that the University “[a]ddress issues of distrust between the University of Chicago and the South Side community so that residents and organizations see the University as a place of opportunity and partnership.”

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were to endorse the CBA ordinance, powerful organizations, like STOP or KOCO, may be more inclined to enter into formal partnerships with the University of Chicago Office of Civic Engagement. This could open up an ongoing dialogue and working relationship between these organizations and the University, thus achieving one of the University’s goals.

Although the CBA ordinance would certainly limit the University’s capacity for unconstrained development in Woodlawn, this concern would be far outweighed by the potential for the University to produce positive press and improve their reputation as a result of this improved relationship with Woodlawn. Given the importance of positive press and reputation for universities’ application numbers, yield rates, alumni relations and donations, and of course, rankings, this would seem to be a more than worthwhile trade-off for the University.

Working to enact the Coalition’s proposals would have a similar impact on and appeal to the City of Chicago. As discussed, there is also a historically-rooted tension between Woodlawn community members and the City of Chicago. Enacting the Coalition’s proposals would certainly demonstrate goodwill to Woodlawn residents. Moreover, doing so could begin the process of making amends for City actions that have harmed Woodlawn, like redlining. This would also help to restore trust between Woodlawn community members and the City.

This recommendation would come with some drawbacks for the City in the form of a reduced potential for investment and for high-value, high-tax generating residents and properties on the South Side. However, unlike the University of Chicago, which would trade off economic and development potential for reputation, the City would trade off economic and development potential for the advancement of the public interest. Passing the CBA ordinance would work to make amends for the City’s historical wrongdoings, as well as work to reduce and prevent against poverty, homelessness, and displacement. Given that advancing the public interest is a
substantial government goal, this recommendation would certainly work towards achieving the aims of the City.

Finally, this recommendation would also help the Obama Foundation to achieve their goals. As discussed, the Foundation has frequently emphasized the Obamas’ connection and commitment to the South Side of Chicago. This recommendation would work toward the Foundation’s goal of promoting the self-determination and wellbeing of South Side communities. Although this is certainly appealing in and of itself, it could also generate positive publicity for the Foundation, especially among their future Woodlawn neighbors.

Taken together, the two main recommendations of this paper – for Woodlawn community groups to join forces to advocate for the CBA ordinance using a Power-Based model, and for the institutional stakeholders to support and enact this ordinance – work to advance the interests of all of those who are connected to the Woodlawn community. They take into account the various responses to the OPC and recognize that progress does not come without tradeoffs.

Perhaps most importantly, however, we must recognize that the various responses to the Obama Presidential Center are all deeply rooted in a strong sense of pride within and for the Woodlawn community. Woodlawn residents have shown time and time again that they will organize and advocate for themselves and their fellow community members. They know their community better than anyone else. Maybe they should be the ones determining their own future.
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## Appendix One: Interview and Observation Table

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<td>11/14/2019</td>
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<td>CBA Housing Ordinance Teach-In</td>
<td>Southside Together Organizing for Power (STOP)</td>
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<td>University of Chicago Office of Civic Engagement</td>
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<td>Jawanza Malone</td>
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<td>Devondrick Jeffers</td>
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Appendix Two: Community Benefits Agreement Development Principles

Obama Library South Side Community Benefits Agreement Coalition

DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES

In keeping with the commitment of President Barack Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama to strengthen families, the Obama Library South Side Community Benefits Agreement Coalition (the “Coalition”) celebrates the opportunity of the Obama Presidential Center in concert with the University of Chicago and the City of Chicago (collectively, the “Library”) to bring unprecedented redevelopment benefits to households in the neighborhoods surrounding the site of the future Library.

As critical stakeholders, we are committed to participation that reflects our right to self-determination, equitable development, and a legally binding community benefits agreement. To guarantee these rights the Coalition has cultivated a diverse group of perspectives, skills, and goals to coordinate, collaborate, and engage with the Library, including seasoned community development practitioners and the leadership of low-income and working African American tenants, home and business owners, youth, seniors, and long-time-residents.

We universally agree that the Obama Presidential Center has the power and duty to help restore suffering south side communities in innovative ways, and to begin leveling the playing field historically pitched against African Americans. While we recognize the old ways of redeveloping black communities have not created community wealth, we see exciting potential
to develop differently now. We aim to catalyze measurable and substantial increases in our community wealth and well-being through sustainable, inter-generational land ownership and transfer; increased revenue streams through neighbor-owned businesses and buildings; and revived resources for vibrant lifelong learning.

Collectively the Principles below create the foundation for a comprehensive south side master plan which sustains cultural heritage and prioritizes rewards and incentives to present residents. Achieving these ambitions will require a Community Benefits Agreement which embraces the following Development Principles:

**Employment**

- A majority of jobs should go to residents from the communities surrounding the library.
- Jobs should be set aside for hard-to-employ populations including: people in low income housing, ex offenders, youth, seniors and long-time unemployed.
- Workforce development programs should be set up to meet local hiring requirements.
- All jobs should pay at least a living wage.
- Community should have input in hiring of security and other jobs that impact quality of life.
- There should be quarterly reports which monitor hiring.

**Economic Development**

- Development occurs without ultimately displacing present residents.
• Develop a black business corridor and generally support local small business development.

• Establish a revenue-sharing program with the Library and the black business corridor to support local community and economic development activities.

• Set aside a majority of all contracts with the Library for minority-owned businesses.

Education

• The Library should partner with local schools to enhance school programming, including curriculum, tutoring, and other supports.

• The Library should offer its programming free to Chicago Public School students.

• The Library should establish a relationship with Chicago Public Libraries and other area libraries to share resources.

Housing

• Support the development of a Federation of Community Land Trusts in the surrounding neighborhoods.

• A significant guaranteed set-aside of new housing for low-income housing in the area surrounding the Library.

• Create an emergency rental assistance program.

Transportation

• Improve Metra Electric with input from community stakeholders.

• Restore #1 Bus to its Official Route.
• Facilitate transit-oriented economic development.

Sustainability

• Sustain, increase, upgrade, and maximize green open space for local uses and local users.
• Replace the 21-acre footprint of The Library with at least 21 acres of quality nearby park land, designed for, with, and by neighboring stakeholders, including state-of-the-art replacement sports facilities.
• Establish a Green Infrastructure Master Plan for neighborhoods surrounding the Library.
• Support and engage Sustainable South Side Community Council in developing resilience features applicable to all new development, upgrades, repairs, and future planning.
• Appoint “Sustainable Chicago” representative from City of Chicago to connect and translate its initiatives to applications in the neighborhoods surrounding the Library.

Thank you for the blessed potential of this monumental project. We appreciate your partnership at this historic time.

Signed on September 29, 2016:
Bronzeville Regional Collaborative
Kenwood Oakland Community Organization
Prayer in Action Collective
Southside Together Organizing for Power

Awaiting signatures:
Marty Nesbitt, Obama Presidential Foundation

Rahm Emanuel, City of Chicago

Robert Zimmer, University of Chicago
Appendix Three: CBA Ordinance

CBA HOUSING ORDINANCE

WHEREAS, the City of Chicago (the "City") is a home rule unit of local government under Article VII, Section 6(a) of the 1970 Constitution of the State of Illinois; and

WHEREAS, the City's home-rule authority includes the power to enact ordinances and regulations aimed at preserving safe, decent, and affordable housing in Chicago; and

WHEREAS, the City is experiencing a shortage of affordable housing; and

WHEREAS, the lack of affordable housing is a critical problem, which threatens the economic and social quality of life in the City; and

WHEREAS, the City Council finds that the 2015 Affordable Requirements Ordinance, Section 2-44-080 (formerly 2-45-115) of the Municipal Code, is insufficient to prevent displacement and broad demographic change in neighborhoods facing significant displacement pressure, and that additional measures are necessary to increase production of affordable housing, protect vulnerable residents, and create neighborhoods where residents of all incomes can thrive; and

WHEREAS, the DePaul Institute of Housing Studies has classified the area surrounding the Obama Presidential Center (the “OPC”) as vulnerable to displacement due to a high share of rent-burdened families and increasing property and rental costs; and

WHEREAS, since the announcement of OPC, the property values and sales amounts in the immediately surrounding area of the OPC have increased at among the highest rate in the country; and

WHEREAS, in 2017, Redfin reported that since the announcement of OPC, the area around the OPC had the third-highest increase in estimated home values compared to that of its metro area in the country; and

WHEREAS, when approving the lease and master use agreement for the OPC, the City recognized the significant potential for “demographic change and displacement arising from large-scale public and private investment in urban neighborhoods and is committed to closely monitoring property values and other indicators of neighborhood change and implementing measures to preserve economic diversity, home ownership and affordability for long-time residents in the communities surrounding the OPC”; and

WHEREAS, housing stability and neighborhood stability is vitally important for an economically and healthy City; and

WHEREAS, the DePaul Institute for Housing Studies has shown that catalytic investments such as the 606 Trail in Logan Square and Humboldt Park have shown extreme elimination of affordable housing units in those neighborhoods; and
WHEREAS, development alone is not sufficient to reinvest in the people of a community, and appropriate policies and solutions need to be crafted to ensure that investment into a historically disinvested community flows to the people that currently reside there, and not just the built environment and future residents; and

WHEREAS, the Obama CBA Area contains a significant number of vacant city owned lots, which can be intentionally utilized to build community wealth, support resident homeownership, and prevent displacement; and

WHEREAS, the voters in the area surrounding the OPC overwhelmingly approved a referendum that the local aldermen should approve “Obama CBA Ordinance” that would create a 30% set aside for affordable housing, create a community trust fund for affordable housing and economic development, and provide property tax relief to long-time low, moderate and middle income residents; and

WHEREAS, it is necessary, desirable, and in the public interest to protect the existing affordable housing stock, build community wealth, to minimize the displacement of long-time residents and to avoid the wholesale gentrification of the OPC Residential Area; and

WHEREAS, the passage of this reform ordinance is calculated to maintain and preserve existing affordable housing units and create new affordable housing units in the OPC Residential Area; and

WHEREAS, this Obama CBA Ordinance is intended to promote equitable neighborhood development, increase housing choice for residents of all income levels, minimize displacement of long-term residents in the Obama CBA Residential Area, and address disparities in social and economic outcomes for the residents of Chicago; and

WHEREAS, significant investment is needed from public and private sources into the preservation and creation of affordable housing, supporting local employment training, establishing a pipeline from schools to employers, and building and retaining community wealth with the long-time residents; and

WHEREAS, the Trust will be capitalized by a combination of moneys appropriated by the City Council of the City and capital provided by a range of third parties; and

WHEREAS, repayment of any moneys provided by the Trust to finance or support any project will not be a general obligation of the City and will not be secured by the City's full faith and credit; and

WHEREAS, it is in the best interest of the City of Chicago to establish a professionally managed and governed trust fund (the “Trust”) to manage public and private investments with community oversite into the OPC Residential Area to invest in the residents of the area in addition to investments into the building and the land; and

WHEREAS, the increase in property values may result in increased incentive for building owners to sell their buildings, and leave tenants vulnerable to displacement; and
WHEREAS, ensuring that renters are not displaced due to rising property values and the incentive to sell; and

WHEREAS, creating more incentives for non-profit affordable housing developers to obtain and keep affordable housing units is in the best interest of the City;

WHEREAS, creating opportunities for tenants to purchase the buildings they live in is a possible method of preventing displacement; now, therefore,

Be it ordained by the City Council of the City of Chicago

SECTION 1. The foregoing recitals are hereby adopted as the findings of the City Council.

SECTION 2. Chapter 2-44 of the Municipal Code of Chicago is hereby amended by adding a new Section 2-44-135, as follows:

2-44-135 Obama CBA Residential Area Affordable Housing Pilot Ordinance.

(A) Title. This section shall be known and cited as the "Obama CBA Residential Area Affordable Housing Pilot Ordinance."

(B) Purpose. The purpose of this section is to establish modified affordable housing requirements for designated neighborhoods near the proposed Obama Presidential Center that are at risk of displacement. The goals of these modified requirements are to mitigate the displacement impacts associated with increased development in a historically disinvested community of color, better protect the interests of the area's economically vulnerable residents from demographic and housing market change and preserve the economic diversity critical to a healthy economy.

(C) Relationship to 2015 ARO. The requirements in this section supplement or modify the affordable housing requirements in Sec. 2-44-080. In the event of a conflict between these requirements and the requirements in Sec. 2-44-080, the requirements in this section will control.

(D) Definitions. Except as provided below, defined terms shall have the meanings given in Sec. 2-44-080.

“Affordable” means a sales price or rent less than or equal to the amount at which total monthly housing costs, as specified in the rules and regulations, would total not more than thirty percent (30%) of household income for a household whose income is the maximum allowable for an eligible household.

“Affordable housing” means (1) with respect to rental housing, housing that is affordable to households earning up to fifty percent (50%) of the area median income, and (2) with respect to owner-occupied housing, housing that is affordable to households earning up to eighty percent (80%) of the area median income.
"Affordable unit" means a housing unit required by this section to be affordable or deeply affordable, whether located on-site or off-site and whether a rental unit or an owner-occupied unit.

“Affordable housing agreement” means a covenant, lien, regulatory agreement, promissory note, mortgage, deed restriction, right of first refusal, option to purchase or similar instrument, governing how the developer and subsequent owners or occupants of affordable units shall comply with this section.

"Demolition" means any action resulting in the complete or partial, interior or exterior, destruction of a building, structure, or portion thereof, or the combination of two or more housing units to make a larger unit, or any action that results in a reduction in the number of housing units on a covered property.

“Deeply affordable housing” means (1) with respect to rental housing, housing that is affordable to households earning up to thirty percent (30%) of the area median income, and (2) with respect to owner-occupied housing, housing that is affordable to households earning up to eighty percent (80%) of the area median income.

“Owner-Occupied” means any building with six (6) residential units or less where the owner occupies the unit as the owner’s primary residence and has for at least the year prior to any rezoning, substantial rehabilitation, demolition, or other action which would subject a residential housing project to requirements of this Section.

“Qualifying Locally Controlled Community Land Trust” means a community land trust, whether privately or publicly operated, where the majority of its Board of Directors or the applicable decision-making body determining affordability for properties in the Obama CBA Residential Area is composed of residents of the Obama CBA Residential Area or residents of properties in the community land trust and which limits the sale of its properties to households earning up to 80% AMI.

“Residential housing project” means one or more buildings that collectively contain one or more new or additional housing units on one or more parcels or lots under common ownership or control, including contiguous parcels. A “residential housing project” may be developed in one or more phases and may consist of new construction, substantial rehabilitation, or the conversion of rental housing to condominiums. In determining whether a development constitutes a residential housing project, the Department will consider all relevant factors, including whether the development is marketed as a single or unified project, shares common elements, or is a phase of a larger development. The definition of “residential housing project” shall be interpreted broadly to achieve the purposes of this section and to prevent evasion of its terms.

(E) **Boundaries.** This Section shall apply to the Obama CBA Residential Area. A map of the Obama CBA Residential Area is on file in the Office of the City Clerk and made a part hereof. The boundary lines of the Area follow streets, and such boundary lines are to be construed as the center lines of said streets.
(F) Modified ARO Requirements. The requirements of Section 2-44-080 shall apply to the Obama CBA Residential Area, except as modified below:

1. No in lieu fee option. The option to pay a fee in lieu of the establishment of affordable units is eliminated in the Obama CBA Residential Area.

2. Required Percentage of Affordable Units. Except as provided in subsection (F)(5) below, the percentage of units required to be affordable in a residential housing project in the Obama CBA Residential Area, whether rental or for-sale, is increased from 10 percent to 30 percent.

3. Increased Applicability. The Obama CBA Residential Area Pilot Ordinance shall apply:

   (i) Rezoning. Whenever the City approves the rezoning of property, and such property is subsequently developed with a residential housing project which creates three (3) or more new units.

   (ii) City Land. Whenever the City sells real property to any developer and such property or any portion thereof is (a) subsequently developed with a residential housing project, or (b) incorporated into a residential housing project site in order to satisfy minimum off-street parking, minimum lot area, setback or other zoning or Municipal Code requirements or standards.

   (iii) Demolitions. Whenever a residential housing project undergoes a demolition. The number of affordable units required in the case of a demolition will be determined based on the higher number of either the number of total housing units prior to the demolition or the number of total housing units in any resulting residential housing project. This subsection (F)(3)(iii) shall only apply where the residential housing project that is demolished is three (3) or more units or where the subsequent residential housing project that is built is three (3) or more units.

   (iv) City Financial Aid. Whenever the City provides financial assistance to any developer in connection with the development of a residential housing project of three (3) or more units.

   (v) Substantial Rehabs. Whenever the City approves a building permit for a substantial rehabilitation of any residential property with six (6) or more units. This requirement does not apply to building permits issued for (a) repairs that merely bring a building into compliance with applicable building codes or (b) construction that is undertaken for the sole purpose of increasing the accessibility of the building for people with disabilities or seniors.
(4) **Affordability standards and Income eligibility criteria for City Land Sales.**

Whenever the City sells or otherwise transfers real property to any developer and such property or any portion thereof is (a) subsequently developed with a residential housing of any size, or (b) incorporated into a residential housing of any size in order to satisfy minimum off-street parking, minimum lot area, setback or other zoning or Municipal Code requirements or standards, the developer shall be required to establish no less than one hundred percent (100%) of the housing units in the residential housing project as affordable housing except in the instances specified in subsection (F)(5).

(5) **Specific City Land Uses.**

(i) The requirements of this Section will not apply to the following instances:

a. Sales or transfers of city owned land made through the program “City Lots for Working Families.”

b. Residents of the Obama CBA Area who purchase or otherwise receive city owned land for the purpose of developing a residential unit which will be used as that resident’s primary residence

(ii) The following instances require 30 percent of units, whether rental or sale, to be affordable;

a. Any sales or transfers of city owned land to the Chicago Housing Authority

b. Any sales or transfers of city owned land where any subsequent development into residential housing of any size are developed in partnership with the Chicago Housing Authority

c. Any sales or transfers of city owned land to current residents of the Obama CBA area that are subsequently developed into residential housing of any size (including single family home developments)

d. Any sales or transfers of city owned land to a group or association of individuals where the majority are residents of the Obama CBA Area or a non-profit entity controlled by residents of the Obama CBA Area, such as Community Land Trusts or a community land bank

(6) **Affordability standards and Income eligibility criteria for rental units:**

(i) **For rental units that do not receive city financial aid.** Affordable rental units in the Obama CBA Residential Area for which must be affordable to households earning up to fifty percent (50%) of the area median income. Additionally, thirty-three percent (33%) of all affordable rental units in the Obama CBA Residential Area must be deeply affordable units.
(ii) **For rental units that receive city financial aid.** Affordable rental units in the Obama CBA Residential Area must be affordable to households earning up to fifty percent (50%) of the area median income. Additionally, sixty-six percent (66%) of all affordable rental units in the Obama CBA Residential Area must be deeply affordable units.

(7) **Affordability standards and Income eligibility criteria for sales units.** Affordable sales units in the Obama CBA Residential Area must be affordable to households earning up to eighty percent (80%) of the area median income.

(8) **Requirements for Larger Bedroom Rental Units.** For all residential housing projects subject to this Section that are required to create a total of ten or more affordable rental units, at least fifty percent (50%) of the required affordable units and deeply affordable units must be units containing two or more bedrooms (“multi-bedroom units”). Of such required multi-bedroom units, forty (40%) of those required multi-bedroom units must be units containing three or more bedrooms.

(9) **Location Requirements.** Except for sales units that satisfy the requirements of this Section under subsection (F)(10), all of the required affordable units must be built on-site.

(10) **Community Land Trust Option.** A developer of sales units may satisfy the affordable units requirements by placing any number of sales units within the Obama CBA Residential Area with a qualifying locally controlled community land trust or the Chicago Community Land Trust. Any initial sale amount to a locally controlled community land trust or the Chicago Community Land Trust of such affordable housing unit shall be subject to the income eligibility and price restrictions set forth in this Section.

(11) **Community Engagement Requirements.** All residential housing projects subject to the requirements of this Section shall be required to conduct at least two community meetings within half a mile of the site of the project. At such meetings, the developer will present plans to community members for comment. The Chief Engagement Officer may develop further rules and specifications regarding conducting these meetings.

(G) **Exempt Buildings.** This section shall not apply to any owner-occupied buildings of six units or less.

(H) **Reporting.** All affordable units created under this section shall be reported to the Department of Housing and the Commissioner, as directed by the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall create and maintain a list of affordable units created under this section and shall require the owner of those affordable units to report yearly that the units are being occupied by residents meeting the requirements of this Section, the total rent charged, any periods of vacancy, and other information the Commissioner deems relevant.
(I) **Displacement Studies.** The Department of Housing, in coordination with the Chief Engagement Officer, will create a standing committee (the “taskforce”) on housing conditions and displacement in the Obama CBA Residential Area.

(1) **Goals.** The goal of the taskforce is to study housing conditions and displacement through a racial equity lens.

(2) **Activities.** The taskforce will:

   (i) Conduct ongoing monitoring on the effects of the Obama Presidential Center on housing conditions in the Obama CBA Residential Area, specifically focusing on displacement of low, moderate, and middle income residents.

   (ii) Provide recommendations that prevent displacement, build community wealth through homeownership, retain and create affordable housing, and reduce tax burdens for low, moderate, and middle income residents.

   (iii) In coordination with the City’s Chief Engagement Officer, the taskforce will regularly present findings and engage the community for feedback at accessible locations. These shall happen at least quarterly, beginning no later than January 30, 2020.

(3) **Composition.** The Commissioner will determine the members of the taskforce, which will include at least two residents of the Obama CBA Residential Area who are renters, one person with expertise on housing conditions, one person with direct community experience advocating for affordable housing, a representative from a non-profit developer, and other individuals as determined by the Commissioner.

(J) **Pending Applications.** This section shall apply to all residential housing projects subject to the affordable housing requirements herein, unless: (1) an ordinance authorizing a city land sale or financial assistance, as described in Sec. 2-44-080(C), has been introduced to city council prior to November 1, 2019; or (2) an ordinance authorizing a rezoning of property, as described in Sec. 2-44-080(C), has been introduced to city council and (i) in the case of projects that are subject to planned development review, the Chicago Plan Commission has adopted a resolution recommending approval of the planned development prior to November 1, 2019, or (ii) in the case of any other rezoning of property, the Committee on Zoning, Landmarks and Buildings Standards has voted to approve the rezoning prior to November 1, 2019.

(K) **Rules.** The commissioner is authorized to adopt such rules as the commissioner may deem necessary for the proper implementation, administration and enforcement of this section. The commissioner shall provide an annual report to the City Council Committee on Housing and Real Estate detailing the outcomes of the pilot program.

(L) **Expiration.** This section shall expire and be repealed of its own accord, without further action by the City Council, on December 31, 2029.
SECTION 3. The Obama CBA Community Trust Fund

(A) Organization and Qualification of the Obama CBA Community Trust Fund.

The Chief Financial Officer of the City, the City Comptroller of the City and the Corporation Counsel of the City are each authorized and directed to take such steps as may be necessary to enable the Trust to become duly organized and qualified as an Illinois not-for-profit organization. (If, at any time, no person is appointed to serve in the position of Chief Financial Officer, then, for all purposes of this Ordinance, the term "Chief Financial Officer" shall mean the City Comptroller.)

(B) Board of Directors

(1) The Board of Directors of the Trust shall consist of eleven (11) voting members ("Voting Members"). Eight of the Voting Members shall be elected residents of the Obama CBA Residential Area (the "Elected Members") and three of the Voting Members shall be appointed by the Aldermen from the Obama CBA Residential Area (the “Appointed Members”).

(2) The Elected Members will be voted on by the residents who are eighteen (18) years of age and older of the Obama CBA Residential Area. Of the Elected Members, one (1) of the Elected Members shall be a member with a disability, three (3) of the Elected Members shall be renters, two (2) of the Elected Members shall be renters with a rental subsidy, two (2) of the Elected Members shall be homeowners, one (1) of the Elected Members shall be under the age of 25, and one of the Elected Members shall be a small business owner.

(3) The Appointed Members shall be appointed by the Aldermen from the Obama CBA Residential Area. One (1) of the Appointed Members shall be a representative of the University of Chicago, one (1) of the Appointed Members shall be a representative of the Obama Foundation, and one (1) of the Appointed Members shall be a representative of the Obama Community Benefits Agreement Coalition.

(4) Each Voting Member (a) will serve for a term of two years. Each Voting Member will serve until his or her successor is duly qualified and elected or appointed. Any appointment or election of Voting Members subsequent to the appointment of the initial Voting Members shall occur within one year of any vacancy created. Voting Members appointed pursuant to sub-section (3) will be subject to removal for cause by the City Council.

(5) Any Voting Member who has a financial interest in any entity that is being considered by the Trust to perform work for the Trust or for the City, to receive funds from the Trust or from the City, or to provide funds to or otherwise make an investment in the Trust, shall recuse himself or herself from any vote of the Board.
of Directors regarding said entity. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "financial interest" shall be defined as provided in Chapter 2-156, as amended from time to time of the Municipal Code of Chicago, (the "Municipal Code"). Pursuant to this paragraph, all Voting Members owe the Trust a fiduciary duty, and accordingly are strictly prohibited from making decisions or recommendations on behalf of the Trust for personal financial gain.

(6) The Chair of the Board of Directors of the Trust will be selected by the Voting Members. Other officers of the Board of Directors will be selected by the Voting Members. The Chair and other officers will serve one-year terms.

(7) The Board of Directors of the Trust will not receive a salary and will be compensated only for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses in accordance with procedures approved by the Board.

(C) Staffing and Personnel; Professional Services

(1) Subject to the availability of funds duly appropriated, it is hereby directed that for the period from the effective date of this Ordinance and ending on May 31, 2020, an amount not to exceed $200,000 may be transferred to the Trust for professional services and otherwise to assist the Trust in accomplishing its purposes and objectives as described in this Ordinance.

(2) For the period through May 31, 2020, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer and the Department of Finance are each authorized to provide such staff support to the Trust as may be required to accomplish their respective purposes and mission, including, without limitation, operations and administration of the Trust prior to hiring of an Executive Director and/or other, staff.

(3) The Chief Financial Officer and the City Comptroller (each an "Authorized Officer") are each authorized to negotiate: (i) grant agreement(s) with the Trust that set forth the terms and conditions pursuant to which funding authorized by sub-section (a) will be provided to the Trust; and (ii) agreement(s) with the Trust that set forth the terms and conditions pursuant to which staff support authorized by sub-section (b) will be provided to the Trust.

(D) Grant of Funds

(1) Subject to the availability of funds duly appropriated, it is hereby directed that an amount not to exceed $2,500,000 be transferred to the Trust in one or more grants to support projects to be financed and supported by the Trust in furtherance of the purposes and objectives as described in this Ordinance. The Authorized Officers are each authorized to negotiate agreement(s) with the Trust that set forth the terms and conditions of any such grant(s).

(E) Revenue

[RESERVED]
(F) **Goal of the Trust; Spending of the Trust Funds**

(1) The Trust is organized with the specific goals of:

   (i) Creating and preserving affordable housing for households earning less than 50% of the Area Median Income;

   (ii) Supporting homeownership for households earning less than 80% of the Area Median Income and households earning between 80% and 120% of the Area Median Income;

   (iii) Supporting employment access for local residents, emphasizing those with barriers to employment;

   (iv) Supporting and creating small business opportunities for local residents;

   (v) Engaging with the community for input on local decision-making;

   (vi) Preventing the displacement of low, moderate, and middle income residents in the area surrounding the Obama Presidential Center

(2) The Trust shall focus on the geographic area of the Obama CBA Residential Area. A map of the Obama CBA Residential Area is on file in the Office of the City Clerk and made a part hereof. The boundary lines of the Area follow streets, and such boundary lines are to be construed as the center lines of said streets

(3) The Trust’s Board of Directors shall determine how funds are distributed from the Trust in pursuance of the purposes and objectives of this ordinance. The Trust may authorize expenditures consistent with the purposes and objectives of this Ordinance and consistent with the specific goals identified in Subsection (a), limited to the following categories of expenditures within the Obama CBA Residential Area:

   (i) Subsidizing low- and moderate-income residents’ rents;

   (ii) Pay for low, moderate, and middle income long-time (ten years or more) residents’ property tax increases;

   (iii) Provide loans, funds, or grants for low, moderate, and middle income residents with barriers to traditional financing in order to promote homeownership;

   (iv) Grants for home repairs for long-time (ten years or more) residents with barriers to accessing private financing;

   (v) Funding affordable housing projects;

   (vi) Providing loans and grants for developers to preserve and/or expand affordable housing;
(vii) Providing loans, grants, and other finances to small businesses;

(viii) Providing local economic development grants;

(ix) Funding workforce development initiatives;

(x) Establishing or funding business development centers for career building and building pipeline to good jobs;

(xi) Establishing or funding existing jobs center(s) for job training, placement, and referral.

(4) Any project over $500,000 in total cost shall require the approval of City Council.

(G) **Conditions to Receipt of City Grants**

As a condition to the execution and delivery of any grant agreement(s) authorized this Ordinance, such agreements will provide for the following, all determined or established to the reasonable satisfaction of the applicable Authorized Officer:

1. The Trust will, consistent with the purposes and objectives as described in this Ordinance, establish criteria for all investments, grants, and other moneys received by the Trust from third parties. It will develop financing structures, grant requirements, and lending requirements for all projects undertaken by the Trust.

2. The Trust shall have no power to pledge the full faith and credit of the City nor shall any obligation issued by the Trust (or any entity sponsored by the Trust) in connection with any project be a general obligation of the City.

3. The Trust will require full disclosure from investors, grantors, and lenders on all projects and will require completion of disclosure statements that will be substantially similar to the economic disclosure statements required of third parties for transactions with the City. The Trust will make each such disclosure statements available online for public review.

4. The Trust will be responsible for overseeing preparation and auditing of its financial statements, including full compliance with applicable Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.

5. The Trust will provide public notice of its meetings and conduct its meetings in accordance with the Illinois Open Meetings Act, 5 ILCS 120/1 et seq., as now enacted or as hereafter amended. The Trust will post and maintain online, for public review, the minutes of its meetings.

6. The Trust will provide public access to books, records, minutes and documents, in accordance with the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, 5 ILCS 140/1 et seq., as now enacted or as hereafter amended (“FOIA”).

7. The Trust will cooperate with the City with respect to compliance with the requirements of FOIA concerning any public documents or records that are in the
possession of the Trust but are nonetheless subject to the City's obligation to provide public access under FOIA.

(8) Commencing in 2020 and for each year thereafter, the Trust shall, on or about April 1 of each such year, prepare quarterly reports for public review detailing the activities and accomplishments of the Trust for the prior year, including, without limitation, investments, grants, and other monies received by the Trust; projects supported by the Trust; articles of incorporation, by-laws and rules and regulations adopted or amended by the Trust; and the Trust's quarterly financial statements. A copy of each quarterly report shall be presented to the Mayor and the City Council.

(9) The Trust will comply with all applicable City procurement rules and requirements, including, without limitation, Article IV (Minority-Owned and Women-Owned Business Enterprise Procurement Program) and Article VI (M.B.E./W.B.E. Construction Program) of Chapter 2-92, as amended, of the Municipal Code.

(H) Power and Authority of City Council

The prior approval of the City Council shall be required for any transaction to be undertaken by the Trust that seeks to utilize present or anticipated funds, revenues, assets or properties of the City. Nothing in this Section supersedes, limits or otherwise affects the power and authority of the City Council with regard to any projects or financing transactions involving the Trust.

SECTION 4. Commercial Linkage Fee for the Obama CBA Residential Area

The Department of Planning and Development shall engage an independent consulting entity to conduct a study (the “Nexus Study”) on the potential use of a Commercial Linkage Fee in the Obama CBA Residential Area to mitigate the potential for displacement of low, moderate, and middle income residents caused by increased housing, commercial, and other development in the area.

The Nexus Study shall study the appropriateness and scope of instituting a Commercial Linkage Fee that applies to large businesses, large nonprofits, and large developments which build or develop commercial projects in the Obama CBA Residential Area. The fee would not be intended to apply to small businesses, small nonprofits, or small developments. This fee would be intended to directly mitigate the effects of increased commercial activity, particularly larger developments, that might contribute to rising cost of living and displacement. Further, the fee would be intended to fund affordable housing, homeownership, and supporting local jobs for residents.

The Nexus Study shall be conducted by one or more non-profit organizations or academic institutions with significant expertise in urban development and housing with a specific understanding of Chicago neighborhoods.
The Nexus Study shall determine what, if any, Commercial Linkage Fee is appropriate for the Obama CBA Residential Area to prevent displacement of low, moderate, and middle income residents and to ensure that the current and long-time residents of the area are able to benefit from the new developments through housing security and economic engagement.

SECTION 4. Section 2-44 of the Municipal Code of Chicago is hereby amended by adding a new Section 2-44-140, as follows.

Section 2-44-140

The Community Opportunity to Purchase Act in the Obama CBA Residential Area

(A) Title and Purpose. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Community Opportunity to Purchase Act in the Obama CBA Residential Area” and shall be liberally construed and applied to achieve its purpose, which is to preserve, maintain, and create affordable rental and owner-occupied housing for low, moderate, and middle income households in the area of the Obama CBA Residential Area. This Section shall apply to the Obama CBA Residential Area. A map of the Obama CBA Residential Area is on file in the Office of the City Clerk and made a part hereof. The boundary lines of the Area follow streets, and such boundary lines are to be construed as the center lines of said streets.

(B) Definitions.

“Affordable housing” means housing where the residents pay no more than 30 percent of their adjusted gross monthly household income in rent.

“Area Median Income” means the Unadjusted Area Median Income published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for the geographic area that includes the City.

“City” means the City of Chicago.

“Commissioner” means the commissioner of the Department of Housing.

“Department” means the Department of Housing, or any successor agency, department, or office.

“Fee Interest” means ownership of real property in fee simple.

“Multi-Family Residential Building,” or “Building,” means any privately-owned real property in the Obama CBA Residential Area improved with three or more residential rental units (whether or not the property also includes non-residential uses).

“Purchaser” means the individual, individuals, entity, or entities engaged, or seeking to engage, in the Purchase of a Multi-Family Residential Building.

“Selling or otherwise transferring ownership” means transferring the current owner's interest in a Multi-Family Residential Building to any person, other than a member of the owner's family, by any means, including changing the title or changing the beneficiary of a trust. This definition
does not include any internal transfer of control between current officers, members, or managers of corporations, partnerships, or other business entities. Nor does this term apply to any transfer of a Building to a tenant, group of tenants, or association of tenants that are currently living in the building. Nor does this term apply to any transfer of an interest in real property subject to the requirements of Section 2-44-120 (the Affordable Housing Preservation Ordinance).

“Qualified Purchaser” is defined in subsection (D).

(C) **Preservation Fees**

Any preservation fee remitted pursuant to this Section shall be calculated by the Commissioner of Housing. The formula for determining such fees may be adjusted annually based upon the United States Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers for the Chicago metropolitan area, or, if this index no longer exists, some other comparable index, selected by the Commissioner of Housing in his or her reasonable discretion.

(D) **Qualified Purchasers List**

The Commissioner shall maintain a list of qualified purchasers of nonprofit organizations, for-profit companies, Community Land Trusts, and Land Banks that have demonstrated a commitment to the provision of affordable housing for low, moderate, and middle income city residents, and to preventing the displacement of such residents. The Commissioner will establish a process for certifying, on an annual basis, the list of Qualified Purchasers. The Commissioner shall promptly investigate any organization which displays a failure of upkeep in buildings, a pattern of unjust evictions, or significant complaints from tenants and remove such organizations from the list of Qualified Purchasers.

(E) **Sales and Transfers of Multi-Family Residential Buildings**

(1) **First Right to Offer Conferred.** Prior to selling or otherwise transferring ownership in any Building, the owner shall:

(i) provide to the Department of Housing by first class mail, and to the residents of the Building by first class mail, at least 180 days’ notice of a proposed sale or transfer of the property, which the Commissioner shall share with the Qualified Purchasers;

(ii) allow 180 days following the date of notice for a buyer, whether a Qualified Purchaser or not, intending to maintain affordable housing at the location, including, but not limited to, current residents and their representatives, to tender an offer which includes a commitment to maintain a minimum of 30% of the units as affordable rental units for households earning up to 60% of the AMI; and

(iii) upon receiving such offer, engage in good-faith negotiations, during the remaining portion of the 180-day period, as well as any extension of time beyond that 180-day period agreed to by the owner and the offering party, toward a purchase and sale agreement with the offering party;
(2) **Exclusive Negotiation Period.** During the 180 day period required by subsection (E)(1), the owner shall not list the building for sale publicly, solicit offers that do not include a commitment to maintain affordable housing, or negotiate any offers which do not include a commitment to affordable housing.

(3) **Expiration of Exclusive Negotiation Period.** If no such offer is received during the exclusive period, the owner may solicit other offers.

(4) **Alternative to Compliance.** As an alternative to complying with Subsection (E)(1), the Owner may instead:

   (i) sell the building to a tenant of the building, group of tenants of the building, or tenants association of the tenants of the building; or

   (ii) remit to the City before selling or otherwise transferring ownership in a multi-family residential building, an affordable housing preservation fee in the amount of the number of units at the property times $20,000 (as adjusted pursuant to subsection (C)).

(5) **Confidential Information Protected.** Any information obtained from a Seller by a Qualified Purchaser under this Section—including, but not limited to, disclosures made under subsection (G), and terms and conditions of an offer of Sale made under subsection (F)—shall be kept confidential to the maximum extent permitted by law, except that a Qualified Purchaser may, if otherwise permitted by law, share such information with other Qualified Purchasers to facilitate Qualified Purchaser’s exercise of the rights conferred by this Section. Nothing in this Section permits or requires the disclosure of information where such disclosure is otherwise prohibited by law.

(6) **Preexisting Rights Unaffected.** This Section shall not be construed to impair any contract, or affect any property interest held by anyone other than the Seller of a Multi-Family Residential Building (including, but not limited to, any interest held under a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security interest; any option to purchase; or any right of first offer or right of first refusal), in existence before the effective date of this Section.

(F) **Incentive; Real Estate Property Tax Exemption**

Sales made pursuant to subsections (E)(1) and (E)(4)(i) shall be exempt from tax imposed by Chapter 3-33 of the municipal code (the Real Property Transfer Tax).

(G) **Existing Tenant Protections upon Sale to Tenants**

Following the Sale of a Multi-Family Residential Building to a tenant of the building, group of tenants of the building, or a tenants association of the tenants in the building, each existing residential tenant who is not a purchaser or member of the purchasing tenants association in the Building shall be permitted to retain that tenant’s existing leasehold interest according to the terms (including, but not limited to, duration) of that tenant’s existing lease. Existing tenants that
of resided in the Building for more than a year shall each have an automatic right to extend an existing lease under substantially similar terms by a period of one-year after the expiration of the tenant’s current lease.

(H) Enforcement.

Any resident of a building subject to the requirements of this Section who is injured by a violation of this Section may institute injunctive, mandamus, or other appropriate legal action seeking enforcement. A resident who institutes a legal action pursuant to this Section and is adjudged to be a prevailing party may be awarded attorney's fees and court costs.

If the City initiates or joins any enforcement action against an owner who violates or resists enforcement of subsection (E), the owner shall be fined not less than $200.00 nor more than $500.00 for each offense upon which a finding of liability is entered. Each day a violation continues shall constitute a separate offense.

If the owner of a multi-family building sells or otherwise transfers the property before remitting to the City a preservation fee required under this Section, the owner and purchaser shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of such fee.

(I) Rules. The Department shall have the power to interpret and implement this Section. The Department shall, within 90 days of the effective date of this Section, promulgate appropriate rules or regulations interpreting and implementing this Section, including the establishment of procedures to implement this Section, in a manner that the Department deems most appropriate. The Department may thereafter revise those rules or regulations from time to time.

Section 5. Chapter 3-33 of the Municipal Code is hereby amended by deleting the stricken text and adding the underscored text as follow:

CHICAGO REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER TAX
3-33-060 Exemption Transfers

Subject to the requirement contained in subsection 3-33-070(C) of this chapter, the following transfers are exempt from the tax or the specified portion of the tax imposed by this chapter:

(A) Transfers of real property made prior to January 1, 1974 where the deed was recorded after that date, or assignments of beneficial interest in real property dated prior to July 19, 1985 where the assignment was delivered on or after July 19, 1985;

(B) Transfers involving real property acquired by or from any governmental body, or acquired by with respect to the City portion, or acquired from with respect to the C.T.A. portion, any corporation, society, association, foundation or institution organized and operated exclusively for charitable, religious or educational purposes or acquired by any international organization not subject to local taxes under applicable law;
(C) Transfers in which the deed, assignment or other instrument of transfer secures debt or other obligations; provided, however, that any transfer must be to a mortgagee or secured creditor;

(D) Transfers in which the deed, assignment or other instrument of transfer, without additional consideration, confirms, corrects, modifies, or supplements a deed, assignment or other instrument of transfer previously recorded or delivered;

(E) Transfers in which the transfer price is less than $500.00;

(F) Transfers in which the deed is a tax deed;

(G) Transfers in which the deed, assignment or other instrument of transfer releases property which secures debt or other obligations;

(H) Transfers in which the deed is a deed of partition; provided, however, that if a party receives a share greater than its undivided interest in the real property, then such party shall be liable for tax computed upon any consideration paid for the excess;

(I) Transfers between a subsidiary corporation and its parent or between subsidiary corporations of a common parent either pursuant to a plan of merger or consolidation or pursuant to an agreement providing for the sale of substantially all of the seller's assets;

(J) Transfers from a subsidiary corporation to its parent for no consideration other than the cancellation or surrender of the subsidiary's stock and transfers from a parent corporation to its subsidiary for no consideration other than the issuance or delivery to the parent of the subsidiary's stock;

(K) Transfers made pursuant to a confirmed plan of reorganization as provided under Section 1146(c) of Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code of 1978, as amended;

(L) Transfers of title to, or beneficial interest in, real property used primarily for commercial or industrial purposes located in an enterprise zone, as defined in Chapter 16-12 of this Code;

(M) Transfers in which the deed or other instrument of transfer is issued to the mortgagee or secured creditor pursuant to a mortgage or security interest foreclosure proceeding or sale or pursuant to a transfer in lieu of foreclosure; and

(N) Transfers in which the transferee is a participant in the Illinois Home Ownership Made Easy Program (H.O.M.E.), authorized under the Illinois Home Ownership Made Easy Act, 310 ILCS 55/1.

(O) Transfers in which the transferee is a person 65 years of age or older who demonstrates, by proof acceptable to the Chicago Tax Assistance Center, (1) that he will occupy the property as his principal dwelling place for at least one year following the transfer, and (2) that the transfer price is $250,000.00 or less; provided, that this exemption applies only to the C.T.A. portion of the tax; and provided further, that this exemption shall be
administered in the form of a refund for which the transferee desiring the refund shall apply to the Chicago Tax Assistance Center within three years following the transfer.

(P) Transfers made pursuant Sections 2-44-140(E)(1) or 2-44-140(E)(4)(i) of the Community Opportunity to Purchase Act in the Obama CBA Residential Area Act.

SECTION 6. To the extent that any ordinance, resolution, rule, order or provision of the Municipal Code of Chicago, or any portion thereof, is in conflict with any provision of this ordinance, the provisions of this ordinance shall control. The provisions of this ordinance are declared to be separate and severable. The invalidity of any provision of this ordinance, or the invalidity of the application thereof to any person or circumstance, shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this ordinance, or the validity of its application to other persons or circumstances.

SECTION 7. This ordinance shall take effect thirty days after its passage and approval.

Attachments: Exhibit A - Depiction of Obama CBA Residential Area

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Rutkeyl04
Exhibit A
Depiction of the Obama CBA Residential Area

(Attached)