

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE SHIBANID QUESTION:

REASSESSING 16<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY EURASIAN HISTORY IN POST-SOVIET UZBEKISTAN

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF NEAR EASTERN LANGUAGES AND CIVILIZATIONS

BY

AUGUST NABE SAMIE

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

AUGUST 2020

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## Acknowledgments

When I began graduate school in 2011, to my surprise, some faculty members in the Center for Middle Eastern Studies suggested I register for Uzbek as my primary language. Not Arabic. Not Turkish. But Uzbek! The only reference point I had for Uzbekistan at that time was a crude line from the 2006 film, *Borat*, where the Uzbeks and their nation were cursed as the enemy of the Kazakhs. Well, how does one go from barely being able to decipher the differences between “the -stans” to becoming a scholar of the region? It is a simple answer: mentorship. Since my arrival at the University of Chicago, John Woods has been the cornerstone of my academic and personal growth. I count myself extremely fortunate to have an advisor and mentor who has taken countless hours out of his time to help guide me. I thank him for his generosity, his honesty, and for his unwavering support of my intellectual pursuits. Most of all, I am grateful to him for his presence. He is, simply, what a graduate student wishes an advisor to be.

I also thank Holly Shissler and Leah Feldman as members of my committee. Both of them have taken time out of their schedules to sit with me, discuss my dissertation, and methodically respond to the drafts I have produced. In addition to familiarizing me with the thematic intersections of Eurasian empires, Holly Shissler has consistently supported my interdisciplinary approach to the study of Uzbekistan. She has helped me shape nascent ideas into fully formed arguments that have become the crux of my dissertation. Leah Feldman has been a source of support throughout my writing process. Her diligent feedback has proven most thought-provoking. Reading and listening to her speak on her own work also has been a source of inspiration as she shows by example how we can engage with “the big picture” while not losing track of the nitty-gritty details that make up our work.

This project has also benefited from the insights and encouragement I have received from a number of faculty and staff at the University of Chicago. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Helga Anetshofer, my Uzbek and Ottoman instructor, and to Kağan Arik, the Turkic-master who instructed me in advanced Uzbek, Turkish, Kazakh, and Old Turkic. *Sizga, ustozlarim, chin dildan katta rahmat.* And outside of the classroom, Noha Forster, Hripsime Haroutunian, Hakan Karateke, Fred Donner, Orit Bashkin, and Cornell Fleischer also have been staples in my UChicago experience, and their talents and expertise have been a model to me in so many ways. Amanda Young, Thomas Maguire, and Paul Walker have always been available to answer questions and see my progress along in both CMES and NELC. And working alongside Marlis Saleh, my Regenstein manager for the last seven years, in the library has shown me how far academic study can reach beyond the classroom and page.

My gratitude also extends to the many scholars who I have met in person and corresponded with during the course of writing this dissertation. Shoshana Keller was kind enough to lend me the textbooks necessary to write the fifth chapter of my dissertation. Marianne Kamp, Russell Zanca, and Devin DeWeese, in addition to having works that have so informed my knowledge on the history of Central Asia, have been kind enough to read drafts, provide answers to pressing questions, and supply me with materials that I could not have otherwise accessed. Ralph Jaeckel went out of his way to provide me access to unpublished materials from UCLA. And lastly, I want to thank Joo-Yup Lee and Adeeb Khalid for their tireless work on the region. Their scholarship has truly inspired my own endeavors in the field.

I began writing this dissertation in earnest with the comradery and help of the “Woodsian Dissertation Group:” Carol Fan, Michael Bechtel, and Zachary Winters. To them, I give the heartiest of thanks for if it were not for the accountability of our weekly meetings, I would not

have managed to finish this project. Their candor, advice, words of encouragement, and friendship have turned the lonely process of dissertating to one of engagement and, dare I say, fun!

Graduate school has not only been an academic experience but a personal one. In my nine long years at this institution, I have come to meet and cultivate so many important friendships. Annie Greene, Arlen Wiesenthal, Alexandra Hoffmann, Samuel Hodgkin, Claire Roosien, Sarah Furger, Chelsea Flenar, Mohsin Rao, Golriz Farshi, Shahrzad Farshi, Diana Ohanian, John al-Haddad, Benjamin Beames, Adam Burba, Kate Costello, Katie Hodgdon, Ben Anderson, Coleman Durkin, Kara Peruccio, Matthew Barber, Andrew Wright, Adam Zeidan, Omeed Valipour, Farrah Nasrollahi and so many more, to them all, I give my gratitude. Whether it was over coffee, cheese nights, or fancy dinners, this experience has been made all the more rich having had them alongside me. Also, I would like to thank Madina Djuraeva and Zukhra Kasimova who have always aided in attaining materials from Uzbekistan and answering questions, large and small.

I would be remiss if I did not mention my support network outside of Chicago: Randall Sparks, Nancy Steinmann, Pat Swenson, Martin Pousson, Norma Aceves, Orry Klainman, and Vaheed Rezai. A text every once in a while, a coffee when we could, and virtual meetings have been life savers. Truly, there are no words to express my appreciation for their continued friendship.

I cannot express the gratitude I feel toward my family for affording me the chance to venture out of Los Angeles to pursue a doctorate. My father, Mahmoud, my mother, Vila, and my sister, Donna, have had to put up with so much while I chased my dream of higher education.

And with the completion of this dissertation, I am one step closer to returning home to California.

Finally, my thanks to the Hus: Wang Yi and Hu Ming graciously accepted me into their family last June when my partner and I joined in matrimony. To Lester Samie Hu, what can I say? He has been at my side for every joyous and difficult moment of the last five years. Not a day has gone by that he has not encouraged me, boosted my spirit, and shown his unconditional love. His support has been the greatest of comforts through this entire process. And one last thanks to, Luna Stalinstache, the master of our house and our four-legged comrade who incessantly sat on my keyboard to prevent me from finishing this project (but made up for it with cuddles!).



### **Note on Transliteration and Style**

This dissertation utilizes a number of primary sources written in Latin, Cyrillic, and/or Perso-Arabic scripts. Latin script materials (Uzbek, Turkish, French) are cited as they originally appear. Perso-Arabic script materials (Persian, Chagatai, Arabic) are transliterated using the standards of the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* for Arabic and Persian unless the text cited is borrowed from another scholar. For example, the methods used by Bodrogligeti and Karasoy do not follow IJMES. Particularly, I note that, rather than following existing methods of transliteration for Chagatai that are popularized in Turkic studies – like Schönig’s system –, my translation and transliteration follow the IJMES standards for Persian and Arabic. This is to render an accurate and unambiguous representation of the original written text in my dissertation, instead of sound, vocalizations, or pronunciations in all instances. Cyrillic materials are transliterated using the standards of the Library of Congress, except for the letters IO and Я, represented as “yu” and “ya” respectively.

All translations and transliterations are my own unless footnoted. Some manuscripts are illuminated, therefore words that appear in color in the original text are represented with a single bar |. Instances that represent couplets in the original text use a double-line ||.

### **Note on Dates**

This dissertation straddles two major time periods: the 15<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>-21<sup>st</sup> centuries. Sources from the 15<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> centuries in Persian and Turkic languages use the Hijri (Islamic) Calendar. Sources from the 20<sup>th</sup>-21<sup>st</sup> centuries use the Gregorian Calendar. Since this dissertation focuses on Soviet and post-Soviet framings of the 15<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> centuries – and for consistency throughout the dissertation – I present dates using the Gregorian Calendar. All Hijri months and years have been converted to the Gregorian Calendar.

## Dissertation Abstract

Committee: John E. Woods (Chair), Holly Shissler, Leah Feldman

Defense Date: 4 June 2020

This dissertation investigates how post-Soviet Uzbekistan appropriated 15-16<sup>th</sup> century history and historiographies in constructing a national identity and a national historical memory. I pursue how a particular historiographic problem has played out in history-writing in Central Eurasia and shaped the discourses and practices of nation-building in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, a problem that I refer to as the “Shibanid Question”: where should the Shibanids stand in the history of “Uzbekistan”? Tracing back to as early as the 16<sup>th</sup> century when the Shibanid rulers themselves had to reconcile their nomadic roots with Timurid customs, institutions, and cultures of sedentary rule, I illuminate the *longue durée* process whereby Turkic, Persian, imperial Russian, and early Soviet historiographers have addressed the Shibanid Question in hallowing the Timurids as progenitor of the Uzbeks and of Uzbekistan. I analyze these processes anchored in 15-16<sup>th</sup> century Persian and Chaghatay historiography, 19-20<sup>th</sup> century Russian historiography, and post-Soviet applications of those historiographies on nation-building.

## Chapter 1 – Introduction

*It is necessary to distinguish the circumstances of the formation of a people from the history of their name.*<sup>1</sup>

— Aleksandr Yakubovskii

According to the late president and nation-builder of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov (r.1991-2016), the ancestral hero of the post-Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan is Amir Timur, the 14<sup>th</sup> century founder of the Timurid dynasty. The Timurid legacy is visible everywhere in the Uzbek landscape with splendid mosques, public squares, museums, and monuments, and Timurid cultural, literary, and artistic productions backing Karimov's claim to a national history. Yet since Uzbekistan's independence in 1991, the choice of Timur as the national ancestor of the country has been highly contentious among historians. Many point instead to Shībānī Khān [see figure 1.1.], who hailed from the steppes and conquered such important Timurid urban centers as Samarkand, Herat, Balkh, and Bukhara in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>2</sup> It was precisely by ousting the descendants of Timur that Shībānī Khān established Uzbek rule over the territory that is known today as Uzbekistan.

These historiographic debates centered on 14-16<sup>th</sup> century Central Eurasia are not simply academic trivialities or mere political rhetoric. Fashioned and fostered by both the Ministry of Education and the Academy of Sciences, state-sanctioned narratives of early modern Central

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<sup>1</sup> Aleksandr Yuryevich Yakubovskii. *The Question of the Ethnogenesis of the Uzbek People (K voprosu ob etnogeneze uzbekskogo naroda)*. (Tashkent: UzFan, 1941): 3

<sup>2</sup> Transliterations of place names and proper names that are uncommon in English or do not have a common Uzbek spelling follow the standards set by the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. Comparable to norms of transliterating "Timurids," I have chosen not to transliterate "Shibanids" using diacritical marks.

Eurasian history are taught at every level of public education, from elementary schools to universities. As instruments of state policy, these narratives also permeate varying aspects of Uzbek society, from extraordinary public projects, such as museums and monuments, to familiar articles of daily life, such as stamps, coins, and banknotes.



[Figure 1.1] Bihzād Watercolor Portrait of Shībānī Khān

This dissertation investigates how post-Soviet Uzbekistan appropriated 15-16<sup>th</sup> century historiographies in constructing a national identity and a national historical memory. I examine how a particular historiographic problem has played out in history-writing in Central Eurasia and shaped the discourses and practices of nation-building in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, a problem that I will refer to as the “Shibanid Question:” where should the Shibanids stand in the history of

“Uzbekistan?” Tracing back to as early as the 16<sup>th</sup> century when the Shibanid rulers themselves had to answer this question in reconciling their nomadic roots with Timurid customs, institutions, and cultures of sedentary rule, I will outline the *longue durée* process whereby Turkic, Persian, imperial Russian, and early Soviet historiographers have addressed the Shibanid Question in hallowing the Timurids as progenitor of the Uzbeks and of Uzbekistan. I will further combine the study of this diachronic process with synchronic analyses that follow the Shibanid Question and responses thereto in various sites of nation-building in contemporary Uzbekistan, physical and imaginary. I will also explore how Uzbekistan’s puzzling and still contentious anointment of Timur and the Timurids at the specific expense of Shībānī Khān and 16<sup>th</sup> century Uzbeks both arises from and appropriates imperial Russian and Soviet historiographies of early-modern Central Eurasia.

### ***Situating the History of Central Asia and Uzbekistan***

Drawing on both sources from 14-16<sup>th</sup> century Central Eurasia and subsequent historiographic accounts, my project differs from previous scholarship on nationalism and nation-building in Uzbekistan. Though current scholars like Vera Tolz and Adeeb Khalid<sup>3</sup> have illuminated the significant roles of imperial Russian and Soviet policy-makers, bureaucrats, and cultural elites in the making of the Uzbek nation-state, overlooked in their accounts are the legacies of imperial Russian and Soviet historians and their narrativization of 15-16<sup>th</sup> century Central Eurasia. Such oversight arises from two methodological constraints. First, scholars often

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<sup>3</sup> Vera Tolz, *Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

study nation-building as a modern phenomenon in which state-building agents make conscious choices in appropriating historical legacies and narratives. This “presentist” view of nationalism overlooks *longue durée* processes and discourses, which not only furnish nation-builders with convenient ideological materials, but also condition their nation-building efforts. By critically engaging the history and historiographies of Uzbekistan with theories of nationalism—most notably Prasenjit Duara’s notion of “bifurcation”—my dissertation contextualizes Shibanid history in the Uzbek national narrative and charts the contemporary efforts to subordinate the 16<sup>th</sup> century’s legacy in the contemporary imaginary. Second, scholars of Uzbek history have not considered how history-writing itself has been embedded in various attempts at state- and nation-building in the region. By analyzing how, if at all, the state and other agents in contemporary Uzbekistan understand and use the broad range of historiographies of 14-16<sup>th</sup> century Central Eurasia in various languages and from various periods in constructing a national identity, my dissertation draws on historiography itself as a critical source and discourse of nation-building. It sheds light on how history itself has come to shape and become shaped by the building and rebuilding of the Uzbek nation-state.

In contemporary scholarship on Uzbekistan, the 16<sup>th</sup> century is often overshadowed by the preceding Timurid era. Not only did Timur and his descendants leave significant tangible and intangible cultural legacies, but these legacies have also become the primary source for constructions of a national history and identity of Uzbekistan since the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It is only in more recent years that Uzbek scholars have begun to explore nomadic Uzbek tribes, in

particular the Shibaniids, who displaced the Timurids in the late 15<sup>th</sup> and early 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, as a major part of their national lineage.<sup>4</sup>

It is evident that current scholarship does not provide an analysis of *how* 14-16<sup>th</sup> century history is reified in contemporary Uzbek history and social structures. My approach to the study of Uzbekistan allows for the incorporation of historical texts and contemporary material culture and their uses for the nation-state. Many scholars have engaged with the broader history of Central Eurasia, through the lenses of geo-politics, economic influences of post-Mongol history, or Chinese interventions in the region. Recently, scholars have contributed significantly to the history of Uzbekistan, particularly that of the late imperial Russian and early Soviet periods.<sup>5</sup> My work engages with their assessments of this crucial period in Uzbek history and adds to the dynamic nature of history production. As mentioned, these works do not fully incorporate 14-16<sup>th</sup> century elements of Uzbek history and their impact on the formation of modern Uzbekistan.<sup>6</sup>

Since the late 1980s, a number of monographs have been written, either general works such as Svat Soucek's comprehensive history,<sup>7</sup> or more focused attempts to contextualize the

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<sup>4</sup> For a thorough discussion of controversy surrounding the spelling of Shībānī Khān (Shaybani Khan), see Maria Eva Subtelny. "Art and Politics in Early 16<sup>th</sup> Century Central Asia". *Central Asiatic Journal* 27.1/2 (1983): 121-148.

<sup>5</sup> See Marianne Kamp, *The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006); Douglas Northrop, *Veiled Empire: Gender & Power in Stalinist Central Asia*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Jeff Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); Adeeb Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015); and Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

<sup>6</sup> There have been few attempts at this *longue durée* approach: see, Edward Allworth, *The modern Uzbeks: from the fourteenth century to the present: a cultural history*. (Stanford: Hoover Inst. Press, 1996).

<sup>7</sup> Svatopluk Soucek, *A history of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Soucek has great strengths but also unfortunate weaknesses in providing the necessary backgrounds for the study of 16<sup>th</sup> century Central Asia. Soucek offers a history of Central Asia, which for him consists more or less of the modern "-stan" states, from the arrival of Islam in this



history of post-Timurid Eurasia under the Uzbeks. The longest such work available on cultural aspects of the 16<sup>th</sup> century is Mansura Haidar's *Central Asia in the Sixteenth Century*,<sup>8</sup> which discusses the rise of the Shibanids in Transoxiana and assess the cultural impact of the Uzbek

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region in the 700s to the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Soucek's work is particularly valuable given that there are not many recent historical surveys of Central Asia. Thus, his text serves as a strong general introduction to the history of "inner Asia" through its discussion of history, religion, culture, society, and politics. Soucek stays true to the literature he utilizes in constructing this history. Focusing on dynastic struggles in the Syr Darya region, he utilizes military history regarding conflicts between different groups to guide his overall discussion of this region. Cultural history is not forgotten; he examines, in his introduction and early chapters, the arrival of Islamic culture and, later, the influence of Arabs, Persians, and Turks on the region.

<sup>8</sup> See Mansura Haidar, *Central Asia in the Sixteenth Century*, (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 2002). Haidar references the lack of English language scholarship on the subject multiple times stating, "A detailed study of the Central Asia of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has not been undertaken in English so far, probably because of a relative paucity of source material outside the libraries of the erstwhile USSR." She engages with numerous primary sources from Central Eurasia, Iran, and India, giving names, dates, and summaries when available. Much of her approach is reminiscent of Martin Dickson's dissertation. See Dickson's "Appendix II: Sources and Bibliography" for a more detailed outline of primary source materials relevant to the Uzbeks and Safavids, Martin Dickson, *Shah Tahmasb and the Uzbeks (The Duel for Khurasan with `Ubayd Khan: 930-946/1524-1540)*, (Princeton University, 1958). This is the only secondary source that deals most directly with the Shibanids using a variety of Persian manuscripts, as well as secondary sources in French, Uzbek, and Russian. For this reason, Haidar's work is valuable. Chapter six, "Shaibani Khan Uzbek: Early Life and Adventures," is one of the only chapters in a scholarly work that speaks directly of Shībānī's life, struggles, and achievement in overcoming Babur and beginning his dynasty. Furthermore, Haidar provides a substantial chapter entitled, "Cultural Life in Shaibanid Times," which is a far cry from the everlasting military nature of the sixteenth century she presents in the previous chapters. She delves into the cultural contributions of scholarship and the fine arts (or, what may be seen as a continuation of some aspects of Timurid culture) of the Shibanids, which are often overlooked in other sources. This allows Haidar to represent the Shibanids in what she claims to be an objective light, rather than misrepresenting them as many other scholars have done. For example, see the introduction to Babur, and W. M. Thackston, *The Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor* (Washington, D.C.: Freer Gallery of Art, 1996), 10: "The Uzbeks, suffering from a cultural inferiority complex, concentrated their efforts on the cultivation of Persian, mainly by importing talent, both voluntary and involuntary, from Timurid Heart and had little time or inclination for patronage of their own Turkish language." Given Haidar's aim, scholars might question if scholarship on the Shibanids is, in any form, objective. Much of what I have read terms nomadic Uzbeks of the 16<sup>th</sup> century "destroyers" of Timurid achievements. In light of some of the discussion I have presented, it is clear that the uncritical view that typically appears in scholarship needs reassessment.

tribes on the region. *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age*<sup>9</sup> deals broadly with, as the title suggests, the Chinggisid Age,<sup>10</sup> covering the history of the Mongol empire and its successor states. Collectively, this compilation includes contribution by some of the most notable individuals in Central Eurasian scholarship, such as Bregel, McChesney, DeWeese, and Manz. Joo-Yup Lee's *Qazaqliq, or Ambitious Brigandage*<sup>11</sup> is the latest in this series of works

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<sup>9</sup> Nicola Di Cosmo, Allen J. Frank, and Peter B. Golden, eds., *The Cambridge history of Inner Asia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Yuri Bregel's "Uzbeks, Qazaqs and Turkmens," is a brief but discerning outline of Shibani Khan, and it allows him to draw connections between this time period and the evolution of political terms, such as "Uzbek" and "Qazaq," which are used in contemporary terms — that is, in modern Uzbekistan — to distinguish the two ethnogenes. An argument can be made that the notion of "Uzbek identity" arises from this period, when Shibani Khan resolves to embark on conquests in the weakened Timurid states. For a more complete discussion on the controversy behind the term "Uzbek" and the construction of contemporary Uzbek identity, see Matteo Fumagalli, "Ethnicity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and 'Uzbeks abroad,'" *Central Asian Survey*, 26 (March 2007):109; A. Ilkhamov, "Archeology of Uzbek Identity," *Anthropology and Archeology of Eurasia*, 44 (Spring 2006): 10-36; and P. Shozimov, "Rethinking the Symbolic Scope of Uzbek Identity," *Anthropology and Archeology of Eurasia*, 44 (Spring 2006): 47-51.

<sup>10</sup> Though one can argue that the Chinggisid Age penetrated well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the last essay of this collection, Yuri Bregel's "The New Uzbek States: Bukhara, Khiva and Khoqand: c 1750-1886," ends in the mid 1880s. See pages 392-411.

<sup>11</sup> Lee, Joo-Yup. *Qazaqliq, or ambitious brigandage, and the formation of the Qazaqs: state and identity in post-mongol Central Eurasia*. (Leiden: Brill, 2016). Lee presents the formation of the early role of qazaqliq in the construction of a Kazakh identity separate from Uzbeks. The fourth chapter of this text, "The Qazaqliq of Two Rival Chinggisid Clans: The Formation of the Qazaqs and the Shibani Uzbeks" masterfully engages with the source material in parsing the trajectory of Jānībeg khan and Girāy Khan's separation from Abū'l-Khayr Khan's Uzbek ulus. Lee continues to narrate the new rise of the Qazaq-Uzbek ulus under the two "dissidents", after their long period of *qazaqlik*. Further of importance for my study is the sections on Muḥammad Shībānī Khān's days of political vagabondage. Using primary materials, like Banā'ī's *Shībānīnāma*, he gives detailed accounts of Muḥammad Shībānī and his brother's, Mahmud Sultan, escape from Astrakhan after the death of Abū'l-Khayr Khan and Shaykh Ḥaydar. After providing a thorough narrative of the late 15<sup>th</sup> and early 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, Lee delves into the term "qazaqliq" and provides an intricate discussion on Kazakh and Uzbek identity, and how Turks, Mughals, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks are similar/different. Lee's major approach in this study is done through his analysis of "ambitious brigandage" or qazaqliq in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries. He does this by utilizing chronicles and histories commissioned by the Timurids, Uzbeks, Ilkhanids, and Mughals, and he further includes some Mongol sources. Relevant to our project is the discussion of Uzbek-i qazaq and Uzbek-i Shiban that Bregel started in his work, and Lee continues in his. It is crucial to understand that for contemporary Uzbek ethnogenic

that have impacted the field, all of which have profoundly influenced my understanding of Eurasian history.

### ***Nationalism, Nation-Building, and Approaches***

Borrowing from a number of “classical” and “post-classical” theories of nationalism and nation-making, my project examines the multilayered processes of transmission, construction, and appropriation, whereby 19-20<sup>th</sup> century Russian and Soviet historiographies of 15-16<sup>th</sup> century Central Asia affected post-Soviet nation-state building in Uzbekistan. I analyze these processes rooted in 15-16<sup>th</sup> century Persian and Chagatai historiography, 19-20<sup>th</sup> century Russian historiography, and post-Soviet applications of those historiographies on nation-building. While this dissertation is not anchored in one particular camp, I find it necessary to draw distinctions between theoretical schools, explain their uses, and clarify that Uzbekistan—as a modern nation-state—merges what academics too often categorize as either/or mechanisms to nation-making.

In my reading of various literature on nationalism, I differentiate between classical and post-classical theories with respect to their distinct understandings of nationhood, national origin, and nation-building. Subsets of the classical tradition include constructivist-modernists, primordialists, and ethnosymbolists. In the constructivist-modernist framework, national identity and nationalism are products of the modern era. Most notably, Elie Kedourie’s work frames the

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studies, these variations in terminology become essential to the core understanding of modern ethnic groups (i.e. Uzbeks and Kazakhs). In another of his works, Lee provides an in-depth discussion of how Chinggisid and Timurid historians used the term “Turk” as a relational term to “Tajik” (sedentary Iranian population), and this is quite useful because we see the same discussions of relational terms appearing during the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. See, Joo-Yup Lee, “The Historical Meaning of the Term ‘Turk’ and the Nature of the Turkic Identity of the Chinggisid and Timurid Elits in Post-Mongol Central Asia” in *Central Asiatic Journal* 59 (2016): 101-132.

modern period as having begun in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century on and focuses on how nations are created rather than how they organically grow.<sup>12</sup> Kedourie's emphasis on creation is later taken up in the 1980s and 1990s and applied to all manner of socio-political developments, including approaches to industrialization, print media, state bureaucracy, and democratization.<sup>13</sup>

Benedict Anderson's work argues that collective memory allows for seeking refuge from existentialist doubts through investment in a communal imaginary.<sup>14</sup> Social imagination and collective memory is part and parcel of collective identification, and in appropriating certain images (like that of Timur), individuals come to assume that the image is a representation of themselves. Take, for example, Karimov's words on the pamphlet cover of the Amir Timur Museum in Tashkent: "If somebody wants to understand who the Uzbeks are, if somebody wants to comprehend all the power, might, justice and unlimited abilities of the Uzbek people, their contribution to the global development, their belief in future, he should recall the image of Amir Temur."<sup>15</sup> The appropriated image of the state-building, high-cultured Amir Timur is, as Anderson would argue, the quintessential image of Uzbekness in the collective memory.

Eric Hobsbawm's work serves a valuable framework for exploring Uzbek history.<sup>16</sup> Hobsbawm expresses that once traditions have been created in a given society, those traditions become engrained in day-to-day existence making it difficult for historians to determine the

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<sup>12</sup> Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism (expanded edition)*. (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing, 2008).

<sup>13</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994)

<sup>14</sup> Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1991).

<sup>15</sup> Habibullaev, H. *In the Halls of the State Museum of Timurids History*. (Tashkent: San'at, 2002): 6.

<sup>16</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

“true” nature of a nation or its people. For Uzbekistan, that is particularly important to keep in mind because of the intense appropriation of historical figures and events by Soviet and later Uzbek scholars to create a cohesive national narrative. Imperial Russian and Soviet historians helped fabricate a history, first for Turkestan, then for ethno-groups, like the Uzbeks. With this foundation, we can approach Uzbekistan to parse some of the effects of Imperial and Soviet historians on this modern nation-state.

Parallel to the constructivist-modernist approach, the primordialist camp views nationalism through the prism of shared social and political roots. Common descent, shared language, and having a territorial affiliation tie a “nation” together. In the case of primordialists, emotional investment in these shared aspects create a national identity and collective memory.<sup>17</sup> Where constructivist-modernists view nationalism as a byproduct or creation of recent history, primordialists stress the *longue durée* existence of a group or nation. For Uzbekistan, much of the stated—or more directly, created—common ancestry of the Uzbeks goes as far back as the 11<sup>th</sup> century. While this dissertation does not intend to challenge or undermine Uzbekistan’s self-perception, it is clear that the Soviet scholars who actively wrote and rewrote the region’s history did so through primordialist lenses.<sup>18</sup>

In the classical purview of nationalism, ethnosymbolism stands as a middle ground between modernists and primordialists. As a reaction and rejection of the modernist frame, ethnosymbolists reject the idea that nationalism arises solely through socio-economic factors of

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<sup>17</sup> Clifford Geertz, “Primordial Ties,” *Ethnicity*, Anthony Smith ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

<sup>18</sup> Victor Shnirelman, “Politics of Ethnogenesis in the USSR and after,” *Bulletin of the National Museum of Ethnology* 30:1 (2005): 93-119; Yuri Slezkine, “Marr and the National Origins of Soviet Ethnogenetics,” *Slavic Review* 55:4 (1996): 826-862.

the modern world. They argue that nationalism and national identity are created through practical use of symbols, therefore socio-political and economic structures may affect nationalism, but are not its driving force. Of import within this camp is the notion that nations have their roots in pre-existing categories of sociological organization that lead to the development of fairly cohesive and distinctive ethnies.<sup>19</sup> Anthony Smith uses the term “ethnie” to describe a population with common ancestry and shared historical memories. He also emphasizes association with a territorial homeland. This idea is visible in Uzbek national identity because the legitimacy of a group’s claims to a nation-state rely on that group’s ability to prove their historical and long-term association with that territory. It diminishes any competing claims by other actors on that territory. I argue in the fourth chapter of this dissertation that Uzbekistan’s claims to historically Persianate symbols and sites are challenged by Tajiks who still assert ownership over the collective memory now appropriated by the Uzbeks.

In Uzbekistan, Timur has come to signify the strength and honorable history of the nation. Using John Armstrong’s terminology, Timur constitutes part of the “mythomoteur” of the Uzbek nation-state. Armstrong defines mythomoteur as the “constitutive myth of a polity,” meaning that a state’s creation myth—or any component part of it—can be traced back to antiquity and defines the historical and cultural limits of a national identity.<sup>20</sup> It is not the part of scholars to nullify the mythomoteur; rather, it exists—much the same way religion does—and it is incumbent upon social scientists to trace the various mechanisms operating within any given national narrative. We can surmise from the ethnosymbolists that ethnies have developed

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<sup>19</sup> Anthony Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Anthony Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

<sup>20</sup> John Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1982): 3-14.

through the use of a *longue durée* approach. The mythomoteur, then, is the (re)appropriation and application of symbols from antiquity, or in the case of Uzbekistan, the 16<sup>th</sup> century, which allows the continuity of the *ethnie*.

In more recent years, nationalism theories have progressed to the post-classical frame, meaning theories are less concerned with assessing *when* nations and nationalisms developed but *how* nationalism is invoked as a form of social consciousness. Part II of this dissertation borrows heavily from this school of thought focusing on banal forms of nationalism to illustrate how individuals become “national” in an everyday context. Michael Billig’s *Banal Nationalism* shows how the reoccurring re-production of symbols, emblems, and ideas are conspicuously placed for inconspicuous consumption.<sup>21</sup> Rather than focusing on “hot” inflection points of nationalism—war, revolutions, political coups—Billig argues that Western nations reproduce their concept of self through “flagged” indicators of nation, thereby hiding the ideological underpinning of nationalism, while simultaneously forcing it upon people.

By applying theories like banal nationalism to Uzbekistan, I see that national identity and memory are constructed through association of ideas in which representation and perceptions of the external becomes infused with the image of an object. Both connoted and denoted messages (either in image or text) have a bearing on what individuals are meant to consume, and in so doing, people begin to develop ideas of the self or group and the external objects becomes part of the self/group-image. In the context of Uzbekistan, we must consider that the construction of collective identity and memory, and control of and condition of that collective memory creates social structures. External images, once appropriated by individuals to signify their self or their

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<sup>21</sup> Michael Billig. *Banal Nationalism*. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1997).

belonging to a society, illustrates the power of totalitarian regimes and states in “enslaving” citizens.<sup>22</sup> This enslavement of the mind is replicated by the construction of collective assumptions and myth through reified images of the nation. Through the absorption of visual resources, the individual begins to feel part of a national whole, or nation, and begins to further propagate images and iconography that led them to this feeling in the first place. Since nations are imaginary constructs that rely on cultural fictions to maintain the national apparatus, we can use various media to illustrate the permanence and continuity of the Uzbek nation.

The approach of this dissertation, while influenced by the classical and post-classical theories of nationalism, is most informed by Prasenjit Duara’s *Rescuing History from the Nation*.<sup>23</sup> Where other scholars might usually be pigeonholed as belonging to one school or another, Duara combines various approaches of nationalism and nation-building to coin his theory of “bifurcated history.” The concept of bifurcation allows us to look at how the past is appropriated for present-day needs and analyzing processes of appropriation to move toward a historicity (or as close to one) of national narratives. Furthermore, Duara coins the term “discent”—a combination of descent and dissent. Through a case study of Chinese history and historiography, he shows how modern nationalists claim unilinear descent from eras past while also dissenting against narratives or aspects of history that subvert the contemporary nation-state’s historical/national narrative. Both of Duara’s terms—bifurcated history and discent—lend themselves to a thorough undertaking of Uzbekistan’s national history/memory/identity. This approach allows my dissertation to not pass evaluative judgments on Soviet and Uzbekistan’s

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<sup>22</sup> Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 14.

<sup>23</sup> Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).



politics, scholars, and intellectuals; rather, I map the development and procedure of creating and reifying a national narrative that then serves the contemporary nation-state.

### ***Summary of Chapters***

My dissertation is comprised of two parts. The first two chapters constitute Part I where I synthesize the history of the Shibanids from 16<sup>th</sup> century narrative and religious sources. This crucial, transformative period in Uzbek history is often overlooked because of Soviet academic suppression. By incorporating this history, I provide a much-needed assessment of the territory's past. Part II of my dissertation consists of three chapters that examine the historical narrative provided in post-Soviet Uzbekistan through banal forms—namely currency and textbooks. I show that while the current regime still does not situate the Shibanids at the foreground of the national imaginary, the Shibanids were integral to the formation of Uzbek identity. Ultimately, I speak to the constructs and limits of modern national myth-making while contributing to the comparative aspects of nationalism studies and state-sponsored projects of identity creation that have eschewed previous nationalism frameworks.

Part I of my dissertation begins with Chapter 2, “From Qazāq to Khān: Shībānī Khān’s Rise and Fall,” which narrates a synthesized history of Shībānī Khān’s life and activities from 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century sources.<sup>24</sup> I provide this concise narrative of Shībānī Khān for two reasons: first, there is very scant scholarship on him that elaborates either on his activities or the rationale

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<sup>24</sup> For discussions on Shībānī Khān’s writings see, Andras Bodrogligeti, “Muhammad Shaybani’s ‘Bahru’l-huda’: An Early Sixteenth Century Didactic Qasida in Chaghatay”, *Ural-altaische Jahrbucher*: 1-56, and András J. E. Bodrogligeti, “Devotions, Rituals, Moral and Social Issues in Muḥammad Shaybānī Khān’s *Risāla-i Ma‘ārif*,” in *The Golden Cycle: Proceedings of the John D. Soper Commemorative Conference on the Cultural Heritage of Central Asia, UCLA Conference Center at Lake Arrowhead, October 1-4, 1998*, ed. András J. E. Bodrogligeti (Kecskemét: Central Asian Information Project/Sahibqiran, 2002), 126-147.

for imperial expansion; and second, in order to fully comprehend why contemporary Uzbekistan favors Timur over Shībānī Khān, we must understand how Soviet and post-Soviet literature on the 16<sup>th</sup> century marginalized that history. As a brief overview here, the Shibanid<sup>25</sup> dynasty takes its name after its first effective ruler, Muḥammad Shībānī Khān, grandson of Abū'l-Khayr Khan. When Abū'l-Khayr's reign had succumbed to internal turmoil, the so-called "Qazaq-Uzbeks" broke away, eventually becoming today's Kazakhs. Once Abū'l-Khayr Khan died, the remaining Uzbeks rallied around Shībānī Khān, who, after some decades of *qazāqlik*, waged wars against cities ruled by descendants of Timur, i.e. the Timurids, throughout the Dasht-i Qipchaq and Syr-Darya regions. Under Shībānī Khān, the Uzbeks expelled Bābūr from Samarqand in 1501, and defeated the sons of Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā in Balkh in 1505 and in Herat in 1507.

From a broader historical perspective, the Uzbeks' conquest of the sedentary regions of Central Eurasia under Abū'l-Khayr Khan and Shībānī Khān marked the last major nomadic migration from the steppe into settled territories in Transoxiana. Not only did the Shibanids displace the Timurids as rulers of the region, but the large influx of Turkic peoples into the Persianate region also heralded the merging of previous distinct political, cultural, literary, and, indeed, historiographical traditions. The conflicts and integrations between settled groups and the incoming nomadic populations inspired a new wave of historiography, including chronicles, biographies, and hagiographies in both Turkic and Persian languages.

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<sup>25</sup> For the purposes of this dissertation, the Shibanid Dynasty should be understood as the Abū'l-Khayrid Shibanid Dynasty in Transoxiana, which differs from a second Uzbek dynasty that has the name 'Arabshāhid Shibanids in Khwarezm. See Clifford Edmund Bosworth, *The Encyclopedia of Islam. Vol. 9*, (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 426: "It should more properly be known as the Abū'l-Khayrid/Shibanid one (to distinguish it from, among others, the Yādgariid or 'Arabshāhid Shibanid clan who gained control Khwarazm.)"

Following the narrative of Shībānī Khān's creation of a Turko-Mongol *and* Islamic empire, Chapter 3, "Rescuing Shībānī Khān from History: A Risāla for the Age," analyzes Shībānī Khān's own writings, his *Dīvān*, *Baḥru'l-Khudā*, and *Risāla-yi Ma'ārif*, the latter with which this chapter is most concerned, to argue that he projected a personal image of extreme piety. Since he had inherited the court high culture of the Timurids, Shībānī Khān considered himself a very cultured and cultivated person and he continued the traditions and flourishing of the Timurid court. Scientists, artists, poets, historians, architects and others now emigrated from the territory taken over by the newly formed Safavid territory into the cultural centers of Shībānī Khān's new empire, and he consciously patronized works in the manner of the Timurids.<sup>26</sup>

It is in this apparent mixture of traditions that the Shibanids themselves were confronted with what I have termed the "Shibanid Question," that is, where Shībānī Khān, the Shibanids, and their nomadic heritage should stand in a national history of Uzbekistan. As the dust of conquest settled, the new nomadic rulers of sedentary Transoxiana had to reconcile their steppe heritages based on Chinggisid principles of confederation and consensus with the new political realities of the lingering customs and institutions of Timurid statecraft. Shībānī Khān attempted at such reconciliation by reintroducing aspects of *yasa*, yet the delicate balance between the two legal traditions of *yasa* and *shari'a* would always pose a problem for him.<sup>27</sup> Ironically, according to his commissioned biographies and poetry, it was Shībānī Khān himself who projected his lineage as heir to the great political, literary, and artistic traditions of the Timurids. In fact, he felt he had moved so far beyond his nomadic heritage to the point that he no longer wanted to be

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<sup>26</sup> Dorothea Duda. "The Illustrated Shaybaniname in Vienna Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Cod. Mixt. 188". *Turkish Art*. (1999): 266

<sup>27</sup> Nurten Kilic-Schubel. "Balancing 'Yasa' and 'Shariat' in the Shibanid-Uzbek Khanate in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century" in *Central Asia on Display*. (Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2004): 17-30.

referred to as “Uzbek.”<sup>28</sup> The Shibanids’ surprising renunciation of much of their nomadic heritage and identification with the Timurids whom they displaced from the region arose partly from a cultural self-fashioning. Shībānī Khān’s imperial ambitions—while successful during his time—proved problematic for Soviets and post-Soviets their writing of Uzbek history to assess, and the next part of my dissertation focuses specifically on that issue.

Chapter 4, “Paying It Backward: The Historical Narrative on Uzbekistan’s National Currency,” constitutes the first chapter of part II of this dissertation—the Shibanid Question in contemporary Uzbekistan. Part II of this dissertation deals extensively with banal forms of nationalism, namely currency and textbooks. Banknotes and coins are agents of material culture that illustrate the links between individuals, societies, and collective memory. These material objects are instrumental in conditioning narratives of the past and what specifically is important to the national self-image. Currency is not just a conduit for trade; it is also a medium of communication. Through the images and iconography present on money, nations can form, unite, and disseminate notions of a national identity. The images that are part of banknotes and coins become engrained as part of an individual’s environment, and through this institutional structure, discourses of meaning—whether drawn out for an individual or a collective—spread through society and reinforce government narratives.

Uzbek currency makes Uzbek national identity tangible through providing visual representations with meaning. Emblems, landscapes, buildings, monuments, iconography, cartography, and color are some of the elements present in currency, and all of these elements

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<sup>28</sup> This point is discussed further in Chapter 3. See also, Shībānī, Muḥammad and Yakup Karasoy, *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998).

combine to create a cohesive national narrative that contributes to the feeling of belonging to the Uzbek nation. The imagery that appears on Uzbek currency namely consists of three broad categories: (1) Borders and Territory; (2) Timurid Monumentality; and (3) New/Government Buildings. These examples comprise the national imaginary, which constructs identity as everything encompassing Timurid architecture (i.e. a great history) and a modern, contemporary present and future through government buildings. Each site, then, is a repository of information, knowledge, and signification for users of currency as the buildings and landscapes refer to particular national locations and historical events. Cities like Samarkand and Bukhara, historically Tajik strongholds, are territorialized in the broader national conception of what is considered “Uzbek,” thereby constructing and subsuming the locations and local histories of modern Uzbekistan into a unified national memory creating an “Uzbek” identity. By doing this, Uzbekistan ties itself to everything important historically that comes before it, especially Timurid history to which the Uzbeks are benefactors despite not being direct descendants. References to history permeate Uzbek currency precisely for the purpose of imbuing the national memory with the histories of the region that some may, and quite successfully, argue does not belong to contemporary Uzbekistan. By issuing a common currency with specific iconography, the Uzbek government does a number of things: first, it enshrines the places, peoples, and landscapes on their currency as “Uzbek”; second, it defends the territory against rivaling claims of history, identity, or customs; and third, it aids in the creation of an “imagined community.”

My discussion of government narratives of national origin/memory/identity continues with my interrogation of the Shibanid Question in Chapter 5, “Textbook Nationalism: 16th Century Uzbek History from a 21st Century Perspective.” Uzbek history textbooks serve to reinterpret and reclassify Uzbek history. We can see from early post-Soviet textbooks that major

efforts were taken to rewrite certain parts of Uzbek history. For example, the Basmachi movements of the 1910s and 1920s are now cast in the image of freedom and independence movements. Classical Turkish and Persian texts were used purely for didactic reasons, and this was mainly due to the lack of a “political self” in Uzbek literary production. Beginning in 1993, Uzbekistan opted to teach history as a course for all students, rather than just in higher grades. These early textbooks, however, were very much still in the Soviet historiographical tradition.

Soviet traditions are clear in the methodologies of teaching history and culture. Uzbek historians try to build chronological continuity that incorporates historical figures and works that may seem to belong more to other ethnic groups. In doing so, Shibanid history was sidelined in the early years of independence, and it is still somewhat of a difficult issue for the nation-state to incorporate. The textbooks used in this chapter show the continuity between independent Uzbekistan and the Uzbek SSR. For example, the Soviets, like Yakubovskii and local intellectuals adopted ‘Alī Shīr Navā’ī as the father of the Uzbek language, and this is still the case in textbooks. Though he wrote in Chagatai, what Yakubovskii termed *stariy uzbek* (*eski uzbek*, in modern Uzbek), his legacy is used to compete with the longevity of the Persian literary tradition of the region. From a historical perspective, the events of the 20<sup>th</sup> century have led to the trends we see in contemporary Uzbekistan.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Fierman explains the development of language formation, transformation, and implementation. A variety of factors proved crucial to the processes of script change in the 20<sup>th</sup> century: the modernization and standardization of terminology, the implementation of these standardized forms, the monitoring of usage and dissemination, and the regulation of the orthographic changes. The approach that was taken in Uzbekistan was one of language development for the purposes not only of progress, but for social identity construction. If we look at language within a historical framework, we see the symbolism that orthography and script takes both in the process of writing and in the realm of national and ethnic identity. Soviet discourses on ethnic identity included debates over orthography and script, which stemmed from the imperial expansion of the tsarist regime, and it was these imperial intellectuals who were keenly aware of the regional usages of Chaghatai, Persian, and to some extent Arabic. As such, a

Through different methods and source bases, each chapter reveals the place of Shībānī Khān and the Shibanids. In the concluding chapter, I briefly lay out the import of Shībānī Khān's contributions to the national history of Uzbekistan, and I analyze the implications of what I term "Uzbekistan's lost century": the 16<sup>th</sup> century. At its core, this dissertation plots the development of Uzbek nationalism, and it provides voice to the history that has so thoroughly been written out of the national narrative. I show why this history had to be excluded for Soviet and post-Soviet Uzbekistan, and why its exclusion is still so prevalent in the nation-making narrative. This

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break from the Islamic world and past came with the introduction of a modified Latin script for Central Eurasian languages. At the same time, though, successful Latinization efforts in the new Turkish Republic began causing suspicion among Soviets who now saw Turkey as an external threat to Moscow's rule over Eurasia. Again, the Soviets argued for change, and beginning in 1937, Central Asian Turkic languages shifted toward the use of Cyrillic scripts. While one of the objectives of the Latinization project from the decade before had been to create more unity among Turkic languages, the goal of the Cyrillicization project was the opposite. Baskakov, a Soviet Turkologist, was a proponent of Cyrillic because it was meant as a conduit for Russification, or at least assimilation of the Russian language and culture with local ones. The implementation of Cyrillic script allowed the introduction of Russian words into Turkic languages without needing to adapt those words to fit linguistic and grammatical rules. In fact, words with Russian origin were to be adopted by Turkic languages exactly as they appeared in Russian. The mass importation of Russian words was an achievement for the Soviets, since Turkic peoples would now have the opportunity to easily adjust to and adopt Russian as a lingua franca. Unlike the Latinization efforts, Cyrillicization enabled the formation of difference for the Soviets among Turkic groups. In order to do this, there was never a unified Cyrillic Turkic alphabet. Instead, the Soviets "created" different alphabets for each Turkic group. For example, Uzbek had four additional letters to the Russian Cyrillic alphabet, where Kyrgyz had three, and Kazakh nine. These letters were, of course, meant to supply written forms of vowel harmony and regional differences, but the creation of extra letters added to the feeling of difference among Turkic groups. The promotion of Uzbek as a national language began in 1989 before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in order to promote Uzbek and offsetting the dominance of Russian in the UzSSR. In 1993, after two years of conferences and symposia with other post-Soviet nations and Turkey, Uzbekistan's parliament passed a law ordering the introduction of the newly adopted Latin alphabet. Students in the first grade would learn to read in Latin at the beginning of the 1994 academic year. Through media, advertisements, and private courses, the rest of the population would have until 2000 to switch from Cyrillic to Latin. That deadline was pushed back twice, and it is clear from recent publications that Cyrillic is still very much considered the norm in scholarly publication. See Fierman, William. *Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience*. (Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2011).

project is not simply acting as restorative justice for the 16<sup>th</sup> century but points out the driving force that undergirds all of the nation-making historiographies of Uzbekistan that—on the surface—may seem not to have anything to do with the Shibanids. In a way, the lack of Shibanid history in the Soviet and post-Soviet frameworks lends to their active presence in that they are consistently having to be explained away. Their absence is, in essence, a perpetual presence in Uzbekistan's history.



[Figure 1.2] Map of Uzbekistan<sup>30</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Rafis Abazov. *The Palgrave concise historical atlas of central Asia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008: map 38



## Chapter 2 - From Qazāq to Khān: Shībānī Khān's Rise and Fall

In his conclusion to *Notes on the Study of Central Asia*, Bregel explains that Eurasian history lacks the wealth of primary sources available to scholars of other regions, yet the ambition and determination of scholars of Central Eurasia may lead to accurate and worthwhile scholarship.<sup>1</sup> His assertion that fair critiques must be made of scholarship as a means of maintaining the academic standards set by noteworthy specialists, such as Bregel himself, is still valid today. It is this determination then that drives the focus of this chapter on the Abū'l-Khayrids, namely the critical gap of scholarship on Muḥammad Shībānī Khān and his empire, the Shibanids. Given that 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century Central Eurasian history is composed of tribal and dynastic feuds, military expeditions, and various other intricacies, producing a cohesive narrative of this historical figure is a daunting task, which may very well be the reason for the dearth of scholarship on the matter. As such, this chapter attempts to provide a synthesized narrative of Shībānī Khān's life from his birth to his death and point to specific historiographical tropes that – while they served him well during the 16<sup>th</sup> century – came to be detrimental to the development of 20<sup>th</sup> century national identities (illustrated in subsequent chapters of this dissertation).

By utilizing 16<sup>th</sup> century sources, this chapter recounts Shībānī Khān's political and territorial gains and touches upon his mastery of political manipulation. Section I, "Scholarship and Sources," lays out the material available to construct a synthesized narrative. Section II, "Shībānī Khān's Early Years (1451-1469)," explores Shībānī Khān's childhood and the loss of his grandfather's empire, which pushes him into a period of *qazāqlīq* (ambitious brigandage).

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<sup>1</sup> Yuri Bregel, *Notes on the Study of Central Asia*, (Bloomington: Indiana University, Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1996): 60-61.

Section III, “Shībānī Khān’s Period of *Qazāqlīq* (1469-1499),” explains Shībānī Khān’s adept knowledge of the Central Asian political landscape and his ability to maneuver the waning Timurid Empire. Section IV, “Shībānī Khān’s Consolidation of Power (1499-1509),” narrates the creation of the Shibaniid (Abū’l-Khayrid) Empire through the conquest of major southern Central Asian cities. Section V, “Shībānī Khān’s Demise (1509-1510)” is an in-depth analysis of Shībānī Khān’s interactions with Shāh Ismā‘īl , and the latter’s political and militaristic outmaneuvering of the former. The last section of this chapter, “Conclusion,” touches briefly on the religio-cultural developments of the Shibaniid Empire and serves as an entry point to discuss Shībānī Khān’s own writings presented in chapter 3.

### ***(I) - Scholarship and Sources***

The usual scholarly approach to Shībānī Khān is to treat him and his period only in relation to other leaders, and writers often provide scant information about this Eurasian conqueror. Bregel provides this description:

His given name was Muhammad Shahi Bek (or Sheybek) and his nickname Shah-Bakht, while Shībani was his pen name, derived from the name of his Jochid ancestor, Shīban; in the sources of the 16<sup>th</sup> century the given name and the pen name were frequently combined in one as ‘Muhammad Shībani Khan.’ (The pen name was later often misunderstood as ‘Shaybani,’ by analogy with the name of a well-known Arab jurist of the 8th century.)<sup>2</sup>

This detail is not only useful, but unique, since he is one of few scholars who directly address various minutiae of Central Asian history, such as the multiple names of Shībānī Khān.

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<sup>2</sup> Bregel, *Atlas*, 50. For a thorough discussion of controversy surrounding the spelling of Shibani Khan (Shaybani Khan), see Maria Eva Subtelny. “Art and Politics in Early 16<sup>th</sup> Century Central Asia”. *Central Asiatic Journal* 27.1/2 (1983): 121-148.

Of the newer pieces of scholarship available on Central Eurasia, Di Cosmo, Frank, and Golden's *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age* deals broadly with, as the title suggests, the Chinggisid Age,<sup>3</sup> covering the history of the Mongol Empire and its successor states. Since the period and geographical space of Central Asia are vast, there are only two essays that specifically cover the Shibanids. First, Yuri Bregel's "Uzbeks, Qazaqs and Turkmens,"<sup>4</sup> though not exclusively about the Shibanids, reveals some insightful facts about Shībānī Khān's early years. In fact, much of the information provided by Bregel is useful in constructing the early years of Shībānī leading to the rise of the Shibanid Dynasty. Bregel writes,

A grandson of Abu'l-Khayr, Muhammad Shah-Bakht [...] tried to carve out for himself a part of his grandfather's *ulus*, but was only able to capture a region along the northern bank of the Syr Darya [...] Shibani Khan apparently abandoned his hopes of restoring the authority of his family in the Dasht-i Qipchaq and, instead, embarked upon the conquest of the Timurid states in Mawarannahr and Khorasan, which was accomplished in the first decade of the sixteenth century.<sup>5</sup>

Bregel's brief but discerning outline of Shībānī allows him to draw connections between this time period and the evolution of political terms, such as "Uzbek"<sup>6</sup> and "Qazaq," which are used in contemporary terms — that is, in modern Uzbekistan — to distinguish the two ethnic groups.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Di Cosmo, Nicola, Allen J. Frank, and Peter B. Golden. *The Cambridge history of Inner Asia: the Chinggisid age*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Though one can argue that the Chingissid Age penetrated well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the last essay of this collection, Yuri Bregel's "The New Uzbek States: Bukhara, Khiva and Khoqand: c 1750-1886," ends in the mid 1880s. See pages 392-411.

<sup>4</sup> Bregel (2009), in *Chinggisid age*, 221-236.

<sup>5</sup> Bregel (2009), in *Chinggisid age* 227-228.

<sup>6</sup> For a more complete discussion on the controversy behind the term "Uzbek" and the construction of contemporary Uzbek identity, see Matteo Fumagalli, "Ethnicity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and 'Uzbeks abroad,'" *Central Asian Survey*, 26 (March 2007):109; A. Ilkhamov, "Archeology of Uzbek Identity," *Anthropology and Archeology of Eurasia*, 44 (Spring 2006): 10-36; and P. Shozimov, "Rethinking the Symbolic Scope of Uzbek Identity," *Anthropology and Archeology of Eurasia*, 44 (Spring 2006): 47-51.

<sup>7</sup> Bregel (2009), in *Chinggisid age*, 228-229.

An argument can be made that the notion of “Uzbek identity” arises from this period, when Shībānī resolves to embark on conquests in the weakened Timurid states, and it is this argument exactly that Soviet scholars attempt to dismantle (see chapter 5).

The second chapter that is necessary to mention from this collection is Robert McChesney’s “The Chinggisid Restoration in Central Asia: 1500-1785.”<sup>8</sup> McChesney covers topics that are not discussed in the other sources, making it vital for a complete study of the Shibanids. McChesney delves into the issues of administration, the appanage system, and the succession of the Shibanids.<sup>9</sup> He writes,

The Abu’l-Khayrid Shibanids also revived seniority as a qualification for office, making succession to the khanate unpredictable and giving rise to more or less formal institution, of the *qaalkhan* (*qaalghah*, *qonalghah*) or heir-apparent, a compromise with the Perso-Islamicate system of lineal succession.<sup>10</sup>

He concedes, however, “From 1488-1500 the sources are silent about Muhammad Shibani.”<sup>11</sup>

McChesney then moves to discuss the rise of the Abū’l-Khayrid dynasty under Shībānī’s rule.

Gülay Karadağ Çınar’s article, “İki büyük Türk hakanı Şah İsmail ve Şeybani Han arasındaki söz düellosu,”<sup>12</sup> systematically presents a case through the letters of Shībānī Khān and Shāh Ismā‘il and of the two leaders’ desires to rule the region of Khorasan. After the establishment of Safavid rule in Iran and Shibanid rule in Central Eurasia, the two heads of their respective dynasties contended for the highly prized region of Khorasan, establishing relations

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<sup>8</sup> McChesney (2009), in *Chinggisid age*, 277-302.

<sup>9</sup> For further discussion of the Uzbek political institution, see Martin Dickson, *Shah Tahmasb and the Uzbeks (The Duel for Khurasan with ‘Ubayd Khan: 930-946/1524-1540)*, Ph.D. Diss.. Princeton University, 1958, 20-37.

<sup>10</sup> McChesney (2009), in *Chinggisid age*, 280.

<sup>11</sup> McChesney (2009), in *Chinggisid age*, 292.

<sup>12</sup> Gülay Karadağ Çınar, “İki büyük Türk hakanı Şah İsmail ve Şeybani Han arasındaki söz düellosu” in *International Journal of History* 3/2, 2011: 75-87.

through the passing of letters. Ultimately, the Uzbek leader lost the battle and his life in 1510.

Çınar establishes that the letters begin quite formally from both parties, slowly escalating in their violent rhetoric. Notably, Shībānī Khan's petulance and rash behavior led to his demise.<sup>13</sup> In addition to their desire of acquiring Khorasan, the letters represent the deep-seated anxieties from both parties regarding religion. The Safavid rise marks the institutionalization of Shi'ite doctrinal practices in clear opposition to what emerges as Ottoman and Uzbek Sunni rule.<sup>14</sup>

Interestingly, Çınar's approach to the set of letters serves as a valuable comparison to two anonymous letters presented in Lütfi Paşa's *Tevārīḥ-i Āl-i 'Osmān*. In his introduction, Lütfi Paşa, the Ottoman Grand Vizier under Sultān Süleyman, presents two letters from Central Eurasian members of the '*ulamā*' depicting Sultān Selīm, Süleyman's predecessor, as the renewer of Islam and the harbinger of order to the chaos caused by Shāh Ismā'il's rule. The arising Shi'i influence in eastern Anatolia and the forceful nature of Shāh Ismā'il in imparting his vision of a "heretical" world caused much of this turmoil.<sup>15</sup> The first letter, written in Chagatai, presents Sultān Selīm as a messianic figure who has saved the righteous Sunni population from the heretical figure, Shāh Ismā'il. The second letter in Lütfi Paşa's introduction, written in Persian, consists of fifty lines depicting Sultān Selīm as the second Alexander and a world conqueror. Much like the first letter, this one begins with Selīm's accomplishment in forestalling the spread of Shi'ism.<sup>16</sup> The letters that Çınar analyzes present valuable insights from yet another Sunni, Shībānī Khan, and the antagonist himself, Shāh Ismā'il.

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<sup>13</sup> Çınar, 86.

<sup>14</sup> Çınar, 79.

<sup>15</sup> Lütfi Paşa, *Tevārīḥ-i Āl-i 'Osmān*, ed. 'Alī Bey, (Istanbul, 1925): 12.

<sup>16</sup> Lütfi Paşa, 15.

For the study of 16<sup>th</sup> century Central Eurasia, there are numerous sources written in Persian and fewer in Chagatai. Whereas authors of sedentary backgrounds generally wrote in Persian, those with nomadic or tribal backgrounds wrote in Chagatai. Few of the extant sources have yet to be critically translated or analyzed, despite the broad information they provide. The 16<sup>th</sup> century included a wave of new historiography produced in post-Timurid Central Eurasia under the Uzbeks. The Uzbeks<sup>17</sup> displaced the Timurids and brought a new influx of Turkic populations to the region. This accelerated the Turkification of the region's settled peoples and greatly affected the subsequent historiography of Central Eurasia. It was early in his rule that the Uzbek leader, Shībānī Khān, commissioned his court biographer, Bannā'ī to write the *Shībānīnāma*. According to Kubo, Bannā'ī relied heavily on the anonymous Turkish text of *Tavārīkh-i Guzīda-yi Nuṣratnāma*.<sup>18</sup> The latter text is somewhat problematic, but it does provide detail on Shībānī Khān's invasion and conquering of Samarkand. *Nuṣratnāma* is also important for its use in later Persian historiography, namely the work of Khwāndamīr's *Ḥabīb al-siyar*. And Bannā'ī also authored *Futūḥāt-i khānī*, an expanded version of his *Shībānīnāma* utilized in this chapter. Bannā'ī's work mirrors that of Muḥammad Ṣālīḥ who also wrote a *Shībānīnāma* at a

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<sup>17</sup> The Abū'l-Khayrid Dynasty (Shibānīd Uzbeks) in Mawarannahr, which differs from a second Uzbek dynasty that has the name 'Arabshāhid Shibānīds in Khwarazm, was formerly and somewhat erroneously called the Shibānīd Dynasty. In this paper, the term "Uzbek" is used to describe the Abū'l-Khayrid Dynasty. Contemporary scholarship only refers to the Abū'l-Khayrids as Uzbeks, but in sources from the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, the term denoted all nomads of the former Uzbek Ulus of the Golden Horde. See Clifford Edmund Bosworth, *The Encyclopaedia of Islam. Vol. 9*, (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 426; and see Martin Dickson, "Uzbek Dynastic Theory in the Sixteenth Century", in *Proceedings of the 25<sup>th</sup> International Congress of Orientalists*, vol. 3, (Moscow, 1963): 208-209.

<sup>18</sup> Kazuyuki Kubo, Bannā'ī's *Shībānī-nāma*, in *A Synthetical Study*, by Eiji Mano (Kyoto, 1997), 65. Kazuyuki's text appears within the pages of Eiji Mano's publication, *A Synthetical Study on Central Asian Culture in the Turco-Islamic Period*. This project is devoted to the study of Ḥaydar Dughlāt's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, which includes an extensive introduction and analysis of the text in Japanese.

later time. Khwāndamīr's *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, written in Persian, provides information for the history of the early Abū'l-Khayrids. Faẓl Allāh ibn Rūzbihān Khunjī-Isfahānī's Persian texts, *Mihmānnāma-yi Bukhārā* and *Sulūk al-mulūk*, are excellent sources for Shībānī Khān's early *qazāq*<sup>19</sup> period, the expulsion of the Timurids from Central Eurasia, Uzbek administrative practices, notions of sovereignty, military organization, and agrarian and taxation systems. The anonymous Persian manuscript *Tārīkh-i Shībānī Khān va mu'ālamat bā avlād-i Āmīr Tīmūr Khān*. Mas'ūd ibn 'Uthmān Kūhistānī's Persian *Tārīkh-i Abū'l-Khayr Khānī*, written for 'Abd al-Latīf, highlights the power of Abū'l-Khayr Khān during the Timurid period. Ḥāfiẓ Tanīsh al-Bukhārī's Persian *'Abdullāhnāma* (also referred to as *Sharāfnāma-yi Shāhī*) is a genealogical resource for Shībānī Khān, written in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century as an observation of the Uzbek-Safavid encounters of the previous century. Vāṣifi's Persian memoir, *Badāyi' al-vaqāyi'*, gives a detailed account of the Uzbek-Safavid conflicts and Uzbek-Timurid struggles, socioeconomics, and the politics of court nobility. Iskandar Beg Munshī's *Tārīkh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī*, a Persian history of the Safavid Dynasty, includes systematic entries in mostly chronological order, some of which are quite useful for Uzbek history. This source is one of the few available for studying later Abū'l-Khayrid history. Two sources that provide opposing perspectives to those

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<sup>19</sup> A *Qazāq* period (*qazāqlik*; *zamān-i qazāqī*) can be defined as a period during which a young leader is deprived of their patrimony, is forced to defend against rivals for the throne, or is forced to find a method of creating a political circle through ingenuity. For a thorough discussion on the matter, see Maria Eva Subtelny, "Babur's Rival Relations: A Study of Kinship and Conflict in 15<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> Century Central Asia", in *Der Islam* 66:1, (Berlin, 1989): 103; also, see Joo-Yup Lee, *Qazaqliq, or ambitious brigandage, and the formation of the Qazaqs: state and identity in post-mongol Central Eurasia*, Leiden: Brill, 2016.

that may favor the Abū'l-Khayrids are Bābur's Turkish *Bāburnāma* and Ḥaydar Dughlāt's Persian *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*.

## (II) - *Shībānī Khān's Early Years (1451-1469)*

*When the great judge and disposer of all things determines to exalt some mortal with the crown of sovereignty and make him illustrious, he so arranges that great warriors and intelligent councilors assemble round his person, who may defend him from his enemies and ill-wishers, and make all far-sighted men blind and all attentive men deaf, so that father and son, brother and brother, are at enmity with one another. These words may serve as a preface to the story of Shahi Beg Khan.*<sup>20</sup>

Shībānī Khān was born in 1451 as Muḥammad ibn Shāh Būdāq Sulṭān ibn Abū'l-Khayr Khān. At the time of Shībānī's birth, his grandfather, Abū'l-Khayr Khān, was at the peak of his military career having surpassed a number of other steppe warlords descending from Shībān, Chinggis Khan's grandson and Jūchī's fifth son. Abū'l-Khayr Khān called Shībānī "Shāh-i Bakht," or the king of fortune, anointing him as a great future leader of the Uzbek people.<sup>21</sup> Because of the stature of the family to which he was born, Shībānī was privileged with a sense of grandeur that later manifested in taking up his grandfather's mantle to conquer southern Central

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<sup>20</sup> Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥaydar Dūghlāt, *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī: A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia*. E. Denison Ross, trans. London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1895: 166; Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥaydar Dūghlāt, and W. M. Thackston. *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*. English translation & annotation by W.M. Thackston. (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1996): 99 [folio 67]: "When the Absolute Omniscient and True Ruler, in accordance with His infallible wisdom and incontrovertible command, wills that one person be ennobled with the crown of rule and elevated among his peers, first of all the means to accomplish this are brought into existence in such a manner that wherever there are warriors and people who know how to rule, they gather around him from all directions, while those who are opposed to him are so afflicted with the negligence arising from conceit and pride that those who have eyes to see are blinded and those who have ears to hear are deafened as son revolts against father and brother against brother."

<sup>21</sup> The term "Uzbek" was a general designation that was affixed to the Jochid Ulus after the rule of Uzbek Khan (r. 1313-1341). Over time, this term came to be associated with Abū'l-Khayr Khān's empire, and later, Shībānī Khān's empire. See Lee, Joo-Yup. *Qazāqliq, or ambitious brigandage, and the formation of the Qazāqs: state and identity in post-mongol Central Eurasia*. (Leiden: Brill, 2016): 124.



Asia. Since his father, Shāh Būdāq died when Shībānī was a child, Shībānī's future, along with that of his brother's, Maḥmūd Sulṭān Bahādur,<sup>22</sup> were entrusted to Abū'l-Khayr Khān, and in turn, to the posse surrounding this military figure. Our sources indicate that loyal followers of Abū'l-Khayr Khān were tasked with protecting the young boys. Bannā'ī writes a verse to the youths, "Protecting them showed diligence, and soon each of these conquerors will rise to govern the world and eradicate oppression, unbelief, and rebellion from the land of the people of faith."<sup>23</sup>

When Shībānī was a child, Abū'l-Khayr Khān's authority was challenged when members of his tribal confederacy defected from him – namely, Girāy and Jānībeg.<sup>24</sup> By 1468, when

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<sup>22</sup> Born 1454. Abū'l-Khayr Khān called him "Bahādur." See Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, ed. Kazuyuki Kubo. (Kyoto, 1997): 7. All translations for Bannā'ī's *Shībānīnāma* are my own.

<sup>23</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 9.

<sup>24</sup> Lee, Joo-Yup. *Qazāqliq, or ambitious brigandage, and the formation of the Qazāqs: state and identity in post-mongol Central Eurasia*. Leiden: Brill, 2016. Lee presents the formation of the early the role of Qazāqliq in the construction of a Qazāq identity separate from Uzbeks. The fourth chapter of this text, "The Qazāqliq of Two Rival Chinggisid Clans: The Formation of the Qazāqs and the Shibanid Uzbeks" masterfully engages with the source material in parsing the trajectory of Jānībeg Khān and Girāy Khān's separation from Abū'l-Khayr Khān's Uzbek ulus. Lee continues to narrate the new rise of the Qazāq-Uzbek ulus under the two "dissidents", after their long period of *Qazāqlik*. Further of importance for my study is the sections on Muḥammad Shībānī Khān's days of political vagabondage. Using primary materials, like Bannā'ī's *Shībānīnāma*, he gives detailed accounts of Muḥammad Shībānī Khān and his brother's, Maḥmūd Sulṭān, escape from Astrakhan after the death of Abū'l-Khayr Khān and Shaykh Ḥaydar. After providing a thorough narrative of the late 15<sup>th</sup> and early 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, Lee delves into the term "Qazāqliq" and provides an intricate discussion on Qazāq and Uzbek identity, and how Turks, Mughals, Qazāqs, and Uzbeks are similar/different. Lee's major approach in this study is done through his analysis of "ambitious brigandage" or Qazāqliq in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries. He does this by utilizing chronicles and histories commissioned by the Tīmūrīds, Uzbeks, Ilkhanids, and Mughals, and he further includes some Mongol sources. Relevant to our project is the discussion of Uzbek-i Qazāq and Uzbek-i Shiban that Bregel started in his work, and Lee continues in his. It is crucial to understand that for contemporary Uzbek ethnogenic studies, these variations in terminology become essential to the core understanding of modern ethnic groups (i.e. Uzbeks and Qazāqs). In another of his works, Lee provides an in-depth discussion of how Chinggisid and Tīmūrīd historians used the term "Turk" as a relational term to "Tajik" (sedentary Iranian population), and this is quite useful because we see the same discussions of relational terms appearing during the Soviet and post-Soviet eras.

Shībānī was eighteen years old, Abū'l-Khayr Khān died, leaving his empire's fragmented day to day leadership under Shaykh Ḥaydar, who was killed almost immediately upon taking power.<sup>25</sup> Shībānī, along with his brother and the rest of the family, saw the quick disintegration of the tribal confederation, but the core leadership remained intact as they fell into a three-decade long period of *qazāqliq*.<sup>26</sup> From 1469 to 1499, Shībānī underwent a period of ambitious brigandage – a ritualistic rite of passage (discussed in detail below) –, moving from place to place in search of support for his claim as the head of a tribal empire. Mostly, his followers were incapable of providing support for fear of retribution from rivaling tribes, especially from the Qazāq Empire led by the descendants Girāy Khān, a defector of Abū'l-Khayr Khān's confederacy. Nobles from one of the Turko-Mongol tribes of the region, the Qarachin, sided with Shībānī, providing him with a guard led by Ḥusayn Bahādur.<sup>27</sup>

As Girāy Khān and Jānībeg Khān pushed further for the alienation of Abū'l-Khayr's tribesmen, Shībānī requested aid from the Astrakhanid ruler, Qāsim Khān, Tughā-Tīmūr's descendant. Because of the vengeance of the Qazāqs on Shībānī, Qāsim Khān appointed the *amīr al-umarā'* of Astrakhan, Tīmūr Beg, as Shībānī's protector. This protection led Shībānī's enemies, spearheaded by a steppe warlord, Ibaq Khān, to attack Astrakhan and Qāsim Khān for providing shelter to Shībānī. After nearly eighteen days under siege, Shībānī and about one hundred followers fled Astrakhan with the knowledge that the city would inevitably fall to the

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See, Joo-Yup Lee, "The Historical Meaning of the Term 'Turk' and the Nature of the Turkic Identity of the Chinggisid and Tīmūrid Elites in Post-Mongol Central Asia" in *Central Asiatic Journal* 59 (2016): 101-132.

<sup>25</sup> *Tārīkh-i Shībānī* states that Shaykh Ḥaydar was a soft-spoken and weak man not fit to be a monarch, 94a-97b.

<sup>26</sup> Bannā'ī's *Shībānīnāma* covers the life of Shībānī Khān up to about 1502.

<sup>27</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 9.

steppe warriors. Shībānī's life was safeguarded by his valiant soldiers, but nearly forty of them died during the escape. As Subtelny elucidates in her study of Timur, valiant soldiers safeguarding their leader's life was referred to as *jānsipārliq* (pledging one's life for the leader); a true sign of *qazāqliq*.<sup>28</sup> Once free of the stranglehold Ibāq Khān held on the city, Shībānī was once again left to face the reality of being a wandering king with his enemies slowly encroaching on any territory he occupied.<sup>29</sup>



[Figure 2.1] Map of the Shibanid Conquests and Empire<sup>30</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Maria Eva Subtelny, *Timurids in transition: Turko-Persian politics and acculturation in medieval Iran*. (Leiden: Brill, 2007): 31.

<sup>29</sup> Kamal-ad-Din Ali Binai, *Shaybani-nāma*. Moskva: Direkt-Media, 2010: 15-17 (excerpted from C.K. Ibragimov, *Materiali po istorii kazakhskikh khanstv XV-XVII vekov*, Almati: Nauka Kazakhskoy SSR, 1969.). See also, *Tārīkh-i Shībānī*, 3-7.

<sup>30</sup> Altered map from Peter Sluglett and Andrew Currie. *Atlas of Islamic History*. London: Routledge, 2014: map 32, pages 56-57.

### **(III) - Shībānī Khān's Period of *Qazāqliq* (1469-1499)**

*There is no equating a crescent to a cup, and the eastern sun will understand this opposition. Not every head deserves the eminence of being above; this crown will be placed upon a head that knows mastery.*<sup>31</sup>

The right to rule was already preordained for Shībānī, or at least his grandfather had thought as much. Since there was no transition of power for Shībānī to take advantage of, he fell into a period that – for many Eurasian leaders – is called *qazāqliq*. In Eurasian history, the concept of a landless leader taking years to maneuver the political landscape and rise to power was fairly common. Some of the most prevalent characters of this era, like Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā, the ruler of Herat, or Bābur, the founder of the Mughal Dynasty in India, and even Timur himself, followed the same model that Shībānī did.<sup>32</sup> In many ways, this ritual becomes a rite of passage, and for Shībānī, it further legitimates his claim as *khān* since it shows his ability to participate in this Turko-Mongolian tradition and gain a huge following. This section illustrates how Shībānī managed to rise from being a landless *qazāq* (wanderer) to that of *khān*.

In the years leading up to 1479, nearly a decade into his *qazāqliq*, Shībānī slowly began gathering likeminded individuals who had once been part of his grandfather's empire, including a certain general named Buruch Ughlān. The few groups of soldiers and followers that joined Shībānī hailed him as their leader, providing him a status of legitimacy needed for greater, braver actions. One of the necessary evils of *qazāqliq* was plundering, which Shībānī, newly imbued with the support of his followers, felt necessary as a means of keeping his new military formation intact. One of his riskier attempts at reconquering territory for the distribution of

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<sup>31</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 11. This verse is in reference to the failed leadership of Shaykh Ḥaydar Khān after the death of Abū'l-Khayr Khān and the soon-to-be victorious Shībānī Khān.

<sup>32</sup> Subtelny, *Timurids in Transition*: 27-32.

goods among his followers took place in when he attacked Yūnus Khān's territory in 1479 near Turkistan.<sup>33</sup> Alongside Buruch Ughlān, Shībānī led raids to plunder booty for his growing military, and ultimately, Buruch Ughlān was able to defeat Yūnus Khān's military with a force of 20,000 men. While Shībānī and his followers were pillaging the city, Yūnus Khān regrouped and managed to disperse Shībānī's force, killing Buruch Ughlān after being seized by women and rendering Shībānī even weaker than his status prior to the failed invasion.<sup>34</sup>

Shībānī's repeated failed attempts to bolster his rightful position at the head of a sedentary civilization rendered his ability to fund his companions naught. Part of his yearning to conquer territory near Sighnaq had been to assert his own personality – and he did not lack in that! — by building upon the legacy of his grandfather. After 1479, however, his inability to secure any of his ancestral lands forced Shībānī to venture south toward Timurid lands. Working in Shībānī's favor, the Timurid Empire was looking less imperial by the year. At the beginning of the same decade that Shībānī lost his foothold in the steppe, Ūzūn Ḥasan of the Aqquyunlu wrested power away from the Qaraqyunlu in western Iran, further destabilizing the Timurid hold in the region. The appanaging of the Timurid Empire also served Shībānī by allowing him to manipulate the political system of southern Central Asia to his advantage in that major cities were ruled by different factions of the Timurid family. It was this socio-political situation coupled with his keen desire for power that urged him on to success by the end of the century.

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<sup>33</sup> Ross's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 114-115. Thackston's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 49 [folio 32].

<sup>34</sup> Ross's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 115-116. Ḥaydar Dūghlāt mistakenly lists Buruch Ughlan as Abū'l-Khayr's son. Ross notes that this might have been a confusion of another of Shībānī's names, but does not account for who this individual actually was to Abū'l-Khayr Khān. Thackston's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 49-50 [folio 32].

Shībānī's first stop in southern Central Asia was Turkistan, where the governor, Mazīd Tarkhān<sup>35</sup> invited him to reside. Shībānī's descent from Abū'l-Khayr Khān and his own renowned attempts at recapturing the steppe gave Shībānī a certain air of prestige to which Mazīd Tarkhān supplied the trappings of lavish hospitality. Noting his inability to launch any military missions from Turkistan, he accepted an additional invitation by Šūfī Bahādur to summer at Qarakul where he plotted with 'Alayka Sultān, Ḥamza Sultān,<sup>36</sup> and Sevīnch Khwāja<sup>37</sup> to raid his ancestral homeland to supply his new growing military entourage. As his group grew in Qarakul, Shībānī realized he could not pay his men with the goods he had previously extracted and returned to Turkistan for protection.<sup>38</sup> The growing power of his enemies, especially that of the Qazāqs under Girāy Khān,<sup>39</sup> made him all the weaker in his struggle to consolidate some power. Once Shībānī returned to Turkistan, Mazīd Tarkhān forced Shībānī out of the city to protect himself from the wrath of Girāy Khān.<sup>40</sup> It seemed that Shībānī's fortunes were diminishing even more. The major cities of Transoxiana were squarely in the hands of the Timurids, and he had no idea from where to mount any attack that would allow him to set up a base to establish power. He marched south, arriving near Sauran where

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<sup>35</sup> He was an amīr of Sultān-Aḥmad. Died 1512 at Kulmalik. Bābur. *Bāburnāma: Memoirs of Babur*. Annette Beveridge. London: Luzac and Co., 1922: 39-40 [f22-22b].

<sup>36</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 57-59 [f33-34b] and Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 14. 'Alayka Sultān and Ḥamza Sultān were Abū'l-Khayr Khān's cousins once removed.

<sup>37</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 14. Sevīnch Khwāja was Abū'l-Khayr's son and successor to the throne after Shībānī's death. For more details see, Ismā'īl Türkoğlu, "Şeybaniler," *İslam Ansiklopedisi* Vol. V: 45-47.

<sup>38</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 15-16.

<sup>39</sup> For the "beginnings" of the Qazāqs, see Ross's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 272-274. Thackston's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 176-177 [folio 131].

<sup>40</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 15-16.

Iranji Khān,<sup>41</sup> the ruler of the city, attacked Shībānī and destroyed any vestiges of his military, including his greatest military men. Those left alive fled.

With nowhere to turn, Shībānī sought shelter with a relative of Mazīd Tarkhān, ‘Abd al-‘Alī Tarkhān,<sup>42</sup> the governor of Bukhara. ‘Abd al-‘Alī Tarkhān treated Shībānī very much the same way that Mazīd Tarkhān had when Shībānī first arrived in Turkistan. ‘Abd al-‘Alī Tarkhān praised Shībānī’s valiant attempts at reconstituting his exceptional lineage, and granted him a position as a tutor to his son.<sup>43</sup> It is this one event in Shībānī’s life that changed his fortune from that of a wanderer to a settled, politically adept individual. From this moment on, Shībānī began his slow manipulation of ‘Abd al-‘Alī Tarkhān, taking advantage of every little consideration bestowed upon him. In the *Bāburnāma*, Bābur even writes, “This same ‘Abd al-‘Alī Tarkhān was the cause of Shaibānī Khān’s rise to such a height and of the downfall of such ancient dynasties” (i.e. the Timurids).<sup>44</sup> Shībānī spent his time in Bukhara learning the intricacies of Timurid socio-political life, which was useful to him later in setting up his own imperial vision. For two years in Bukhara, he began perfecting his Persian and learning from religious figures, like Mowlānā Muḥammad Khiṭā’ī, Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥāfiẓ Maḥmūd, and Khwāja Muḥammad Pārsā.<sup>45</sup> In the third chapter of this dissertation, I show how ṣūfī individuals like these had great impact on Shībānī’s own religious development. Due to his standing in Bukhara, Shībānī was able to

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<sup>41</sup> Bannā’ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 16-17.

<sup>42</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 38-39 [f21-22b].

<sup>43</sup> Bannā’ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 16-18.

<sup>44</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 39 [f21b-22]; Thackston’s *Bāburnama*, 39: “The direct cause for Shaybani Khan’s attaining such success and the ruin of such ancient families was this Abdul-Ali Tarkhan.” Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 166-172. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 99-101 [folio 67-68].

<sup>45</sup> Bannā’ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 17-18. Also see, Yuri Bregel, “Bukhara III. After the Mongol Invasion,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Vol. IV, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (Boston: Routledge, 1982): 516-517.

draw more of his old companions to join him, slowly giving rise to a prepared and established military to carry out expeditions and campaigns against the Qazāqs to the north and, later, the Timurids themselves.

‘Abd al-‘Alī Tarkhān tried unsuccessfully to keep Shībānī in Bukhara, knowing that Shībānī’s newfound power spelled trouble for those around him.<sup>46</sup> Shībānī’s own set task list included chasing down anyone who had slighted him and his legacy. His first bold move was against Burunduq Khān, the Qazāq leader. In the winter of 1481, Shībānī and his military companions hatched a plan to invade Burunduq Khān’s *qishlaq* (settlement) near Sighnaq. They were initially met with some resistance, but Shībānī’s men were able to subdue Burunduq Khān’s small retinue. This was the first step in Shībānī rebuilding his *ulus* in the image of his forefathers’ empire. His success against Burunduq Khān caught the attention of Shībānī’s father-in-law, Mūsā Mīrzā Manghit. Mūsā Mīrzā offered the loyalty of the Manghit tribe, and Shībānī gladly accepted, joining his father-in-law where he was lavished with treasures.<sup>47</sup> Shībānī and Mūsā Mīrzā’s combined military strength alerted the Qazāqs, one of whom, Burunduq Khān,<sup>48</sup> felt it imperative to break this dangerous alliance. Burunduq Khān gathered a great force and attacked the Manghits. Initially hesitant, Mūsā Mīrzā stayed back, but Shībānī gave a rousing speech which prompted all of his and Mūsā Mīrzā’s tribesmen to enter battle. They successfully resisted Burunduq Khān, then Maḥmūd Sulṭān, Shībānī’s brother, gave chase to the remaining enemies and looted their belongings. As a gesture to Shībānī for this second great victory, Mūsā Mīrzā gave his daughter to Sevīnch Khwāja.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Bannā’ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 18-19.

<sup>47</sup> Bannā’ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 19-20

<sup>48</sup> Girāy Khān’s son. For further details, see *O’zbekiston Milliy Entsiklopediyasi*. II Jild. (Toshkent: Davlat Ilmiy Nashriyoti, 2010): 718

<sup>49</sup> Bannā’ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 21-22.



While in Manghit territory, Shībānī hoped that his presence would satisfy the elites, allowing him to take the throne for himself. Even though Mūsā Mīrzā was in favor of Shībānī taking reign, Manghit nobles made it difficult for him to make any move upon the throne. Even with his great victories, Shībānī's persistence on creating an empire for himself made the Manghits uneasy. The Manghit nobles gathered for a large assembly where they officially denounced anyone outside of the tribe from taking the throne, ultimately excluding Shībānī from ever becoming their ruler. Not only was Shībānī not a Manghit, he was not a Chaghatayid. Given this slight, Shībānī had no choice but to take his followers and return to his conquered city of Sighnaq.<sup>50</sup> Almost immediately upon returning to Sighnaq, Maḥmūd Sulṭān ibn Jānībeg, the ruler of Suzaq and Sauran, invaded. Shībānī quickly gathered his forces and defeated the invading military. As retaliation, Maḥmūd Sulṭān joined with Burunduq Khān, the Qazāq who had previously attacked Shībānī and the Manghits and attacked Shībānī at Sunghunluq. Maḥmūd Sulṭān was killed in this battle. Shībānī's forces came out victorious.

Shortly after his battle at Sunghunluq, Shībānī received a letter from Sulṭān-Aḥmad Mīrzā, the Timurid ruler of Samarkand, requesting his protection on the northern border of his territory.<sup>51</sup> Sulṭān-Aḥmad Mīrzā, son of Sulṭān-Abū Sa'īd and paternal uncle to Bābur, was defenseless against raids from the northeast, especially from western Mughulistan. Since Shībānī had proved himself on the battlefield against such rivals as Burunduq Khān, Sulṭān-Aḥmad Mīrzā believed Shībānī would be able to fortify the northern flank and prevent any further disturbances from Mughulistan. Sulṭān-Aḥmad Mīrzā promised Shībānī the territory of Mughulistan should he be able to do what his forefathers, specifically Abū'l-Khayr Khān, had

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<sup>50</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 20-22.

<sup>51</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 27.

done in protecting Samarkand from northern invaders. Shībānī could not refuse this offer. He had been looking for a patron to protect him while he continued to build his military strength, and Sulṭān-Aḥmad Mīrzā's invitation to join his military entourage proved a valuable occasion for Shībānī to implement his own agenda.

On his way to Samarkand, Shībānī's reputation preceded him. A number of Sulṭān Aḥmad's rivals feared being attacked as Shībānī made his way through the region to Samarkand. Amīr Naṣīr al-Dīn 'Abd al-Khāliq Fīrūz Shāh, the ruler of Khwarazm, praised Shībānī and sent presents ahead of his arrival. Sulṭān-Ḥusayn of Qarabekkul did the same. Once in Bukhara, Sulṭān-Aḥmad Mīrzā's governor, 'Abd al-'Alī Tarkhān, received Shībānī and sent Maḥmūd Sulṭān, Shībānī's brother, ahead to Samarkand. Shībānī was shortly thereafter welcomed by Sulṭān-Aḥmad in Kul Malik where they drew up a plan of attack to defeat Sulṭān-Maḥmūd Khān, Yūnus Khān's son, and Mughulistan. Despite the rapport between the two, the palace intrigue of Samarkandi nobles' plot to kill Shībānī reached him, which caused somewhat of a divide in their relationship. Fearing being a casualty of the nobles' attempts, Shībānī chose not to attend court or dine with Sulṭān-Aḥmad. Regardless of these minor troubles, Shībānī continued to support Sulṭān-Aḥmad's plan to attack Mughulistan, and he marched with 150,000 men toward Syr Darya.<sup>52</sup>

Once at the battle site on the banks of Syr Darya, Sulṭān-Aḥmad's forces faced off with Sulṭān-Maḥmūd's. Over the course of the three-day confrontation, Shībānī yet again formulated a plan to benefit himself. Realizing an alliance with Sulṭān-Maḥmūd might serve him in the long run, he formulated a plan to switch allegiances. There are conflicting accounts of who initiated the negotiations for Shībānī's abandonment of Sulṭān-Aḥmad. Ḥaydar Dūghlāt explains that

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<sup>52</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 28-31.

Shībānī initiated negotiations with Sulṭān-Maḥmūd, but Shībānī's court chronicler says it was Sulṭān-Maḥmūd who approached Shībānī.<sup>53</sup> In either case, the events occur as follows: Shībānī ordered his men to attack Sulṭān-Aḥmad's forces from within their ranks, causing confusion among the tribesmen. As Sulṭān-Aḥmad's men began dispersing, large numbers of them fell into Syr Darya and drowned. Shībānī's court chronicler reports that a letter from the Mughals to Shībānī urged him to remember the ties between the Abū'l-Khayrids and Mughals, prompting Shībānī to give in to the suspicions he had of Sulṭān-Aḥmad and his court and switching sides.<sup>54</sup> Regardless of the actual reason, one fact remains: Shībānī acted in a manner that was consistent with his previous behaviors, and he took advantage of the situation to secure his own standing.

Shībānī's victory over Sulṭān-Aḥmad's forces was a boon to his military career, since he was now allied with an impressive military figure like Sulṭān-Maḥmūd Khān. This victory also served a major blow to the Timurids, which helped Shībānī later in his career. Shībānī remained by Sulṭān-Maḥmūd's side for a short while after the battle, taking advantage of the favors bestowed upon him by his new patron.<sup>55</sup> After some time, he realized that Sulṭān-Maḥmūd was providing nothing more than lip service to his greatness without actually availing himself of Shībānī's skills as a leader, so Shībānī decided to move to 'Abd al-'Alī's court at Bukhara. From there, Shībānī acted on an invitation to visit Qāzī Bitīkchī in Turkistan. Qāzī Bitīkchī offered Shībānī the fort of Arquq, and Shībānī accepted, handing the governorship over to his brother, Maḥmūd Sulṭān. While this new endeavor seems to have been a positive development for

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<sup>53</sup> Ross's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 115-117. Thackston's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 60-64 [folio 41-43]. Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 30-36.

<sup>54</sup> For a description of the events and Sulṭān-Aḥmad, see Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 33-40 [f18-23].

<sup>55</sup> Ross's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 118-19. Thackston's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 65 [folio 43].

Shībānī, it was rather a precarious move. Shībānī was spreading his military support too thin with his new hold on Arquq, his conquest of Uzgand, and his other holdings. Recognizing the intense threat Shībānī posed to the normal order of the region, Mazīd Tarkhān, the governor of Turkistan and former ally of Shībānī, allied with Burunduq Khān to attack Maḥmūd Sulṭān at Arquq. Simultaneously, Ḥamza Beg Manghit attacked Uzgand. Shībānī's forces were unable to withstand the onslaught from Ḥamza Beg, so they fled northward toward Khwarazm, ceding the territory to Ḥamza Beg. Arquq was sieged for months, but Maḥmūd Sulṭān was able to deliver a decisive blow to the joint forces of Mazīd Tarkhān and Burunduq Khān, retaining the city for Shībānī.<sup>56</sup>

The loss of Uzgand prompted Shībānī to besiege a number of towns, including Hisar before moving on toward Tirsak, a fort controlled by his followers.<sup>57</sup> Luckily for Shībānī, his fortunes were not all bad. He received yet another invitation from his Mughal ally, Sulṭān-Maḥmūd, to take control over the capital city of Turkistan, Otrar, as delayed repayment for Shībānī's changed allegiance. Sulṭān-Maḥmūd had managed to take control of the region after Shībānī's departure from Sulṭān-Maḥmūd's court following the Syr Darya battle. Shībānī quickly accepted, finally achieving a milestone in his career which would prompt further consolidation of his power in the region. For Sulṭān-Maḥmūd, however, this decision to grant Shībānī the governorship over Turkistan would prove disastrous. The relationship between the Mughals and the Qazāqs had historically been amiable, and that of Abū'l-Khayrids and Qazāqs had been adversarial. Because Sulṭān-Maḥmūd raised Shībānī's status, the Qazāqs were now subservient to the new governor, causing intense resentment toward the Mughals. Ḥaydar Dūghlāt says,

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<sup>56</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 34-36.

<sup>57</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 36-40.

“[They complained, saying:] ‘Shahi Beg Khan is our enemy; why did you send him to oppress us in Turkistan?’”<sup>58</sup> The straining of the relationship between the Mughals and Qazāqs led to two wars, further diminishing Sulṭān-Maḥmūd’s status. Shībānī’s status, however, continued to rise. He used his base in Otrar as a way to gain further ground in the region. His neighbors began voluntarily submitting to him because of his reputation, as was the case with the residents of Sauran who invited Shībānī’s brother to take the town away from its ruler, Qūl Muḥammad ibn Mazīd Tarkhān.

Mazīd Tarkhān and Burunduq Khān immediately set upon Sauran as they had when Maḥmūd Sulṭān had taken control over Arquq. Unlike their previous encounter, however, Mazīd Tarkhān and Burunduq Khān were successful in taking the fort and subsequently, taking Maḥmūd Sulṭān prisoner. Maḥmūd Sulṭān managed to escape imprisonment and make his way to Otrar to meet Shībānī, prompting the joint forces of Mazīd Tarkhān and Burunduq Khān, bolstered by a retinue from the Timurid leader, Sulṭān-Aḥmad, to attack Otrar. Shībānī’s forces were able to withstand the onslaught while Sulṭān-Maḥmūd Khān sent reinforcements to Shībānī, causing Burunduq Khān to sue for peace while Mazīd Tarkhān fell prisoner to Shībānī.<sup>59</sup> After this encounter, Shībānī was powerful enough to try an attack on his patron, Sulṭān-Maḥmūd Khān. Shībānī and his brother came up with a plan for Shībānī to attack Tashkent and Maḥmūd Sulṭān to pillage nearby towns while Sulṭān-Maḥmūd was away in Ferghana. Unbeknownst to Shībānī, Maḥmūd Sulṭān was to return to Tashkent quickly, and Shībānī was able to convince his patron that he was in Tashkent purely as a protector, not as a conqueror. His brother, however, did not realize Sulṭān-Maḥmūd had returned, and he continued to plunder, which caused Sulṭān-

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<sup>58</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 118. In Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 65 [folio 43]. “They claimed, ‘Shahi Beg Khan is our enemy. Why do you station him in Turkistan to oppose us?’”

<sup>59</sup> Bannā’ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 33-40.

Maḥmūd to capture Maḥmūd Sulṭān and attempt to kill him. Sulṭān-Maḥmūd then called upon Muḥammad Ḥusayn Mīrzā Kurgan, Ḥaydar Dūghlāt's father, for advice and he intervened to save Maḥmūd Sulṭān.<sup>60</sup> Shībānī offered Shahr-i Sabz as a fief to his brother's savior.

Regardless of this unfulfilled power grab, some major political shifts were taking place just south of Shībānī, which would lead to his great rise in the region as the head of a dynasty. In Timurid cities, Sulṭān-Abū Sa'īd's death had led to a number of succession conflicts, each of sons taking control of one or more major cities. Sulṭān-Aḥmad controlled Samarkand, Sulṭān-Maḥmūd controlled Badakhshan, Ulughbeg II controlled Kabul, and 'Umar Shaykh controlled Ferghana. Each one of Sulṭān-Abū Sa'īd's sons faced trouble as they died successively, leaving the cities in the control of people who would succumb to Shībānī's forces. Ferghana was passed to Bābur after 'Umar Shaykh's death, and Samarkand was passed from Sulṭān-Aḥmad who had ruled the territory for decades, to his brother, Sulṭān-Maḥmūd who ruled the city for less than a year before dying. Samarkand then passed into a brotherly rivalry between Bāysunghur Mīrzā and Sulṭān-'Alī, Sulṭān-Maḥmūd's sons, each of whom had separate military support for their claims to the city.<sup>61</sup> Ultimately by 1496, Bāysunghur Mīrzā had won the struggle and he invited Shībānī to aid in the defense of his claim to the city. His main rival, aside from Sulṭān-'Alī, was Bābur who had set his sights on taking Samarkand. Shībānī marched toward Samarkand but quickly reassessed the situation, avoiding entrance to this conflict for fear of weakening his power. He marched on to pillage Shahr-i Sabz and Qarshi but took no action in Samarkand. Bābur, for his part, continued his siege of the city, finally taking it 1497, forcing Bāysunghur

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<sup>60</sup> Ross's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 171. Thackston's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 99-101 [folio 67-68].

<sup>61</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma* 60-70 [f35-40].

Mīrzā to flee.<sup>62</sup> After only a short period in power, Bābur had to return to Ferghana, leaving Samarkand to fall to Sulṭān-‘Alī. This however did not work to Sulṭān-‘Alī’s benefit, as Samarkand and Bukhara had fallen to the manipulations of Tarkhān nobles, namely Bāqī and Mazīd.<sup>63</sup> This convoluted power struggle is what finally gave Shībānī his opening to gather his forces and make an attempt on Samarkand.

#### ***(IV) - Shībānī Khān’s Consolidation of Power (1499-1509)***

*As his power increased, so did his arrogance and ambition, and he held any other powerful prince in low esteem.*<sup>64</sup>

Shībānī’s period of qazāqliq manifested in what Subtelny characterizes as “contempt for sedentary society.”<sup>65</sup> Part of the Turko-Mongol tradition of qazāqliq was the constant pillaging of agricultural (sedentary) societies. Nomadic social, political, and economic practices often placed cities and towns in the crosshairs of nomadic exploitative measures, namely exhortative taxation or plundering.<sup>66</sup> Fear of losing the nomadic heritage to Persian sedentary life caused this hostility toward cities. For Shībānī, however, it seems he recognized the grandeur of the Timurid legacy and the territory that he was conquering. In this section, we will see consolidation of power, and in the next chapter, we will see how he – unlike the assessment Subtelny makes about nomads – comes to present himself as a sedentary figure.

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<sup>62</sup> Khusrow Shāh killed Bāysunghur Mīrzā in 1498. For Bābur’s gains and losses of Samarkand, see Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 60-90 [f35-54b].

<sup>63</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 121 [f76]. *Tārīkh-i Shībānī*, 95a-80b.

<sup>64</sup> Iskandar Beg Munshī, *History of Shah ‘Abbas the Great (Tārīkh-i ‘ālam-ārā-yi ‘Abbāsī)*. R.M. Savory, trans. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978): 59. Iskandar Beg Munshī. *Tārīkh-i ‘ālam-ārā-yi ‘Abbāsī*. 3 vols. Edited by Īraj Afshār. (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1971): 37 [folio 27].

<sup>65</sup> Subtelny, *Timurids in Transition*: 28.

<sup>66</sup> Anatoly Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, trans. Julia Crookenden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984): 198–99.

In 1499, Shībānī used the chaos and powerplays of nobles in the major cities of the waning Timurid empire to launch a series of raids against Samarkand.<sup>67</sup> These raids prompted Bāqī Tarkhān stationed at Bukhara to rush to the aid of Sulṭān-‘Alī, but Shībānī turned his attentions away from Samarkand to meet Bāqī Tarkhān head on near Dabusi<sup>68</sup> where he swiftly defeated his enemy and went on to siege Bukhara. Nobles in Bukhara did not have the wherewithal for a continuous fight with Shībānī, and they surrendered only after a few days. Reports from Bukhara quickly reached Samarkand, where the Tarkhān nobles were actively undermining Sulṭān-‘Alī and promising Bābur support for his invasion of the city.<sup>69</sup> Shībānī started toward Samarkand but before arriving, he received word from Muḥammad Šālih, the poet, who was in Bukhara at the time that the local notables were offering Bāqī Tarkhān entry to the city. Shībānī regrouped and returned to Bukhara to prevent Bāqī Tarkhān from taking the city, to which the latter immediately fled, taking refuge in Qarshi. Shībānī, frustrated by the actions of the Bukharans, ordered a purge of the elite, a massacre of the population, and heavy tax levy upon the remaining residents. Though cruel in action, this proved to be instrumental for Shībānī’s state-building effort, as it allowed him to appoint his brother as the ruler of the city, and appoint trusted officials in positions of power.<sup>70</sup> Once his power was consolidated in Bukhara, Shībānī chose to once again march on Samarkand.

In order to help prepare Samarkand for Shībānī’s attack, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Mīrzā Kurgan left his stronghold in Herat, saying to Khusrow Shāh at Hisar, “I look upon your gracious

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<sup>67</sup> Qureshi ed., Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar* v. I, 300-303. Thackston ed., *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II:490 [folio 276-277]

<sup>68</sup> This narrative appears in the 1993 textbook: Shībānī defeats Muhammad Boqī near Dabusiya castle (see chapter 5 of this dissertation).

<sup>69</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 118-123. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 60-70 [folio 40-45]. Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 190-196 [f122-126].

<sup>70</sup> Anon., *Tārīkh-i Shībānī*, 95a-80b.



visit as a blessing from God; for it is the season of Shahi Beg Khan's supremacy. My fear is that though this year his mind is set upon the conquest of other territories, he may next year turn towards this quarter. I have never been to war with the Uzbek, and do not know their mode of warfare."<sup>71</sup> It seems the Timurid elite had finally recognized the threat Shībānī posed to their power after all of the years Shībānī had spent slowly manipulating individual leaders and biding his time to strike. By the time managed to arrive near Samarkand, Shībānī already had begun laying siege to the city, forcing Mazīd Tarkhān and Bābur to migrate to Kesh. From within the city, Zuhra Begī Āghā Uzbek, Sulṭān-‘Alī's mother, began negotiating with Shībānī. She offered Samarkand to Shībānī in exchange for marriage and the promise that Sulṭān-‘Alī would remain as governor.<sup>72</sup> Khwāja Yaḥyā, a Naqshbandī ṣūfī leader and son of Khwāja Aḥrār, was one of the local nobles who was wary of Shībānī's plans, and he had preferred to maintain the status quo given his ability to manipulate the weakened Sulṭān-‘Alī. Shībānī sent an emissary, Jalāl al-Dīn Khān, into the city to negotiate for the surrender of Samarkand. Khwāja Yaḥyā refused to meet with Jalāl al-Dīn Khān, but Sulṭān-‘Alī accepted him. He was quickly convinced that the negotiation between Zuhra Begī Āghā Uzbek and Shībānī would have the best outcome.<sup>73</sup> Bābur writes regarding Zuhra Begī Āghā Uzbek, "As for that calamitous woman who, in her folly, gave her son's house and possessions to the winds in order to get herself a husband, Shaibānī Khān cared not one atom for her, indeed did not regard her as the equal of a mistress or a concubine."<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Ross's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 163-164. In Thackston's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 97 [folio 66]: "Your advent is a divine favor because it is the time of Shahi-Beg Khan's supremacy. My fear is that this year he may have the leisure to head in this direction. We have not done battle with the Uzbek before and do not know their tactics."

<sup>72</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 124-128 [f78-80].

<sup>73</sup> Anon., *Tārīkh-i Shībānī*, 94b-80b.

<sup>74</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 128 [f80b]. Thackston's *Bāburnama*, 117: "In her lust to get a husband, that wretched, feeble-minded woman brought destruction on her son. Shaybani Khan paid her not the slightest attention and regarded her as less than a concubine."

Since Khwāja Yaḥyā was suspicious of both Shībānī and Sulṭān-‘Alī, he put a constant surveillance team on Sulṭān-‘Alī. Sulṭān-‘Alī managed to escape prying eyes during Khwāja ‘Alī’s Friday prayers<sup>75</sup> and went directly to Shībānī’s camp at Bagh-i Maydan without consulting anyone. Shībānī received him indifferently. Before Khwāja Yaḥyā could stop the surrender, a number of amīrs had surrendered to Shībānī, and Shībānī’s camp sounded the drums of success. Khwāja Yaḥyā too surrendered, receiving a mixed reaction from Shībānī. He was first accosted by Shībānī, but later, when Khwāja Yaḥyā wanted to leave Shībānī’s court, Khwāndamīr writes that Shībānī said, “‘I forget the past and wipe out the ill will I have in my heart in respect of you.’”<sup>76</sup> His fate, however, was poor and he was soon killed after being expelled from Samarkand. Shībānī did not take the blame, saying it was two of his beys who did the deed. Bābur writes that Shībānī said, “‘His excuse is worse than his fault,’ for if begs, out of their own heads, start such deeds, unknown to their Khans or Padshahs, what becomes of the authority of khanship and sovereignty.”<sup>77</sup>

Shībānī, now as the legitimate power of the region and khān of his empire, took a number of measures to secure Samarkand. He first appointed Tarkhāns as the heads of government: Fāzil Tarkhān as the head of the treasury and his brother, Jān Wafā Mīrzā as the governor. Shībānī then set about currying favor with the ‘ulamā’.<sup>78</sup> Near Kan-i Gul, he granted audience to ṣūfīs and other religious leaders, giving certain figures high positions at his court. Jalāl al-Dīn

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<sup>75</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 127-128 [f80-80b].

<sup>76</sup> Qureshi ed., Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar* v. I, 302. Thackston ed., *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II:491, “What is past is past. Our devotion to you has erased the anger we felt, but henceforth you, like your fathers and forefathers, must not disobey us.” [Folio 278]

<sup>77</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 128 [f81]. Thackston’s *Bāburnama*, 118: “As the saying goes, ‘The excuse is worse than the crime.’ If begs have free rein to engage in such acts without the knowledge of their khan or padishah, what is the use of khanate or kingship?”

<sup>78</sup> Andras Bodrogligeti, “Muhammad Shaybani Khan’s Apology to the Muslim Clergy.” *Archivum Ottomanicum* 13 (1993): 85-100.

Khawānd, for example, was given the post of *shaykh al-Islām*. To shore up his hold on power, Shībānī Khān also sought to eliminate Sulṭān-‘Alī. Despite having entered negotiations with his mother to preserve Sulṭān-‘Alī’s life, Shībānī Khān grew tired of the constant oversight needed to keep Sulṭān-‘Alī at court. According to the *Shībānīnāma*, Sulṭān-‘Alī was contemplating suicide because of his loss of Samarkand and was later killed by Shībānī’s close allies.<sup>79</sup> Bābur explains that Sulṭān-‘Alī’s begs had planned an escape from Shībānī Khān’s court, but they were found out and executed. It seems Shībānī Khān’s consolidation of power included swift reneging of his promises and elimination of any persons who posed a legitimate threat to his newfound position.

Another of Shībānī Khān’s actions was that of gathering wealth. To undercut the nobles who were resistant to their new overlord, Shībānī Khān tasked his military with confiscating nobles’ property. Though he was attempting to protect himself, gathering the wealth of local nobles cost Shībānī Khān general support among those who were partial to his rule. Nobles and the population complained about Shībānī Khān’s ruthlessness in taxation and extortion, nostalgically recalling their lives under Timurid rule.<sup>80</sup> Shībānī Khān’s hold on power in Samarkand faltered quickly. The loss of support among the nobles along with his militarization of forts around the city furnished Khwāja Abū’l-Makārim with reason to negotiate with Bābur to invade the city.<sup>81</sup> With 240 men, Bābur proceeded to Hisar to join Khwāja Abū’l-Makārim. Other notables, including Qanbar ‘Alī, Abū’l-Qāsim Kūhbar, and Ibrāhīm Tarkhān deserted Shībānī Khān and also joined Bābur.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Bannā’ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 67-71. Beveridge mentions that other sources state Sulṭān-‘Alī drowned when he was drunk. Footnote in Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 128.

<sup>80</sup> Bannā’ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 70-81.

<sup>81</sup> Anon. *Tārīkh-i Shībānī*, 6b-9b.

<sup>82</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 127-131 [f81-83].

Bābur's joint mission with Khwāja Abū'l-Makārim was successful. He sent a retinue of 80 men to Samarkand to kill the night guards. Shībānī Khān, because of his base outside of the city in Kan-i Gul, was unable to prevent the attack. Rather than overstretch his military, Shībānī Khān allowed the city to fall to Bābur. The latter's military killed nearly 500 of Shībānī Khān's tribesmen and imprisoned his *dārūghachīs* (administrators). The Uzbeks fled the Timurid onslaught, and Bābur's military gave a short chase to Shībānī Khān but restricted their advance so that Bābur could consolidate his power in Samarkand before attacking Shībānī Khān with all out force. Miyankal, Shavdar, Sughd, and other forts fell or capitulated to the Timurids as the Uzbeks continued to flee.<sup>83</sup> Shībānī Khān's rivals quickly followed suit and started recapturing cities. Aḥmad Tarkhān took Dabusi and Bāqī Tarkhān, the previous leader of Bukhara, took Qarshi. Shībānī Khān, though, having regrouped, sieged Qarshi for three months, forcing Bāqī Tarkhān to surrender, then Shībānī Khān moved on to attack Dabusi, where he ordered a massacre of the population.<sup>84</sup> In retaliation for the mass slaughter of his kinsmen, Bābur quickly attempted to gather reinforcements for a decisive response. Sulṭān-Maḥmūd sent nearly 5,000 men, Bābur's brother, Jahāngīr, sent 100-200 men, and Bāqī Tarkhān responded to Bābur's call, having suffered himself at Qarshi, with 2,000 men. In April 1501, Bābur's forces attacked Shībānī Khān near Sar-i Pul (near Khwāja Kardzan), but Shībānī Khān's better organized and larger force quickly defeated Bābur. Huge numbers of Bābur's military were killed, and Bābur fled back to Samarkand with a small retinue of a dozen men where he entrenched himself for four months on the roof of Ulughbeg's Madrasa. After numerous failed attempts at attaining help from sympathetic leaders in neighboring regions, Bābur succumbed to Shībānī Khān's siege of

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<sup>83</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 135 [f86].

<sup>84</sup> Bannā'ī, *Shībānīnāma*, 75-81, Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 127-140 [f81-90].

Samarkand and sued for peace, and as part of the peace negotiation, Bābur gave his sister, Khānzāda Begum, to Shībānī Khān in marriage.<sup>85</sup> Gulbadan Begum writes, “At this difficult time, Shāhī Beg Khān sent to say: ‘If you would marry your sister Khānzāda Begum to me, there might be peace and a lasting alliance between us.’ At length it had to be done; and he [Bābur] gave the begum to the khān, and came out himself (from Samarkand).”<sup>86</sup> Bābur then fled with Khwāja Abū’l-Makārim to Andijan.

From there, Tanbal exiled him to Tashkent where Bābur spent time with Sulṭān-Maḥmūd.<sup>87</sup> Sulṭān-Maḥmūd, his brother, Sulṭān-Aḥmad Khān, and Bābur fortified Tashkent, knowing that Shībānī Khān might make an attempt on the city.<sup>88</sup> Shībānī Khān had been leading raids into nearby towns, threatening to attack Tashkent. As a ruse, Shībānī Khān marched toward Ura Tepe (modern Istaravshan) to mislead Bābur’s envoy, led by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Dughlāt, of his intent to invade. After a brief respite near Ura Tepe, Shībānī Khān and his forces quickly moved on to Andijan where he prepared to engage with Bābur’s forces who were sure to follow him. Bābur’s military advanced swiftly after Shībānī Khān, but Shībānī Khān had already reached Akhsi near Nāmangan and fortified himself with 30,000 men. Bābur’s forces were no match for Shībānī Khān having been split between Tashkent, Ura Tepe, and Akhsi. Shībānī Khān took Bābur’s forces hostage, treating them benevolently with the promise that Shahrukhiya would be surrendered to him. Ḥaydar Dughlāt writes that Shībānī Khān said, “I took you captive,

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<sup>85</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 137-148 [f87-95b].

<sup>86</sup> Gulbadan Begum, *Humāyūn-nāma: The History of Humayun*. Annette Beveridge, trans. (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1902): 85. Gulbadan Begum also provides a short biography of Khānzāda Begum, see pages 250-252.

<sup>87</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 150-151 [f97-98]

<sup>88</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 121-124. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 66-68 [folio 44-45].

but do not kill you; I let you go.”<sup>89</sup> Shībānī Khān then moved on Tashkent where the nobles, having heard of Shībānī Khān’s recent conquests, surrendered without much resistance. Bābur fled, whereas others in his entourage were put to death.<sup>90</sup> As part of the concession to Shībānī Khān’s victory, Sulṭān-Maḥmūd gave three women from his family to Shībānī Khān. Shībānī Khān married one of Sulṭān-Maḥmūd’s daughters, ‘Ā’isha Sulṭān Khānim, known as Mughūl Khānim. Shībānī Khān gave Sulṭān-Maḥmūd’s second daughter, Qutūq Khānim – who would become the grandmother of the last effective Shibanid ruler, ‘Abdallāh Khān II – to a valiant soldier named Jānībeg. Sulṭān-Maḥmūd’s younger sister, Dughlāt Sulṭān Khānim, was married off to Shībānī Khān’s son, Tīmūr-Sulṭān.<sup>91</sup> It was this victory over Bābur’s forces that Shībānī Khān further solidified his position as the preeminent khān of Central Asia, having successfully rooted out the most powerful Timurid leaders. His attention then turned to consolidation of power over other prominent cities, like Herat. The remaining adversarial powers in Central Asia resided with the leaders of Mughulistan, Sulṭān-Aḥmad and Sulṭān-Maḥmūd. The former passed away shortly after his encounter with Shībānī Khān. Ḥaydar Dūghlāt records an anecdotal exchange between Sulṭān-Aḥmad before his death in 1504 and the *shaykh al-Islām* of Mughulistan, Khwāja Tāj al-Dīn Muḥammad, in which Khwāja Muḥammad says,

When the [Aḥmad] Khan was extremely ill, I said to him, ‘It is commonly reported that Shahi Beg Khan has caused poison to be put in your food; if your Highness is also of this opinion, I will bring some of that powerful antidote, which comes from Khitai, and administer it.’ The Khan replied, ‘Yes, indeed, Shahi Beg Khan has poisoned me, and the poison is this: having risen from the most degraded station to the highest elevation, he has taken us two brothers prisoners and then set us at liberty. This disgrace is the cause of my

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<sup>89</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 159. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 94 [folio 64]: “Thanks to your strength I have attained such dominion and strength.”

<sup>90</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 178. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 104-105 [folio 71]. *Shībānīnāma*, 85.

<sup>91</sup> Hofiz Tanish al-Bukhoriy, *Abdullanoma: Sharafnoma-yi Shohiy*. Sodiq Mīrzāev, trans. (Toshkent: Sharq Nashriyot-Matbaa Kontserni Bosh Tahririyati, 1999): 74; and Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 160. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 104-105 [folio 71].

succumbing to illness. If yours is an antidote against this kind of poison, it may prove efficient.’<sup>92</sup>

Sultān-Maḥmūd, on the other hand, resigned his power to his nephews to spend five years wandering Mughulistan. By 1508, he had grown weary of life in Mughulistan, and he returned to Shībānī Khān’s territory in Ferghana with the desire of having a settled life in a more populous region. Shībānī Khān, who at this point was in Herat, was unhappy with Sultān-Maḥmūd’s arrival. Shībānī Khān sent an envoy to Khujand where Sultān-Maḥmūd and his children were captured and killed.<sup>93</sup>

After his encounter with Bābur, Shībānī Khān set his mind to reorganizing his power as a means of seeking greater security over other territories. He restructured the method of rule, appanaging his new empire as khanates to his relatives as a form of creating independent genealogical dynasties. Shībānī Khān put his brother, Maḥmūd Sultān, in charge of his capital city, Samarkand, and put Turkistan and Tashkent under his uncles’ rule – one of whom, Sevīnch, would become successor to Shībānī Khān. Other portions of his territory were given to notables. He charged Amīr Ya‘qūb with Shahrukhiya, Jānībeg Malik Sultān with Akhsi, and Maḥmūd Shāh Sultān with Andijan.

Forced with the reality of Shībānī Khān’s ascendancy in Timurid Central Asia, Sultān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā, the ruler of the last bastion of Timurid power in Herat, began dispatching envoys to his son, Badī‘ al-Zamān, and to others, like Khusrow Shāh, Zū al-Nūn Beg,<sup>94</sup> and Bābur, seeking a joint military response to Shībānī Khān’s conquests. Aware of the possible

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<sup>92</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 160. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 104-105 [folio 71].

<sup>93</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 129-131 and 156-163. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 96-97 [folio 65].

<sup>94</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 190-191 [f122-123]. Qureshi ed., Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar* v.II 7-8. Thackston ed., *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II: 498 [folio 294]

attack, Shībānī Khān sent an ally, Sayyid Ja‘far Khwāja, to Badī‘ al-Zamān under the pretense of seeking refuge and help against Shībānī Khān. Shībānī Khān’s plan was to have Ja‘far Khwāja convince Badī‘ al-Zamān’s nobles to rise against the latter. In his slow-moving coup plot, Ja‘far Khwāja informed Bāqī Tarkhān, the governor of Andkhud and former courtier of Badī‘ al-Zamān, of the plot. Despite his discontent with Badī‘ al-Zamān and invitation to Shībānī Khān to occupy Andkhud, Bāqī Tarkhān revealed the plot, leaving all of the nobles participating in this coup along with Ja‘far Khwāja to suffer arrest and execution. By the time news of this failed coup attempt had reached Shībānī Khān in 1503, he had already moved to Karki, near Andkhud. Shībānī Khān moved to attack Shibergan where he had an easy victory. Given his success, Shībānī Khān began besieging Balkh, where Badī‘ al-Zamān’s son, Muḥammad-Zaman Mīrzā, had fortified himself. With a small force, Muḥammad-Zaman Mīrzā was able to put up a strong resistance to Shībānī Khān’s 10,000 soldiers, ultimately killing 500 Uzbeks. To prevent further losses, Shībānī Khān sued for peace, but Muḥammad-Zaman Mīrzā refused. Shībānī Khān then continued his siege of Balkh for three months until finally giving up and destroying the surrounding region.<sup>95</sup>

Shībānī Khān then moved on to besiege Hisar. Badī‘ al-Zamān tried appealing to his father, Sulṭān-Ḥusayn, to send troops against Shībānī Khān, but Sulṭān-Ḥusayn, feeling safe in his territory of Herat, did not offer to help his son or the other Timurids fighting Shībānī Khān. Shībānī Khān went on a campaign against Jīn Ṣūfī in Khwarazm ordering Ḥamza Sulṭān to siege Hisar and Maḥmūd Sulṭān to siege Qunduz. Hisar and Qunduz fell quickly to the Uzbeks despite Badī‘ al-Zamān’s efforts to prevent this from occurring. He dispatched reinforcements to

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<sup>95</sup> Qureshi, ed., Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar* v. II, 11-13. Thackston ed., *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II:499-500 [folio 297-298]



Qunduz, but they did not arrive before the Uzbeks were successful. Badī‘ al-Zamān then fled to Herat to meet with his father and Muḥammad-Zamān Mīrzā about the Uzbek onslaughts in their former territories. By now, Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā must have seen the mistake of not helping to defend the region against the Uzbeks. Among the Timurid leaders, Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā had been the only one not engaging with Shībānī Khān. Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā, now realizing his unforced error, began imploring others like Bābur and Badī‘ al-Zamān for greater action. Bābur, however, remarks, “These letters threw us into despair; —for why? [...] how could hope live in a tribe or horde when a great ruler like Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Mīrzā, sitting in the place of Tīmūr Beg, spoke, not of marching forth to meet the enemy, but only of defense against his attack?”<sup>96</sup>

In early 1505, Shībānī Khān once again attempted a conquest of Balkh, which resulted in the destruction of the surrounding territory.<sup>97</sup> His supporters moved on and captured Maymana and Faryab, solidifying Shībānī Khān’s hold on the territory. This period, however, marked a shift in his relationship with the Mughals. Maḥmūd Sulṭān had been the chief operator liaising with the Mughals and controlling over 30,000 men, but he died shortly after his subjugation of Qunduz. Ḥaydar Dūghlāt says, “The death of Maḥmūd Sulṭān was a great loss to the Moghuls, for he was, in every respect, a thorough Moghul [and they recalled all he had done for them].”<sup>98</sup> For Shībānī Khān, however, his brother’s death did not seem to bother him much. Ḥaydar Dūghlāt continues,

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<sup>96</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 191 [f122]. Thackston’s *Bāburnama*, 163: “These letters of Sultan-Husayn Mirza caused despair [...] In this manner the people who had been disheartened by years of Uzbek disruption would take heart and become hopeful. If a great padishah like Sultan-Husayn, sitting in Temur Beg’s stead, said merely to fortify localities rather than to attack the enemy, what hope was left to the people?”

<sup>97</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 242 [f154b].

<sup>98</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 179. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 109 [folio 79]: “Mahmud Sultan's death was very difficult for the Moghuls because he had been their protector in all respects, and he always repaid favors done to him, as has been mentioned.”

He remained silent for a while, never showing the slightest change in his countenance, nor shedding a tear. At the end of an hour he raised his head and said: ‘The death of Maḥmūd is a good thing: men have been wont to say that the power of Shahi Beg Khan was upheld by Maḥmūd: let it now be known that Shahi Beg Khan was in no way whatever dependent upon Maḥmūd. Carry him away now, and bury him.’ Having said this, he turned away, and all present were astounded at his boldness and composure.<sup>99</sup>

After his brother’s death, though, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Mīrzā Kurgan [Ḥaydar Dūghlāt’s father], was problematic for Shībānī Khān, to whom Shībānī Khān had a messenger sent with a warning to allow for Muḥammad Ḥusayn to escape.<sup>100</sup> Once he fled, Shībānī Khān took his older daughter Ḥabība Sulṭān Khānish, and he gave her in marriage to his nephew, ‘Ubaydallāh Khān. Shībānī Khān then had a number of Mughals in the region killed, thrown into prison, or forced into his military expeditions further into Khwarazm, which took nearly eleven months. Jīn Ṣūfī, the region’s governor, had seen some military action with Shībānī Khān before, but without other Timurid protection, he was unable to withstand Shībānī Khān’s siege. Shībānī Khān had Jīn Ṣūfī put to death, then returned to his capital, Samarkand.<sup>101</sup>

Upon hearing of this incredible feat by Shībānī Khān, Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā once again gathered forces in early 1506 to attack the Uzbeks, but shortly after setting out, Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā died at Baba Ilahi, leaving his territory to be ruled jointly by his sons, Badī‘ al-Zamān

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<sup>99</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 179. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 109 [folio 79]. The death of Maḥmūd Sulṭān is disputed, since sources place it occurring in 1504 or 1505. Shībānī Khān had him buried in a mausoleum in which he himself and his successor, Sevīnch Khwāja, were buried later. See, R.G. Mukminova, *K istorii agrarnix otnoshenii v Uzbekistane v XVI v. Po Materialam “Vakf-name.”* (Tashkent: Nauka, 1966): 9-20.

<sup>100</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 191-197. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 116-118 [folio 81-83].

<sup>101</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 204. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 137 [folio 98]. Bābur says in contradiction to Ḥaydar Dūghlāt, “Just as [Jīn Ṣūfī] he was beating and forcing down the Auzbegs, his own page, in a discharge of arrows, shot him from behind.” Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 255 [f163]. Also see, *Shībānīnāma*, 83-86.

and Muẓaffar Ḥusayn Mīrzā.<sup>102</sup> Shībānī Khān's response to this news was swift: he gathered his forces and crossed the Amu Darya, marching south to pillage Murghab and Badghis, just north of Herat. To bolster his presence and influence in the region, Shībānī Khān sent an envoy with Mawlānā Khiṭā'ī to Badī' al-Zamān, imploring the latter to remember how previous Timurids relied on Abū'l-Khayr Khān, and now, as a descendant of Abū'l-Khayr Khān, the Timurids should submit to Shībānī Khān's authority.<sup>103</sup> Concurrent to Badī' al-Zamān dismissing the claims and requests put forth by Shībānī Khān, news arrived to Badī' al-Zamān that Shībānī Khān's forces had begun to overrun Balkh and Badakhshan.<sup>104</sup> Concerning this period of instability for the Timurids, Bābur's daughter, Gulbadan Begum says, "They set forth to him the inconvenience of winter and said: 'Wait till it is over and we will fight the Uzbegs.' But they could not in any way settle about the war. Eighty years long had Sultan Husain Mirza kept Khurasan safe and sound, but the mirzas could not fill their father's place for six months."<sup>105</sup> Bābur had joined the Timurid princes on 26 October 1506 because of his desire to preserve the reputation of the dynasty, though it is clear that the Timurids were insistent on warring from within during the winter before attacking the Uzbeks. Bābur writes,

At that time there was in Tīmūr Beg's territory (*yūrt*) no ruler so great as Sulṭān Husain Mīrzā, whether by his years, armed strength, or dominions; it was to be expected, therefore, that envoys would go, treading on each other's heels, with clear and sharp orders [...] so that men whose spirit years of Auzbeg oppression had broken, might be cheered to hope again. But how could hope live in tribe or horde when a great ruler like Sulṭān Husain Mīrzā, sitting in the place of Tīmūr Beg, spoke, not of marching forth to meet the enemy, but only of defense against his attack?<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Qureshi ed., Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II 26-29. Thackston ed., *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II: 509 [folio 317-318]

<sup>103</sup> Qureshi ed., Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II 58. Thackston ed., *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II: 538-539 [folio 377-378]

<sup>104</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 190-191 [f121-122].

<sup>105</sup> Gulbadan Begum, *Humāyūnnāma*, 88.

<sup>106</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 191 [f122]. Thackston's *Bāburnama*, 163: "At that date no padishah within Temur Beg's domain was greater in age, estate, or army than he. It would have

Bābur shortly left thereafter, needing to deal with insurrections in Kabul. The following spring, Shībānī Khān once again marched south and occupied Karki (Turkmenistan) on 13 May 1507, then marched on Andkhud.<sup>107</sup> By the following week, Tīmūr-Sultān, Shībānī Khān's son, had occupied Badghis, leaving Herat open for conquest. The Timurid princes were at a loss in their response to Shībānī Khān's approach. Badī' al-Zamān fled to Kandahar, while his brother, Muẓaffar Ḥusayn, remained in Herat to gather up the remaining loyalists for a final fight. Muẓaffar Ḥusayn approached the clergy and noble classes of Herat, but they were not willing to side with him. With no military or support, Muẓaffar Ḥusayn left the city.<sup>108</sup> On 20 May 1507, the nobles of the city surrendered Herat to Tīmūr-Sultān, accepting Shībānī Khān as their new leader. Vāṣifī writes of the encounter,

Word came that Shībānī Khān, who has sacked the city of Nasaf meaning the city of Qarshi, has arrived. Amīr Zu'lnūn Arghūn, who is the sipāhsālār and bahādur of that dynasty, rode out with ten thousand armed soldiers [...] The army of Shībānī Khān, like flood destroying its path, eradicated the men of Zu'lnūn Arghūn. He was killed in that battle, and the army of the khan, having taken his head, stuck it upon a lance and is now advancing. Upon hearing this, the princes as if they were affrighted asses, fleeing from a lion<sup>109</sup> disbanded and the khan, with fifty-thousand men, arrived near the city.<sup>110</sup>

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been expected that emissaries and commissars would be coming hard on each other's heels in all seriousness and urgency bearing orders, for example, to build boats at the Termez, Kelif, and Kerki crossings, gather material for bridges, and keep a close watch on the Toquz Olum fords above. In this manner the people who had been disheartened by years of Uzbek disruption would take heart and become hopeful. If a great padishah like Sultan-Husayn, sitting in Temur Beg's stead, said merely to fortify localities rather than to attack the enemy, what hope was left to the people?"

<sup>107</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 325 [f204b]. Qureshi ed., Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v. II 62. Thackston ed., *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II:537 [folio 374]

<sup>108</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 299-328 [f187-206].

<sup>109</sup> *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937: 74:50-51, page 1,647.

<sup>110</sup> Zayn al-Dīn Maḥmūd Vāṣifī. *Badāyi' al-vaqāyi'*. Edited by Aleksandr Boldyrev, ed. (Tehran: The Cultural Foundation of Iran, 1970): v. II, 275.

The inhabitants of Shībānī Khān's new city were not welcoming, and Shībānī Khān himself was not as benevolent as he could have been. The population initially rejected the arrival of the Uzbeks, and some of Shībānī Khān's men were killed. Once Shībānī Khān himself arrived, however, the population ceased its resistance, and the city's new leader levied heavy taxes as punishment. Merchants, artisans, and inhabitants of the city were forced to pay a tax, and nobles and *soyūrghālchīs* were to pay a tax and a *māl-i amānī* (security tax). Bābur writes, "Shaibaq Khan, after taking Herī, behaved badly not only to the wives and children of its rulers but to every person soever. For the sake of this five-days' fleeting world, he earned himself a bad name."<sup>111</sup> The day following the city's fall, Shībānī Khān's men entered Herat to plunder. Tax collectors were chosen to harass the nobles and give up their jewels, which went into Shībānī Khān's coffers. Before all of the taxes were paid, Shībānī Khān did not address his new public. After the punishment of these payments were met, Shībānī Khān ordered a public function where a number of high-ranking Timurid nobles were present, showing the inhabitants of Herat that the Shibaniid dynasty was now at the helm of power, and the Timurids no longer were to rule this territory. The week after Shībānī Khān's invasion, the *khuṭba* (Friday prayer) was recited for Shībānī Khān and Abū'l-Khayr Khān. Additionally, he adopted the titles of *imām al-zamān* and *khalīfat al-raḥman* (imam of the age and viceregent of God), proclaiming himself the defender of Islam (discussed further in chapter 3).<sup>112</sup> These efforts were the slow transformation of Shībānī Khān from nomadic conqueror to what he envisioned a great sedentary leader to be.

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<sup>111</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 328 [f205b]. Thackston's *Bāburnama*, 255-256: "When Wormwood Khan took Herat, he maltreated the princes' wives and children. Not only with them but also with all the people, even rustics and insignificant little people, he left behind a bad name for his love of this fleeting world." Thackston translates Shībānī as "Wormwood" because Bābur calls Shībānī "Shībāq" as a perversion of his name.

<sup>112</sup> Markiewicz points out that Faḏl Allāh ibn Rūzbihān Khunjī-Isfahānī declares Shībānī Khān imam of the age and vicegerent of God (*imām al-zamān* and *khalīfat al-raḥman*). He

To solidify his power, Shībānī Khān sent his nephew, ‘Ubaydallāh Sulṭān, and his son, Tīmūr-Sulṭān, to the surrounding forts of Herat to root out the remaining Timurid princes.<sup>113</sup> Many of the forts, including Sabzavar, Marv, Sarakhs, and Neratu fell without much effort. Much as he conquered Samarkand, Shībānī Khān put a number of loyal appointees in high offices in Herat and began appanaging his new territory. He appointed Jān Wafā Tarkhān Mīrzā, previously the governor of Samarkand, as *dārūghachī*. Khwāja Mu‘īn al-Dīn Ḥusayn Shabānkāra’ī and Mowlānā Ḥajjī Muḥammad Kūhīstānī were named *vazīr* (ministers). He appointed Khwāja Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Munshī and Mowlānā Khwāndamīr as *dīvān-i amlāk va asbāb* (estate managers).<sup>114</sup> Ayqam Chuhra was made *dārūghachī* of Qushung. He gave his son, Khurram Shāh,<sup>115</sup> born to Bābur’s sister, Khānzāda Begum, the city of Balkh. Tīmūr-Sulṭān received Samarkand and ‘Ubaydallāh received Bukhara. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, the

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elaborates that Khunjī-Isfahānī fulfills two roles, one as a jurist and one as a courtier, explaining how he held the juridical view that rulers could not be Viceregent of God (khalifat al-rahman) but also the courtier’s view that leaders could adopt the title. In his view, caliphs could be elected through the consensus of Muslims, designation, election through a council, or the forceful seizure of authority. While Markiewicz uses this one source, we see from Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, Bannā’ī, and other contemporaneous sources that the title was, in fact, used at Shībānī Khān’s court. See, Christopher Markiewicz. *The Crisis of Kingship in Late Medieval Islam: Persian Emigres and the Making of Ottoman Sovereignty*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019): 242-245; also, for more detail on the use of these titles by Shībānī Khān, see Shebl Ebaid, “Muhammad Shaybani Khan’s Coffin: New Light on the Monument.” *Iran* 50 (2012): 103-108.

<sup>113</sup> Beveridge’s *Bāburnāma*, 328 [f205b].

<sup>114</sup> Ghiyās al-Dīn Muḥammad Khwāndamīr. *Ḥabīb al-siyar*. vII Hamid Afaq Qureshi, English trans. (Lucknow: New Royal Book Co., 2007): 74-75. Ghiyās al-Dīn Muḥammad Khwāndamīr. *Habibu’s-Siyar, Tome three: the reign of the Mongol and the Turk*. Volume II (Cambridge: Harvard University, Dept. of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1994): 540 [folio 379]

<sup>115</sup> Gulbadan Begum writes of Khurram Shāh, “Khānzāda’s son by Shaibānī, Khurramshāh, died a young man. Shaibānī divorced her [Khānzāda Begum] because she leaned to her brother’s side in disputed matters.” *Humāyūnnāma*, 251.

court historian, was put in charge of Jam.<sup>116</sup> Shībānī Khān then proceeded to take a number of women from the Timurid household. Shībānī Khān married Khānzāda Khānim, the daughter of Aḥmad Khān, and Muẓaffar Ḥusayn's wife. Muẓaffar Ḥusayn's daughter, Mihr Angīz Begum, was given to 'Ubaydallāh Sulṭān.<sup>117</sup> Yet another mark of his recent achievement was the minting of coins, signifying the substantial shift Timurid power to that of the Shibanids.<sup>118</sup>

With Shībānī Khān's conquest of Herat, Bābur, the last-remaining major Timurid threat to Shībānī Khān marched on and conquered Qandahar.<sup>119</sup> Shībānī Khān gathered his forces to attack Bābur, and Bābur records his loss:

Strangers and ancient foes, such as are Shaibaq Khan and the Auzbegs, are in possession of all the countries once held by Tīmūr Beg's descendants; even where Turks and Chaghatais survive in corners and border-lands, they have all joined the Auzbeg, willingly or with aversion; one remains, I myself, in Kabul, the foe mightily strong, I very weak, with no means of making terms, no strength to oppose; that, in the presence of such power and potency, we had to think of some place for ourselves and, at this crisis and in the crack of time there was, to put a wider space between us and the strong foeman.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Qureshi ed., Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II 74-75. Thackston ed., *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II: 540 [folio 379]

<sup>117</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 328-329 [f205b-206]. In this same passage, Bābur makes mention of Bannā'ī in verse, saying, "Except Abdullah the stupid fool/ Not a poet today sees the color of gold / From the poets' band Bannā'ī would get gold / All he will get is kīr-khar." Beveridge notes that this is the only mention in the sources of Bannā'ī fleeing fellow poets.

<sup>118</sup> N.M. Lowick. "Shaybanid Silver Coins." *The Numismatic Chronicle* 7:6 (1966): 251-330; E.A. Davidovich. *Korpus Zolotikh I Serebrianih Monet Sheibanidov: XVI v.* (Moskva: Nauka, 1992); E.A. Davidovich. "The Monetary Reform of Muḥammad Shībānī Khān in 913-914/1507-1508." *Studies on Central Asian History in Honor of Yuri Bregel*. Devin DeWeese, ed. (Bloomington: IU Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 2001): 129-185.

<sup>119</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 339-340 [f213-214].

<sup>120</sup> Beveridge's *Bāburnāma*, 339-340 [f213]. Thackston's *Bāburnama*, 263: "A foreign people like the Uzbeks and an old enemy like Wormwood Khan had overrun the territory held by Temur Beg's descendants. Turk and Chaghatay, in every nook and cranny where they were left, had joined the Uzbeks, some willingly and others unwillingly. Only I was left in Kabul. The foe was powerful, and we were weak. There was neither any possibility for coming to terms nor any scope for resisting. Such potency and strength did not allow us to think of any territory for ourselves, and at this juncture there was no way we could get far enough away from such a mighty foe."

Bābur's loss at the hands of Shībānī Khān, yet again, marked the final blow to the Timurids and hopes of a reversal of fortunes, driving Bābur south, away from the new Shibaniid Empire.

From within his new empire, Shībānī Khān was forced to deal with minor Timurid princes and nobles, some of whom accepted their new overlord; many of whom did not accept Shībānī Khān. A number of nobles in near Marv and Mashhad revolted, but Shībānī Khān's son and nephew managed to quell the danger.<sup>121</sup> Particularly troublesome for Shībānī Khān were Badī' al-Zamān and Muẓaffar-Ḥusayn who had taken Damghan, west of Mashhad. Muẓaffar-Ḥusayn died shortly thereafter, but Shībānī Khān chose to march on the city to finally rid himself of Badī' al-Zamān.<sup>122</sup> The latter fled to the Safavid Empire, and Shībānī Khān managed to capture Damghan, folding that territory into his empire. After taking refuge with Shāh Ismā'īl, Badī' al-Zamān—following the Battle of Chaldiran—was carted off by Selim to Constantinople where he died in August 1515.

#### **(V) - Shībānī Khān's Demise (1509-1510)**

*As Shahi Beg Khan had filled the cups of the Khans and my father with the wine of martyrdom, and had made them drink it to the last dreg, so also was his own cup of life full, and his fortune departed; for has it not been said: 'The wine which thou hast made others drink, that must thou also drink of in the end'? The goblet of his prosperity was upset, and that which he had caused others to taste, he was himself, in turn, obliged to drink to the dregs.*<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Qureshi ed., Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v. II 76-90. Thackston ed., *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II:540-546 [folio 379-384]

<sup>122</sup> *Tārīkh-i Shībānī* says he died of thirst, 9B.

<sup>123</sup> Ross's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 230. Thackston's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 154 [folio 114]: "When Shahi-Beg Khan gave the khans and my father the potion of martyrdom to drink-as is said, 'Whatever you give to drink you will drink yourself' – since the goblet of his life reached its fill, and the cup of his fortune was overturned, he himself quaffed the dregs of what he had poured down others' throats. *O light of my eye, hear these words: when the cup of your life is filled, give it to others to drink, and drink it yourself.*



Another of the lingering annoyances for Shībānī Khān was the Qazāq leader, Burunduq Khān, who had for nearly thirty years now tried to upset Shībānī Khān's conquests. Because of a number of raids into Shibaniid territory, Shībānī Khān convened a council of his kin at the beginning of 1509 to discuss the perpetual threat posed by the Qazāqs. Shībānī Khān had taken the extraordinary step to declare the Qazāqs infidels and to seek a religious war against them. He led a large number of soldiers in the thousands against the Qazāqs, but despite his initial victories, his forces were thrown into chaos by the forces of Qāsim Khān, another Qazāq leader with whom Burunduq Khān shared some powers.<sup>124</sup> After a brief retreat, Shībānī Khān regrouped his forces and attacked both Burunduq Khān and Qāsim Khān in Mughulistan. While he was successful in plundering the territories of these leaders, Shībānī Khān was unable to capture them. After these unfortunate encounters, Shībānī Khān made the ill-fated decision in the autumn of 1510 to leave Herat and encamp at Marv, which brought him in a fateful encounter with Shāh Ismā'īl, the young conqueror of Iraq and Iran.

More threatening to Shībānī Khān's power than Burunduq Khān and Qāsim Khān was the rising threat to his south in Iran. Shāh Ismā'īl was propagating his Shi'ī ideology over Iran and Iraq as he conquered and built his power in region.<sup>125</sup> So great was Shāh Ismā'īl's threat, that Lūtfī Paşa<sup>126</sup> records anonymous letters written after the death of Shībānī Khān from

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<sup>124</sup> Ross's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 230-233. Thackston's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 154 [folio 114]

<sup>125</sup> Qureshi ed., Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v. II: 91-168. Thackston ed., *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II:544-600 [folio 386-540]

<sup>126</sup> Most noted for his position as grand vizier under Sultān Süleyman, Lūtfī Paşa rose through the ranks of the Ottoman bureaucracy and, after being forced into retirement, wrote two noteworthy works, *Asafnāme* (*Book of Asaf*) and *Tevārīh-i Āl-i 'Osmān* (*The Chronicles of the Ottoman Dynasty*). The production date of the latter work is unclear, but the mid-1550s is generally accepted given that the text covers extensively the reigns of Bayezid I, Selīm I, and Süleyman II up to 1553. The two letters provide a fascinating glimpse into the time of Sultān Selīm's reign. These letters may very well have been forged and inserted by Lūtfī Paşa as a means of illustrating the character and significant actions of Sultān Selīm. Though these panegyric letters do not have clear sources of

Uzbeks sent to Sulṭān Selīm, showing the anti-Shi‘i alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Central Asia. In his introduction, Lūtfi Paşa offers two letters from Central Asian members of the ‘*ulamā*’, representing Sulṭān Selīm as the renewer of Islam and the harbinger of order to the chaos caused by Shāh Ismā‘il’s reign. The rising Shi‘i influence in eastern Anatolia and the forceful nature of Shāh Ismā‘il in imparting his vision of a “heretical” world caused much of this turmoil.<sup>127</sup> He writes, “The Ottoman Sulṭān Selīm improved the religion of Islam and revived the tradition of the Messenger of Allah. Because at the time which Sulṭān Selīm became padishah, the world was full to the brim with sedition and chaos.”<sup>128</sup> In August 1514, Sulṭān Selīm’s military definitively defeated Shāh Ismā‘il at the Battle of Chaldiran, which bears out the rhetoric of the two letters.<sup>129</sup>

The seventy-eight lines first letter describing Sulṭān Selīm as a messianic figure are filled with panegyric phrases that call him the ruler of the time. The letter begins with laudatory titles, and then moves to ultimately call Selīm the Mahdi of the end of time:

Oh king of the Caliphate’s throne  
Oh moon of the sky of Justice

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origin, the likelihood that they were fabricated is small. Lūtfi Paşa lived and worked in the bureaucracy at the time of Sulṭān Selīm’s conquests. The living memory of the advent of Shāh Ismā‘il and his radical form of religion remained a nascent threat. The letters reflect the reality and consensus of the time that Sulṭān Selīm was not a leader because of intangible miracles, but due to the substantial qualities of divine dispensation to restore world order. His success in 1514 demonstrated his organizational and ruling capabilities. Another factor to keep in mind is that these letters are from Transoxiana and Iran, two areas that were predominantly Sunni before the start Shāh Ismā‘il’s reign in 1501. See, Cornell Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah,” in *Soliman le magnifique et son temps*, ed. G. Veinstein, (Paris, 1992): 163; Kayhan Atik, *Lūtfi Paşa ve Tevārīh-i Āl-i Osman*, (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı, 2001): 12.

<sup>127</sup> Lūtfi Paşa, *Tevārīh-i Āl-i ‘Osmān*, ed. ‘Alī Bey. Istanbul, 1925: 12. All translations for Lūtfi Paşa’s work by Samie.

<sup>128</sup> Lūtfi Paşa, *Tevārīh*, 12.

<sup>129</sup> For discussion on Shāh Ismā‘il’s retreat at Chaldiran, see Kemalpaşazāde in Ahmet Uğur, *The Reign of Sulṭān Selīm I in the Light of the Selīm-nāme Literature*, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1985): 256-263.

Oh Solomon with the quality of Christ's breath  
Oh the prophet-natured one and best guardian  
Oh commander in the kingdom of beneficence  
Oh celebrated one in the kingdom of courage  
[...]  
Know that you are security for religious people  
You are the Mahdi of the end of time<sup>130</sup>

The letter is not merely used to illustrate the impressiveness of Sulṭān Selīm's status after his encounter with Shāh Ismā'il. The author has a direct request he places upon Selīm:

I have a petition for you, oh Shāh  
I dare now to petition you  
[...]  
Pull the string of blasphemy and strike it  
Come and put right the people of Islam  
The Khurasanis are awaiting you  
Be Sulṭān in Khurasan, too  
The people of Iraq are longing for you  
Just like the flesh longs for the soul<sup>131</sup>

The petition to have Selīm take control of territories further east of Tabriz, the Safavid capital, illustrates his support outside of his domain among Central Asian sunnis. It also incorporates aspects of Selīm's character that are praised in the second letter.

The second letter in Lūtfi Paşa's introduction, written in Persian, consists of fifty lines depicting Sulṭān Selīm as the second Alexander and a world conqueror. Much like the first, this epistle begins with Selīm's accomplishment in forestalling the spread of Shi'ism:

You put the basis of religion in the world  
You put the *shari'a* of Muḥammad in the world  
Your efforts renewed the faith  
The world is indebted to you  
If the dominion of the *shari'a* is straightforward  
It is due to the political fortune of Sulṭān Selīm.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Lūtfi Paşa, *Tevārīḥ*, 13.

<sup>131</sup> Lūtfi Paşa, *Tevārīḥ*, 14.

<sup>132</sup> Lūtfi Paşa, *Tevārīḥ*, 15.

The latter half of the letter, though, carries on the Alexandrine trope and further alludes to the great respect Sulṭān Selīm supposedly held in Iran. Much like the first letter, this Persian letter begins with a request, but rather than presenting a forthright appeal, the author relays that Sulṭān Selīm has the capacity of following in Alexander’s steps and being a great conqueror:

Thus I read histories from the Prophet  
That Alexander was Caesar in Rūm  
Alexander rose because he  
Annexed the Persian land to Rūm  
He ruled for two centuries in the world  
Expanding his governance to the east and west  
Come destroy idols from the victory of the faith  
Annex the dominion of Fars to Rūm  
Out of political success and desire  
Once again east and west have the Alexander of Islam<sup>133</sup>

The hostility between the Uzbeks and Shāh Ismā‘īl predates Shībānī Khān’s death, however. Iskandar Beg Munshī, a court historian of Shah ‘Abbās I, writes,

Moḥammad Khan Šībānī, commonly known as Šāhī Beg Khan, brought under his sway all the land from the farthest reaches of Turkestan to the borders of Persian Iraq. As his power increased, so did his arrogance and ambition, and he held any other powerful prince in low esteem. He began to show hostility toward Shah Esma‘īl, and in the year that the Shah led his second expedition to Šīrvān (915/1509-10), Moḥammad Khan Šībānī sent a detachment of troops across the desert to Kerman, plundering, killing, and destroying.<sup>134</sup>

*Tārīkh-i Rashīdī* records the tense relationship between Shāh Ismā‘īl and Shībānī Khān in a series of short exchanges sent back and forth through envoys. Since Shībānī Khān’s empire had now reached the territories being conquered by Shāh Ismā‘īl, the latter sent presents and a letter to Shībānī Khān to quell animosities. He writes, “Hitherto the dust of dissension has never settled upon the skirts of our thoughts to such an extent as to raise a cloud of enmity. Let the path

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<sup>133</sup> Lūtfī Paşa, *Tevārīḥ*, 16.

<sup>134</sup> *Tārīkh-i ‘ālam-ārā-yi ‘Abbāsī*, 59. Afshar’s edition, *Tārīkh-i ‘ālam-ārā-yi ‘Abbāsī*, 38 [folio 27].

of fatherly conduct be observed on your side, and on this side the bonds of filial relationship shall be established.”<sup>135</sup> Upon receiving this letter, Shībānī Khān wrote back a scathing letter mocking Shāh Ismā‘īl’s claim of kingship, writing,

It is fitting that every man follow the profession of his father. If he follows his mother he is going backwards. For Ūzūn Ḥasan withdrew himself from the circle of kings, on the day that he gave his daughter in marriage to your father, as did also Sulṭān Ya‘qūb, son of Ḥasan, in giving him his sister. You had a right to make claims on your mother’s side, so long as there was no son in the world like me – Sulṭān, son of a Sulṭān. As the proverb says: ‘Let the son do the father’s work, and the daughter the mother’s.’<sup>136</sup>

Even more insulting to Shāh Ismā‘īl were the presents accompanying Shībānī Khān’s letter: an *‘aṣā* (staff) and a *kachkūl* (a beggar’s bowl), both signifying Shāh Ismā‘īl’s ṣūfī origins to contrast Shībānī Khān’s own lineage from Abū’l-Khayr Khān. For Shībānī Khān, his lineage preordained his right to rule.

Shāh Ismā‘īl’s response to this slight was as spiteful as Shībānī Khān’s letter. He sent Shībānī Khān a spinning-wheel and spindle, along with a letter saying,

If it is incumbent on every son to follow his father’s trade, we, being sons of Adam, ought all of us to practice prophecy! If sovereignty had been confined to the hereditary descendants of kings, there would have been more Pishdadi, and never any Kaiani. How would Chinggis himself have become king? And where did you come from? [...] You wrote in your letter to me, ‘Whosoever would clasp the bride of sovereignty close to his

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<sup>135</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 232. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 155 [folio 115]: “Before now the dust of disagreement has never arisen in our minds. On your part, if you continue to tread the path of fatherliness, on our part the filial connection will persist.” Iskandar Beg Munshī also mentions the exchange, providing brief quotations: Shībānī Khān writes, “I have a strong desire to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca [...] where shall our rendezvous be?” To which Shāh Ismā‘īl responds, “I too have a firm resolve to visit the tomb of the Imam of jenn and men; I hope that we will meet in the holy city of Maṣhad.” Shāh Ismā‘īl’s response was meant as an insult to the Sunni ruler. See Savory’s edition, *Tārīkh-i ‘ālam-ārā-yi ‘Abbāsī*, 60; Afshar’s edition, *Tārīkh-i ‘ālam-ārā-yi ‘Abbāsī*, 38 [folio 28].

<sup>136</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 232. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 155 [folio 115]: “It would be appropriate for you to continue in your father’s trade and cease running behind your mother’s skirts. Uzun Hasan excluded his daughter, Sultan Yaqub’s sister, from the royal family the day she was given in marriage to your father. For you to claim royalty from such a mother would be appropriate when mother earth has no child like me, a sultan and son of a sultan, as the saying goes, ‘A son does the father’s work, and a daughter the mother’s.’”

breast...’ I, too, say the same thing, and behold, I have bound on the girdle to offer you fight, and have placed the foot of contest in the stirrup of fierce warfare. If you come out to meet me face to face in battle, our claims shall be thereby decided. And if you will not fight, go and sit in a corner and busy yourself with the little present I am sending you.<sup>137</sup>

Shāh Ismā‘īl was not only countering Shībānī Khān’s perspectives through rhetoric, he was using these letters to goad Shībānī Khān into an all-out military encounter. Should God favor Shībānī Khān’s right to be king, Shāh Ismā‘īl would surely lose. Having left Herat to encamp at Marv, Shībānī Khān received this letter as Shāh Ismā‘īl was marching on the city. He had gathered his forces from across Iran and Iraq near Damghan, where Shībānī Khān’s son-in-law, Aḥmad Sulṭān, had been ruling and had fled with the arrival of Shāh Ismā‘īl. After some initial skirmishes, Shībānī Khān was under the impression that Shāh Ismā‘īl had realized his mistake marching on a “Sulṭān – son of a Sulṭān” and had decided to turn away from Marv.

On the first day of Ramadan, 2 December 1510, Shībānī Khān went against his advisors’ warnings and marched out of his encampment with 20,000 men to follow and attack Shāh Ismā‘īl. ‘Ubaydallāh Sulṭān and Tīmūr-Sulṭān were one *farsakh* (roughly 4-6 miles) away with another 20,000 men, but Shībānī Khān did not heed the advice that he should wait for his reinforcements to arrive before giving chase to Shāh Ismā‘īl. Shībānī Khān’s response to his confidantes was, “[You have said well] nevertheless, to make war on Shāh Ismā‘īl is a holy war, and one of importance: moreover there will be much plunder, and it would be a sacrifice of gain in this world and advantage in the next, were I to share this undertaking with the sulṭāns. We must be

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<sup>137</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 233. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 156 [folio 115] “If it were necessary for every son to follow his father’s calling, all who are sons of Adam would have to engage in prophecy. If kingship were necessarily hereditary, there would be more Pishdadis and no Kayanids. Do not pride yourself on a dead father, my young fellow. ‘Do not be content with a bone, like dogs.’ [...] As for the line you wrote in your letter, ‘The bride of kingship is embraced tightly,’ I too say the same. Behold, I have girded my loins to confront you. If you confront me, our dispute will be settled in battle. If not, you can sit behind the things I am sending.”

bold.”<sup>138</sup> After all of his achievements throughout Central Asia and his conquering of the Timurid Empire, Shībānī Khān’s last act of boldness was not met with success. Shāh Ismā‘īl had an army of nearly 40,000 men with superior weaponry and a zeal to which Shībānī Khān’s forces could not rise. Ḥaydar Dūghlāt writes, “When Shahi Beg Khan’s men saw themselves outflanked by the enemy, they lost their steadiness and turned in flight. But the leaders of the army stood their ground, till at length Shahi Beg Khan and all his officers were killed. No history has recorded, nor has any one read or heard of another battle in which all the commanders of the army were slain.”<sup>139</sup> At the sight of Shāh Ismā‘īl’s forces, Shībānī Khān and a small retinue fled toward a small cattle-herding enclosure. In desperation, Shībānī Khān and his men jumped the walls to reach horses, but Shībānī Khān was crushed by the men who followed him.<sup>140</sup> His head was cut off and presented to Shāh Ismā‘īl, who turned Shībānī Khān’s skull into a drinking goblet. The rest of Shībānī Khān’s head was stuffed with straw and sent to Sulṭān Bayezid II.<sup>141</sup> Iskandar Beg Munshī provides much more detail of this event than other sources, writing,

Šahī Beg Khan and a group of Uzbegs, in their precipitate flight, entered an enclosed area which had no escape route. There they piled one upon the other in a bog, only to perish miserably. The corpse of Šahī Beg Khan was discovered beneath a pile of dead bodies by one of the Bozčālū gāzīs, Azīz Āqā by name, known as Ādī Bahādor. The head of Šahī Beg Khan, which in its arrogance had not considered any other head worthy of wearing a crown, was separated from his body and flung down beneath the dragon standard, under the hooves of Esma‘īl’s steed. Shah Esma‘īl prostrated himself in thanksgiving to God,

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<sup>138</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 234. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 156 [folio 116]: “‘To do battle with him is major holy war. In addition, he has much to take as booty, and there will be much of both this-worldly and other-worldly profit to share among the commanders.’ So saying, he set out.”

<sup>139</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 234. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 156 [folio 116]: “Seeing the opponent’s strength as vastly outnumbering themselves, the Uzbeks’ resolve failed and they took flight. The leaders, however, stood firm until Shahi-Beg Khan and all his commanders had been killed. In no history and from no one has it ever been read or heard that all the generals of the army were killed in such a fashion.”

<sup>140</sup> Qureshi ed., Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v. II 122-124. Thackston ed., *Ḥabīb al-siyar*, v.II: 591-592 [folio 511-512]

<sup>141</sup> Ross writes in a footnote in *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 237.

and dispatched each of the limbs of the slain Uzbek leader to a different province.<sup>142</sup> The skin of the head, stuffed with straw, was sent to Soltān Bāyazīd b. Soltan Moḥammad Gāzī, the Ottoman Sultān. The skull, as we are told by the author of the *Ahsan al-Tavārīk*, was encased in gold and fashioned into a chalice that was circulated as a wine cup at banquets and festive occasions. Kāja Maḥmūd Sāgarčī, the renowned vizier of Šahī Beg Khan, who had emerged from the citadel at Marv, was standing among the ranks of the prisoners at the moment when Shah Esma‘il took the gold-encrusted skull in his hand and proceeded to drink deeply from that cup of joy and prosperity. Shah Esma‘il addressed him as follows: ‘Oh Kāja, do you recognize this cup? It is the head of your king.’ The Kāja replied, ‘Glory be to God! What a fortunate man my master was! For his good fortune is still with him, in that he is now in the hands of such an auspicious ruler as yourself, who ever moment drinks from that cup of joy!’<sup>143</sup>

Shāh Ismā‘īl then retired to Herat where he had the Friday prayer read in his name and in the name of the twelve imams, and he instituting a policy of renouncing the first three caliphs.<sup>144</sup>

Shībānī Khān’s headless body was sent back to Samarkand for burial in the mausoleum he had built in 1504 [see figure 2.1].<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> An officer of Shībānī Khān who was antagonistic towards the Safavids and would say, “The power is mine, under the protection of Šahī Beg Khan,” had one of Shībānī Khān’s severed hands delivered to him and thrown on his lap with a note from Shāh Ismā‘īl stating, “His [Shībānī Khān’s] protection has availed you nothing; now his hand lies in your lap.” This is a play on words from Persian, where the idiom *dast be dāman* (lit. hand to skirt, meaning to beg for aid) has been altered to *dast rū-yi dāman* (lit. hand on skirt). *Tārīkh-i ‘ālam-ārā-yi ‘Abbāsī*, 62-63.

<sup>143</sup> *Tārīkh-i ‘ālam-ārā-yi ‘Abbāsī*, 62.

<sup>144</sup> Ross’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 235. Thackston’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 157 [folio 116]. *Tārīkh-i ‘ālam-ārā-yi ‘Abbāsī*, 63.

<sup>145</sup> *Turkestan Album*, Archaeological Album, 1871-1872, part 1, vol 2, plate 126.






Figure 2.2. Plan for Shībānī Khān's mausoleum

The nearly thirty years of Shībānī Khān's conquests came to a terrible end for this conqueror. His demise marked not only the end of his life, but the start of a tumultuous period for his conquered lands, since he had built up his territory around his own charisma. His enterprise truly relied upon his personal governance and less upon an administrative and bureaucratic infrastructure. Since he had not appointed a successor, a decision was reached at a *qūrūltāy* (electorate of chiefs), in which according to some Turkic customs, the eldest member of the ruling family would be elected as khān. Normally, upon the death of the khān, in this case, Shībānī Khān, the sultāns of the appanaged territories would join to elect the eldest

representative of the family rather than the heir by right of primogeniture.<sup>146</sup> In this case, Kūchūm Khān, Shībānī Khān's uncle, was elected as khān.<sup>147</sup> *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī* notes that Kūchūm Khān (Kūchgūnjī) ruled from 1510-1530, and was then succeeded by his son, Abū Sa'īd (r. 1530-1533), and then Maḥmūd Sulṭān's son, 'Ubaydallāh (r. 1533-1539).<sup>148</sup>

## **(VI) - Conclusion**

With the death of Shībānī Khān's grandfather and dissolution of the Abū'l-Khayrid confederacy, it seemed that Shībānī Khān's early life was one of a lost battle, yet he spent the rest of his life attempting to win the war. His story is one of perseverance and defiance in the face of ostensibly unsurmountable odds. And with his victory over the waning Timurid Empire, he solidified his place in history as one of the last great nomadic conquerors of Central Asia with territorial conquests, cultural innovations, and political implications for centuries to come. That position, however, has consistently been challenged by sources contemporary to the Shibanids written from external perspectives, and it has been challenged by 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century historiography. While this dissertation is not meant to bolster Shībānī Khān's status in history writing, it is meant to unravel the historical inaccuracies – or more often, general indifference – that have led to the devaluing of the 16<sup>th</sup> century and its impact on contemporary societies.

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<sup>146</sup> Ross's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 282. Thackston's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 174 [folio 129].


<sup>147</sup> 1500-1510 Muḥammad Shībānī ibn Shāh Budaq ibn Abū'l-Khayr, Abū'l-Fath; 1512-1531 Kōchkunju Muḥammad ibn Abū'l-Khayr; 1531-1534 Abū Sa'īd ibn Kōchkunju, Muẓaffar al-Dīn; 1534-1539 'Ubaydallāh ibn Maḥmūd ibn Shāh Budaq, Abū'l-Ghāzī; 1539-1540 'Abdallāh I ibn Kōchkunju; 1540-1552 'Abd al-Latīf ibn Kōchkunju; 1552-1556 Nawrūz Aḥmad or Baraq ibn Sunjuq ibn Abū'l-Khayr; 1556-1561 Pīr Muḥammad I ibn Jānī Beg; 1561-1583 Iskandar ibn Jānī Beg; 1583-1598 'Abdallāh II ibn Iskandar; 1598 'Abd al-Mu'min ibn 'Abdallāh II; 1598-1599 Pīr Muḥammad II ibn Sulaymān ibn Jānī Beg. See, Clifford Edmund Bosworth. *The new Islamic dynasties: a chronological and genealogical manual*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012): 468.

<sup>148</sup> Ross writes in a footnote in *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, 206.

Shībānī Khān's rule of major sedentary cities formerly governed by Timurids melded his nomadic heritage with local cultural norms, which resulted in new literary works framing the Shibānids as heirs to the great history of the region. Furthermore, Shībānī Khān produced writing, discussed in the next chapter, that showcases his imperial vision of Islamic *and* Turko-Mongol rule over Central Asia – one that rightfully, he believed, belonged to his genealogy. As this chapter has shown, Shībānī Khān used his period of *qazāqliq* to maneuver the political landscape of the region and rise out of brigandage to being a legitimate leader. The template he laid out in his writing is the focus on the next chapter, and as I show, it was one of aspiration for his people – a note that is often written out scholarship on the 16<sup>th</sup> century.







[Figure 2.5] Genealogy of Timurid Dynasty in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries

**[Figure 2.6] *Dramatis personae in Shībānī Khān’s historical narrative:***

‘Abd al-‘Alī Tarkhān: governor of Bukhara before Shībānī Khān’s rise

Abū’l-Khayr Khān: Qipchaq steppe leader and grandfather to Shībānī Khān

Bābur: direct descendant of Tīmūr and territorial foe of Shībānī Khān

Badī‘ al-Zamān: Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā’s son and claimant to rule; rival to Shībānī Khān

Burundūq Khān: a Qazāq military leader and enemy to Shībānī Khān

Jān Wafā Mīrzā: Appointed governor of Samarkand after Shībānī Khān conquers the city

Mazīd Tarkhān: governor of Turkistan before Shībānī Khān’s rise

Muḥammad Ḥusayn Mīrzā Kurgan: father of Ḥaydar Dūghlāt

Muḥammad Ṣālīḥ: Shībānī Khān’s court historian and governor of Bukhara after his expansion

Muḥammad-Zamān ibn Badī‘ al-Zamān: Badī‘ al-Zamān’s son

Maḥmūd Sulṭān Bahādur: Shībānī Khān’s brother

Muẓaffar-Ḥusayn: Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā’s son and brother to Badī‘ al-Zamān

Qāsim Khān: Astrakhan leader who provides a young Shībānī Khān protection

Sevīnch Khwāja (Kūchgūnjī): Shībānī Khān’s uncle

Shāh Ismā‘il: Conqueror of Iran and Iran in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century

Shībānī Khān (Muḥammad ibn Shāh Būdāq Sulṭān ibn Abū’l-Khayr Khān): Central Asian conqueror and grandson of Abū’l-Khayr Khān

Sulṭān-‘Alī: ruler of Samarkand when Shībānī Khān conquers the city

Sulṭān-Aḥmad Mīrzā: Timurid ruler of Samarkand before Shībānī Khān’s rise

Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā: ruler of Herat as Shībānī Khān expands in southern Central Asia

Sulṭān-Maḥmūd Khān – governor in Mughulistan

Tīmūr-Sulṭān: Shībānī Khān’s son

‘Ubaydallāh Sulṭān: Shībānī Khān’s nephew

### Chapter 3 - Rescuing Shībānī Khān from History (and the ‘nation’)

The Uzbek conquest of Transoxiana under Abū'l-Khayr Khān and Muḥammad Shībānī Khān marked the last major nomadic migration from the steppe to sedentary territories in Central Asia. Not only did the Shibanids replace the Timurids as the new rulers of the region, but the large influx of Turkic peoples into this Persianate world also brought into contact political, cultural, literary, and historiographical traditions that were previously distinct. Conflicts and integrations between established sedentary communities and the nomadic newcomers sparked a new wave of historiography, including chronicles, biographies, and hagiographies in both Turkic and Persian languages.<sup>1</sup>

As the Khanate of the Golden Horde waned in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, from Dasht-i Qipchaq, the southern steppe of Russia, arose an Uzbek power in the 1420s under Abū'l-Khayr Khān, who would be succeeded by his grandson, Shībānī Khān, in 1488. Under the former, discord between the Uzbeks and “Qazāq-Uzbeks” (who would later become the Kazakhs) became irresolvable to the point of splitting the two groups apart, and the remnants of his line gathered under Muḥammad Shībānī Khān to conquer the Timurid cities, which had weakened due to an aggressive appanaging of territories in the mid-to-late 15<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>2</sup> After some decades of *qazāqliq*, or ambitious brigandage, Shībānī Khān began his conquests throughout Dasht-i Qipchaq and Syr-Darya, and set out to put an end to Timurid rule in the region, first by expelling

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<sup>1</sup> See Bosworth, Dickson, and Bregel for definitions and variances in “Uzbek.”

<sup>2</sup> For a greater discussion of Janibeg and Giray Khān’s separation from Abū'l-Khayr Khān, see Joo-Yup Lee. *Qazaqliq, or ambitious brigandage, and the formation of the Qazaqs: state and identity in post-mongol Central Eurasia*. (Leiden: Brill, 2016).



Bābur from Samarkand in 1501 (though Bābur would return twice more) and defeating the sons of Sultān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā in Balkh and Herat in 1505 and 1507.

The Uzbek conquest destroyed the remaining Timurid rule in the region, but the Uzbeks did, in fact, keep many Timurid principles of governance, while also keeping in place Chinggisid political and social structures. The complexity of the appanage system was exacerbated with the instability of a firm dynastic succession, causing both tension among those aspiring to be the great Khān and among the loosely tied confederation of appanages.<sup>3</sup> Shībānī Khān also reintroduced aspects of the *yasa*, or Mongolian law, but that delicate balance between the *yasa* and *Sharia* always posed a problem for him. He writes in his *Dīvān*,

If I brighten the light of the state, it is no strange deed || That the (burned) extinguished Chinggisid candle is relit by me || I am the owner of happiness since I was born of Chinggis [Khān] || When I stir like the wind, the flame of Tīmūr goes out because of me. (*Eger devlet çerağını yarutsam hîç tang ırmes || Ki öçken Çingizî şem 'i biling bigler yanar mindin || Min ol şubh-ı şa 'âdet-min ki Çingiz kökidin toğdum || kaçan kim tipresem yıl tig Tīmūr şem 'i öçer mindin.*)<sup>4</sup>

He legitimized his successful conquest of southern Central Asia by destroying Tīmūr's "charisma" and by his own legacy as a descendant from Jochi's fifth son, Shībān. Yet, his emphasis on ridding the region of Timurids did not prevent him from taking hold of the previous dynasty's claims to power and the remnants of their court. For instance, Shībānī Khān appropriated the title of *şāhib-qirān*, given to Tīmūr by his biographers Nizām al-Dīn Shāmī,

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<sup>3</sup> Nurten Kilic-Schubel. "Change in Political Culture: The Rise of Sheybani Khan." *Cahiers d'Asie Centrale* 3/4 (1997): 57-68.

<sup>4</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Muḥammad Shaybānī, and Yakup Karasoy. *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): verses 1-4: 212.

Hāfīz-i Abrū, and Sharaf ad-Dīn ‘Alī Yazdī.<sup>5</sup> As the direct heir to the land and heritage of the Timurid dynasty, Shībānī Khān writes,

Shībānī does not lie that God has made him Lord of the Fortunate Conjunction || By personal realization, I am a slave to God, by descent, I am a Chinggisid. (*Şiban yalğan dimes kim Hakk anı şāhib-kıran kıldı || Hasebde Tingri’ge kul-min nesebde Çingizîdür-min.*)<sup>6</sup>

We know from his *Dīvān*, *Baḥru’l-Khudā*, and *Risāla-yi Ma’ārif*, the latter with which this chapter is most concerned, that he projected an image that he was quite pious, and Islam was not a superficial edifice to rulership. Because he had inherited the court culture of the Timurids, Shībānī Khān considered himself a very cultured and cultivated person and he continued the traditions and flourishing of the Timurid, now Shibanid, court. Scientists, artists, poets, historians, architects and others were emigrating from the territory taken over by the newly formed Safavid Empire into the cultural centers of Shībānī Khān’s new empire, and he consciously patronized works in the manner of the Timurids.<sup>7</sup>

Ironically, according to his commissioned biographies and poetry, it was Shībānī Khān himself who projected his lineage as heir to the great political, literary, and artistic traditions of the Timurids. In fact, he felt he had moved so far beyond his nomadic heritage to the point that he no longer wanted to be referred to as “Uzbek,” since the term had become synonymous with “nomadic” groups in Persian sources.<sup>8</sup> His biographer writes that Shībānī Khān said,

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<sup>5</sup> Chann, Naindeep Singh. “Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction: Origins of the Sahib-Qiran”. *Iran and the Caucasus*. 13:1 (2009): 93-110

<sup>6</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Muḥammad Shaybānī, and Yakup Karasoy. *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): verses 1-2: 235.

<sup>7</sup> Dorothea Duda. “The Illustrated Shaybaniname in Vienna Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Cod. Mixt. 188”. *Turkish Art*. (1999): 266

<sup>8</sup> See introduction to Shībānī, Muḥammad and Yakup Karasoy, *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998).

Do not let the Chagatai people call me Uzbek || do not they worry in vain and be sad ||  
that I am from the Uzbeks || but this light is Divine. (*Chaghatāy īl manī ūzbak dīmāsūn ||*  
*bīhūda fikr qīlīb ghamm yīmāsūn || gar mīn ūzbak īlīdīn dūr mīn || layk tīngrīgā īrūr bū*  
*rawshan*).<sup>9</sup>

The Shibanids' distancing of much of their nomadic heritage and simultaneous identification with the Timurids whom they displaced from the region arose partly from a cultural self-fashioning. Shībānī Khān also understood the complexity of his position, since he not only inherited the literary traditions of the region, but he also inherited the perceived hatred of Mongol leaders after Hulagu's destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate in 1258, despite Shībānī Khān being a distant kinsman of Hulagu. As a point of legitimacy, he draws on the Quranic verse, "Say, 'Oh God! Lord of Power, Thou givest Power to whom Though pleases, and Though strippest off Power from whom Though pleases.'"<sup>10</sup> He writes,

Oh Shībānī God has always been your friend || Because of that He has made kings in all  
types of states [i.e. wet and dry lands] || God has helped you to victory with any type of  
difficulty || destroy your ego and praise him without sleeping. (*Ay Şibānī Haqq sanga*  
*boldı ezeldin āşinā || aning üçün khuşk u ter mülkinde kıldı pādşā || her niçe müşkil*  
*işingdür birdi Haqq nuşret sanga || nefsi-i dünyā öltürüp uqlamayın kılğıl senā*).<sup>11</sup>

Having inherited the sophisticated court culture of the Timurids, Shībānī Khān and his descendants consciously projected themselves as cultured rulers distinct from their nomadic pasts with the recognition that their rise to power was Divinely granted.

It is in this apparent mixture of traditions that the Shibanids themselves were confronted with what I have termed the "Shibanid Question," that is, where Shībānī Khān, the Shibanids,

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<sup>9</sup> Translation and transliteration for Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ's *Shībānīnāma* by Samie. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, and Hermann Vambéry. *Die Scheibaniade: ein özbegisches Heldengedicht in 76 Gesängen*. (Budapest: In Commission bei Friedrich Kilian, 1885): 148

<sup>10</sup> *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937): 3:26

<sup>11</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Muḥammad Shaybānī, and Yakup Karasoy. *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998):10b, 76

and their heritage should stand in the history of southern Central Asia, and as of 1924, Uzbekistan. As the dust of conquest settled, the new nomadic rulers of sedentary Transoxiana had to reconcile their steppe heritages based on Chinggisid principles of confederation and consensus with the new political realities of the lingering customs and institutions of Timurid statecraft. Shībānī Khān attempted at such reconciliation by reintroducing aspects of *yasa*, yet the delicate balance between the two legal traditions of *yasa* and *Sharia* would always pose a problem for him.<sup>12</sup> He explains,

I am Shībānī, (I am the one) who has accepted Your *Sharia* || I am the sword of Islam willing to give my life on the Path [of Islam]. (*Şībānī Çingiziden şer 'ingni satun alğan || Yolunda cānın birgen İslām kılıcı min-min*)<sup>13</sup>

He did, however, use his own writing as an expression of his piety and desire to be seen as a savior of the juridical nature of Islam.

After Shībānī Khān's siege of Samarkand, his court biographer, Muḥammad Şālih, expressed that the leader ruled with piety and equity, documenting that Shībānī Khān said,

However much the people do not want me I want them || If however much people do not love me, I love them || What I want God has given oh shaykh || God's Word has penetrated me. (*har nīcha il tīlāmās mīn tīlārām || il mīnī sīlāmās mīn sīlārām || mīn tīlāb tīngrī bīrībūr ay shaykh || tīngrī sūzī mangā kīrūbtūr ay shaykh*).<sup>14</sup>

The most vociferous explanation of explanation of his devotion to Islam in his *Dīvān* is as follows,

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<sup>12</sup> Nurten Kilic-Schubel. "Balancing 'Yasa' and 'Shariat' in the Shibanid-Uzbek Khānate in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century" in *Central Asia on Display*. (Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2004): 17-30.

<sup>13</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Muḥammad Shaybānī, and Yakup Karasoy. *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): 119a.

<sup>14</sup> Translation and transliteration for Muḥammad Şālih's *Shībānīnāma* by Samie. Muḥammad Şālih, and Hermann Vambéry. *Die Scheibaniade: ein özbekisches Heldengedicht in 76 Gesängen*. (Budapest: In Commission bei Friedrich Kilian, 1885): 148

What I mean with *Sharia* is the way of the Prophet || Those unloving of *Sharia* are foolish || *Sharia* is the enemy of the ego and Satan || These (nefs ü şeytan) are contemptible to the people of the *Sharia* (who follow the *sharia*, know the *sharia*) || *Sharia* is the greatest endless sea || in *Sharia* actions are pearls || know that the meaning of *Sharia* is in the Qur'an || the secrets of the meanings of *Sharia* are the pearls || Those unloving of *Sharia* shall go to Hell || Know to Heaven *Sharia* is the guide || mercy from your Father is *Sharia* || *Sharia* is the sweetheart, the houri, and the fairy || Shībānī sank into the sea of *Sharia* || he speaks of the words of *Sharia*. (šerī'at digenim rāh-ı nebīdür || šerī'at sıvmegan ol kevdenīdür || šerī'at nefis ü şeytān düşmen irmiş || šerī'at ehliḡa munlar denīdür || šerī'at bahr-ı 'aẓam bī-nihāyet || šerī'atda 'ameller gevherīdür || šerī'at ma 'nāsı kūr'ān'da bilgil || šerī'at sırr-ı ma 'nā cevherīdür || šerī'at sıvmegen barsun cehennem || šerī'at cennete bil rehberīdür || šerī'atdur atangdın mihribāning || šerī'at dilber ü hūr u perīdür || šerī'at baḡrine ẓumdı Şibānī || šerī'at sözleridin sözlerīdür).<sup>15</sup>

Taken in tandem with his religious treatise and poetry, his words weave together the intricacies of political Islam, juridical Islam, and his background as a master of sufi traditions in the region. So long as he promoted the Quran and the traditional *sunna*, his life and activities would be Divinely sanctioned. He says,

Oh Shībānī in this evil world || you will always be halal [i.e. honest] by following *Sharia*.” (Ay Şibānī uşbu mekrūh dūnyāde || şer'ini kılsang dāyım boldung ḡelāl).<sup>16</sup>

It is with this understanding of Shībānī Khān's religious and political agenda that I turn to his religious treatise as an exploration of his larger vision. I argue that this religious manual, which has not been examined by scholarship to any great degree, shows the complexity and in-depth knowledge of Shībānī Khān, and it serves to counter much of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century discourse emphasizing his nomadic heritage.

In this chapter, I argue that Shībānī Khān projected an image as a scholarly, literate figure, as illustrated by his *Risāla*. The structure of my chapter follows these thematic

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<sup>15</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Muḡammad Shaybānī, and Yakup Karasoy. *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): 57b-58a, 136-137

<sup>16</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Muḡammad Shaybānī, and Yakup Karasoy. *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): 6B, 70

subheadings: (1) *Yasavism and Sufism in Shībānī Khān's Ideology*, (2) *Risāla-yi Ma'ārif-i Shībānī Khān – The Religious Manual of Shībānī Khān* (3) *Tawḥīd – Oneness of God*, (4) *Tahlīl and Shahādat – Acclimation toward God and Testimony*, (5) *'Asmā' u llāhi al-ḥusnā – God's Beautiful Names*, (6) *Qirā'at – Method of Recitation [of the Readings]*, (7) *Taḥmīd and Taṣliya – Praising God and the Prophet*, (8) *Ṣalavāt – Importance of the Five Daily Prayers*, and (9) *Concluding Remarks*. Each section illustrates aspects of Islamic values Shībānī Khān emphasizes in his writings. My contention is that these individual qualities that he propagated for his newly conquered population, military, followers, and family are his vision for the creation of an Islamic Uzbek empire, and his writings serve as a strong counterpoint to the historical developments of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that suppressed Shībānī Khān's contributions to history.

### ***(1) Yasavism and Sufism in Shībānī Khān's Ideology***

One of the most skewed historical views of Shībānī Khān is that he clung to the heritage of the Chinggisids as a legitimizing factor for his conquest of Central Asia. While not wholly incorrect – that is, he did use his heritage to a great extent – I argue that the larger project at hand was coopting Mongol heritage from the non-Chinggisid Timurid lineage and definitively binding Chinggisid legitimacy with that of Islamic legitimacy. Where some scholars tie Shībānī Khān to his vision of reinstating *yasa*, or Mongolian law, I view his efforts in relation to the *yasa* as one of three legitimizing factors in his conquests. First, I suggest that he recognized his Chinggisid lineage to the extent that it allowed him to abstractly draw on the concepts of fidelity, integrity, and devotion to his public. Considering his newly conquered territory was predominantly sedentary and was coming out of a long literary tradition promoted by the Timurids, simply invoking the Chinggisid name was not nearly enough. His second claim to legitimacy was that of

the literary nature of his subjects. A strong centralized government would not be possible without something more than a name. His ability to utilize simplified Turkish as an effective tool to promote a sedentarized image of self proved valuable, as is illustrated through his writings below. Third, I see Islam as a tool in his arsenal of legitimacy. To solidify his imperial power, the loyalty of his subjects necessitated a broader idea that could bind people to each other. Islam as a unifying factor clearly stated the tasks and duties expected of his public in a popularized – and arguably vulgarized – form. By drawing on his own upbringing and familiarity with Yasavism, he reinforced many of the traits articulated by the Yasavi school of thought and gave credence to the segment of his population that was already predisposed to such ideas.

I contend that Shībānī Khān utilizes sufi ideas as his way of popularizing the tenets of Islam as a common identity for his empire. The majority of his ideas, as displayed in his *Dīvān* and *Baḥru’l-Khudā*, pull from the teachings of Aḥmad Yasavī (d. 1166). Yasavī was the author of *Dīvān-i Hikmat*, a collection of sermons and aphorisms, which heavily influenced Shībānī Khān’s ideas. He writes about Aḥmad Yasavī,

Khwājā Aḥmad Yasavī became the leader of saints.  
(*Evliyālar serveri boldi Khwāce Aḥmed Yesevī*)<sup>17</sup>

As a popularizer, Yasavī understood the nature of popular versus elite cultures and the impact of the cultural sphere of Perso-Arabic literary and religious production.<sup>18</sup> With the language of local Turkic populations of Central Asia, Yasavī managed to create a vernacular through which complex religious ideas were expressed in a manner that could be digested and implemented by

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<sup>17</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Yakup Karasoy, *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): 175a

<sup>18</sup> Edward Allworth. *Uzbek literary politics*. (London: Mouton, 1964). For a deep analysis of this argument, see Allworth.

his followers. Shībānī Khān continued this tradition through the production of his own texts. The purpose of using such a vernacular was to reach as many people as possible, as he states in the introduction to his *Risāla*. Similar to Yasavī's purpose, by introducing the tenets of Islam to his population, the religion would transform into a unique iteration distinct from the Perso-Arabic traditions that were overshadowing the literary capacity of Turkic peoples.<sup>19</sup> There is a recognition by Shībānī Khān of the importance of Arab scholars on the development of Islamic doctrine in Eurasia. He writes,

If you are a demander [i.e. student], go to the tavern innkeeper [i.e. master] || Drink the wine of proper names and nicknames [i.e. *Sharia* and *tariqa*] from the pub || Whosoever drinks the glass of *Sharia* from this city || will be respected by the people as an Arab. (*şimdi t̤ālib irseng p̤ir-i muḡhāna barghul || meyhānedin meyh içkil ism ü laḡab berāber || her kim bu şehrdin cām-ı şerī'at içse || bilgil ki ehliḡa ol kılḡay 'Arab berāber*)<sup>20</sup>

According to Bodrogligeti, Shībānī Khān borrows such words as *ḥubb al-vaṭan* from Yasavī's teachings as a means of showing his desire for the unity of all Turkic peoples in Central Asia under the ideological umbrella of Islamic doctrine as it is understood and practiced popularly by Turks. Bodrogligeti writes, "*Vaṭan* is the place where the Beloved resides and *ḥubb* is the attraction the believer feels toward that place."<sup>21</sup> The place is not necessarily a geographical location; rather, it could be understood in a spiritual sense for the place where one becomes as self-actualized religious follower. Shībānī Khān does use the term in both contexts – that is, physically and spiritually. For example, he writes,

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<sup>19</sup> John Trimingham. *The Sufi Orders in Islam*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971: 58-60. Andreas Bodrogligeti. "Yasavī Ideology in Muhammad Shaybani Khan's Vision of an Uzbek Islamic Empire" *Journal of Turkish Studies* (1994): 48 and 53.

<sup>20</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Yakup Karasoy, *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): F45, page 120

<sup>21</sup> Andreas Bodrogligeti. "Yasavī Ideology in Muhammad Shaybani Khan's Vision of an Uzbek Islamic Empire" *Journal of Turkish Studies* (1994): 48.



Oh, nightingale of the soul, fly straight to that garden || Spring has come, why do you not fly straight to that story || Everyone needs to talk about the love of the homeland || Know (I will love Turkistan as my homeland) I have to speak to this (land) Turkistan || Khwājā Aḥmad Yasavī became a leader of saints || What if I follow Yasavī and passed over to Sobron. (*Ay köngülning bülbüli sin barghil ol bustān sari || yaz boldı ne turur-sin kilgil ol destān sari || her kişige lāzım oldur sözlese ḥubbü 'l-vaṭan || bil manga söz vācib oldı uşbu Türkistān sari || Evliyāların server boldı khāce Aḥmed Yesevī || Yesevīni güzerlep ötsem ol Şabrān sari*)<sup>22</sup>

Shībānī Khān evokes Yasavī here as the path of truth, residing in the territory of southern Central Eurasia, the region that gave rise to both his ideological leanings and legitimate motive to rule the territory.

Yasavī's vision of Islam in Central Eurasia long outlived him. Though not much is known about his life, it is clear that he placed himself within the socio-religious lineage of the Prophet and was constantly seeking refuge in religion as a way of stifling carnal urges. He viewed his actions in Central Eurasia as so reminiscent of the Prophet's deeds that he referred to his *Dīvān-i Hikmat* as *Daftar-i Sānī*, or the *Second Book* – that is, the second book after the first, the Prophet's saying and deeds as hadith collections.<sup>23</sup> It was with this notion of Turkic linguistic and religious autonomy that Shībānī Khān incorporated Yasavī's ideology into his propagation of Islam as a unifying and legitimating factor for his empire.<sup>24</sup> He went as far as siphoning tax income to the restoration of Yasavī's mausoleum for the purpose of pilgrimage.<sup>25</sup>

The influence of Yasavism and sufism on Shībānī Khān is illustrated through his usage of the style, techniques, and importance of sufi ideology in his *Dīvān*. In a number of spots, he

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<sup>22</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Yakup Karasoy, *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): F175, page 285

<sup>23</sup> Andreas Bodrogligeti. "Aḥmad Yasavī's Concept of *Daftar-i Sānī*." *Milletlerarası Ahmed Yesevi Sempozyumu Bildirileri*. (Ankara: Feryal Matbaası, 1992): 1-11.

<sup>24</sup> For more on the use of Yasavī ideology in Shībānī Khān's *Dīvān*, see Karasoy: F69-70, page 150 and F175a-b, page 286

<sup>25</sup> Adeeb Khalid. *Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia*. (Berkeley: UC Press, 2007): 28-31.

refers to himself as *miskīn*, or destitute.<sup>26</sup> He usually does not refer to himself as *faqīr* as that draws attention to one's professing of ascetic belief, undercutting the point of sufism. *Miskīn* takes on the meaning of a dervish, much like Yasāvī, who disavows the material world. He goes even further with the perpetuation of sufi ideas with the invocation of *zīkr-i arra*, a sufi method of *zīkr* in which one holds their breath for long periods of time while quietly reciting the names of God.<sup>27</sup> He says,

How late do you want to hide the treasure of this word in your heart || Sufis do not find their place unless they partake in *zīkr-i arra*. (*Niçe kizler-sin köngülde uşbu sözning gencini || erre zīkrin dimeyinçe yir tapmas ol şūfī şa 'ab*)<sup>28</sup>

Ḥakīm Atā,<sup>29</sup> one of the sufi figures who followed this method of *zīkr*, is cited as a reputable source to follow in his *Risāla*.<sup>30</sup> The two aphorisms cited are the first examples of its kind in literary Chagatai given the era of production, and they serve to perpetuate Shībānī Khān's religious ideology.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> For examples of the term in *Dīvān*, see Karasoy: 21a, 27b, 29b, 35b, 63b, 75b, 76b, 81b, 85b, 97a, 100a, 147b, 157b, 164b

<sup>27</sup> See the section below: *'Asmā' u llāhi al-ḥusnā – God's Beautiful Names*

<sup>28</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Yakup Karasoy, *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): F21b, page 91

<sup>29</sup> Ḥakīm Atā was Aḥmad Yasāvī's student, and either his third or fourth successor given the conflicting accounts of his name. In sources, he names himself Sulaymān, Ḥakīm Sulaymān, Ḥakīm Khwāja, and Sulaymān Bāqīrghānī. Navā'ī recorded a number of Ḥakīm Atā's aphorisms, and he states that the title "Ḥakīm" was given by Aḥmad Yasāvī because of the former's wisdom. See, Rahmeti Arat, "Ḥakīm Ata," *İslam Ansiklopedisi* Vol. V: 101-103; and Devin DeWeese, "Ḥakīm Ata," *Encyclopaedia Iranica* Vol. XI: 573-574.

<sup>30</sup> See the section below: *Tawḥīd – Oneness of God*

<sup>31</sup> Zeki Velidi Togan, "Yeseviliğe dair bazı yeni malumat," *Fuad Köprülü Armağanı*, (Istanbul: Osman Yalcın Matbaası, 1953): 528-529. In addition to the citations in the *Risāla*, Shībānī Khān cites Ḥakīm Atā in his *Dīvān*. See Karasoy: F29B, 30A, and 30B.


## (2) *Risāla-yi Ma ‘ārif-i Shībānī Khān – The Religious Manual of Shībānī Khān*

In this section, I provide a brief explanation of Shībānī Khān’s religious manual before moving into an analysis of the source. In 1979, Alparslan, a scholar of Turkic literature, explained that the resources and source materials for the study of the Shibanid era are present, yet scholarship on the subject has not yet achieved its potential. Forty years later, his assessment is still true.<sup>32</sup> The only extant copy of *Risāla-yi Ma ‘ārif* is in the British Library (OR12956). It was copied in a calligraphy school of Herat in 1510-1511 by Sulṭān ‘Ali Mashhadī, shortly after the death of Shībānī Khān, who had penned this religious text for his son, Muḥammad Tīmūr Bahādur, after he conquered Herat in 1507.<sup>33</sup> The text consists of 46 folios, each with roughly 10 lines of text in *nasta‘īlīq* script. The first page of the text is illuminated with various floral designs and is titled in gold, silver, and blue ink, *Risāla-yi Ma ‘ārif-i Shībānī Khān* [see Figure 3.1]. The text continues with Quranic verses and hadith, written in gilded gold, red, blue, and black ink, which run throughout the text.

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<sup>32</sup> Ali Alparslan, “Şeybani Han’ın Türk Kültür Tarihindeki Yeri,” *I. Milletler Arası Türkoloji Kongresi (1973) Tebligler*. (Istanbul: Türk Tarihi, 1979): 2. Chapter 2 serves as an introduction to who the Shibanids were and delves deeply into the sources that are available on the study of this era: Naṣrullahī Balkhī’s *Zubdat al-al-āṣār* (c. 1525), Mīrzā Ḥaydar Dughlāt’s *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī* (1540s), ibn ‘Uṣmān Kūhistānī’s *Tārīkh-i Abū ‘l-Khayr Khānī* (1540 – 1555), Ḥāfiz-i Tanīsh Bukhārī’s *Sharafnāma-yi Shāhī* (c. 1591), Banā‘ī’s *Shībānīnāma* (1502-1505), Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ’s *Shībānīnāma* (1506), Khwāndamīr’s *Ḥabīb al-siyar* (1523), Babur’s *Bāburnāma* (c. 1530), Vāṣifī’s *Badā‘i ‘al-vaqā‘i* (1517-1531), and of course, works penned by Shībānī Khān: *Baḥru ‘l-Khudā* (c. 1508), *Risāla-yi Ma ‘ārif*, and his *Dīvān*. Shībānī Khān’s own works have not been utilized much, and they serve as incredible counterpoints to early Soviet interpolations of nomadic Uzbek barbarity and lackluster literary prowess.

<sup>33</sup> The text’s colophon is signed Mashhad al-Raḥaviyya (F47A). Mashhadī was an autodidact who worked at the Timurid court in Herat from 1470-1506. After the Shibanid takeover of the city, he worked under the Shibanids for a short period. He then retired to Mashhad where he wrote an autobiographical verse treatise. For a short biography of Sulṭān ‘Ali’s life and works, “Sultan ‘Ali Mashhadī.” In *Grove Encyclopedia of Islamic Art and Architecture*, edited by Jonathan Bloom and Sheila S. Blair. Vol. 3. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 256–57.



[Figure 3.1] Illuminated *Risāla-yi Ma'ārif* masthead

*Risāla-yi Ma'ārif* has not been dealt with extensively. The most thorough work, yet still lacking in translation and annotations, is Bodrogligeti's work. To Bodrogligeti's credit, his work describes Shībānī Khān's *Risāla* as, "A book of devotions that the Uzbek ruler put together for his people. As such it reflects the Khān's views on religious and social issues and sets the moral standards for people living in his empire. It is the Khān's testimony to his acceptance of the basic tenets of Islam and to his pledge of enforcing them within the sphere of his influence."<sup>34</sup> Few others have taken up the task of utilizing this work as a 16<sup>th</sup> century text illustrative of the Chagatai language, the Timurid-Shibanid literary tradition, or the genre of *risāla*. The most

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<sup>34</sup> Andras Bodrogligeti. "Devotions, Rituals, Moral and Social Issues in Muhammad Shaybani Khān's *Risala-i Maarif*" in *The Golden Cycle: proceedings of the John D. Soper Commemorative Conference on the Cultural Heritage of Central Asia, UCLA Conferences Center at Lake Arrowhead*. (Sahibqiran: Central Asia Information Project, 1998): 127.

recent publication on the subject is Alışık's 2004 article, which utilizes Bodrogligeti, Togan, and Alparslan as the base of research. Alisik provides a reiteration of Bodrogligeti's 1998 article.<sup>35</sup> Even with their difficulties, Bodrogligeti and Alisik's articles are the most detailed works available on this particular manuscript. Other articles and encyclopedia entries are available, but they are based not on this prose manuscript housed in the British Library; rather they are based on a versified manuscript of the *Risāla* housed in Köprülü's private collection, which is unavailable to researchers. It is clear that this scholarship was unaware of the prose manuscript in the British Library.

The earliest descriptions of the *Risāla*, based on the versified manuscript, appear in Köprülü's "Çağatay Edebiyatı" where the "classical" era of Chagatai literature is broken into two subsections: Shibanid and Mughal.<sup>36</sup> In the Central Asian context under Shibanid rule, Köprülü notes that much of the literature of the region was produced in Persian; yet, the works produced in Chagatai were heavily influenced by the Timurid legacy, specifically under Sulṭān-Ḥusayn Bāyqarā, and religious sufi orders, like the Yasaviyya that informs Shībānī Khān's work. Under Shībānī Khān and 'Ubaydallāh Khān, the techniques and content of Herati and Samarkandi works prior to the arrival of the Uzbeks continued. Literary production in this era heavily

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<sup>35</sup> Gülşen Seyhan Alışık, "Şeybānī Han'ın Risāle-i Ma'ārif Adlı Eseri ve Türkçeciliği" in *V. Uluslararası Türk Dil Kurultayı*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 2004): 131-155. Also see Zeki Velidi Togan, "Yeseviliğe dair bazı yeni malumat," *Fuad Köprülü Armağanı*, (Istanbul: Osman Yalcın Matbaası, 1953): 523-529; and Ali Alparslan, "Şeybani Han'ın Türk Kültür Tarihindeki Yeri", *I. Milletler Arası Türkoloji Kongresi (1973) Tebligler*. (Istanbul: Türk Tarihi, 1979): 1-6. Alparslan presents this source in comparison with Fażlallāh Khunjī's *Mihmānnāma-yi Bukhāra*, which was commissioned and written in Shībānī Khān's name.

<sup>36</sup> Fuad Köprülü. "Çağatay Edebiyatı". *İslam Ansiklopedisi* III. (Istanbul, 1945): 270-323. An updated entry by Kemal Eraslan is available online. There is no mention of the *Risāla*, as in Köprülü's entry, but there is a vague description: <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/cagatay-edebiyati>

influenced later Ottoman and Azeri prose and poetic developments. Köprülü writes, “In his classical poems, [Shībānī Khān’s] language is simple, and his metaphors are simple. His works are a *dīvān* including poems, a religious-ethics composition called the *Baḥru’l-Khudā*, and a *risāla* about *fiqh*.”<sup>37</sup> Eckmann does not provide a treatment of the *Risāla*, but he does provide bibliographic information about Shībānī Khān’s works along with basic translations of a few couplets from Chagatai to German.<sup>38</sup> Bombaci, echoing Eckmann, also makes some remarks on this work in his 1969 *La Letteratura Turca*, which describes the *Risāla* and Shībānī Khān’s *Baḥru’l-Khudā* in a section on “Poetics” and “Abu’l-Khayrid Historiography.”<sup>39</sup> Bombaci explains that these two works illustrate Shībānī Khān’s religiosity, and they parallel other works of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, like the writings of Navā’ī in their descriptions of Yasavid ideology. There are minor mentions of the text in other works of scholarship, yet none as relevant as the ones discussed above.<sup>40</sup> It is for that reason that this chapter focuses primarily on this religious manual as a representation of Shībānī Khān’s understanding of religion and ability to fashion himself a “sedentary” figure.

I argue that Shībānī Khān’s purpose in producing his religious manual was to include commentary on Islamic philosophy, practices, and sacred shrines, while also translating Quranic

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<sup>37</sup> Köprülü. “Çağatay Edebiyatı”. See above for link.

<sup>38</sup> Janos Eckmann. “Die tschagataische Literatur”. *Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta*, II. (Wiesbaden 1964): 304-402, especially pages 362-365.

<sup>39</sup> Alessio Bombaci. *Storia Della La Letteratura Turca*. (Sassoni: Firenze, 1969): 184-192.

<sup>40</sup> There was an article to be published from UCLA, but it has never been made public. The article was to be a transliteration, translation, and commentary on the *Risāla*. I have reached out to one of the authors, and the manuscript seems to have been lost. See, Bodrogligeti and Jaeckel, “Muhammad Shaybani Khān’s ‘A Manual of Religious Knowledge’ [*Risāla-yi Ma’ārif*]” cited in Bodrogligeti’s “Muhammad Shaybani’s *Baḥru’l-hudā*: An Early Sixteenth Century Didactic Qasida in Chaghatay” in *Ural-altaische Jahrbücher* 54 (1982): 1-56.

verses, religious stories, and prayers into Chagatai<sup>41</sup> as a way to use this text to tie himself to the literary heritage of the Persianate world. He utilized the works of Islamic scholars, such as Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ-i Bukhārī (d. 1420), Shaykh Najmuddīn-i Kubrā (d. 1221), Shaykh Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 966), and Sufyān al-Ṣawrī (d. 777).<sup>42</sup>

*Risāla* is not the first text where Shībānī Khān expresses his appreciation for his literary predecessors.<sup>43</sup> In his *Baḥru 'l-Khudā*, he writes,

O Lord, let me, Shaban, join [the circle of] the people of knowledge. May this world never ever be without them! (*Yā Rabb ahl-i dāniš ilā birgā qilgīl bu Šabān || Bolmasun hargiz alarsiz ušbu dunyā dā'imā*).<sup>44</sup>

He had immense respect for the traditions that he continued through his treatises and poems. He continues in his religious *qasida*,

I was then residing in Bistām or Dāmaghān, and there the pure spirits of the prophets assisted me. [Here also the spirits of the saints aided me:] the spirits of Bū'l-Ḥasan the imam [i.e., the founder] of the Shaykh Kharaqānī order, and that of the leader of all the saints, Bāyazīd [of Bistān], the Sovereign of the Sufis. (*Manzili ol vaqt edi Bistām bilā Dāmaghānda kim manga qildi madad arvāh-i pāk-i anbiyā. Pīr Kharaqānī tarīqatning imāmi Bū'l-Ḥasan, barča 'āriflarga sulṭān Bāyazīd ol muqtadā*).<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Ali Alparslan, “Şeybani Han’ın Türk Kültür Tarihindeki Yeri,” *I. Milletler Arası Türkoloji Kongresi (1973) Tebligler*. (Istanbul: Türk Tarihi, 1979): 3.

<sup>42</sup> Shībānī Khān gives names and titles on the following pages of his manual: F17B7-8, F18A6, F20A2, F41B1. For the lives of these individuals, see entries in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*. For Süfyān b. Saīd b. Mesrūk es-Sevrī, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/sufyan-es-sevri>. For Muhammed el-Ḥāfiẓi el-Buhārī, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/muhammed-parsa>. For Ebū Ṭālib, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/ebu-talib-el-mekki>. For Necmüddīn-i Kübrā, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/necmeddin-i-kubra>

<sup>43</sup> Shībānī Khān alludes to a number of Persian and Turkish literary figures. He names a few and uses verses from their works as well. For Navā’ī, see *Dīvān* 64b, 65a, 86b-87a, 96a. For quotes from Nasīmī, see *Dīvān* 100a-b. For quotes from Ḥakīm Atā, see *Dīvān* 167b. For quotes from Mowlānā Ḥusayn-i Khwārazmī, see *Dīvān* 168a.

<sup>44</sup> Transliteration and translation for this text belong to Bodrogligeti. Andreas Bodrogligeti. “Muhammad Shaybani’s *Baḥru 'l-huda*: An Early Sixteenth Century Didactic Qasida in Chagatay”. *Ural-altaische Jahrbücher* (54) 1982: f20r, 32

<sup>45</sup> Transliteration and translation for this text belong to Bodrogligeti. Andreas Bodrogligeti. “Muhammad Shaybani’s *Baḥru 'l-huda*: An Early Sixteenth Century Didactic Qasida in Chagatay”. *Ural-altaische Jahrbücher* (54) 1982: f22: 5-8, 34



In his *Dīvān*, he even goes as far as comparing himself to such literary and sufi masters as ‘Aṭṭār, writing,

Shībānī sets the world on fire with his wailing || Because Shībānī speaks in ‘Aṭṭār’s voice.  
(*Köydürür ‘alemni āhıdın Şibān || Çün Şibānī nağme-i ‘Aṭṭār iter*).<sup>46</sup>

His purpose in placing himself squarely in the midst of such greats of the Persianate world was not only an expression of his appreciation but a legitimizing practice in his promotion of particular convention of Islamic practices that set himself apart from the rising tide of what he deemed heretical forms of Islam in Iran.

Shībānī Khān’s reputation as a patron of the arts preceded him as a number of Persian chroniclers, poets, and literati migrated from parts of Iran and Herat to his court in Bukhara.

Muḥammad Ṣālīḥ,<sup>47</sup> one of Shībānī Khān’s court biographers mentions in his *Shībānīnāma*,

The dynasty of Timur will be extinguished || The period of another person will come ||  
That person is Shībānī Khān || Prince of the Shibānids [and] *mahdī* of the era || Now he is  
in Turkistan || The glorious khan of the Uzbeks || He is the descendant of Abū’l-khayr ||  
He is the successor to the seat of the crown || He is the descendant of Jochi and the  
grandson of Chinggis || He stands foremost among all khans || He is the one who  
conquers these lands || He shows grace to his people || Because what he does is in line  
with the Quran || He has conferred with many sultans (*Dawlat-i āl-i Tīmūr kītūsīdūr ||*  
*nawbat ūzga kīshīga yītūsīdūr || ūl kīshī bārdūr shībānī khān || khan-i shībāndūr mahdī-*  
*yī zamān || Hālī anīng yīrī turkistāndūr || ūzbak īlīga mu‘aẓẓam khāndūr || khān*  
*abū’lkhayrgha farzand īrūr || jāhīnīng shākhīgha payvand īrūr || yūjī khān ūghlī va*

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<sup>46</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Muḥammad Shaybānī, and Yakup Karasoy. *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): 48a

<sup>47</sup> Shībānī Khān had no qualms praising and admonishing members of his court. In his *Dīvān*, he has numerous praises to Ṣālīḥ and his ability to produce prose (see *Dīvān* F186a). Similarly, he scolds Banā’ī for the lateness of his *Shībānīnāma*. One can only assume that the language Banā’ī writes in – that is, Persian – was not the mode in which Shībānī Khān desired for the production of a dynastic history that was meant for a period that saw the rise in common Turkic dialects as a mass mode of communication.



*jangīz tūrūnī || bārcha khānlārdīn ‘ālī ūrūnī || ūl alūr ūshbū vilāyatlārni || kūrātūr ilgā  
‘ināyatlārni || bārdūr anīng īshī qu’rān bīrla || ūltūrūbdūr nīja sulṭān bīrla*)<sup>48</sup>

Şālih joined Shībānī Khān not just because of the latter’s ability to conquer territory, but because of his competence in Islamic doctrine and receptiveness to advice from local leaders in developing his legitimacy as a ruler.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Abdurauf Fitrat’s comments on the 16<sup>th</sup> century’s language and literary production indicated how important it was for the development of Uzbek national identity. Fitrat, a *jadid reformer*,<sup>49</sup> explained that the arrival of the Shibanids in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century in southern Central Asia corresponded with the dismantling of the vestiges of Chagataid literary production. Shībānī Khān’s followers were renowned for their desire to propagate Timurid literary traditions, and Shībānī Khān himself benefited from the Bukharan and Herati schools of production. Therefore, should one look through the history of Turkic prose or poetry, Shībānī Khān would be at the top of the list.<sup>50</sup>

At the time of Shībānī Khān’s rise in the former Timurid lands of Central Asia, Shāh Ismā‘il was propagating his Shi‘i ideology over Iran and Iraq as he built his Safavid realm. Anonymous Uzbek letters to Sulṭān Selīm praise the Ottoman leader as “caliph”, “mahdi”, and the defender of the faith (discussed in chapter 2). The versified letters go as far as to say about Shāh Ismā‘il, “Blasphemy completely destroyed the palace of religions || On the throne of

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<sup>48</sup> Translation and transliteration for Muḥammad Şālih’s *Shībānīnāma* by Samie. Muḥammad Şālih, and Hermann Vambéry. *Die Scheibaniade: ein özbekisches Heldengedicht in 76 Gesängen*. (Budapest: In Commission bei Friedrich Kilian, 1885): 34-36

<sup>49</sup> For a thorough analysis of these socio-cultural and political modernists, see Adeeb Khalid. *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*. (Berkeley: UC Berkeley, 1998).

<sup>50</sup> Abdurauf Fitrat. *Tanlangan Asarlari II Jild*. (Toshkent: Ma’naviyat, 2000): especially chapter on “XVI Asrdan So’ngra O’zbek Adabiyoti”: 55-60.

religion blasphemy settled.”<sup>51</sup> It is no stretch then that Shībānī Khān viewed himself as the savior of Sunnism against what he viewed to be heresy rising just south of his conquered territory. After conquering Khorasan in May 1507, Shībānī Khān had the *khuṭba* (Friday prayer) recited in his own name, along with adopting the eminent titles, *imām-i zamān va khalīfat al- raḥmān* (imam of the age and viceregent of God) meant to inspire the masses against the Shi‘i threat.<sup>52</sup>

Shībānī Khān’s presentation of devotional materials is simple and straightforward. I suggest that he recognized the linguistic, and somewhat cultural, barrier to Islamic doctrine among his population, and he set out to rectify this matter through unobscured formulas of prayer with verbatim translations in Chagatai.<sup>53</sup> The expressed purpose of his text is to reinforce Islamic doctrine among his subjects. He writes,

F1A4<sup>54</sup> | ammā ba‘d | mūdāq aytūr faqīr-i ḥaqīr  
But then the wretched one says such,

F1A5 al-mutawakkilu ‘alā al-maliki al-musta‘āni | Muḥammad al-Shībānī ibn Abī al-Khayr Khān |

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<sup>51</sup> Lütü Paşa. *Tevāriḥ-i Āl-i ‘Osmān*. (Istanbul: Matbaa-yi Āmire, 1922): 12-13.

<sup>52</sup> A. A. Semenov, “Sheibani-Khān i zavoevanie im imperii Timuridov,” in *Materialy po istorii tadzhikov i uzbekov Srednei Azii I*, Stalinabad, 1954: 68; Ali Alparslan, “Şeybani Han’ın Türk Kültür Tarihindeki Yeri,” *I. Milletler Arası Türkoloji Kongresi (1973) Tebligler*. (Istanbul: Türk Tarihi, 1979): 1

<sup>53</sup> This trend of writing in Chagatai was a rising trend in the 15-16<sup>th</sup> centuries. Navā‘ī writes at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, “Turkish contains many nuances such as are made possible by these words and expressions, but they have remained unknown until the present day because on one ever studied the matter. Ignorant and affected youths have tried to compose facile poems with Persian words. But if anyone truly ponders and reflects sufficiently, he will realize the plentitude and scope of the Turkish vocabulary which facilitate the arts of eloquence and narrative style and versification and telling of fables. The superiority of the Turkish language has been demonstrated by many proofs. Therefore, Turkish poets and writers should have used their own tongue and not resorted to others. They erred in even attempting such a thing. If they were capable of composing in both tongues, they should have composed most in their own tongue and only rarely in another. When they indulged in hyperbole, they should have done so equally in both tongues.” See Levi, Scott Cameron, and Ron Sela. *Islamic Central Asia: an anthology of historical sources*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010): 185-186.

<sup>54</sup> Transliteration and translation of Shībānī Khān’s *Risāla* by Samie.

Refuge of the needy, Muḥammad al-Shībānī ibn abu al-Khayr Khān

- F1A6 raḥimahu Allāh al-Raḥmān kīm bū tārikh tūqqūz yūz ūn ūchdā  
God have mercy on him, who in 913 was
- F1A7 Khurāsān takhtī muyassar būldī Samarqand va Khurāsāndā tūshkān  
granted the throne of Khurasan [and said] that the books in Samarkand and  
Khurasan
- F2A1 kitāblār kīm ṭā‘at va ‘ibādat bābīda taṣnīf qīlīb  
composed on the matters of obedience and worship
- F2A2 irdīlār tūkāl ‘arabī va fārsī tīlī bīlān  
were all in Arabic and Farsi,
- F2A3 irdī ūl sababdīn bū risālanī turkī bīlān  
for that reason, this risāla in Turki
- F2A4 farzand-i a‘zz-i arjumand-i sa‘ādyār-i firūz-jang-i zafar-ašār  
[for] a dear son, honorable and august victor, in whose footsteps victory  
follows,
- F2A5 Mu‘izz al-Salṭana Muḥammad-Tīmūr Bahādur ṭawwal Allāh ‘umrahu ūchūn  
Mu‘izz al-Salṭana<sup>55</sup> Muḥammad-Tīmūr Bahādur, may God give him longevity,
- F2A6 āytildī basa bīglār nāyiblār-i ṭā‘at-khwān  
was composed. Also, for commanders, for obedient deputies
- F2A7 yigītlār-i islām-chirīgī ūchūn bārcha ādamīlārgħa  
for the warriors of the army of Islam, for the benefit of all people,
- F2A8 fāyida būlghāy dīb ūlūq kitāblārdīn chiqārīb  
I extracted from great books [and]
- F2A9 taṣnīf qīldim umīd ulkīm bārchagā nāfi‘ būlghāy  
I composed it. I hope it will be useful to all.
- F2A10 in shā’ Allāh ta‘ālā bīlgīl kim tīngrī ta‘ālā va taqaddas  
God willing, God most high. Know that God, exalted is He and Venerable
- F3A1 ūz kalāmīdā zīkr ūchūn bisyār āyat kīltūrūbtūr  
Sent many verses for devotion in His own Word (i.e. the Quran)

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<sup>55</sup> Support of the Sultanate

For those who follow his advice, Shībānī Khān argues they will gain eternal prosperity. The nomadic nature of his population required him to simplify the fundamentals of the religion in a language that was comprehensible to his subjects and – more importantly – ease the intensity of practical implementation to daily tasks to which his subjects could follow. He focuses primarily on the practicality of Islam in daily life, which is important to consider given the task Shībānī Khān assumed: namely, turning his nomadic population into a settled, literate people.

Shībānī Khān's primary concern in relaying religious prescriptions is the reinforcement of *Sharia* because of the numerous challenges facing his new empire. I suggest that Shāh Ismā'il's newfound power in Iran, Shībānī Khān's own nomadic heritage, and the pervasive nature of sufism in Eurasia posed imminent challenges to his burden; each of which is spoken to at length in his *Risāla*. Sufism and its impact on Eurasian society was intimately tied to the nomadic roots of the Uzbeks. Despite the expansiveness of sufi traditions in the region, and the understanding that sufi practice led to the expansion of Islam in the region, the Shi'i danger from the south, rooted in the Safaviyya sufi order, threatened to undermine Shībānī Khān's desire for a solid, powerful centralized Islamic empire. To address this complex problem, Shībānī Khān adopted – more likely, his personal beliefs were formed by – sufi traditions stated by prominent scholars and sufi masters into his own propagation of Islamic doctrine. I argue that following his model of Islam – emphasis on *Sharia* and downplaying yet still recognizing sufism – allowed him to control the embodied aspects of religion. He writes in his *Dīvān*,

On the path of God, Shībānī took up the sword of religion || He always converted hordes of infidels into Muslims. (*Tingri yolida Şibānī dīn kılıcını alıp || Her zamān bir khayl-i kāfirni müselmān eylemiş*).<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Muḥammad Shaybānī, and Yakup Karasoy. *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): 69a. F81b-82a also serve as examples of his desire to act as ghazi for the expansion of the dominion of and protection of Islam.

Uzbeks are urged to practice the “true path,” meaning the prescribed laws passed to humanity from the Prophet, in hadith, and God’s Word, the Quran. The sufi path, never directly addressed as a lesser path, is only utilized as cultural nodes of encounters to overtly illustrate to subjects the correct reading of religious practice.

### ***(3) Tawḥīd – Oneness of God***

In this section, I show how Shībānī Khān places the oneness of God at the center of belief for his followers. As the main purpose of Islam, Shībānī Khān threads *tawḥīd*, the oneness of God, throughout his manual. Muslims are to shy away from carnal sin, ego, and thoughts or actions inspired by the Devil. Since remembrance and action are direct responses to a person’s devotion toward God, Shībānī Khān dictates that good thoughts and bad thoughts, what he terms *khavāṭir*, require specific religious prescriptions. He begins a long discussion on sin and subsequent redemption through prayers as follows:

F3A2<sup>57</sup> taqī jahran va khafiyyat[an] āyatlār kīltūrūbtūrūr tāng namāzī  
He (God) has sent verses to read out loud and quietly (by oneself) . Morning prayers,

F3A3 āqshām namāzī yassīgh namāzī jahran ūqūlūr jahr  
evening prayers, night prayers are read out loud

F3A4 īshītūr dīmāk bülūr ūla namāzī īkindī  
Meaning hearing it aloud. Noon prayers and afternoon

F3A5 namāzī khafiyya ūqūlūr khafiyyat[an] īchīdīn ūqūmāk bülūr  
prayers are read quietly, khafiyya means reading from inside [sincerely]

F3A6 imām-i ‘aẓam raḥmat Allāh ‘alayhi khafiyyat[an] aytib tūrūr zikrī  
The Great Imām, God rest his soul, prayed inwardly.

F3A7 imām-i Shāfi ‘ī raḥmat allāh jahran aytib tūrūr zikrī

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<sup>57</sup> Transliteration and translation of Shībānī Khān’s *Risāla* by Samie

Imam Shāfi‘ī, God have mercy on him, prayed aloud.

F3A8 bīz faqīr kūngīldīn mūdāq kichār kim khavāṭir-i rūḥ khayriyyat  
This humble one thinks that thoughts of the spirit are welfare

F3A9 tūrūr khavāṭir-i vasvasa shayṭāndīn tūrūr nafs va  
and thoughts of temptation are from the Devil. Carnal desire,

F3A10 shahvat zinā nāmaḥramlārgha bāqmāq chāghīr īchmāq badannī  
lust, fornication, gazing upon strangers,<sup>58</sup> gluttony, drinking alcohol,

F3B1 basīlāmāk mūnūng mīngizlīk nafsdīn tūrūr  
gluttony, and the like are caused by the self.

F3B2 vasvasa-yi shayṭān yālghān sūzlāmāq yāmān fikrlār  
temptations of the Devil, lying, having impure

F3B3 qīlmāq kishīnī chāqishtūrmāq va ūrūshūrmāq  
thoughts, inciting people to attack and fight,

F3B4 mūnūng mīngizlīklār shayṭāndīn tūrūr basa  
and the like are caused by the Devil.

Whereas these thoughts, and sometimes deeds, are considered influences by the Devil, there are thoughts that are considered virtuous – namely those praising God and reinforcing *tawḥīd*.

F3B5 khavāṭir-i rūḥ īmān va Islām namāz va rūza va zakāt va  
Good deeds of the spirit, faith and religion, prayer, fasting, charity,

F3B6 ḥajj musulmānlārgha yakhshīlīq tīgūrmāk pādishāhlār qāshīdā  
and pilgrimage bring good fortune to Muslims. In front of kings,

F3B7 faqīr miskīn sūzīn aytib īshīn kafāyat qīlmāq mūnūng  
Speaking like a poor humble man and being modest

F3B8 mīngizlīklār kūngīldā kīchsa khudāy ūl qūlgha tarbiyyat  
if one thinks thoughts like that, (it is that) then God has instructed

F3B9 qīlmīshī tūrūr mūnūng mīngizlīklār nī khavāṭir dīmāslār  
that servant. Things such as this are not considered distractions (thoughts).

F3B10 agar mūnūngdīk nīmārsālār kūngīldā kīchsa zikr ūrnīdā

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<sup>58</sup> i.e., those upon we are not allowed to gaze, sinful covetousness.

If things such as these pass from the heart, they are considered as

F4A1 bŭlŭr ŭl kih shayṭānnī aytildī nafsnī aytildī  
zīkr. He who says Satan or says the self,

F4A2 khavāṭir ŭl bŭlŭr kūngŭldā kīchmāk bīla khudāy ŭl gunāhnī  
that is a distraction. God does not consider such an inner thought

F4A3 bītīmās ŭl īshnī qīlmāghūncha.  
a sin, as long as he (the person) does not actively do these things.

Such *khavāṭir* are not considered distracting from one's system of belief because it simply acts in accordance with what practicing Muslims ought to do. As previous and virtuous Muslims have done, good thoughts require inward, silent prayer, keeping in line with sufi conceptions of piety. Outward expression of religion might be read as pretension or vulgarity.<sup>59</sup> However, should one have negative *khavāṭir*, Shībānī Khān writes,

F4A3 nafs va shayṭān īshlārī  
carnal thoughts and the work of the Devil

F4A4 kūngŭlgā kūp kīlŭr kīshī zīkrnī qātīq āytsā āvāz  
come often to the heart, [but] if a person says *zīkr* aloud

F4A5 bīlan kūngŭlgā āz kīlgāy khavāṭir bū ma' nādīn  
distraction (these thoughts) will rarely come to the heart. This is what *khavāṭir* means.

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<sup>59</sup> In accordance with Central Asian methods of *zīkr*, *Rashaḥāt-i 'ayn al-ḥayāt*, a hagiographical source focused on Khoja Ahrar, includes anecdotes about the necessity of outward and inward prayer. The anecdote says in response to a loud, outward production of a *zīkr*-circle, “‘If a servant or a retainer were to stand before Shahrukh Mirza and constantly keep saying, in his presence, ‘Shahrukh, Shahrukh, Shahrukh,’ in a loud voice, it would be extremely rude and offensive. The proper thing for a retainer in the presence of a ruler, and for a servant in the presence of his master (khoja), is to be quiet and attentive, not to shout and raise an uproar’”. See Levi, Scott Cameron, and Ron Sela. *Islamic Central Asia: an anthology of historical sources*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010): 192.

Rather than praying inwardly, as he describes when having “good” thoughts and remembering God, negative or devilish thoughts require an embodied experience of outward prayer to purify one’s sin.

In accordance with his incorporation of sufi illustration of religious devotion, Shībānī Khān includes a pair of couplets from Ḥakīm Atā,

F4A5 Ḥakīm Atā khabar bīrūr kim  
Ḥakīm Atā advises that:

F4A6 Allāh Allāh dīsām Allāh || zarra yāzūq qālmās wa-Allāh  
if I say God God God || By God, the slightest trace of sin will not remain

F4A7 iblīs aytūr dīma Allāh || man aytūr man ma‘āz Allāh  
if the Devil says do not say God || I say I take refuge in God

Again, Shībānī Khān reiterates the necessity of *zīkr* for devotion, and those done without pretention, that is quietly and from within, are better and deemed good.

F4A8 ūl kih rūḥ-i khavāṭirdīn aytīldī *zīkr*nī īchīdīn aytsā  
That is said as a good effort of the spirit. If ones says *zīkr* within

F4A9 kīshī bīlmāsa riyāsī yūq būlūr basa bū yakhshīrāq  
[and] unknowingly, it is not pretention. Then this is

F4A10 būlghāy  
better

#### ***(4) Tahlīl and Shahādat – Acclimation toward God and Testimony***

The most important show of devotion for Muslims alongside the belief of the one God is the pronouncement of faith in the one God. Shībānī Khān’s basis for the use of *lā illāha illā allāh*, there is no god but God, as *zīkr* is the Quran.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937): 37:35 and 47:19, 1195 and 1400 respectively.



- F4A10<sup>61</sup> bülghāy Islām lashkarī ūchūn bū qadar āytildī bīlgānī  
For the Islamic community, this was deemed appropriate. He
- F4B1 Qur'ān ūqūghāy ānī bīlmāsā namāz ūqūghāy va zikr-i lā illāha  
who knows how will read the Quran, he who does not will pray, and say in lieu of  
zikr
- F4B2 illā Allāh aytqāy kim payghambar ṣallā Allāh ‘alayhi wa-sallam aytibtūr  
as “There is no god but God,” because the Prophet, peace be upon him, said
- F4B3 | afḍal al-zikr lā illāha illā allāh | ya‘nī zikrlardīn afḍalrāghī  
afḍal al-zikr lā illāha illā Allāh meaning, the best zikr is
- F4B4 lā illāha illā Allāh dūr anīg ūchūn kim īmānnīg madārī  
lā illāha illā Allāh. Because of that, the center of faith
- F4B5 bū kalima bīla tūrūr ya‘nī hīch īsh bū kalimasīz mu‘tabar īmās va  
is this phrase meaning nothing is valid without this phrase and
- F4B6 ḥaẓrat-i risālat ṣallā Allāh ‘alayhi wa-sallam aytib tūrūrlār  
the Prophet, peace be upon him, has said
- F4B7 | man qāla lā illāha illā Allāh dakhala al-janna | ya‘nī har kīm  
man qāla lā illāha illā allāh dakhala al-janna meaning anyone who
- F4B8 lā illāha illā Allāh dīsa ūchmāḥgha kīrgāy va ḥaqq subḥānahu wa-  
says lā illāha illā Allāh will enter heaven and God, may he be praised
- F4B9 ta‘ālā ūz kalāmīdā bū ma‘nādīn ishārat qīlīb tūrūr  
and exalted, indicates this in His own Word.
- F4B10 qawluhu ta‘ālā | inna Allāha lā yaghfiru an yushraka bihi wa-yaghfiru mā dūna  
He said, God most high, Indeed, Allah does not forgive association with Him, but  
He forgives what is less than
- F5A1 dhālika liman yashā’u |<sup>62</sup> ya‘nī chīnlīq va rāstlīq  
that for whom He wills. Meaning with rightness and correctness
- F5A2 bīla tīngrī ta‘ālā yārlīqāmās ūl kīshīlārnī kīm  
God most high forgives not those who perpetrate
- F5A3 angā shirk kīltūrūbtūrlār va yārlīqār ūl kīshīnī kim

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<sup>61</sup> Transliteration and translation of Shībānī Khān’s *Risāla* by Samie

<sup>62</sup> *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937): 4:48

shirk unto him and forgives those who

F5A4 shirk kīlmāydūrlār  
do not perpetrate shirk

The testimony of belief in the one God is traditionally broken into two parts: the initial clause, called the *tahlīl*, is taken to be the celestial aspect of the devotion. The second part of the testimony guides Muslims in their belief that the Prophet is nothing more than a man, as well as placing him in the direct lineage of Abrahamic messengers. Together, these two parts comprise the *shahādat*, which in and of itself is not a prayer, though it is used, as Shībānī Khān describes, as the best phrase in an act of devotion. As a tool for his followers, this phrase is meant to be uttered consistently as a reminder of God’s existence and as a means of resisting *shirk*, or attributing partners to God. The Quran states, “God forgiveth not that partners should be set up with Him, but He forgiveth anything else, to whom He pleaseth, to set up partners with God is to devise a sin most heinous indeed.”<sup>63</sup> Equating anything to God is a betrayal, punishment for which one cannot imagine. God can, however, given His nature, forgive those who repent.

### **(5) ‘*Asmā’u llāhi al-ḥusnā* – God’s Beautiful Names**

As a continuation of the importance of God at the center of his religious propensity, I showcase some of the tools Shībānī Khān offers his followers in this section. He provides the ninety-nine names of God in Arabic along with a literal Chagatai translation. His purpose in providing these names is for devotional practice, which is connected to a prophetic tradition recorded by Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī: “Allah’s Apostle said, ‘Allah has ninety-nine Names, one-hundred less one; and he who memorized them all by heart will enter Paradise.’ To count

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<sup>63</sup> *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937): Q4:48, 195

something means to know it by heart.”<sup>64</sup> Shībānī Khān first cites al-Bukhārī, then begins the recitation with a Quranic verse as a reminder that there is but the one God.

F42B4 | qāla rasūlu Allāh ṣallā allāh ‘alayhi wa-sallam | inna li-llāhi tis‘at  
the Prophet peace be upon him said God has ninety-nine

F42B5 wa-tis‘in isman man aḥṣṭhā dakhala al-janna | payghambar ṣallā allāh ‘alayhi wa-sallam aytti kim tengri  
names and he who memorizes them will enter Heaven. The Prophet peace be upon him said that God

F42B6 ta‘ālaning tūqsān tūqqūz ātī bār har kīm ūl ātlārñī  
the exalted has ninety-nine names. Whoever recites

F42B7 ūqūsā ūshtmaḥgha kīrgāy | huwa Allāh alladhī lā ilāha illā huwa<sup>65</sup> | ya‘nī  
His names will enter Heaven. He is God other than whom there is no god meaning

F42B8 ūl dūrūr ūl tengrī kim yārātmāqghah qādir dūrūr  
He is the God who has the power to create.

A necessary point drawn here is that the names attributed to God are single attributes to God and should not by any Muslim be accepted or believed to be individual gods.

F42B8 ūl dūrūr ūl tengrī kim yārātmāqghah qādir dūrūr | al-Raḥman |  
He is the God to whom none reaches [equals]. al-Raḥman

F42B9 bandalargā rūzī bergūjī | al-Raḥīm | ‘aṣīlārdīn ‘afv  
the one who provides sustenance to followers. al-Raḥīm, the one who forgives sinners.

F42B10 qīlghūjī | al-Malik | pādishāh | al-Quddūs | ārīgh  
al-Malik, the king. al-Quddūs, the pure.

F43A1 | al-Salām | ‘aybsīz | al-Mū’mīn | imīn qīlghūjī | al-Muḥaymin | ‘adl va ḥukm  
al-Salām, the perfect one. al-Mū’mīn, the provider of assurance. al-Muḥaymin, the provider of justice and rulings

F43A2 qīlghūjī | al-‘Azīz | ūlkīm anīngdīk tāpilmāghāy | al-Jabbār | ūlūgh  
al-‘Azīz, none is found likend to Him. al-Jabbār, the great.

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<sup>64</sup> *Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī. *Saḥīḥ Bukhari*, Muhsin Khan trans. (2009) Volume 9, Book 93, Number 489: 1653

<sup>65</sup> *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937): Q20:98

- F43A3 | al-Mutakabbir | asrū ūlūgh | al-Khāliq | yārātqūjī | al-Bārī‘ | ‘ālamnī  
al-Mutakabbir, the supreme. al-Khāliq, the creator. al-Bārī‘,
- F43A4 tadbīr qīlghūjī | al-Muṣavvir | mukhtalif ṣūratlārnī yārātqūjī | al-Ghaffār |  
the designer of the universe. al-Muṣavvir, the creator of differing forms.  
al-Ghaffār,
- F43A5 yāzūqlārnī ‘afv qīlghūjī | al-Qahhār | ‘aṣīlārgḥah asrū qahr qīlghūjī  
the forgiver of sins. al-Qahhār, the one who fiercely suppresses  
sinners.
- F43A6 | al-Vahhāb | bāghīshlāghūjī | al-Razzāq | rūzī bergūjī | al-Fattāḥ |  
al-Vahhāb, the merciful. al-Razzāq, the sustainer. al-Fattāḥ,
- F43A7 īshlārnī fath qīghūjī | al-‘Alīm | bīlgūjī | al-Qābiḥ | tūtqūjī  
the opener. al-‘Alīm, the knower. al-Qābiḥ, the restrainer.
- F43A8 | al-Bāsiṭ | king qīlghūjī | al-Khāfiḥ | tūshūrgūjī | al-Rāfi‘ |  
al-Bāsiṭ, the expander. al-Khāfiḥ, the downgrader. al-Rāfi‘,
- F43A9 kūtārgūjī | al-Mu‘izz | ‘azīz qīlghūjī | al-Muzill | khvār qīlghūjī  
the upgrader. al-Mu‘izz, the honor giver. al-Muzill, the dishonor giver.
- F43A10 | al-Samī‘ | īshītghūjī | al-Baṣīr | kūrgūjī | al-Ḥakam | ḥukm qīlghūjī  
al-Samī‘, the (all-)hearer. al-Baṣīr, the (all-)seer. al-Ḥakam, the arbiter.
- F43B1 | al-Laṭīf | yakhshī īsh qīlghūjī | al-Khabīr | bārī nimanī bīlghūjī  
al-Laṭīf, the doer of good. al-Khabīr, the all-knowing.
- F43B2 | al-Ḥalīm | ‘azabnī tā’khīr qīlghūjī | al-‘Azīm | asrū buzurg | al-Ghafūr |  
al-Ḥalīm, the deterrer of torment. al-‘Azīm, the greatest. al-Ghafūr,
- F43B3 ‘afv qīlghūjī | al-Shakūr | tā‘at va khidmat qadrīn bīlghūjī | al-‘Alī |  
the forgiver. al-Shakūr, the knower of the value of worship and servitude. al-  
‘Alī,
- F43B4 yāmān ṣifatlārdīn īrāq | al-Kabīr | ūlūgh | al-Ḥafīz |  
the far from bad characteristics. al-Kabīr, the great. al-Ḥafīz,
- F43B5 sākhilāghūjī | al-Muqīt | quvvatlīq va quvvat bīrgūjī | al-Ḥasīb |  
the preserver. al-Muqīt, strong and giver of strength. al-Ḥasīb,
- F43B6 ḥisāb va siyāq bīlgūjī | al-Jalīl | ūlūgh qīlghūjī va yūqārī  
the knower of accounts and methods. al-Jalīl, the doer of greatness and raiser.
- F43B7 kūtārgūjī | al-Karīm | yāzūqlār bāshīdīn ūtkūjī | al-Raqīb | banda

al-Karīm, the passer of sins. al-Raqīb, knower of

- F43B8 lār aḥvalīnī bīlgūjī | al-Mujīb | banda javābīnī bīlghūjī | al-Vāsi‘ | servants’ conditions. al-Mujīb, the knower of servants’ answers. al-Vāsi‘,
- F43B9 bāghīshlāmāghī kīng bīlgūjī | al-Ḥakīm | īshī bütün | al-Vadūd | the one full of forgiveness. al-Ḥakīm, the complete. al-Vadūd,
- F43B10 muṭī‘lārnī sīvgūjī | al-Majīd | ūlūgh | al-Bā‘is | payghambarlār the loving of the obedient. al-Majīd, the great. al-Bā‘is, sender of prophets.
- F44A1 yibārgūjī | al-Shahīd | tānūq | al-Ḥaqq | khudāylīqqa sizāvār | al-Vakīl | al-Shahīd, the witnesser. al-Ḥaqq, the worthy of divinity. al-Vakīl,
- F44A2 īshlārnī kifāyat qīlghūjī | al-Qaviyy | quvvatlīq | al-Matīn | bīrk the accomplisher of things. al-Qaviyy, the strong. al-Matīn, the firm.
- F44A3 | al-Valī | yārī bīrgūjī | al-Ḥamīd | sutūda | al-Muḥṣī | qūt al-Valī, the helper. al-Ḥamīd, the sanctified. al-Muḥṣī,
- F44A4 līq va bīlgūchī | al-Mubdī’ | yārātqūjī | al-Mu‘īd | yang bāshdīn yārātqūjī the blessed and wise. al-Mubdī’, the creator. al-Mu‘īd, the creator from the beginning.
- F44A5 | al-Muḥyī | tīrgūzchī | al-Mumīt | ūldūrgūchī | al-Ḥayy | dāyim al-Muḥyī, the life-giver. al-Mumīt, the death-giver. al-Ḥayy,
- F44A6 tīrik | al-Qayyūm | pāyanda | al-Vājid | niyāsīz | al-Mājid | ūlūgh the always living. al-Qayyūm, the eternal. al-Vājid, the needless. al-Mājid, the great.
- F44A7 | al-Vāhid al-‘Aḥad | bīr | al-Ṣamad | niyāzmandlārnīng panāhī | al-Qādir | al-Vāhid. al-‘Aḥad, the unique, single. al-Ṣamad, the refuge of the needy. al-Qādir,
- F44A8 | al-Muqtadir | qudrat īgāsī | al-Muqaddim | īlgārī bārchadīn al-Muqtadir, the all-powerful. al-Muqaddim, the one ahead of all.
- F44A9 | al-Mu’akhhir | yārātqāndā ta’khīr qīlghūchī | al-‘Avval | bārchadīn yūqārī al-Mu’akhhir, the postponer at creation. al-‘Avval, the one greater than all.
- F44A10 | al-‘Ākhir | bārchadīn sūng qālghūchī | al-Zāhir | paydā al-‘Ākhir, the one remaining after everything. al-Zāhir, the manifest.
- F44B1 | al-Bāṭin | har nimagā dānā | al-Vālī | īshlār bāshlāghūjī | al-Muta‘ālī | al-Bāṭin, the knower of everything. al-Vālī, the starter of all things. al-Muta‘ālī,

- F44B2 buzurg | al-Barr | yakhshī īshliq | al-Tavvāb | tavba bīrgūjī  
the supreme. al-Barr, the beneficent. al-Tavvāb, the acceptor of penitence.
- F44B3 | al-Muntaqim | dād ālghūjī | al-‘Afūvv | yāzūqlārnī yāpqūjī  
al-Muntaqim, the avenger. al-‘Afūvv, the forgiver of sins.
- F44B4 | al-Ra’ūf | ‘ayblārnī yāpqūchī | al-Muqsit | yingīshī tūz | al-Rabb |  
ar-Ra’ūf, the one who covers up faults. al-Muqsit, the correct one. al-Rabb,
- F44B5 ‘ālam tartīb qīlghūjī | al-Jāmi‘ | yighīstūrqujī | al-Ghanī | bīniyāz  
the world regulator. al-Jāmi‘, the assembler. al-Ghanī, the needless.
- F44B6 | al-Mughnī | bīniyāz qīlghūchī | al-Mu‘tī | ‘atā bīrgūjī al-Māni‘  
al-Mughnī, the responder of needs. al-Mu‘tī, the grace-giver. al-Māni‘,
- F44B7 man‘ qīlghūjī | al-Nāfi‘ | sūd bīrgūchī | al-Žārr | žarar yitkūrgūjī  
the withholder. al-Nāfi‘, the giver of subsistence. al-Žār, the afflicter.
- F44B8 | al-Nūr | yārūghlūq sālghūchī | al-Hādī | yūl kūrātūgūjī  
al-Nūr, the one who spreads light. al-Hādī, the guide.
- F44B9 | al-Badī‘ | yang bāshdīn yārātqūjī | al-Bāqī | pāyanda | al-Vāris |  
al-Badī‘, the originator. al-Bāqī, the eternal. al-Vāris,
- F44B10 bārcha khalqdīn sūng qālghūjī | al-Rashīd | taqdīrī tūz | al-Şabūr |  
the remainder after all. al-Rashīd, the one whose decree is correct. al-Şabūr,
- F45A1 şabr qīlghūjī  
the patient one.

He ends the recitation with a Quranic verse reiterating the sentiment at the beginning of this recitation.

- F45A1 laysa ka-mithlihi shay’un wa-huwa al-samī‘ u al-baṣīr <sup>66</sup> ning mislī  
There is nothing like unto Him, and He is the hearing, the seeing [meaning] there is
- F45A2 yūqtūr va ūzī īshītūgūjī va kūrūgūgūjī tūrūr  
nothing like Him and He hears everything and sees everything.

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<sup>66</sup> *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937): Q42:11

Using God's names as supplication is taken directly from the Quran and prophetic traditions, and it reinforces sufi traditions of *zīkr*, which Shībānī Khān tightly controlled in his empire. Rather than permit embodied performances familiar to the western Islamic world, *tasbīh*, or repetitive phrases glorifying God, were a solid replacement for continual remembrance and glorification of God.<sup>67</sup>

### **(6) *Qirā'at* – Method of Recitation [of the Readings]**

Shībānī Khān quotes Q16:97 as the rationale for the importance of reading and reciting from the Quran.<sup>68</sup> People who place their trust in God and believe wholeheartedly seek forgiveness from God and protection from evil. Evil, as is expressed in this passage as Satan, has no authority or influence over people so long as they recite from the Quran and as an earnest symbol of their desire to fully understand God's Will. By reciting such passages, Muslims literally and figuratively seek strength through God's Word and try to act according to His law. Shībānī Khān writes,

F10A9<sup>69</sup> ḥaẓrat-i payghambar ṣallā Allāh 'alayhi wa-sallam aytūrlār afḍal  
The Prophet, peace be upon him, says "afḍal

F10A10 al-'ibādāt qirā'at al-Qur'ān" ya'nī 'ibādātlārnīng yakhshī

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<sup>67</sup> In two other sections of his *Risāla*, Shībānī Khān gives two phrases to be repeated as part of the *tasbīh*. First, on F15A4 he says to recite "Glory be to God and with His Praise, Glory be to God the Great, and with His praise". Then, on the following folio F15B1-5, he explains that the following recitation should be utilized between prayers: "Lord, Praise be to You, there is no god but You, You are my Lord and I am your servant, I believe in You and serve You alone, and I heed your covenant sincerely, I turn away from evil and repent, I ask you for forgiveness of my sins, truly you are You are the forgiver of sins."

<sup>68</sup> He quotes, "Whoever works righteousness, man or woman, and has Faith, verily, to him will We give a new Life, a life that is good and pure" but in the Quran, the verse continues, "and We will bestow on such their reward according to the best of their actions." *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937): 683.

<sup>69</sup> Transliteration and translation of Shībānī Khān's *Risāla* by Samie

al-‘ibādāt qirā’at al-Qur’ān meaning the best type of worship

F10B1 rāghī Qur’ān ūmāq<sup>70</sup> tūrūr  
is reading the Qur’ān

Traditionally, *qirā’at* conform to a corpus of intonations and pronunciations of the Quran that are passed down from master to student, each having its chain of transmission verified to the Prophet. Shībānī Khān’s purpose here, however, is the implementation of regular recitations among his own population. There is little emphasis on the actual method of pronunciation; rather, he implements Quranic recitation as a daily ritual meant to reinforce commemoration of God and a meritorious action to accomplish. For a population that was not literate, rote memorization was sufficient as literacy.

#### **(7) *Tahmīd and Taṣliya– Praising God and the Prophet***

Shībānī Khān’s religious manual begins with a version of *al-ḥamdu li’-lāh* or praise be to God: *laka al-ḥamdu*, or praise be to You. Shībānī Khān utilizes the phrasing throughout his entire manual, which is taken directly from the Quran as it appears in the first chapter: “All praise be to God, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the Worlds.”<sup>71</sup> Where the Quran begins, “*Bismillāh al-raḥmāni al-raḥīm*,” in the name of God the most Gracious, most Merciful, Shībānī Khān starts with his supplication toward God and then continues with two other attributes that do not commence the Quran.

F1A1<sup>72</sup> | laka al-ḥamdu yā man bi-yadihi malakūt kulli shay’in wa-huwa ‘alā  
Praise to You Who has in His hand the kingdom of everything and Who is

F1A2 kulli shay’in qadīrun | wa-ṣ-ṣalātu wa-s-salāmu ‘alā jamī‘ al-anbiyā’i

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<sup>70</sup> MS correction: Should be ūqūmāq for “to read.”

<sup>71</sup> *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937): 14.

<sup>72</sup> Transliteration and translation of Shībānī Khān’s *Risāla* by Samie



powerful over all things; prayers and blessings upon all prophets

F1A3 wa-l-mursilīna khuṣūṣan ‘alā rasūlinā Muḥammadin al-sirāji al-munīri wa-‘alā ālihi wa-  
And messengers especially upon our Prophet Muḥammad the illuminating lamp<sup>73</sup>  
and upon all of his family and

F1A4 aṣḥābihi wa-tābi‘ihi ajma‘īna  
companions and followers.

He continues with the explanation that whosoever states the *tahmīd*, or some version thereof, alongside morning, afternoon, and nightly prayers, shall be exonerated of all sins. In mentioning the Prophet and stacking praise on him, his family, and followers, Shībānī Khān legitimizes his own lineage as a bearer of Islamic doctrine and implementer of *Sharia*. This introductory section is meant to solidify the purpose of his translations from Arabic to Chagatai while providing his followers the proper method of Islamic ritual, namely that of monotheism and the reinforcement of Islamic belief in the Prophet as messenger.

The phrase *ṣallā Allāh ‘alayhi wa-sallam*, God’s benediction and peace be upon him, and variations of it are used throughout the text. It is shortened in some sections as *‘alayhi wa-sallam*, or peace be upon him. The *taṣliya* has traditionally been used by Muslims as an important expression of religiosity. Its origin is in the Quran 33:56: “God and His angels send blessings on the Prophet: O ye that believe! Send ye blessings on him, and salute him with all respect.”<sup>74</sup> The Quran emphasizes the Prophet’s human nature, but also expresses his preeminent status above all previous prophets in the process of revelations.<sup>75</sup> Through transmission of

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<sup>73</sup> *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937): 33:45

<sup>74</sup> *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937): 1125-1126.

<sup>75</sup> Cristina de la Puente. “The Prayer Upon the Prophet Muhammad (Tasliya): A Manifestation of Islamic Religiosity” in *Medieval Encounters* 5:1 (1999) Leiden: Brill: 121. Further, de la Puente writes, “The *taṣliya* is also a summary of a larger prayer known as *al-ṣalāt al-ibrāhimiyya*, or, at a later date, also as ‘Cordovan prayer for comfort’ that runs like this: “Oh

hadith, the Prophet's impeccable nature has become a model for Muslims to follow as he embodies the original, pure state of humanity.

Shībānī Khān's deliberate use of the *taṣliya* whenever the Prophet is mentioned by name or title is also an indication of a Muslim's appeal to the Prophet's *shafā'a*, or intercession.<sup>76</sup>

Together with ritual and devotional prayers and practice, praising the Prophet acts as a link to having personal supplications to God heard, which might include any self-motivated entreaty but most importantly that of having prayers heard and sins absolved.

### **(8) *Ṣalavāt – Importance of the Five Daily Prayers***

Shībānī Khān spends a portion of his manual discussing the importance and merits of the daily prayers and alludes to a number of Islamic traditions stating that the five prayers help absolve mundane sins and help Muslims atone for them. For example, a tradition from the Prophet says, "Verily from prayer to prayer there is an expiation for the minor sins committed between them, as long as the major sins have been avoided."<sup>77</sup> Another tradition states, "For

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God, pray for Muhammad and his family as You prayed for Abraham and his family, as you deserve praise and glory; send blessings on Muhammad and his family as You did with Abraham and his family, since you deserve praise and glory; say to Muhammad and his family may you rest in peace as you did with Abraham and his family, since you deserve praise and glory; be merciful with Muhammad and his family as you were with Abraham and his family since you deserve praise and glory; save Muhammad and his family as you saved Abraham and his offspring, since you deserve praise and glory."<sup>77</sup> See de la Puente, 124.

<sup>76</sup> I contend that Shībānī Khān's incorporation of Sufism into his religious doctrine allows for full-fledged intercession on the part of Muhammad. Despite the Quran's clear message against intercession except that of God's – see Quran 2:48, 39:44 – the Quran does allow for certain instances of angels and prophets interceding on behalf of Muslims: see Quran 10:3; 20:109, 34:23, 53:26, 40:7, 53:26.

<sup>77</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr. *The study Quran: a new translation and commentary*. (New York: Harper, 2017): 586

everything there is a polish and the polish of the heart is the remembrance of God.”<sup>78</sup> Prayer should be performed in congregational settings as often as one is able, but each of the five prayers should be done without question of its necessity; that is, the Quran necessitates prayer and hadith elaborate on the merits of prayer, therefore Muslims should not try to rationalize or question the number or compulsion to perform *ṣalavāt*. The verse Shībānī Khān alludes to from the Quran is as follows, “Establish regular prayers at the two ends of the day and at the approaches of the night: for those things that are good remove those that are evil: be that the word of remembrance to those who remember their Lord.”<sup>79</sup>

As a method of administering and compelling the five daily prayers, Shībānī Khān makes mention of two *ḥikmats*, or words of wisdom, from Ḥakīm Atā. These two passages are meant as anecdotes illustrating the necessity of prayer as well as the consequences of those who do not participate in *ṣalavāt*. “*Bīnamāz*,” or prayerless, is used as a category of personhood; one who does not perform the ritual prayers has forgotten God, or at the very least, not placed God at the forefront of thought, as is required by the belief of *tawḥīd*. The two *ḥikmats* are as follows,

F29B9<sup>80</sup> khūk dīg qūpār bīnamāz yūzī anīng yārāmāz  
Without prayers one will be resurrected like a pig and his face will not save him

F29B10 ūrnī ūjtmāḥdā būlmāz ūtālmāsā bīsh namāz  
He will not have a place in Heaven not having carried out the five prayers

F30A1 bīnamāzdā yūq īmān dīnīdā bār shakk gumān  
The prayerless has no faith. In his religion he has doubt and suspicion

F30A2 ūlūgh kūndā bīr ūghān qūldīn sūrār bīsh namāz

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<sup>78</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr. *The study Quran: a new translation and commentary*. (New York: Harper, 2017): 586

<sup>79</sup> *The Holy Quran*. Yusuf Ali trans. (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937): 11:114, 545

<sup>80</sup> Transliteration and translation of Shībānī Khān’s *Risāla* by Samie

On the Great Day [i.e. Day of Judgment] the One Almighty will ask from slaves of the five prayers

- F30A3 bīsh namāzlīq qīlmāghīl bīsh namāznī qūymāghīl  
Do not skip the five prayers. Do not miss the five prayers
- F30A4 ūlmās man tīb atmaghīl tāmūq tūrūr bīsh namāz  
Do not say “I will not die”. The five prayers will be the witness.
- F30A5 ḥikmat  
Words of Wisdom [i.e. the genre and concept]
- F30A6 bīnamāznī kīltūrūng ḥaqq farmānīn bīldūrūng  
Summon those who have not done prayers. Make known to them God’s law.
- F30A7 ūnūmāsā ūltūrūng kullī imam qavlīnjā  
If he does not agree, kill him, according to all of the imams
- F30A8 bīnamāzgha bārmānglār ūzrā namāz qīlmānglār  
Do not go to those who do not do prayers. Do not do the prayer over them.
- F30A9 khalqlār arā kūmmānglār ītkā sāling kūygunjā  
Do not bury them among the people. Throw him to the dogs and leave them.
- F30A10 ītkā īsh ūl bīnamāz tungūzgha tūsh bīnamāz  
Those who do not do prayers are equal to dogs. Those who do not do prayers are equal to pigs.
- F30B1 kāfir tūrūr bīnamāz shāfi’ī qavlīnjā  
Those who do not do prayers are infidels according to Shāfi’ī

In the first *ḥikmat*, the punishment for not performing *ṣalavāt* is given as having the prayerless equated to that of a pig, rendering Hell the destination for their inaction during the five required times of prayer. On the Day of Judgment, God will ask His followers if they performed prayers, and if they have not, it will be apparent. One’s deeds will be revealed upon death and the prayers – performed or not – will testify for or against the person.

The second *ḥikmat* is more explicit about societal punishments against the prayerless. First, a person who does not perform the daily prayers should be given the chance to reform. If

they do not, they should be shunned and killed. Upon death, their body should not undergo the rituals of a Muslim burial (i.e. washed and buried) with prayers read for them.

### **(9) Concluding Remarks**

As a religious manual for the broader Uzbek society led by Shībānī Khān, the *Risāla* captures the ideological essence of what this new Eurasian leader attempted to build for his empire: namely, a religious and political legitimacy couched in the socio-cultural norms of the 16<sup>th</sup> century Islamicate and Persianate world. The text Shībānī Khān composed was meant for the entirety of his population as a standard of morals and virtues to follow. Those within his realm were expected to accept and uphold Islamic tenets, serve God, and accept Shībānī Khān's authority in the region as Divinely granted as illustrated through his rise to power.

Shībānī Khān's conception of an Islamic Uzbek empire is clearly stated in the pair of quatrains that conclude his religious manual:

F46B2<sup>81</sup> Rubā'ī - Quatrain<sup>82</sup>

F46B3-4 Islām yūlīndā ḥaẓrat-i khāqānī || jamshīd-i zamān Muḥammad Shībānī  
On the path of Islam, Muḥammad Shībānī, His Excellence the Khān, the era's  
Jamshīd

F46B5-6 taṣnīf qīlīb tūrūr kitābī kīm ānī || har kīm kih bīlūr yaqīn bīlūr īmānī  
Has composed this book in such a way that whoever knows it well will  
find faith

F46B7 Rubā'ī - Quatrain

F46B8-9 ūlkīm angā bakht yār va yāvar būlgḥāy || tawfīq dāghī rafīq va rahbar būlgḥāy  
He to whom fortune is a friend and helper, success will be his companion and  
guide

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<sup>81</sup> Transliteration and translation of Shībānī Khān's *Risāla* by Samie

<sup>82</sup> These quatrains contain Western Turkic elements different from those of previous verses.

F47A1-2 qīlghān bū kitāb sūzlārī bīrlah ‘amal || kīm dawlat-i jāvidān muyassar būlghāy  
Whosoever acts [in accordance] with the words of this book will have eternal  
blessings bestowed on them

F47A3 Rubā‘ī - Quatrain

F47A4-5 irshād ṭarīqatīdā kūz kūrđī ‘ayān || ḥaqq yūlīnī īstāgāngā Shībānī Khān  
The eye saw clearly on the path of enlightenment, as Shībānī Khān was  
seeking the path of Truth

F47A6-7 Islām sharī‘atīdā har mas’alahnī || āyāt va aḥādīs bīlah qīldī bayān  
On the Path of Islam he clarified every problem with [Quranic] verses and  
hadīth

This template for an empire was aspirational, and though never fully realized, acted as Shībānī Khān’s modus operandi in constituting a new Uzbek empire fashioned out of the remnants of the Timurid Empire.

The three works of Shībānī Khān collectively illustrate his erudite knowledge of Persian, Arabic, and Turkic languages and literatures, and the *Risāla*, in particular, expresses the shifting nature and popularization of Islamic practices in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Through an analysis of these works, Shībānī Khān is cast in a new light; certainly one that is more productive than the fate of this figure in Soviet and post-Soviet constructivist views of Uzbek history. In this dissertation, Part II will explore contemporary Uzbek national identity and memory. How are banal forms of nationalism established? How does education serve to perpetuate these ideas? This current chapter will serve as a necessary counterpoint to the narrative we see in Chapters 4 and 5.

## **Chapter 4 - Paying It Backward: The Historical Narrative on Uzbekistan's National Currency**

On 31 August 1991, after months of tension within the Soviet Union and desperate attempts from Eurasian Soviet Socialist republics to remain in the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan formally withdrew its status as a republic and declared independence through a number of resolutions, ending its over seventy years of shared statehood experience within the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> During the months that followed, a debate raged about the monetary policies of this newly founded nation: should the new Uzbek republic remain part of the ruble zone, along with other former member states of the Soviet Union, or should they create a new form of currency, independent of the joint usage of Russian currency among Eurasian states?

By November 1993, attempts by post-Soviet governments were futile in keeping the ruble zone intact.<sup>2</sup> Member states ceased usage of Russian currency, opting to transition to and create new forms of monetary exchange. Uzbekistan adopted the *so'm* as their certified and sanctioned currency, broken into 100 *tiyin* per *so'm*. The new Uzbek currency, authorized by the Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU), acted alongside other developments of national identity as a form of building legitimacy, authority, and common bonds among Uzbek citizens. In analyzing Uzbek currency, this chapter pays specific attention to the Uzbek government's attempts to utilize the aesthetic conventions of a banal communication tool, banknotes and specie, in rationalizing a common historical memory and national identity – one partial to Timur and the

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<sup>1</sup> Associated Press. "2 More Soviet Republics Make Sovereignty Moves." Reported in *Los Angeles Times*. 21 June 1990. See also, *Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan*, adopted at the eleventh session of the twentieth Supreme Council (Oliy Majlis) on 8 December 1992.

<sup>2</sup> Richard Pomfret. "Aid and Ideas: The Impact of Western Economic Support on the Muslim Successor States." *Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia*. Yaacov Ro'i ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2004): 77-100.

Timurid legacy of the territory. Through the application of national, historical, and symbolic imagery, banknotes and specie have come to be a prime source for the understanding of Uzbekistan's nationalism project.

Since no previous study has been conducted on the currency of post-Soviet Uzbekistan, this chapter will serve to fill a much-needed gap in our understanding of one aspect of Uzbek nationalism, as well as contribute to the broader field of nationalism studies given that banal nationalism is often understood as a “Western” phenomenon, whereas violent, confrontational, and demonstrative – or “hot” – nationalism is understood as third-world. By focusing on the images on currency, I will show how Uzbek identity is reified, whether successfully or not, through this banal medium. Section I, “Why Currency? – Methodology and Approach,” presents the framework and significance of approaching currency as a vehicle of study. It also addresses some of the controversy surrounding the theoretical framework of banal nationalism produced by Michael Billig. It is worth noting here, that Uzbekistan – as a non-Western, Islamic, and post-Soviet nation – may not seem to fall easily into the category of a nation radiating banal nationalism, but it does in fact exude exemplary nodes of the banal through daily reproductions of national identity. Sections II, “Borders and Territory,” lays out the main argument of this chapter: Uzbekistan's nationalism, though ethnic and religious to great extents, is also hugely territorialized. The country exists in its current form having exploited Persianate historical legacies and “Uzbekified” that heritage. Section III, “Timurid Monumentality,” serves as an illustration of Uzbekistan's rendering of nationalism in currency, namely the appropriation of what is often considered part of the Timurid legacy. This section, however, reveals that the most utilized image in currency is not Timurid, but is in fact a product of the Shibanid era. Section IV,



“Conclusion,” closes the chapter with comments on Uzbekistan’s vision as a great, sovereign nation.

### ***(I) - Why Currency? – Methodology and Approach***

Currency is an agent of material culture that illustrates the links between individuals, societies, and collective memory. These material objects are instrumental in conditioning narratives of the past and what specifically is important to the national self-image. The images that are part of currency become engrained as part of an individual’s environment, and through this institutional structure, discourses of meaning spread through society and reinforce statist narratives.

Uzbekistan’s currency makes its national identity tangible by providing visual representations with meaning. Persianate emblems, landscapes, buildings, monuments, iconography, cartography, and color are some of the elements present in Uzbek currency, and all of these elements combine to create a cohesive national narrative that contribute to the feeling of belonging to the Uzbek nation. Through currency, we are able to see but one aspect of the Uzbek regime’s claims to territory and its establishment of a collective home for Uzbeks.

The foundation of the Uzbek national economy is its form of currency, the *so'm*. *So'm* were first introduced in 1993, and like most nation-states that arose in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Uzbekistan used currency as a way to imbue the symbols of state in daily life. Currency has always contained some form of politico-cultural symbolism constructing the dominant power structure of society, as is seen in Uzbekistan’s neighboring countries, the empires from which these countries arose (Soviets and Russia), and their Turco-Mongol and Islamic predecessors. As Billig’s notions so artfully illustrate, currency now acts much the same way it has historically in

that they are imbued with significant images and iconography that advance the government's vision of society and what individuals are to understand their nation to be.<sup>3</sup> Money is banal both in its existence and in its use. Its existence is not unique to any one society and is almost universally accepted in some form. National iconography, then, often goes unnoticed because of the banality of the medium on which the images are presented.<sup>4</sup> By ignoring the very form that presents the iconography, individuals are not prone to critically evaluate the conception of self and national memory that is presented to them, and these images then come to constitute through time what is accepted as part of the nation. Images of national heroes, monuments, government buildings, landscapes, and history continually promote a national narrative. As with many national currencies being the sole charge of a central bank, the Central Bank of Uzbekistan's committee and Uzbekistan's Senate are in charge of currency design and hold the sole authority for the minting and distribution of currency.<sup>5</sup>

As a conveyer of information, banknotes and specie serve as a tool to build an "imagined community."<sup>6</sup> Political branding on currency alongside cultural and historical sites provide the necessary place classifying tool for Uzbek citizens. Given that Uzbek currency is not internationally tradeable like the US dollar or Russian ruble, I analyze the currency predominately as it would affect locals rather than an international community. The choice of iconography on Uzbek currency is done primarily with a national audience in mind. The presence of specific images affects not only how people perceive their nation, but what they are

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<sup>3</sup> Michael Billig. *Banal Nationalism*. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1997).

<sup>4</sup> Michael Billig. *Banal Nationalism*. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1997): 41

<sup>5</sup> Unwin and Virginia Hewitt. "Banknotes and national identity in central and Eastern Europe." *Political Geography*, 20:8 (2001): 1015

<sup>6</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

*to perceive their nation as*. These value-based images help shape what the “nation” is, was, and will be.

Billig’s *Banal Nationalism* is the basis of my approach to nationalism in this chapter, but the works of Benedict Anderson, Rogers Brubaker, and Anthony Smith’s approaches to the nation also inform my approach to nationalism. Though I am less concerned with the classical approach to nationalism through the question of when nationalism developed, I do engage extensively with that topic in trying to answer the post-classical question of how nationalism is invoked as a form of social consciousness, and how individuals become national in everyday contexts. The elements that encompass a nation through currency are presented in the following sections through the perspective of production rather than that of reception.

Billig elaborates on two forms of nationalism. The first is “hot nationalism,” meaning that a moment of crisis that has arisen out of separatist or violent movements has led to an ideology of building a new state based on the aims of a group (hence “hot”). He critiques this idea because he does not understand nationalism as always being an ideology of separatism or violence. He argues that in daily life, there are aspects of ideology that are so successful – such as flags, postage stamps, money, language, television shows, slogans, logos, architecture –, that people often do not notice that those things are part of a broader nationalistic endeavor meant to shape how individuals view themselves and their place in society. This understanding prompts Billig’s second notion of nationalism, “banal nationalism,” which unlike hot nationalism, is not a political ideology per se, but a daily, reoccurring re-production of the emblematic ideas of a nation-state through methodically placed iconography. As such, “banal nationalism” is conspicuously placed for inconspicuous consumption. His popular example is of a flag on a public building: it is a sight so common that it goes unnoticed. This methodic daily reproduction

of images and emblems reinforces nation-states as nations and individuals as citizens of that nation-state.<sup>7</sup> By repeating emblems and ideas on a daily basis, habits, beliefs, and conceptions of self and of the nation are shaped, and subsequently reproduced by citizens (ex. “this is who we are”). Since, as Billig argues, Western nations are reinforced with few “hot” occurrences, Western nations reproduce their concept of self through these “flagged” indicators of nation, thereby hiding the ideological underpinning of nationalism, while simultaneously forcing it upon people.<sup>8</sup> Individuals then take emblems of the state and reinforce them through their own understanding of who they are and what comprises their nation.

One of the critiques leveled against Billig is his narrow use of banal nationalism in that he does not take into consideration sub-national categories.<sup>9</sup> As Elhan points out, Iran has multiple subnational and ethnic identities, such as Azeris, Kurds, and Baluchis, and each has their own method of displaying banal nationalism. In Uzbekistan, there are multiple minority groups – Karakalpaks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Koreans – and it is important to understand that regionalism plays a large role in how Uzbeks themselves understand their places in society. Samarkandis are not the same as Bukharans; Tashkenters are not the same as Khivans. And yet, where critiques of Billig fall apart is the fact that banal nationalism on the national scale, that is

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<sup>7</sup> Michael Billig. *Banal Nationalism*. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1997): 6

<sup>8</sup> Michael Billig. *Banal Nationalism*. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1997): 6 and 192. Part of banal nationalism is the ordinary and mundane ways in which nation is expressed on a small scale. For example, spectacular events clearly evince nationalism through grand shows of history, flag waving, songs, dancing, or other means of expressing the nation, but banal nationalism is the simple, usually unconscious, reminder of the nation. These reminders of nation are not always visual, but aural as well. Through the use of pronouns like “us” and “our,” the national homeland is reinforced. In Uzbekistan, “Amir Temur – buyuk bobomiz” is a clear indicator through the simple use of “our” that he as a historical figure belongs not only to the nation, but to the people who inhabit the territory of modern Uzbekistan.

<sup>9</sup> Nail Elhan. “Banal Nationalism in Iran: Re-production of National and Religious Identity.” *Insan ve Toplum* 6:1 (2016): 122-123

to say large-scale, “official” nationalism, affects each of the minority groups regardless of how they understand their subnational group. If we look at the US, for example, Texans boast of elements unique to their state; Californians boast of elements unique to theirs. Both are American. Both receive the American flag, stars and stripes, red, white and blue as equally American, yet citizens will conceive of themselves as slightly different from residents of other states.<sup>10</sup> Transposed on Uzbekistan, this concept of understanding oneself in a subnational category does not automatically nullify what Billig argues: national symbols, emblems, and icons are displayed and consumed by citizens. Regionalism, then, is not an invalidating factor for our understanding of banal nationalism.

A second critique often leveled against Billig’s theory is his perception that banal nationalism is seen in “modern,” “Western” nation-states. While we can level accusations of bias, or ignorance, against such an idea, Billig has addressed these issues. When writing in the mid-1990s, Billig’s focus was the revelation to social scientists and humanists alike that nationalism does not solely exist in separatist, violent crises; rather, it exists in the daily lives of most citizens, even in western countries like the US. Critiques leveled against Billig,<sup>11</sup> are not wholly incorrect in their assessment that his framework suggests that nationalisms outside of

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<sup>10</sup> A stark example of this is the Republican political slogan, “Don’t California My Texas,” which was used for Governor Abbott’s re-election campaign. See, “The West Coast just might be California-ing your North Texas.” *Dallas Morning News*. 6 April 2019.

<sup>11</sup> See Nail Elhan. “Banal Nationalism in Iran: Re-production of National and Religious Identity.” *Insan ve Toplum* 6:1 (2016): 122-123; Marco Antonsich and Michael Skey, “Introduction: The Persistence of Banal Nationalism,” in *Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity, and Belonging after Banal Nationalism*. Antonsich and Skey eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2017): 1-16; Ivana Spasic, “The Universality of Banal Nationalism, or Can the Flag Hang Unobtrusively Outside a Serbian Post Office?,” in *Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity, and Belonging after Banal Nationalism*. Antonsich and Skey eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2017): 31-52.

Western nations are “hot” and therefore not banal in form.<sup>12</sup> As multiple studies have already shown, and as this chapter aims to do with Uzbekistan, banal nationalism exists regardless of whether nations are “Western.” Spasic writes, “This exercise is premised on the belief that it is always beneficial to bring into productive confrontation theoretical constructs invented (almost invariably) in the affluent, peaceful societies of Western Europe and North America, with social contexts their authors did not have in mind.”<sup>13</sup> While Spasic convincingly argues that banal forms of nationalism exist in Serbia, a larger point seems to be missed in this and many other critiques of Billig’s work: “banal” as a concept is ignored. Yes, Billig’s work omits large portions of the globe and simplifies the theory to an extent that is almost too simple, but it does something for researchers: the theory fits for the understanding of cultural and social trends, manufacturing, reproducing, and affecting of societies. By introducing the concept of “banality,” social scientists can separate the different forms of contemporary nationalisms: hot, violent, crisis, banal, and ethnic. And even as historians write from the “semiperiphery,” by placing the nation-states of Central Eurasia, or any other geography at the center of a study, the concept of *banality* holds.

Where critiques of Billig go too far are suggestions that Billig deliberately views only the West as having banal forms of nationalism. In a response to critiques, Billig rightly argues, “Social scientists have concealed the nationalism of Western nations by labelling it positively as

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<sup>12</sup> Michael Skey, “The National in Everyday Life: A Critical Engagement with Michael Billig’s Thesis of *Banal Nationalism*,” *The Sociological Review* 57:2 (2009): 332

<sup>13</sup> Spasic is responding to Billig’s “introductory” definition: “The present book insists on stretching the term ‘nationalism,’ so that it covers the ideological means by which nation states are reproduced. To stretch the term ‘nationalism’ indiscriminately would invite confusion: surely, there is a distinction between the flag waved by Serbian ethnic cleansers and that hanging unobtrusively outside the US post office. (...) For this reason, the term banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced.” See Ivana Spasic, “The Universality of Banal Nationalism, or Can the Flag Hang Unobtrusively Outside a Serbian Post Office?,” in *Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity, and Belonging after Banal Nationalism*. Antonsich and Skey eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2017): 31-32.

‘patriotism’, which they contrast favorably, but unjustifiably, with the ‘nationalism’ of others.”<sup>14</sup> His effort, as he explains, was to counter the popular narrative in scholarship that the West has patriotism while the rest of the “developing world” has nationalism. While patriotism exists in the West, as it does in other parts of the world, so does nationalism. Just because we do not often see violent clashes of ideologies, daily forms of what we can term nationalism exist. As Billig elaborates, “Banal Nationalism aimed to apply the word ‘nationalism’ to the processes, often unnoticed, by which established nation states are reproduced day by day.”<sup>15</sup> As such, this chapter centers forms of currency as indicators of the Uzbek government’s project of reinforcing a unified national history and identity.

Currency forms are not merely instruments of exchange or used simply for determining and amassing wealth, but as distinct tools of communication. With a fascinating anecdote about Iraqi currency after the American invasion in 2003, Lauer discusses how the familiarity of images and iconography are a necessity for the acceptance of notes by the public and the need to keep an economy afloat regardless of a desire of quick changes in government.<sup>16</sup> This use of currency as a form of mass communication dictates the necessity of governments in their choices of imagery. As Gilbert argues so forcefully, currency is much more than an economic tool devoid of meaning; currency is imbued with socio-political, cultural, and economic values by issuing governments.<sup>17</sup> Each image on currency serves to communicate messages to the

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<sup>14</sup> Michael Billig, “Banal Nationalism and the Imagining of Politics,” in *Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity, and Belonging after Banal Nationalism*. Antonsich and Skey eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2017): 309.

<sup>15</sup> Michael Billig, “Banal Nationalism and the Imagining of Politics,” in *Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity, and Belonging after Banal Nationalism*. Antonsich and Skey eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2017): 311.

<sup>16</sup> Josh Lauer, “Money as Mass Communication: US Paper Currency and the Iconography of Nationalism.” *The Communication Review* 11 (2008): 109

<sup>17</sup> Emily Gilbert, “Currency in Crisis,” *Scapegoat* (Winter-Spring 2013): 23.

multitudes of people who use banknotes and coins on a daily basis. Mwangi explains that this exchange between strangers constitutes a common “imagined community.”<sup>18</sup> Contributions to the field of banknotes and specie have greatly aided in the understanding of nation building, national memory, identity, and territorialization, and how this form of communication reifies each of those categories.<sup>19</sup> Lauer writes, “physical circulating money is often taken for granted; it is ubiquitous and prosaic to the point of invisibility.”<sup>20</sup> And Eric Hobsbawm contends that currency is the “most universal form of public imagery.”<sup>21</sup> And yet, with scholars familiar with the means of communication, few have ventured into the field with currency at the fore of their research. Neglecting this part of communication is common, and it is only in recent years that more scholars have bothered using currency and banal nationalism as a means of communication in nation-building. Scholarship on currency, as Helleiner and Gilbert illustrate, has typically centered on historical, socio-political, and cultural perspectives of how banknote imagery develops.<sup>22</sup>

In recent years, Hymans has been seminal in the field of currency studies. Hymans points out in his work on Japanese banknotes that currency is predominantly meant for national consumption, but there are instances where local currency is fashioned with an international

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<sup>18</sup> Wambui Mwangi, “The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant: Political Imagery and the Ambiguous Art of Currency Design in Colonial Kenya,” *Geopolitics*, 7: 1 (2002): 35.

<sup>19</sup> Emily Gilbert, “Common cents: Situating money in time and place,” *Economy and Society*, 24:4 (2005): 375

<sup>20</sup> Josh Lauer, “Money as Mass Communication: US Paper Currency and the Iconography of Nationalism,” *The Communication Review* 11 (2008): 110.

<sup>21</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, “Mass-producing traditions: Europe, 1870-1914,” in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 281.

<sup>22</sup> Eric Helleiner and Emily Gilbert (editors), *Nation-states and money: the past, present and future of national currencies* (New York: Routledge, 1999).



audience in mind.<sup>23</sup> More importantly, Hymans discusses how currency is used as a tool of legitimacy by governments: the iconography legitimizes the territorial reach of a government for local, national, and international audiences. In a study of post-Soviet banknotes, Hymans analyzes the evolution of the imagery in ten new members to the European Union<sup>24</sup> and concludes that their currency parallels the development of those that we see in Western Europe. The “unique” aspects of post-Soviet European nation-states is not truly unique, as some scholars would argue.<sup>25</sup>

Hymans’ works produce productive quantitative and qualitative studies on banknotes. His study on Japanese banknotes delves further than others in analyzing the production of banknotes and design by the Bank of Japan up to 2005 and the input the Finance and Prime Ministers of Japan had on their production. Hymans’ assessment of Japanese banknotes is that the Prime Minister actively chose to follow European models of currency production and imagery for the expressed reason of appealing to both national and international audiences.<sup>26</sup> For our purposes, we see the Bank of Uzbekistan following very similar patterns in their coin production, shaping and following European Union standards for small issue denominations [see figure 4.1-2]. Hymans further illustrates that the mass communication aspect of currency was an important facet in the design of banknotes, since they are first and foremost a political and didactic tool for governments. Though governments often follow international models of design, there are also

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<sup>23</sup> Jacques E.C. Hymans, “International patterns in National Identity Content: The Case of Japanese Banknote Iconography,” *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 5, no. 2 (2005): 329

<sup>24</sup> Bulgaria, Czech Republic (including Czechoslovakia), Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

<sup>25</sup> Jacques Hymans, “East Is East, and West Is West? Currency Iconography as Nation-Branding in the Wider Europe.” *Political Geography* 29:2 (2010): 97-108.

<sup>26</sup> Jacques Hymans, “International Patterns in National Identity Content: The Case of Japanese Banknote Iconography.” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 5:2 (2005): 329

excellent examples of localization; that is, governments use local and territorial images to forge narratives that aid professed national identities.<sup>27</sup>



[Figure 4.1] Luc Luycx Euro Cent design from 1996/1997  
(circulation began in 2002) depicting Eurasia with stripes and stars for flags



[Figure 4.2] Uzbek So'm design from 2001/2002 depicting Uzbekistan with three stripes for flag

<sup>27</sup> Jacques Hymans and Ronan Tse-min Fu, “The diffusion of international norms of banknote iconography: A case study of the New Taiwan Dollar.” *Political Geography*. 57 (2017): 49-59.

In the same vein as Hymans' assertions that the intense observation of currency forces governments to be deliberate with their choices of imagery, Mwangi thoughtfully explains the distinction between looking at banknotes and truly seeing (i.e. observing or analyzing) them. The East African Currency Board was in charge of the production of Kenyan currency, and once it was apparent to the Board that colonial Kenyans were analyzing their currency rather than simply using it as a tool of exchange, the Board altered the images and iconography to reflect East Africa as part of the European and global market system.<sup>28</sup> Mwangi argues banknotes were not meant to be observed specimens but simply traded as materials of value, which gives us more reason to use banknotes and specie as sources for understanding aspects of national memory construction from the top-down.

Helleiner<sup>29</sup> provides much of the framework for scholars who followed through his assessment that currency fosters national identity as a propagandistic tool by forging and cultivating a collective national memory. Following much of Helleiner's approach, other scholars have done unique studies on individual nation-states.<sup>30</sup> Two other scholars whose works

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<sup>28</sup> Wambui Mwangi, "The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant: Political Imagery and the Ambiguous Art of Currency Design in Colonial Kenya." *Geopolitics* 7:1 (2002): 31-62.

<sup>29</sup> Eric Helleiner, "National Currencies and National Identities." *American Behavioral Scientist* 41:10 (1998): 1414

<sup>30</sup> For example, for Canada see, Emily Gilbert. "Ornamenting the facade of hell: iconographies of nineteenth-century Canadian paper money." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 16 (1998): 57-80. For the UK, see Matthew Rowlinson, "'The Scotch hate gold': British identity and paper money," in Gilbert and Helleiner (eds.), *Nation-states and Money: the Past, Present and Future of National Currencies*. (New York: Routledge, 1999): 47-67; Virginia Hewitt and John Keyworth. *As good as gold: 300 years of British banknote design*. (London: British Museum, 1988); David Blaazer. "Sterling identities," *History Today* 52 (2002): 12-18; Yair Wallach, "Creating a country through currency and stamps: state symbols and nation-building in British-ruled Palestine." *Nations and Nationalisms* 17:1 (2011): 129-147. For Eastern Europe, see Tim Unwin and Virginia Hewitt. "Banknotes and national identity in central and Eastern Europe." *Political Geography* 20:8 (2001): 1005-1028; Jacques Hymans, "The changing color of money: European currency iconography and collective identity." *European Journal of International Relations*, 10:1 (2004): 5-31. For Japan, see Jacques Hymans,"

have been of much use are Gilbert and Hewitt, who show the intimately tied nature of currencies to the processes of growing and strengthening of nationalisms in the twentieth century.<sup>31</sup> Much like previous scholars, Pointon goes as far as arguing that currencies are chief in producing and transforming an “imagined community.”<sup>32</sup> Though many scholars refrain from deliberately mentioning or engaging currency designers and their agendas – and this chapter is no different – Penrose is highly critical of this approach and asserts that knowing exactly who the architects of

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International patterns in national identity content: The case of Japanese banknote iconography.” *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 5:2 (2005): 315–346; Maruyama, “Local currencies in pre-industrial Japan.” in Gilbert and Helleiner (eds.), *Nation-States and Money: The Past, Present, and Future of National Currencies*. (London: Routledge, 1999): 68–81. For Kenya, see Wambui Mwangi. “The Lion, the Native and the Coffee Plant: Political Imagery and the Ambiguous Art of Currency Design in Colonial Kenya,” *Geopolitics* 7:1 (2002): 31–62. For Iran, see Nail Elhan, “Banal Nationalism in Iran: Daily Re-Production of National and Religious Identity.” *İnsan ve Toplum*, 6:1 (2016): 119–136.

<sup>31</sup> For Hewitt’s work see, Virginia Hewitt. *Beauty and the Banknote: Images of Women on Paper Money*. (London: British Museum Press, 1994); Virginia Hewitt (ed.). *The Banker’s Art. Studies in Paper Money*. (London: British Museum Press, 1995); Virginia Hewitt. “Imagery and imagination in the paper currency of the British Empire, 1800–1960,” in Gilbert and Helleiner (eds.), *Nation-states and Money: the Past, Present and Future of National Currencies*. (New York: Routledge, 1999): 97–116. For Helleiner’s work, see Eric Helleiner. “One money, one people?”, in P. M. Crowley (ed.), *Before and Beyond the EMU: Historical Lessons and Future Prospects*. (London: Routledge, 2002): 183–202; Eric Helleiner. *The Making of National Money*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Eric Helleiner. “Historicizing territorial currencies: Monetary space and the nation-state in North America.” *Political Geography*, 18 (1999): 309–339; Eric Helleiner. “National currencies and national identities.” *American Behavioral Scientist*, 41 (1998): 1409–1436; Eric Helleiner. *The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). For Gilbert’s work, see Emily Gilbert. “Ornamenting the facade of hell: iconographies of nineteenth-century Canadian paper money,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 16 (1998): 57–80; Emily Gilbert and Eric Helleiner. “Introduction – nation-states and money: historical contexts, interdisciplinary perspectives,” in E. Gilbert and E. Helleiner (eds.), *Nation-states and Money: the Past, Present and Future of National Currencies*. (New York: Routledge, 1999): 1–21; Emily Gilbert. “Common cents: Situating money in time and place.” *Economy and Society*, 34 (2005): 357–388; Emily Gilbert. “Forging a national currency: Money, state-building and nation-making in Canada.” in E. Gilbert & E. Helleiner (eds.), *Nation-States and Money: The Past, Present, and Future of National Currencies*. (London: Routledge, 1999): 25–46.

<sup>32</sup> Marcia Pointon. “Money and Nationalism.” *Imagining Nations*, Cubbitt, ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998): 233

design are will shed light on state conceptualization.<sup>33</sup> Though I do not wholly disagree with this assessment, I do argue that the imagery and iconography on currency (regardless of the individual designer's agenda) taken collectively forms its own narrative of nationhood, which needs analysis.

Despite the clear connections between currency and mass communication, distinguished scholars like Habermas<sup>34</sup> have not critically engaged with this source base. As a medium of communication, it is also a medium of epitomizing a state. For this reason, this chapter will use banknotes and specie to advance the argument of banal nationalism in Uzbekistan and its construction of a unified national memory. Whether or not banknote design is pervasive and straightforward,<sup>35</sup> the end result in our case is that the main idea of "Uzbekifying" aspects of territorial history into the national framework leads to a unified narrative. A survey of available literature on currency has shown great strides forward in the development of nationalism studies, and this chapter weaves many of the arguments and criticisms of prior literature to illustrate banal nationalism at work in Uzbekistan.

After independence in 1991, Central Eurasian governments dismantled the visible emblems of Soviet power that were occupying the public sphere of their newly independent countries. Lenin, Stalin, Marx and other figures of the communist/Soviet ideological realm were taken down in order to cultivate new interpretations and iterations of national unity and history.

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<sup>33</sup> Jan Penrose, "Designing the Nation: Banknotes, banal nationalism and alternative conceptions of the state," *Political Geography* 30:8 (2011): 430

<sup>34</sup> Jurgen Habermas. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987).

<sup>35</sup> Penrose, for example, argues that scholars assume a pervasive and straightforward approach to currency production. I argue that this is not very relevant. The end result is what we can read through the images and iconography of currency. See Jan Penrose, "Designing the Nation: Banknotes, banal nationalism and alternative conceptions of the state," *Political Geography* 30:8 (2011): 438

The construction of these new national histories and versions of “cultural heritage” consists of a forging of a unified symbolic repertoire with which countries associate themselves. The ethnic diversity of Uzbekistan and the late Soviet adoption of Timur as the “Great Father” (*Buyuk Bobo*) of the nation complicates a unified national collective memory and identity, which is why the production of an amalgamated narrative by the government is so essential to the Uzbek project. The heterogeneous population of the country would logically dictate an inclusive history, yet the government has opted to “Uzbekify” the varying aspects of the nation’s history. By territorializing its nationalism – that is, turning all prior histories and peoples of the area “Uzbek” – the “imagined community” that is united by their indigenesness to the land rather than by their tribal or ethnic affiliations. Though somewhat amorphous at first glance, the grand structure of Uzbek national memory is made tangible through this construction of territorialization.

The imagery that appears on Uzbek currency namely consists of three broad categories: (1) Borders and Territory; (2) Timurid Monumentality; and (3) New/Government Buildings. These examples comprise the national imaginary, which constructs identity as everything encompassing Timurid architecture (i.e. a great history) and a modern, contemporary present and future through government buildings. Each site, then, is a repository of information, knowledge, and signification for users of currency as the buildings and landscapes refer to particular national locations and historical events. Cities like Samarkand and Bukhara, historically Tajik strongholds, are territorialized in the broader national conception of what is considered “Uzbek,” thereby constructing and subsuming the locations and local histories of modern Uzbekistan into a unified national memory creating an “Uzbek” identity. By doing this, Uzbekistan ties itself to everything important historically that comes before it, especially Timurid history to which the Uzbeks are benefactors despite not being direct descendants. References to history permeate

Uzbek currency precisely for the purpose of imbuing the national memory with the histories of the region that some may, and quite successfully, argue does not belong to contemporary Uzbekistan. By issuing a common currency with specific iconography, the Uzbek government does a number of things: first, it enshrines the places, peoples, and landscapes on their currency as “Uzbek”; second, it defends the territory against rivaling claims of history, identity, or customs; and third, it aids in the creation of an “imagined community.”

## ***(II) Borders and Territory – “An Uzbek Without a Tajik is ... an Uzbek”***

This section focuses on the ties between Persian (Tajik) and Turkic (Uzbek) speaking peoples of Uzbekistan. I argue that the currency produced immediately after independence, specifically in the 1990s, serves as a constant reminder of the territorialized nature of Uzbek nation-building.<sup>36</sup> The history of this country is rooted in centuries-old ethnic interactions and 20<sup>th</sup> century Soviet interventions, which have had a great impact on post-Soviet conceptions of national identity.

Abdulla Oripov, a poet and author of the Uzbek national anthem,<sup>37</sup> wrote in his 1996 collection, *Saylanma*,

You are the head of one furrow ||  
 I am the head of another furrow ||  
 Do not stop plowing the soil from  
 springtime on ||  
 My Uzbeks and Tajiks ||  
 It is my wish for these two dear  
 friends always to find ||  
 A meaning from a tale || My Uzbeks  
 and Tajiks

*Bir egatning boshi senu ||*  
*Bir egatning boshi men ||*  
*Yer ekib tinmas hamaldan, ||*  
  
*O'zbegin tojik bilan. ||*  
*Bul qadrdon ikki do'stga*  
*Hohishimdir, to abad ||*  
*Topsa bir ma'no masaldan, ||*  
*O'zbegin tojik bilan.*<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Abdulla Opirov. *Tanlangan Asarlar*. (Toshkent: G'afur G'ulom nomidagi Adabiyot va san'at nashriyoti, 2001): 24.

He expresses the interconnectedness of the Uzbek and Tajik peoples in these few lines, illustrating the centuries of dependence of one another of these differing ethno-linguistic groups.<sup>39</sup> Oripov's interjection on the subject came during the "Year of Amir Timur"<sup>40</sup> in 1996 when Uzbekistan officially claimed Timur the progenitor of the Uzbek people, solidifying this figure's place in the national ideology along with all historical sites – especially those of Tajik-speakers – in the national borders of Uzbekistan. Oripov's comment on the close links between Uzbeks and Tajiks is but one iteration in a millennium-long debate over the distinctness of nomads and sedentary peoples, Persian-speakers and Turkish-speakers that has taken place in Central Eurasia.

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<sup>37</sup> Embassy of Uzbekistan to the United States. "The State Symbols." (2017): <https://www.uzbekistan.org/page/view?id=5>

<sup>38</sup> Abdulla Opirov. *Tanlangan Asarlar*. (Toshkent: G'afur G'ulom nomidagi Adabiyot va san'at nashriyoti, 2001): 24.

<sup>39</sup> For further discussion on the terms of Turk and Tajik, see Maria Eva Subtelny, "The Symbiosis of Turk and Tajik," in *Central Asia in Historical Perspective*, Beatrice Manz ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994): 45–6; and Joo-Yup Lee, "The Historical Meaning of the Term Turk and the Nature of the Turkic Identity of the Chinggisid and Timurid Elites in Post-Mongol Central Asia." *Central Asiatic Journal* 59 (2016) 1/2: 101-132.

<sup>40</sup> Each year is officially declared by the President: 1991 - Year of Alishir Navoi, 1992 - Year of Nurses, 1993 – Year of Ahmad Yassavi, 1994 – Year of Mirza Ulugh Beg, 1995 – Year of Ibn Sina, 1996 – Year of Amir Timur, 1997 – Year of Human Interests, 1998 – Year of the Family, 1999 – Year of the Woman, 2000 – Year of Healthy Descendants, 2001 – Year of Mothers and Children, 2002 – Year of Appreciation for the Elderly, 2003 – Year of Neighborhood Prosperity, 2004 – Year of Mercy and Compassion, 2005 – Year of Health, 2006 – Year of Patrons and Healers, 2007 – Year of Social Protection, 2008 – Year of the Youth, 2009 – Year of Rural Development and Improvement, 2010 – Year of the Perfect Descendants, 2011 – Year of Small Business and Private Entrepreneurship, 2012 – Year of the Strong Family, 2013 – Year of Prosperous Marriage, 2014 – Year of Healthy Kids, 2015 – Year of Caring for the Elderly, 2016 – Year of the Healthy Child and Mother, 2017 – Year of National Communication and Human Interests, 2018 – Year of Proactive Entrepreneurship, Innovative Ideas and Technologies, 2019 – The Year of Active Investments and Social Development, 2020 – The Year of Science and Digital Economy Development. Baxtiyor Roziq. "O'zbekistonda yillarning nomlanishlari." (2019): <https://baxtiyor.uz/o-zbekistonda-yillarning-nomlanishi-1991-2019>



From 1072 to 1077, Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī produced his seminal *Dīvān Lughāt al-Turk*,<sup>41</sup> the first comprehensive dictionary of Turkic languages meant to help legitimize Seljuk and Qarakhanid rule in the Western Asia and Central Eurasia given the recent conversion of the Turkic tribes ruling in the regions.<sup>42</sup> al-Kāshgharī included a series of Turkic phrases, idioms, and verses, many of which illustrate the ties between Turkic and Persian speakers. The most often cited aphorism— twice in his *Dīvān* — drives at the core of this matter: “*tatsız türk bolmas başsız börk bolmas*.”<sup>43</sup> Peter Golden provides a thorough explanation that this phrase, as it appears in the *Dīvān* is translated in two ways. First, “A Turk is never without a Persian (just as) a cap is never without a head,” and second, the more literal translation, “There is no Persian except in the company of a Turk (just as) there is no cap unless there is a head to put it on.”<sup>44</sup> Both of these given translations necessitate a relationship based on dependency, where one’s language or culture is informed – either positively or negatively – on the existence of the other.

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<sup>41</sup> There is an extensive literature on al-Kāshgharī’s *Dīvān Lughāt al-Turk*. For more, see Mahmud Koshg’ariy. *Turkiy So’zlar Devoni: Devonu Lug’otit Turk* I-III. (Toshkent: O’zbekiston SSR Fanlar Akademiyasi Nashriyoti, 1963); Süer Eker. “Divanü Lügâti’t-türk’te ‘İranlı’ Kavramı”. *Kaşgarlı Mahmud ve Dönemi*. Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2008; Peter Golden, “The Turkic World in Mahmud al-Kashghari.” *Complexity of Interaction Along the Eurasian Steppe Zone in the First Millennium CE*, Jan Bemann and Michael Schmauder eds. (Bonn, Germany: University of Bonn, 2015): 503-556; Claus Schönig. “On some unclear, doubtful and contradictory passages in Mahmud al- Kashgari’s ‘Diwan Lugat at-Turk.’” *Türk Dilleri Araştırmaları* 14 (2004): 35-56.

<sup>42</sup> Robert Dankoff, James Kelly, Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī. *Compendium of the Turkic Dialects: Dīvān Lughāt al-Turk* I-III. (Duxbury: Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures, 1982, 1984, 1985): I, 5-9.

<sup>43</sup> Peter Golden. “The Turkic World in Mahmud al-Kashghari.” *Complexity of Interaction Along the Eurasian Steppe Zone in the First Millennium CE*, Jan Bemann and Michael Schmauder eds. (Bonn, Germany: University of Bonn, 2015): 520

<sup>44</sup> Peter Golden. “The Turkic World in Mahmud al-Kashghari.” *Complexity of Interaction Along the Eurasian Steppe Zone in the First Millennium CE*, Jan Bemann and Michael Schmauder eds. (Bonn, Germany: University of Bonn, 2015): 520-521.

Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī presents a rather negative view of peoples who do not speak Turkic languages and an incredibly favorable view of those who do – especially Turks. He goes as far as tying the Turks to figures of Abrahamic religions through Noah and Abraham, writing, “The Turks are, in origin, twenty tribes. They all trace back to Turk, son of Yafith, son of Nuh, God’s blessings be upon them—they correspond to the children of Rum, son of Esau, son of Isaac, son of Abraham, God’s blessings be upon them. Each tribe has branches whose number only God knows.”<sup>45</sup> At the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Niẓām al-Dīn ‘Alīshīr Navā’ī continued the tradition set by al-Kāshgharī by promoting the status of Turks among the other Muslim peoples of the Western Asia and Central Eurasia. He borrows the same rhetoric connecting the Turks to Noah, stating,

After Arabic there are three principal varieties of language, each having many arms and branches. These are Turkish, Persian, and Hindi, the origins of which go back to Yafith, Sam, and Ham, the three sons of the Prophet Nuh. These are the details: When the Prophet Nuh (May God bless him!) was delivered from the disasters of the Flood and he once again set foot upon the ground, no traces of mankind remained in the world. Then Nuh (upon whom be peace!) sent to the land of Khata [i.e., Khitai or Cathay] his son Yafith, whom historians call the father of the Turks. He [Nuh] made Sam, whom they call the Father of the Persians, the ruler of the lands of Iran and Turan, and he sent Ham, who is called the Father of the Hindus, to Hindustan. The children of these three sons of the Prophet spread and multiplied in the places named. The son of Yafith was the progenitor of the Turks. Historians all agree that he wore the crown of prophethood and was therefore superior to his brothers. The three languages—Turkish, Persian, and Hindi—thus spread among the children and the children’s children of the three.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī. *Dīvān Lughāt al-Turk*. In *Islamic Central Asia: an anthology of historical sources*. Scott Levi and Ron Sela. (eds). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010:71. Schonig provides a rationale for the inconsistency of this canonical lineage for the Turks. See Claus Schönig. “On some unclear, doubtful and contradictory passages in Mahmud al-Kashgari’s ‘Diwan Lughat al-Turk.’” *Türk Dilleri Araştırmaları* 14 (2004): 36.

<sup>46</sup> Mīr ‘Alī Shīr Navā’ī. *Muḥākamat al-Lughatayn*. In *Islamic Central Asia: an anthology of historical sources*. Scott Levi and Ron Sela (eds). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010: 185-186.

Moreover, for Navā'ī, the Turks are superior to Persians because of their bilingualism, where Persian-speakers are monolingual. He writes,

There are more literates among the Persians. But although that is true, Turks from notables to commoners and from slaves to lords are acquainted with the Persian language and speak it according to their particular stations. Turkish poets even write beautiful poems in Persian. In contrast, not one member of the Persian nation, be he brigand or notable or scholar, can speak Turkish or understand anyone who does. If one in a hundred or even in a thousand learns and speaks this language, everyone who hears him knows that he is a Persian. With his own tongue he makes himself an object of ridicule. There can be no better proof than this that Turkish is inherently superior to Persian, and no Persian can claim the contrary. The Persian language would be lost without Turkish expressions, for the Turks have created many words to express nuances and gradations of meanings which cannot be understood until explained by a knowledgeable person.<sup>47</sup>

While the heavy-handedness with which he expresses his ideas may cause pause, it is notable that the underlying factor remains: Persian-speakers and Turkic-speakers still rely on one another. Centuries after al-Kāshgharī wrote his compendium of Turkic languages, Navā'ī shows that the socio-cultural landscape of the region continues to rely on the coexistence of these two groups of people.

The difficulty for Central Eurasians came, then, when the Soviet Union instituted a policy of nation-building, effectively separating the Persian and Turkic-speaking peoples of southern Central Asia. Shnirelman illustrates the struggle for the legacy of the Bulgars in newly created “nations,” the Tatars and Chuvash. Whether through literal borders or in name, groups set out to “claim” historical symbols as a means of rationalization for government policies, national unity, and state legitimacy in the “mythologization of ethnic history.”<sup>48</sup> Common history, cultural ties,

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<sup>47</sup> Mīr 'Alī Shīr Navā'ī. *Muḥākamat al-Lughatayn*. In *Islamic Central Asia: an anthology of historical sources*. Scott Levi and Ron Sela (eds). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010: 185-186.

<sup>48</sup> Victor Shnirelman, *Who Gets the Past?: Competition for Ancestors among non-Russian Intellectuals in Russia* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996); Anthony Smith. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).

and language are then used as a nodes of securing a population's tie to each other and the state. As Khalid points out, this process was not simply a Soviet strategy in "divide and rule," but a multilateral effort by intellectuals, the state, and locals to construct a new national paradigm within a Soviet context.<sup>49</sup> Uzbek intellectuals and revolutionaries began to use the Soviet system as a means of protectionism; by mastering the languages of the "Soviet" and "Nation," the Uzbeks were able to participate in what Hirsch terms "double assimilation" – that is, adopting a unified culture distinct from one's neighbors as a legitimating factor for the nationality and creating a tie of loyalty to the greater Soviet state.<sup>50</sup> By dividing Central Eurasia into national-territorial units intersecting with economic prosperity necessitated active participation by titular nationalities in creating strong cases for their positions in the Soviet Union. Border-making rested on ethnic, economic, and administrative principles that locals recognized as the path in protecting their interests; that is, by using the languages set forth by the state, they could critically argue for their territorial and economic progress.

Prior to 1924, Uzbek and Tajiks did not see themselves through unitary ethnic lenses of national territorial claims. The concept of an official nationality dismantled self-conceptions of subjects in the former khanates and emirates of southern Central Asia, in that Bukhara, Khiva, and Khoqand incorporated into newly formed borders where previous categories – language, clan, religion – were suppressed and new national categories were prescribed. Hirsch illustrates that prior to the national delimitations, people often used "compound identities" that were greatly reduced with the creation of borders and the introduction of the census, causing individuals to

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<sup>49</sup> Adeeb Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR*. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2015): 286.

<sup>50</sup> Francine Hirsch, "Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities." *The Russian Review* 59:2 (2000): 204-05

conceive of “Tajik” and “Uzbek” as separate, perhaps even contradictory, national identities.<sup>51</sup> In the newly formed Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, Uzbeks quickly came to see the territory as their own. The territory that was to become Tajikistan was initially allocated as an oblast of the UzSSR, but was ultimately elevated to the status of autonomous republic in October 1924.<sup>52</sup> People claiming Tajik culture or language as their primary identity were suppressed or pressured to migrate to the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which prompted many, if not most, Tajiks to rethink their identity within this new social paradigm.<sup>53</sup> Was it more beneficial to claim a Tajik heritage when there was little hope for a creation of a Soviet republic? It seems not. Through census statistics, it is clear that Tajik speakers were much more inclined to claim Uzbek nationality over Tajik nationality. Nourzhanov shows that in 1917, there were roughly 45,000 Tajiks and 3,300 Uzbeks in Samarkand whereas in 1926, the same statistic stood at roughly 11,000 Tajiks and 43,000 Uzbeks.<sup>54</sup> Through the centralized Soviet apparatus, this ethnoterritorial delimitation not only transformed the cartographic features of Central Eurasia but transformed the literal conceptions people had of themselves and their neighbors – regardless of whether these neighbors had historically been friends.

The creation of an ethnoterritorial national republic served as a conduit to titular nationalities claiming – or creating – their own symbols and history. Citizens of the UzSSR thus began learning to become Uzbek. As Khalid cites, the creation of the UzSSR that was proposed

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<sup>51</sup> Francine Hirsch, “Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities.” *The Russian Review* 59:2 (2000): 215

<sup>52</sup> Kirill Nourzhanov and Christian Bleuer. *Tajikistan: A Political and Social History*. (Canberra: ANU Press, 2013): 40

<sup>53</sup> Francine Hirsch, “Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities.” *The Russian Review* 59:2 (2000): 220

<sup>54</sup> Kirill Nourzhanov and Christian Bleuer. *Tajikistan: A Political and Social History*. (Canberra: ANU Press, 2013): 41

by Fayzulla Xo'jayev was on the basis of Bukhara, which would unite “Bukhara, except for the left bank of Amu Darya; Ferghana; Syr Darya oblast, excluding its Kazakh parts; Samarkand oblast; [and] Khorezm, except for regions inhabited by Turkmens and Kazakhs.”<sup>55</sup> Incorporating all of the historically significant sites of southern Central Asia into one republic served the Uzbek titular nationality through territorial terms, essentially enshrining the people, events, and sites of this new country into the new historical memory and identity of the Uzbek people. Khalid writes, “Xo'jayev asserted that the Timurid state was the national state of the Uzbeks—a key Chaghatayist point—and saw the loss of a unified state as the cause of decline, cultural backwardness, and even exploitation. This last then provides the link to Soviet considerations.”<sup>56</sup> In territorializing their claims, Uzbeks were able to declare all portions of the territory's history – even those of non-Turkic speaking or Persianate peoples' histories – as their own. This is evident in the currencies produced immediately after the Soviet collapse [see figure 4.3]. Having learned to frame their concerns as “national,” this new class of Uzbeks consolidated their monopoly on power and began the process of coercing anyone who dare speak against the national delimitation – namely Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhs – to assimilate, to move, or to suffer discrimination.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Cited in Adeeb Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR*. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2015): 273

<sup>56</sup> Adeeb Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR*. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2015): 273

<sup>57</sup> Francine Hirsch, “Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities.” *The Russian Review* 59:2 (2000): 214.



[Figure 4.3] 1999 25 so'm design depicting "Jaloliddin Manguberdi"<sup>58</sup> honoring the 800<sup>th</sup> year of his birth

As a sub-territory of Uzbekistan, Tajiks began their defensive strategy of appealing directly to the Moscow to be elevated to a Soviet republic. Petitioners argued that the UzSSR was in no subtle way causing cultural genocide through Uzbekification and assimilation. Officials from UzSSR, Tajik ASSR, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, and the Central Asian Economic Council met in closed meetings to hear the Tajik case for secession.<sup>59</sup> Advocates explained that the new Tajik SSR borders should include historically Tajik-speaking cities, including Bukhara and Samarkand, two of the most culturally significant cities in the UzSSR, as well as Khojand and Surkhandarya.<sup>60</sup> The process for actual border drawings, however, were exceptionally complex, leaving each party to make claims on cities. Masov's *The*

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<sup>58</sup> Jalāl al-Dīn Khwārazmshāh (d. 1231) was the last ruler of the Khwarazmshahs who succumbed to the onslaught of Mongol expansion. For a full description of his life, see <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/celaleddin-harizmsah>. His name is a point of discussion since the Arabic consonant lettering (MNKBRNY) needs to be interpreted for meaning. Bosworth explains that in the 19th century, d'Ohsson suggested *Mengübirni* (God Given). Peter Jackson has suggestion his name be read *Mingīrnī* (having a thousand men), which would make the name parallel to the Persian *hazārmard*. Modern Uzbeks prefer the former meaning. See Bosworth, "Jalāl al-Dīn Khwārazmshāh Mengübirni," *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (2012): <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/jalal-al-din-kvarazmsahi-mengbirni>

<sup>59</sup> Francine Hirsch, "Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities," *The Russian Review* 59:2 (2000): 220; see also, Rahim Masov, *The History of a National Catastrophe*. Iraj Bashiri, ed. (Minneapolis: Bashiri Working Papers on Central Asia and Iran, 1996).

<sup>60</sup> Francine Hirsch, "Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities," *The Russian Review* 59:2 (2000): 219-221

*History of a National Catastrophe*, perhaps, best captures the arguments made by both Uzbeks and Tajiks for the inclusion of historically Tajik-speaking cities into the UzSSR and Tajik SSR respectively, and his work illustrates the intensity with which the rhetoric of nationality and nation penetrated these discussions in the 1920s.<sup>61</sup> This played perfectly into the millennium-old discussion of the differences between Persian and Turkic speakers, and it definitively placed two newly created categories of nationalities – Uzbeks and Tajiks – at odds.

Tajikistan was elevated to the status of a Soviet Socialist Republic in October 1929 and was granted a portion of Ferghana and the city of Khujand, and Samarkand remained fully in Uzbekistan's borders with what Nourzhanov calls "underhanded tactics."<sup>62</sup> The Uzbek government moved its capital city from Tashkent to Samarkand for the expressed purpose of preventing it from being acquired by the Tajiks. Hirsch writes, "The commission originally agreed to give Surkhandarya to the Tajik SSR, but in the end, for reasons that are not entirely clear, only Khojand was transferred."<sup>63</sup> From then on, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were left to build their national histories on the narratives that were available to them from the territory that was effectively granted to each state by Moscow.<sup>64</sup>

Given the lack of cultural sites provided to Tajikistan during the national delimitations of the 1920s, Tajik scholars were tasked with constructing a national history with what they could.

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<sup>61</sup> Rahim Masov, *The History of a National Catastrophe*. Iraj Bashiri, ed. (Minneapolis: Bashiri Working Papers on Central Asia and Iran, 1996): 77-125.

<sup>62</sup> Kirill Nourzhanov and Christian Bleuer. *Tajikistan: A Political and Social History*. (Canberra: ANU Press, 2013): 41

<sup>63</sup> Francine Hirsch, "Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities." *The Russian Review* 59:2 (2000): 224

<sup>64</sup> Kassymbekova discusses this transitional period between TajASSR to TajSSR and the problems that arise in creating a bureaucracy and national narrative. See, Botakoz Kassymbekova, *Despite Cultures: Early Soviet Rule in Tajikistan*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016.



Much like Yakubovskii's opus, Bobojon Ghafurov<sup>65</sup> produced a two-volume publication, *The Tajiks*, based on his 1947 notion of Tajik exceptionality.<sup>66</sup> Ghafurov's aims, published in 1972 in Russian, were very similar to Yakubovskii's: produce a distinct history for the Tajiks and lay claim to a history of the distant past to legitimize a primordialist claim to territory (discussed more in chapter 5). He argued that the Tajik "nation" had been established in the 10<sup>th</sup> century under the leadership of the Samanid dynasty. Similar to Uzbekistan's claims of Timurid lineage, the Tajiks claim Ismā'īl Sāmānī as their progenitor. The Samanids are a useful apparatus for the Tajiks given that the empire was a Persianate Muslim empire which came to an end in 999 at the hand of the Qarakhans, a Turkic Muslim empire – the very same Turkic empire that Soviet and post-Soviet Uzbeks claim their ethnicity solidified around in the 10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> centuries. Not only do the Samanids symbolize the Tajiks' Persianate, pre-Turkic heritage, they also serve as an excellent foil to Turkicization, Uzbekification, and the Soviet legacy that, as Masov argued, deprived Tajiks of their socio-cultural lands. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, each country was then left to legitimize their histories and national identities based on occurrences of the early-to-mid 20<sup>th</sup> century. It is reported that Emomali Rahmon, the Tajik president, even threatened to retake the Tajik-speaking territories of Uzbekistan when meeting with Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov.<sup>67</sup> This, then, serves as the perfect rationale for the reification of Uzbekistan's claims of territory through early post-Soviet currency.

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<sup>65</sup> Ghafurov appears on the 50 somoni banknote of Tajikistan. See Ekaterina Bolashenkova, "Faces on Banknotes: Tajik Somoni as a Symbol of National Identity." *Manuscripta Orientalia* 21:1 (2015): 29-41

<sup>66</sup> Bobojon Ghafurov and J. Sharifov. *Tajiks: Pre-Ancient, Ancient and Medieval I-II*. Dushanbe: Ifron, 2011.

<sup>67</sup> Kiril Nourzhanov and John Heathershaw, "Nationalism in Tajikistan 25 years on." Forthcoming with Cambridge University Press, edited by Peter Rutland: 6

In Uzbekistan, the imagery appearing on most banknotes and coins reinforce the history of the territory, building the conception that all peoples and historical events that occurred within the borders of this nation are distinctly part of Uzbek history. A series of coins illustrate important historical figures and the literal boundaries of the country, noticeably showing the inclusion of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Surkhandarya, territories that had been claimed by the 1929 Tajik commission for the development of the TajikSSR [see figures 4.4-5]. During the transition from the Soviet and Russian ruble to the *so 'm* in 1992, a series of *so 'm*-coupons were printed showing the Registan Complex in Samarkand. The specific building on the banknote is the Shir-Dor Madrasa, which I contend was used for two purposes: it is located in the Tajik-speaking city of Samarkand and it utilizes Persianate imagery, discussed in section 3 of this chapter [see figure 4.6]. Beginning in 1994, after a successful buyback policy, the Central Bank of Uzbekistan began circulating their 1994 Series of seven banknotes, five of which depict sites from Samarkand and Bukhara – the 1 and 100 denominations will be discussed below [see figures 4.7-10]. Since 1994, the government has issued seven series of banknotes.<sup>68</sup> I contend that the initial series relied heavily on reiterating for purpose of cultural consumption the fact that sites in Samarkand and Bukhara belong to Uzbekistan. After the 1994 series, the government began issuing banknotes with statuary, cultural images (rather than historical sites), and government buildings, which are discussed in sections below. It was not until 2019 that the CBU returned to a historical site, minting a 100,000 banknote with an image of the Ulugh Beg Observatory [see figure 4.11].

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<sup>68</sup> 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2013, 2017, and 2019



[Figure 4.4] 2001 50 *so'm* design depicting the Uzbekistan map in honor of the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of independence



[Figure 4.5] 2004 100 *so'm* depicting the Uzbekistan map in honor of the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the national currency



[Figure 4.6] 1992 *so'm*-coupons depicting the Shir-Dor Madrasa in Samarkand



[Figure 4.6] 1992 so 'm-coupons depicting the Shir-Dor Madrasa in Samarkand cont.





[Figure 4.6] 1992 *so'm*-coupons depicting the Shir-Dor Madrasa in Samarkand cont.



[Figure 4.7] 1994 3 *so'm* banknote depicting the “Chashmayi Ayub” in Bukhara



[Figure 4.8] 1994 10 *so'm* banknote depicting the Gur-i Amir in Samarkand





[Figure 4.9] 1994 25 so'm banknote depicting the “Shohi Zinda” in Samarkand



[Figure 4.10] 1994 50 so'm banknote depicting Registan Square in Samarkand



[Figure 4.11] 2019 100,000 so'm banknote depicting the Ulugh Beg Observatory in Samarkand

### ***(III) Timurid Monumentality – “The past is our present”***

Part of the necessity in claiming and reifying the territory of modern Uzbekistan is to push the narrative that all portions of the territory’s history is part of the Uzbek national narrative. No other history is more physically manifested than that of the Timurid Empire with dozens of mosques, schools, and mausoleums still standing. Gorshenina introduces the concept of “patrimonialization” into English language scholarship on the history of incorporating

Eurasian architectural monuments into the cultural historical legacy of empires and later, nation-states. From the start of the Russian invasion into southern Central Asia in the 1860s, scholars, travelers, photographers, artists, politicians, and bureaucrats were attracted to the sites of the region, which soon came to comprise the European imaginary of the region as “Timurid.”<sup>69</sup> Regardless of era, the architecture of what would later become Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan were termed “Timurid historical monuments” by European observers and used as identifiers of empire. During the Russian conquest, these inventions of cultural heritage should be understood as discourses between what Gorshenina terms “self and other” rather than “self and self,” since this “rediscovery” of the region was necessarily manipulated to fit the imperial structures of identity.<sup>70</sup>

The repertoire of cultural heritage sites that were chosen by the imperial Russians and those focused on by travelers in the luminous descriptions extant provide insightful views on how the Soviet and post-Soviet officials focused on Timur and Timurid history. Sites that were not of the Timurid era or of the Timurid fashion were quite literally forgotten by the imperial Russian administrators, and those sites have proven difficult for inclusion in the post-Soviet narrative of nation-state. Still, as Uzbekistan moves beyond its 25<sup>th</sup> year of independence, sites that were preferred in the 19<sup>th</sup> century by colonialists, are present and given preference in the construction of national memory. The activity of 19<sup>th</sup> century colonial administrators is present

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<sup>69</sup> Patrimonialization is defined as, “An ideologically engaged sociocultural, legal and political process, in the course of which individual, consciously selected material objects, areas and practices are endowed with lustrous significance and called upon to symbolize special moments of the past, understood to be key during the construction of imperial/national identity.” See Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 246

<sup>70</sup> Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 24

in contemporary Uzbek propaganda in the words of attributed to Timur and inscribed on the portal of the Aq-Saray in Shahr-i Sabz, “Let those who doubt our power look upon our monuments.”

Cultural heritage sites were chosen first by the Russians, but soon after, local elites adopted the approach in creating an identity and history befitting Russian Turkestan through the publishing of epigraphic materials, translations of sources, and photography.<sup>71</sup> By the early 1920s and the national delimitation under the Soviets, the sites initially directed for renovation and reconstruction under the Russian Turkestan Governor-General von Kaufman became the final compendium of cultural-historical sites that have persevered as the national sites of modern Uzbekistan. During the Soviet period specifically, the number of historical sites grew in correspondence to the Jadids’ modernization projects, which included the influx of European ideas surrounding nationalism.<sup>72</sup> The range of sites associated with “Uzbekistan” was forced as the focus of ethno-nationalism, and throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, discussions regarding what sites and images were to continue as the center of “Uzbekness” persisted, so much so that contemporary Uzbekistan perpetuates these images in banal forms with which Uzbeks are meant to associate themselves.

The study and preservation of architecture in Uzbekistan began with the tsarist invasion of Eurasia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Imperial Russians, Soviets, and later

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<sup>71</sup> Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 260

<sup>72</sup> Jadidism and their intellectual discourses are discussed in further detail in chapter 5. Also, see, Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 261



independent governments of Eurasia sponsored large-scale preservation projects. One of the more prominent works of the 20<sup>th</sup> century on Timurid architecture is by G.A. Pugachenkova, which has most recently given way to Yusupova's work on architecture.<sup>73</sup> As Golombek writes, "Timurid architecture shows innovation in every aspect of the practice [of tile decoration] if we compare it with its predecessors. However, this innovation was built upon earlier progress in the technology of domes and vaults. This knowledge arrived in Timurid Central Asia with master craftsmen, brought by Timur from Iran."<sup>74</sup>

Golombek asserts that "Timuridity" was a consistent and essential part of the Mughal conception of self because they, unlike the Ottomans, Safavids, and Uzbeks, were the only dynasty who could claim direct genealogical descent from Timur.<sup>75</sup> The lack of textual testimony in the Mughal case regarding the "Timuridity" of architecture is paralleled in the Uzbek case, except for the heritage that Shībānī Khān articulated as being necessary to adopt in his desire to rule Central Eurasia. Art and architecture during the Mughal period has traces of Timurid architecture because the artists and architects were trained in Timurid territory. Proximity also played a major role in the production of landscape, as Shibanid architecture illustrates: Timurid traditions were passed from the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> centuries to later builders.<sup>76</sup> This concept of "Timuridity," however, is useful for our discussion as the Shibanids and contemporary Uzbeks purchased the cultural significance and malleability of the Timurid heritage.

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<sup>73</sup> Lisa Golombek and Ebba Koch. "The Mughals, Uzbeks, and the Timurid Legacy" in *A Companion to Islamic Art and Architecture volume II*. Finbarr Flood and Gulru Necipoglu (eds.). (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2017): 812; Mavlyuda Yusupova. *Buxarskaya Shkola Zodchestva: XV-XVII veka*. Tashkent: Izdatelstvo "SMI ASIA", 2014.

<sup>74</sup> Lisa Golombek and Ebba Koch. "The Mughals, Uzbeks, and the Timurid Legacy": 813

<sup>75</sup> Lisa Golombek and Ebba Koch. "The Mughals, Uzbeks, and the Timurid Legacy": 811

<sup>76</sup> Lisa Golombek and Ebba Koch. "The Mughals, Uzbeks, and the Timurid Legacy": 812

History plays a major role in the construction of Uzbekistan's collective memory. The government tries to tie the histories, dynasties, and peoples of the entirety of the country into the vision it purports is "Uzbekistan," doing so as local, regionalized history and projecting Uzbekistan as a global country. Both coexist in the vision Uzbekistan promotes, and this is seen in the architectural and symbolic structures presented in currency. As Rizvi writes about Dubai, "Indeed architecture provides an important opportunity for the representation of nationalist ideals that mobilize the refashioned past, present, and the future of the country. Thus there are multiple histories at play in representing the modern nation, monumentalized through traditional forms and international institutions."<sup>77</sup> In the case of Uzbekistan, the mobilization of a refashioned history, along with historic architecture and newly built structures, spot the new *so'm*.

The monumentality of Uzbekistan's architecture is often attributed to the Timurid era and the structures built by Timur (r. 1370-1405), most prominently those of Samarkand. Vámbéry, in his 1883 autobiography, writes, "The Tadjiks maintain to this day that Samarkand, this ancient city of Central Asia, is the centre of the world. And it does, in truth, excel all other cities of Central Asia, in its ancient monuments as well as in the splendor of its mosques, its grand tombs, and new structures."<sup>78</sup> Monumentality was at the fore of Timur's project when he commissioned his Friday mosque, Bibi Khanim Masjid (1398-1405). According to O'Kane, construction of the mosque began before Timur's campaigns into India in 1398, but "he was so dissatisfied with its scale on his return that he ordered the two supervisors executed and its height to be increased.

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<sup>77</sup> Kishwar Rizvi. "Dubai, Anyplace: Histories of Architecture in the Contemporary Middle East" in *A Companion to Islamic Art and Architecture volume II*. Finbarr Flood and Gulru Necipoglu, eds. (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2017): 1247

<sup>78</sup> Arminius Vámbéry. *The Life and Adventures of Arminius Vámbéry*. (New York: Stokes Company Publishers, 1884): 222.

Apart from its size it was also innovative in several ways. It had an exterior that was decorated on every side.”<sup>79</sup> Clavijo further elaborates in detail the latter stages of the construction – though mistakenly attributing the construction to the memory of Timur’s mother-in-law – illustrating Timur’s intimate involvement in this specific project:

The Mosque which Timur had caused to be built in memory of the mother of his wife the Great Khanum seemed to us the noblest of all those we visited in the city of Samarkand, but no sooner had it been completed than he began to find fault with its entrance gateway, which he now said was much too low and must forthwith be pulled down. Then the workmen began to dig pits to lay the new foundations, when in order that the piers might be rapidly rebuilt his Highness gave out that he himself would take charge to direct the labour for the one pier of the new gateway while he laid it on two of the lords of his court, his special favourites, to see to the foundations on the other part. Thus all should see whether it was he or those other two lords who first might bring this business to its proper conclusion. Now at this season Timur was already weak in health, he could no longer stand for long on his feet, or mount his horse, having always to be carried in a litter. It was therefore in his litter that every morning he had himself brought to the place, and he would stay there the best part of the day urging on the work. He would arrange for much meat to be cooked and brought, and then he would order them to throw portions of the same down to the workmen in the foundations, as though one should cast bones to dogs in a pit, and a wonder to all he even with his own hands did this. Thus he urged on their labour: and at times would have coins thrown to the masons when especially they worked to his satisfaction. Thus the building went on day and night until at last a time came when it had perforce to stop—as was also the case in the matter of making the street [for the new bazaar]—on account of the winter snows which began now constantly to fall.<sup>80</sup>

Regardless of the population’s physical positions in the city center, Timur ordered homes to be torn down in order to make way for his grand structure.<sup>81</sup> Not unlike the present government’s

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<sup>79</sup> Bernard O’Kane. “Architecture and Court Cultures of the Fourteenth Century” in *A Companion to Islamic Art and Architecture volume II*. Finbarr Flood and Gulru Necipoglu, eds. (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2017): 603-604

<sup>80</sup> Ruy González de Clavijo and Guy Le Strange (trans.). *Embassy to Tamerlane 1403-1406*. (London: Routledge, 1994): 147

<sup>81</sup> For Timur’s interest in construction and disregard of local populations, see Clavijo and Guy Le Strange (trans.). *Embassy to Tamerlane 1403-1406*. (London: Routledge, 1994): 146; “No heed was paid to the complaint of persons to whom the property here might belong, and those whose houses thus were demolished suddenly had to quit with no warning, carrying away with them their goods and chattels as best they might. No sooner had all the houses been thrown

approach to build roadways around these Timurid structures, individuals were relocated and their property destroyed. The Friday Mosque is so grand and its front portal so high that it can be seen from a distance “like great ships on the ocean of the urban fabric.”<sup>82</sup> Blair and Bloom explain further that, “Timur’s mosque was designed not only to continue Iranian imperial tradition, but also to symbolize his conquest of the world.”<sup>83</sup> Timur’s power and strength had led to a number of envoys traveling between Samarkand, Bukhara, and Herat to Ming China. Chen Cheng, in his 1415 travel account from the Ming court to Timurid lands, writes,

Alcohol is banned in neighborhoods. Butchers of cows and goats do not sell the blood of animals; they dig a hole in the ground and bury it. There is an earthen house in the northeast corner of the city. It is where the Muslims pray to God. It is elegantly decorated; its pillars are all made of dark green stones with particularly exquisite engravings. There are wide corridors on four sides of the structure, with a place for sermons in the middle. Their holy text is covered with sheepskin and is written in golden ink.<sup>84</sup>

Though the description is scant and not nearly as detailed as Clavijo’s below, we come to appreciate the nature of Timurid buildings with their elaborate designs and attention to detail. These are the elements of architecture that further elaborate the monumentality of Timur’s project.

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down than the master builders came and laid out the broad new street, erecting shops on the one side and opposite, placing before each a high stone bench that was topped with white slabs.”

<sup>82</sup> Lisa Golombek and Ebba Koch. “The Mughals, Uzbeks, and the Timurid Legacy” in *A Companion to Islamic Art and Architecture volume II*. Finbarr Flood and Gulru Necipoglu (eds.). (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2017): 816

<sup>83</sup> Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom, *The Art and Architecture of Islam 1250-1800*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994): 37-70, 199-212.

<sup>84</sup> Cited in an unpublished manuscript, see Carol Fan, *Chen Cheng: A Ming Diplomat to the Timurids and a Full Translation of his Xiyu Fanguo Zhi*. (University of Chicago, 2016): 23-24. Chen Cheng 陳誠. *Xiyu xingcheng ji xiyu fanguo zhi* 西域行程記 西域番國志 [Record of the Journey of the Western Regions and Record of the Countries of the Western Regions], ed., Zhou Liankuan 周連寬. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1991: 81-82.

Timur's buildings were constructed for the purpose of impressing not only the inhabitants of his cities, but the travelers and envoys that visited the region. The sheer size of these structures lends themselves to the monumentalism of the projects, but design factors also contribute to the enormity of the buildings. As Golombek writes, "Timurid cities generally had a major thoroughfare running through the city and serving as a covered bazaar. This type of urban model was an adaptation of the common configuration for the cities found throughout the Iranian world. The second feature was the articulation of the public square through the construction of complementary buildings around its periphery. The square, *maydan*, was common in Iranian cities, but under the Timurids it became the nucleus of an architectural ensemble."<sup>85</sup> Much like the Friday Mosque, Registan Square is filled with the same "Timuridity" that give us the colossal structural sights of Samarkand. The Registan is comprised of three buildings, the Madrasa of Ulugh Beg (1417-1422), the Shir-Dor Madrasa (1619-1636), and the Tilleh-Kari Mosque (1646-1660), the latter two having been constructed under the direction of Yalangtāsh Bahādur Ālchīn (1578-1656), a Shibaniid amir.<sup>86</sup> Prior to the Timurid era, buildings were typically left bare. With the destruction of homes for the creation of space, Timur and his successors were able to drape their buildings "in glazed tiles, assembled in patterns that look like masonry (hence are called *bannā'i*, or 'mason's technique') or woven fabric (*hazār-bāf*, or 'a thousand-weaves'). The purpose of this type of decoration was to give clarity to the volume and to enhance the feeling of solidity, another trait one could relate to Timur's grip on power."<sup>87</sup> The end of the Timurid-era, though, did not lead to the end of the style and magnitude of Timurid-era structures.

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<sup>85</sup> Lisa Golombek and Ebba Koch. "The Mughals, Uzbeks, and the Timurid Legacy": 814

<sup>86</sup> Robert McChesney, "The Amirs of Muslim Central Asia in the XVII<sup>th</sup> Century." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 26:1 (1983): 33-70.

<sup>87</sup> Lisa Golombek and Ebba Koch. "The Mughals, Uzbeks, and the Timurid Legacy": 817

Yalangtāsh Bahādur Ālchīn was raised during the late-Shibanid period, under ‘Abdullāh II’s protection, the last effective Shibanid ruler. By 1598, when he was a young military general, the Shibanid Empire collapsed under ‘Abdullāh II’s son, ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s short-lived reign. The territory was taken over by four rivaling claimants, ultimately leading to Yalangtāsh Bahādur Ālchīn entering the service of the Tuqay-Timurid leader, Imām Qulī.<sup>88</sup> As a rising amir, Yalangtāsh Bahādur Ālchīn patronized the construction of a number of structures, one whose image is reproduced repeatedly in contemporary Uzbekistan, the Shir-Dor Madrasa. Construction on the structure began in 1619 with plans to resemble and mirror the Madrasa of Ulugh Beg, which stands opposite.<sup>89</sup> Unique to the design of the building is one of the most often-replicated images on Uzbek currency: the lion and sun design [see figures 4.12-14].<sup>90</sup>



[figure 4.12] 1997 200 *so'm* bill depicting the lion and sun imagery on the Shir-Dor Madrasa in the Registan Complex in Samarkand

<sup>88</sup> Audrey Burton. “Who were the First Ashtarkhanid Rulers of Bukhara?” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 51:3 (1988): 482-488.

<sup>89</sup> Yaşar Çoruhlu. “Şirdâr Medresesi.” *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (2010): <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/sirdar-medresesi>

<sup>90</sup> Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom, *The Art and Architecture of Islam 1250-1800*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994): 204



[figure 4.13] Shir-Dor Madrasa in the Registan Complex in Samarkand



[figure 4.14] The most recent depiction of the sun and lion motif from the Shir-Dor Madrasa on 2018 200 *so'm* coin

The lion and sun (*shīr* and *khūrshīd*) have historically symbolized kingship, divine power, and the florescence of an eternal state in Iran and Central Asia. In Iranic mythologies, the lion, as the king of beasts, is the symbol of power and the sun, as the king of the heavens, is associated with the ancient god of light and justice. The image of the lion has been present in the region since at least the Achaemenid period and is present in stone reliefs, and it has continually persisted in Persianate cultures, most prominently in literature, Perso-Turkish currency, flags, philately, and other forms of ideological materials. These symbols, though, predate their usage

by Persianate societies. The earliest documented reliefs are from Honan in the 8<sup>th</sup> century BCE.<sup>91</sup> In the Turko-Mongol context, we have examples of lion imagery on mirrors and rock reliefs from the Uighurs in the 8<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>92</sup> In Central Asia, specifically, the production of sun markers seem to be influenced by the earliest production of these images from Iran and Mesopotamia.<sup>93</sup>

In Iran and Central Asia, the “Asiatic lion,” or Persian lion, was a common sight. It is believed that the Chinese depictions of lions that appear during the Han dynasty are of the Asiatic lions that commonly roamed the region. The earliest documentation of lions in Chinese sources is found in the *Book of Han* (c. 1st century CE) in reference to the Parthian Empire.<sup>94</sup> This particular source borrows the extant character 師 *shī* (T1), whose proper meaning is “army,” “capital,” and “teacher,” to phonetically transcribe the Middle Persian word *šīr* “lion.” As the animal became more familiar to Chinese authors—particularly after the Tang era—, gradually, a proper character was created to stand for “lion”: 獅 *shī*, a phono-semantic compound that adds the semantic radical 犳 “dog” (quǎn t3) to the original phonetic transcription of *šīr*, 師 *shī*.<sup>95</sup> From at least the 1<sup>st</sup> century, the image of the lion, then, has been used as protectors of the emperor’s palace, lending the shape and face of these creatures on buildings, roads, brick, and other paraphernalia around the emperor’s palace. Culturally, however, the lion, along with the

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<sup>91</sup> Madanjeet Singh. *The Sun: Symbol of Power and Life*. (New York: Abrams, UNESCO, 1993): 11

<sup>92</sup> Madanjeet Singh. *The Sun: Symbol of Power and Life*: 11

<sup>93</sup> Madanjeet Singh. *The Sun: Symbol of Power and Life*: 12-13

<sup>94</sup> Fan Ye 范曄, *Houhan shu* 後漢書 (“The Latter Book of Han,” 445), Vol. 6 “孝順孝沖 孝質帝紀” (“Deeds of Emperor Shun, Emperor Chong, and Emperor Zhi”): “[陽嘉二年]六月辛未[...] 疏勒國獻\*師子\*封牛” (“[On July 21, 133 CE, the Kingdom of Shule submitted as tributes lions and hunchback cows.”). Zhuqing Hu (trans.), 2019.

<sup>95</sup> Laurence Picken. *Music for a Lion Dance of the Song Dynasty*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984): 201.



sun counterpart has been utilized across the Eurasian landmass to signify the of power and justice in a variety of imperial contexts. As Najmabadi points out, the unity of the two symbols and their persistence has perpetuated its Persianate background, which has spilled into the rest of Eurasia.<sup>96</sup>

As a potent figure of strength, the lion and sun has been utilized by Iranian, Turkic, Arab, Mongol, and Chinese traditions, in order to exemplify the power a ruler wields. Shahbazi states, “Islamic, Turkish, and Mongol traditions also stressed the symbolic association of the lion and royalty. They likewise reaffirmed the charismatic power of the sun, and the Mongols re-introduced the veneration of the sun especially in its rising phase.”<sup>97</sup> This is particularly interesting in that many of the Eurasian depictions of the lion and sun have the sun rising behind the lion. These developments resulted in its heraldic use in all manner of state and institution-building paraphernalia. Variations also exist in bird-sun imagery, as we see in the architecture of Bukhara.<sup>98</sup> These variations and expansions of the bird (*simurgh* or *huma*), lion, and sun motif has been adopted into all manner of cultural representations, not least of which is the Central Asian carpet,<sup>99</sup> which appears prominently on Uzbek currency [see figures 4.15-17].

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<sup>96</sup> Afsaneh Najmabadi. *Women with mustaches and men without beards gender and sexual anxieties of Iranian modernity*. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2010): 63-96.

<sup>97</sup> A. Shapur Shahbazi, “Flags i. of Persia,” *Encyclopædia Iranica*, X/1 (2012): 12-27.

<sup>98</sup> Madanjeet Singh. *The Sun: Symbol of Power and Life*: 26-27

<sup>99</sup> Madanjeet Singh. *The Sun: Symbol of Power and Life*: 74



[figure 4.15] 1994 100 so'm bill depicting humma (mythical bird) on the Nadir Divan-begi Madrasa in Bukhara



[figure 4.16] 1994 5 so'm bill depicting humma (mythical bird) on the Nadir Divan-begi Madrasa in Bukhara





[figure 4.17] Nadir Divan-begi Madrasa in Bukhara


Clavijo continues to provide some of the most detailed descriptions of Samarkand, including many of the most important cultural monuments that are displayed on currency, like the Gur-i Amir. He writes,

This Mosque was the place of burial of one of his [Timur's] grandsons, namely Prince Muhammad Sultan who had died in Asia Minor shortly after the battle where Timur conquered the Turkish [Sultan Bayazid]. Indeed, it was this Prince who had taken the Sultan prisoner [at the battle of Angora], but afterwards he had succumbed to his wounds there received. Timur had loved this grandson greatly and in his remembrance had caused this Mosque to be built as his place of burial [after the Prince's body had been brought back home]. To the palace adjacent thereto and but recently constructed Timur came that day, it being his intention to celebrate the consecration of his grandson's tomb by a feast, to which we as usual had been graciously invited. Then as we presented ourselves we were shown over that chapel, which was the place of interment of the Prince, and we found it square in plan and very loftily built. Both outside and in it was magnificently adorned in gold and blue tiles beautifully patterned, and there was much other fine work in gypsum... Now when this Prince had died in the Turkish country, as above explained his body had been transported home to Samarkand for burial, and the city authorities had



received command to erect this Mosque for his tomb. But recently Timur had come in from the Horde to view the building and he had found that the chapel was not to his liking, holding that it was built too low. Immediately he ordered the walls to be demolished, and laid it on the architects that it should be rebuilt within ten days' time, under threat of a terrible forfeit to the workmen. Without delay the rebuilding was set in hand, day and night the work went on, and Timur himself already twice had come into the city to see what progress had been made, on which occasions he had caused himself to be carried in a litter, for at his age he could no longer sit his horse. The chapel had now been completely rebuilt within the appointed ten days' time, and it was a wonder how so great a building could have been put up and completed within so brief a space.<sup>100</sup>

Timur had initially constructed this monument only for his grandson, and he himself had intended to be buried in his birthplace of Shahr-i Sabz. Gur-i Amir has, however, become a familial tomb of sorts when his body was transported, much like his grandson's back to Samarkand. This structure has a prominent place on the 1994 10 *so'm* [figure 4.18].



[Figure 4.18] 1994 10 *so'm* banknote depicting Gur-i Amir

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<sup>100</sup> Ruy González de Clavijo and Guy Le Strange (trans.). *Embassy to Tamerlane 1403-1406*. (London: Routledge, 1994): 144

Despite the spectacular descriptions provided by Clavijo, a large number of 19<sup>th</sup> century descriptions provide a bleaker vision of this “forgotten” part of the world. Khanykov, in 1868 wrote,

The enormous ruins surrounding the walls of present-day Samarkand clearly said that its glory had passed; nonetheless, even in this moribund form, the city, from a distance, is quite alluring. Several domes, covered in azure tiles, several tall, slight minarets and the bright greenery of its gardens, sharply appearing on the cloudless blue of the sky, the quiet ruling around us, all gave this picture a sort of solemn beauty.<sup>101</sup>

The local population is not portrayed well in their abilities to hold on to the lingering remnants of the cultural heritage started by the Timurids and carried forth through the centuries.

If you have not renounced the hope of reveling in the sight of the most celebrated of the cities of Central Asia, Tamerlane’s capital, long renowned in the Orient, you will be bitterly disappointed. Samarkand was, at one time, famed for its mosques, palaces and madrasas. But now, from this epoch of past glory, there remains only a weak memory! The magnificent tiled buildings are collapsing each year because of time, earthquakes, ignorance, and the apathy of the Central Asians. The collapsed parts of the walls of ancient buildings are not restored, although bricks with magnificent tiled mosaics are scattered around right there, on the street, or in the courtyard of the madrasa, but simply smeared with clay. These grey, earthen patches unpleasantly catch the eye of everyone who is not infected with Asiatic indifference towards the splendid remains of Antiquity.<sup>102</sup>

As Gorshenina explains, 19<sup>th</sup> century Russian and European travelers formulated the notion that the “golden age” of this region was precisely the time of Timur and his descendants, from which many of the buildings remain. The quintessential image of the blue mosaic that defines southern Central Asia was connected to the Timurids and placed at the fore of the local and imperial

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<sup>101</sup> Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 251. For full original document see: <http://ts.manas.edu.kg/ts/007/mobile/index.html#p=131>

<sup>102</sup> Cited in Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 251.

sentiments for cultural heritage.<sup>103</sup> Because of this, the term “Timurid” has, through the late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, come to blur the chronological boundary of the Timurid era (1370-1507). A common example worth repeating here is the popular Registan Square, which comprises of multiple buildings, one of which was built during the reign of Timur’s grandson, Ulugh Beg (the Ulugh Beg Madrasa 1417-1420). The remaining buildings were built in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, but since they consist of the same cultural elements of the Ulugh Beg Madrasa, they are often termed “Timurid.” This term, then, helps in our understanding of the contemporary Timuridification of Uzbekistan, in that the cultural heritage that was patrimonialized by Europeans in the 19<sup>th</sup> century lingers to the present-day.

After the Russian conquest of Central Asia, Samarkand became the first city to begin restorations in 1869 because of its status as a “Timurid” city.<sup>104</sup> The Governor-General of Russian Turkestan von Kaufman thought it incumbent upon himself to begin the project of cleaning up the cities of the Timurid realms, preserving what could be preserved, and restoring areas that were degraded by a lack of appreciation by locals. He writes,

The indifference of the descendants of the pious builders of these monuments to their maintenance compelled me, at Treasury expense, to restore the famous tomb of Tamerlane – Gur-Emir [Gur-i Amir] – to make arrangements for cleaning up the square surrounding the half-destroyed Bibi-Khanym mosque, the best of the monuments of Islamic architecture in Central Asia, and for keeping clean certain madrasas of the Samarkand Registan, the main square of the native city.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 252

<sup>104</sup> Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 254

<sup>105</sup> Cited in Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 254. For the original, see Konstantin von Kaufman, *Proekt Vsepoddanneishago Otcheta po Grazhdanskomu Upravleniyu i Ustroistvu v Oblastyakh Turkestanskogo General-Gubernatorstva*. (Saint Petersburg: Glavnago Shtaba, 1885): 248.

The cleaning of the area was further aided by setting up Russian style shops in lieu of the local bazaar style that had occupied public squares. Gorshenina writes,

More extensive work was done on the Shah-i Zinda. After total reconstruction of the large entrance staircase, almost all the mausoleums of the complex underwent renovation of their walls and domes to one degree or another, with the use of plaster and brick both from old buildings and of the European type. Extensive clearing of rubbish led to a lowering of the ground level and the necessity of building small staircases in front of the entrance to practically every mausoleum. The same sort of work affected the madrasas of the Registan, the square of which was freed from bazaar stalls and enclosed with grating.<sup>106</sup>

The effort promoted by von Kaufman was predominantly superficial in its attempts at clearing debris from structures, but there were also attempts at strengthening structures with scaffolding and replacing crumbling sections with brick.

Samarkand's disarray and deterioration was well-documented by von Kaufman's reign as Governor-General. In 1883 when Vámbéry was passing through the historic city, he noted, "The tomb of Timur, and its many brilliant medresses are worth mentioning too. Only a portion of the latter are used as dwelling-places, and many of them are threatened with decay. The medresse of Hanim, once so grand, is in ruins now."<sup>107</sup> This decay that von Kaufman, Vámbéry, and others noted was first mentioned by Anthony Jenkinson during travels in the 16<sup>th</sup> century only a half century after the end of Timurid sovereignty in the region. He writes on his 1562 map [figure 4.19], "Samarkand was once the metropolis of the entire Tartaria, yet now it lays in deformed ruins, one [city] with many vestiges of antiquity. Here is buried Tamerlane, the one who once

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<sup>106</sup> Svetlana Gorshenina. "Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments." *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 254

<sup>107</sup> Arminius Vámbéry. *The Life and Adventures of Arminius Vámbéry*. (New York: Stokes Company Publishers, 1884): 224.



brought around the captured and vanquished Turkish Emperor Bayezid in golden chains. The inhabitants are Muslims.”<sup>108</sup>



[Figure 4.19] Jenkinson's 1562 Map of Russia and Central Asia

Von Kaufman's decision to restore Samarkand first, rather than Tashkent, which began in 1885, lends itself to the view that imperial Russia truly was setting itself as an inheritor to both the classical and Islamic powers that preceded it. The choice of Samarkand and the

<sup>108</sup> Translation by Samie: "Shamarcandia olim totius Tartariae metropolis fuit at nunc ruinis deformis iacet, una cum multis antiquitatis vestigiis. Hic conditus est Tamerlanes ille qui olim Turcarum Imperatorem Baijasitem captum aureis catenis vinctum circumtulit. Incolae mahumetani sunt." For further explication, see Krystyna Szykula, "La carte de Russie de A. Jenkinson (1562) et son influence sur la cartographie européenne." *Revue Belge de Géographie* 3-4 (2008): 325-340.



Timuridification of Eurasian history had a major impact on the 20<sup>th</sup> century development of the UzSSR, and independent Uzbekistan. Vámbéry wrote in 1873, “Timour is spoken of in Samarcand as if the news of his death had only just arrived from Otrar,”<sup>109</sup> illustrating the extent to which von Kaufman and others’ perspectives on the cities historical sites resonated with the population and lent itself to the Russian attempt at inheriting Timur’s mantle.

Continuous promotion of the city and its historical cultural sites was not continued after von Kaufman’s death in 1882. The general maintenance of the heritage sites continued to diminish for years with laxer rules of enforcement regarding protection. The perspective of Samarkand’s historical sites lending themselves to the Russian Empire’s conception of self also drastically changed when the Governor-Generalship was taken over by Alexander Samsonov (1909-1914). He is quoted saying about the Registan, “The quicker all of this is destroyed, the better it will be for the Russian state.”<sup>110</sup> Though Samsonov’s perspective led to further diminishment of the buildings, von Kaufman’s notions of preserving and utilizing Eurasian architecture as sources of identity and legitimation gained greater traction under the Soviets, where we see the change of historical sites as simply being “Timurid” to the Uzbekification of Timurid history.

The Russian colonial administrators, directed by von Kaufman, undertook the project of the *Turkestan Album*, led by Aleksandr L. Kun (1840– 1888), and with the collaboration of

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<sup>109</sup> Arminius Vámbéry. *Travels in Central Asia*. (New York: Arno, 1970): 207. Online archive: <https://archive.org/details/travelsincentra01vmgoog/page/n248>

<sup>110</sup> Cited in Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 258

Nikolai V. Bogaevskii.<sup>111</sup> The album was published for the 1872 Moscow Polytechnic Exhibition in six volumes, which consists of two archeological volumes, one historical volume, two ethnographic volumes, and one trade volume. The archeological volumes have lustrous photographs of monuments and their detailed elements, which have become so prevalent in their association with the historic city of Samarkand and the nation-state of Uzbekistan. The 1872 exhibition also produced a full-sized oil-painting replica, albeit in its “ideal and restored” form, of the Shir-Dor Madrasa, showcasing the blue mosaics of the Registan.<sup>112</sup> Gorshenina writes, “Such a glossy image was supposed to underline the importance of the cultural heritage obtained by Russia on the battlefield. It also reflected the desire of the colonial administration to preserve it for its descendants, at the same time ‘modernizing’ other aspects of Central Asian life and, indirectly, subordinating the symbolic meaning of Samarkand’s Islamic architecture to the political programmes of the Russian Empire.”<sup>113</sup>

#### ***(IV) Conclusion – “Uzbekistan: Future Great State”***

Currency, as the new form of state propaganda, has incorporated large amounts of Soviet era concepts of what constitutes the Uzbek national heritage. As parts II and III of this chapter illustrate, currency was used to draw and reinforce the physical boundaries of Uzbekistan while


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<sup>111</sup> Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 255

<sup>112</sup> Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 255.

<sup>113</sup> Gorshenina also makes mention of Veselovskii’s photographic album, *The Mosques of Samarkand*, that was published in 1905. This volume is dedicated to the Gur-i Amir. See Svetlana Gorshenina. “Samarkand and its Cultural Heritage: perceptions and persistence of the Russian colonial construction of monuments.” *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014): 255, 259-260

laying claim to the structures and histories spotting the landscape of the country. Beginning in 2001, the CBU began to issue more currency depicting the “modern” aspects of the country – namely government buildings and monuments. We might view this shift in visual production from historical monuments to contemporary buildings on currency as a move from contextualizing the national identity to manifesting the presence of a legitimate, sovereign state. A manifestation of the state’s existence is in the construction of museums and statues, which then create a full circle of consumption for the public in that these sites of historical memory are distributed and used through currency, reinforcing the government’s national project [see figures 4.20-31].



[figure 4.20] 1994 1 *so'm* depicting the Alisher Navoi Opera and Ballet Theater in Tashkent



[figure 4.21] 1994 5 *so'm* depicting the Alisher Navoi Monument in Tashkent



[figure 4.22] 1994 100 *so'm* depicting the Bunyodkor Palace in Tashkent





[figure 4.23] 1999 500 *so'm* depicting the Amir Timur Statue in Tashkent



[figure 4.24] 2001 *so'm* depicting the Amir Timur Museum in Tashkent



[figure 4.25] 2013 5,000 *so'm* depicting the Oliy Majlis (National Assembly) in Tashkent



[figure 4.26] 2017 10,000 *so'm* depicting the Uzbekistan Senate in Tashkent





[figure 4.27] 2017 50,000 *so'm* depicting the top of the “Ezgulik” ark in Independence Square and the Anjumanlar Saroyi (Palace of Conventions) in Tashkent.



[figure 4.28] 2002 50 *so'm* coin celebrating the 2700 anniversary of Shahrisabz with a depiction of Aq Saroy and Timur's Monument in Shahrisabz



[figure 4.29] 2009 100 *so'm* celebrating the 2200 anniversary of Tashkent with a depiction of Mustaqillik Maydoni



[figure 4.30] 2009 100 *so'm* celebrating the 2200 anniversary of Tashkent with a depiction of the Ezgulik Ark in Tashkent



[figure 4.31] 2011 500 *so'm* coin celebrating 20 years of independence with a depiction of the Anjumanlar Saroyi in Tashkent

To buttress the collective memory of Timurid history and to show the state's power, the Uzbek government has sponsored a number of architectural projects, some of which appear on the country's currency. On one of the most circulated banknotes, 1,000 *so'm*, an image of the Timurid Museum of Tashkent takes center stage. The museum was built for the 660<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Timur's birth, lending itself to the continued museumification of Uzbekistan as a tribute to the 15<sup>th</sup> century warlord. Emblazoned in the entrance of the museum and on the pamphlet cover, the former president's words encapsulate the importance of this figure for the country: "If anyone wants to understand who the Uzbeks are, if anyone wants to comprehend all the power, might,

justice and unlimited abilities of the Uzbek people, their contribution to the global development, their belief in future, he should recall the image of Amir Temur.”<sup>114</sup> The appropriated image of the state-building, high-cultured Amir Timur is, as Anderson would argue, the quintessential image of Uzbekness to the collective memory.

The building itself, as Paskaleva notes,<sup>115</sup> was designed by Turdiev and Umarov in 1995 after a Turko-Mongol yurt, but it is this design specifically that illustrates Timur’s impact in the melding of peripatetic, nomadic life with that of settled, imperial life. Inscribed upon the walls of the museum are words that exemplify the current government’s aspirations: justice, dignity, stability; words from the Quran, which would typically appear as epigraphy are absent. Of note inside the museum are two murals with symbolic images of national importance [see figure 4.32]. The center panel of the triptych, “Buyuk Sohibqiron,” incorporates the very imagery from the Shir-Dor Madrasa of the sun and lion motif. Paskaleva shows that its placement directly next to Timur’s throne indicates the prominence of the dynasty to Uzbek history regardless of the lack of mention – or suppression – of the dynasty during the Soviet era.<sup>116</sup> By pulling on images from the territory’s history and incorporating contemporary political aspirations, the museum stands as a “shrine to contemporary Uzbek politics rather than a commemoration site.” As a construction to modern Uzbekistan, the building itself is the ideal representation of the various territorialized aspects of Uzbekistan’s history, reinforcing the Timurid legacy that the government eagerly

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<sup>114</sup> H. Habibullaev. *In the Halls of the State Museum of Timurids History*. (Tashkent: San’at, 2002): 6.

<sup>115</sup> Elena Paskaleva. “Commemorating Tamerlane.” *International Institute for Asian Studies: The Newsletter* 74 (2016): 40

<sup>116</sup> Elena Paskaleva. “Commemorating Tamerlane.” *International Institute for Asian Studies: The Newsletter* 74 (2016): 41

pushes, but also incorporating and quietly disseminating the country's roots to the Shibanid dynasty.

The country's incorporation and continual propagation of Persianate, Shibanid-era imagery is a material acknowledgement of the territory's cultural heritage and the creation of a modern nation-state with long lineage of cultural icons from which to pull. By literally building a museum that showcases the nation's museumification of historical sites and reproducing the façade on banal forms of nationalism, the Uzbek state offers its citizens physical evidence of a great past, and in turn, a great present and future – this underpins one of the national mottos, *O'zbekiston – kelajagi buyuk davlat!* (Uzbekistan: Future Great State). The government's initial territorialization, building upon Soviet-era structures, has led to the compelling narrative that the Uzbek national memory consists of a magnificent past that belongs uniquely to the Uzbek people.



[figure 4.32] Buyuk Sohibqiron center panel of triptych in the Amir Timur Museum in Tashkent



## **Chapter 5 - Textbook Nationalism: 16<sup>th</sup> Century Uzbek History from a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Perspective**

In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the governments of Central Asia were burdened with the creation of national ideologies to replace the communist self-vision of the region and supply the citizenry of each new nation-state with a national ideology. The ruling class in Uzbekistan, led by President Islam Karimov, articulated a distinct break from Soviet interpretations of history and ideology in order to fashion a new – though arguably old and pre-communist – vision of the nation. Karimov viewed the Uzbek peoples' heteronomy to the Soviet Union in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and its subsequent Soviet construction of “nationhood” as a hindrance on the true history of Uzbekistan. Through the adoption of a territorialized history with claims over historical sites, figures, and events, Karimov's nationalism would triumph over the “false” narrative laid out by the Soviets and allow Uzbeks to thrive. The objective of national independence (*milliy istiqlol g'oyasi*), becomes a consistent theme in the governance and education of this new national population. In the educational laws of Uzbekistan and the textbooks published after independence, there is an intense focus on the legitimization of Uzbek-held territory, the national history, and the historical figures that constitute the national collective memory.

Karimov ensured that the development of a collective Uzbek national memory was enshrined in the laws of the country, specifically through the inculcation of cultural values and specific historical details in children's education. In his 1998 article, “There is No Future without Historical Memory” (“*Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo'q*”), discussed in detail below, Karimov

deliberately dwells on the issue of a national consciousness and spirituality, or *ma'naviyat*.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the 1990s, *ma'naviyat* became part of the core expression of Uzbek nationhood, as it encompassed all of the proper aspects and facts an Uzbek citizen should know about their country. As a concept, *ma'naviyat* became “a core element in Uzbek educational parlance and pedagogical materials related to preparing worthy citizens of the state with desired qualities and virtues [...] This emphasis on the inner potential of a person is the most important feature of the Uzbek educational system’s efforts to bring up a younger generation with an ideological immune system.”<sup>2</sup> The necessary imperviousness of post-Soviet Uzbek nationalism is directly targeting the “false” narratives that were constructed in the Soviet era.

The (re)education of Uzbeks to constitute a national, independent state occurs through the educational system. Uzbekistan’s educational standards were set in two laws passed in 1992 and 1997, which fixed the government’s standards for primary (kindergarten to 4<sup>th</sup> grade) and secondary (to 11<sup>th</sup> grade) education, as well as the texts necessary for each subject taught.<sup>3</sup> Additional Ministry of Education laws set the weekly standard per subject per grade.<sup>4</sup> Starting in

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<sup>1</sup> Islam Karimov, “Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo’q,” (Tashkent: O’zbekiston Fanlar Akademiyasi, 1998). “Ma’naviyat.” *O’zbekiston Milliy Ensiklopediyasi* v.5 (Tashkent: O’zbekiston Milliy Ensiklopediyasi Nashriyoti, 2003): 334; Donohon Abdugafurova. “Islam, Morality and Public Education: Religious Elements of Ethics and Etiquette in the Uzbek School Curriculum.” *Central Asian Affairs* 5 (2018): 213-232; Seraphine F. Maerz. “Ma’naviyat in Uzbekistan: an ideological extrication from its Soviet past?” *Journal of Political Ideologies*, (2018) 23:2: 205–222

<sup>2</sup> Donohon Abdugafurova. “Islam, Morality and Public Education: Religious Elements of Ethics and Etiquette in the Uzbek School Curriculum.” *Central Asian Affairs* 5 (2018): 216.

<sup>3</sup> “Ta’lim To’g’risida Qonuni” (Presidential Decree 636-XII-son, July 2, 1992 and 464-I-son, August 29, 1997): <https://lex.uz/docs/-56418> and <https://lex.uz/docs/-16188?ONDATE=08.10.2013>

<sup>4</sup> *Uzviylashtirilgan Davlat Ta’lim Standarti va O’quv Dasturi*. (Toshkent: O’zbekiston Respublikasi Xalq Ta’limi Vazirligi Respublika Ta’lim Markazi, 2010) based on a law by the same name, Education Ministers’ Decree, July 1, 2010.

1<sup>st</sup> grade, students learn acculturation and nationalism for one hour a week, which is meant to tie the student to national pride and their immersion in learning to be a good citizen. Beginning in 5<sup>th</sup> grade, students are given at least two hours a week of history, starting with world history and transitioning to national history in 7<sup>th</sup> grade [see figure 1]. The coupling of these two subjects is intended to formalize a consistent national narrative and historical memory, which is overtly stated in the country's laws.

The laws setting education standards are but one of the methods used to inculcate the population to the proper vision of a complete Uzbek citizen, often described in literature and in laws as “a complete, perfect person” (*komil inson*). A propaganda center was reaffirmed with a 2006 presidential decree founding the Republican Center for Spirituality and Enlightenment (*Respublika Ma'naviyat va Ma'rifat Kengashi*), which Karimov alluded to in his writings during the first decade of his presidency.<sup>5</sup> Part of the law enshrines the need for the government to promote specific traits in the younger generation, namely fidelity to one's family, a common historical memory, national pride, and the aspiration to become a *komil inson*. The law also further establishes Islam as the religion of the Uzbeks and provides the foundation for respect

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<sup>5</sup> The government passed a law on the Center's formation in 1999, and reupped the law in 2006. Karimov, in his “Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo'q,” makes reference to the center, writing, “We have formulated the Republican Center for Spirituality and Enlightenment.” He then goes on to say, “Why am I repeating the word ‘enlightenment’ (ma'rifat) and emphasizing it? After all, enlightenment is the basis of the development of society, and it is the only power that can save it from inevitable destruction. Remember the events that took place in Turkestan at the beginning of this century. Why was there more of an enlightenment movement in this country than ever before? After all, it was only through enlightenment that we could awaken a country that had fallen into the trap of Tsarist Russia and was completely ruined. The enlightenment movement has not lost its relevance today. Only by bringing up intelligent and high-minded people will we achieve our goals and have prosperity and progress in our country. If we do not solve this problem, all our prayers will be naught: no progress, no future, no prosperity!” See, Karimov, “Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo'q”: 3-4; and see, “Milliy G'oya Targ'iboti va Ma'naviy-Ma'rifiy Ishlar Samaradorligini Oshirish To'g'risida Qaror.” (Presidential Decree PQ-451-son, August 25, 2006): <https://www.lex.uz/docs/-1354503>

toward peoples of other faiths.<sup>6</sup> Karimov's attempt at ridding the nation of its Soviet legacy, however, is not as easy as one might assume. As this chapter will show, Karimov uses the same ideological methods employed by Soviet scholars such as Yakubovskii. Karimov's attempts at shaping Uzbek minds has less to do with reaching an objective, factual history of the nation and the people and more to do with the reframing of a national narrative to legitimize Uzbekistan's insecure national collective memory and existence.

As a genre, textbooks are a unique tool that are used by states in their creation of national myths and the reinforcement of national ideologies.<sup>7</sup> Because the state has access to children through textbooks and education, this medium occupies a crucial position in the state's efforts to consolidate a common historical memory for its population, and it functions as a mechanism to tie people to each other and to the state. As Karimov so aptly stated, "It is impossible to understand identity without knowing history,"<sup>8</sup> and to this end, textbooks serve to imbue the youth of Uzbekistan with the appropriate historical nuggets that create a sense of identification with and pride in the nation. Karimov's stated objective is to create an "objective historical truth" for the newly independent nation, but through a reading and analysis of post-Soviet textbooks, it is apparent that there are underlying insecurities about the state's existential standing. Described

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<sup>6</sup> Irene Hilgers. *Why Do Uzbeks have to be Muslims? Exploring religiosity in the Ferghana Valley*. (LIT Verlag, 2009).

<sup>7</sup> Williams cites seven civic tasks that schools undertake in support of the nation. These seven elements can be stretched to include the role of textbooks: (1) to transmit knowledge to students about what they should know; (2) to promote social cohesion; (3) to teach attitudes, values, and norms; (4) to teach students to think critically/correctly (this concept is well-articulated by Karimov); (5) to legitimize to social and political order; (6) to explain the dichotomy of "us and them"; and (7) to explain how we have arrived at where we are and where we are going. See, James Williams, "Nation, State, School, Textbook." *(Re)Constructing Memory: School Textbooks and the Imagination of the Nation*. James Williams, ed. (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2014): 4.

<sup>8</sup> Karimov, "Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo'q": 24.

in the previous chapter of this dissertation, there are perceived challenges by Tajiks on Uzbekistan's territorial and cultural heritage sites, and textbooks serve a dual purpose in challenging Soviet historiography and reinforcing the territorialized conception of nationalism pushed by Karimov. James Williams, writing on the intimacies between nation and textbook explains,

It seems obvious, for example, that a new nation would, on gaining independence, revise its textbooks to reflect its own understanding of history rather than that of the colonizers. Even if the new textbooks agreed with those of the former colonizer on all facts, the selection and presentation of such facts and their meaning to textbook authors, teachers, students, parents and government officials would surely differ.<sup>9</sup>

Much of this new construction of historical narratives and national myth is intended to shore up any insecurity in the state's conception of self, and to prevent any challenge to the state's authority.

This chapter focuses on educational textbooks to showcase how education is used by states to construct a suitable historical narrative for their population. Section I, "Scholarship and Approach," lays out the foundation of textbook usage as a tool of nationalism. Section II, "A new framework for understanding Uzbek history?," analyzes Karimov's 1998 essay as the basis for understanding how post-Soviet Uzbekistan's history is written in textbooks for school aged children. Section III, "The 'Historical' Narrative in Action: School Textbooks," presents that narrative from two history textbooks – one published immediately after independence in 1993 and a second twenty years later in 2014. The last section, "Conclusions," ties together both these narratives and definitively situates the Shibanids in the history of modern Uzbekistan.

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<sup>9</sup> James Williams, "Nation, State, School, Textbook." *(Re)Constructing Memory: School Textbooks and the Imagination of the Nation*. James Williams, ed. (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2014): 1.

## ***(I) – Scholarship and Approach***

The study of textbooks as a genre and tool of nationalism is well established. Though textbooks may seem to present whitewashed accounts of “true history,” they do offer overwhelming insights to statist visions of shaping national consciousness and historical memory. In a state like Uzbekistan where school materials are directly approved by government ministers, these works can be read to understand how the state wishes its public to understand an official and state-sanctioned version of historical events. Furthermore, these state-sanctioned textbooks provide the public a shared culture, which, when introduced in the schools, enables the state to inculcate in all of its citizens a common historical memory before they reach an age to question the validity or accuracy of the “official” history.<sup>10</sup>

A number of scholars have contributed to my conceptions and framework for analyzing Uzbek textbooks and their interpretation of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined communities, Mario Carretero’s notion of constructing patriotism, and Shoshana Keller’s work on time constructs in Uzbekistan’s history curriculum serve as the basis for this chapter’s methodology.<sup>11</sup> Of these scholars’ works, Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* is perhaps the most transformative work for nationalism studies as it relates to socio-cultural and ethnic identity structures.<sup>12</sup> While his work is undoubtedly influential in my own understanding

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<sup>10</sup> Michael Apple and Linda Christian-Smith. *The Politics of the Textbook*. (London, UK: Routledge, 2017), and Michael Apple, “The Text and Cultural Politics.” *Educational Researcher* 21(7): 4–11.

<sup>11</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 2006); Mario Carretero, *Constructing Patriotism: Teaching History and Memories in Global Worlds*. Nicolas Bermudez, ed. (Charlotte: IAPublishing, 2011); Shoshana Keller, “Story, Time, and Dependent Nationhood in the Uzbek History Curriculum,” *Slavic Review* 66: 2 (Summer 2007): 257-277.

<sup>12</sup> Sobe points out that most studies of nationalisms have now been influenced by Anderson, but Anderson himself did not make much use of textbook analyses to exemplify the creation of an imagined community. See, Noah Sobe, “Textbooks, Schools, Memory, and the

of the nation and the constructed Uzbek consciousness, Anderson did not make use of textbooks as illustrative examples of creating imagined communities, but does refer to education and textbooks in passing. For example, he appropriately points to the geographical and territorial nature of reproducing maps:

The map entered an infinitely reproducible series, available for transfer to posters, official seals, letterheads, magazine and textbook covers, tablecloths, and hotel walls. Instantly recognizable, everywhere visible, the logo-map penetrated deep into the popular imagination, forming a powerful emblem.<sup>13</sup>

As discussed in the previous chapter of this dissertation, the map and its incessant reproduction in banal forms is one tool for the rationalization of the Uzbek claims over territory, and these claims are further established through their reproduction and discussion of the historical developments of Uzbekistan's territory. Anderson also briefly deals with history and memory in education, since education serves as a way to conveniently gloss over gritty details that do not fit well in the national narrative. He writes,

A vast pedagogical industry works ceaselessly to oblige young Americans to remember/forget the hostilities of 1861-65 as a great 'civil' war between 'brothers' rather than between — as they briefly were — two sovereign nation-states. (We can be sure, however, that if the Confederacy had succeeded in maintaining its independence, this 'civil war' would have been replaced in memory by something quite unbrotherly.) English history textbooks offer the diverting spectacle of a great Founding Father whom every schoolchild is taught to call William the Conqueror. The same child is not informed that William spoke no English, indeed could not have done so, since the English language did not exist in his epoch.<sup>14</sup>

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Technologies of National Imaginaries.” *(Re)Constructing Memory: School Textbooks and the Imagination of the Nation*. James Williams, ed. (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2014): 313-317

<sup>13</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities*: 175

<sup>14</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities*: 201

This same example of a pedagogical industry exists in Uzbekistan, creating and reformulating the very history that students are meant to know about who they are as a people and where they come from.

Carretero's trifold conceptualization of "history" and its uses for the creation of imagined communities serves as a concrete method of furthering the study of school textbooks. He theorizes three distinct yet intertwined conceptions of history: academic history, school history, and everyday history. Carretero writes,

The three types of histories correspond to three records of the past's social and significant construction, which incorporate collective identity into each individual's vital plot. In the first place, history taught at school offers contents that are structured as an official narrative of an experienced common past, besides an important emotional charge which is destined to create identification (with the motherland's national heroes and forefathers) and a feeling of loyalty and belonging, strengthened by the use of patriotic symbols, icons, and anthems in daily school routine. Second, academic history offers an institutionalized knowledge within social science, which is born and constituted in function of national states, to which it ensures a common and legitimate past that makes place for the development of identity. Finally, everyday history informally re-signifies part of the 'taught knowledge' and part of the 'academic knowledge,' which are used to interpret the present in key with current times.<sup>15</sup>

Because of the intimate ties between these three categories, we will see how Uzbek school textbooks come to explain the official history of the territory while also reifying the historical memory necessary to hold the nation-state together. Coupled with Anderson's ideas of "imagined communities," Carretero's framework shows that a state or government can indoctrinate the youth of a society with vital "truths" – usually in the form of heroes and historical characters – in order to bind the population together and have those "truths" propagated as part of a national historical memory.

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<sup>15</sup> Carretero, *Constructing Patriotism*: 6



The place of a school and curriculum in a nation-state's development is important in suffusing the public with rational and "enlightened" thought, or as it stands in Uzbekistan, *ma'naviyat*. This process in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries stems from the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>16</sup> During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Russian Empire, along with Europe and the Ottoman Empire, underwent numerous reforms targeted at introducing imperial subjects to the Enlightenment Era through comparable techniques. Russian Muslim intellectuals, *Jadids*, who had been educated in Russian-style schools advocated for the "new method" of education as a means of reforming Muslim thought and society.<sup>17</sup> This was essentially a way to bridge the differences between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of Russia. Predominantly comprised of the clergy and merchant classes, *Jadids* engaged in discourses of modernizing and protecting Turco-Persian speakers in the Russian Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union against a self-perceived decline. A number of prominent *Jadids*, such as Mahmudkhodja Behbudiy (d. 1919), Munavvar

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<sup>16</sup> Francisco Ramirez, Patricia Bromley, and Susan Garnett Russell, "The Valorization of Humanity and Diversity." *Multicultural Education Review*, 1:1 (2009): 29-54; William Cummings and Noel McGinn, *International Handbook of Education and Development: Preparing schools, Students, and Nations for the Twenty-first Century*. (New York: Elsevier, 1997).

<sup>17</sup> The Ottoman Empire also introduced a number of educational reforms. Reforms grew out of an awareness of a rising Western hegemony, and for the Ottomans, their relative weakness in centralized government posed a challenge. This period saw Russia's growing military power in the Balkans and Caucasus, separatist movements like the Greek Revolution, and the growing power of Muḥammad Ali in Egypt. For the intellectuals of this time, the institutions of late that gave rise to the Empire's strength were no longer suited for a quickly changing world. Some Ottoman intellectuals wanted to modernize and protect the Empire (much the same way as Russian Muslims). Literacy and education were central to these ideas. In 1845, there was a push by Ottoman administrators to simplify Ottoman Turkish through adding more Turkic words to the language, attempting to purge Farsi and Arabic, and reforming the complex script. All of these ideas, supplemented by the use of the printing press and periodicals, spread the intense debates among intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire; borders, however, did not stop these periodicals from reach Russia, meaning these discussions were of immense value to Russian Muslims. See, Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*. (Berkeley: UC Berkeley Press, 1998): 134-36; Adeeb Khalid, "Printing, Publishing, and Reform in Tsarist Central Asia." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26:2 (1994): 186-200.

Qori (d. 1931), and Abdurrauf Fitrat (d. 1938), traveled across the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, and parts of the Near East, only to come to the conclusion that Central Asian society had lagged behind the rest of the world.<sup>18</sup> Central Asian culture, in their opinion, was backward, and it was only through cultural modes of transmission, like education, religion, literature, and art, that their culture would advance. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the *Jadidist* discourse was subsumed under discourses of a national project.<sup>19</sup> *Jadids* wanted to reform education, simplify language, emancipate women, and develop the civic society of Muslims within the Russian Empire. Russian Muslims responded to colonialism through the appropriation of cultural models of education to begin construction of a communal identity. At its core, *Jadids* wanted to reform Muslim thinking through education to allow for a peaceful existence in the Russian Empire.

Many *Jadidist* ideas in Bukhara and Central Asia stem from Ismail Bey Gaspirali or Gasprinskii (d.1914) who published his paper in Tatar as *Tercuman* and as *Perevodchik* in Russian.<sup>20</sup> In this publication, we see the arguments of both *Jadids* and Ottoman intellectuals finding a voice. These ideas were mixed with pan-Turkism, calling for Turkic and Muslim groups of the Russian Empire to unite. To use Anderson's framing, he was essentially calling for

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<sup>18</sup> Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and DeWeese, Devin. "It Was a Dark and Stagnant Night ('til the Jadids Brought the Light): Clichés, Biases, and False Dichotomies in the Intellectual History of Central Asia." *Journal of the Economic & Social History of the Orient* 59: 1/2 (March 2016): 37–92;

<sup>19</sup> Adeeb Khalid makes an argument that this process should not be called "nationalism" but a "national project" because of its pejorative connotations: See *Making Uzbekistan*: 16.

<sup>20</sup> Adeeb Khalid notes that before 1905, Gaspirali's paper was the only non-official Turkic paper in print. See, Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan*: 35-36; Edward Lazzerini, *Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878–1914* (Seattle: University of Washington, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1973); Edward J. Lazzerini "Jadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View from Within," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 16:2 (April-June 1975): 245–277; Mustafa Özgür Tuna. "Gaspirali v. Il'minskii: Two Identity Projects for the Muslims of the Russian Empire." *Nationalities Papers* 30:2 (2002): 265-289.

an imagined co-cultural community devoid of boundaries among the Muslims of Russia. His popular slogan, “unified in spirit, thought, and work” (*dilda, fikrda, ishda birlik*), was a means of uniting Turkic speaking peoples under a cultural umbrella that would, through education, modernize and reform their standing in the Empire. Starting in 1881, he began publishing articles that promoted his basic philosophy: Russian Muslims were united in faith, they spoke dialects of the same language, and had similar socio-cultural traditions. The lack of written vowels in Arabic script allowed Gaspirali to mask the differences between Tatar and southern Central Asian Turkish (Uzbek, Karakalpak). He would write in simplified Ottoman Turkish and utilize local Crimean or Caucasian phrases when addressing specific Turkic groups. Gaspirali, like many reformers, wanted Muslims to modernize without losing their identities, and he believed that education was the primary mode to achieve this goal.<sup>21</sup> The popular press influenced the production of textbooks, which in turn helped cultivate loyalty to the government, but more importantly, illustrated to governments the ability to use this method of education as a conditioning tool.

Shoshana Keller points out that in Soviet Uzbekistan, despite artistic productions in high culture – literature, opera, dance –, the only effective method of reaching beyond urban elites into the rest of the public was through schooling.<sup>22</sup> As the Soviet Union contended with the

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<sup>21</sup> Paolo Sartori, “Towards a History of the Muslims' Soviet Union: A View from Central Asia.” *Die Welt des Islams*, 50: 3/4 (2010): 315-334.

<sup>22</sup> Keller, “Story, Time, and Dependent Nationhood in the Uzbek History Curriculum”: 257. Shoshana Keller’s work is but one of a number of works dealing with education and textbooks. See, Baktygul Ismailova, “Curriculum Reform in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: Indigenization of the History Curriculum.” *Curriculum Journal*, 15:3 (2004): 247–264; Magdalena Gross, “Rewriting the nation: World War II Narratives in Polish History Textbooks.” In *Post-socialism is not dead: (Re)reading the global in comparative education*. Iveta Silova, ed. (Bingley: Emerald Group, 2010): 213–246; James Williams, ed. *(Re)Constructing Memory: School Textbooks and the Imagination of the Nation*. (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2014); Jan Germen Janmaat, “Ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation in Ukraine’s history textbooks.”

collapsing Ottoman Empire and their newfound control over multitudes of Muslims in Eurasia, the Soviet regime opted to transform the region's school system not just for the purposes of (re)educating their public but also to remove the Muslims of the Soviet Union directly out of their tied and shared history with the rest of the Islamic world. While the efforts of intellectuals like Gaspirali nudged imperial Russia's Muslims into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Soviet intellectuals put that history aside by creating an alternate periodization and historical timeline for Soviet Muslims. Rather than allow Muslims to conceptualize their collective history through "sacred" Islamic timelines that bound them to the greater Islamic world, they had a Marxist, dialectical materialist history thrust upon them with Russian history as the "enlightened" framework within which Uzbeks – among the other newly created titular ethnic groups – were to formulate their history.<sup>23</sup> Keller focuses on the post-WWII era curriculum in which intellectuals and educators were instructed to create and foster a "long-term Uzbek continuity and cultural autonomy,"<sup>24</sup>

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*European Education* 37:3 (2005): 20–37; Jan Germen Janmaat, "The ethnic 'other' in Ukrainian history textbooks: The case of Russia and the Russians." *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education* 37 (2007): 307–324; Nancy Popson, "The Ukrainian history textbook: Introducing children to the 'Ukrainian nation'" *Nationalities Papers* 29 (2001): 325–350; Deborah Michaels and Doyle Stevick, "Europeanization in the 'other' Europe: Writing the nation into 'Europe' education in Slovakia and Estonia." *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 41 (2009): 225–245; Taras Kuzio, "History, Memory and Nation Building in the post-Soviet Colonial Space." *Nationalities Papers* 30 (2002): 241–264; Joseph Zajda, "The new history textbooks in the Russian Federation: 1992–2004." *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education* 37:3 (2007): 291–306; Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, and Edward Allworth, *Nation-building in the post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.); Hanna Schissler and Yasemin Soysal, *The Nation, Europe, and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition*. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005); Miha Kovač and Mojca Šebart. "Where East meets West: Controversies in textbook publishing in small former communist countries." *Publishing Research Quarterly*, 20:3 (2004): 40–52.

<sup>23</sup> Keller, "Story, Time, and Dependent Nationhood in the Uzbek History Curriculum": 261

<sup>24</sup> Keller, "Story, Time, and Dependent Nationhood in the Uzbek History Curriculum": 263

whereby inconvenient aspects of Eurasian history could be glossed over in favor of hero-martyrs that fit within the newly established linear, European, and “enlightened” version of history. Soviet intellectuals, like Yakubovskii, who edited the authoritative volumes of Soviet Uzbek history in the 1940s and 1950s, greatly influenced the position of the Shibanids in the titular history presented to Uzbeks in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries.

Where the Shibanids ultimately fell in the Soviet conception of history lies with the manner in which history was ultimately constructed. Keller writes,

The textbooks were mapping ‘Uzbek’ history onto Russian history, which they could do only by disregarding, in the manner of sacred histories, strict chronological correspondence. The themes of unity, love for the people, and willing sacrifice for the ruler were long-standing in Russian historiography. What the textbooks could not explain was that in Central Asia ‘the people’ were mostly the descendants of previous generations of invaders.<sup>25</sup>

Because of the need to situate the Uzbek peoples in a long-term narrative over their territorial occupation, the 16<sup>th</sup> century Shibanids were sidelined for a much older chronology that began with the Turks of the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> centuries. This conception was not just solidified by Soviet scholars, but it was reinforced through educational journals and textbooks. By removing Uzbek origins from the post-Mongol period, Soviet scholars were able — through their Marxist frameworks — to deny that the Soviet Uzbek population were descendants of “invaders”; rather, they were a product of a time not sullied by feudal lords, like Chinggis Khan or his descendants, thereby relegating the Shibanids to only being a footnote in the construction of Uzbek history.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Keller, “Story, Time, and Dependent Nationhood in the Uzbek History Curriculum”: 272

<sup>26</sup> Keller, “Story, Time, and Dependent Nationhood in the Uzbek History Curriculum”: 272-273

## ***(II) – A new framework for understanding Uzbek history?***

The framework for positioning the Shibanids in Uzbekistan's history was produced in the 1940s and 1950s. This section will first showcase how Yakubovskii solidifies Shībānī Khān's fate in the framing of Uzbek history in 1941. I then analyze the impact of Yakubovskii's ideas and their impact on education in a 1956 article, "Central Asian Culture in the Middle Periods," from the academic journal *Teaching History in School*. I then delve into Karimov's post-Soviet formulation of how history ought to be taught in schools.<sup>27</sup>

History, knowledge, power, and nation-building are intertwined, and their connections have been made abundantly clear through the works of figures like Hobsbawm. Ilkhamov writes, "The Soviet and post-Soviet experiences probably represent the most evident case of this link because, under the Soviet regime, historical knowledge was itself, at least in some instances, a form of power."<sup>28</sup> Following the collapse of Tsarist Russia, the Soviets began an impressive project in which titular national histories were forged for purposes of instituting the needs of Marxist governance structures. By coopting the fields of social sciences – namely history, anthropology, and archaeology –, and by focusing on Russia's Orient,<sup>29</sup> Soviet scholars aided in the establishment of pseudo nation-states that would realize titular national self-determination and contribute to the Soviet vision of a federalist union.

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<sup>27</sup> O.G. Bolshakov, "Kul'tura Sredney Azii v Srednie Veka (VI-XVI vv.)," *Prepodavanie Istorii v Shkole* 1 (Jan-Feb 1956): 29-39. Karimov, "Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo'q."

<sup>28</sup> Ilkhamov, "Yakubovskii and Others": 237

<sup>29</sup> Vera Tolz's *Russia's Own Orient* serves the purpose of framing the school of thought from which late Imperial and early Soviet scholars stemmed. She discusses the formation of the new school of "Orientology" that was spearheaded by Victor Rozen. She argues that the Rozen school of thought informed his disciples, leading to new and innovative ideas about Central Eurasia, which through an academic genealogy influenced Bartold and his student, Yakubovskii. See, Vera Tolz, *Russia's Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

The most overt reason for post-Soviet Uzbekistan's historical treatment of Shībānī Khān and the 16<sup>th</sup> century lies in Aleksandr Yuryevich Yakubovskii's conceptual project of nation-building and construction of national legacies for newly created Soviet Union republics in the 1940s and 1950s. During the post-WWII era, Soviet intellectuals took up the call to formulate the "nationalist in form, socialist in content" histories of Eurasian republics. For Yakubovskii, this project took the social sciences out of solely an academic pursuit and effectively melded it with the realm of politics. In order to fully transform Eurasian life, scholars like Yakubovskii undertook the necessary steps to formulate and disseminate a history that the Uzbek people could rally around and utilize as a legitimizing factor for their existence.

Post-Soviet Uzbekistan has continued the three-pronged approach Yakubovskii laid out in his work. As Ilkhamov so appropriately illustrates, Yakubovskii's project included: first, the ethnonym of a state is not tied to the ethnogenesis and national ethnic formation of that state's people; second, ethnonyms should be deemphasized while similarities in people's *modus vivendi* and language ought to be emphasized; and third, any group that lived on the territory of the state should be available to the current state as ancestors and should be referred to with the current ethnonym of a state.<sup>30</sup> While this dissertation focuses on the ethnonymic namesake of the Uzbeks, Yakubovskii deliberately subdued Shībānī Khān's impacts on Uzbek history and promoted the notion that Uzbek ethnogenetic origins formed under the Qarakhanids of the 11<sup>th</sup> century.

For scholars like Yakubovskii, Central Asian peoples lacked the necessary historical preconditions that would situate them within the linear Marxist progression of history. To remedy this conundrum, Soviets chose to frame Central Asian history as one that existed in

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<sup>30</sup> Ilkhamov, "Yakubovskii and Others": 247

feudalism and would, in the present and future, operate through a socialist lens. Ilkhamov points to two tasks that were essential for creating direct control from Moscow with the aid of local (read: indigenous) populations and their intellectual elites: first, Soviets began defining through statistical and ethnographic bases the borders and national delimitation of titular ethnic nation-states. These ethnocentric republics redefined the Marxist view of nations existing as a product of capitalism; the new republics would be steered by a centralized communist party and with the aid of the Russian proletariat. Second, national languages were earmarked as *the* indispensable trait of the new titular nationalities. Debates raged over which branch of Turkic would serve as the basis of Uzbek. Proponents of Kipchak and Karluk dialects made their cases, but ultimately, the Karlukites won out. Karluk was the predecessor to Chagatai, which served the Soviets the purpose of showcasing a long, settled, and rich history for the Uzbeks. Kipchak dialects were deemed too nomadic, thus making it difficult to situate in the Soviet framework.<sup>31</sup>

Yakubovskii's model for constructing Uzbekistan's history in his 1941 publication of *The Question of the Ethnogenesis of the Uzbek People* (*K voprosu ob etnogeneze uzbekskogo naroda*) was based on his own work, the 1937 publication *The Golden Horde and its Fall* (*Zolotayaorda i ee padenie*). In his work on the Golden Horde, Yakubovskii went out of his way to incorporate Marxist methodology to showcase Chinggis Khan as a member of the aristocracy who took advantage of commoners – not just Russians but Mongols as well. Yakubovskii ultimately diminished the intricacies of Russian-Mongol relations and history to one of foreign invaders, Chinggis Khan and his descendants, occupying the sovereign territory of the Russian people resulting in the latter's inability to consolidate and grow at an earlier period.<sup>32</sup> The model of

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<sup>31</sup> Ilkhamov, "Yakubovskii and Others": 238-239

<sup>32</sup> Ilkhamov, "Yakubovskii and Others": 242-244



Chinggis Khan as the nomadic yet aristocratic usurper of power was enticing and useful when Yakubovskii turned his attention to Shībānī Khān. Shībānī Khān would suffer the same fate as his ancestor.

To get the titular populations of Eurasia to associate patriotically with the Soviet Union, scholars like Yakubovskii were tasked with forming the great pasts of these populations. Only through the nationalism of individual peoples could union republics contribute and integrate to the federated-nature of the Soviet Union. Ilkhamov writes,

In regard to Uzbekistan, scholars had to address the Mongol-Turkic associations of the ethnonym ‘Uzbek’ and specifically its connections to the confederation of Dasht-i Kipchak tribes whose leaders, Abulkhair Khan and Sheibani Khan, claimed to be descendant from Genghis Khan. Associations with the Dasht-i Kipchak tribes were inconsistent with the task of deposing the Mongolian Empire from the pedestal of historical glory and would imply that modern Uzbeks were of relatively recent and less prestigious historical origin, as they would be seen as the offspring of the ‘uncivilized’ nomadic invaders of the Maverannahr.<sup>33</sup>

Shībānī Khān and the 16<sup>th</sup> century nomads who termed themselves “Uzbek” would completely undermine modern Uzbeks’ autochthonous claims to the territory of Uzbekistan. Were Uzbeks to claim Shībānī Khān as a true member of their national history, the premise that Uzbekness derived from the Qarakhanids would be an overt falsity. Furthermore, for the Soviets, casting Shībānī Khān as a conqueror allowed for a common bond between the Russians who were conquered by the Mongols and the Uzbeks who were conquered by the Shibanids (read: Mongols). In his 1941 work, Yakubovskii writes the following:

For a long time, the dominant view which still prevails to this day was that the Uzbek people descended from nomadic Uzbeks who began to arrive in Central Asia in the 15<sup>th</sup> century and conquered it all in the 16<sup>th</sup> century under Shībānī Khān’s leadership. Unfortunately, this view has also been reflected in recent textbooks on the history of the USSR. Such a point of view would be correct only in two cases: 1) if the nomadic Uzbeks did not find any population in Central Asia and 2) if they exterminated the entire population that they found there. Neither one nor the other, as is known, took place. On

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<sup>33</sup> Ilkhamov, “Yakubovskii and Others”: 246

the contrary, the nomadic Uzbeks found, if not throughout the territory of modern Uzbekistan, then at least on its vast part, a dense Turkic-speaking (i.e. Turkic and Turkized) who had lived there for a long time with a cultural life and formed in the process of merging with other, more ancient peoples who had lived there since ancient times. Uzbek nomads entered this Turkic-speaking population only as an end piece, passing their name to it.<sup>34</sup>

And so it was, with a flick of a pen, the history of Uzbekistan was altered to fit the Marxist view. One could imagine that this alteration of history would self-correct or be corrected over time, but as this dissertation shows, Shībānī Khān has perpetually been sidelined or completely left for the dustbins of history.

To rectify the disparity between the association of “Uzbek” with the Shibanids, Yakubovskii concludes his argument with the introduction of a new term: Old Uzbek (*starouzbek*). He writes, “Does the abovementioned give us the right to overcome purely formalistic considerations regarding the origin of the term ‘Uzbek’ and to replace it with the term ‘old Uzbek,’ referring to all of the Turkic past on the territory of Uzbekistan before the sixteenth century? It seems to us that it does.”<sup>35</sup> Yakubovskii’s contribution to the formation of Uzbek national identity was twofold: (1) it solved the problem of the Shibanids as the originators of the term Uzbek and (2) he indicated that any history prior to the arrival of the Shibanids could use the appellation of “Uzbek” or “Old Uzbek.” At its core, this meant any production of historical writing could claim, say the Timurids or the Qarakhanids, as the progenitors of modern Uzbeks simply by virtue of having existed on the territory in which the contemporary state of Uzbekistan stands.

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<sup>34</sup> Aleksandr Yuryevich Yakubovskii. *The Question of the Ethnogenesis of the Uzbek People (K voprosu ob etnogeneze uzbekskogo naroda)*. (Tashkent: UzFan, 1941): 3

<sup>35</sup> Aleksandr Yuryevich Yakubovskii. *The Question of the Ethnogenesis of the Uzbek People (K voprosu ob etnogeneze uzbekskogo naroda)*. (Tashkent: UzFan, 1941): 19

In a very short manual on the culture of Central Asia from the 11<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> centuries, Bolshakov reiterates much of the same historical frameworks set out by Yakubovskii, specifically for the purposes of educators and their classroom techniques. In a section entitled “The Culture of Central Asia during the Height of Feudalism (13<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries),”<sup>36</sup> Bolshakov characterizes the Mongol invasions as a betrayal of the working masses at the hands of feudal lords and local merchants. In this historical narration, the Mongols gave Transoxiana to Maḥmūd Yalavāch, one of the richest merchants of the region. Not only were heavy taxes levied on the masses, but they were required to provide room, board, and horses to anyone who had an official pass (*paiza*). These “abuses” were on such a grand scale that Mongke Khan (r. 1251-1259) had to issue a special decree banning messengers and other officials from taking the horses of locals or taking provisions in excess, but as was Mongol custom, “This decree was hardly ever enforced.”<sup>37</sup> Artisans and craftsmen were another class subjugated under the Mongols. Such was their humiliation and hardship that a master sieve-maker, Maḥmūd Ṭārābī,<sup>38</sup> started an uprising in 1238 in Bukhara against the Mongols and the feudal lords. At the beginning of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, another rebellious movement began in Khorasan, leading to the formation of the Sarbadarid state which existed from 1337-1381, later succumbing to Timur’s conquests.<sup>39</sup> Such portrayals of these types of rebellious movements against the feudalistic and nomadic Mongols

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<sup>36</sup> Bolshakov, “Kul’tura Sredney Azii”: 36-38

<sup>37</sup> Bolshakov, “Kul’tura Sredney Azii”: 36

<sup>38</sup> Mansura Haidar, “The Revolt of Mahmud Tarabi and the Sarbadar Movement,” *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Vol. 52 (1991): 939-949

<sup>39</sup> Bolshakov writes in a footnote that they were termed “sarbadar,” or gallows-bird, because they believed that in the event of their failed struggles, it would be better to go to the gallows than to continue enduring such oppression under the Mongols. “Kul’tura Sredney Azii”: 36. Also see, Jean Aubin, “Aux origines d’un mouvement populaire medieval le cheykhisme du Bayhaq et du Nichapour,” *Studica Iranica* v.5 (1972): 213-224; and Jean Aubin, “La fin de l’état sarbadar du khorassan,” *Journal asiatique* v.262 (1974): 95-118.

served Bolshakov well; direct parallels could be drawn to the Bolshevik Revolution and the rising of the masses from under the hand of Imperial Russian oppression.

While the Mongols are represented as barbaric nomadic invaders, Bolshakov's work turns to the "previously unknown Mongol amir, Timur," as the leader who unifies the region with Samarkand as his base.<sup>40</sup> The article, however, does not have kinder words for Timur. Despite Timur turning Samarkand into the cultural capital of Central Asia, the city was built upon the backs of "captive craftsmen taken from neighboring regions," and the buildings of the city were constructed using materials stolen from those regions.<sup>41</sup> Of these grand buildings, Bibi Khanim Mosque diminished the surrounding landscape with a 40 meter high dome. Bolshakov states that Timur's court historians compared the dome with the entrance to Heaven and the front portal of the building with the Milky Way. He then goes on to say, "The dimensions of the mosque clearly exceeded the building capabilities of the time, and it soon began to collapse."<sup>42</sup> Other buildings near the mosque, however, were smaller and better preserved – including the Gur-i Amir mausoleum. Bolshakov does say something positive: the tilework of the buildings was inimitable and the craftsmanship unmatched. The labor, though, was carried out by prisoners of war, who unlike the craftsmen and designers, were subject to unbearable conditions and often suffered death in the construction of such monumental structures. Since such a huge burden was placed on the local population, "the masses looked upon the Bibi Khanim Mosque with hatred. Historians, coming from groups who despised Timur, compared the mass of the mosque's dome to that of Timur's sins."<sup>43</sup> Once Timur died, his empire broke up into smaller states; his son,

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<sup>40</sup> Bolshakov, "Kul'tura Sredney Azii": 36

<sup>41</sup> Bolshakov, "Kul'tura Sredney Azii": 36

<sup>42</sup> Bolshakov, "Kul'tura Sredney Azii": 36-37

<sup>43</sup> Bolshakov, "Kul'tura Sredney Azii": 37

Shahrukh, ruled over Khurasan, Afghanistan, Persian ‘Iraq, and Fars, and his grandson, Ulugh Beg, ruled over Samarkand. During Ulugh Beg’s reign, massive constructions were not undertaken, so one might assume prisoners of war were not used for labor. One building was constructed, though: the Ulugh Beg Madrasa, which is located now at Registan Square next to the Shir-dor Mosque and the Tilleh-Kari Mosque (the latter two were built by the Shibanids).

Consistent with the Soviet era necessity for national-hero martyrs, Bolshakov works in a number of positive points about individuals of the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, reinforcing the idea that the local masses – despite the disruption of the invading and disrupting Mongols – continued their successful, linear social progress. He touches on Herat as a flourishing center for book making, where leather binding and embossed ornamentation were key in developing the art of book design. Individuals like Kamāl al-Dīn Bihzād (1450-1535) are key figures in the development of miniature painting and book illumination. Alongside art, there was a flourishing of “Tajik” literature, in which poets like ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (1414-1492) grew the foundations of Samarkand and Herat’s literary scene. “Tajik” was not the only language that was developed: old Uzbek was solidified in this period. Bolshakov writes, “The base formation of the Uzbek nationality was the 11-12<sup>th</sup> centuries, and in the 14-15<sup>th</sup> centuries, this nationality formation was finally completed and even created its own literature. The Uzbeks under Shībānī Khān were only the last element in the formation of Uzbek nationality, and their contribution was in name only.” Bolshakov clarifies this statement in a footnote, writing, “In the 8<sup>th</sup> grade history textbooks of the USSR, it is incorrect to assert that the Uzbek nationality first appeared in Central Asia with Shībānī Khān.”<sup>44</sup> The Uzbek language was formed and substantiated as a

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<sup>44</sup> Bolshakov, “Kul’tura Sredney Azii”: 37

literary language by Navā'ī, who wrote a philological treatise, “A Comparison of Two Languages,” and a number of poems, like “Farhad and Shirin,” which discuss fidelity and friendship. To reinforce the point that the Shibanids were nothing but the etymological source of the ethnonym “Uzbek,” Bolshakov dedicates a short section at the end of the article to the region under the Uzbeks in the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

In the section entitled “Culture of Central Asia at the Start of the Decline of Feudalism (16<sup>th</sup> century),” Bolshakov downplays the impact of the Shibanids on Uzbekistan’s history by explaining that at the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Transoxiana and Herat were conquered by Uzbek nomads who called themselves Shibanids, after their leader, Shībānī Khān. With the arrival of these nomads, the old practice of distributing land grants to feudal lords and levying taxes upon the masses continued. Shībānī Khān allowed for these nomads to seize the best lands from peasants, which forced huge numbers of people to move to the mountainous terrain of the neighboring regions. This period was also the same one in which spiritual leaders gained huge influence and became some of the largest landowners in the region. Their influence increased due to the “accession of scholastics and obscurantism in Central Asia” (*skholastika, mrakobesie*)<sup>45</sup>

Bolshakov contends that culture did not decline under the Shibanids but remained consistent. There were some new constructions in Bukhara as the later capital of the Shibanids, including bridges and caravansarays. Book-making and miniature painting was kept on par with that of the Timurid period. Despite these small achievements, though, “The 16<sup>th</sup> century brought nothing really new to Central Asia.”<sup>46</sup> Since Bolshakov’s article was intended for 7-8<sup>th</sup> grade

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<sup>45</sup> Bolshakov, “Kul’tura Sredney Azii”: 39

<sup>46</sup> Bolshakov, “Kul’tura Sredney Azii”: 39

teachers, the basic historical narrative comes to a swift end. Bolshakov ends the narrative by explaining that the culture of Central Asia stagnates and remains perpetually behind European progress. The largest cities were Bukhara and Samarkand, and those cities experienced no progress from the 16<sup>th</sup> century until the Russian conquests in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The establishment and development of new social constructs and relationships were thoroughly hindered in Central Asia by European colonial policies. The document ends, “A new, genuine flourishing of the culture of the Central Asian peoples came after the Great October Socialist Revolution, when the peoples of Central Asia began to build a socialist society.”<sup>47</sup>

Where Bolshakov and the Soviets end with the topic of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Karimov picks up in the post-Soviet period.<sup>48</sup> Karimov’s article serves two functions: first, it tries to legitimize the basis for Uzbekistan to reset its historical narrative as an independent, sovereign nation; and second, it functions as the “new framework” from which Uzbek scholars are to operate. This section of my dissertation will show that while Karimov tries to move the historical narrative of Uzbekistan out of the Soviet period, we are left with many of the same tropes that were developed by Yakubovskii and Bolshakov, so much so that one of the mottos of the country (*kuch adolatda*, or strength is in justice) is a Soviet misreading of the Persian *rāstī rastī*, or salvation lies in righteousness (discussed in detail below).

In order to legitimize Uzbekistan’s claim of a historical narrative, Karimov lingers on the fact that Uzbek history was written by “colonizers,” and that historical memory is imperative for a cohesive society and prosperity. He explains that during the Soviet era, “The pursuit of historical truth was discouraged, and sources that did not serve the interest of the ruling ideology

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<sup>47</sup> Bolshakov, “Kul’tura Sredney Azii”: 39

<sup>48</sup> Karimov, “Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo’q,” (Tashkent: O’zbekiston Fanlar Akademiyasi, 1998).

were kept away from the public.” He lambasts the Soviet intellectuals who helped fashion the history of Uzbekistan as he explains that in the *History of the USSR* textbooks,<sup>49</sup> only 3-4 pages were dedicated to Central Asia, and no details were given about important historical events and individuals. He asserts, then, that because the history of Uzbekistan was written by people other than Uzbeks, the root cause for the thirst for knowledge and self-awareness arises from independence. The purpose of history, as he states it, is for the development of free will. Karimov writes, “A person with a historical memory is a person with free will. I repeat, they are a person with free will.”<sup>50</sup> “Free will” is the turn of phrase Karimov uses to transition to his descriptions of culture, spirituality, and the formation of the *kamil inson*. Conceding that he is not a historian, he writes, “It is said that ‘even if it is a sparrow, let the butcher butcher it.’ I am not a historian.”<sup>51</sup> But as the leader of the newly independent Uzbekistan, he is intent on clarifying that the nation’s history was written by Soviets, and that it is now time for Uzbeks to start formulating their own history. Furthermore, since Uzbek history was manufactured by the Soviets, Uzbeks are a lost people until they can take a “holistic approach” to their own history, reclaim it, and provide thorough and grounded analyses of their past. He writes, “Self-awareness begins with knowledge of history.”<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Two examples of this are a 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> grade textbooks. The Soviet Union’s 7<sup>th</sup> grade textbook from 1971 has three sections on Central Asia: “Slave Ownership in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” “The Development of Feudal Relations in Central Asia: The Rise of Khwarazm,” and “The beginning of the Mongol-Tatar invasion: The struggle of the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus.” See, M.V. Nechkina and P.S. Leybengrub. *Istoriya SSSR: Uchebnoe posobie dlya 7 klassa*. (Moskva: Prosveshchenie, 1971) 19-22, 68-71, and 71-74. The 1982 text book has two sections: “The peoples of Central Asia and Siberia in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century,” and “Uniting Central Asia with Russia: The peoples of Siberia and the Far East.” See, I. A. Fedosov. *Istoriya SSSR: Uchebnik 8 Klass*. (Moskva: Prosveshchenie, 1982), 145-150.

<sup>50</sup> Karimov, “Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo’q”: 6

<sup>51</sup> Karimov, “Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo’q”: 4. “Chumchuq so‘ysa ham qassob so‘ysin.” (i.e. no matter how small the task, let the expert do it).

<sup>52</sup> Karimov, “Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo’q”: 2.



It is specifically the notion that Soviets wrote Uzbek history that allows Karimov to dismantle claims that Uzbeks do not have rights over historical figures or territorial sites. The imposition of colonial – Soviet – history onto the Uzbek people has caused Uzbeks to question who they are as a people, and this is what needs rectifying. He writes,

From the foregoing considerations, naturally, the question arises: is there a true history of Uzbekistan and the Uzbek people that is worth disseminating today? I do not consider what was written during the Soviet period as history. I am totally against reading the history that others have written. When have colonialists ever given an impartial, fair view of a nation dependent upon them? They dedicated their efforts to humiliating Turkestan's past and destroying our history. You know well what it is to be separated from history. For a person, the separation from one's history means the separation from one's life [...] Surprisingly, when it comes to our history, we still rely on the research of Russian scholars and quote them. 'Bartold said such and such, Gumilev said such and such,' and so on. I do not want to belittle the work of Russian scholars, but how long will we evaluate our own history from the perspective of others?<sup>53</sup>

Karimov's main argument is that since his own population was not at the core of the creation of Uzbek identity and their historical memory and narrative, it is time for Uzbeks—through academic institutions and state policy—to take the reins to construct as objective a view of history as possible, so long as that objectivity operates from within the framework Karimov sets out below. The existential question that Karimov poses for the state and the Uzbeks is simple: "It is not only me but all people who want to know: In what century did Uzbek statehood emerge?"<sup>54</sup> This same question was grappled with in the 1940s and 1950s, and Karimov shows that after independence, the influence of Russian scholars and intellectuals weighs on independent Uzbekistan in their quest for the answer. In order to foster a "true" and "objective" answer to the question, Karimov provides the new historical framework as a point of departure from which scholars are to start.

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<sup>53</sup> Karimov, "Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo'q": 8.

<sup>54</sup> Karimov, "Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo'q": 8.

Similar to the argument Bolshakov makes, Karimov lays out the case that the territory of Uzbekistan has been subject to a number of invading groups, and that the notion that the Uzbek people originated in the 16<sup>th</sup> century is wrong. He writes, “We know people not by name but by culture and spirituality, and we look at them through their history.”<sup>55</sup> He concedes that Alexander came from Europe, Qutayba ibn Muslim came from Iraq, Chinggis Khan came from Mongolia, and Russians came from Moscow, but they only conquered Central Asia to gain political power and to extract the resources of the region, then left.<sup>56</sup> The remaining population – because of their spirit, wisdom, and great culture – withstood the invaders. Karimov continues,

According to Soviet historians, the name of the Uzbeks appeared in the 16<sup>th</sup> century after the invasion of our lands by the Dashti Kipchak khanates. Well, there were people already living in the territory between the two rivers that we call Transoxiana! Or were these people a different nation? Where is the logic in that? If we accept this Soviet-era doctrine, does it not mean that the history of our nation begins with every invader? Where, then, would our millennial history be? Since Samarkand, Bukhara, and Khiva were already governed by Uzbeks – precisely where our Uzbek state is – why would we begin our history from the 16<sup>th</sup> century when a group came, left a name, and departed?<sup>57</sup>

Karimov’s rationale for the *longue durée* vision of Uzbekistan’s territorial history is that the local population of the region, whatever they were called, were and still are the Uzbek people. Soviet scholars argued that the Uzbek “ethnogene” originates from the centuries prior to the Mongol invasions, and that the Uzbek “ethnonym” is supplied by the Shibanids. Karimov takes it a step further in arguing that a back-projection of the term “Uzbek” applies to the historical figures who lived and worked in the region – including figures like Aḥmad al-Farghānī, Muḥammad al-Khwārazmī, Ibn Sīnā, Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī, Imam Būkhārī, Timur, Ulugh Beg, Navā’ī, Bābur – all of whom are national heroes of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. As discussed in the

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<sup>55</sup> Karimov, “Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo’q”: 14.

<sup>56</sup> Karimov, “Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo’q”: 14.

<sup>57</sup> Karimov, “Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo’q”: 14.

previous chapter, this territorialized claim to history is essential for the perpetuation of the Uzbek collective national memory.

Much of Karimov's reaction and his need to explain Uzbekistan's history in this light stems from his interaction with world leaders at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris during a celebration dedicated to Timur, the designated progenitor of the Uzbek people.<sup>58</sup> At this event, although Karimov argued that had Timur laid the foundations of the Uzbek nation-state, a number of scholars challenged him, making the case that not only was Timur a Mongol but the Uzbek ethnicity is tied to him. Karimov was convinced that European scholars were following the Russian model of Uzbek subjugation, quoting Skobelev, the imperial Russian general who conquered Central Asia: "The local people are more civilized than we think. We cannot subjugate them. Only by destroying all of the ancient artifacts, mosques, madrasas, and religious books of these people can we take them under our wing and quench their spirituality."<sup>59</sup> Karimov's greatest complaint is of scholars and historians who tie the Uzbek people to the Mongols. He writes, "Some historians like to say that we are Chinggis Khan's descendants, and that even Amir Timur has the blood of Chinggis Khan and is of Mongol origin. Try to consider then, to which nation would our great-grandfather belong?"<sup>60</sup> Viewing Uzbek history through the lens of invading parties nullifies the *longue durée* framework of history for which Karimov argues, and for him, it is essential to illustrate that the core ethnic identity of the Uzbek people was formed *before* the coming of the Mongols and that Timur set the cultural and intellectual standards *after* the Mongols had departed. To clarify his argument and provide spurious proof of his stance, he writes,

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<sup>58</sup> Karimov, "Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo'q": 12.

<sup>59</sup> Karimov, "Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo'q": 20.

<sup>60</sup> Karimov, "Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo'q": 18.

[Timur] is accused of being evil, even though he was a great warrior. It is not difficult to prove that there is no logical reason for this. A person cannot be both creative and evil at the same time. Man cannot be both creative and evil at the same time. A person cannot be evil who builds so many madrasahs, mosques, and palaces, and patronizes scholars and intellectuals, and knows the Qur'an by heart. Can a bloodthirsty man say, 'Strength is in justice'?<sup>61</sup>

Karimov explains that Timur was a great statesman, patron of science, art, and culture, and an invaluable contributor to human civilization. His accomplishments alone speak for the necessity of making him the forefather of the country, and it is up to scholars and intellectuals to continue to prove that the Uzbek peoples' origins go back far beyond the 16<sup>th</sup> century invasions of the nomadic tribes of Dasht-i Kipchak. The contemporary usage of the national motto, "strength is in justice" (*kuch adolatda*), poses a challenge for Karimov's argument of moving away from Russian scholars and their constructions of titular national histories for two reasons: first, there is no documented evidence that Timur ever said "*kuch adolatda*"; and second, Russian scholars misinterpreted Timur's seal where this phrase is said to originate (*rāstī rastī*, "salvation lies in righteousness") and it is those same Russian scholars upon whom Karimov relies for his newly-minted Uzbek national motto.

There is no record that Timur ever used the aphorism Karimov cites, but its sense can be traced through the work most often mentioned by Karimov, *Tuzūk-i tīmūrī* (*Temur Tuzuklari*), a later fabricated work based on Niẓām al-Dīn Shāmī's *Ẓafarnāma*.<sup>62</sup> In the manuscript presented by William Davy, the Persian reads, "*Mulk bekufr bāqī mānad va bezulm bāqī namānad*," and is translated as, "That dominion may be continued to the infidel but that to the tyrant it shall not be continued."<sup>63</sup> On the government-sponsored website dedicated to *Temur Tuzuklari*, the same

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<sup>61</sup> Karimov, "Tarixiy Xotirasiz Kelajak Yo'q": 12.

<sup>62</sup> B.F. Manz, "Tīmūr Lang," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Online Edition, 2006

<sup>63</sup> Timur, *Tuzūk-i tīmūrī* (*Institutes: Political and Military*). William Davy and Joseph White, English trans and eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1781): 340-341.

phrase reads, “*Mamlakat kufr bilan turishi mumkin, lekin zulm bor yerda turolmaydi.*” (A country can stand where there is blasphemy, but it cannot stand where there is oppression.)<sup>64</sup> Similar publications in Uzbek translate the phrase as, “*Mamlakat zulmga chidashi mumkin, ammo adolatsizlikka chiday olmaydi.*” (The country can endure oppression, but it will not tolerate injustice.)<sup>65</sup>

The notion of the primacy of justice in governance seems to be a rationalization for Karimov’s use of “*kuch adolatda,*” but there is also the inconvenient issue that there is a phrase recorded by Ibn ‘Arabshāh in his biography of Timur: “The inscription of his seal was: Rasti, Rusti—that is ‘Truth is safety.’” (*kāna naqshu khātimihi rāstī rastī ya ‘nī šadaqta najawta*).<sup>66</sup> Why then would Karimov rely on a fabricated phrase when the Arabic text – along with a

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<sup>64</sup> Alixonto’ra Sog’uniy va Habibulla Karimatov, Uzbek trans. Bo’riboy Ahmedov and Ashraf Ahmedov, eds.: 53 of PDF, <http://www.temurtuzuklari.uz/oz/site/index>

<sup>65</sup> Muḥammad Ali. *Amir Temur Solnomasi*. (Toshkent: Alisher Navoiy nomidagi O’zbekiston Milliy Kutubxonasi nashriyoti, 2008): 10

<sup>66</sup> Aḥmad Ibn ‘Arabshāh. *‘Ajā’ib al-maqdūr fī nawā’ib Tīmūr*. Edited by Aḥmad Fāyiz al-Ḥimṣī. (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 1407/1986): 451 [a more recent edition is by Suhayl Zakkār, (Damascus: Manshūrāt al-hay’ah al-‘Ammah al-Sūriyah lil-Kitāb, Wizārat al-Thaqāfah, 2008): 277.] *Tamerlane or Timur the Great Amir*. English trans, J.H. Sanders. (London: Luzac & Co, 1936): 295. François Pétis de La Croix translates “rasti rusti [sic~ as a verb *rustan/rū* means “to grow”; *rust* as a noun could mean “strength”]. See, Sharaf al-Dīn ‘Alī Yazdī. *Ẓafar-nāma*. Edited by Sayyid Sa’īd Muḥammad Ṣādiq and ‘Abd al-Ḥusayn Navā’ī. 2 vols. (Tehran: Mūza va Markaz-i Asnād, Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, 1387/2008): 232 (continuous pagination); *Histoire de Timur-Bec, connu sous le nom du Grand Tamerlan, empereur des Mogols & Tartares* tome troisieme. French trans, François Pétis de La Croix. (Paris: Antonin Deshayes, 1722): 153. John Darby translates the phrase as, “Safety consists in fair-dealing.” See, Sharaf al-Dīn ‘Alī Yazdī. *The history of Timur-Bec, known by the name of Tamerlain the Great, Emperor of the Moguls and Tartars: being an historical journal* volume II. English trans, John Darby (London: Printed for J. Darby, E. Bell, W. Taylor, W. and J. Innys, J. Osborne, and T. Payne, 1723): 91. On the “Uzbekistan Youth Center” website, there is a direct translation of “rosti [sic] rusti [sic]” as “*kuch adolatda.*” See, <http://www.rym.uz/oz/news/yangiliklar/surxondaryo-viloyati/amir-temur-markazlashgan-davlat-asoschisi-mavzusida-ochiq-dars>. Subtelny notes the use of the phrase in other Timurid seals, like that of Muẓaffar-Ḥusayn Mīrzā: see, Maria Eva Subtelny, *Timurids in transition: Turko-Persian politics and acculturation in medieval Iran*. (Leiden: Brill, 2007): 260

number of illustrations of the phrase in Persian – are extant?<sup>67</sup> The phrase was preserved in Arabic and Persian, and as argued in the previous chapter, the national consciousness is purely Uzbek,<sup>68</sup> but the linguistic aspect may have far less to do with Karimov’s chosen motto. There is no evidence that Karimov was reading the Persian phrase on a seal or the Arabic preservation of it in Ibn ‘Arabshāh. More likely, Karimov was utilizing the explication of the phrase by Russian scholars—the very same ones that he lambasts in his article. In his 1958 translation of the account of Timur’s expedition to India, A. A. Semenov writes, “It is valuable for historians, as seemingly trifling as it may seem, to mention Timur’s motto, ‘Justice and strength,’ (*Справедливость и сила*) which has completely changed in today’s usage to ‘Justice is strength.’ (*Справедливость — сила*).”<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, in a collection of his articles published in 1968, Bartold writes, “Timur even created a Persian motto for his reign: ‘rāstī rustī [sic]’ or strength is in justice.” (*в справедливости сила*).<sup>70</sup> One small misreading of a vowel diacritic from decades of Soviet historiography has led to the incorrect national aphorism of “*kuch adolatda*.” Rather than reading the phrase as *rāstī rastī* – where the first vowel of the second word is a *fatha* (short “a”) rendering the meaning of “salvation” – Russian scholars read it as

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<sup>67</sup> Heribert cites al-Bukhārī as the source for the motto “rāstī rastī” as it appears in ibn ‘Arabshāh’s text:

لا ينجيكم إلا الصدق. See, Heribert Horst, *Tīmūr und Ḥōğā ‘Alī: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Şafawiden*. (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1958): 33-36.

<sup>68</sup> Soudavar postulates that the phrase, “rāstī rastī” is from pre-Islamic Persian empires and is a testament to Timur’s preference for Persian language and culture over Turkish. See, Abolala Soudavar, “Histoire d’une imposture ou naissance d’un mythe: ‘Tamerlan,’” *Le pouvoir en actes. Fonder, dire, montrer, contrefaire l’autorité*, ed. E. Marguin-Hamon, (Paris: Archives nationales Somogy, 2013): 191; and Abolala Soudvar, *Mithraic societies: from brotherhood ideal to religion’s adversary*. (Houston: Lulu, 2014): 50-52, 91.

<sup>69</sup> Ghiyas ad-Din Ali and Alexander Semenov. *Dnevnik poxoda Timura v Indiyu*. Russian trans. A.A. Semenov, (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Vostochnoy Literatury, 1958): 8.

<sup>70</sup> V.V. Bartol’d, *Tyurki: Dvenadtsat’ lektzii po istorii turetskikh narodov Srednei Azii*. (Almati: Zhalin, 1998): 179.; and Bartol’d, *Sochineniia*, vol. 5, Лекция XII, p. 181.

*rāstī rustī* – where the first vowel of the second word is a *zamma* (short “u”) rendering the meaning of “strength.” While the national motto of “*kuch adolatda*” is not totally incorrect – as it is clear Karimov’s use of the phrase is based on sentiments articulated in some, albeit problematic, historical evidence – its usage is directly linked to the Russian translation and Soviet misreading of the Persian “*rāstī rastī*.”

### ***(III) – The “Historical” Narrative in Action: School Textbooks***

Schooling encourages students to acquire critical thinking skills and yet, as textbooks illustrate, there is also a major effort to mold a uniform collective memory. As Karimov lays out in his article on historical memory, on the one hand, there is a fundamental understanding that education is a cause for the betterment of peoples. Often contrary to the objective of forming a “whole” or “spiritual” person, however, is the clear nationalistic approach taken in Uzbekistan’s textbooks where objective and impartial history undermines the core ideology of the Uzbek national collective memory. As this dissertation has tried to illustrate, the creation of a strong shared past – as is the case with Uzbekistan – rejects and discards objective fact for the purposes of strengthening an insecure nation’s hold on power. The very existence of post-Soviet territories necessitates a *longue durée* approach to a national history, and because impartiality undermines the constructed nature of the Uzbek historical narrative, the history that is presented to students may not reflect the information that sources and evidence suggest otherwise. This section covers the narrative conveyed to 8<sup>th</sup> grade students in the form of two history textbooks – one published immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union and a second twenty years on as a point of comparison.

Much like Karimov's complaint that Soviet texts did not cover Uzbek history in detail, the 1993 textbook, *History of the People of Uzbekistan*, only dedicates five pages to the 16<sup>th</sup> century and the arrival of the Uzbeks under Shībānī Khān to the territory that is now Uzbekistan.<sup>71</sup> This textbook makes a clear distinction between “modern” Uzbeks – meaning those living in Uzbekistan today – and the Shibanids. The Shibanids are consistently referred to “nomadic Uzbeks” (*ko'chmanchi o'zbeklar*), in line with the Soviet narrative that the group led by Shībānī Khān was not a huge factor in the development of the Uzbek ethnicity. In fact, much of the discussion surrounding these nomads explains how they arrived in southern Central Asia and quickly adapted to the sedentary way of life established by the Timurids, adopting the local culture and customs that existed in the region from before their arrival.

According to the 1993 textbook, moreover, the arrival of the Shibanids was an earthshattering event for the population of the region, namely in that the “working class” were forced to give up their pasturelands and farmlands to accommodate the multitude of new settlers.<sup>72</sup> While they made space for the Shibanids, the “masses” were not completely displeased with the Shibanids because they too were Muslims. As the textbook authors write:

The majority of the working-class were in a critical situation, and they did not care who was in power. In addition, indigenous people were not religiously hostile to the Uzbek tribes because they were also Muslims. Shībānī Khān calls his struggle a holy war (‘jihad’) against the ‘atheistic’ Timurids.<sup>73</sup>

His conquest was so ruthless that he managed to eradicate the remnants of the Timurid family by taking the major cities of the region, like Bukhara, Samarkand, and Herat, while also seizing

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<sup>71</sup> M. Ishoqova and V. Kostetskii. *O'zbekiston Xalqlari Tarixi: O'zbekiston xalq ta'limi vazirligi o'rta maktablarning 8-9 sinflari uchun o'quv materiali sifatida tavsifiya etgan*. (Toshkent: O'qituvchi, 1993): 124-130.

<sup>72</sup> M. Ishoqova and V. Kostetskii. *O'zbekiston Xalqlari Tarixi*: 125

<sup>73</sup> M. Ishoqova and V. Kostetskii. *O'zbekiston Xalqlari Tarixi*: 126



control of major fortresses, like Dabusi.<sup>74</sup> The narrative of Shībānī Khān's conquests comes to a swift end as the textbook mentions that the "independent system" (i.e., the appanage system) of the dynasty weakened the Shibanid state.<sup>75</sup>

Twenty years later, the Uzbek government commissioned and published the 8<sup>th</sup> grade textbook, *History of Uzbekistan*, which puts forward a much more extensive history of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. In eight chapters, the 2014 textbook follows the narrative of Shībānī Khān and his primary rival to the throne, the Timurid Bābur.<sup>76</sup> Three primary themes can be drawn out of the information presented to students: first, Shībānī Khān was a nomadic figure who managed to displace but not replace the splendid history of the Timurids; second, the history of modern Uzbekistan is one of ethnic territorialization and the adoption of suitable figures for the collective historical narrative; and third, the Shibanids may have been the inheritors to the Timurid culture, but they did not disrupt or supplant the culture.

As far as Shībānī Khān's rise to power is concerned, students are given a fairly accurate portrayal of what occurred in the late 15<sup>th</sup> and early 16<sup>th</sup> centuries. Shībānī Khān's successes are attributed to the political discord of the waning Timurid Empire: "As Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, historian of the time, wrote, 'Everyone was afraid of each other. They each demanded kingship, sowing seeds of discontent in the land.'"<sup>77</sup> The main reason for casting events in this light is to show that the strongest claimant to the throne – however untrue – was Bābur, and "his dream was to occupy the throne of Samarkand, the center of the kingdom of Amir Timur, his great

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<sup>74</sup> For a description of Shībānī Khān's conquest of this fortress, see chapter 2 of this dissertation.

<sup>75</sup> M. Ishoqova and V. Kostetskii. *O'zbekiston Xalqlari Tarixi*: 127-128.

<sup>76</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo'rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O'zbekiston Tarixi: XVI-XIX asrning birinchi yarmi, 8-sinf uchun darslik*. (Toshkent: O'qituvchi Nashriyot-Matbaa Ijodiy Uyi, 2014): 6-35.

<sup>77</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo'rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O'zbekiston Tarixi*: 7.

grandfather.”<sup>78</sup> Through these conflicts, Shībānī Khān was able to demonstrate his political and military prowess and reach heights no other figure could achieve in this period.

Shībānī Khān is not described in a harsh light for most of the narrative in this textbook. He was born to Shāh Būdāq Sulṭān, Abū’l Khayr Khān’s son, in 1451. According to Turkic traditions, he was given a Muslim name at birth, Muḥammad, and he attained a second, Turkic name, Shībānī, as he grew in strength and fame.<sup>79</sup> It is stated that in the *Bāburnāma*, Shībānī’s name is given as Shībak Khān (*Shoyboqxon*), which itself means strength.<sup>80</sup> The narrative of Shībānī Khān’s childhood continues with his becoming an orphan. Bāy Shaykh (*Boyshayx*), a relative of Shāh Būdāq Sulṭān, was charged with raising Shībānī and his brother, Maḥmūd Sulṭān. As Shībānī grew older, one of the most influential Timurid leaders of Turkistan and Utrar, Muḥammad Mazīd Tarkhān, began supporting him. It was with this backing from a Timurid that Shībānī was able to move to Bukhara to gain an education in poetry and sciences, and as he reached the age of puberty, Shībānī developed “a burning desire to restore his grandfather, Abū’l Khayr Khān’s state.”<sup>81</sup> He then moved to Dasht-i Kipchak where he began to gather an army and become a strong military leader in order to enter the service of the Timurids. Leaders in Mughulistan, Transoxiana, and Khurasan took advantage of Shībānī’s military power to fight against internal Timurid rivals. As these leaders’ trust in Shībānī grew, he was able to learn more about the discord among the Timurid family and use that to his advantage.

The textbook’s narrative now begins to rationalize not just how Shībānī rose in power but why he did. Starting in the 1480s, Shībānī gained the throne of his grandfather’s former empire,

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<sup>78</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 6

<sup>79</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 8

<sup>80</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 9

<sup>81</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 9

the “Uzbek Ulus” founded in 1428.<sup>82</sup> Due to the nomadic lifestyle of the empire’s subjects, the current supporters of Shībānī Khān, there was a need to expand the physical bounds of the empire to allow for the “perpetuation of their nomadic lifestyle.”<sup>83</sup> Since Shībānī Khān had proved his military abilities, more people began supporting his cause knowing that he would be able to provide them with the necessary territory to continue their way of life. Furthermore, people who already lived in Timurid lands were tired of the incessant in-fighting of the princes, and they thought it would be in their interest to join forces with Shībānī Khān to gain a peaceful life. For Shībānī Khān, however, his primary purpose was the destruction of the Timurid Empire, and he set his sights on Samarkand, which he conquered in 1501. This event marks the foundation of the new Uzbek state, the Shibaniids.<sup>84</sup>

Shībānī Khān’s conquest is described in quick succession.<sup>85</sup> In 1503, he took Tashkent and Shahrukhiya, then began appanaging his territory. Shībānī Khān’s brother, Maḥmūd Sultān received Bukhara and his uncles, Sevīnch Khwāja (Kūchgūnjī) and Sūyūnch Khwāja—sons of Rābi‘a Sultān Begim, daughter of Ulugh Beg and wife of Abū’l Khayr Khān —received Turkistan and Tashkent respectively. By 1504, Shībānī Khān had conquered Ferghana. His cousin, Jānī Beg Sultān, son of Khwāja Maḥmūd Sultān ibn Abū’l Khayr Khān, was assigned Akhsi and Andijan. As Shībānī Khān conquered more territory, his strength began to grow, and he began forays into Khwarazm in 1505. By 1506, Balkh had fallen to him, and by 1507, he had taken Herat. Shībānī Khān’s conquest of Herat is described as follows: “Herat lost its own

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<sup>82</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 10

<sup>83</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 10

<sup>84</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 11

<sup>85</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 11-12

quality as the center of the economy, politics, and culture.”<sup>86</sup> Despite the Shibanids being cast as the invaders of Timurid territory, and therefore invaders to the Uzbek nation, the textbook does provide one gleaming pearl of information about the Shibanids: Shībānī Khān was able to unify the territory in a way that the successors to Timur could not. Because of this, “This is [Shībānī Khān’s] service to our statehood [...] In this way, Transoxiana, Khorasan, and Khwarazm came under Muḥammad Shībānī’s rule and in our national history began the period of the Shibanids.”<sup>87</sup>

The second major theme covered in this textbook is the formulation of Uzbekistan’s history of as one of ethnic territorialization and the adoption of fitting figures to populate the new national narrative. Uzbek ethnicity and its dominance over Persianate historical sites was a major component of the previous chapter of this dissertation, yet what the textbooks illustrate adds an additional layer of complication to the narrative: Uzbeks are not just a distinct historical group with ties to the territory but they are a group that was formed long before the 16<sup>th</sup> century invasions of the Uzbek/Shibanid/nomadic groups. The textbook written twenty years after independence still follows the model Karimov set forth in his article on collective memory:

You learned in 7<sup>th</sup> grade that the Uzbek people were formed in the 9-12<sup>th</sup> centuries in Transoxiana and Khwarazm. It is true that in these regions, our ancestors who lived there before the 16<sup>th</sup> century were not called Uzbeks. Since ancient times, Turkic ethnic groups have not only lived on our territory but on other territories, including Dasht-i Kipchak [...] When the Shibanids conquered our territory, various *o’zbek* tribes from Dasht-i Kipchak began moving into Transoxiana and Khwarazm. This phenomenon did not change the ethnic makeup of our Nation.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 12

<sup>87</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 12

<sup>88</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 12-13

The Soviet conception that the Uzbek peoples were formed before the arrival of Shībānī Khān is clearly stated, and the rationale for this assertion follows with four “facts” that students are to assimilate. First, the arrival of the Shibanids causes the Uzbek people to absorb nomadic tribes. Second, the nomadic Uzbeks were “naturally drawn to their local relatives”<sup>89</sup> (i.e. co-ethnic group) because of the locals’ higher political and cultural status. Third, the nomadic Uzbeks quickly acclimated to settled life and embraced all of the positive aspects of the former Timurid Empire, making the nomads indistinguishable from locals. And fourth, and most important, the ethnonym of the nomadic Uzbeks is the only contribution of this group to the original inhabitants of southern Central Asia. The textbook states, “And thus, from the 16<sup>th</sup> century onward, in Khwarazm and Transoxiana, the official and national name ‘o’zbek’ began to be used. From these [facts] it is necessary not to say that the Uzbek people originate in the 16<sup>th</sup> century.”<sup>90</sup>

Part of the necessity in arguing that the Uzbek ethnic group came into being prior to the 16<sup>th</sup> century is the ability to lay claim to additional figures who might not otherwise fit neatly into the national historical narrative. After a lengthy discussion on ethnicity and a reemphasis on when the Uzbeks were formed, the textbook turns to a discussion of Bābur’s life and activities after Shībānī Khān’s successful conquest of Central Asia.<sup>91</sup> More important than Bābur’s conquests in India, however, is the “correction” this textbook makes to the terminology used to describe Bābur’s eventual empire, and how that “correction” lends itself to adopting Bābur as an Uzbek historical figure. The textbook asserts in a bolded section,

**Read this with attention: Abroad as well as in India, Babur and his descendants are known as the ‘Great Mughals.’ This is totally wrong. The Baburids are our compatriots; the Timurids are Babur’s ancestors. In historical documents, they refer to themselves as**

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<sup>89</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 13

<sup>90</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 13

<sup>91</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 14-15

‘Baburids.’ The mistaken reason for the Baburids being called Mughals is because Europeans incorrectly considered Amir Timur and the Timurids ‘Mongols.’ In recent years, the phrase ‘Baburids’ has more commonly replaced ‘the Great Mughals,’ restoring historical truth.<sup>92</sup>

“Restoring historical truth” has more to do with the Karimovian project of nation-building and statecraft than with actual fact. Bābur was indeed both a Timurid and a Chinggisid: he was a fifth generation descendant of Timur paternally and his mother was a Chinggisid princess from the house of Chinggis Khan’s second son Chaghatay. This, however, does not conform to the historical narrative of contemporary Uzbekistan, for if they say their “compatriot” Bābur is of Chinggisid descent, where does that leave other Chinggisids, like Shībānī Khān? The corrective for the state, then, is to re-brand Bābur a “Baburid” and bypass any relation to the Mongols. Karimov buttressed this historical narrative with the adoption of a 1993 law celebrating Bābur’s 510<sup>th</sup> birthday and declaring him a forebear of the Uzbek people.<sup>93</sup>

The last major theme that we can extrapolate from this textbook is the notion that the Shibanids were the benefactors – not the successors – of Timurid culture, but they did not disrupt, supplant, or truly alter the culture that modern Uzbekistan has inherited. We read:

The Shibanids could not be the successors to the highly developed culture created in our country during the Timurid era. Nevertheless, during the Shibanid period, science reached new heights. This was also influenced by the fact that among the rulers of this dynasty, there were trained scholars of their time [...] Muḥammad Shībānī Khān tried to develop further the arts and sciences of Bukhara and Samarqand after the Timurids.<sup>94</sup>

Despite the attempt to disregard of the entirety of the 16<sup>th</sup> century in this textbook, there is nevertheless some attempt at truth-telling in the account of a deliberate attempt by Shībānī Khān

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<sup>92</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 15-16

<sup>93</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 17

<sup>94</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo’rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O’zbekiston Tarixi*: 31-35

and his successors to build upon the cultural foundations laid by the Timurids. As illustrated in the first two chapters of this dissertation, the arts and production of literature were not stifled by the political and imperial transition from the Timurid to the Shibanid regime.

Moreover, the identical sources that were utilized in this dissertation to synthesize a cohesive narrative of Shībānī Khān's military and socio-political achievements are cited in this textbook among the "many great works of history"<sup>95</sup> that were produced in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Kamāl al-Dīn Shīr 'Alī Bannā'ī's *Shībānīnāma*, Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ's *Shībānīnāma*, Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥaydar Dūghlāt's *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, Faḡl Allāh ibn Rūzbihān Khunjī Iṣfahānī's *Mihmānnāma-yi Bukhārā*, and Ḥāfiẓ Tanish Mīr Muḥammad al-Bukhārī's *Sharafnāma-yi Shāhī* are but some of the literary contributions patronized by Shibanid leaders and scholars. While they followed Timurid literary models, their production belies the notion that the Shibanids were benefactors but not successors to the Timurid lineage of artistic production. In addition to these texts, Shībānī Khān's *Dīvān* is mentioned, but there is no attempt to deem his literary production as one of cultural importance other than to express Shībānī Khān's understanding that Samarkand – one of the historically and culturally important cities of Uzbekistan – was the gem of his conquests:

Muḥammad Shībānī Khān, who spent most of his life fighting, was also engaged in poetry. He produced high quality works. In present day, his works have reached numerous countries. For example, his poems known as his *Dīvān*, are kept in an Istanbul library. In his own poems, he especially praises the cities of Samarqand and Bukhara. For example, in one poem, he compares Samarkand to Paradise:

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<sup>95</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo'rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O'zbekiston Tarixi*: 32-33.

Jannati ma'no bog'i Samarqand emish	Samarkand is the Garden of Paradise.
Kavsari a'lo degan obi Samarqand emish <sup>96</sup>	Samarkand is the excellent waters of Kavsar <sup>97</sup>

Showing that even Shībānī Khān understood the importance of the Timurid capital of Samarkand reinforces the idea that Uzbekistan's cultural center is truly an Uzbek one since Timur – the national *buyuk bobo* (grandfather) – himself managed building such grand structures. The textbook continues to reinforce the idea that the cultural production of the 16<sup>th</sup> century “maintained” the legacy of the Timurid 15<sup>th</sup> century, but that the Uzbeks were a good centralizing government in that they produced monetary and land reforms.<sup>98</sup>

#### **(IV) – Conclusions**

Post-Soviet Uzbekistan's approach to national historical memory is inherently tied to an insecure national identity; one that is easily challenged both by competing minority groups in the state and by external forces. The establishment of national boundaries is particularly important not just for the promulgation of a statist nationalism but also for the adoption of the figures, sites, and events encompassed by those boundaries. As this chapter shows, however, not every figure or historical event is given equal weight in the creation of a historical narrative. After the fall of the Soviet Union, each newly-formed republic invented national myths to legitimize their territorial existence. Some national ideologies, like Uzbekistan's led by Karimov, focused on the notion that the Soviets had obscured and diminished the “true” history of the Uzbek people, and

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<sup>96</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo'rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O'zbekiston Tarixi*: 31-35. This is the Uzbek translation of the original Chagatai, “cennet-i me'vā digen bāğ-ı Semerkend imiş // Kevser-i ā'lā digen āb-ı Semerkend imiş.” See, transliteration by Karasoy; translation by Samie. Muḥammad Shaybānī, and Yakup Karasoy. *Şiban Han dīvānı: inceleme, metin, dizin, tıpkıbasım*. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1998): f71b, 159.

<sup>97</sup> Quran:108

<sup>98</sup> Q. Usmonov, U. Jo'rayev, and N. Norqulov. *O'zbekiston Tarixi*: 20-26



it is only through objective scholarship and schooling that this narrative could be recovered. But as we see in the development of school textbooks, there is a reliance upon Soviet versions of history and historiography that have – whether deliberate or not – reinforced Soviet perceptions of specific historical figures. As for Shībānī Khān, he is still viewed as the nomadic invader who contributed nothing but the ethnonym to the contemporary Uzbek population.

The approach in this chapter toward nationalism studies is useful because textbooks offer a glimpse of the state's intended message for its citizens, and they show what constitutes legitimate, official knowledge. While I did not look at the politics involved in the writing of textbooks, I have traced the intellectual narrative that exists in post-Soviet textbooks to the Soviet intellectuals who shaped the very generation presently producing the “new” historical narrative for Uzbekistan. While Karimov consistently articulated the need to shake off the yolk of Soviet colonial interference in the writing of Uzbekistan's history, it is an unfortunate reality that the nascent country is still subject to the legacy that was forged for them in the 1940s and 1950s. Part of the reification of Soviet conceptions of historiography is due simply to the generation in charge of writing it in addition to the lack of linguistic accessibility to works by scholars of the Middle and Early Modern Periods. But as I have argued here, much of it is related to the territorial integrity of the country itself. As hidden as some messages are intended to be in textbooks, these writings embody an overt attempt to perpetuate the only form of history that sanctions the inclusion of certain physical parts of the country within the national narrative. Reinforcing the idea that Timur is the progenitor of the nation allows the government to lay claim the major historical sites of Samarkand and other important cities without relinquishing power to minority groups in or outside of the country.

Areas and Educational Subjects	Grades and Weekly Study Hours											Total Weekly Hours
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
<b><i>Philological Studies</i></b>	10	12	14	14	14	12	10	10	10	7.5	9	122.5
Mother Language and Literature	8	8	10	10	9	7	5	5	5	2.5	4	73.5
Uzbek and Russian Language	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	20
Foreign Language	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	29
<b><i>Social Studies</i></b>	1	1	1	1	3	3	4	5	6	4.5	4.5	34
History	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	17
Global Religious History	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
Fundamentals of the State and Law	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	4
Acculturation Studies	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Nationalism	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
Fundamentals of National Independence and <i>Ma'naviyat</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.5	0.5	4
<b><i>Exact Sciences</i></b>	5	5	5	5	5.5	5.5	5.5	6	7	6	6	61.5
Mathematics	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	54
Information and Communication Technologies	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	2	2	1	7.5
<b><i>Elemental and Economic Studies</i></b>	1	1	1	1	2	6	8	9	9	7	8	53
Physics and Astronomy	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	3	13
Chemistry	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	10
Biology	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	13
Nature and Geography	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	0	14
Fundamentals of Economy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
Fundamentals of Business	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b><i>Applied Sciences</i></b>	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	4	4	4	2.5	52.5
Musical Culture	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	7
Fine Art and Drawing	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	9
Technology	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	12
Physical Education	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	21
Initial Preparation for Military Service										2	1.5	3.5
<b><i>Vocational Training</i></b>										6	6	12
<b><i>School Hours</i></b>	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	1	1	0	3.5
<b><i>Total Hours</i></b>	23	24	26	26	31	33	34	35	37	36	36	339

[Figure 5.1] Base Curriculum for Grades 1-11 in Uzbekistan

## Chapter 6 - Conclusion

While the Shibanids simultaneously identified with and appropriated the political and cultural legacies of the Timurids in securing their grip on sedentary Transoxiana, the Shibanid Question resurfaced in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. As this dissertation has documented, much of 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century history has been ignored or suppressed because of Soviet interventions. The Soviets introduced two legitimizing ideologies of the newly created Central Eurasian nations in the 1920s: communism and nationalism. Soviet Orientalism and the conception of nation was specifically based on primordialism, according to which national groups had long, cohesive ties to the land and heritage they occupied.<sup>1</sup> Thus, in the late 1910s and early 1920s, in order to become a member state of the Soviet Union and a nation pursuant to Soviet primordialism, the Soviets began constructing a unified Uzbek history anchored on a national lineage tracing back to a national progenitor.

Three major historical groups were identified as candidates for the forefather of the would-be Uzbek nation: the Mongols, the Timurids, and the Shibanids. Each choice, however, engendered ideological pitfalls and inconveniences. Not only were the Mongols deemed primitive, but their violent conquest of Rus impeded their participation into the “friendship of peoples” model, which the Soviet Union touted in its massive state- and nation-building campaigns in Central Eurasia at the time. The dismissal of the Mongols also weighed on the Shibanids in this search for the national progenitor, as contemporary ethnic categorizations derived heavily from primordialism and identified the Shibanids as Mongols, by way of their descent from Shībān. Besides, similar to the Mongols, the Shibanids bore violent associations of

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<sup>1</sup> Francine Hirsch. *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge & the Making of the Soviet Union*. (Ithaca.: Cornell University Press, 2005).

nomadism, which even Shībānī Khān himself renounced in fashioning himself as heir to the Timurid political tradition.

This left the pre-Shibanid, Persianate, and sedentary Turkic population of the region under the Timurids the prime choice as the origin of the Uzbeks for the Soviets. From a current standpoint, this choice may appear surprising, especially given the assumption that the very name “Uzbek” derived from Shībānī Khān’s conquests. In context of the state- and nation-building endeavors in the 1920s, however, the choice appears rather reasonable. According to Beatrice Manz,<sup>2</sup> the historical memory of Timur had gained quite the stature among Eurasian societies. Though probably of Mongol origin, Timur was remembered as a Muslim conqueror and ruler whose achievements also rival those of Chinggis Khan himself. What is more, the abundant artistic productions from the Timurid period not only served as lasting testimonies to its prosperity, but they provided the Soviet Uzbeks with a plethora of acceptable cultural icons to draw on in narrating their national history.<sup>3</sup>

The creation of the Tajik ASSR inside the Uzbek SSR in 1924 heightened the urgency for more rigid identification and appellations of the Uzbeks, particularly in distinction from other “nationalities” in Central Eurasia. Until the 1920s, identities and labels in the region—“Tajik,” “Sart,” “Uzbek,” “Muslim,” “Turk,” to name a few—had not only been flexible in their meaning but also mutually compatible. The Soviets, however, imposed an either/or structure, which faced extreme difficulties in face of the ethnolinguistic mixtures in the region where, for example,

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<sup>2</sup> Beatrice Forbes Manz. “Tamerlane’s Career and its Uses”. *Journal of World History* 13.1 (2002): 1-25.

<sup>3</sup> The debate over Timur raged in the late 1960s and 1970s. See, Muminov, I.M. *Rol’ i mesto Amira Timura v istorii Sredney Azii v sveete dannnykh pis’mennykh istochnikov*. (Tashkent: Fan, 1968); and A. P. Novosel’tsev, “Ob istoricheskoi otsenke Timura,” (*Voprosy Istorii*, 1973).

many identified themselves as ethnic Uzbeks but spoke Tajik in their daily lives. The legitimization of these rigid national delimitations along with borders between the Soviet Socialist republics drew heavily on the works of historians who began to theorize who the Uzbeks are and should become. In the late 1930s and 1940s, Yakubovskii attempted to create and legitimize a historical past for the Uzbek nationality. He suggested Uzbek history be severed from its roots in the nomadic regions of Dasht-i Qipchaq, because, according to him, the Uzbek people had already taken shape in the Timurid territory before the coming of the Shibanid nomads, whose migration was but a mere last step towards the solidification of the Uzbek people. To further his argument for a minimized importance of the Shibanids, Yakubovskii even forged the term *starouzbek* or “Old Uzbek” in reference to pre-Shibanid history and literature (or what other scholars would characterize as Chaghatai).

Yakubovskii’s projection of a pre-Shibanid origin of the Uzbek nation concurred with the *Jadids* at the forefront of the modernization and nation-building endeavors. For many of them, including Fitrat, Timur became a symbol of nationalism. Fitrat, in his poem “Yurt Qayg’usi” goes as far as pleading with Timur to rise from his grave and take revenge on the people who destroyed his legacy and overthrew Turkish sovereignty; one can only debate whether he meant the Shibanids or the Russians.<sup>4</sup> Much in line with Yakubovskii’s historiography, Xo’jayev asserted that the Uzbeks’ “nation-state” was really the Timurid Empire. The loss of this unified state under the Shibanids and later khanates and emirates led to the cultural decline and regression of Muslims in the region.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Fitrat, “Yurt qayg’usi” *Tanlangan asarlar*, 5 vols. (Tashkent: Manaaviyat, 2000-2010).

<sup>5</sup> See discussion of Xo’jayev in Adeeb Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015): 257-300.

And indeed, even into the 1940s and 1950s, historiographic debates continued regarding the Shibanid Question, despite official endorsement of Yakubovskii's Timurid narrative of Uzbek national history. In *Istoria Narodov Uzbekistana*, Bartold and Semenov, disagreed with Yakubovskii and argued that it was the Shibanids who gave birth to Uzbek identity.<sup>6</sup> The Shibanid Question continues to shape modern-day Uzbekistan up until and through the post-Soviet era. On the one hand, the Timurids, their history, and their legacies continue to furnish the construction and reconstruction of the Uzbek nation by fashioning it into one of the world's many long-lived high cultures. As the forefather of this officially projected Uzbek nation, Timur also serves Uzbekistan as a major player in Central Eurasia, in distinction from other nations and states in the region, as well as once a significant contestant of empire-building in world history.<sup>7</sup> Yet on the other hand, the Shibanid Question lingers, if not also enjoying a resurgence in the new domestic and geopolitical realities after the fall of the Soviet Union. Even as memories of the Timurid history of Uzbekistan permeates through various aspects of daily life in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, many continue to ask: what should Uzbekistan do with their ethnic forebears, the Uzbeks? Where should Shībānī Khān, an able, cultured, and pious ruler who established Uzbek rule over the territories of current-day Uzbekistan, feature in the latter's national history? Do the nomadic Uzbeks even factor into contemporary Uzbek historical memory? This dissertation has showed that while there is greater recognition of Shībānī Khān and his era – especially as it

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<sup>6</sup> Yakubovskii, A. *Istoria Narodov Uzbekistana*. (Taskent: Izdatel'stvo AN UzSSR, 1950).

<sup>7</sup> This adoption of Timur can be contrasted to the Tajik cult around Ismail Somoni. Uzbekistan celebrated Timur's 660<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 1996, and in reaction, Tajikistan marked the 1,100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Samanids. Much like Timur appearing in the works of Fitrat, Somoni appears in the works of Aini and G'afurov. Tajik textbooks do not portray Somoni and the Samanids as belonging to the feudal age; Somoni is portrayed as the father and leader of contemporary Tajiks.

appears in the latest iterations of Uzbek textbooks –, Uzbekistan still operates from within a Soviet framework. The attempts that were made by Karimov in the 1990s to de-Russify/Sovietize the nation's history still ran into the problem posed by claiming a more recent historical figure as progenitor. Shībānī Khān would destabilize the claims of a one-thousand-year-old Uzbek ethnic group – one that solidified around the Qarakhanids and solidified with the Timurids. And yet, this dissertation has shown that while Shībānī Khān was dismissed in 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century history writing, he was, in his own right, a successful historical figure whose dynasty had major impacts on the succeeding centuries of the region.

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