WIN, LOSE, OR DRAW: ROMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION AND RESISTANCE
IN THE EARLY PRINCIPATE

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For Chelsea
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Abstract

The late Republic and early Principate witnessed mass expansion of the Roman Empire, and the ensuing consolidation and incorporation efforts in the decades after conquest resulted in dozens of episodes of mass indigenous resistance. Scholars have addressed issues of provincial revolts in several fields of Roman history, and a few have sought to understand provincial revolts phenomenologically. Within acculturation studies, Stephen Dyson has examined the role of socio-economic and political changes brought about by Roman conquest and incorporation in causing revolts, arguing that revolts often broke out in the second generation after conquest because Rome’s attempts to consolidate its power over newly conquered peoples disrupted local practices (1971, 1975). Meanwhile, recent articles by Greg Woolf (2011) and Myles Lavan (2017) call to attention the way ancient authors wrote about revolt, namely revealing how revolt narratives fit into broader historiographic trends (as well as the intertextuality of narratives), tropes, and authorial agendas. Recently, Gil Gambash has approached provincial revolts from the field of Roman imperialism, where he focuses on the agency and various responses of Roman central policymakers, as well as how they managed tensions with provincials, handled revolts when they broke out, and how Rome commemorated revolts (2015).

Despite great advancements in our understandings of the nature and functioning of the Roman Empire, its administrative apparatus, and how it incorporated recently conquered peoples into the empire, there is still a need to study systemically the relationship between provincial resistance and the administrative institutions cited for causing mass unrest to make further progress on these aspects. This project utilizes known instances of mass provincial resistance towards Roman provincial institutions as a magnifying glass to study how Rome first implemented its administrative structures in recently acquired territories. Through this endeavor,
we may see if and how these provincial institutions were conducted differently than in later (and more settled) periods of the Principate, and to what extent the method and timing of Rome implementing these administrative structures could inadvertently incite resistance. Specifically, in my project, I look at how institutions such as taxation, the provincial census, and conscription were implemented and conducted in the first few decades after conquest in order to show how these institutions could contribute to the occurrence of provincial revolts as well as reveal the previously misunderstood connections between revolts and these institutions.

Chapter 1 focuses on the use of military officers as prefects set over local communities (praefecti civitatum) in the early decades of Roman rule. I contextualize the circumstances and periodicity of their use and emphasize that they are only utilized when Rome had concerns about a population’s propensity for unrest or their trustworthiness to conduct specific tasks. The appearance of prefects among provincial communities suggests that in certain places in the early Principate there was a greater Roman presence, allowing us to view the potential relationship between military officers operating at local levels and the occurrence of revolt (such as in the case of the Frisian revolt of 28 CE) in a new way.

In Chapter 2, I reconstruct the operation of the provincial census in the early Principate to show how it may have been conducted differently when compared to later periods. Whereas previous scholarship has ascribed resistance to the modus operandi of Rome’s form of census taking, through case studies of mass resistance against the census (Gaul in 13/2 BCE, Judaea in 6 CE, and Rough Cilicia c. 36 CE) I argue that mass provincial resistance to the census only occurred when Rome or its proxies lacked a control over a region at the time of a census, either due to regional instability or conducting it too soon during the consolidation process.
In Chapter 3, after briefly outlining patterns in eleven episodes of anti-fiscal complaints and revolts, I show that many anti-fiscal episodes occurred in a wartime context. I then argue that under certain conditions, such as military campaigning on the fringes of the empire, that certain populations experienced heavier burdens due to the strains placed on populations by increased military recruitment and requisitions on top of routine exactions. This argument is sustained by investigating how the Roman armies’ auxiliary levies, and logistical and requisition systems could negatively impact the production capabilities, resources, and demography of indigenous populations, especially among recently subjugated populations and when considering the unevenness of the spread of burdens among populations across a provincial landscape.

Whereas Chapters 1-3 are thematic in orientation, with each one focusing on how resistance could have formed against specific administrative processes, Chapters 4 and 5 approach some of the most well-known and well-attested indigenous revolts: the Varian Disaster in Germania Magna (9 CE), the Tacfarinian revolt in Africa (c. 17-24 CE), and the Boudican revolt in Britain (60/1 CE). In Chapter 4, I contextualize these multi-causal revolts within their regional histories and provide a survey of modern assessments of the causes for each revolt. This chapter then serves as a companion piece to Chapter 5, the conclusionary chapter of this project. Here, I draw upon lessons derived from earlier chapters to add fresh perspectives to these multi-causal revolts by exploring how mass resistance against institutions such as the census, taxation, and conscription only erupted under circumstances where there were undercurrents of tension already present within provincial communities. While the sorts of tensions varied greatly between case studies, I contend that revolts were often ignited by opportunism, such as revolts or military campaigning in neighboring regions, or by a Roman inopportune timing in implementing its administrative structures.
In this dissertation I argue that ancient explanations for the causes of revolts do not capture the whole story, but these authors had recognized that there was something about censuses, conscription, and extractions that caused mass resistance, which provides a path towards better understandings of why such institutions could create the circumstances for mass provincial resistance. Through more meaningful examinations of how and when these institutions were implemented and carried out in the first decades of Roman rule, I discover that the institutions in their own rights do not cause resistance, otherwise there would be more examples of such revolts than there are, and they would likely have continued to occur throughout the Principate. Rather, aspects that are largely unique to the early period of Roman rule contributed greatly to the likelihood of revolts against symbols of Roman power (census, taxes, and the military), namely a greater Roman presence (especially of military officers) at local levels in conducting various routine tasks of provincial administration, issues with regional stability and/or a lack of Roman control when operations were conducted, and higher burden levels brought on by the high frequency of Roman campaigning in the Julio-Claudian period.

Through the novel approach taken in this manuscript, my work contributes to ongoing debates on the nature of Roman government in areas such as how Rome exercised its control over subjugated populations and integrated them into the empire. Furthermore, I provide fresh insights into why mass movements of resistance were largely limited to the first fifty years of Roman rule over a region.
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Introduction

In 1987, Thomas Pekáry compiled a list of at least 140 instances of unrest and rebellion in the Roman world in order to question the commonplace belief that the provinces experienced a golden age (saeculum aureum) of peace and prosperity over the two-hundred-year period from Augustus to Commodus, 31 BCE – 192 CE.¹ Most provincial revolts occurred in the first decades after the initial conquest and, according to ancient accounts, were responses to administrative institutions like the provincial census, taxation, auxiliary recruitment, and injustices endured at the hands of imperial agents/policies. Such revolts were an important aspect of the positive and negative negotiations between the state and provincials during the formative years of imperial rule.² If this is the case, then despite great advancements in our understandings of the nature and functioning of the Roman Empire, its administrative apparatus, and how it incorporated recently conquered peoples into the empire, there is still a need to study systemically the relationship between provincial resistance and the administrative institutions cited for causing mass unrest to make further progress on these aspects. This project utilizes known instances of mass provincial resistance towards Roman provincial institutions as a magnifying glass to study how Rome first implemented its administrative structures in recently acquired territories. Through this endeavor, we may see if and how these provincial institutions were conducted differently than in later (and more settled) periods of the Principate, and to what extent the method and timing of Rome implementing these administrative structures could have inadvertently incited resistance. The results will permit us to view from a new angle how Rome

¹ Pekáry 1987. One should note that Pekáry’s list is both incomplete and counts several sorts of unrest and resistance that are not studied here (civil war, mutinies, communal stasis, riots, etc.). It is also very likely that the occurrence of revolts is underreported by Roman authors and the seriousness of some of them was surely played down too (Woolf 1993, 188).
² By this I mean that rebellions and revolts are two in a wide range of ways that provincials could engage with the Roman state. These two are obviously negative negotiations, but others had a more positive nature.
sought to integrate newly conquered/annexed regions to the empire, as well as allow for some deeper insights into why provincial resistance was largely limited to this early period of “provincial” rule.

At the heart of this project is a study of the relationship between Julio-Claudian administrative practices in the provinces and instances of resistance to them. This timeframe is dictated by two related factors: new conquests were infrequent after Augustus, and there are fewer instances of provincial revolts after the Julio-Claudian period. While revolts still occurred after this period, their nature is quite different from those that occurred between 31 BCE and 68 CE. One could argue that the infrequency of revolts after the Julio-Claudian period was due to Rome’s adapting its administrative practices based on experiences elsewhere (perhaps as part of the process leading towards a local consensus of an acceptance of Roman rule). While Roman ambitions in the provinces were to maintain peace (in addition to its financial and material extraction goals), the means of administratively integrating recently conquered or annexed regions was often fraught with tension and occasional violent outbursts. Conquest and incorporation were a process, not a singular moment. It often entailed multiple uprisings and re-conquests as communities resisted first the very fact of conquest and Roman right to rule or make impositions. Later, there could also be revolts against administrative institutions as acts of negative negotiations with the state and its representatives. These tensions and violent outbursts, however, nearly entirely dissipate within the first fifty years of Roman dominance over an area. As such, this provides for a rough chronological framework for this study.

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3 See generally: Pekáry 1987; Woolf 2011. The last plausible indigenous revolts were those that broke out at the end of Nero’s life and during the Year of the Four Emperors. But even there, native revolts like that led by Civilis were fully caught up in the politics of the civil war, which belies a different set of ambitions and perhaps underlying causes of the revolts (cf. Brunt 1959; Dyson, 1975; Haynes 2013, 4-5 n16. See here, 16n26, 193-7, cf. 52).

Historiography

Scholars have addressed issues of provincial revolts in several fields of Roman history. While most studies focus on individual episodes of provincial resistance, there are a few studies that have sought to understand revolts phenomenologically. Within acculturation studies, Stephen Dyson has examined the role of socio-economic and political changes brought about by Roman conquest and incorporation in causing revolts, arguing that revolts often broke out in the second generation after conquest because Rome’s attempts to consolidate its power over newly conquered peoples disrupted local practices (1971, 1975). Meanwhile, recent articles by Greg Woolf (2011) and Myles Lavan (2017) call attention to the way ancient authors wrote about revolt, namely revealing how revolt narratives fit into broader historiographic trends (as well as the intertextuality of narratives), tropes, and authorial agendas. They approach the discourse of revolts in the common themes and terms employed by ancient authors in describing the causes of provincial revolts. We are reminded by them that with the exception of Josephus, we lack accounts by rebels, and that the causes of revolts presented in surviving literature are those espoused by the imperial elite, who are providing their understandings and viewpoints of why provincials would revolt in individual circumstances. In other words, ancient authors were not necessarily reporting indigenous rebels’ viewpoints for why they were in revolt. Studies such as these help us read between the lines to better understand the place of revolts within works and narratives. Furthermore, through such studies we are better equipped to navigate the issues of

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5 As Josephus was a member of the Iudaen priestly aristocracy who participated in the Great Jewish revolt, his narratives can provide insights from a local perspective. But we must be wary of his presentation of causes and events in the revolt. While Josephus had a leading role among the rebels in Galilee, he defected to Rome’s side after his capture at Jotapata. After the war, he wrote his accounts at Rome in Vespasian’s court, which surely affected his presentation of events.

6 For example, Roman authors tend to explain events such as revolts through moralizing analyses rather than assessing the structural causes of revolts, such as economic issues or state repression, or assessing the agency and ambitions of provincials. Thus, revolts are often blamed on Roman moralistic vices (like greed or licentiousness) resulting in injustices or abuses. A second example is the freedom/slavery paradigm that fit into the broader agendas of individual works (on which, see further, Woolf 2011; Lavan 2017. See also here, 61-4).
how Romans understood indigenous revolts and what we can and cannot recover directly from revolt narratives, such as issues in accessing a social history of indigenous resistance to Rome and the precise causes of revolts (especially from a non-Roman perspective).

Recently, Gil Gambash has approached provincial revolts from the field of Roman imperialism. In the first book length project to approach provincial revolts, he focuses on the agency and various responses of Roman central policymakers, as well as how they managed tensions with provincials, handled revolts when they broke out, behaved when revolts ended, and how Rome commemorated revolts (Gambash 2015). In assessing Rome's approach to governing recently conquered populations, Gambash argues that its agents typically preferred to allow indigenous notables to govern locally and for these notables to use an array of means to express grievances to Roman agents as needs arose. When peaceful coexistence was broken and revolts erupted, he shows that Rome was pragmatic in the ways it approached a return to a peaceful rule by dealing as little damage and disruption to routine practice as possible. But when punitive measures were required, they were reserved only for those offering the utmost stubborn resistance; the rest of the population was typically spared of violent reprisals.7

Beyond the few attempts to analyze provincial revolts systemically, there is a wealth of publications on the most well-known and well-attested indigenous rebellions and revolts; for instance, in our period there are the Boudican revolt, Varian Disaster, and Tacfarinian revolt (see further below). Additionally, there is often mention of localized resistance in studies on individual provinces, though these are typically relegated to a paragraph or a small section in a chapter, perhaps to merely admit that things were not always rosy in the provinces (see below for references to provincial studies). This is meant not as a criticism of these works but rather to show that revolts are often a minor focus in provincial studies. The goal of this dissertation is

7 Gambash 2015.
thus to provide a general study on a subset of provincial resistance, namely those blaming
Roman administration and its institutions as causes. It is my hope that this project will bring the
studies on indigenous resistance to the Roman Empire more into conversation with areas such as
Roman imperialism, provincial administration, military history, and to a lesser extent
acculturation studies.

One of the reasons for this dearth of scholarship on indigenous revolts is that the
surviving literary explanations for the causes and motivations for revolts come only from Roman
authors. This makes understanding the relationships between Rome (and its representatives) and
the indigenous populations under its control all the more difficult. Furthermore, many revolt
narratives are extremely short, making attempts to analyze and contextualize them frustratingly
difficult. For instance, one of the shortest accounts studied here is the Dalmatian revolt of 10
BCE, which Cassius Dio described in two sentences: “…the Dalmatians rebelled against the
exactions of tribute. Against these people Tiberius was sent from Gaul, whither he had gone in
company with Augustus; and he reduced them again to submission” (Cass. Dio 54.36.2-3-
Earnest Cary trans.).

In terms of provincial studies, scholars have made great gains in our knowledge of
provincial affairs over the past several decades in areas such as administration, governance,
acculturation/Romanization, provincialization, and the nature of frontiers. At the same time,
many of these provincial studies gained their strides through relatively narrow foci on individual
provinces, regions, or studies on a limited number of disparate provinces over a broad

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8 Lavan 2017, 20.
9 “…οἱ Δελμάται πρὸς τὰς ἐπιφάνειας τῶν χρημάτων ἐπανέστησαν. καὶ τούτους μὲν ὁ Τιβέριος ἐκ τῆς Γαλατίας, ἐς ἣν μετὰ τοῦ Ἄγοιοστου ἐπεληφθείς, καταπεμφθείς ἀνεκτήσατο.”
chronological period.\textsuperscript{10} By focusing on individual provinces scholars have often commented on the unique qualities or quirks of their provinces of study and have created something of a sense that the creation and administration of Roman provinces were \textit{ad hoc} in nature.\textsuperscript{11} As this project focuses on a broader geographical scale, there is an opportunity to take a step back and reassess a somewhat pertinent question: to what extent are the provinces and the range of experiences experienced by provincials similar?

To a certain extent this question has been addressed in several different kinds of studies that often focused on positive aspects of provincial administration and acculturation, presenting the view that Roman administration was both a good thing and was largely well-received by provincials.\textsuperscript{12} And while these studies, again often focused on long-term trends, are right to show that there was little overall resistance to Roman rule over the course of the Principate, there are certainly plenty of studies to show that resistance did occur and could at times be serious.\textsuperscript{13} For the studies of Roman provinces that do not even mention resistance, or merely give it a paragraph, it is understandable because any resistance made in a given province was often just a momentary deviation from an otherwise quiet Roman rule lasting centuries. But as resistance was an important aspect of the positive and negative negotiations towards Rome’s working relationships in the provinces, it is worthwhile to narrow the focus down from hundreds of years to the critical early years of various provinces’ existences to see more clearly how relatively peaceful coexistence between the empire and its subject peoples developed. Bearing this in mind,

\textsuperscript{10} For example: Woolf 1998 (Gaul); Curchin 1991 (Spain); Le Roux 2010 (Spain); Wilkes 1969 (Dalmatia); Alföldy 1974 (Noricum); Dise 1991 (Balkans); Kovács 2014 (Pannonia); Capponi 2005 (Egypt); Mitchell 1993 (Asia Minor); Creighton 2006 (Britain); Mattingly 2006 (Britain).

\textsuperscript{11} Scholars may be led to believe that Rome used \textit{ad hoc} measures due to the regional variations for systematic measures like taxation (the kinds of taxes, especially indirect taxes and tolls, and levels of taxation), location of forts or soldiers, and certain institutions such as provincial level cults to the imperial family (like in Gallia Comata and Germania Magna).

\textsuperscript{12} For positive aspects of Roman dominion and several of the issues presented below, see Woolf 2011, 28ff.

\textsuperscript{13} For instance, see the plethora of works on Boudicca, Arminius, and the Great Jewish revolt.
there are several opportunities out there that have been hitherto largely unexplored by scholars. While there has been a multitude of works on individual revolts or surveys of the largest revolts, there has not been one that focuses empire-wide on resistance to Rome during the first decades of a province’s existence.\textsuperscript{14} A study of this sort would allow us to better understand not only the causes of revolt and how they start, but would also add to our understanding of the positive aspects of Roman rule already attested by others.

\textbf{Where does my project fit in? What does it hope to achieve?}

While Gil Gambash’s work will greatly contribute to our understanding of the complex relationships between central policy makers and provincial populations (under friendly and hostile circumstances), there is room to expand upon our knowledge of provincial resistance by looking at the institutions that are reported by ancient sources to have caused such resistance. Through a greater understanding of how Rome’s administrative institutions were implemented and conducted among provincial communities one may better understand the circumstances leading to revolts in new and more meaningful ways. In that respect this project will differ from the recent work of Gambash, which focused on the personal agency and policies of decision-makers. This project also endeavors to understand Rome’s attempts to navigate and negotiate varying local circumstances across the empire in its efforts to effectively maintain control over regions with minimal disruption or resistance by surveying: (i) how soon after conquest and annexation did Rome implement various institutions; (ii) the timing of an institution’s implementation with respect to other significant events at regional and imperial levels, such as military campaigning and needs of the state; (iii) how the institutions were conducted at an early

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. Gambash 2015.
date in a province’s history; and (iv) the impact of Roman exactions on particular populations in extraordinary circumstances such as times of war. While the implementation of these institutions and the way they were conducted in the early Principate fulfilled essential stately functions, the disruptions they brought to local customs and practices had the potential to incite resistance among recently conquered territories.

**Terms, Limits, and Methodology**

At this time, it would be prudent to define some terms and lay down the extent of institutions that this project will address. To start, it would be useful to define what is meant by “provincial” in this context. This project will follow Gambash in treating any area that was formally or informally within Rome’s sphere of control, such as allied tribes and client-states, as “provincial”.\(^\text{15}\) In this way, one may treat major revolts that occurred when Rome was consolidating a more direct control over populations that were in the process of being incorporated into the empire, such as the revolts led by Arminius and Boudica.\(^\text{16}\) It is also important to define what will be referred to as provincial resistance here. The language employed by Romans to describe revolts presents a challenge in distinguishing different types of resistance and movements because ancient authors used terms indiscriminately, resulting in different types of conflicts and disruptions being conflated in the source material (indigenous revolts, banditry, communal stasis, civil war/coup attempts, etc.).\(^\text{17}\) For example, the Tacfarinian revolt is described by different authors as an African war (*bellum Africum*), banditry (*Gaetulorum*

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16 The Iceni revolted when they were in the process of being annexed, and there are ongoing debates about whether Germania Magna was a province or not in 9 CE. Roman sources refer to both incidents, as well as similar events on the fringes of Illyricum in the Augustan era, as revolts (see further, pages 236-82, 295-309, 323-31).

17 Lavan 2017, 22-4. One may see further here for an analysis of Latin nouns and verbal phrases utilized by authors, mainly Tacitus, in the period from Augustus to Trajan.
latrocinia), and as a disturbance in Africa.\textsuperscript{18} These descriptions cause interpretative issues on the nature of the episode, banditry (a delegitimized form of resistance) versus foreign war, neither of which are in line with modern interpretations that this conflict was an indigenous revolt. Furthermore, the language deployed does not give voice or agency to the indigenous populations in revolt. The choice of language employed here to describe the scope and types of resistance reflects both an interpretative choice and an attempt to attribute political action to the indigenous populations seeking to overthrow Roman rule, seeking to cast off particular burdens, seeking revenge for misdeeds, or seeking to change how they are governed.

As far as the type of resistance this project approaches, it is only concerned with mass communal resistance to Rome, meaning when one or more communities resisted Rome. One must bear in mind that provincial resistance never involved all the communities within a province, nor did revolts entail the participation of every member of a community. Most instances of mass resistance that occur in this project were active (or open). This is a violent form of resistance that could result in fierce, large-scale revolts.\textsuperscript{19} Oftentimes, the first act of such instances of resistance is the ambushing or murdering of local Roman soldiers, officials, and/or citizens. This project will also occasionally describe acts of communal passive resistance, namely incidents where large portions of one or more communities refuse, flee, or evade impositions made by the imperial state and its agents. In this project, passive resistance most often takes the form of a refusal to enroll in the census.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{18} Bellum Africum (Vell. Pat. 2.129.4; Tac. Ann. 2.52, 3.20). Gaetulorum latrocinia (Aur. Vic. De Caes. 2.3; Ps. Aur. Vic. Epit. 2.8). Disturbance (Tac. Ann. 3.32.1): \textit{missis ad senatum litteris Tiberius motam rursum Africam incursa Tacfarinatis docuit} “Tiberius sent a letter to the senate informing them that Africa had been disturbed again by an incursion of Tacfarinas.”

\textsuperscript{19} For instance, the Great Illyrian revolt, Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt, Tacfarinas’, and Boudica’s revolts.

\textsuperscript{20} Census of Drusus in 13/2 BCE and the census of Quirinius in 6 CE) (one could also count mass acts of evading auxilia service (either by flight or desertion), such as the Usipetes (Tac. Agr. 28). Similarly, other incidents initially began as passive resistance as portions of communities fled impositions by Roman or client-state agents, but
This project, especially Chapters 1 and 2, utilizes James Scott’s model of a state using state simplifications to make their subject populations more legible. 21 The purpose of making these populations more legible, more knowable and therefore “manipulable- from above and from the center,” is to help guarantee the standard “state functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion.” 22 State simplifications are the various processes used by the state that strips away the complex, disparate socio-political knowledge and customs of local subject populations – land tenure systems, languages, weights and measures, etc.—to make a standard through which the center may measure, assess, and control those populations. The implementation of these institutions (such as the census, Roman legal forms, property measurements and assessments, and the encouragement of centralized urban centers) consisted of attempts by Rome to make its provincial populations more legible. But while the implementation of these institutions achieved that aim, it could disrupt the customs and practices of the local populations. In recently acquired provinces, this process could exasperate the already difficult situation wherein communities were coming to terms with Roman domination, and lead to provincial resistance.

As to the limits of this study, three major administrative and imperial institutions are analyzed in relation to provincial resistance in this project: the Roman military, the provincial census, and taxation. Additionally, this project covers other institutions and systems of provincial control where primary source material or modern scholarship ascribes tensions or actual resistance to them, such as administrative urban centers (civitates), the building of road networks, conscription, and military supply logistics. Each of these administrative institutions

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21 Scott 1998.
and systems of control is worthy of full studies in its own right. Because not every facet of these institutions can be analyzed within the scope of this project, only a limited set of questions and issues are approached in relation to how they could have contributed to mass communal resistance in the first decades of imperial rule in a given region. For example, unlike previous studies which have focused on the titles, statuses, and names of those who carried out the provincial census, or used the census for economic or demographic inquiries, Chapter 2 is concerned with how the provincial census was carried out in a new province in its initial iterations to see if it was conducted differently than in later periods. If the census was conducted differently in this period, it explores how the census could have unknowingly played a role in creating conditions for revolt.

The geographic scope of this project is only limited by which provinces yield evidence for the institutions under review or by which places yield evidence of resistance to those institutions within fifty years of conquest. As Chapter 2 notes (page 111), it is often difficult to determine when conquest was completed or when Rome began to administratively intervene in a region or when annexation occurred (see below). This provides some leeway in determining which incidents of mass resistance get used as case studies. For instance, while Caesar completed the initial conquest of Gallia Comata in the 50s BCE, Rome does not appear to have begun to intervene administratively in a meaningful way until 27 BCE, despite some ad hoc measures taken in the 30s BCE (see further, 135-7). Therefore, this project takes Augustus’ census of Gaul in 27 BCE as the starting point for the fifty-year timeframe for resistance. For the geographic range of resistance, case studies come from Gallia Comata (census of Drusus- 12 BCE; revolt of Florus and Sacrovir- 21 CE), Illyricum (Dalmatian revolt- 10 BCE; Great Illyrian revolt- 6-9 CE), Germania Magna (Varian Disaster- 9 CE; Frisian revolt- 28 CE), Judaea (6 CE), Africa
Proconsularis (Tacfarinas’ revolt- ca. 17-24 CE), Cilicia (revolt of the Cietae- ca. 36 CE), and Britain (Boudica’s revolt- 60/1 CE). Additionally, reference is made to several other revolts throughout to supplement and provide *comparanda* for case studies and analyses. In addition to the provinces covered by revolts, evidence on administrative institutions will come from the above provinces as well as from Egypt, Arabia, Syria, Lusitania, Raetia, Cottian and Maritime Alps, Moesia, Macedonia, Thrace, Armenia Minor and Cappadocia, Commagene, Sardinia, and Corsica. In the main, the chronological framework of this project is limited to evidence from the Julio-Claudian period, 31 BCE – 68 CE. While the periodization is relatively narrow, roughly 100 years, I also interact with material beyond the confines of the Julio-Claudian period where relevant, especially to contextualize this type of revolt as episodic (limited in time to the early empire). Furthermore, evidence from earlier and later periods is also incorporated to reveal how certain administrative activities differed, such as taxation, the provincial census, and *auxilia* service.

Acknowledging the fact that we do not have the viewpoints of the indigenous peoples in revolt, I seek a path that attempts to recover, even only minimally, why provincials would revolt against the institutions that elite Romans perceived were the causes of mass unrest and revolt. To this end, I investigate the institutions that Romans thought caused revolts to better understand if, how, and under what circumstances these institutions could foment and incite unrest among provincials. In this vein I hope to access the voiceless. Within these interrogations there is a desire to better understand how Rome and its agents attempted to navigate and negotiate varying local circumstances across the empire in its efforts to effectively maintain control over its subject populations. As such this project is very much concerned with the method and timing of the implementation of various institutions. Revolt narratives certainly suggest that there is a
correlation between the implementation of censuses or routinized taxation and resistance, but the situation is surely more often complex. It is very hard to imagine that many of these peoples had never experienced taxation of some kind before, even taxation directed towards a larger, centralized state (of varying degrees). There must be something more to the situation than simply the implementation of census and taxes. For if it was purely how the census was carried out in the provinces, and the taxation that ensued, then why is there no evidence of resistance to these institutions in more provinces? Or, why does resistance to these institutions disappear after a few decades across the board? And while it is possible to simply state that resistance to these institutions ended after a generation or two because subject populations acclimated to these processes, it is highly likely that there are other more satisfying explanations out there. In other words, my contention is that ancient explanations for the causes of revolts do not capture the whole story, but as these authors had recognized that there was something about the census, conscription, and fiscal extractions among recently subjugated populations that caused unrest, they provide a path towards a deeper understanding of why such institutions could create the circumstances for mass provincial resistance.

Another concern is the relative degree of perceived control Rome levied when it attempted to conduct tasks or exactions for the first time. In other words, how recently an area was pacified/acquired and how firm Rome’s grip was on an area when it conducted these tasks could be a major factor in the occurrence of revolts. Relatedly, this project engages with the contexts of impositions and the early implementations of state extraction schemes and institutions. For instance, were there military campaigns or specific state needs ongoing when Rome determined to implement a census, conscription, or taxation in recently acquired territories? If so, the immediate needs of the state may have dictated the decision to make
impositions or conduct tasks before a population was thoroughly subdued. Were there legions in the area? The presence of military forces could not only provide a friction point, but equally their sudden absence could likewise provide an opportunity for locals to resist Roman control.

Likewise, the same question may be asked for high ranking officials. It is frequently seen in the case studies that the transition periods between governors and indigenous rulers (here, often client kings) are volatile moments in the relations between states and subject populations.

Similarly, when high ranking officials leave a region for military campaigns or to return to Rome over winter periods (such as imperial family members) there was a greater risk of provincials revolting against impositions and Roman administrative institutions. Finally, this project is concerned with questions of how these institutions were carried out at an early date in a province’s history. Answering the question of who was administering the census and gathering taxes at an early date and how these operations were conducted in the early Principate allows us to better understand why mass communal resistance to these institutions did not occur in later periods.

Through such questions one may find, for instance, that an inopportune timing of an irregular exaction, or even exactions over any period, could impoverish locals and potentially drive an area to rebel. Likewise, locales with a higher Roman presence at lower civic levels may lead to more unrest than areas with less of a Roman presence. Or even still, perhaps the speed at which Roman institutions like the census or taxation were imposed on populations may be a key in understanding why resistance occurred in some places and not in others. Regional and global contexts could likewise explain anti-fiscal resistance in the early Principate. If Rome rarely increased the tribute rate on provincial communities, and sought to maintain taxation at
sustainable levels,\textsuperscript{23} then the average yearly taxes and tributes were likely not the cause of anti-fiscal resistance. Rather, there may have been contexts that increased the likelihood for revolt, such as extended periods of military campaigning wherein irregular taxation and \textit{ad hoc} exactions on top of routine exactions greatly increased the burden levels placed on provincials.

The approach taken in this project comes with certain methodological sacrifices. This project focuses on imperial institutions, which entails assuming a certain consistency in imperial administrative practices and responses to various situations, leaving minimal opportunities to discuss Rome’s responses to the cultural particularities and values of specific local contexts among the diverse cultures under its rule. Similarly, this project suggests that the levels of existing urbanization upon annexation determined how Rome governed and utilized its administrative institutions, rather than viewing a geographical division administratively between the East and West. The important thing to note is that Rome adapted to local circumstances to achieve the same ends regardless of whether it was in the East or West.\textsuperscript{24} This approach focusses less on local practices and peculiarities, and instead draws patterns on how Rome tended to govern its provinces and administer institutions during the early decades of its rule. It is my belief that by doing so, it is possible to uncover how, why, and under what circumstances indigenous populations may have negative reactions to Rome’s rule at such an early date in ways different to later periods of Roman history. Through this approach I am also able to analyze and compare the circumstances leading to revolts against specific institutions, despite such variations in local contexts and cultures.

Another sacrifice is that decisions made in the type of revolts to survey and the chronological limits of how long to survey individual regions have meant that a pair of well-

\textsuperscript{23} For instance, Gambash 2015; Tan 2015.
\textsuperscript{24} Cf. Le Teuff 2012a, 320.
known revolts from the end of the Julio-Claudian period have been omitted from the case studies – the Batavian revolt and the Great Jewish revolt.²⁵ One other major methodological sacrifice to mention concerns the thematic approach of the chapters. A decision was made to organize this project thematically around institutions and instances of resistance to them, which means that when certain regions appear over multiple chapters, events and developments within them may be taken out of order. For example, events and developments in Gallia Comata, including Germania Magna, are described throughout this project in analyses of institutions and case studies. The events, however, are taken out of order by the thematic approach utilized here, preventing a fluid narrative of the incorporation of Gallia Comata into the empire and resistance movements from 39 BCE to 68 CE.

**Romanization and its role in the project**

Romanization has formed a key aspect of studies on provincial revolts in the past. As the periods prior to and after conquest often witnessed great changes within indigenous societies, revolts in the years after conquest have been seen in various ways as provincials resisting acculturation.²⁶ Scholars in more recent times have pushed back against the notion that provincials were passive receptors of Roman culture and modes of living in favor of (some) local elites taking a more active role in adopting aspects of Roman culture, while (re)defining their local cultures and identities after incorporation into the empire.²⁷ This need not necessarily mean that Rome did not

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²⁵ Both revolts are excluded as case studies because they broke out after the first five decades of Roman provincial rule in their respective regions. Furthermore, the causes of the Great Jewish revolt do not align with those surveyed here. Meanwhile, in the case of the Batavians, the revolt was intimately intertwined with the politics of the civil wars after Nero’s death, which makes it difficult to define as an indigenous revolt (Haynes 2013, 4-5, n.16). One may note, though, that while the Batavian revolt is excluded as a case study, aspects of the revolt has parallels to other revolts under review here and, and such, this revolt will be discussed where relevant.

²⁶ For example, Dyson 1971; Bénabou 1976.

encourage or facilitate the adoption or expansion of culture, especially centralized urban
development. These developments on acculturation studies of course have implications for the
role that societal changes had in the outbreak of revolts, but tensions within societies because of
socio-cultural and political changes will play only a minor role in this project. While this topic
merits re-examination considering advances in the field since the 1990s, a choice was made to
study revolts from institutional and sociopolitical perspectives rather than a sociocultural
perspective. Where this project approaches socio-political change, it largely focuses on
centralized urban development and elite competition. As this project is concerned with urban
development, road network building, census taking, conscription, military supply, taxation, etc.,
the changes among provincial populations traced here are more institutional in nature: changes in
local hierarchies and structures of them, military service, tax systems, and local government. The
hope is that this narrower focus will open insights into these changes contributed to the
underlying tensions underpinning mass resistance to Roman administrative institutions.

The role of abuses in causing revolts

P.A. Brunt long ago pushed back against the view that Augustus enacted vast administrative
reforms of Rome’s empire that ended the gross abuse and exploitation of provincial populations
by the large publicani companies and governors of the late Republic. While he acknowledged
that such a view cannot be disproven, he rightfully pointed out that though provincials seem to
have greatly benefitted and prospered from the pax Augusta, “it is unsafe to argue that…(the
provinces) were necessarily governed with far more honesty and justice than in the late
Republic.” In essence, abuses and maladministration by imperial agents continued to largely

29 Brunt 1961; cf. Eck 2007, 97-9; idem 2009a, 234-5.
exist to the same degree as they had in the late Republic. Focusing on repetundae (extortion), vis (force), and maiestas (treason) laws and court cases he showed that they were still frequent in the Julio-Claudian period – in fact, there were thirty-one or thirty-two known cases/charges brought before the courts in this period.\(^{30}\) While his article also treated the method and likelihood of provincials receiving compensation from appeals,\(^{31}\) I want to focus on one of his arguments in particular, namely the role of abuses in causing provincial revolts. Given the uncertainty of restitution and the potential for imperial agents to go unpunished for maladministration and abuses, Brunt argued that, if injustices were left too long, a revolt would break out, using the Great Jewish revolt in the Neronian period as a case in point. Furthermore, citing several references to provincial revolts, he argued that abused provincials in places he called “uncivilized areas” “could hardly know their legal rights…(and that) rebellions in imperial provinces are the counterpart of prosecutions from senatorial (provinces).”\(^{32}\) He perceived that this situation continued until the early 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) century CE, since there are no certain attestations of governors being prosecuted for repetundae in these sorts of provinces before the reign of Hadrian.\(^{33}\)

This explanation seems unsatisfying. It seems unlikely that even relatively recently conquered peoples were unaware that they could take up issues over their maltreatment before

\(^{30}\) Brunt 1961. Quotes, p. 189. See pp. 224-6 for Brunt’s list of cases with further details. His paper had also traced Roman expansion and refining of these laws in the late Republic and Principate, which would suggest that there were still frequent issues concerning maladministration in the provinces.

\(^{31}\) The only way provincials could receive compensation was to secure a conviction in court, often before senators or the emperor (Brunt 1961, 194, 199, 201). But conviction was not always certain, especially if the imperial representative held the emperor’s favor. Furthermore, there was no guarantee that the emperor would always hear appeals from provincial communities in these matters (ibid., 206-8). Being that there are more prosecutions for senatorial provinces than imperial ones it is possible that either imperial agents, whose very appointments relied on imperial favor, were being protected or provincials may have deemed it “too hazardous to assail one who appeared high in the Emperor’s esteem” (ibid., 211).


\(^{33}\) Brunt 1961, 212.
Roman officials within their province or at Rome. In fact, in one of Brunt’s examples, the Frisian revolt, the locals had appealed to Roman officials when their tribute burdens were suddenly increased by Olennius before ultimately revolting (Tac. Ann. 4.72- see further, pages 58-72).

Provincial communities surely had some familiarity with their rights or means to find them out given the number of Roman citizens present in the provinces, let alone the fact that communities seemed to have sought various immunities and privileges and that provincials brought cases before governors during assizes from a relatively early date.34

As to the correlation between abuses waged on provincials by imperial agents and the occurrence of revolts, I strongly believe that we need to reassess the link heretofore promoted by scholars. As Brunt and many others have shown, abuses towards provincials continued to exist throughout the Principate, yet provincial revolts largely ceased within the first fifty years of Roman rule in a given province. Governors, procurators, imperial slaves, and soldiers all had the capacity to use their connections and uneven power dynamics to exert themselves over individuals and provincial communities, especially given that imperial agents were more frequently utilized in tasks in this period.35 For example, there was a wide array of ways that soldiers could abuse provincials: extortion, beatings, theft, making illegal exactions (or rather exact more than they are legally entitled to do), and rape.36 Despite the relative frequency of

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34 For instance, it is feasible that the proliferation of provincial councils provided spaces for provincials of differing communities to discuss issues with one another and place where such questions of their rights could be answered by someone who happens the law.

35 For example, imperial agents, especially soldiers, were used to collect and raise taxes, gather supplies, and conduct census operations. See further, pages 31-5, 50-72, and 114-20. This is not to state that emperors and other officials did not express an interest in hearing provincial appeals and stamping out abusive behaviors. Despite such positive efforts, though, abuses continued to occur.

these abuses, they rarely were the cause of revolts in and of themselves, though abuses and maladministration could be a catalyst for revolts. To restate this in another way, it is my contention that, if a revolt was sparked by an act of abuse, there must have already been underlying tensions and discontent in the affected communities. Furthermore, even in cases where the source material cites oppression, abuses, and maladministration as the cause of revolts there are grounds for being wary. Recent works by Greg Woolf and Myles Lavan show the common themes and tropes that appear in provincial revolt narratives and their causes; Romans often explained the occurrence of revolts as the result of bad government, hence a focus on the abuses, greed, and lust of Roman agents in accounts. One must also separate instances of outright abuse from those instances where the implementation of imperial policy by a Roman agent was ill-received by locals and led to revolt. It is easy to take ancient authors at face-value in their evaluations of the intentions and actions of Roman agents such as Olennius (Chapter 1) or Varus (Chapter 4) as acts of abuse, but closer inspection reveals that such characters were at times likely carrying out directions from the center and were used as scapegoats when locals reacted adversely to the measures implemented (see individual case studies). Additionally, given that most abuses were likely aimed at individuals and families it is somewhat difficult to assume that an abuse would cause mass resistance. Rather, the only way that abuses could likely spark a revolt is if large segments of one or more communities were oppressed, such as the actions of Rectus), no 163 (edict of Vergilius Capito); P. Oxy. 240 (extortion ring). One could also look to satire. “Juvenal presents a picture of the overweening soldier, ready to resort to force against any civilian who failed to comply with his demands” and Sadderton urges us to not simply discount this presentation as a mere “stock rhetorical theme” (Juv. 16.13-7; 24-5; 2012, 123). On this theme in Juvenal, see further, Umurhan 2018, 137-45.


Gambash 2015; Joseph. BJ 2.342-407 (speech of Agrippa II). Cf. Frisian case study Chapter 1, and Varian Disaster in Chapter 4. Examples of outright abuse occur for instance in the Agricola, the Boudican revolt, and the Batavian revolt.

For example, officers in Britain had compelled the farmers “to deliver grain to granaries at great distances form their farms and then forced them to pay large sums to be excused from the cost of the transport involved” (Saddington, 2012, 124; Tac. Agr. 19). Though it surely affected many individual families, a revolt did not break out. This may be due to the lack of a charismatic individual to unite the discontented or that provincials never gathered to realize their common complaints. Both of these issues are taken up in chapters 2, 4, and 5.
Sabinus in Jerusalem after Herod’s death in 4 BCE (Jos. BJ 2.41, 46) or Catus Decianus’ mishandled annexation of the Iceni (Tac. Ann. 14.31). Even in these instances, there were already several tension points present within these communities prior to the oppressive measures of imperial agents; in other words, these communities were already powder kegs of tension just waiting for ignition. So, while there is abundant evidence of predation and abuses on provincial populations at the hands of imperial agents, they do not seem to be in evidence as significant factors in the type of large-scale revolts studied here, and as such they only play a small role in the analyses that follow.

**Disruption and Change Post Conquest**

To conclude this introduction, it may be fruitful to briefly describe in general terms some of the disruptions and impacts that conquest and incorporation had on indigenous societies in the first years after conquest. It is my hope that this will frame and contextualize the tensions pre-existing in indigenous societies when Rome sought to inaugurate its forms of administration and control on recently conquered populations. The pre- and post-conquest periods were times of massive changes amongst local communities, because subjugation did not happen in isolation. There was almost always pre-war contact with Roman society, which often saw changes and developments in indigenous communities even prior to conquest.⁴⁰ The most immediate impact of conquest was the death and destruction brought on by the initial war and subsequent reconquests. Aside from the loss of life, warfare had a devastating impact (unevenly across the landscape) on the production capabilities and wealth of local populations.⁴¹ Advances in conflict archaeology are beginning to bear fruit on how conquest was achieved, or the devastation wrought by warfare. In

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⁴⁰ See for instance, Creighton 2000; *idem.* 2006
places like the northwest of the Iberian Peninsula, the Dinaric Alps of Illyricum, or southwestern Britain the fighting was fierce, and Rome had to systemically capture sites, one by one, because the local populations sought refuge rather than pitched battle. In many places, this resulted in sieges and the destruction of indigenous hillforts, castella, and settlements. At sites like Monte Bernorio in Spain, archaeology attests to the violent end of the site with Roman and native militaria, “abundant ash, charcoal, and burnt or carbonized artefacts.” One can only imagine the collateral damage and civilian casualties. Sometimes Rome resorted to extreme measures to set an example and intimidate neighboring populations into submitting or complying with Roman demands. Rome might chop off the hands of defeated warriors, as occurred during the Cantabrian Wars. Rome might also sell captives into slavery or conscript men of military age to deny locals the ability to revolt. When Rome conquered Raetia in 15 BCE Tiberius and Drusus feared the potential for revolt because of the large male population, so “they deported most of the strongest men of military age, leaving behind only enough to give the country a population, but too few to begin a revolution” (Cass. Dio 54.22.5). A few years later, after a victorious campaign in Pannonia, Tiberius broke his foes’ weapons and sold the men of military age into slavery to prevent further disturbances from the tribes in the region (Flor. 2.24; Cass. Dio 54.31.3). While such measures were typically reserved only for those occasions where Rome met fierce resistance, it was always a possibility and happened often enough to warrant mention. The loss of leaders and countless men of military age, not to mention those who survived maimed or crippled by war, represented severe challenges for indigenous populations to experience imperial exactions (such as tribute and conscription) and make ends meet locally.

42 Torres-Martínez et al. 2012, 531.
43 Torres-Martínez et al. 2012, 531; Torres-Martínez and Fernández-Götz 2017. From the same way, settlement destructions are attested archaeologically in the modern provinces of Cantabria, Palencia, and Burgos.
After conquest, populations were occasionally displaced by the state to more effectively count and control local populations. In our period, one example of this process was the forced movement of hillfort populations to lowland areas during the Cantabrian War in the 20s BCE (Flor. 2.33.52, 59-60). Similarly, the foundation of colonies could displace portions of or entire local populations from their lands in favor of veterans and other Roman citizens to settle upon them. Conquest also had the potential to break socio-political hierarchies within indigenous populations, including the breaking up of large tribal federations or appointing new leaders among certain communities.44

Furthermore, once Rome established its hold over conquered populations, new avenues of elite competition and advancement were created by Roman forms of administration, which could also create friction points between new and old local elites. For instance, enrollment in the auxilia presented opportunities for advancement for some local elites and provided a means to enter imperial service. Because the state now controlled the access to martial prowess, it disrupted former power structures of some societies where local power was based around combat leaders building up retainers around them (see further, pages 230-5). Changes in units of measurement, acceptable coinages, land tenure systems, and the language of law and stately affairs (perhaps even at the local level) could elicit a range of responses and impacts. The same could be said for changes in the local economy. Rome built its own road networks, in part influenced by pre-Roman routes, primarily for military purposes (to control populations inside and outside of provinces, to supply forces, and to move information and people across space). But these roads could also be used for economic purposes by locals and foreigners alike. The changes in communications networks had the potential to shift economic and political centers of

44 For instance, see further Illyricum after the Great Illyrian revolt, pages 41-4 and 345-50, or the Treveri in the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir, pages 201-36.
gravity within indigenous spaces, informing imperial choices in administrative centers as locals could be easier to control if their main sites were along the major roads in a region. This might entail favoring a new site over older, more established native *oppida*. Rome did these things for the sake of enhancing their control over indigenous populations, potentially ignoring local identities, meanings, and practices – all of which could serve as friction points that could contribute to unrest. The creation of new sites and garrison forts likewise had the potential to shift local/regional economic and political centers of gravity as they suddenly drew surpluses in from their surrounding country-sides and created new markets and demands that were not always going to be readily accepted by local populations. Furthermore, the impact of tribute, (in)direct taxes, requisitions, etc. could all frustrate communities, especially in this early transitional period.

Even if a population went over to Rome without a fight, it surely experienced several of these ascribed changes and possibly some internal factionalism. I do want to finish this brief survey on a more positive note. We should bear in mind that some individuals and communities could and did greatly benefit from the conquest by maintaining or attaining newfound statuses, wealth, and positions in their local communities that could eventually lead to entrance and advancement in Roman imperial society. For example, some local notables could use connections made with prominent Romans while holding local offices or serving as prefects of auxiliary units to receive recommendations for equestrian posts in the imperial administration, such as procuratorships and prefectures, thus advancing their statuses locally and provincially.

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45 One must be ready to admit that local elites also engaged in building new sites to take advantage of these new road networks. It is possible that this could also create friction within indigenous communities, but it is difficult to measure.
Structure of Dissertation

As soldiers were ever present in recently conquered regions and often were utilized by the state for a wide-range of operations, especially in the first decades after conquest, this project begins with an examination of the use of military officers as prefects set over certain provincial populations (praefecti civitatum/nationum and other related terms). For Rome this was one possible means to closely observe and control potentially hostile populations, especially in circumstances where Rome could not rely on the local elites to govern and administer themselves for one reason or another. This will set the tone for the rest of the project as military personnel were also frequently present in extraction schemes and census operations in the Julio-Claudian period, which suggests that there was a higher presence of Roman agents in the early decades of Roman rule over an area. The frequent presence of soldiers in state-imposed operations and their potential to use their positions of power to abuse or oppress subject peoples could provide friction points between the state and provincial populations, thus creating situations ripe for mass resistance. On the study of these military prefects, I both incorporate and expand upon previous scholarship of these poorly understood provincial administrators.

Previous scholarship on military prefects has tended to focus on three broad areas of interest. First, there are prosopographical studies of equestrians serving in Roman imperial administration. Second, there are regional studies, often for North Africa and Central Europe, that seek to understand the contexts of their appointment, the way Rome sought to administer and control a region, and to understand when Rome utilized indigenous elites rather than Roman citizens for this type of command. A third category of scholarship seeks to better understand these prefects by linking and comparing them to provincial governorships held by equestrians (such as Judaea, Egypt, and Sardinia), as opposed to those held by senators. Taking these three
foci into account, I explain the use of military prefects among local populations by emphasizing Roman concerns about the trustworthiness of local populations to conduct specific tasks or concerns about a population’s propensity for unrest. I also contextualize the periodicity of their use regionally to show that they were largely limited to the decades immediately following annexation. This would then suggest that in certain places and instances there was a greater Roman presence among provincial populations and would allow us to view the potential relationship between military officers operating at local levels and occurrences of revolt or unrest in recently annexed territories in a new way.46

In Chapter 2, I examine the introduction and operation of the provincial census in the early Principate to show how this institution could cause unrest among provincial populations. Due to the very fragmentary nature of the literary, epigraphic, and papyrological evidence, which spans several hundred years, scholarship often presents the provincial census as a relatively static institution rather than tracing how it developed and changed over time. It is maintained here, however, that it is possible to trace how the provincial census was initially implemented and what that would have entailed in a recently annexed region in this period. The chapter is organized around four principal questions: what did the census ask of people, and how did it work? Why was the census introduced on top of Rome’s pre-existing tax-regimes? How long would Rome typically wait after annexation before Rome administered its first provincial census in a region? And who conducted local census operations in these recently annexed regions? Through these four questions I argue that the information required of provincials for the census could vary across provinces as well who was liable and when. Despite the variation in practice across provinces there were certain types of information commonly asked of provincials. Such

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46 One should note that the use of military administrators existed side-by-side with local self-government in the same province, meaning that the decision to officers as prefects over populations was circumstantial and on a case by case rather than a broad geo-political policy.
types of information were: where people lived within the province (usually just enough
information to track down individuals should the need arise); who lived at the property, how old
each person was, and what their status was; to record certain types of properties and resources
that may be found on their property. The depth of the information thus obtained goes beyond
mere tax and assessment functions and reveals both the invasiveness of the process and the depth
to which Rome sought to know its population. To this end the Roman state sought the kind of
information useful for controlling a population and for propagating the power of the emperor and
Rome.

As to why this institution was introduced in the Augustan era, it may be argued that the
utility of the information obtained from provincial censuses could provide a more reliable
knowledge of the empire’s resources, which allows for a more predictable income to support the
state’s needs, like the professional army introduced in the reign of Augustus. As the provincial
census was not introduced to all provinces simultaneously, a study of the contexts for the
introduction of provincial censuses in various provinces reveals that the impetus for many of the
earliest known examples was to gather information on the human and natural resources in
regions neighboring impending or ongoing military campaigns. This then shows that the
provincial census did not serve a single purpose at any one time, but could serve local, global,
and ideological purposes that could shift and change across time. When Rome did introduce a
provincial census, it will be shown that it often did so after a lengthy period of consolidation, on
average twenty to thirty years after conquest. This is in stark contrast to earlier views on the
subject that suggest a census was conducted shortly after conquest. Finally, it will be revealed
that there was an increased likelihood for soldiers to be involved in census operations at the civic
or regional levels in the early Principate. It will be shown that these soldiers were only used as
census agents in under-urbanized and recently annexed places, or in regions that had proven difficult to pacify, had just been pacified, or had recently rebelled against Rome. Finally, scholars have ascribed the cause of census resistance to the *modus operandi*, namely the Roman form of census. Instead, I argue that mass provincial resistance to the census was precipitated by a lack of control over a region at the time of a census, either due to conducting it too soon during the consolidation process or inopportune timing.

In Chapter 3, I examine the role of irregular exactions (such as *ad hoc* taxation, military levies, and supply requisitions) during the course of military campaigns in neighboring regions in increasing the burdens of provincials and, therefore, increasing the likelihood for revolt. In the process I build off of and elaborate on the typologies of anti-fiscal resistance produced by Jérôme France in his 2009 article, “L´impôt provincial dans l´Occident romain à travers l´exemple de l´Aquitaine et de l´Hispanie septentrionale,” that synthesizes direct provincial taxation (*tributum soli* and *tributum capitis*) and surveys anti-fiscal resistance in Aquitania and northern Spain. Here the particular focus is on his third type of negative provincial reactions Rome’s tax system, namely resistance against heavy or continuous impositions and its attendant side effects.\(^\text{47}\) I argue that despite the frequency of debt and tax burdens being cited as causes of unrest and revolt in the primary sources (174-8), there is no evidence that Roman taxation levels were normally higher than those of earlier regimes. After briefly outlining patterns in eleven episodes of anti-fiscal complaints and revolts, I find that many of these episodes occurred in a wartime context. An argument is made that under certain conditions, such as wars on the fringes of the empire, that some populations experienced, or at least perceived, heavier burdens brought on by routine exactions being augmented by increased military recruitment and requisitions. This

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\(^{47}\) France 2009. The other three are: protests against abuses, exactions, and brutalities of collecting imposts; sudden increases in imposed tribute; resistance by a population when Rome introduced its fiscal system (a switch from previously irregular exactions to regular exaction).
argument is sustained through an investigation of how the Roman armies’ auxiliary levies, and logistical and requisition systems could negatively impact the demography and production capabilities of indigenous populations, especially among recently subjugated populations and when considering the unevenness of the spread of burdens among populations across a provincial landscape.

Chapters 4 and 5 differ slightly from the preceding three. Whereas Chapters 1-3 are thematic in orientation, with each one focusing on specific administrative processes and how resistance could have formed against them, Chapters 4 and 5 deal with some of the most well-known and well-attested indigenous revolts: the Varian Disaster in Germania Magna (9 CE), the Tacfarinian revolt in Africa Proconsularis (c.17-24 CE), and the Boudican revolt in Britain (60/1 CE). Most modern accounts treat these revolts in isolation and take a diachronic approach towards these revolts, dealing with the pre-conquest period, the conquest, and finally the revolt, using numismatic and archaeological material to augment the ancient narratives. My approach is initially similar in that in Chapter 4 my aim is to contextualize these multi-causal revolts within the history of their regions and provide a survey of modern assessments for each of these revolts. In essence, this chapter serves as a companion piece to Chapter 5, which also serves as the conclusionary chapter of this project. Here, I add fresh perspectives on the circumstances that brought about these three revolts by comparing them to others surveyed throughout the project. In the process I comment on how mass resistance against institutions such as the census, taxation, and conscription only erupted when there were undercurrents of tension already present within provincial communities, and oftentimes it still required charismatic leaders like Boudica, Arminius, and Tacfarinas to unite the abused and discontented to act against Rome. The sorts of tensions present within these societies varied widely across the case studies: Roman agents
bungling imperial orders or abusing local populations; the stress and strains of regime changes were fragile periods of uncertainty and change; wars of conquest and ongoing Roman military campaigning placed heavy burdens on recently conquered communities; and factionalism and regional instability disrupted Roman control over populations. In addition to these tensions, I contend that revolts were often ignited by opportunism, such as revolts or military campaigning in neighboring regions, or by a Roman inopportune timing in implementing its administrative structures.
Chapter 1: Role of urbanization and military administrators post annexation

As soldiers were virtually ever-present in the early post conquest and integration period, a chapter seemed necessary in a project surveying Roman provincial administration and resistance to administrative apparatuses. Soldiers conquered the new territory, served as the garrison, and were even utilized for their administrative experience in carrying out certain tasks in recently acquired territories. Here, Rome was utilizing the resources it had locally at its disposal, but these resources could also be a cause for discontent and resistance. An increased military presence among a recently conquered territory was a constant reminder of that conquest and could lead to increased tensions between local populations and Roman agents there. Furthermore, the asymmetrical power relationship between Roman soldiers and provincial populations left scope for soldiers to abuse their positions of power inciting resentment and sparking resistance. Rather than surveying the various relationships between soldiers and provincials in the early decades of Roman rule (a subject too broad for the scope of this project), in selecting the subject of this chapter I sought to select a group of characters who often came from a military context and were responsible for conducting civil administrative tasks among recently acquired populations in order to effectively link soldiers to other processes investigated in this project (census, conscription, and taxation). As one praefectus civitatum was heavily involved in the outbreak of the Frisian revolt, Olennius (a centurion set over the tribe in the Tiberian period), there is an opportunity to investigate how Rome utilized its soldiers for various administrative tasks in the early Principate, the sorts of tasks they could have conducted, and how their use could have disrupted local hierarchies or contributed to unrest.\(^1\) Olennius appears to have been placed among the Frisii to keep watch over the tribe, use soldiers under his

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\(^1\) One should note that these issues reappear in portions of chapters 2, 4, and 5, and, as such, ideas formulated in this chapter naturally continue to develop later in this project.
command to collect tribute, and to fix the quality and size of the Frisii’s tribute (which was paid in ox hides). As we will see in the case study, the tribute terms set by Olennius would end up playing a key role in the outbreak of the revolt.

Due to the fact that most of the evidence concerning praefecti civitatum derives from funerary and honorific inscriptions, there are very few firm details for what their precise tasks were among the peoples over whom they were appointed. Recent links made between praefecti civitatum and equestrian prefects by scholars such as Hannah Cotton and Davide Faoro allow details of the former’s relationship and authority over their appointed communities to come to light.² The prefects would have been delegated imperium by either the emperor or the governor of the community’s province. Like the prefects of Judaea, they would have held similar tasks and objectives to imperial legates and senatorial governors, and, in this way, they were responsible for a series of civil administrative and military tasks. First and foremost it was their duty to maintain peace and security in their delegated region.³ As the territories of praefecti civitatum differed in scale from their senatorial (and equestrian) peers and often comprised recently conquered territories,⁴ they may have been more directly involved in local governance, guiding communal affairs to ensure that “the principes always considered Rome’s interests first in their deliberations.”⁵ Still, these prefects to some extent had to rely upon either a local governing body

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² Cotton 1999, 77; Faoro 2011. The comparison is presented by Cotton as an opportunity to ask whether Judaea was an independent province from 6 CE or not.
⁴ Most praefecti civitatum/nationum/gentium were given charge over one or two tribes/communities. For example, Marcellus (no. 15) was set over the Maezi and Daesitiiates, or Olennius (No. 8) over the Frisii. We must note, however, that occasionally some prefects studied here were given more extensive territories within military zones or provinces. Sex. Pedius Lusianus Hirrutus (no. 7) was given Raetia, Vindelicia, and the Poine Valley, which was a large military district at the time under the leadership of the Rhineland legates (see below). Likewise, L. Marcius Optatus was set over a whole section of Hispania Tarraconensis, Asturia, in the Augustan period (no. 1).
⁵ Dise 1991, 32.
or members of the local elite in conducting their tasks in the communities they were administering, and thus were not in complete control over their communities.⁶

As part of their tasks of pacifying and governing these recently subdued communities, praefecti civitatum would often have command of soldiers, either whole units or a few soldiers seconded to their posts. Related to their military command, these prefects may have occasionally been tasked with military recruitment in their districts (Publilius Memorialis- no. 31). Certainly in the case of Olennius (no. 8), but feasibly for other praefecti civitatum, prefects could be charged with tax assessment and collection (Tac. Ann. 4.72), settling disputes between communities, adjudicating local court cases, or conducting other sensitive tasks such as land delimitation (cf. Ti. Flavius Macer [no. 29]).⁷

In summary, these praefecti civitatum/gentium/nationum were set among provincial communities with a range of tasks ranging from securing communities’ loyalty, to conducting the tasks of local government alongside of – or in place of – local elites, collecting tribute, conscripting soldiers, and demarcating boundaries between communities. The invasiveness of this post for communities is important to bear in mind as they tended to operate within the first several decades of Roman rule and did so at depth that most Roman agents did not. Furthermore, it is also important to ask how familiar such military officers could have been with the people and their ways they were governing, especially in the early years of Roman rule as frequently they did not originate from the region where they were serving in this capacity (see below). Their abstract understanding of communal norms and practices may have led to tension. A further lack of informational depth about the number of people or their wealth may have caused issues when

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⁶ Mócsy 1974, 70.
⁷ On tasks of military praefecti: Mattingly 1992, 47; Jones 1960, 120; Sherwin-White 1939, 12; Ruscu 2014, 163.
it came to introducing conscription and taxes. Using these officers for such a range of tasks would have disrupted local practices. Their presence could disrupt the local balance of power by being injected into the community, which could in turn upset the socio-political hierarchy of the pre-Roman period and present opportunities for increased tensions and resentments: there would be those local elites who gained at the expense of their peers (rivalries), and a perceived loss of freedoms in certain practices (such as extent of territory, setting tributary rates and collecting it, as well as the profits of such ventures), and determining the communities’ policies in local councils.

_Praefecti civitatum_ and related titles were flexible and adaptable posts. As will be shown below, the needs of the state determined what sort of man should be appointed to the task, whether client kings such as Cottius, local elites from the province, equestrian officers with or without previous military experience, or centurions. It should be noted that these prefects replaced civic government amongst the communities they were set over in any of the provinces in which they appear. By that it is meant that if there is evidence of a _praefectus civitatum_ in a province, it does not mean that all communities in the province had prefects set over them. In other words, those communities that did not have prefects, had regular civic government. The scope of these prefectures was commands over districts of diverse sizes, but never commands over an entire province. These “district prefects,” as they are occasionally called, were

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8 Cf. Scott 1998, 2, 22-23. In many of the places where these _praefecti_ operated there is rarely evidence that the population had a census held over them yet. On the issue of how long after conquest that a census would often be taken, see pages, 108-14.


ultimately subordinate to a governor or legate just like the equestrian prefects of Judaea, Raetia, and Commagene in the Augustan and Tiberian periods.\footnote{Faoro 2011; Cotton 1999, 77; Demougin 1981, 102; Ruscu, 163. Cf. Eck 2009a, 246. The only significant exceptions to this are the \textit{praefecti civitatum} attested in the provinces of Sardinia, Corsica, and Egypt who were subordinate to equestrian prefects.}

The post is associated with military command and administration, as it was often held by auxiliary prefects or legionary commanders in recently conquered territories, especially in the Julio-Claudian period.\footnote{Cf. Demougin 1981, 99; Dise 1991, 32. Note the title of D.B. Saddington’s 1987 article, \textit{Military Praefecti with Administrative Functions}.} Under these Julio-Claudians they were utilized in exceptional circumstances that necessitated a “military-type management.”\footnote{Ruscu 2014, 164.} In ideal circumstances Rome would utilize local elites for civic government, but this option was not always feasible in the first decades of Roman rule. Because many of Rome’s territorial gains were acquired via conquest, there were many instances where prefects were needed at a local level as the elites of certain communities could not be relied upon, namely because they had heavily resisted Roman conquest or integration, or the communities were not centrally organized enough to suit Rome’s governing style. In light of the fragile state of the relationship between Rome and certain recently subjugated populations in these early decades (incidentally the period with the highest risk of revolt), prefects of the Julio-Claudian period were chosen for their military experience and were oftentimes given command over some soldiers in their region.

While \textit{praefecti civitatum} and their ilk were firmly associated with military command and administration in the chronological framework of this project, prefects of the Flavian period and onward reveal the shifting nature of the post over the first two centuries of the Principate. In this later period prefects could be appointed without previous, or even contemporary, military commands/experience. The consequence of this lack in military experience or command for the
prefects in the 2nd century CE is that they may have less frequently had soldiers seconded to their commands than those of the Julio-Claudian period. What this may show is that this sort of prefecture was becoming more associated with civil administration than military command and administration the longer prefects were utilized in provinces. Furthermore, it may show that in these later years the communities posed a lesser risk to Roman security, namely that the tribe or region was more fully pacified and therefore less likely to revolt, meaning that the need had waned for appointing a prefect with military experience or a concurrent military posting. The lack of military experience and the fact that many of the prefects of this later period came from nearby communities could possibly reveal a transitionary step towards self-administration for certain communities across the empire (alongside other processes of integration).

**Regional Studies**

This study comprises thirty-seven examples of *praefecti civitatum/nationum/gentium* dating from the reigns of Augustus to Septimius Severus. A table enumerating all the prefects surveyed here (organized chronologically) and prosopographies of these prefects are presented in appendices 1 and 2. The numbers given to prefects are those utilized in Appendix 1. This section comprises surveys of the places where more than one prefect appeared and provides an overview of the history and uses of prefects in the Alpine region, Spain, Danube region, north Africa, and Sardinia and Corsica. To fit within the scope of this project, only prefects are included where they were utilized as “temporary” measures. Here, they were set in place by Rome in part to keep a closer watch over local populations for one reason or another (distrust, protection, recently conquered or resisted, etc.). For this reason, prefectures in northern Britain and southern Egypt will be excluded because the prefects were of a more permanent nature, likely because the
garrisons stationed in those regions became permanent over time, and therefore they were not necessarily utilized in the same manner as those prefects studied here. While this project is limited chronologically to the first five decades after annexation for the case studies, prefects from later periods are considered to shed light on how *praefecti civitatum* were used in the early decades of Roman rule in a region.

Finally, a few notes on the nature of the data utilized for this study. The majority of the data derives from inscriptions, so there are few details in the primary sources as to why prefects were placed where. Many of the inscriptions are fragmentary, leaving difficulties in understanding certain details, which of course vary between inscriptions. The name of the prefect, his appointments prior to and after his prefecture, and the status of the prefect may be missing. One may not know when someone held his prefecture or how familiar the prefect was with the community he was set over, let alone the name of the community under his command, or whether or not there was a military unit under the prefect’s command. Despite these difficulties, there is enough evidence to make sound claims about *praefecti civitatum* as a whole, their role in governing recently acquired territories, and the relationship between them and provincial resistance. But as new fragments or inscriptions are found it will broaden and reshape our understandings of the relationship between prefects and their communities as well as the local and global reasons for the existence of *praefecti civitatum*.

**Alpine Region (Raetia, Maritime Alps, Cottian Alps)**

The Alpine region, largely conquered over a series of campaigns from the 20s and 10s BCE, yields seven prefects dating from the Augustan to Vespasianic period. Only Sex. Pedius Lusianus Hirrutus in the Tiberian period (no. 7), certainly held a contemporary military command during his prefecture, *praefectus levis armaturae*. His command was over a very large region, which was more like a military district than a formal province, and this may explain why he had troops under his command. It is also possible that the first two prefects of the Cottian Alps, M. Iulius Cottus (no. 2) and C. Iulius Donnus (no. 6), also had command over soldiers. Of the other prefects only two others had military experience prior to their prefectures: C. Baebius Atticus (no. 9) in the Maritime Alps, and Pro--- (no. 10), who was possibly a *praefectus civitatum* in Raetia (\[pr\]ae\{ectus\} gaesa\{torum civitat\}um Helvet\{iorum\}). The general lack of whole units being attached to these prefectures, aside from Hirrutus and maybe the Cottian dynasts, combined with an absence of men with military experience in the latter Julio-Claudian period suggests that there was little risk of unrest in the Alpine region beyond the first three decades after its annexation in the Augustan era. There is a slight trend, which may be seen more strongly in some other regions (such as the Balkans and Africa), where the prefects had a more militaristic nature in the early Julio-Claudian period towards ones of a more civilian nature in the late Julio-Claudian to Flavian periods.

**Spain (Asturias, Gallaecia, and the Balearic Islands)**

Prefects are attested in two regions of the province Hispania Tarraconensis; the northwestern areas conquered by Augustus in the 20s and 10s BCE, and the Balearic Islands. The use of prefects in the northwest is limited to two examples, one in the Augustan era (L. Marcius Optatus- no. 1), and one during the Flavian period (*Ignatus, CIL 2.3271* - no. 23). Meanwhile,  

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15 Cf. Strab. 4.6.4 on the mountainous areas of Liguria being subject to an equestrian official in the Augustan era.
there are five prefects known from the Balearic Islands ranging from the Claudian period to c.150 CE, only three of which fall under the scope of this study: L. Pomponius Lupus (no. 13), M. Clodius Martialis (no. 27), T. Claudius Paulinus (no. 28), L. Titinius Glaucus Lucretianus (no. 51), and Ignotus, Hep II, 62 (no. 52). Unlike many of the prefects studied in this chapter those of Spain were given regional commands rather than commands over civitates or nationes (praefectus Asturiae, Galleciae, or insularum Baliarium). In the northwest of the peninsula prefects served in a strongly military context in the decades following the difficult Augustan conquests, but by the time that the ignotus of CIL 2.3271 (no.23) served the region had been gradually pacified and it was possible for Rome to appoint a prefect without any military experience.

The use of prefects on the Balearic Islands (praefecti insularum Baliarium), however, poses some interpretative problems. The first use of prefects on the island dates to the Neronian period, though it is possible that prefects existed on the islands since c. 6 CE. Due to the few literary references to events on the islands it is difficult to contextualize the reasons for these prefects’ existence. To compound the issues further, a range of titles existed for these prefects which may suggest that their use may not have been continuous or that their use changed as needs arose. There are the three praefecti Baliarium insularum: L. Pomponius Lupus (no. 13-Neronian), from Italy, who was simultaneously praefectus cohortis equitatae Macedonum et cohortis Lusitanorum; M. Clodius Martialis (no. 27- likely Flavian, but possibly Antonine), who served as a praefectus fabrum before becoming praefectus insularum Baliarum; T. Claudius Paulinus (no. 28- Flavian to Antonine), became praefectus insularum Baliarum et orae maritimae after holding a few civic posts, and seems to have had no military experience prior to

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16 Though note that it is not unique (Appendix 1, nos. 5, 7, 26, 53).
17 A plague of rabbits, which were ravaging the crops of the islands, led the population to petition Augustus for military aid to rid them of their problem (Pliny, NH, 8.218). Cf. Str. 3.2.6.
his appointment. Beyond Claudius Paulinus, there are at least two more praefecti orae maritimae whose commands included the Balearic Islands in their brief. C. Baebius (no. 49) had command over coastal Hispania Citerior during the Actian War, and Q. Pomponius Rufus (no. 50) had command over the coasts of Hispania Citerior and Gallia Narbonensis in 68 CE in the “war that imperator Galba waged on behalf of the Republic.”\(^{18}\) Then, finally, there are two praefecti pro legato insularum Baliarum known from the 1st century. L. Titinius Glaucus Lucretianus (no. 51) held the post in the Neronian period after serving as a military tribune of the Legio XXII Primigenia in lower Germany, and the ignotus of Hep II, 62 (no. 52) who held the post during the same century.

What is the significance of these title variations? Praefecti pro legato are equestrian prefects given charge of legionary forces, often equivalent to provincial commands.\(^{19}\) This may suggest that military surveillance or force was needed at some point during the first century CE on the islands. The same may be said for the praefecti orae maritimae, where two of them served specifically during a time of civil war. Of the other three praefecti Baliarum insularum, only L. Pomponius Lupus in the Neronian period had command over forces on the islands (no. 13). The distinct military nature of this post forms a cluster around the period between Nero and the Flavians, and possibly beyond in the case of M. Clodius Martialis (no. 27).\(^{20}\) The question is why at this time? One potential explanation is that piracy and/or banditry in the region may have necessitated a greater military presence. Another possible explanation is that soldiers may have been needed to keep watch on individuals exiled on the islands.\(^{21}\) Meanwhile, praefecti orae

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\(^{18}\) “Bello quod imperator Galba pro re publica gessit” (IRT 537); Devijver 1989, 34-35.

\(^{19}\) Šašel 1974.

\(^{20}\) Though considering this clustering, an argument could be made that Clodius probably served at some point around the Year of the Four Emperors.

\(^{21}\) Baccolini 2007, 211; Faoro 2011, 130; Zucca 1998, 137; McElderry 1918, 90-91. There are two exiles on the Balearic Islands known during the reign of Nero; Publius Suillius Rufus (Tac. Ann. 13.43) and an exile brought back
maritimae tended to be used only when coastal areas were endangered, such as a time of civil war or regional instability (nos. 49, 50, 55; cf. Iulius Tutor [no. 54]). Because of their central location between the north and south coasts of the western Mediterranean and the fact that they were along the major east-west sailing routes across the sea, the Balearic Islands were strategically important in times of war and were also vulnerable to raids or invasions. A combination of the instability of this period between Nero and the Flavians, the location of the islands, and the presence of exiles may best explain why prefects appear on islands that had been incorporated into the Roman Empire in the late 2nd century BCE. The use of prefects on the Balearic Islands then is unlike those studied here in that it was not a difficult conquest, recent unrest, or a lack of faith/trust in the loyalty or capabilities of the local elite, rather it was Roman political instability that created the need for the praefecti Baliarum insularum.

Balkans (Dalmatia, Pannonia, Moesia)

There are seven praefecti civitatum in the region dating from the late Augustan period to the early Flavian period, where they may have been used more widely after the Great Illyrian revolt. Five out of seven definitely held their posts alongside military ones, while the situational context of the sixth, a prefect over Liburnia and the Iapodes during the Great Illyrian revolt by Galba (Suet. Galba 10.1). Another exile, Votienus Montanus, is attested in the Tiberian period (Euseb. Chronicon, 201st Olympiad b). On the question of whether or not soldiers accompanied and kept watch over exiles see, Bingham 1979, 379-380; Braginton 1944, 395.

22 Wesch-Klein 2008, 73. Pflaum, in describing the career of no. 55, wrote that “v. Domaszewski placed his career during Claudius' reign. Note that this is when Mauretania was annexed, which was a troubled annexation. This would make a great deal of sense for a praefectus orae maritimae to come into place” (Pflaum 1960, no.23 [p56]). 69 CE could be another good context for a praefectus orae maritimae, especially in light of events in Mauretania between the reigns of Galba and Vitellius (Tac. Hist. 2.58).
24 Dise 1991, 32. Though see Appendix 1 on Calpurnius Ma (no. 19) from the Julio-Claudian period. As his post is uncertain because he may have been a prefect of a Dalmatian civitas or of a cohort/ala, or both, he is analyzed alongside other uncertain prefects in Appendix 2 (Baccolini 2007, 136).
revolt (no. 3), suggests that he also had a contemporary military command. Meanwhile the inscription of the seventh prefect is too fragmentary to tell whether he held a military command contemporaneously or not.

There appear to be two patterns to the use of prefects in the Balkans. The first revolves around tribes who had posed a threat to the security and the stability of the region. The *ignotus* of *CIL* 5.3346, over Liburnia and the Iapodes, could have been placed there to prevent these peoples from joining the Great Illyrian revolt as much as it could have been to protect Italy from invasion (no. 3). Marcellus’ prefecture was over two tribes very much involved in the Great Illyrian revolt, the Maezaei and Daesititates (no. 15). Q. Gavius Fronto had been set over the Breuci, who had participated in the Great Illyrian revolt (no. 11), and Antonius Naso’s Colapiani was

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25 Cf. Vell. Pat. 2.110-111 on concerns of leaving Italy unprotected after the outbreak of the revolt. Placing a prefect in the area around Histria provided protection along the land routes to Italy from the Balkans. See Vel. Pat. 2.111 for the calling up of senators and equestrians to serve in this war, like our prefect of *CIL* 5.3346 (no.3).
created out of the Breuci, suggesting that the tribe was broken up after the revolt (no. 16). All these tribes are along the Adriatic Coast or its hinterland. Three were recalcitrant tribes who had recently participated in a revolt, and two more may have had a prefect placed over them to prevent them from joining in the war. The continued use of prefects in this period for over five decades after the Great Illyrian revolt shows that the trustworthiness of the political elite was a serious issue and required a large army to directly control the population. Second, the other four tribes that had prefects placed over them were along the Danubian frontier where the legionary forces had pushed further north in the later Julio-Claudian period. Two things may be stated in regards to this: 1) the army moved closer to those borders to keep an eye beyond the Danube while also simultaneously keeping an eye within the province; 2) the Danube region, except the area near Carnuntum, was the most recently annexed part of the Balkan provinces. This area was also the furthest part of these provinces from the Mediterranean basin, meaning that it had less contact with Rome prior to annexation. There were also less centrally organized urban centers in this hinterland region in this period than in the Adriatic region. It is possible that Rome was not ready at this early date to grant self-administration to these populations, and desired to keep a closer eye on the populations of this fluid border region and its mineral resources.

The use of prefects over tribal communities ceased in the late Julio-Claudian and early Flavian periods, and in some places prefects were replaced by indigenous elites either appointed by Rome or elected from among their peers to govern and administer their communities under

26 The two other tribes placed under Fronto (no. 11), the Scordisci and Iasi, were unlikely involved in the revolt, though the latter dwelled near other tribes in revolt. Perhaps these populations were placed under a prefect for a different region, such as a general lack of centralized urbanization at the time. Cf. pages 260-1, and Mócsy on geographical limits of tribes who participated in the Great Illyrian revolt (1974).
the title *princeps*. The transition to these *principes* being appointed or elected among native communities could not happen until Rome was confident that the local elite were capable “to take over their traditional role in an efficient and orderly manner.” These *principes* in turn appear to have lasted until municipal self-government was granted to individual communities, which utilized the same group of local elites for magistracies and councils. This was a process that started in the Claudian and Flavian periods.

**Africa (Africa Proconsularis, Numidia, Mauretania Caesariensis)**

There are eleven *praefecti gentium* known from the African provinces. Only two of these eleven prefects show evidence of holding military commands concurrently to their prefectures. Both prefectures date to the late Julio-Claudian and Flavian periods, at a time when Rome was extending its control further to the south and west (L. Calpurnius Fabatus [nos. 12] and *Ignotus* [AE 1973, 654- no. 25]). Meanwhile, a further four prefects held military commands prior to their prefectures. On the whole these prefects were appointed in the decades after those with simultaneous military commands, namely from the late Flavian to Antonine eras: Ti. Claudius Pollio (no. 24), Victor Martialis (no. 30), Publilius Memorialis (no. 31), and L. Egnatuleius Sabinus (no. 35). Finally, there are five prefects who lack evidence of any military experience at the time of their prefectures: Ti. Flavius Macer (no. 29), *Ignotus* (*CIL* 8.622 et 11781- no. 33), I[ulus ? A]djectus (no. 34), *Ignotus* (AE 1992, 1766- no. 36), and Alezeiveus Rogatus (no. 37). All five of these men were local elites from the region and held their posts from the Trajanic to Severan eras. The *praefecti gentium* in Africa first appear after Tacfarinas’ revolt of the Tiberian

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29 Wilkes 1969, 104.

The introduction of prefects into the African provinces may represent an effort by Rome to control, administratively organize, and tax the transhumant peoples around the southern and western borderlands (especially of Africa Proconsularis and the borders between Numidia and Mauretania Caesariensis). While this process had started in the late Julio-Claudian period, it began in earnest in the Flavian period and continued into the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian.  

The gentes involved were largely those that Rome had focused its military efforts on during the reigns of Augustus, Tiberius, Claudius, and the Flavians. The later introduction of prefects into Mauretania Caesariensis at the end of the 1st century CE may be explained in part by the later annexation of the province, c.40 CE, and partially by the series of disturbances in the new province over its first few decades. The annexation itself was resisted by Aedemon, who led a revolt against the

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31 As Chapter 4 shows (296-302), Rome was engaging in similar processes in the frontier regions during the Late Augustan and early Tiberian periods in the years leading up to the Tacfarinian revolt.

execution of Juba II by Caligula. Around the same time, Moorish tribes were causing problems on the fringes of the new province, perhaps as a consequence of the destabilized situation brought on by Juba’s execution. And finally, some disturbances are suspected in Mauretania under the Flavians.33

In a similar manner, the prefects in Africa Proconsularis and Numidia served largely over peoples involved in the wars and disturbances of the 1st century CE. Macer and an ignotus were prefects over the Musulami (nos. 31 and 38), a Gaetulian tribe, who were involved in the Gaetulian War, Tacfarinas’ revolt, and possibly in disturbances c.44-46 CE (Aur. Victor 4.2).34 The Gaetuli confederation themselves had L. Calpurnius Fabatus (no. 12) appointed over them, likely because of their involvements in these same incidents. L. Egnatuleius Sabinus (no. 35) was prefect over the Cinithii, who participated in Tacfarinas’ revolt along with the Garamantes (Tac. Ann. 2.52, 3.74). It is also possible that the prefect Ti. Claudius Pollio (no. 24) may have had charge over tribes involved in the same revolt. It was a revolt that had impacted the tribes at the southern end of the province, such as the Musulami, Gaetuli, Cinithii, and to an extent the Garamantes, and so it would not be surprising to find that Pollio was prefect over some portion of Africa Proconsularis that was involved in that revolt. 35

Across time there is a generally discernable pattern in the African provinces that shows Rome selected officers from units garrisoned in neighboring communities to serve as prefects in the first and early second centuries CE. After that, it seems that prefects were often selected from

33 Baccolini 2007, 209-210; Fishwick 1971. Disturbances in the Flavian period are deduced by the extraordinary commands of the governors there (CIL 9.4194 = ILS 5955; AE 1941, 79; AE 1903, 368 = ILS 9200), which may explain the presence of no. 25 among the Mazices.
34 Baccolini 2007, 208; Syme 1951, Tacfarinas, 122.
35 Baccolini 2007, 206, 208. It is interesting to note that Memorialis (no. 31) may have been a prefect over the Numidae, who were besieged by Tacfarinas in 24 CE (Syme 1951). So, in this case he was a prefect over a tribe attacked by rebels rather than a prefect over a recalcitrant tribe.
local elites, some of whom also had military experience prior to their appointments. An argument may be made that a familiarity with the region and a firm understanding of local situations and challenges might be more likely to prevent disturbances between imperial agents and local communities than military officers with limited experiences and understandings of the communities they are governing. The ability to use these local elites as prefects appears to have been only possible once it was certain that the communities were unlikely to revolt (i.e. that a strong military presence was not needed).

**Sardinia and Corsica**

In 6 CE Sardinia was so overrun by brigands (λῃσταί) that it necessitated a change in governance (Cass. Dio 55.28.1; cf. Str. 5.2.7). From that time until the reign of Nero, Sardinia was an imperial province, oftentimes with an equestrian governor. Until the reign of Claudius, these governors were termed *praefectus Sardiniae* (for example, *AE* 1921, 86), at which point their full title became *procurator et praefectus Sardiniae* (*CIL* 10.8023f.; *ILS* 5350). But in the first decades of the 1st century CE these *praefecti provinciae* delegated command and administration of difficult regions (in terms of pacification and geography) to prefects: one with

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37 “καὶ γὰρ ἔμειναν διότι ἀρχονταὶ βουλευταί ἐπεὶ τις σχεῖν, ἀλλὰ στρατιώταις τε καὶ στρατιάρχαις ἐπετραφήναι” / “Pirates overran a good many districts, so that Sardinia had no senator as governor for some years, but was in charge of soldiers with knights as commanders” (Cass. Dio 55.28.1- Earnest Cary trans.).
38 Swan 2004, 189; Demougin 1982, 100. Corsica became a district of Sardinia in 6 CE under the leadership of an equestrian, subordinate to the prefect of Sardinia (Faoro 2011, 80).
39 From a surviving milestone dating to 13/14 CE (*ILS* 105) we know that there were legionary troops temporarily stationed in Sardinia under the command of a *pro legato*, and that in 19 CE Tiberius sent 4,000 freedmen (followers of Jewish and Egyptian religions) to fight brigandage in Sardinia (Joseph. Ant. 18.83-4; Suet. Tib. 36; Tac. Ann. 2.85.4) (Zucca 1987, 357; Wrobel 2009, 80). To contextualize this latter event, the sending of freedmen from Rome may be potentially related to some events of 19 CE, namely issues with grain shortage at Rome. Additionally, this episode took place in the middle of Rome’s efforts to put down Tacfarinas’ revolt (for an outline of the revolt, see pages 283-6). It must not be forgotten that revolts in major grain producing regions, such as Africa, would disrupt the production, transport, and supply of grain locally and to places like Rome. On top of this, the issue would be compounded by the needs of Roman troops to put down such revolts, oftentimes requiring the aid of more troops.
simultaneous command over a unit in the late Augustan era (Sex. Iulius Rufus- no. 4), the other with previous military experience in the early Tiberian period (L. Vibrius Punicus- no. 5).

The Data

In this section, we will draw some conclusions on the uses and nature of these prefectures on an empire-wide scale based on patterns discerned in the regional studies. First, where and when prefects are found. As Figure 1 below shows, these prefects are found across a large number of provinces: Raetia (2), the Cottian Alps (3), Maritime Alps (1), Hispania Tarraconensis (5), Dalmatia (4), Pannonia (2), Moesia (1), Africa Proconsularis (5), Numidia (4), Mauretania Caesariensis (2), Sardinia and Corsica (2), and Gallia Belgica (1). There are also prefects attested than before the war, and therefore more supplies to support their efforts. In this way we must bear in mind the potential impact of the Tacfarinian revolt, 17-24 CE, on Rome’s grain supply and the possible reasons for troops being raised from populations in Rome to serve elsewhere, such as Sardinia in 19 CE, in a time of grain shortages (cf. Tac. Ann. 4.13.2-3; Faoro 2011, 59 n130).

Demougin 1982, 102.
in the eastern provinces, but with less certainty as to whether individuals served in Syria, Judaea, or Arabia (nos. 17, 26, 32).41

The majority of these prefects operated in these provinces within very specific contexts (Figure 2). Most of the provinces where prefects are attested were places conquered or extended in the Julio-Claudian period (northwest Spain, the Alpine provinces, the Balkan provinces, the Frisii, and the African provinces) or in the Flavian to Trajanic periods (in the cases of Africa and the near East). Hence, there is a strong connection between conquest, integration, and praefecti. Augustus conquered the Astures and Cantabri in the 20s BCE, and prefects are attested in his reign and in the reign of Vespasian. Around the same time Rome conquered the Alpine region, where prefects are attested from the Augustan to early Flavian periods. The same may be said for the Balkan provinces, but here the trend sees the prefects move towards the northern and eastern

41 Not detailed in the figure above are prefects (and centurions) of a less temporary nature that served in southern Egypt and northern Britain (nos. 38-48).
ends of the region during this period as the military forces shifted towards the Danube frontier. As Rome extended its domain to the south and west in Africa prefects appeared in these newly annexed places from the reign of Claudius onwards.

The relationship between recently subjugated populations and the imperial center was at its most fragile state in this period, and, not coincidentally, it was the period with the highest risk of revolt. During this same period, Rome would have sought to incorporate these recently annexed lands into the imperial system administratively. While Rome desired to make use of local elites for civic government this was not always a feasible option during the earliest decades post annexation, especially among communities that had heavily resisted conquest or incorporation. For these latter communities who had resisted Rome, the situation oftentimes necessitated a higher presence of imperial representatives (such as soldiers and equestrian officials) among local populations. Soldiers and their officers were engaged in important administrative tasks at the local level in the early years of communities’ lives under the Roman Empire, in roles such as (but not limited to) praefecti civitatum/gentium/nationum, tax collectors (Tac. Ann. 4.72; CIL 11.707), or census agents (see pages 114-20).

But, the introduction of prefects would also disrupt local self-government (as it had existed in the pre-conquest period) and could become flashpoints for provincial resistance, especially as they could be representatives of the subjugating armies. Tacitus provides two testimonies to how prefects assigned over communities might spark provincial resistance. At the beginning of his revolt, Civilis provides a potential “provincial” perspective on praefecti civitatum through giving the scope for abuse by these types of imperial agents: “we are no longer regarded as allies, as once we were, but as slaves…. We are handed over to prefects and centurions: after one band is satisfied with murder and spoils, the troops are shifted, and new
purses are looked for to be filled and varied pretexts for plundering are sought” (Tac. Hist. 4.14-Clifford Moore trans.). In the second example, which serves as this chapter’s case study, the tribute rate was starkly increased while Olennius was prefect over the Frisii – an event that precipitated the Frisian revolt (Tac. Ann. 4.72-74). Meanwhile, there is the possibility that soldiers, or at least equestrian officers, were involved in two of the three instances of large-scale resistance to the provincial census (on which see Ch.2). The use of soldiers in Rome’s consolidation efforts were therefore a double-edged sword. While being an efficient source of recruits for overseeing and enacting Rome’s administrative apparatus in the absence of reliable local elites, the scope for abuse (due to an asymmetrical power dynamic) and soldiers being potent symbols of subjugation among local populations could lead to communal resistance against Roman rule.

Prefects were typically found among less centralized communities post annexation, especially tribal entities. The majority of recently annexed regions in this period were lacking central places and were less politically centralized than Italy and most parts of the Greek east. It is to some extent coincidental, though, that these praefecti civitatum/gentium/nationum were in place among such communities over the several decades that local governments were being organized and developed, feasibly by a combination of imperial encouragement and local initiative. While prefects do not appear among polis style communities, and on the whole cease to be appointed when communities receive self-government, it does not necessarily stand to reason that prefects were installed among communities with the goal to urbanize and politically

42 Neque enim societatem, ut olim, sed tamquam mancipia haberi: quando legatum, gravi quidem comitatu et superbo, cum imperio venire? Tradi se praefectis centurionibusque: quos ubi spoliis et sanguine expleverint, mutari, exquirique novos sinus et varia praedandi vocabula. Chilver and Townsend treat these praefecti as praefecti civitatum (1985, 35).
43 Saddington 1982, 186; Dise 1991, 33; MacMullen 1963, 63-64.
44 Ruscu 2014, 164.
organize the local elites. That is to state that it is entirely uncertain if prefects could or did aid indigenous communities work towards self-rule. Rather, prefects were installed among communities because Rome was attempting to consolidate its hold over regions and because Rome perceived that it could not rely upon local elites to govern themselves at that time. Just because they were installed for these reasons, however, it does not mean that prefects could not encourage local populations to invest in centralizing urbanization projects. And we must remember that urban development was a process that lasted several generations, in many places not reaching their apex until the 2nd century CE (i.e. places continued to develop long after prefects served in many regions). On the ground, as prefects were monitoring local affairs and conducting various tasks, it is entirely possible that some prefects could have (in)directly fostered development or showed local elites how to conduct various civic tasks along Roman lines while supervising or conducting such tasks themselves. While these things are possible, to an extent they were a part of a prefect’s role or mission it is impossible to state with the current evidence. There simply is no explicit evidence to help us here.

Prefects ceased to be used among these communities often shortly before communities received self-government. The process for how long it took for communities to receive self-government varied province to province, community to community, and was often based on each community’s relationship to Rome. For example, Claudius and the Flavians founded cities across Pannonia at a time when prefects were still attested among communities that were deemed, for whatever reason, not ready for self-government. In Pannonia and Dalmatia, it appears that prefects were phased out during the Flavian dynasty. The transition to self-government, however, could even continue after prefects ceased to be used (as it happened in

46 Goodman 2012, 251.
Pannonia and Dalmatia). And similar scenarios might be found in northwest Spain and north Africa. Members of the local aristocracy, *principes* (and similar terms), could be employed until such a time that Rome “was satisfied that the tribal aristocracies were able to take over their traditional role in an efficient and orderly manner.”

In this way, prefects or *principes*, and self-governing communities may appear at the same time in any province.

The final two contexts where prefects governed local communities were where Rome was seeking to consolidate its control over isolated regions of existing provinces or after major provincial revolts. Until the Great Illyrian revolt prefects are not yet attested in Dalmatia or Pannonia. This may be due, in part, to Rome administratively ignoring the region prior to 6 CE. Another reason why they appeared after 9 CE is that Rome continued to slowly expand around the Danube area into the Claudian period, and this would have been a natural moment for prefects to first appear in those places. Meanwhile, the first appearance of prefects in north Africa was after a series of disturbances in the second quarter of the 1st century CE. Here, there is evidence that three prefects in the African provinces appear over tribes that had once been involved in Tacfarinas’ revolt; even one serving nearly 150 years after the revolt was put down (nos. 29, 35, and 36). Furthermore, two prefects are posited to have served over peoples who may have been resisting Roman domination in the reign of Claudius (nos. 12, 29; cf. Suet. *Galba* 7, 8). Lastly, prefects only appear in the northwestern corner of the Iberian Peninsula among the

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47 Wilkes 1969, 104, cf. 193. On *principes* only appearing after prefects cease, see Wilkes 1969, 288. It is important to note that there may be some interpretative quandaries when it comes to *principes*. In each instance it is hard to tell if one was a municipal magistrate, a tribal leader, or simply a representative of the local nobility. There is no way to tell if a *princeps* was recognized, or appointed, by Rome or if local communities chose their *princeps*, let alone knowing how influential he was within the community he represented (Baccolini 2007, 81). As with prefects chosen from among the provincial elite, there must be the potential for *principes* to be serving communities of which they were not members (for prefects from the same province in which they served see, nos. 1, 2, 6, 14, 23, 29, 33, 34, 35, 37, 19?, and 26?).

48 *Principes* are known in Iberian, Balkan and African provinces (García 2011, 192-193 w/notes; Džino 2014, 224; Wilkes 1969, 167, 170, 193, 287-288; Mócsy 1974; Fitz 1995, 177-178; Baccolini 2007).


50 Kovács 2014, 18, 26.
peoples conquered by Augustus early in his reign, namely only after a series of revolts in 22, 19, and 16 BCE (Cass. Dio 54.5; 54.11.1-5; 54.20.3). These revolts reveal the fragility or volatility of Rome’s control over the region and show a need for a tighter and more invasive control over the recalcitrant tribes in the region.

In places like Sardinia, Corsica, Germania (the Frisii), and possibly the Balearic Islands prefects appear briefly as Rome was seeking to consolidate its control over isolated areas. In these consolidation efforts Rome sought to contain populations more so than attempting to transform them. These communities contained few central settlements for Rome to control their elites, or at the least negotiate with, as the landscape and dispersed settlement patterns allowed for indigenous forces to disperse and regroup to continue their raids, banditry, etc.

The Frisii was one of the few tribes who remained loyal to Rome east of the lower Rhine after the Varian Disaster, and as the case study below argues, Rome was consolidating its authority over this tribe in the years leading up to the Frisian revolt in 28 CE. On Sardinia and Corsica, prefects were utilized in the interior of the islands to extend Rome’s control over the populations there after serious issues of brigandage radiated from highland areas on the islands in 6 CE. In both instances the use of prefects appears to have been very limited in time, to perhaps two decades from when Rome started its consolidation efforts.

Turning to the military nature and experience of these prefects, figure 3 outlines an attempt to gauge the military experience of prefects at the time of their appointment by dividing them into three major categories: those with a simultaneous command over a unit at the time of their prefecture; those appointed with previous military experience, but without a

51 Dyson 1975, 151.
53 Included under this heading are prefects who may have held simultaneous commands. Here, this is determined by the proximity of the unit to the tribe, where it is known. It should be noted that it remains possible that several of the
contemporaneous military command to their prefectures; those appointed with no military experience. By dividing prefects by their military experience at the time of their appointment it is possible to examine several facets of Roman imperialism and governance over recently annexed provinces. Prefects with contemporaneous commands could reveal not only the disposition of legions and auxiliary units in provinces but could also reveal which tribes Rome perceived as the most dangerous, or those most likely to resist subjugation and incorporation into the empire.

![Figure 3 Prefects by Military Experience](image.png)

But, the contemporality of prefects with military commands does pose some interesting issues that can only be answered partially at best. How was time divided between these posts, especially in those circumstances where there were more than fifty miles between the district in question and the unit’s base? Did part or all of the unit move with the commander to his posting? And finally, how much could prefects observe and control populations with these dual posts? I suspect that prefects probably divided their time between their posts in similar ways to how prefects listed with simultaneous or contemporary commands held their prefecture and military commands sequentially (for which, see Appendix 2).
imperial legates divided their time between martial and administrative tasks. In terms of the latter, maybe prefects with simultaneous military commands set aside portions of the year to travel around their assigned district (similar to governors with their assize districts) and conduct their various tasks. If this is the case, then such prefects would have had less direct oversight of day-to-day affairs in their districts, unless they were able to place soldiers seconded from their units among various local communities to aid them. Given the size of some of the districts under these prefects’ commands, it is hard to imagine how well prefects could have observed and control their populations directly without the aid of some local elites or soldiers from their units seconded to the task. I also think that it is plausible that prefects could have used their units’ bases as the administrative centers of their prefectures. Here prefects could summon local notables and dictate policies, settle disputes, and conduct various tasks at times when they were needed in their military command roles.

Meanwhile, the placement of prefects with military experience may indicate that an area had some strategic value to Rome beyond the tribe over which a prefect was placed. For instance, they may be placed in frontier regions to protect tribes from raids or placed in mining districts to protect and oversee operations (nos. 9, 15, and 36-42). Those prefects without any military experience, however, may reveal that a tribe or region was more fully pacified and therefore less likely to revolt. It may also be one of the steps towards self-administration for a community as many of the prefects without military experience came from nearby communities (nos. 2?, 6?, 14, 23?, 29, 35, and 37).

Overall, figure 3 shows a relatively equal distribution for the military experience of praefecti civitatum. This, however, is slightly deceiving, for if one compares all those with

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54 Cf. pages 273-4 for a similar suggestion for the use of military bases as substitutes for administrative centers in provincial censuses in recently conquered places lacking organized administrative centers.
55 See, Hirt 2010, 107-149.
military experience to those without, then nearly 70% of prefects had some sort of military experience when they were appointed. When the military experience of prefects is periodized certain patterns are revealed (figure 4).

Prefects with contemporaneous commands over military units predominate the Julio-Claudian period. In fact, 50% of prefects serving under the Julio-Claudians held simultaneous military commands. If taken together, all prefects with current or previous military command experience account for 75% of all prefects during the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius; the only two who did not have military experience were client kings (Appendix 1, nos. 2, 6. Though they may have had some soldiers under their command). Under the later Julio-Claudian emperors, 85% of all prefects had military experience. But by the end of the Flavian period prefects appointed with military experience start to decline in use; only 60% had military experience at the time of their appointment in this period. Of the attested prefects beyond the first century CE only 40% had any military experience, but none had contemporaneous command over units. This data then show that military experience was highly valued when prefects were selected under the
Julio-Claudians and Flavians. Under the earlier dynasty prefects were more likely to have command of whole units while serving as praefecti civitatum than in other periods. This is most likely due to the difficult conquests of the regions where they served, as well as the fact that this was the earliest stages of the Roman consolidation efforts in these provinces. Even where prefects did not hold simultaneous military commands, those with military experience are instructive to Roman thinking on how pacified a region was or how best to govern over recently conquered communities. From the Flavian period onward, there is a trend for a greater percentage of prefects having no military experience prior to their prefecture.\textsuperscript{56} Military action in the provinces involved had largely ceased by this period and incorporation of these regions into the Roman Empire was likely nearly complete when these prefects served.

**Case Study: Frisian Revolt 28 CE**

In 28 CE, the Frisii, a coastal tribe located between the Oude Rijn and Ems rivers in the modern Dutch provinces of Friesland and Groningen,\textsuperscript{57} revolted against the tribute levied by Olennius, a former primipilus set over them. According to Tacitus, the Frisii had paid a tribute of ox-hides for military use since the days of Drusus because of the scarcity of their resources (pro angustia rerum). It was only thirty-nine years later with Olennius that someone had set about determining the size or firmness of the hides, in which case he chose the aurochs as the standard; up to that point it seems that Rome was simply concerned with the quantity of hides delivered.\textsuperscript{58} When the Frisians could not, or did not, pay the tribute – Tacitus claims that the new assessment standard

\textsuperscript{56} 25% Augustan-Tiberian (client-kings), 8% Julio-Claudian (client-king), 33% Flavian, 33% Trajanic-Hadrianic, 60% Antonine. It must be borne in mind that the three prefects with no military experience in the Julio-Claudian period may be anomalies as they were from the royal family of the Cottian Alps; i.e. likely client-kings.

\textsuperscript{57} Dietz 2006; Rives 1999, 262; cf. Tac. Germ. 34.1.

\textsuperscript{58} non intenta cuiusquam cura, quae firmitudo, quae mensura, donec Olennius e primipilaribus regendis Frisii inpositus terga urorum delegit, quorum ad formam acciperentur.
would be difficult for the locals – the Roman soldiers under Olennius at first confiscated their cattle, then their land, and at last enslaved their wives and children. Despite this, according to Tacitus, the Frisii revolted only after an unsuccessful appeal to Roman authorities for aid or relief from the tribute. At this point, the tribe killed the soldiers aiding Olennius in collecting the ox-hides, chased Olennius back to a fort called Flevum and besieged it (Tac. Ann. 4.72). After raising the siege, the governor of lower Germany, Lucius Apronius, gathered a force to engage in a retaliatory campaign, which failed to defeat the Frisian forces (Tac. Ann. 4.73). Tacitus’ account then ends with a criticism of how Tiberius handled the revolt by stating that Tiberius suppressed Roman losses and would not “entrust anyone with the conduct of the war” (Tac. Ann. 4.74).

While Tacitus’ account of the revolt appears a straight-forward situation where the revolt was brought on by either the tribute rate being set too high or a former soldier abusing his power, recent studies on how Tacitus wrote revolts reveal that one must be wary of Tacitean aims, biases, and patterns in his explanations for the occurrence of revolts. Myles Lavan recently
assembled a series of models based on explanations for the occurrence of revolts in the early Empire in Latin texts to reveal the limited ability of modern historians to write a social history of Roman revolts. His third model, rebellions by subject peoples, is what concerns us here and includes both of Tacitus’ accounts of the Boudican revolt, as well as the Frisian revolt and the Batavian revolt. In this narrative category authors like Tacitus cite provincial grievances as the cause of revolt, either in the form of institutional structures (provincial census, taxation, or military levies) or the vices of agents of Roman authority (such as “greed, lust, and cruelty”).

In one account of the Boudican revolt, Tacitus suggests that the lustful and greedy actions of imperial agents incited the Britons to revolt: the way Roman agents conducted levies and dealt violence to Britons in stealing their homes and abducting their children (Agr. 15). In the other account, Tacitus focuses on the abuses levied on Prasutagus’ family and leading Icenian families as the reason for the revolt. After the client king’s death, his family was abused, and their property and that of leading Icenians’ were stripped by centurions and imperial slaves when the client kingdom was annexed. Meanwhile, the Trinovantes joined the Iceni because veterans at the colony of Camulodunum had driven locals from their homes and expropriated their lands (Tac. Ann. 14.31). As for the Frisian revolt, Tacitus blames it on Roman cupidity more so than Frisian “impatience of subjection” (obsequi impatientes) – the cupidity being the confiscations made by Olennius and his soldiers when they could not or would not pay the increased tribute demand (Tac. Ann. 4.72). In the final example, it was Roman greed and licentiousness in how the levy was conducted that pushed many Batavians to join the revolt: namely, selecting the

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60 Lavan 2017, 27-28; Woolf 2011, 36-7; Martin and Woodman 1989, 256. Martin and Woodman observe that cupidity is a common complaint, citing among their cases the two above.
elderly in attempts to receive bribes for letting them go, and dragging off children to satisfy their lust (Tac. *Hist.* 4.14).⁶¹

In these accounts, authors like Tacitus typically reinforce what appear like valid, and real, grievances of subject populations with some sort of desire for freedom. The conventionality of Tactius’ explanations are given more credibility and authority by details that lend distinct identity to each account. For this case study, it is the Frisii’s form of tribute, ox-hides, that Tacitus used to make his account both distinct and more credible. Here, as in other instances, the provincials are driven to revolt by either the vices of Roman agents or how administrative structures were carried out, giving provincials little to no agency in accounts of provincial resistance (“revolt as reflex,” as Lavan puts it).⁶²

Beyond the commonalities found within Tacitus’ accounts of provincial revolts, it is important to recognize the complex agendas of the author’s texts as the revolt narratives are shaped to fit authorial agendas and biases.⁶³ In the *Annales* Tacitus uses revolt narratives to comment on individual emperors and their agents abroad. The kind of men emperors choose as their agents (the kind of men who incite provincials to revolt) and how emperors respond to revolts allow Tacitus to critique the competences of individual emperors and the sorts of men each employ.⁶⁴ It is no coincidence, then, that Tacitus’ account of the Frisian revolt emphasizes the form of the tribe’s tribute, because Tiberius’ agent, Olennius, increased the standard for the tribute, which drove the Frisii to revolt. This in turn allows Tacitus to critique Tiberius in two ways: the sorts of people Tiberius relied on to rule his empire (who “fail generally to live up to

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⁶¹ Lavan 2017, 29. One may note that Civilis and other leaders had ulterior motives in getting the discontented locals to revolt (See further, pages 16 n25 and 188).
⁶² Lavan 2017, 27, 29, 30; Woolf 2011, 38. The lack of agency on the provincials’ part in Tacitus denies any aims or ambitions beyond the pursuit of freedom (see the first lines of Tacitus’ account of Frisian revolt), as well as denying rebel long-term planning in the outbreak of resistance.
⁶³ Lavan 2017, 33.
⁶⁴ Woolf 2011, 35. In other words, revolts are “intimately bound up with his overarching subject, the state of the Roman *res publica*” (Lavan 2017, 30).
traditional ideals and at times seem almost to behave like barbarians”), and the competence of the emperor by his response to the revolt (Tiberius determined to suppress Rome’s losses and deemed no one trustworthy to conduct a retaliatory campaign).

To get around these issues a careful treatment of Tacitus’ account will be combined with a mixture of archaeology, local topography, and observable patterns for how and why praefecti civitatum were utilized that will expand upon our understanding of why this revolt broke out while both substantiating some of Tacitus’ claims and challenging others. The extended narrative will be stripped down to its basic points. First, the Frisii entered into an alliance with Rome in 12 BCE that included a tribute in the form of ox-hides; there were no issues with tribute payment or with the relationship with Rome until 28 CE. When, however, tribute was increased (or a standard was officially set), the tribe resisted the tribute (either through an inability or unwillingness to pay it). A history of the tribe’s interaction with Rome and Roman presence in the region will be sketched so that important questions may be addressed, such as: why was a prefect present among an allied tribe and what were his roles among them?; why was a tribute rate set, and why at this time specifically did Rome send someone to do it?; was the rate increased due to greed or statal needs in the region (or potentially both)? A case will be made that Roman actions and activities in the region indicate that Rome was seeking to consolidate its hold over the Frisii, and it is these activities and actions which explain Olennius’ presence among the Frisii, his task setting a tribute rate for the tribe, and why the Frisii resisted his efforts.

It seems that the first contact the Frisians had with the Romans was during Drusus’ first campaign across the Rhine River in 12 BCE – a campaign brought about by threats to the stability of Gallia Comata through the incursions of the Sugambri and Usipetes among others.

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65 Martin and Woodman 1989, 256.
66 To an extent, Rome may have been extending its influence over their other North Sea allies, such as the Batavians and Cananefates, at the same time as the efforts with the Frisii.
After repulsing an incursion by the Sugambri and Usipetes, Drusus crossed the Rhine in a retaliatory campaign and subdued both tribes. He then engaged in a second campaign across the North Sea area making contact and alliances with the Cananefates and Frisii before going up the Ems and fighting the Bructeri (Cass. Dio 54.32.1-2; Str. 7.290-1). In this campaign against the Bructeri and Chauci, the Frisii committed infantry to the cause and even saved Drusus’ fleet when it got stranded on its return to winter quarters (Cass. Dio 54.32.3).

As Dyson points out, the campaign in 12 BCE was surely an attempt to secure Gaul and the Rhineland by cowing the tribes immediately beyond the Rhine, especially those who had recently threatened the provinces’ security (secondarily, there was an exploratory aspect to it). Dio’s phrasing suggests that the Frisii came over to the Romans without a fight (“won over the Frisians”/ τούς τε Φρισίους ᾠκειώσατο Cass. Dio 54.32.2) and serves as an example of Rome’s flexible approach to frontier politics (a mixture of diplomacy—Cananefates and Frisii – and conquest – Usipetes, Sugambri, Chauci, and Bructeri). Here, as Rome sought to extend its influence it could take advantage of inter-tribal rivalries and relationships in the region to gain allies from potential adversaries. Additionally, by allying with tribes like the Frisii, Rome could count on these tribes to contribute local guides, translators, supplies, and even military support, all of which would be crucially important as Rome first enters the region.

As far as the specifics of Rome’s treaty with the Frisii, there appear to have been two terms worth noting. The first was a military component. The exact terms of this are, as often is the case, wanting, but it appears that Rome could call on the Frisii to serve in local campaigns,
such as in 12 BCE and surely in others, with either irregular forces or possibly organized into some unknown auxiliary units.\textsuperscript{72} The second treaty term entailed the famous tribute in the form of ox-hides, which according to Tacitus contained no set quality and size standards for the hides until Olennius’ prefecture (Tac. Ann. 4.72).\textsuperscript{73} Despite Frisian territory having fertile land, stockbreeding played a more important role in their economy as much of their terrain was not suitable for agriculture.\textsuperscript{74} Surely this explains why the Frisii paid their tribute in the form of ox-hides. Unfortunately, we do not know the quantity of hides they paid, with which one could conjecture how heavy of a burden it was upon the population. Furthermore, leather was an extremely important commodity for legions to operate. By way of an example, a single legion would need some 53,000 calf hides just for its tents.\textsuperscript{75} It is on these terms that Rome’s relationship with the Frisii was founded.

The Frisii remained loyal to Rome through the latter stages of Augustus’ reign, the Varian disaster, and the campaigns of Germanicus (Pliny NH 25.20-21; cf. Tac. Ann. 1.60ff). During Germanicus’ second campaign across the Rhine, in 15 CE, he constructed a naval camp at Velsen, often linked to the camp Flevum from Tacitus’ account.\textsuperscript{76} While there is some evidence of a Roman military presence in Frisian territory, possibly even a small garrison, at

\textsuperscript{72} Cf. Powell 2011, 74; Galestin 2009. On treaty obligations to support Rome at war, see also pages 191-2, 200-1. Other possible campaigns where Rome may have enlisted their Frisian allies include Tiberius’ campaign c. 5 CE and Germanicus’ campaign in 15 CE. In fact, five Frisians are known to have served in Rome’s forces through c50 CE.\textsuperscript{73} Lendering and Bosman remark that when Olennius set the standard to the aurochs, it was surely a large cow as the aurochs itself “had already disappeared from the Low Countries by that time” (2012, 65).\textsuperscript{74} Galestin 2005, 223; Lendering and Bosman 2012, 69-70.\textsuperscript{75} Albrethsen 2005, 535. Cf. \textit{Tab. Vindol.} 2.343 for a letter discussing the transport of leather to a camp (Kehne 2011, 327). Among the uses of leather for military purposes are: “shoes, shield covers, tents, baggage covers and kit bags, saddles and horse trappings, briefcases, letter and tablet envelopes, cushion covers and purses…wine and water skins, flask covers, sheaths and quivers as well as innumerable straps and fittings”, and also belts, and horse harnesses (Driel-Murray 1985, 44). The quantities of skins for items for whole units were immense: 46,000 goat skins for enough tents for a legion, or 4,200 goat-hides for a \textit{cohors quingenaria} (Bishop and Coulston 2006, 247). Carol van Driel-Murray appears to arrive a slightly lower number by arguing that “a tent for eight men requires about 70 complete goatskins” (1985, 46). As Driel-Murray reminds us, “to fully equip a newly raised unit or to re-equip one at a time of emergency or following hostilities must have posed formidable problems of supply” (46).\textsuperscript{76} Rives 1999, 261; Lendering and Bosman 2012, 65, 74-75; cf. Pliny NH 25.21.
sites such as Winsum or Bentumersiel from the Augustan period. Velsen is the first Roman camp attested around Frisian territory on the Oer-IJ near Lake Flevo. The camp could control both the route into the lake and an important religious center of the tribe, as it was also situated near the village of Velserbroek, which was possibly “a central sanctuary for the Frisians.”

Prior to the expansion of the camp in the 20s CE, the earliest phase of Velsen could support a 500-man garrison within the camp’s triangular layout. The camp was then extended twice prior to its abandonment c. 28 CE. The first extension saw Velsen change shape from triangular to trapezoidal, and the excavation of three new defensive ditches on the land sides of the camp, all of which suggests to Lendering and Bosman that the garrison was anticipating an attack. With the second extension of the camp, a second trapezoidal camp was attached to the first, doubling the garrison size to 1,000. This expansion of the camp suggests that either Rome was seeking to establish a firmer control over the Frisii, or that there were growing concerns over the tribe’s loyalty; one should note that these suggestions are not mutually exclusive.

The camp’s link to Flevum and Tacitus’ account of the Frisian revolt is based on the hasty abandonment of Velsen c. 28 CE after an attack. The discovery of some 520 sling bullets around the perimeter of the camp, varying in quality and build technique (which suggests that some were made hastily in defense), the poisoning of wells with cadavers (likely by the Romans) when the camp was abandoned, and bones found in the harbor area all point to Velsen being besieged and abandoned quickly when the siege was lifted. Potentially linked to the events of

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77 Galestin 2002, 483-488; Mattern 2012, 233. Cf. Lendering and Bosman who propose that it is likely that Rome had a small garrison somewhere in Friesland since the days of Drusus (2012, 261). In a similar manner, Rives believes that Flevum was in existence since the days of Drusus (1999, 261).
78 Lendering and Bosman 2012, 71.
79 Ibid. The authors suggest that the camp was extended after 21 CE. The camp also included three piers that could hold thirteen ships at any given time (useful for patrolling, moving supplies and troops between the North Sea and the Rhine delta area.
80 Ibid, 74-75. The location of the different quality/varieties of sling bullets suggests to the authors that an outline of the course of the battle at the site may be made, in which the attackers came quite close to winning it (on the outline
the Frisian revolt and indirectly affirming Velsen’s abandonment is the Tolsum Tablet (formerly called the Frisian Ox-Sale). The document, dated now to February 29 CE, seems to be a loan note. On the back of the note are the signatures of a tribune of the fifth legion *Alaudae* and a soldier of an unidentified Batavian unit. The appearance of such a high-ranking officer of the fifth legion signing a loan note at this date so far from his unit’s base suggests that Rome continued to have an influence and a presence among the Frisians despite the revolt, or alternatively that Tacitus had compressed events and the revolt lasted longer. The fifth legion’s camp at Vetera was the closest legionary camp to the Frisii, some 140 miles away from Tolsum. The closest known camp however was Velsen, only 78 miles away, and its absence from the Tolsum Tablet may suggest that the camp had already been abandoned by February, 29 CE. In any case, this document reveals that relations between Roman agents and locals continued or were reestablished quickly after the events described by Tacitus.

Having examined Rome’s relationship with the Frisii it is time to engage with issues surrounding Olennius: why was he there, and what was his role in the outbreak of the revolt? *Praefecti civitatum* tended to appear over communities that were recently conquered or had resisted Rome. But, as has just been seen, the Frisii were faithful allies to Rome since 12 BCE. It is possible, though, that Olennius was set over the Frisii to maintain the peace and security of the North Sea region, an area that not only contained allies such as the Batavi, Cananefates, and the Frisii, but an area that also granted access to the North Sea and the rivers that emptied into it (such as the Ems and Weser, utilized in campaigns between 12 BCE and 16 CE). Perhaps the Frisii had come under threat from their neighbors in recent times or there was instability among

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*see p.74). If Lendering and Bosman are correct in equating Velsen with the site of Flevum then the archaeological evidence of the battle at Velsen would shed a great deal of light Flevum’s besiegement and how its garrison narrowly lifted the siege.*

*81 Bowman et al. 2009, 166-167.*
Frisian leaders that threatened Rome’s interests in the region, thus necessitating an increase to the garrison at Velsen as well as instituting a prefect over the tribe, who would be involved in local governance or guiding communal affairs.

Alternatively, and more feasibly, Olennius’ presence was due to Rome seeking to consolidate its control over its erstwhile allies, who were one among a few communities beyond the Rhine that had remained loyal in the aftermath of the Varian Disaster.\(^{82}\) This could explain the increased garrison at Velsen in the 20s CE – though one cannot rule out increased tensions or strained relations between Rome and the Frisii prior to the revolt as the cause for the increased garrison either. Given the nature of Frisian geography and society, if Rome was seeking to incorporate the Frisii administratively into the imperial system in the 20s CE, then it may explain why there was a prefect among them as well as some of Olennius’ actions (such as setting the tribute rate and collecting the tribute). Like many areas where prefects are attested, the Frisii were a tribal society with low levels of urban and political centralization. In the 1\(^{st}\) century CE there may have been 1,500-2,000 settlements within Frisian territory, and very few of those settlements were larger than small villages or hamlets.\(^{83}\) In fact, it seems that Rome had not ever attempted to organize Frisian tribal territory until 47 CE when Corbulo imposed a senate, magistrate, and laws upon the tribe (\textit{senatum, magistratus, leges imposuit}, Tac. Ann. 11.19).\(^{84}\) So, as the Frisii were lacking a level of central organization that Rome preferred as the state was

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\(^{82}\) Rüger 1996, 532. See above on prefects appearing over isolated regions over which Rome was seeking to consolidate its hold.

\(^{83}\) Dietz 2006; Lendering and Bosman 2012, 69-70; Galestin 2005, 223. See above on the presence of prefects because the elite of a community could not be relied upon. In such communities the situation at times could require a higher presence of imperial representatives within a given community, such as Olennius. When the local elites could not be relied upon there was also a higher presence of soldiers who could engage in important administrative tasks at the local level, as it happened among the Frisii with the tribute collection.

\(^{84}\) Rives 1999, 261, Mattern 2012, 223. It is also notable that Frisian society exhibited a near egalitarian or relatively unhierarchical structure. With that being stated, the tribe could occasionally have kings it seems (Tac. Ann. 13.50), however the first evidence of this occurs after Corbulo’s efforts in 47 CE (Cf. Galestin 2005, 223). This shallow hierarchy and dearth of central places would have made it difficult for Rome to manage the Frisian society without providing their own agent to act on the ground.
consolidating its control over the tribe, the imposition of a prefect makes sense and fits into the broader patterns attested in this chapter, even though we are uncertain if the Frisii had previously resisted Rome or if there was regional or elite instability in the 20s CE.

If the argument is correct that Roman consolidating efforts over the Frisii explain the presence of a praefectus civitatum there, then there are still some difficulties in ascertaining precisely when this process started. There are no direct literary references to Roman interactions with the tribe between 12 BCE and 28 CE, save for Pliny’s comment that they were still loyal to Rome when Germanicus was operating across the Rhine (Plin. NH 25.20-21). Given the arguments above and the increased presence at Velsen, Olennius or some unknown predecessor (if there was one) most likely took on the task of prefect sometime between 21 and 28 CE. As prefect, it appears that part of Olennius’ task was to set a tribute rate for the Frisii. Rather than setting a quantity of hides (which was surely already set, as it is notably absent from the changes to the tribute in Tacitus’ account), Olennius set a quality standard of the hides (the size and caliber). As noted above, it is the issue over the standard set by Olennius that causes a problem in Tacitus’ account, not the fact that a standard was set at all over the Frisii (Ann. 4.72). Another task of the prefect here was to collect the tribute, and to this end Olennius had a small contingent of soldiers under his command.85 As the Frisii lacked central places it is likely that the prefect and his crew had to operate out of a few places to collect the tribute. Sites like Winsum, roughly 93 miles east of Velsen along the coast, that exhibit a military presence but lack evidence of a camp, may have served as anchoring points (between the Rhine and Ems) and as points to collect

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85 Baccolini 2007, 177. It could not have been a force large enough to deal with any level of resistance based on how dispersed they would have been in collecting the tribute and by the ease it seems that the Frisii were able to overpower the Roman presence in the area (Tac. Ann. 4.72).
tribute regionally.\textsuperscript{86} Considering his title in Tacitus (\textit{e primipilaribus regendis Frisiis inpositus}), a third task was likely to govern the Frisii, but in light of the context of the argument made here, his task may be better represented as managing the incorporation of the tribe into the administrative apparatuses of the Roman Empire. Finally, as prefects were often placed in circumstances where the local elite could not be relied upon for self-government, Olennius’ prefecture would have been the tribe’s nearest Roman agent, and would have been Rome’s intermediary between the local populace and the center. This is exemplified in the Frisian appeals for relief from burdens of the tribute.\textsuperscript{87} Surely the complaints were made to the prefect, as he was the nearest authority who had the ability to relieve their burden or adjust the tribute terms.

Related to the issue of the burden caused by the tribute exacted by Olennius in Tacitus’ account is a need to address whether the revolt was brought about by the abusive behavior of Olennius or if it was brought about by Frisian resistance to Rome’s consolidation efforts. One may note, though, that these possibilities are not mutually exclusive. Tacitus’ treatment of the revolt has long influenced how scholars have interpreted the cause of the Frisian revolt. In his account, like many of his other revolt narratives, Tacitus cites an outrage as the cause of the revolt, namely Roman avarice (\textit{avaritia}). If one looks to Tacitus’ broader treatment of revolts certain patterns become clear. For instance, in the \textit{Agricola}, Tacitus makes a similar claim to the one hinted at in the \textit{Annales}: tribute was not an issue for the local population unless that population was abused (\textit{Agr. 13; Ann. 4.72}).\textsuperscript{88} This sort of presentation has led scholars like P.A. Brunt to declare Olennius’ actions as “illegal exactions,” pushing the claim that the revolt broke

\textsuperscript{86} Galestin 2009, 484-485. Galestin points out that the area around Winsum was densely populated and an area suitable for cattle-breeding.

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Hence, indignation and complaints; then, as relief was not accorded, an appeal to arms} /\textit{Hinc ira et questus, et postquam non subveniebatur, remedium ex bello} (Tac. \textit{Ann. 4.72- John Jackson trans.}).

out simply due to the abuses of a Roman agent.\textsuperscript{89} Despite Tacitus’ agendas and biases discussed above, it is still quite easy to understand how soldiers or \textit{praefecti civitatum} like Olennius could contribute to provincial unrest. Soldiers were not only a firm reminder of how many communities fell under Roman rule (sometimes even garrisoned or administered by the very people who conquered them), but also the asymmetrical power relationship between soldier/Roman agent and the provincial population left plenty of scope for individuals to abuse their power. One can imagine a scenario where Olennius sought to profit from his position by skimming profits from the tribute demands. In a different form of abuse, it is possible that he knew that the standard he set was a heavy burden. As a former soldier, one who may have served in Germania during the difficult periods after 3 CE, possibly during Varus’ governorship or during Tiberius’ or Germanicus’ campaigns in the region, he may have had an axe to grind. And though the Frisians were on all accounts a friendly tribe, they were still a Germanic tribe and he could have been punishing a tribe for the deeds of others. Both of these scenarios are feasible but are impossible to prove.

There is an equally valid argument, though, that Rome’s attempts at consolidating its hold over the tribes in the region led to the Frisian revolt. Here one may present a case that the Frisii refused to pay the tribute or planned a revolt in order to push back against Rome’s increasing grip over them. When looking at why Olennius was given the authority to fix the tribute standard for the tribe it makes perfect sense in the context of Rome’s efforts in the region in the years leading up to the revolt. As Rome was likely attempting to incorporate the tribe into the imperial system, and being that there may not have been a set standard size or quality for the tributary ox-hides in Drusus’ terms in his alliance with the Frisii in 12 BCE, it makes sense that Rome would have sought to establish a consistent tributary rate at this time. Furthermore, it is

\textsuperscript{89} Brunt 1961, 210.
difficult to state whether Rome had demanded the tribute consistently (i.e. yearly) since 12 BCE or if it was only demanded when Rome was operating in the area. There is also the issue of how severe the tribute demand was on the Frisii. The assumption created by Tacitus was that Drusus made the form of the tribute ox-hides because of the tribe’s narrow resources, but the selection of ox-hides was sensible due to the importance of cattle to the Frisian economy (in addition to its utility to the Roman army). Furthermore, if Lendering and Bosman are right in doubting that the Frisii could have been impoverished by Roman exactions, it would raise more questions concerning Tacitus’ treatment of the events. Did Tacitus color the account to make moral claims about Tiberius as an emperor? More importantly for this project though, Lendering and Bosman’s doubts shed light on the possibility that the tribe refused to pay the tribe in an attempt to resist Rome’s consolidation efforts. The goal of this refusal may have been an attempt to reestablish a previous status quo, namely an agreement to provide ox-hides and aid when requested (i.e. they did not desire being incorporated into the empire but may have still desired a friendly relationship). The act of not paying the tribute led to Roman reprisals, which in turn led to organized resistance against Roman agents in the area. In the course of the revolt, Frisians crucified the soldiers they captured, then laid siege to the Roman camp at Flevum, and later defeated the governor’s forces when the latter embarked on a retaliatory campaign (Tac. Ann. 4.72-73). In defense of this view one may note that the Frisii did not attempt to press their advantage and attack/raid Roman territory or Roman allies, they were content with pushing out the Roman occupying forces.

While it is undeniable that the possibility still remains that Olennius exploited his position for profit (or revenge?), the case is strong that it was Rome’s consolidation efforts that sparked the

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90 “The remark is in itself somewhat odd, as the Frisian economy was certainly doing quite well and we would have expected the Frisians to be well able to pay the taxes demanded by the Romans” (Lendering and Bosman 2012, 73). Cf. Mattern 1999, 118.
revolt. It was Rome that built up a presence among the tribe, first with the camp at Velsen, and then with the camp’s extension in the years preceding the revolt. Rome appointed a prefect over a tribe that was, as far as the admittedly meagre evidence reveals, a faithful ally of Rome. Rome introduced a prefect who was given the task of setting the standard of the tribe’s customary tribute and guiding Frisian affairs (possibly as Rome was attempting to incorporate the friendly tribe more formally within the structures of the empire). The increased Roman presence, especially that of the prefect, threatened to disrupt socio-political hierarchies and practices. It is wholly unsurprising therefore that the Frisii acted against the three most powerful symbols of Rome’s dominance over them; the tribute, the prefect and his soldiers, and the camp at Velsen.

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91 It is worth pointing out that these two views are not mutually exclusive. There is no reason why Olennius could not have both a key agent in Rome’s consolidating efforts and have abused his position to further incite Frisian anger and resentment.
Chapter 2: The Provincial Census in the Early Principate: Recently Annexed and Under-Urbanized Regions

The provincial census was an administrative institution meant to create a more predictable and efficient tax regime through an improvement of Rome’s knowledge of the provincial population and their property by means of counting, categorizing, and assessing people and their resources. To borrow James Scott’s terms, the census was meant to make Rome’s subject population and resources more legible to the imperial center. This would allow the state to more effectively tax subjects in currency, natural resources, and manpower (corvée labor and military needs).

Furthermore, the census performed ideological roles, reinforcing the strength of the emperor, who, according to panegyrists, could see and hear all from Rome (Plin. Pan. 80.3; cf. Aristides, Or. 26.33). In theory, the census could also help a state prevent widespread rebellion or revolt by providing the information necessary to create and maintain tax levels at the most sustainable and tolerable levels for local populations. As the provincial census was organized by province, then community, then individual household, the accumulation of information about individual’s identity, kin relations, juridical/social status, and age serves as an important instrument of control for the imperial center. At the same time the information that the Roman state drew from its provincial population was a simplification of the actual people and cultures they sought to better know and extract resources from; i.e. it was impossible for the Roman government and its officials to fully understand the plethora of communities and cultures under its sway so that the state had to create and utilize abstractions of these groups to suit statal needs. The body of individuals that comprised the Roman Empire was reduced to a series of lists containing only the

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1 Claytor and Bagnall 2015, 638. Pliny: postremo velocissimi sideris more omnia invisere omnia audire, et undecumque invocatum statim velut adesse et adisteret/ “finally, like a swift-moving star, to see all, hear all, and be present at once with aid wherever your help is sought” (Betty Radice trans.). Aristides: governing through letters from Rome.
2 Le Teuff 2012a, 161; Hingley 1997, 89-90. Richard Hingley points out that utilizing indigenous elites for local government and organizing areas on a civitas system extends “the state’s mechanism of observation and control.”
aspects of their social lives in which the state was interested (political, military, economic, and ideological). One could say that what the census asked in terms of land or property probably mattered very little to the property owner. A farmer, for instance, could report a quantity, value, or size of land to state officials, but it said nothing of the quality of the land or of how hard a family had to work in order to survive off it, or if they could even thrive. Rather, what the census allowed for was a more direct rule over provincials than previous tax regimes had allowed.  

While the imperial center saw the provincial census as an administrative tool that could also serve ideological goals, provincials connected imperial taxation to the census and received it as one of their foremost reminders of their subjection to Rome. To the former, the poll-tax in Egypt was referred to as *laographia*, thus linking it to the process of assessment. Likewise, Matthew, Mark, and Luke all use the word *kensos* as an equivalent to *phoros*, which P.A. Brunt understood to be “an intimate connection between [the] census and direct taxation in the minds of provincials in Judaea” (Matt. 22.17; Mark 12:14; Luke 20:22). For the latter, this “intimate connection” between the two institutions led provincials to see the census as a burden placed upon them and a keen reminder of their situation under Rome. When the provincial census was first implemented in Judaea it met with resistance from followers of Judas the Galilean, who argued that the “assessment carried with it a status amounting to downright slavery” (Joseph. *AJ* 18.4). Centuries later, John Chrysostom looked back to that same census of 6 CE and equated it to leading the ‘race of the Jews’ under the yoke of empire; i.e. that the census may be ideologically equated to Roman rule over the world (Chrysostom, *Homil. Contra Iudaeos et

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3 Unless what later Jurists say occurred from the start, namely that there was a quantification of property by its quality (property grades).
4 Scott 1998, 26, 76-81.
5 Bérenger 2009, 190; Claytor and Bagnall 2015, 638; Rathbone 1993, 86.
6 Brunt 1981, 164.
Yet, at the same time the provincial census played a key role in the local lives of provincials, for it established a hierarchy of status on a civic and personal level. As the assessment of individuals examined their “juridical status and consequent tax liability”, census returns became extremely valued possessions as it recorded their property and if they had them, their Roman citizenship and tax exemptions. To put it differently, it was in provincials’ interest to register in the census, so they may be accurately identified to avoid confusion and potential over-taxation.

The aims of this chapter will be purposefully narrow. Issues and questions surrounding the provincial census are multifarious and each one merits further research. But for the purposes of this project, the issues are limited to those surrounding the initial implementation of the provincial census and how it would have been implemented in regions with lower levels of centralized urbanization. This decision was made as these regions are the sort of places generally annexed in the Augustan period and beyond and are like the regions that resisted the census (Gallia Comata, Cilicia, and Judaea). Decades ago Lutz Neesen recognized that the task of a provincial census would more likely have been difficult in the imperial provinces, save for Egypt, as the local financial devices or institutions that were already in place may not have met the needs or requirements of Rome. Many of these imperial provinces consisted of recently annexed regions that lacked the well-defined civic centers and surrounding territories familiar to Rome and the littoral Mediterranean (cf. the division of provinces in Cassius Dio 53.12).

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7 Ando 2000, 350-1; Le Teuff 2012a, 442; Paltiel 1991, 78). Chrysostom: "For just as Christ was born, the very first census was held, when the Romans ruled the race of the Jews and led them beneath the yoke of their empire."
8 Rathbone 1993, 86; Ando 2006, 186; idem 2000, 353-8; Scott 1998, 68.
9 As Egypt was “a tightly organized financial entity, which only required a check and repair by the new imperial administration” (Neesen 1980, 39).
10 Neesen writes specifically of Syria, Dalmatia, Hispania Tarraconensis, and the provinces within Gallia Comata (1980).
chapter will then examine the adaptations and innovations made by Rome when it introduced the census in these recently annexed provinces. The task is made all the more challenging, though, given the paucity of evidence concerning the ‘introduction and early development’ of the provincial census in the early Principate, let alone its initial implementation in recently annexed regions. With that being said, the aims of this chapter will be to shed some light on how Rome went about introducing one of its key institutions of provincial administration through four questions to then investigate the relationship between census and revolt in the case studies. 1) What was the provincial census? What did it ask of people, and how did it work? 2) Why was the census introduced on top of Rome’s pre-existing tax-regimes? 3) How long was it after annexation before Rome would typically first administer a provincial census? 4) Who carried out local census operations in these regions?

Through these four questions it will be argued that the information required of provincials for the census could vary province by province as well as who was liable when. Despite this potential for variation in practice across provinces there were certain types of information commonly asked of provincials. Such types of information were: where people lived within the province (usually just enough information to track down individuals should the need arise); who lived at the property, how old each person was, and what their status was; what types of properties and resources might be found on their property (crops, meadows, vineyards, groves, etc.). The depth of the information thus obtained goes beyond tax and assessment functions and reveals both the invasiveness of the process and the depth to which Rome sought to know its population. To this end the Roman state sought the kind of information useful for controlling a population and for propagating the power of the emperor and Rome.

\[12\] Claytor and Bagnall 2015, 640. Their statement concerns Egypt specifically, but applies elsewhere, especially given that Egypt contains the most evidence concerning the provincial census.
In terms of how the provincial census operated on the ground, it will be argued that urban centers were the lowest level where census operations were conducted. The emperor appointed officials (censitores) at the provincial level who then made use of the imperial freedmen and slaves in their general staff, or local magistrates, or army officers as census agents to conduct operations at the local level. These agents could be given charge of operations over individual cities, several cities, or tribes. Once an edict announced the census, provincials were required to go to their nearest administrative center to make a self-declaration before the census agent.

As to why this institution was introduced in the Augustan era, it may be argued that the utility of the information obtained from provincial censuses could allow for a more reliable knowledge of the empire’s resources, which in turn would allow a more predictable income to support the state’s needs, like the professional army introduced in the reign of Augustus for instance. As the provincial census was not introduced to all provinces simultaneously, a study of the contexts of when the provincial census was introduced into a province reveals that for many of the earliest known examples the impetus was to gather information on the human and natural resources in regions neighboring impending or ongoing military campaigns. This then shows that the provincial census did not serve a single purpose at any one time, but could serve local, global, and ideological purposes that could shift and change across time. When Rome did introduce a provincial census, it will be shown that it often did so after a lengthy period of consolidation, on average twenty to thirty years after conquest. This is in stark contrast to earlier views on the subject that suggest a census was conducted shortly after conquest. Finally, it will be revealed that there was an increased likelihood for soldiers to be involved in census operations at the civic or regional levels in the early Principate. It will be shown that these

13 By this I mean that aside from Egypt, which had a greater bureaucratic depth than elsewhere, census agents did not conduct operations at sites of a lower order than a civitas (they did not go to villages, fora, oppida, etc. that were not designated as the administrative center of a given community).
soldiers were only used as census agents in under-urbanized and recently annexed places, or in regions that had proven difficult to pacify, had just been pacified, or had recently rebelled against Rome.

What is the Census?

Republican Census- Antecedent to Provincial Census

The census had a long history at Rome. Before the introduction of this institution in the provinces under Augustus, the Roman citizen census counted, categorized, and assessed Roman citizens for taxation (until 167 BCE) and military service purposes. Until the census reforms of the 1st century BCE, the Republican census required all *sui iuris* citizens to come to the Campus Martius in Rome, tribe by tribe, with some exceptions made for soldiers on campaign (Livy 29.37.5-6), to represent their family under oath before the censors or their aids. This centralized method of conducting the census only worked so long before it would become burdensome and outmoded as Rome expanded its fledgling empire. A centralized census operation like this required a portion of the citizen population to travel great distances to Rome to register, and for those that failed to appear before the censors there was a risk of facing a severe punishment including the loss of liberty and civil rights (Cic. *Pro Caec.* 99).\(^{14}\) The movement of peoples already strained census proceedings as the state continued to expand, but the expansion in citizen numbers over the last two centuries of the Republic made operations nearly impossible.\(^{15}\)

\(^{14}\) Nicolet 1991, 126; Nicolet 1985, 13, 15; Le Teuff 2012a, 183, 224. Cicero: *quum autem incensum vendit, hoc iudicat, quum ii qui in servitute iusta fuerunt censu liberentur, eum qui, quum liber esset, censeri noluerit, ipsum sibi libertatem abiudicavisse. / By selling a man who has evaded the census, the state decrees that, whereas those who have been slaves in the normal way gain their freedom by being included in the census, one who has refused to be included in it although free, has of his own accord repudiated his freedom.* (H. Grose Hodge trans.)

\(^{15}\) On census figures, Italian and citizen populations from c.225 BCE-14 CE, and issues relating to both see: Brunt 1971. On the history of this issue see, Brunt 1971, 6, 35-9, 41. It may be argued that the census lost some of its initial practical purpose by the 1st century BCE as citizens no longer had to pay *tributum* after 167 BCE. Furthermore, as there was a slow shift towards voluntary recruitment (as opposed to conscription by census property
The way the Roman state would adapt the citizen census in the period after the Social War was likely the inspiration for how it would conduct a provincial census a few decades later. With the extension of Roman citizenship to Italians, whose relationships with Rome previously involved supplying specific numbers of men for campaigns and thus required some sort of mechanism for knowing their manpower, the census procedures shifted spatially over the next few decades from being centralized at Rome to being performed in municipia, colonies, and prefectures across the Italian peninsula.\(^\text{16}\) This shift resulted in a flow of documents, rather than people, to Rome. Now, under the procedures laid out in the Tabula Heracleensis,\(^\text{17}\) the highest magistrate in the aforementioned locales was charged with carrying out census proceedings locally. After the census was carried out, the census records were copied, with one being kept in a local archive and a second sent to Rome.\(^\text{18}\)

The information asked of citizens in the Republican census served very specific and limited state needs: the counts and assessments established a socio-economic hierarchy through census classes and centuries assigned by wealth that determined tax contributions and military levies (Dion. Hal. 4.19.1; Livy 1.42.5; cf. Gell. 10.28; 16.10.10-11). To these ends, the census asked citizens to provide, their “nomina, their praenomina, their fathers’ or patrons’ (names), their tribes, their cognomina, and how many years old each of them shall be and an account of their property, according to the schedule of the census” (Tabula Heracleensis, ll. 146-147). The final phrase of the quote implies that what sorts of property items were counted and how they were assessed could vary based on the needs of the state at the time of the census. Nevertheless,

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\(^\text{16}\) Brunt 1971, 40, 52, 98-99, 545-548. Examples of allied requirement demands or allusions to them: Polyb. 2.23.9-24.16; Livy, 29.15, 41.8.6-8.

\(^\text{17}\) CIL I\(^\text{2}\) 593. An inscription most likely dating to the Caesarian period containing material from the period after the Social War.

there is evidence to suggest that these census operations typically recorded monetary valuations, estimated by the citizen himself, for property including Italian lands, slaves, (im)moveable goods, and precious objects (Cic. Flacc. 79-80). There is even evidence that the state could request debts be recorded at individual operations (Livy 6.27; Gell. 6.11.9). It is very plausible that the reason for variations in what was asked of citizens is that interested parties, like senators, could use the information derived from census records to create special taxes, levies, or to inform state policies (for issues like debt).\(^{19}\)

**What did it ask of people?**

In a similar manner, the provincial census of the Principate could be flexible in terms of what information it required from provincials. Here only a couple examples of variations will be quickly mentioned so we may move to a more general level inspection of what the provincial census asked of people. First, in those provinces that had a *tributum soli*, property could be rated differently across provinces. For instance, the *agrimensor* Hyginus found it necessary to note that Pannonian lands were categorized as *‘arvi primi, arvi secundi, prati, silvae glandiferae, silvae vulgares, pascuae’* (Hyginus 205 L).\(^{20}\) Second, the ages at which people were liable to various taxes, like the *tributum capitis* appears to have varied across provinces. In Syria, men were liable to the *tributum capitis* between fourteen to sixty-five years old, while women were liable to the tax starting at twelve years old (*Dig. 50.15.3= Ulpian, de censibus II*). Meanwhile in Egypt women were exempt from the *tributum capitis* altogether and the men were liable for the

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\(^{19}\) Brunt 1981, 166-167; Le Teuff 2012a, 219. Again, see Livy 6.27 on debt.

\(^{20}\) Brunt 1981, 166-167. Hyginus: "...*in Pannonia there are first-class lands, second-class lands, meadows, acorn-bearing woods, ordinary woods, and pasture land*" (Campbell 2000, trans.).
tax between the ages of fourteen and sixty-two. 21 The important thing to note from these examples is that the when and how people and property were assessed for taxation varied from place to place based on local practice or Rome’s need/interest in the region. At the same time though, it should also be noted that there is a distinct probability that census practices actually became more standardized over time.

As the state used information derived from the census for certain statal functions such as assessing provincials for taxation, corvée labor, and military levies, it is necessary to look at what the census asked of its provincial population both to understand the depth to which Rome sought to know its population and how invasive this process was for those subject to it. First of all, the state wanted to know where its residents lived. For Ulpian this meant that people should record the administrative district they belonged to, their pagus within that, the name of their property, and the nearest two neighbors on that property (Dig. 50.15.4= Ulpian, de censibus, III; cf. P. Yadin 16; SB 1 5661). 22 If one lived in a city or a large town, one could indicate the location of one’s house by including the street it was on, the quarter/district of the town, and the name of the town (SB X 10759; SB XII 10788B; SB X 10759). Here, it may be worthwhile to point out that the state did not necessarily need to know precisely where within a community individuals lived – like placing a property on a survey map (though examples of this may be found, like the cadaster map of Arausio). The combination of information asked of individuals

21 Bagnall and Frier 1994, 27; Brunt 1981, 165. Brunt uses this information on the ages of liability for the tributum capitis to argue for the regularity of census operations. So, for Egypt, he would expect a census every fourteen years because that is the age at which men became liable, and in Syria, every twelve years because that is the age at which women became liable, meanwhile Ulpian presupposed ten-year intervals (Dig. 50.15.4 pr.). While this may be possible on a more general level for the Principate, it may not necessarily be the case for the early Principate in particular when the provincial census may have been more ad hoc in nature as the institution developed. See more on this below.

22 Babatha in P. Yadin 16 likewise recorded that she lived in Maoza in the Zoarene [district] of the Petra administrative region, and indicated her two nearest neighbors for each of her properties, which in some cases was a road or the Dead Sea. In SB 1 5661 Tatybynchis simply stated that she lived in Philadelphia in the Arsinoite nome (an administrative division unique to Egypt).
likely provided just enough information for state or local authorities to track down someone if the need should arise. Furthermore, providing a location of residence was also a useful identifier for both the state (as pointed to above) and the subject (to ensure that they were only taxed correctly for what they had).

Second, the provincial census asked each household to state who lived there, how old were they, and what the status was of each person residing there.\textsuperscript{23} To aid with identification, it seems that heads of households included patronymics and as time wore on they increasingly added more names, such as the paternal grandfather’s and/or maternal patronymic.\textsuperscript{24} There is also evidence of further identification aids in Egyptian census returns through mentioning prominent scars of household members (SB 1 5661). If there were renters or lodgers on a property, they were to be listed on census returns as well (SB X 10759).\textsuperscript{25} While rare in the 1\textsuperscript{st} century CE, one could list one’s profession on a census return as Pompeius Niger did (SB XII 10788B).\textsuperscript{26} If the head of a household was female, she had to record the name of her guardian and where he lived on her census returns (P. Yadin 16; SB I 5661). In Ulpian’s day, heads of households had to list the “ages, functions, skills, and nationalities” of each slave when declaring slaves on census returns (Dig. 50.15.5= Ulpian, de censibus, III). It is uncertain though if this was a universal practice or even if this practice was in use during the early Principate.\textsuperscript{27} As the

\textsuperscript{23} On names, ages, and identification marks in census returns see generally: P. Yadin 16, SB I 5661, SB X 10759; Dig. 50.15.

\textsuperscript{24} Bagnall and Frier 1994, 22.

\textsuperscript{25} It appears that among the nine or more renters at this property was a family with six children with children from two marriages, former and current wife of Aphrodisias (Bagnall 1991, 31-2).

\textsuperscript{26} Parassoglou 1970, 95. Providing professions could be a further source of identification aid for both the government and the returnee. By adding key information about themselves on government documents, provincials could benefit when appearing before courts, for instance, to confirm claims over disputed property (they could provide their census return that claims the property, and the additional personal identification markers such as patronymics, scars, or professions may be further proof of personage).

\textsuperscript{27} One must be careful to use Ulpian to describe the census of the early Principate because he was describing the census as it was in his day. There does appear to be a certain general consistency between Ulpian and papyri from Egypt and Arabia, as well as similarities between his description of the provincial census and the descriptions of the Republican census in the accounts of Livy and Dionysius, both contemporaries of Augustus. Therefore, where
state made its direct tax exactions collectable community by community, it needed to know how many people lived within each community and so made lists comprising all the households within the community. Furthermore, the Roman state was also interested in collecting information on when individuals would become liable or cease to be liable for certain taxes, like the *tributum capitis* (*Dig. 50.15.3*= Ulpian, *de censibus*, II), or to know the human resources available for more irregular exactions like corvée labor or military levies. Knowing who lived where, and how many people resided there also allowed the state to more easily control its subject population socially and politically.

Third, the provincial census asked provincials to record certain types of properties they had and where each might be found. Additionally, it asked provincials to record the crops and resources located on the property, as well as providing estimates in value or sowing area for each item. Possessors declared each of their lands, including the name of the property and where it was, how many *iugera* under cultivation, the amount of meadow and pasturage lands, felled woods, and the number of *iugera* of olives under cultivation and number of vines –note that it is only the number, not the acreage of vines (*Dig. 50.15.4*= Ulpian, *de censibus*, III). Provincials were also called to declare lakes on their properties with fish and harbors, and to declare if they possessed saltpans on their properties (*Dig. 50.15.4.6-7*= Ulpian, *de censibus*, III). In addition to the slaves mentioned above, it is likely that animals, other fruits, and moveable goods were declared for valuation as well (Varro, *Re Rustica*, 2.1.16 on flocks of sheep recorded in Italy for tax collectors). To make this absolutely clear, it was the declarant, not some state official, who had to value and estimate their property (*Dig. 50.15.4*= Ulpian, *de censibus*, III).

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Ulpian is utilized here, it is only in those facets that seem likely to apply generally to Roman censuses regardless of period.  
Under normal or ideal circumstances, Rome placed the burden of property valuation upon the provincial. A question still remains as to whether Roman or local of measurements would have been typically used by the provincial. While direct evidence of a gradual trend towards a standardization of weights and measures seems lacking (largely due to the nature of our evidence), it does not mean that Rome did not prefer to make use of its own units when making assessments related to the census (currency, weights, and measures). One must remember that weights, measurements, and land tenure practices were at the center of Rome’s extraction methods. Without a somewhat uniform system, or at least ‘comparable units of measurement’, it was nigh impossible for the state to effectively govern and react to local situations and issues, thus creating greater potential to provoke negative local reactions.29 Despite a probable preference for Roman units in the valuation process, from the evidence pertaining to the early Principate, it appears that Rome could be quite flexible in accepting the use of local weights, measures, currency, and taxes among various groups. For example, when Babatha made a land declaration in the new province of Arabia in 127 CE, a province that had been annexed in 106 CE, she listed each of her properties (three date orchards and one barley field), and the sowing area of each crop/orchard, but did so by using local units of measurement (sata, kaboi, koroi) and tax valuations in the old Nabataean monetary unit melaina. Her declaration also included the old Nabataean royal tax, the stephnikon (P. Yadin, 16; cf. XHev/Se 62).30 The gromatic writer Hyginus also mentions other peoples who expressed measures in non-Roman forms, in this instance relating to the measurement of land. In Dalmatia, the versus may be found, while in Gallia Narbonensis the libra and parallela may be found as units of measurements. Meanwhile in Spain one could use centuriae as a unit of measurement, and in Cyrene there existed square

29 Scott 1998, 29, 32.
blocks of land similar to Roman centuries called *plinthides*, and among the Tungri in Gallia Belgica the use of the *pes Drusianus* rather than the Roman *pes* (foot). In such situations where local custom is to express area in non-Roman terms (i.e. in *iugera*), Hyginus suggests that *gromatici* should note the equivalency between the local measurement and the Roman: for instance, ‘so many *iugera*, so many *versus*’. What he suggested would have made local measurements legible (understandable) to Roman officials operating in the province. From all this, two observations may be made. First, it is quite possible that the burden of converting local units, measures, and, where existing, currencies was upon the shoulders of Roman officials.

Second, and closely related to the first, while Rome certainly inserted itself into local affairs and does appear to have had certain measurements and weights that were ideal, they appear unable or uncommitted to forcing locals to use them. This would have resulted in the need for measurement conversions for surveys as well as further conversions locally to calculate dues, rents, and taxes derived from such surveys. What this suggests is that Rome was more concerned with being able to reliably assess and extract the resources of its provincial populations than to do so uniformly (i.e. with standard weights and measures, or even the same taxes across provinces).

Returning to a more general framework, declarants were supposed to record which properties belonged to which communities so that each one could be evaluated for taxes at their respective locales, as both Babatha and Sammouos did in Arabia in 127 CE (*P. Yadin*, 16; *XHev/Se* 62; *Dig.* 50.15.4.2= Ulpian, *de censibus*, III). In Ulpian’s day it was also the responsibility of declarants to list how much, if any, of their properties they were unable to

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31 Ulpian asserts that “a man who possesses land in another community must declare it in the community in which it is situated. For land tax must relieve that community in whose territory it is owned.” This is why Pompeius Niger of *SB XII* 10788B recorded the portion of a house he owned, though it was not his permanent residence. He had to register within communities and file for each community he had property in (Parassoglou 1970, 97).
“enjoy”; i.e. if portions of land had been lost in an abyss, or vines or trees had died of drought, or land had been flooded by a river (Dig. 50.15.4.1 = Ulpian, de censibus, III). Again, it is uncertain if this last rule applied universally or at all in the early Principate. In sum, what the state asked of people went beyond mere assessment for taxation and other exactions. It certainly sought the kind of information useful for controlling a population and for propagating the power of the emperor and Rome.32 But how did Rome go about acquiring this information in the regions under survey in this study?

**How did it work?**

It stands to reason that the initiative for introducing the provincial census to a province lay with the emperor. It was Augustus himself who had led the first provincial census, in 27 BCE in Gaul and possibly Spain (Cass. Dio 53.22), and it was his relatives or close associates who carried out several of the earliest provincial censuses: Drusus and Germanicus in Gaul (12 BCE- Cass. Dio 53.22; Livy, Per. 134; CIL 13.1668; 14 CE- Tac. Ann. 1.31), Quirinius in Syria and Judaea (6 CE- Joseph. AJ, 17.355; 18.1), and possibly Varus in Germania Magna (7-9 CE- Cass. Dio 56.18.3-4).33 It also stands to reason that Augustus and his successors used the Roman census of the late Republic as a model for how to conduct a provincial census. This means that in the provinces, as in Italy, the framework of the census was based upon urban centers.34 Rome used the aggregate of these communities’ population counts and property declarations to assess the

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32 Ando 2000, 353.
33 Quirinius’ closeness to the imperial family may be seen in his service as rector to Gaius Caesar in the East (Tac. Ann. 3.48.1). Varus had been married to one of Agrippa’s daughters prior to the latter’s death (P. Koln 4701 lines 5-7: ἐπὶ πατευόντον Τιβέριον Νέρωνος | καὶ Κιν〈τι〉λιὼν Ὀδάρων γαμβρὸν τῶν | σὸν προσπειδόθη. He then later married closer into Augustus’ family through his marriage to Claudia Pulchra, granddaughter of Octavia (Tac. Ann. 4.66.1). See below, pages 106, 273-4, 323-5, for suggestions of a census in Germania Magna. There are also two potential instances of subordinate officers being appointed directly by the emperor in the early Principate: Proculus (CIL, 10.680) and Sulpicius Felix (AE, 1931, 36) (Le Teuff 2012b, 46, 70).
burden of the province as a whole and for each of its constituent cities (Suet. Vesp. 16.1; App. pref. 15; Hyginus, On Establishing Boundaries, 160.27-162.2; IG 5.1.1432; Ulpian, de censibus III= Dig. 50.15.4.2). As the provincial census was actually conducted at the civitas level, it was able to serve local civic and imperial needs. The local governments used their census records for local institutions, to assess the wealth of their population, and to distribute the burden of imperial taxation (cf. IG 5.1.1432).

Census Officers

Outside of Egypt, Rome throughout the early Principate generally lacked the institutional and bureaucratic depth in the provinces to use centrally appointed officials at every level of census operation everywhere. To be sure, Rome did make use of its available resources in carrying out such a key imperial institution. The emperor typically made use of provincial governors, his representatives, to conduct censuses. A question still remains concerning the personality of the man in charge: was he specially appointed for the task, or was the census such a routine activity that it merely fell to the governor already there? It is quite possible that the answer varies across space and time. Given that Augustus carefully chose relatives and close associates for the first censuses for which we have evidence, one could suggest that for at least the first censuses in regions currently attested governors were specially appointed for the task (see below on the timing of the first census, which may also lend more credence to this view). But with time,

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35 Ando 2006, 187; Le Teuff 2012a, 307; Campbell 2000, 154-57. It seems that this inscription, IG 5.1.1432, which dates to the 1st century CE (maybe 37-44 CE), reveals both the imperial exaction for Messene (100,000 denarii) and the honorand’s solution to divide up the burden through an Eight obol tax (Levick 2000, 84; Mattingly 2011, 134).
37 Claytor and Bagnall 2015, 639; Le Teuff 2012a, 307-8. Elio Lo Cascio points out that while consular census legates seem to be always governors, the few praetorian census legates that are known do not appear to have been governors while conducting the census. They do, however, appear to have been more limited in the extent of their charge, namely to a district of a province (1999, 203-204; cf. Berenger 2009, 196).
38 Lo Cascio 1999, 203-204.
regardless of whether or not there was a strict periodization between censuses in a given province, the provincial census surely must have become a routine enough event that would not have required a specially appointed official to oversee it. The need for a specially appointed official would be more pertinent during the initial post-conquest or annexation period, when relationships with the locals were at their most delicate. It is at this very stage in the process of integration, the decades immediately following conquest and/or annexation, where most revolts would occur in provincial Roman history. Here the emperor typically relied upon his most trusted and experienced men in such situations to maintain order and peace during this early phase of integration to the empire, so why should one not expect a similar response when it came to the first implementation of the census?

When the emperor issued instructions for a first census in one of these provinces, the governors then issued an edict across their province ordering the census. Governors then relied upon a multitude of imperial subordinates and local magistrates to carry out census operations at lower levels. During the early Principate, governors made use of whatever equestrians, imperial freedmen, and slaves they had in their general staff or military officers available in their province to serve as census agents. The general consensus is that these agents were given specific districts, of variable size, to oversee. There are examples of agents in charge of individual cities.

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39 This question has been debated for a long time and may never quite be settled. Ulpian mentioned a ten-year periodization (Dig. 15.4 = Ulpian, *de censibus*, III), while Egypt initially had a seven-year cycle that turned into a fourteen-year cycle (Claytor and Bagnall 2015). Gaul may have developed a similar cycle to Egypt, but there are gaps and inconsistences that should call a rigid periodization into doubt (see tables in Le Teuff 2012a, 250-251).

40 Though note that equestrian subordinates from the reign of Hadrian onward “were chosen by the Princeps and took the title of procurator Augusti ad censibus accipiendos or a censibus accipiendis” (Bérenger 2009, 198).

41 Cotton and Yardeni 1997, 149: “the appearance of the emperor’s full titulature in the dating formula…suggest(s) that land declarations *P. Yadin* 16 and No. 62 reflect, in their dating formula, the language used by the emperor Hadrian in a letter or an edict ordering a census in the new province. The letter or edict was then published by the provincial governor together with his own edict ordering the census.” See also edicts of governors in Egypt, Bagnall and Frier 1994, 11.

42 Claytor and Bagnall 2015, 639; Bérenger 2009, 196, 198; Brunt 1981, 165; Le Teuff 2012a, 307-308. Note that Priscus, a prefect of cavalry, appears to have been assigned the area around Rabbath Moab where he received land
several cities, and over peoples, but it appears that these interventions at the civic level were rather exceptional as Rome often preferred to rely on local magistrates for this task. To merely introduce some thoughts that will be more fully treated below, imperial interventions at the local level may be predicated on the level of urban development (or the lack of it) or by an area’s recent relationship with Rome (difficult to conquer, recently revolted, could not rely upon the local elite, etc.). Increased Roman presence on the ground may also be caused by specific difficulties at the local level such as boundary disputes between two communities, drastic changes in tribute exactions or the spread of its burden, or even for large military levies. Under ideal conditions most of the registration work in census operations was done by local magistrates of various types at the civitas level (for instance, IG 5.1.1432; SB I 5661; SB XII 10788B). The number of census officials could vary entirely by locale, even within a province, and may in part be determined by the size of the population and territory, and the structure of the local declarations. It is possible that he received XHev/Se 62 as well, but the subscription is missing.

43 CIL 12.1855, D. Iulius Capito, censor of the allied city of the Remi (censor civitatis Remorum foederatae); CIL 14.3955, Gn. Munatius Aurelius Bassus, censor of the Roman colony at Camulodunum (censitor civium Romanorum coloniae Victricensis quae est in Britannia Camuloduni); CIL 3.6687, Q. Aemilius Secundus, carried out a census of Apamea by orders of Syria’s legate Quirinius (iussu Quirini censum egi / Apameae civitatis); CIL, 8.7070, Anonymous, carried out a census over the conventus of Caesaraugusta (Censitori/ [conventus Cae]saraugustae[n][i]); P. Yadin 16, Priscus, a cavalry prefect, was in charge of operations in Rabbath-Moab.

44 CIL 3.388, Q. Lollius Fronto conducted census operations in forty-four urban centers across Africa (Civitates XXXIII ex provin(ia) Afric(ae) quae sub eo censae sunt); CIL 7.1463, C. Moconius Verus took a census of twenty-four urban centers among the Vascones and Varduli in the northern Iberian peninsula (at census accipi[en]/dos civitatum XXIII[1] / Vasconum et Vardul(orum); AE 1960, 163, Q. Marcus Dioga conducted census operations over three urban centers in Gallia Belgica (proc(uratori) / ad census accipiendos trium c[i/vitati(um)] / Ambianorum Murrinorum Atreba[tium]).

45 CIL 11.5213, T. Haterius Nepos as prefect of a cavalry unit conducted census operations over the Anavionenses of northern Britain ([(p)raef(ecto) equit(um)] censito[ri]/ Brittonum Anavion[ensium]); AE, 1960, 167, Q. Domitius Marsianus conducted operations over the Tungri, Frisii, and Batavi in Gallia Belgica and Germania Inferior (proc(uratori) Aug(usti) ad census in Gallia accipiendos provinciae Belgicae per regiones Tungrorum et Frisavonium et Germaniae inferioris et Batavorum).

46 A lack of urban centers deprived Rome of one of its key links in social control and their state power, namely that local elites were critical links between Rome and local communities. Without cities, there was no centralized place for local elites to congregate and establish this key link to the imperial center (Noreña 2015, 183).

government.\textsuperscript{48} There is a benefit though to Rome’s reliance on local magistrates for census operations. By often relying upon local elites for census operations Rome had a potential built-in self-checking device for registration and tax evasion. The reality is that Rome really did rely upon local compliance in carrying out these registration operations as well as ‘giving accurate declarations.’ But by placing this task in the hands of local officials, it encouraged local officials to root out those underreporting, underpaying, or shirking liturgies as the officials were liable to any shortfalls and they would face a heavier fiscal burden at the hands of free-loaders; it was in their self-interest to monitor their peers. At the same time, however, while local elites could self-check their peers, the sheer extent of properties and property types, and use of self-assessments made fraud quite easy. To this end, some scholars perceive that communities could and did on the whole underreport on the census in order to reduce overall taxation – communal solidarity if one will. The likelihood of the state catching fraud may have been relatively low as their means of checking involved costly surveys or reliance on local elites to monitor their peers.\textsuperscript{49}

\textit{Declaration before census official}

So, when provincials appeared before census officers or local officials, how did they make their declarations? First of all, declarants made a self-declaration (cf. Dig. 50.15.4.1). It was the provincials’ responsibilities to accurately register whatever was required in the province, whether it be agricultural lands, people, houses, or other goods. The census official’s role in this process appears to have been merely to check and control the self-assessment of the registrant.\textsuperscript{50} In

\textsuperscript{49} Scheidel 2015, 237-238; Corbier 1991, 227.
\textsuperscript{50} Neesen 1980, 52; Isaac 1994. Benjamin Isaac notes that it is uncertain how and if the census official verified the information. While there is evidence that some places did in fact keep some sort of records concerning their
declaring land, houses, or people in their household, the head of the household would say before the official something along the lines of ‘there belongs to me…’, ‘I, son of X, of X (place) register myself/what I possess’, or ‘I register myself and my family in the house belonging to me in the village of X’ (for instance: XHev/Se 62; P. Yadin 16; SB XII 10788B). After making their declaration, it appears that occasionally registrants swore an oath that their statement was accurate and made in good faith (XHev/Se 61 frg. A+B; P. Yadin 16. Both from Arabia in 127 CE.). Finally, some point after the completion of the declaration, the declarant received an official copy of the original document (a receipt). The importance of receiving an official copy cannot be overstated. The copy bore a subscription verifying that the census officer received the declaration (P. Yadin 16; XHev/Se 61 frg. A+B), and was signed by five witnesses confirming the authenticity of the document (P. Yadin 16). These copies also provided important dating information to show that the document came from the most recent census, such as the day, month, consulship and regnal years (P. Yadin 16; SB X 10759; SB I 5661; SB XII 10788B; XHev/Se 61 Fr. A+B). What one should note here is that the dating formula could vary greatly over time from locale to locale, and the only thing that mattered in this regard was that the dating formula was recognizable at the local and provincial levels. By giving a copy of the declaration to registrants, the state was providing the former with a valuable tool in protecting themselves from “excessive or random demands from the city authorities, who were in a position to impose their own estimation if they were not shown a valid and up-to-date copy of a declaration.”

citizenship population, there is less certainty about the state of records and archives in a recently annexed area. If a community had no tradition of census-like activities, there is a distinct possibility that there would have been no earlier records to verify census results against when Rome first implemented a census in the region.

51 Bagnall and Frier 1994, 22-23.
52 Cotton and Yardeni 1997, 174; cf. Isaac 1994, 263. It is quite possible that the number of witnesses varied from place to place.
53 Isaac 1994, 265. Cf. Ando 2000, 351-362; idem 2012, 224-5. Isaac compares their functionality to military diplomas, which were the only way for veteran soldiers to prove their grant of citizenship and right of conubium.
Where did provincials go to register?

As imperial exactions appear to have been assessed at civitas level, it would make sense that individual registrations were made at civitas level as well. It should be stated that this was not necessarily the case in all provinces, but it should generally apply to those places under study here.\(^{54}\) In places like Egypt that had greater/fuller urban development or had greater organizational depth in appointed magistracies, they may have been able to carry out census operations at the village level. By this I mean that officials were able to carry out operations at a lower level than elsewhere.\(^{55}\) But for many of these recently annexed regions, the provincials lacked this same degree of urban development or even a history of such institutional and bureaucratic depth as provinces like Egypt. To this end there is a distinct lack of evidence for census operations being carried out beneath the civitas level. The only three census declarations known outside of Egypt are land declarations by inhabitants from the village of Mahoza going to their nearest administrative center, Rabbath-Moab, in Arabia (\textit{P. Yadin 16; XHev/Se 61 Frg. A+B; XHev/Se 62}).\(^{56}\) Furthermore, the lowest attested level of census operations carried out by imperial representatives is also at the civitas level. From the imperial perspective this makes a great deal of sense. Overall, Roman rule in the provinces comprised a small provincial

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54 “Besides the ‘tribes’, ‘peoples’, or ‘nations’ (gentes, nations, ethne) which we have already met, there were imperial domains granted their own administration, sanctuaries with their own lands…and large estates of rich individuals enjoying the benefit, according to some gromatici, of special status linked to extraterritoriality” (Corbier 1991, 212). Some regions also never formally developed a ‘civitas and territory model.’ For instance, portions of Syria, Judaea, and Arabia existed on village models. It appears though, that in these places one village was appointed as the chief village for certain administrative needs, but in other ways the smaller villages may have maintained a large degree of autonomy (Cotton 1999, 83ff.). In Arabia there seems to have been two degrees of subordination as shown in the Babatha archive: Mahoza was subsumed to Zo’ar, which was subsumed to the administrative center of Petra (\textit{P. Yadin 16; Cotton and Yardeni 1997, 151-152}). \textit{N.B.} there were only four administrative centers in Arabia.

55 On Egypt, see Bagnall and Frier 1994.

bureaucracy based around the personality of the governor. The costs of carrying out census operations at a level lower than local administrative centers were simply prohibitive in manpower to the Roman state. So instead, the burden was placed upon provincials to travel to their nearest administrative center, which could be quite some distance apart depending on the extent of the civic territory involved.\footnote{Le Teuff 2012a, 224-225; cf. Scheidel 2015a, 240. One may look to the assize system for administering justice for a rough comparison of the potential discontentment with traveling imposed by administrative needs, or rather limitations, of the imperial bureaucracy (see, for example, Burton 1975, 99-102).} To cite a somewhat extreme example, in the aforementioned three land declarations from Arabia the villagers of Mahoza travelled roughly 45 miles to Rabbath-Moab, which was the closest administrative center to them. Perhaps what is more interesting than the distance involved, is that Petra (some 90 miles away), not Rabbath-Moab, was actually the administrative center of Mahoza.\footnote{Unruh 2001, 35; Isaac 1994.} While there may not have been so many civic territories quite as extensive as Petra’s, this shows that there may have been some mechanism in place to potentially ease provincials’ travel burdens to a degree. How the state would calculate a community’s exaction burden in such an instance is difficult to say. Similarly, how information registered at an administrative center that was not one’s own got to its proper place, or even if it did actually get sent there are simply unsolvable questions given our present evidence. Nevertheless, it still stands to reason that the provincial census in many places required provincials to travel to enroll in the census.

\textbf{Why was the census introduced?}

\textbf{Antecedents to Imperial Taxation}

To start, it would be worth exploring why the census came to replace the \textit{ad hoc} measures utilized by Rome across the empire over the preceding decades and centuries. As a process that
is often associated with extracting resources, one should understand how Rome extracted tribute from subject populations prior to the provincial census. Just as during the Principate, there was a variety of taxes and ways in which Rome could extract financial, natural, and human resources from across its disparate parts (Hyginus, 205L). The extraction practices of Rome from the mid-Republic onwards in large part adapted the practices of preceding regimes to suit their needs. After the Third Macedonian War, Rome adapted the existing taxes that locals had paid to the Macedonian kings, at half the previous rate to serve as their *tributum* (Livy 45.29.4). Here, Rome broke up the former kingdom into four administrative districts, each with its own capital and council, and adapted the law code to include Roman stipulations (Livy 45.29, 31.1). All of this would have involved Rome collecting governmental records from the kingdom in order to adapt these institutions and impose obligations on the Macedonians. In other places, Rome eventually extended impositions of reparations, indemnities, and/or requisitions: for instance, Spanish communities continued supplying and paying for Roman armies operating there, war indemnities continued on in Africa, and indemnities were actually extended to Asia after the First Mithridatic War due to some communities’ involvement in the war. In these instances, one may see these lump sum demands as a rough estimate of a community’s resources rather than an actual assessment of local resources under the Principate. Meanwhile, in Sicily and Asia, Rome made use of tax-farming companies to gather a variety of tithes and (in-)direct taxes from local populations.

For Dominic Rathbone the closest precedent for the imperial poll-taxes, derived from census information, was war indemnities and reparations imposed upon Rome’s defeated foes. These impositions were usually lump sums set to be paid over a certain number of years. He then

60 Ando 2006, 177-178; Brunt 1981, 161. See Livy 45.29-32 for how Rome organized Macedonia at that time.
61 Tan 2015, 214-15; Rathbone 1993, 95; Brunt 1990e, 354.
concludes that while states subject to such impositions were free to raise the money however they wished, they were more or less a *tributum*, “additional to normal taxation, imposed on a defeated population.” Rome was not concerned about a fair distribution of the burden within the communities it exacted from, except when quotas were exacted (like the tithes in Sicily, for instance), but rather what interested Rome in this earlier period was only in exacting money. Over the course of the 2nd century BCE it appears that Rome was growing increasingly more interested in efficiently managing provincial resources and their extraction. Imperial taxation grew out this increased interest in efficiently managing resources as well as an increased willingness to intervene in the management of provinces. This would lead in due time to the extension of the census to the provinces.

**Why was the provincial census imposed on top of this tax regime?**

What this range of extraction shows is that it could be easily managed without statal knowledge of a population or of how large it was. Rome had found ways to co-opt local knowledge and practice and tailor it to its needs. It also shows that it was not necessary for the center to create an institution or system to count and assess its subject population for taxation. Rome could lean on existing local institutions, lists, and elites to do this for them. This begs the question: why the provincial census? Why did the state implement a flexible, yet uniform, institution across the provinces when previous methods appear to have worked?

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63 Lo Cascio 1999, 208; Neesen 1980, 36. Periodic census of five years for tribute quotas in Republican Sicily, but doesn't seem to be known elsewhere in the Republican era.
Extortion, Abuses, and Publicani

Since at least the 2nd century BCE there had been complaints and unrest brought about by how Rome’s representatives ‘overtaxed’ or abused their power in the collection of tribute, taxes, indemnities, etc. from provincial populations.\(^{66}\) While some authors have seen the implementation of the provincial census as a reform intended to prevent such abuses,\(^{67}\) especially those of the publicani, I am not quite convinced that this is why the census was extended to the provinces. Exaction abuses would still exist, and some actually resulted in large-scale provincial resistance.\(^{68}\) While it is possible that the so-called ‘Augustan reforms’ weakened the publicani corporations and their ability to greatly profit at the expense of subject populations,\(^{69}\) it could be argued that the ‘reforms’ simply shifted the burden of tax collection from large Republican publicani companies to local elites rather than checking the ability to overtax or collect more than what Rome demanded.\(^{70}\) There was still plenty of room for individuals or groups, both provincials and imperial representatives, to abuse the system.\(^{71}\) For example, Licinius, a

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\(^{66}\) See, Lintott 1981.

\(^{67}\) Stevenson 1934, 10: 192. “From the time of Augustus the provincials were much less likely than they had been to suffer from the depredations of an unscrupulous governor. The governors of provinces were carefully selected. They could be withdrawn from an ‘imperial’ province at any time if the Emperor so desired, and rarely governed a 'senatorial' province for more than a year. The machinery for bringing complaints to Rome was greatly improved, and a successful prosecution for repetundae would ruin a man's career. …In dealing with the publicani and the governors of provinces Augustus merely introduced an effective control which the Republic had been too weak to exercise.”

\(^{68}\) Brunt 1961. See further, pages 17-21, esp. 20n36.

\(^{69}\) Not to mention that current research shows that what is commonly referred to as Augustan provincial reform was really a long-term and slow set of changes, and that publicani were still used in some places for certain tasks and that the downturn of their use was a slow process (see Eck 2007, 89, 97-99). On the weakening influence of publicani: Brunt 1990e, 355; Ando 2006, 179; Scheidel 2015, 238.

\(^{70}\) Publicani, it must be noted, still played a role in the collection of taxes in many provinces across the Roman Empire during the Principate, especially for indirect taxes. What is meant above is that large publicani companies were no longer bidding at Rome for the rights to collect direct taxes or tribute for provinces. Rather, taxes and tribute levels were assessed for communities, who had the responsibility of collecting their direct taxes or tribute. The local governing authorities had the ability to hire publicani, if they so desired, to collect the taxes, but it was the responsibility of local elites to ensure Rome was paid now, not Roman/Italian publicani companies.

\(^{71}\) Bang 2012, 208, 210. While Rome periodically condemned acts of abuse and extortion, it lacked absolute control over its officials, local and imperial, to truly offer protection against over-exaction or abuses to its provincial population.
procurator in Gaul was extorting extra levies from the provincials until the latter gained the ear of the emperor Augustus. (Cass. Dio 54.21.2-8 - see below, page 140). Some scholars have seen the actions of Olennius, a centurion ‘appointed to a governorship over the Frisii,’ as acts of abuse (Tac. Ann. 4.72- e primipilaribus regendis Frisiis impositus). During his governorship he suddenly increased the tribe’s tributary contribution from ox-hides to a more onerous contribution of wild-aurochs hides. A series of further abuses led to the Frisian revolt when the Frisians could not pay the centurion (Tac. Ann. 4.72 - see further, pages 58-72).72

**Practical utility of the census**

Instead of seeing the provincial census being introduced as a means of preventing abuses, it could be explained by the utility of the information derived from its operations for supporting state institutions and for the aggrandizement of the emperor and the state. A more reliable knowledge of the resources of the provinces was required so that Rome might have a better estimate of its yearly income, mostly to ensure that it could support its armies, which had become professionalized by the end of Augustus’ reign.73 One of the justifications for taxing provincials made by ancient authors is that the only way Rome could guarantee peace was to exact taxes/tribute to pay for its military (Cic. Q. fr. 1.1.34; Tac. Hist. 4.74).74 Since the late

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73 Goodman 2012, 90-1; Mattingly 2011, 151; Corbier 1991, 213-214; Potter 2013, 323-324; Rossignol 2009, 78. Martin Goodman also notes here the irony between the census and tax collection as intending to pay the troops, but that these processes also sparked off several revolts in Augustus’ reign. Benoit Rossignol refers to the age of Augustus as the likely pivot in the transition from civic army to professional army, as well as the institutionalization of the army. The creation of a standing professional army consisting of legions and auxilia units, both with set pay rates and set service lengths, was a long development from late republic onwards. In time this would lead to the creation of the aerarium militare, a treasury specifically for military affairs, in part created to pay for discharge bonuses (Cass. Dio 55.24.9-25) (Cheesman 1914; Keppie 1998, 145-171; Eck 2007, 114-120; idem 2016; Raaflaub 2009; Speidel 2009).

74 Mattingly 2011, 130; Le Teuff 2012a, 52-3; Stevenson 1934, 10: 186; France 2009, 177. Cic. Q. fr. 1.1.34; Simul et illud Asia cogitiet, nullam ab se neque belli externi neque domesticarum discordiarum calamitatem a futuram
Republic, armies were slowly becoming permanent, rather than being raised for a war and dismantled when that war ended. Standing armies of course cost more than citizen armies serving only during the campaign season, and the professionalization of the army, in Rome’s case, meant that soldiers had to be paid, supplied, armed, and awarded a grant of money or land upon retirement. A standing army utilizing roughly the same number of soldiers year to year also meant that it would be easier to estimate the upkeep costs of this standing army and would therefore be able to predict when those costs might increase (for instance at the start of a new war). What Rome needed here was a consistent and relatively predictable source of income to support this newly founded professional army and its needs, and the provincial census could provide the information required to do just that. Now while the professional army created by Augustus was not quite yet in existence when he instituted the first provincial census in Gaul (and maybe Spain) in 27 BCE, it may just explain its eventual spread to every province.75

To restate the inferred utility of a provincial census: the provincial census was an administrative institution that could create a more predictable and efficient tax regime through an improvement of Rome’s knowledge of the provincial population and their property.76 With such a legibility, to borrow James Scott’s terms, the imperial center could more effectively extract natural resources and manpower, for corvée labor and military uses. This practical side of the

75 On the question of whether it actually did spread to every province see, Brunt 1981, 163-164; Nicolet 1991, 136.
provincial census, however, came at a cost of greater invasiveness by the state that “represented a potent expansion of state controls over subject populations and their wealth.” It was an invasiveness which would spark resistance in our case studies here.77

**Ideological utility of the census**

As much as the provincial census served practical purposes in obtaining knowledge of the resources and needs of the state, the census was also a tool for ideologically showing the greatness and power of the empire and its emperor. Claude Nicolet has argued that Rome’s magistrates and leaders had become more interested in knowing their empire during the late Republic – its resources, extent, geography, peoples, population, etc.78 As he argued, this interest had started in the late Republic at the latest and carried on through to the Augustan period (see Cic. *Leg.* 3.18.41), during which numerous census operations and land surveys were conducted. In the Augustan period, official Roman documents could be disseminated or displayed in public places where they could be repurposed as displays of power. Public monuments like the Map of Agrippa, the Res Gestae,79 and the *Breviarium*80 contain references to population and province sizes, financial and material resources, and the size of armed forces derived from official records and sources, which can impress upon readers the size and strength of Rome and the depth of the state’s knowledge. I contend that the provincial census and information derived from it can be

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77 Bang 2012, 208.
78 Le Teuff 2012a, 60; Nicolet 1991; Nicolet 1996. Ando 2006, 183: “in the conquest and settlement of new territory…this passion found expression in three, interrelated processes: an inventory of cities, a census of the population, and a survey of the land. The results were documented in several ways, but especially through *formulae* (registers of people and land) and *formae* (maps).”
79 We must remember that this document was not only displayed in Rome in the Campus Martius on bronze but that it was also copied and displayed in cities across the empire. It is also worthwhile to note that Nicolet contended that the second half of this document could be considered “a genuine geographic survey. The names of areas and peoples, locations, and the indications of distance punctuate the princeps’s catalog of his conquests (or of his conquests’ moderation) in such a way that its pedagogical and political insistence is striking” (Nicolet 1991, quote page 9, 17-24).
80 This document was made public in 14 CE (Nicolet 1991, 181).
imbued with an “ideological meaning, stressing [Rome’s] will to know, to conquer, to exploit or to convert,” much like how the decorative effects of monumental displays such as the Map of Agrippa and the Res Gestae could be imbued with such meanings.\textsuperscript{81} The lists and classifications of people derived from census documents “constitute, at the center of power, an administrative memory and picture of the world that will correspond more or less to” geographic displays of the Roman Empire.\textsuperscript{82} To state in another way, Augustus in part used the census and the information derived from it for “self-aggrandizement through quantification.”\textsuperscript{83}

The speech of King Agrippa II created by Josephus illustrates well how such information can be used as a display of power (BJ 2.345-401). Throughout the speech, which was an attempt to dissuade the population of Judaea from revolting against Rome in 66 CE, Agrippa outlines Roman power by enumerating the peoples under Roman sway (Joseph. BJ 2.358-61. 366-78, 380-5), how many cities or pagi there are in Asia or among the Gauls (Joseph. BJ 366, 372), the size of Thrace in marching days (Joseph. BJ 368), and an account of Rome’s military strength in various provinces (Joseph. BJ 368-70, 373, 375, 377, 378, 383, 387). Some of this information could not be provided without a census, such as recalling the population of Egypt (sans Alexandria), 7,500,000 inhabitants (Joseph. BJ 3.85). It is clear to me from this episode that information derived from censuses were made public and disseminated as displays of Roman power and grandeur. Josephus reciting the population total of Judaea has meaning because it at once implies that Rome had conquered the region and had the depth of knowledge to state the resources there, let alone the power and means to order a census over such distant populations.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{81} Nicolet 1991, 6.
\textsuperscript{82} Nicolet 1991, 10-1, quote 10.
\textsuperscript{83} Nicolet 1991; Le Teuff 2012a, 60; Purcell 1990, 179. Quote: Rathbone 1993, 94.
\textsuperscript{84} Nicolet 1991, 22, 181; Ando 2000, 351, 359. This is similar to how Pompey could convey his might by stating with precision that he had “scattered, slain or received the surrender of 12,183,000 people, sunk or taken 846 ships, (and) received the capitulation of 1,538 towns and forts…” (Nicolet 1991, 32-3, on Plin. NH 7.97-8).
We find echoes of this in other sources, where the ability of ancient authors to enumerate the number of citizens of specific statuses or population totals for distant regions and towns conveys Rome’s (or the emperor’s) power and awesomeness: the first edict of Cyrene reveals that Augustus knows that there were 215 Roman citizens in the province with a census valuation of 2,500 denarii;\textsuperscript{85} Pliny is able to provide population totals for the three districts of northwestern Spain,\textsuperscript{86} and Strabo can note that 500 Roman citizens of the equestrian status live in the territory of Gades, Baetica.\textsuperscript{87} The close link between the *tributum capitis* and *tributum soli*, which were regarded as symbols of a population’s subjection to Rome, and the provincial census could be used to make an ideological claim that the census itself could serve as a symbol of Rome’s ideological claim of ownership of the world. This is especially the case considering the fact that Rome could not conduct such operations over populations without Rome holding dominion over them.\textsuperscript{88}

*Initial implementation of the provincial census due to immediate military needs?*

It is quite possible that the initial impetus for the early distribution and subsequent spread of the provincial census was to gather information on the human and natural resources in provinces bordering regions where Rome was either campaigning or planning to campaign. This may very well partially explain when and where provincial censuses were first implemented across the empire during the Augustan era. As shown above, the provincial census was an excellent institution for gathering information about manpower and natural resources (such as grain.

\textsuperscript{85} *SEG* 9.8.1, ll.4-6
\textsuperscript{86} Plin. *NH* 3.28: 240,000 Astures, 166,000 Lucenses, and 285,000 Bracari. This information is surely Vespasianic in origin, probably from the censuses conducted by Vespasian and Titus in 73-4 CE (Nicolet 1991, 138; Le Teuff 2012a, 250; *idem* 2012b, 12-3, 50-1).
\textsuperscript{87} Str. 5.1.7
metals, leather, wood, animals) that would be useful for campaign planning. If the initial extension of the provincial census was due to immediate needs, I believe that this usage would ultimately prove unnecessary as time went on as the frequency of the census in any given region became more regularized; i.e. that the call for a census specifically for military needs would be unnecessary as there was a probability that relatively up to date information was already available to the state – that is of course, if and only if censuses were periodically conducted or routinely updated locally. Here I will expand upon some suggestions made by Roth and Drinkwater concerning censuses in Gaul in 12 BCE and 14 CE to show that there is a link between early censuses and plans for campaigning in neighboring areas. For these authors, the censuses of Drusus and Germanicus in Gaul served as support operations for military campaigns across the Rhine, providing information that would be used to create ad hoc taxes (Cass. Dio 54.32; Tac. Ann. 1.31, 2.6).

One important thing to note here is the various obligations communities of different statuses had for providing materials for campaigns. Such obligations could be made at the time that each community entered into some sort of relationship with Rome, such as a treaty or subjection via conquest. There are very few specific attestations for such arrangements with communities to provide men for campaigns, including the well-known ones such as the Batavi, or to provide a specific sort of supply (as their form of tribute), such as the Frisii. There is, however, a body of scholarship revealing that certain regions faced high levels of auxilia recruitment during the Julio-Claudian period (Spain, Gaul, Illyricum, and Thrace).

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90 Roth 199, 237; Drinkwater 1983, 24, 28.
91 Allies, client-states, dediticii, and peregrines. On obligations, human and material, see further pages 169-200.
92 Ivleva 2016, 164;
93 Cheesman 1914; Saddington 2005, 64; Haynes 2013, 105. A simple calculation of the table, recruitment location of alae and cohortes prior to 70 CE, in Cheesman reveals that roughly sixty percent of known alae and cohortes in the Julio-Claudian period that were known in 1914 were raised across these four areas. Granted that there have been
censuses in these regions could reveal the potential manpower and resources of communities, so that the state might more effectively plan for campaigns by determining and keeping track of each community’s levy, recruitment and supply obligations.

The role of the *civitas* in the relationship between locals and the imperial center is of the utmost importance in establishing tax burdens and potentially for the recruitment of soldiers. It was at this level that census operations were carried out and the same level at which Rome determined tax burdens, both human and material. Rights, privileges, and exemptions, or the lack thereof of these things, could exist at the *civitas* level, which may greatly impact the level and types of burdens experienced by different communities within the same region. Both *civitas* and provincial authorities would have the ability to create lists detailing the number of military aged men and their statuses that could be utilized for conscription or recruitment. *Civitates* were also very likely important centers of both *auxilia* and legionary recruitment.\(^94\) The depth of resources and knowledge available to Rome went beyond merely creating potential *ad hoc* taxes to support impending campaigns. Instead Rome could potentially rely upon an increased movement of human and natural resources, raised by occasional exactions and various obligations towards Rome, in the direction of the campaign area for the duration of a war (which in some cases could continue on for decades as in Gaul towards Germania or southeastern Britain towards northern and western Britain). One must remember that this was an era of great mobility for *auxilia*, where units could be raised in one area and then shortly thereafter shipped off elsewhere to serve in campaigns or to make up shortfalls.\(^95\)

\(^{94}\) Le Teuff 2012a, 182-190; Haynes 2013, 41. See Rossignol (2009, 99) and Le Teuff (2017) for how the provincial census and a *dilectus* go hand in hand.

\(^{95}\) Ivleva 2016; cf. Haynes 2013, 134. In general Haynes is right to point out that *auxilia* often did not move far from their recruitment area except “if they posed a security threat where they were stationed, or if other areas urgently required reinforcement and no other troops were available” (2013, 123). But, wars affect greater geographical areas
The state could combine information derived from the census with the *lex provinciae* of a given province to determine which communities were liable to provide soldiers or certain types of supplies. In fact, there are a pair of examples from Gaul detailing simultaneous census and recruitment operations. L. Volusenus Clemens was a prefect of recruits while also conducting census operations in Gallia Narbonensis and Aquitania in 14/6 CE (*CIL* 11.6011). In 30 CE, Torquatus Novellius Atticus was a legate for a simultaneous census and recruitment operation in Gallia Narbonensis (*CIL* 14.3602). Additionally, there are several *auxilia* units from Gaul that could very well have been raised for campaigns in Germania Magna as a result of census information. As much of our pre-Claudian evidence for *auxilia* units relies on inscriptions lacking precise dating it is impossible to fully verify when individual units came into being beyond which emperor was ruling at the time. So what follows is an attempt to place certain units at a historical moment by comparing the unit’s place of origin, often given away by the unit’s name, with the location of the inscription, which was likely (though not always) close to

and thus find recruitment and resources from a wider extent, bringing soldiers further away from their initial recruitment areas, such as neighboring provinces as argued here (Ivleva 2016, 164-6). Additionally, but heavily recruiting from areas neighboring the campaign, Rome was able to decrease the chance of revolt to their rear by taking fighting age men, from potentially recently conquered areas, with them on campaign where they may be watched more closely (cf. Isaac 1992, 59; Haynes 2013, 106-107; Sparey-Green 2015, 106-107; Ivleva 2016, 165-166).

96 Le Teuff 2012b, 47-8; idem 2017, 51, 55. *praef(ecto) tir(onum) | Gall(iae) Na[rbonen]sis [et Aquita]n[ae] a[cibi census] | accepit missus a | Divo Aug(usto)*. One should note that this reading is not certain, and others have proposed reading *Na[rbonen]sis it[em? in? Pan]onia* | *accepit missus a | divo Aug(usto)*, but Pflaum’s reading (1960-1), that used here, is the more natural reading.

97 Le Teuff 2012b, *idem* 2017, 57. …*[leg(atii a)ld census accip(iendos) et dilect(um) et | *proco(n)]s(ulis) provinciae Narbon(ensis)*… Le Teuff points out that M. Christol has linked this operation with the recruitment of several legionaries around 30-5 CE from Gallia Narbonensis who died in Spain and Mauretania Tingitana (See, Le Teuff 2017, 57 n33-4 for references). Just because legionaries were recruited from this operation does not preclude the possibility that auxiliaries were also recruited at this time. Le Teuff also hypotheses that several of the military officers who conducted census operations could have also used the opportunity to recruit new soldiers (2017).

Military officers as census agents are discussed below on pages 114-20.
where the unit served. With the current body of evidence, it is easier to show the creation of new units prior to a campaign than it would be to show unit replenishment in existing forces.\textsuperscript{98}

While Appendix 4 lists twenty-six auxiliary units from Gaul and the Rhineland that may have been raised either during or shortly after censuses in 27 BCE, 12 BCE, 14/6 CE, 30 CE, and 73/4 CE, only a few of the most likely raised under these circumstances will be described here.\textsuperscript{99}

The most likely unit raised during a census is the Ala Antiana, which was plausibly named after one of Germanicus’ legates tasked with conducting the census of 14/6 CE (Tac. \textit{Ann.} 2.6.1). A prefect of the unit from the early Tiberian period, certainly before 26-9 CE (see pages 367-8), provides further evidence that the unit was likely created around 14-6 CE. The next most likely candidate is a series of units raised in the early 70s CE. Among the cohorts created around this time are the cohortes I-IIII Lingonum, cohortes I-II Nerviorum, I Baetasiorum, I Cugernorum, I Frisiavonium, I Menapiorum, I Morinorum, and I Tungrorum. It is commonly argued that several units were created in the aftermath of the Gallic revolts of 68-70 CE and that these units were (mostly) sent to Britain with Q. Petillius Cerialis in 71 CE to support Flavian expansion on the island.\textsuperscript{100} I, however, contend that we should consider the possibility that many of the units created at this time were actually raised a few years later, during the censuses of Vespasian in 73 and 74 CE. Since the earliest constitution attesting to any of these units dates to 98 CE (\textit{CIL} 16.43), it is plausible that at least some of them were actually raised in 73 CE, assuming that the soldiers discharged had served the full twenty-five years. While the census of Gallia Belgica was surely part of a general census of Vespasian and Titus (\textit{AE} 1975, 251), which in itself was a census aimed at refilling the state’s coffers after years of Nero’s heavy spending and the high

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{98} Haynes 2001, 63.
\item \textsuperscript{99} For all units discussed here and in the following chapter, please see Appendix 3 for analyses of the early history and evidence of these units.
\item \textsuperscript{100} This argument seems to stem from Paul Holder (1982) and has been sustained since then.
\end{itemize}
cost and loss of tax income from the civil wars of 68-9 CE, it does not mean that the census in Gallia Belgica could not simultaneously serve military needs. Fresh recruits were desperately needed after the civil war and they were needed to support the wars of expansion during the governorship of Iulius Frontinus.  

While lacking direct evidence, there are a few other examples of early provincial censuses that may be linked with planned or impending campaigns, aside from those in Gaul in 12 BCE and 14 CE suggested by Roth and Drinkwater. The census in Gaul, and possibly Spain, of 27 BCE carried out by Augustus was around the time he was planning an invasion of Britain. Supposedly, the plan to invade Britain was scrapped due to revolts in northwest Spain not long after the census (Cass. Dio 53.22.5). Likely connected to this census or to a census in Spain c.15-13 BCE, there is evidence of a legionary tribune, T. Clodius Proculus, being sent to Lusitania to carry out a census (CIL 10.680). The region was heavily “mined” for auxiliary service in the early Principate, and regardless of whether the census was carried out in 27 or 15-13 BCE, the activities of T. Clodius Proculus could be seen to serve the same purpose: to raise supplies or manpower for a campaign in Britain or Spain (27 BCE) or across the Rhine (15-13 BCE). Finally, there is a more tentative case, namely the supposed census of Varus in Germania Magna. If Varus actually carried out a census in Germania Magna between 6 and 9 CE, as many scholars are currently suggesting (though see pages 273-4, 323-5), it may have been done in conjunction with raising auxiliaries to help end the Great Illyrian revolt (which was testing the limits of Rome's standing manpower), as much as it would have been for tax purposes.  

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101 Censuses are also attested in Spain (AE 1939, 60) and Thrace (AE 1973, 485) in this period and it is possible that recruitment efforts were also underway in these places as well. This view then pushes back against the current argument that these units were raised as a sort of punishment for the participation of some Rhineland and Belgic tribes in the uprisings of 68-70 CE. As Gil Gambash points out, Rome rarely took harsh measures against communities in revolt against Rome, and conscripting tens of thousands of young men in a single instant would be a harsh measure (cf. Gambash 2015, 69-90; Appendix 4 (Cohors Lingonum I, 395-7).  
102 On attested provincial censuses from the 1st-3rd centuries, see Le Teuff 2012a, 250-1; Brunt 1981, 171-172.  
103 Le Teuff 2012a, 63.
These examples suggest that provincial censuses with a more immediate military purpose (in manpower and supply terms for an upcoming major campaign) largely ceased well before the reign of Hadrian, though the census would still have been important for funds and other resources for the military beyond this point. The provincial census could still serve the same military purpose as before, but regularized/periodic censuses likely negated the need for a census specifically right before a campaign. Also, as D.J. Mattingly asserts, Rome largely ceased to engage in mass conscriptions of troops from one region to serve in another in the 2nd century.\textsuperscript{104} In its place, the tendency was then to make up numbers among existing units from the nearest available recruiting sources. This should mean for the most part that military uses of the census (in manpower terms for an upcoming major campaign) also ceased by the reign of Hadrian.

Again, I want to reiterate that what is presented here is not really a new model of what the census was used for, but rather to expand our current thinking on the subject. The census did not serve a single purpose at any one time but served several purposes that could change and shift in different periods. It was an administrative institution that could be both practical and symbolic.

This section has presented a view that the initial spread and introduction of the provincial census in the Augustan period was piecemeal and implemented as the need arose. Here it was argued that impending or current military campaigns were the catalyst surrounding several of the earliest attested provincial censuses. Despite the chance survival of evidence concerning attested provincial censuses, it is believed that an approach such as this, which takes into account the regional and global circumstances surrounding the implementation of a census in any given province, will still be pertinent as future discoveries continue to add to the subject.

\textsuperscript{104} Mattingly 2006, 168-170.
How long after annexation before a census was implemented?

There is a common conception that the census was one of the first institutions implemented in newly annexed regions. The language oftentimes used by scholars implies a relative immediacy of a census upon annexation as the institution may be linked to surveying, military recruitment and logistics, and, of course, taxation. The assumption that a census arrived on the back of annexation largely relies on the census of Quirinius in Judaea 6 CE, when Augustus annexed Archelaus’ ethnarchy. For instance, G.H. Stevenson once wrote that “the famous assessment of Judaea by Quirinius in A.D. 6 shows that the annexation of a new province was at once followed by a valuation of its taxable capacity.” Scholars have long since used this time-honored belief to propose censuses at the time of annexation for several provinces where there is no definitive evidence, as well as seeking censuses behind tribute-based resistance in the years immediately following conquest or annexation. Under these guises, censuses have been proposed for Cappadocia under Tiberius (Tac. Ann. 6.41), Dacia under Trajan (Lact. De mort. pers. 23.5), and Germania Magna (Cass. Dio 56.18) under Augustus (the latter two hypothesized on tribute-based resistance and/or other imperial activities). There is a simple question here though that is begging to be asked: what are the grounds for believing that a provincial census quickly followed annexation?

105 A small sampling here should suffice: Stevenson 1934, 10: 192; Smallwood 1981, 150; Brunt 1981; Le Teuff 2012a, 24-5.
106 For instance, Smallwood (1981, 150) for Judaea specifically: “The first Roman administrative act in the new province was therefore the holding of a census (a land survey as well as a count of the population) in order to obtain the accurate information about its manpower and financial resources needed for assessing its tax capability.”
107 Stevenson 1934, 10: 193.
108 Brunt 1981, 164 (Judaea, Cappadocia, Dacia receiving censuses after annexation). But see also Bammel, who posits that the census involving the Ciaetae could have been much earlier and that the Roman response could have been much delayed (1958, 499). This could mean that he suggests that the census was shortly after annexation, his phrasing is unclear. Corbier 1991, 214 also appears to follow Brunt, but does not cite him.
There are really three views that spring to mind as to why a provincial census could quickly follow an annexation. First, there is the fact that a provincial census appears to have followed immediately upon the annexation of Judaea (Joseph. AJ 17.355; 18.1, 26). As the table below shows, there are extremely few cases where we know when a first provincial census definitely took place. This is due in part to a lack of literary references to specific censuses, and when they do occur, they tend to lack precision in their description. At the same time, the patchy nature of our epigraphic evidence is lacking in some key details such as when the census occurred or over whom specifically did these agents preside. So, when we do have such specific evidence, like the census of Judaea, it must not be taken lightly.

Second, there is a belief that land surveys were required for taxation and tribute to work effectively. A fairly dominant perception exists, especially in French scholarship, that land surveys and the census are intrinsically linked. In part, this view derives from how the Roman census worked during the Republic, where citizens provided the extent of their property and goods as part of the census recording process. From a rational standpoint, surveying goes hand in hand with a census, because Rome would be better able to judge through these two institutions how much it could extract from communities if it knew the extent, the goods, and the value of possessions for the individuals that made up these communities.

Third, and closely related to the second, is the view that a census must precede taxation. Some scholars find that a census operation was necessary to create the formula provinciae, which would organize the civic layout of the province that was essential for the operation of

111 France 2009, 157-8; Stevenson 1934, 10: 192-3.
112 Brunt 1981, 164. there has been a link between tribute and census since antiquity: “…The intimate connection between census and direct taxation in the minds of provincials in Judaea appears from the fact that kensos can be used as equivalent to phoros (Matt. 22, 17 and Mark 12, 14 with Luke 20, 22), just as in Egypt laographia meant poll-tax. A constitution of 213 (Cod. Iust. 8.14.1) runs: 'universa bona eorum qui censentur vice pignorum tributis obligata sunt'….". Cf. Mattingly 2011, 142 table 5.3; Stevenson 1934, 10: 192.
courts and taxation. In this view if there is any evidence of levies in a recently conquered or annexed area, there must have been a census before that. Without a census it could be difficult to levy the poll-tax in Egypt for instance. This view leads scholars to suppose an earlier, and as yet unidentified, provincial census when the first one known dates some two decades after annexation in provinces such as Egypt and Arabia.\textsuperscript{113}

As the view that a provincial census followed immediately upon annexation has recently come under scrutiny by Hannah Cotton it is worthwhile both to assess her claims against censuses so early in a province’s existence and to look more closely at the existing patterns of when a provincial census was typically first implemented in recently annexed regions from the Augustan period onward. To aid in this process I have created a table presenting attestable and conjectured censuses in recently annexed regions (within the first 50 years of a province’s existence; i.e. the same chronological framework set forth for this project (see page 2 above). Hannah Cotton has argued that the provincial census of Arabia in 127 CE was its first on the grounds that it was ordered by Hadrian and was crucial for explaining the dating formula ‘the new province of Arabia’.\textsuperscript{114} She also pointed out that it was likely the first census of the province as the census declarations revealed holdovers from the previous regime including the currency used, local units of measurement, and continued use of the royal tax (see above, page 84). Furthermore, according to Claytor and Bagnall, Arabia was not unique in this delay for the first implementation of a provincial census. In Egypt the Roman administration also waited roughly two decades before introducing the census in 11/10 BCE. They conclude that Rome was content

\textsuperscript{114} On the importance of an emperor ordering a first census see above pages 86-8.
to consolidate its rule while making use of and modifying the pre-existing structures in the newly acquired territory before implementing a census.\textsuperscript{115}

It should be noted that there are some fundamental difficulties in any attempt to date the time from annexation to a first census. In many cases we simply do not know precisely when any given province was annexed. This is especially the case in large provinces like Britain or Spain where conquest was a lengthy and piecemeal process. Related to this, there are difficulties in determining when the final conquest occurred. The Romans often saw conquest as a singular event, when in reality it was a process. Local resistance to the initial act of conquest may last long after Rome viewed the area as conquered. What Romans often considered as revolts were actually instances of groups still fighting the initial war of conquest.\textsuperscript{116} This creates difficulties in fixing the chronologies around which this table is organized. This table then represents a modest attempt to make a broader investigation possible of when a census was first implemented in various provinces. One final note to make is the exclusion of Dacia and Cappadocia from the table. The evidence presented for an early census of these two provinces is simply not convincing. Tacitus, \textit{Annales}, 6.41 does not support a census of Cappadocia when it was annexed by Tiberius in 17 CE (Tac. \textit{Ann}. 2.42.4). Rather, the passage details a client king Archelaus administering a Roman style census over some of his subjects and their subsequent revolt against it in the 30s CE. Meanwhile, the use of Lactantius shows that a poll-tax was imposed on the Dacians after conquest, not necessarily a census (Lact. \textit{De mort. pers.} 23.5).\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{115} Cotton 1997; Claytor and Bagnall 2015, 465.
\textsuperscript{116} Cf. Woolf 1993, 189.
\textsuperscript{117} Cotton 1997, 206-207; \textit{contra} Brunt 1981. Note that Egypt was subjected to a poll-tax by Rome even from an early date, well before the first census was administered (Claytor and Bagnall 2015, 644-645). This shows that it is possible to carry out such a tax without a census. We also do not know if poll-taxes were customary in Dacia prior to Roman conquest of if this was a Roman innovation. It is also not evident how long after conquest that Trajan imposed the poll-tax on Dacia.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Period(s) of conquest</th>
<th>First Attested Census</th>
<th>Years Between ‘Final’ Conquest and First Census</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gallia Comata</td>
<td>58-51/50 BCE</td>
<td>27 BCE (Cass. Dio 53.22)</td>
<td>23/24 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>218 - 19 BCE</td>
<td>27 BCE (Cass. Dio 53.22.5)&lt;sup&gt;118&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>33 years (using Caesar’s campaign as reference point)</td>
<td>Unlikely that areas conquered by Augustus were included in the possible census of 27 BCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caesar 61-60 BCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cantabrian Wars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28-19 BCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 BCE (Cass. Dio 53.22.5)&lt;sup&gt;118&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusitania</td>
<td>194-24 BCE</td>
<td>27 BCE or 15-12 BCE (CIL 10.680)</td>
<td>12-33 years</td>
<td>Depends upon when the census was done and what Lusitania comprised at that time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caesar 61-60 BCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Augustus 28-24 BCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conjectured 14 or c.20 CE&lt;sup&gt;119&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illyricum</td>
<td>229 -10 BCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6-9 CE (Great Illyrian revolt)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conjectured 14 or c.20 CE&lt;sup&gt;119&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Annexed 30 BCE</td>
<td>11/10 BCE&lt;sup&gt;120&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19-20 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germania Magna</td>
<td>12 BCE- 4 CE</td>
<td>Conjectured 7-9 CE (Cass. Dio 56.18.3-4)&lt;sup&gt;121&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3-5 years up to 10-13 years</td>
<td>Depends on which areas may have been censused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaea</td>
<td>Annexed 6 CE</td>
<td>6 CE (Joseph. AJ 17.355 ; 18.1, 26; CIL 3.6687)</td>
<td>At time of annexation</td>
<td>Census simultaneously held in Syria&lt;sup&gt;122&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrace</td>
<td>Annexed 46 CE</td>
<td>73-77 CE (AE, 1973, 485)</td>
<td>27-31 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>43-84 CE</td>
<td>c.92-102 CE (CIL 11.5213; cf.)</td>
<td>14-24 years</td>
<td>Likely first census of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricola 77(78)-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>119</sup> A proposal for these two dates stands on two grounds. First there are doubts that Rome really exercised any ‘effect control’ until after the Great Illyrian revolt of 6-9 CE (Wilkes 1969, 65; Mócsy 1974, 66). Second, Danijel Džino’s proposal of an intended re-organization of Illyricum and a census led by Tiberius in 14 CE, and a potential completion of these two activities (which were interrupted by Augustus’ death) by Drusus the Younger c.19-20 CE ties in well with the Augustan tendency to use family members and close associations for early census operations outlined above (Džino 2010, 160).
<sup>120</sup> Claytor and Bagnall 2015.
<sup>121</sup> Neessen 1980, 40 (see others referred to in this section).
<sup>122</sup> See Cotton 1999, 76ff; Millar 1993, 48; Taylor 1933, 121 (see n3 for source material); Dąbrowa 1998, 29 (simultaneous censuses).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Census Event</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>84 CE</td>
<td>Tab. Vindol. 3.611; Tab. Vindol. 2.242</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106 CE</td>
<td>127 CE (P. Yadin 16; XHev/Se 61; XHev/Se 62)</td>
<td>21 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: First Attestable Census in recently annexed regions/provinces (cont.)

On the whole it appears that the body of evidence from this table follows a similar pattern to Arabia and Egypt, namely that Rome tended to consolidate its control for nearly two to three decades before imposing a census on any given area. It does appear that from time to time some areas may have experienced a census significantly earlier as was the case with Judaea. But Judaea may actually be an exception to normal practice. Syria was already undergoing a census when Judaea was annexed, and as Judaea appears to have been initially attached to Syria the census was naturally extended to Judaea. The time to a first census was likely determined partially by how an area came under Roman control and the degree of urban development. If a region was underdeveloped or had been difficult to conquer, time may have been required to establish which centers should serve as administrative centers for each community and/or to build a relationship with local elites to help administer and control the region in mutually beneficial ways. In these areas Rome may have found existing civic and tax structures less than ideal and needed time to adjust and adapt these existing structures more to their liking. This initial process of consolidating Roman control at times could involve a temporary military occupation and administration until a certain level of development or relationship fostered with

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124 Rosalind Dunnett hypothesizes an early census for south-east Britain around the time of the foundation of the colony at Colchester on the grounds that Rome would have permanently fixed the tribal boundaries of the Trinovantes before the establishment of the colony (1975, 44). While this is possible, boundaries could have been fixed without a census being carried out.
125 Cotton 1997, 204.
127 Cotton 1999, 76ff.
the local elites could occur (see Ch. 1). In short, the process of determining the status and relationship of each community with Rome as well as fostering the necessary relationships with local elites to (re-)establish local government, consolidating Roman control of the region, the process of creating or extending road networks, and improving civic infrastructures all took several years to accomplish. It is these factors which likely led to the census being implemented several years after annexation.

**Role of Soldiers in the Census**

From time to time throughout the early Principate it appears that Rome utilized military officers in census operations as subordinates to the lead *censitor*. These census officers carried out or supervised operations at civic or regional levels only in the sorts of provinces under review here; recently annexed and under-urbanized. To date there are nine such military officers that conducted census operations in seven (or possibly eight) different provinces across the Roman world dating from the early Augustan era to c.144 CE. The choice of using these officers for census operations was likely dictated by a few specific scenarios. First, the inhabitants of a region were either unaccustomed to census-like operations or the recently acquired region was not yet adapted/suited to Rome’s preferred urbanized form for administration. This would have often been the case in areas further away from the Mediterranean coastline that did not have a network of political communities organized along Roman lines.

Second, a region had proven difficult to pacify, was just pacified, or had rebelled against Rome recently. In this respect the use of officers could be related to the consolidation and control

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129 Hanson 1988, 54.
130 Bérenger 2009, 198. Cf. pages 31-5 and 50-5 for the use of soldiers more generally in provincial administration and why they were used.
of the region. It was not uncommon for recently conquered places to experience a military occupation and administration. Under such circumstances Roman officers may have simply worked through whatever existing local infrastructure there was in place rather than putting in their own structure (because local administration conducted by Roman military officers was often temporary in nature). The length of time in which communities were subjected to an army of occupation and military administration varied in part by how long it took Rome to consolidate its control over an area and if Rome needed to utilize its forces elsewhere.\(^{132}\) By way of an example within a single province, the military occupation of southeast England lasted in most places less than a decade as Rome sought to extend its control over the island further to the west and north, but military occupation and possibly administration lasted for centuries in the north of England (on early Roman expansion in Britain, see further pages 298-301).\(^{133}\) Likewise, military administrators were utilized in Illyricum after the Great Illyrian revolt for several decades (CIL 5.3346; 9.2564; 9.5363).\(^{134}\) Military officers serving in census operations could in some instances be related to issues or concerns with control over a region.

Third, during the early Principate military officers were likely the nearest and most convenient resource available to the Roman government in recently annexed regions as the provincial bureaucracy was quite small at this early date. It is important to note that Rome did not have provincial bureaucracy on this same scale until the 2\(^{nd}\) century CE at the earliest.\(^{135}\) All of these officers were members of Rome’s highest orders, equestrian and senatorial.\(^{136}\) They not

\(^{132}\) Hanson 1988, 54; James 2001, 82; Rossignol 2009, 78-9.

\(^{133}\) Hanson 1997, 72-73.

\(^{134}\) Džino 2010, 163-164; Wilkes 1969, 193, 287-289; Mócsy 1974, 49, 69.

\(^{135}\) The roles played by these soldiers in this early period were replaced by those serving in the governor’s staff of the 2\(^{nd}\) century and beyond, some of which were still soldiers. On the latter see, for example beneficiarii: Nelis-Clément 2000; Fuhrmann 2012.

\(^{136}\) The only definite member of the senatorial order in the list below is C. Mocconius Verus, who served as a tribunus laticlavus in Spain. This tribune was the direct subordinate of a legion’s legate and was usually held by a son of a senator towards the beginning of their public career (on tribunus laticlavus see Le Bohec 2015).
only had familiarity with Rome’s style of government, but were also all likely literate (the importance of which must not be lost when considering their utility in census operations). These military officers would prove useful in carrying out census operations until local officials or centrally appointed census officials (beginning in the Hadrianic period) took over operations on the local and regional levels. In each of these circumstances the areas in question were not yet ready for locals to carry out provincial census operations themselves or Rome could not rely on the local elites. This shows Rome’s flexibility in finding (temporary) solutions in governing such a vast and geographically and culturally varied empire. At the same time, this sort of solution required more extensive involvement of Rome’s provincial administration to carry out tasks normally managed by local citizen organizations.

From the nine examples below, one may make several observations. With the exception of Secundus in Apamea, it appears that military officers were only used for census operations in places with lower population densities and less centralized urbanization patterns. Perhaps the anomaly of Secundus in Apamea could be explained by the simultaneous census operations in Syria and Judaea and the situation required someone to oversee the operation there, and as such was carried out under special circumstances. A more likely alternative explanation is that Q. Aemilius Secundus was appointed because the greater region had been destabilized by recent rebellions. In CIL 3.6687 Secundus explains that he had been sent by Quirinius, governor of Syria, to fight against Itureans at Mount Lebanon. In a similar manner, the officer of CIL

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137 On the importance of literacy in the Roman army, not only among officers but among the rank and file, see Speidel 2001, 57.

138 Agnès Bérenger points out that prior to Hadrian auxiliary census officials could be chosen from among the general staff of the governor or among officers already within the province. From Hadrian’s reign and after, equestrians appear to have been chosen by the emperor and bore the title procurator Augusti ad census accipiendos or a censibus accipiendis (2009, 198).

139 Lo Cascio 1999, 203.

140 “præfect(us) cohort(is) II classicae idem | iussu Quirini censum egi | Apamænae civitatis mil/iium homi(num) civium CXVII | idem missu Quirini adversus | Ituræos in Libano monte | castellum eorum cepi” (CIL 3.6687).
On his title see Le Teuff 2012b, 46. See there also for the observation that Proculus appears to have been personally appointed by Augustus (\textit{ab imperatore} / \textit{Caesare Aug(usto) [misso pro] / censore ad Lus[itanos]} – \textit{CIL} 10.680). Augustus could have appointed him directly while he was in Gaul or Spain at that time.

Beatrice Le Teuff suggests his career was in reverse order (2012b, 93).

Surely the legion number is a typo and \textit{Legio IX Hispana} is correct.

Le Teuff 2012a,401.

There is some difficulty in determining the location of the \textit{censor's} operation. The \textit{Legio IX Hispana} appears in both Britannia and Germania Inferior around this time. The greatest likelihood is that if the census was prior to 121 CE it was conducted somewhere in Britain (the legion was based at York) and if it was conducted between 121 and 130 CE then it was conducted somewhere in Germania Inferior (it was based Nijmegen). On the evidence of \textit{Legio IX Hispana} in this period, see Campbell 2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Officer Title</th>
<th>Area of Operation</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. 27th or 15-12 BCE</td>
<td>T. Clodius Proculus</td>
<td>\textit{Legio X Gemina} or \textit{VI Victrix}</td>
<td>\textit{Tribunus Militum}\textsuperscript{141}</td>
<td>Lusitania</td>
<td>Lusitania</td>
<td>\textit{CIL} 10.680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 CE</td>
<td>Q. Aemilius Secundus</td>
<td>\textit{Cohors II Classica}</td>
<td>\textit{Praefectus Cohortis}</td>
<td>Apamea</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>\textit{CIL} 3.6687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st half of 1st century CE</td>
<td>Q. Lollius Fronto</td>
<td>\textit{Ala Numidica}</td>
<td>\textit{Praefectus Equitum}</td>
<td>Forty-four civitates</td>
<td>Africa Proconsularis</td>
<td>\textit{CIL} 3.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 92-103 CE</td>
<td>T. Haterius Nepos</td>
<td>???</td>
<td>\textit{Praefectus Equitum}</td>
<td>Anavionenses</td>
<td>Britannia</td>
<td>\textit{CIL} 11.521 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. 1st-2nd century CE</td>
<td>\textit{Ignatus}\textsuperscript{142}</td>
<td>???</td>
<td>\textit{Praefectus Fabrum}</td>
<td>\textit{Conventus Caesaraugusta}</td>
<td>Hispania Tarraconensis</td>
<td>\textit{CIL} 8.7070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. 1st-2nd century CE</td>
<td>C. Mocconius Verus</td>
<td>\textit{Legio VII Gemina}</td>
<td>\textit{Tribunus Laticlavus}</td>
<td>Vascones and Varduli</td>
<td>Hispania Tarraconensis</td>
<td>\textit{CIL} 6.1463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127 CE</td>
<td>Priscus</td>
<td>???</td>
<td>\textit{Praefectus Equitum}</td>
<td>Rabbath Moab</td>
<td>Arabia</td>
<td>\textit{P. Yadin} 16; \textit{XHev/S e 61 frg. A+B}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st half of 2nd century CE</td>
<td>L. Stei...</td>
<td>\textit{Legio IX Hispana}\textsuperscript{143}</td>
<td>\textit{Tribunus Laticlavus}\textsuperscript{144}</td>
<td>???</td>
<td>Britannia or Germania Inferior\textsuperscript{145}</td>
<td>\textit{CIL} 8.5355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{141} On his title see Le Teuff 2012b, 46. See there also for the observation that Proculus appears to have been personally appointed by Augustus (\textit{ab imperatore} / \textit{Caesare Aug(usto) [misso pro] / censore ad Lus[itanos]} – \textit{CIL} 10.680). Augustus could have appointed him directly while he was in Gaul or Spain at that time.

\textsuperscript{142} Beatrice Le Teuff suggests his career was in reverse order (2012b, 93).

\textsuperscript{143} Surely the legion number is a typo and \textit{Legio IX Hispana} is correct.

\textsuperscript{144} Le Teuff 2012a,401.

\textsuperscript{145} There is some difficulty in determining the location of the \textit{censor's} operation. The \textit{Legio IX Hispana} appears in both Britannia and Germania Inferior around this time. The greatest likelihood is that if the census was prior to 121 CE it was conducted somewhere in Britain (the legion was based at York) and if it was conducted between 121 and 130 CE then it was conducted somewhere in Germania Inferior (it was based Nijmegen). On the evidence of \textit{Legio IX Hispana} in this period, see Campbell 2018.
8.7070 was appointed to put down rebels in *Hispania Tarraconensis* before he conducted census operations at Caesaraugusta. In each of these cases their presence may signal attempts to prevent further resistance as well as an effort to place potentially volatile operations in the hands of the military rather than civic authorities. This is a similar approach to how Augustus placed first censuses in his own hands, or those of his relatives or close associates (pages 86-8).

The potential for volatile responses to a provincial census may also explain the presence of military officers during the first implementation of a provincial census. T. Clodius Proculus in Lusitania, T. Haterius Nepos in northern Britain, Priscus in Arabia, and possibly Q. Aemilius Secundus in Syria all appear to have carried out portions of the first census over a territory (see case studies below). In this early period, it appears that the decision for appointing census officials rested with the designated provincial *censitor*. In Syria Q. Aemilius Secundus was appointed to carry out a census of Apamea by Quirinius (*CIL 3.6687*). Likewise, T. Clodius Proculus was appointed by Augustus to carry out a census in Lusitania. This was fitting as Augustus was in Spain two times around an early census between 27 and 12 BCE and may have led a provincial census across the Iberian Peninsula (Cass. Dio 53.22.5). From a tablet at Vindolanda there may be evidence that these military officers had the ability to recruit other soldiers to help them in carrying out local operations (*Tab. Vindol. 2.232*).

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Table 2: *Military Officer Censitors*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-144 CE</th>
<th>M. Sulpicius Felix&lt;sup&gt;146&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th><em>Cohors III Ulpia Petraeorum millia</em></th>
<th><em>Tribunus Militum</em></th>
<th>Parts of Armenia (Minor) and Cappadocia</th>
<th>Armenia (Minor) and Cappadocia</th>
<th>AE 1931, 36</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<sup>146</sup> Possibly personally appointed by the emperor (Le Teuff 2012b, 70).

<sup>147</sup> Le Teuff 2012b, 93. “censitori | [conven]tus Cae[saraugusta]n[i] | [misso contra] | [rebelles pro] | [v(incia)]” (*CIL 8.7070*).

<sup>148</sup> This tablet is potentially related to T. Haterius Nepos’ census over the Anavionenses mentioned in *CIL 11.5213*. Tab. Vindol. 2.232: *Cras bene mane Vindolanda veni ut numerationi c(ens) (traces only) vale mi feliciter (?) [frater] karissime | [?scriptum a.d. xiv ?] K* Septembres a Ceriale praef. / Tomorrow nice and early in the morning
the provincial censitor alone, unless one suspects mandata from the emperor, who determined what sorts of men were needed for the job at hand.

The location and scale of operations suggests that military officers were typically used only in areas where local magistrates were unable to carry out operations themselves. They are found among mountainous communities, tribal communities, and communities still urbanizing. It is quite possible that Proculus’ operations in Lusitania were limited to the less urbanized northern reaches of the province. Meanwhile, Fronto in Africa Proconsularis could have been conducting his operations across several centers that were in the process of urbanizing in the south of the province rather than the more fully developed cities along the coast.149 Elsewhere, operations were carried out in the interior of the Ebro Valley in northern Hispania Tarraconensis, among recently conquered tribes in northern Britain, Arabia (a large province comprised mostly of villages with only four administrative centers), and mountainous Armenia Minor and Cappadocia. Taking note of these locations, it appears that these officers were used in both imperial and senatorial provinces. The scope of the operations waged by these officers, however, was limited in scale. With the possible exception of Proculus in Lusitania, the other eight examples were operations over tribes (Anavionenses in Britain, and the Vascones and Varduli in Hispania Tarraconensis), individual towns (Apamea in Syria, Rabbath-Moab in Arabia, and Caesaraugusta in Hispania Tarraconensis), and portions of provinces (forty-four civitates in Africa, and parts of Armenia Minor and Cappadocia).150 As these military officers operated at civic and regional levels on the ground, there is a distinct likelihood that this would have yielded a higher Roman presence in census operations in less-urbanized regions, the sort of places that

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149 Africa was a region of rather intense colonization under Caesar and Augustus, on which see Shaw 1981.

Rome tended to add to the empire during the early Principate. Bearing all of these observations in mind, there is reason to believe that the use of officers for census operations was potentially more widespread than previously thought. The higher Roman presence at a lower level in these census operations had the potential for creating more unrest.

**Case Studies: Mass Resistance to the Provincial Census**

There are two claims typically made for why mass communal resistance broke out against the provincial census. The first is that census procedures were foreign and unfamiliar to provincials. It is assumed that since all instances of census resistance occurred in the early Principate they ceased when provincial communities became more accustomed to Roman forms of governance.  

In support of this view scholars rely on phrasing from Claudius and Tacitus. In a speech to the Senate Claudius spoke of his father’s census in Gaul as “a novel and unfamiliar operation to the Gauls at the time” (*CIL* 13.1668, Col. 2, Lines 31-2). During Tiberius’ reign, the Cietae in Cilicia revolted against the client-ruler Archelaus II when “they were compelled in Roman fashion to render an account of their revenue” (*Tac. Ann.* 6.41).

The second claim is that the close link between the census and Roman extractions could be a reason why provincials resisted the census. The census provided the information useful for the state to extract its taxation, military, and corvée labor needs. In the process, the Roman state

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151 Many who follow such a view also presume that censuses were routinely conducted. Therefore, with each successive census, it became more and more a somewhat regular part of provincial life.

152 The relevant passage in full reads: *Illi patri meo Druso Germaniam | subiigenti tutam quiete sua securamque a tergo pacem praes|titerunt, et quidem cum adcensus novo tum opere et inadsue|to Gallis ad bellum avocatus esset/ While my father Drusus Germanicus was conquering Germany they remained quiet and so afforded him secure and untroubled peace behind him, and that when he had been called away to the war from the work of carrying out the census, a novel and unfamiliar operation to the Gauls at the time* (*CIL* 13.1668, Col. 2, Lines 29-32- trans. Levick, 2000).

153 The passage in full: *Clitarum natio Cappadoci Archelao subjecta, quia nostrum in modum deferre census, pati tributa adigebatur, in iuga Tauri montis abscessit/” The Cietae, a tribe subject to the Cappadocian Archelaus, retreated to the heights of Mount Taurus, because they were compelled in Roman fashion to render an account of their revenue and submit to tribute* (John Jackson trans.).
demanded to know where provincials lived, how many people were within individual households, the ages of everyone, and how much and what kinds of property provincials held. It was a very intrusive process. The institutions that this information aids were the very facets of Roman rule that ancient sources cite as the causes of unrest, as seen in this passage of Tacitus’ *Agricola*:

“Children and kin are by the law of nature each man’s dearest possessions; they are swept away from us by conscription to be slaves in other lands: our wives and sisters, even when they escape a soldier’s lust, are debauched by self-styled friends and guests: our goods and chattels go for tribute; our lands and harvests in requisitions of grain; life and limb themselves are worn out in making roads through marsh and forest to the accompaniment of gibes and blows” (Tac. Agr. 31- M. Hutton trans.).

By extension, provincials may have sought to resist the institution that Rome used to support their extraction schemes. Furthermore, because of the intimate link between the census and taxation, provincials could fear fresh taxes or increased burdens when a census was ordered, which could lead provincials to refuse to register at the census or to oppose the operation. For the sake of ease, these two claims will be referred to as “traditional claims” in the case studies that follow.

Though there is some merit to these claims, it is my contention that they need to be emended. On the one hand, the only way that Rome’s form of census taking played a role in the occurrence of resistance is that it required provincials to descend upon administrative centers for assessments, which inadvertently provided locals a platform to gather in a crowd, air their grievances, and passively resist the operation by refusing to participate. In the cases of Gaul and Judaea a series of disturbances, frustrations, grievances, and fears certainly impacted individuals.

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154 “Liberos cuique ac propinquos suos natura carissimos esse voluit: hi per dilectus alibi servituri auferuntur; coniuges sooresque etiam si hostilem libidinem effugerunt, nomine amicorum atque hospitum polluantur. bona fortunaeque in tributum, ager atque annus in frumentum, corpora ipsa ac manus silvis ac paludibus emuniendis inter verbera et contumelias conteruntur.”
and communities on different levels and in different ways, and any combination of these factors could have incited individuals to resist the census when they were summoned to register themselves and their families. When so many discontented individuals gathered in designated census locations, they may have realized their joint discontentment and gave voice to it. In other words, the census provided an occasion for disgruntled Gauls and Judaeans in a crowd to voice their discontent with some anonymity.

On the other hand, previous studies overemphasize the idea that unfamiliarity caused resistance, especially in relation to first censuses. If there are only two known instances of unrest at first censuses in the whole of the Roman world – the census of Drusus was in fact the second in Gallia Comata (see pages 140-3) – then this claim needs revision. When these three case studies are taken together, it becomes clear that issues with regional stability and the lack of Roman control, or that of its proxies, at the time of census operations created the conditions for revolt. What strengthens this claim is that the cause-and-effect of the resistance in these cases are unified despite the diversity of several variables, namely the distance of the regions from one another, the fact that the regions are ecologically distinct, the cultural differences of the populations involved, and the varying prior experiences with Roman power in each case. Even the issues of stability and control are distinct in each case: in Cilicia, the Cietae had never really submitted to local dynasts before or under Archelaus II; in Gallia Comata, the raids of tribes from beyond the Rhine had destabilized the region in the decade before the census of Drusus; and in Judaea, deep socio-political and religious divides within Judaean society concerning the end of Herodian rule in Judaea destabilized the region and presented challenges at the onset of Roman direct rule there. Therefore, the infrequency of census revolts may best be explained by the few situations where it was imposed on regions that lacked stability and Roman control.
Revolt of the Cietae 36 CE

The Cietae, a tribe residing in Rough Cilicia revolted against the Roman client-ruler Archelaus II, son of Archelaus I of Cappadocia, when he attempted to impose a census and tribute upon them around 36 CE. Initially, the tribe receded further into the mountains where they fortified themselves in strongholds to avoid assessment and paying tribute (Tac. *Ann.* 6.41.1).

Archelaus failed in his attempt to deal with the recalcitrant tribe, and eventually he requested and received Roman aid in the form of troops from Syria. These troops besieged the tribe in the Taurus Mountains and wore down the Cietae into surrendering (Tac. *Ann.* 6.41). Tacitus’ report fails to detail whether the tribe acquiesced to a census and tributary payments after submitting to the Syrian forces, nor is Archelaus II mentioned again after he requested Roman aid. In fact, a new client ruler was appointed shortly thereafter in Caligula’s reign, in May, 38 CE. It is quite possible that this revolt cost Archelaus II either his life or rule over the territory.

What separates this case study from the other two in this chapter is that it occurred in a client-kingdom and it was the only one that certainly required a military intervention.

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155 For the extent of Archelaus II’s domain (as depicted on Map 4 below) and what centers and regions were included within it, see Paltiel 1991, 133; Borgia 2013, 92, 97; Magie 1950, 455, 494. Cf. Syme 1986; Talbert and Bagnall 2000; maps in Shaw 1990, 203; Lenski 1999, 414, 415. On the temple state of Olba, which was inside of Archelaus’ territory but independent of it, see Magie 1950, 494.

156 *Clitarum natio Cappadoci Archelao subiecta, quia nostrum in modum deferre census, pati tributa adigebatur, in iuga Tauri montis abscessit*/*The Cietae, a tribe subject to the Cappadocian Archelaus, retreated to the heights of Mount Taurus, because they were compelled in Roman fashion to render an account of their revenue and submit to tribute* (John Jackson trans.). Bammel is correct to point out that the census did not necessarily occur in 36 CE, but that the Roman intervention came in 36 CE (1958, 498-9). Paltiel is equally correct, however, to point out that Bammel’s suggestion that the census took place in 17 CE is absurd (133n16), especially because he assumes a census at the time of Cappadocia’s annexation (cf. Le Teuff 2012a, 444). The assumption that a census was conducted immediately after annexation, or soon thereafter, is outmoded (Cotton 1997, 206. See further above, pages 108-14). Furthermore, there is no evidence that Rome ever imposed on a census on a client-state (cf. Taylor 1933). Here, Archelaus II appears to have taken it upon himself to impose a Roman styled census on the Cietae; it was not a Roman initiative. This revolt then is only related to the reduction of Cappadocia to a province in 17 CE in so far as Archelaus II’s territory was carved out of lands formerly attached to his father’s kingdom.

157 Le Teuff 2012a, 440-2; Paltiel 1991, 133; Magie 1950, 509-510; Lenski 1999, 419. Rome had mobilized four thousand legionaries and an unknown number of elite auxiliary forces to deal with the Cietae.

158 Paltiel 1991, 163; Le Teuff 2012a, 440-2; Magie 1950, 509.
Cause of Revolt

Traditionally scholars have interpreted two phrases from Tacitus to claim that the Cietae’s reaction to the attempted census was due to its close association with tribute impositions and the mode of Roman assessments, namely that the Cietae were already liable to pay tribute (\textit{pati tributa} - Tac. Ann. 6.41.1) and that the unrest was due to a change in procedure to a Roman one, which would have been unfamiliar to the tribe (\textit{"nostrum in modum deferre census… adigebatur"} (Tac. Ann. 6.41).\footnote{Le Teuff 2012a, 443, 445 (quote); Bammel 1958, 500. Le Teuff in a recent dissertation on the provincial census, for instance, found that while tribute was the driving factor in the tribe withdrawing into the inaccessible portions of the mountains, it would be a mistake to declare it a mere anti-fiscal revolt because Archelaus II had imposed a new and unfamiliar form of assessment, specifically Roman.} While this argument resonates well with how scholars have evaluated mass communal resistance to the imposition of provincial census, there is an alternative reading of Tacitus that would yield a different understanding of the relationship
between the Cietae and Archelaus II. To illustrate this, Tacitus’ passage is provided in full:

*Clitarum natio Cappadoci Archelao subiecta, quia nostrum in modum deferre census, pati tributa adigebatur, in iuga Tauri montis abscessit* (Ann. 6.41). If one reads the passage carefully, there is in fact nothing to suggest that the Cietae were liable to pay tribute to Archelaus prior to his attempt to conduct a census to assess them for tribute. Here I read the passage as writing that “(the Cietae) were being compelled to report for an assessment in the Roman manner.” This then suggests to me that the tribe was being compelled to report for an assessment, (incidentally) in the Roman manner, *and* was being compelled to submit to tribute to the client-ruler Archelaus II. David Magie interpreted this passage as an attempt by Archelaus II to impose himself over the tribe.\textsuperscript{160} Eliezer Paltiel took this one step further to argue that the census was at the heart of the revolt, but that it was an issue of control. He has convincingly pointed out that one of the problems in Rough Cilicia was the lack of interventions from Rome and its client rulers on the tribes of the Taurus Mountains in the decades after the Isaurian revolt of 6 CE (Cass. Dio 55.28.3). The lack of interventions may mean that the Cietae were entirely unaware that their territory was delegated to Archelaus I of Cappadocia (25/20 BCE – 17 CE), let alone his son, the dynast.\textsuperscript{161} This suggests to me that the tribe was not under Archelaus II’s control in any meaningful way.\textsuperscript{162}

The scenario then, as it will be argued here, is that Archelaus II was venturing to exercise a tighter grip over his highland territory through a census. It will be shown that previous

\textsuperscript{160} Magie 1950, 509. Cf. Lenski 1999, 419 whose phrasing implies a similar stance.
\textsuperscript{161} Paltiel 1991, 133. The regnal dates above belong only to his rule over Rough Cilicia. His reign over Cappadocia began in 36 BCE.
\textsuperscript{162} It is worthwhile to note that the tribe may not have been active in raiding lowland territories during Archelaus II’s reign, and that perhaps there was a state of peaceful co-existence in the decades between the Isaurian War and Archelaus II’s intervention in the highlands. Furthermore, it should be noted that lowland empires, ancient and modern, have had difficulties imposing themselves on the highland populations of Cilicia, which formed the subjects of papers Brent Shaw (1990, parts 1 and 2) and Noel Lenski (1999). The issues that Rome and its proxies had in this region were not unique to them but were part and parcel of the challenges imposed by the topography and cultures of the populations in the region.
interventions by Rome and its proxies in the region were retaliatory in nature rather than long-term efforts to establish lasting rule over the Cilician highlands to illustrate how Archelaus’ attempts to impose a census and tribute upon the Cietae were the first serious efforts to govern the Cilician highlands rather than to manage the area (and prevent raids on the coastal cities of the lowlands).

For a brief time, the coastal portions of Cilicia Pedias and Tracheia were directly administered by the Roman state from 64 BCE to 40 BCE. From around 39 BCE until 72 CE, however, Rough Cilicia was parceled out to client rulers. The early years of this period were marked by a frequent turnover of rulers over the mountainous portion of the region. First, Mark Antony doled out part of northwestern Rough Cilicia to a Polemon around 37 BCE. At the same time, Cleopatra may have received some portion of the highlands alongside an unknown section of the Cilician coastline since she had founded Dometiopolis in the highlands. Meanwhile, Amyntas, king of Galatia, was granted a part of Lycaonia (Str. 12.6.3). Sometime between 31 and 29 BCE, Augustus confirmed Amyntas as the king of Galatia but also extended his territory to Rough Cilicia and Isauria (Str. 14.5.6). This ruler appears to have attempted to establish control over the highland peoples of eastern Pamphylia and Isauria, but it ultimately cost him his life when he fell in battle against the Homonadeis in 25 BCE (Str. 12.6.3; cf. Cass. Dio 53.26.3). The Rough Cilician portion of Amyntas’ domains was then granted to Archelaus I, the last king of Cappadocia, sometime between 25 and 20 BCE. Archelaus would rule over Rough Cilicia as part of his large kingdom until his death in 17 CE (Str. 12.1.4, 14.5.6; Tac. Ann. 2.42).

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163 Shaw 1990, passim., but esp. 227-8; Lenski 1999, passim., but esp. 418-9; Magie 1950, 433, 443; Jones 1971, 207-8. Dometiopolis was named after one of Marc Antony’s partisans, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (Jones 1971, 207-8; Syme 1986b, 161). I note Lycaonia here because the cities of Derbe and Laranda in eastern Lycaonia, which Amyntas took from Antipater of Derbe, would eventually belong to Archelaus II’s territory.

164 Broughton 1933, 138; Jones 1971, 205, 208; Lenski 1999, 419.
While the mountainous territories of the Isauri and the Homonadeis, the northern neighbors of the Cietae, became attached to the new province of Galatia after Amyntas’ death, they are essential to understanding the issue of control over the highland tribes in the region.\footnote{There is a cultural unity between the tribes of the region, on which see for instance Jones (1971, 195-6), Shaw (1990) and Lenski (1999).} The Cietae, like the Homonadeis, was a tribe that controlled the difficult terrain of the highlands and had few urban centers that Rome could latch on to for establishing control. In terms of an economy of power, it would have been too costly in manpower and resources to bring the Cietae under closer control from the north compared to the Isauri and Homonadeis.\footnote{Broughon 1933, 142-3; Shaw 1990, 202-3; Lenski 1999, 416. One can compare the routes of access used by Rome in fighting the Homonadesian War from Galatia to the difficult approach from the south east that the Syrian troops would have taken to fight the Cietae on the map above (cf. Ramsay 1917, 230-1; Broughton 1933). Furthermore, this is not an attempt to state that Rome had found it easier to establish themselves over the more northern tribes than over peoples such as the Cietae. Rather, it is a statement that topographical considerations should be made in understanding why one set of highland peoples fell under direct Roman rule, and another set did not while all three tribes resisted attempts at consolidation.} In the case of the Cietae, Strabo details that Rome granted Rough Cilicia to Archelaus because the emperor believed it would be easier for a local ruler to handle the highland tribes than administering the area through a prefect who would neither always be present nor always have soldiers with him (14.5.6).\footnote{“…the region was naturally well adapted to the business of piracy both by land and by sea — by land, because of the height of the mountains and the large tribes that live beyond them, tribes which have plains and farm-lands that are large and very easily overrun, and by sea, because of the good supply, not only of shipbuilding timber, but also of harbours and fortresses and secret recesses — with all this in view, I say, the Romans thought that it was better for the region to be ruled by kings than to be under the Roman prefects sent to administer justice, who were not likely always to be present or to have armed forces with them” (Horace Leonard Jones trans.). Paltiel 1991, 163. Cf. Shaw 1990, 227-8; Lenski 1999.}

To illustrate the difficulties in pacifying the highlands one must simply look to the significant struggles that Rome encountered with the mountainous tribes attached to the new province of Galatia.\footnote{This situation was not unique to Rome (n12 above).} Amyntas’ failure to subdue the highland tribes had created a serious security issue during the course of Archelaus I’s reign (25/20 BCE – 17 CE) for the coastal towns of Eastern Pamphylia, the new province of Galatia, and for the lowland coastal areas of Eastern Pamphylia.
Archelaus I’s kingdom that would eventually require two direct Roman interventions. In the first instance, the intervention would come to be called the Homonadesian War, which was fought sometime between 11 and 6/4 BCE (Tac. Ann. 3.48; cf. ILS 918). In the years prior to the war, Rome was founding colonies and centers near the mountains as attempts to prevent tribes like the Homonadesians and Isaurians from raiding Roman domain. This was complemented by efforts after the war such as the construction of the Via Sebaste, which ran west to east to the north of these tribes’ territories. This latter project was an attempt to control the highlands within Roman territory by providing a route for military forces to access the highlands more easily. While these efforts may in part have laid the groundworks for eventually consolidating control, they in no way had a lasting effect because Rome had to intervene in 6 CE and fight the Isauri, who were then raiding neighboring regions (Cass. Dio 55.28.3). For their part, client rulers like Archelaus I would have been responsible for similar attempts at establishing control, but typically these client rulers lacked the financial and military muscle to force peaceful interaction and cooperation with the highland tribes. The result was that these rulers would find their resources overstretched in their attempts to bring highland populations like the Cieae under closer control, prompting Roman military interventions as would happen in 36 CE.

While Broughton had seen these interventions as part of a larger plan for consolidating Roman control over the northern slopes of the Taurus Mountains and Lycaonia, authors such as Noel Lenski and W.M. Ramsay present these episodes as Roman retaliations for highland raids on the surrounding lowland territories. In the case of the Homonadesian War it is assumed by

169 Broughton 1933; Ramsay 1917; Syne 1986b. On dates: Ramsay 1917 - c.12-6 BCE; Syne 1986b- c.4 BCE.
170 Broughton 1933, 142; Magie 1950, 461-2; Shaw 1990, 229-230; Lenski 1999, 419-20. Though one may note that Archelaus I, as king of Cappadocia, had a far stronger financial and military situation than his son because of the extent of his territory and wealth (Bammel, 1958 498).
171 Broughton 1933, 133, 142; Ramsay 1917; 235; Lenski 1999, 418. Lenski supports this view by looking at how Rome handled such episodes across centuries and found a consistent pattern of Roman reprisals after indigenous
Broughton that the tribe had not remained peaceful in the years between Amyntas’ failed invasion and the Roman war in the last decade of the 1st century BCE, and this is why Rome campaigned against them. Rome’s efforts, however, were not aimed at consolidating control over the tribes. The urban centers and road founded by Rome were not in Isaurian nor Homonadesian territory, they were in the steppes below and were filled with veterans in the hopes of deterring raids. Jumping forward chronologically to point out how peaceful coexistence came into being, the success that Antiochus IV would find in the late Julio-Claudian period was due to him establishing centers of control within the territory of the Cietae, not on the outskirts of the mountain tribes (see further below). Tribal elites are theoretically easier to control and monitor in an urban center than in castella and other mountain strongholds.

What this then shows is that the mountainous area of Rough Cilicia and its neighboring portion in Galatia were not consolidated well by Rome and its rulers, and this is what ultimately created the conditions for resistance to the census of Archelaus II. It was not the modus operandi of the census, but the very fact that Archelaus II had tried to impose one over them. Until late in Archelaus II’s reign interventions from Rome and its agents revolved around retaliatory campaigns against intermittent highland raids and an expansion of control on the steppe region outside of Archelaus II’s territory with the creation of the Via Sebaste. Perhaps more importantly though is the lack of interventions from Rome and its agents in the highland area since the Isaurian War of 6 CE. There are no known new foundations in the territories of the Cietae, Isauri, or Homonadeis or attempts at expanding control in the thirty years between that war and Archelaus II’s attempted census around 36 CE. The result of this is that the Cietae may have

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172 Broughton 1933, 137.
been unaware of being under the rule of Archelaus I of Cappadocia, let alone of his son the dynast. Worse still, if the tribe was aware of being within Archelaus II’s domain, its leaders perceived that it was strong enough to resist the dynast’s attempts to impose himself over them.\textsuperscript{174} Archelaus II appears to have been the first client ruler to venture a tighter grip over the territory with his attempted census and tribute impositions, and it failed, perhaps because Archelaus II did not have the necessary military strength and resources to force Cietan compliance. Unlike his father before him or Antiochus IV after him, Archelaus II did not have vast estates or wealthy territories whose resources he might harness in an effort to truly subjugate the Cietae.\textsuperscript{175}

All the efforts of the Roman state and its client rulers would not truly bear fruit until the reign of Claudius. It required the efforts of Archelaus II’s successor, Antiochus IV of Commagene – a man appointed ruler over Rough Cilicia shortly after the Cietan revolt – to establish dominance over the tribe.\textsuperscript{176} First though, the Cietae had to force intervention. In 52 CE a man, Troxobor, led the tribe in raids along the coast and its cities, and eventually invested the city of Anemurium. After a Roman cavalry detachment from Syria failed to dislodge the attackers, Antiochus IV broke the unity of the attacking party with conciliatory measures and he killed off Troxobor and other leaders (Tac. \textit{Ann}. 12.55). For the rest of the raiders, though, he not only showed clemency, but he also founded an urban center, Eirenopolis, in the heart of the tribe’s territory. This was a move aimed at weakening local potentates and establishing a firmer control over the mountain tribes. Antiochus’ reign was marked by urban (re)foundations across his territory ranging from Commagene in the east to Rough Cilicia in the west. Germanicopolis,

\textsuperscript{174} Paltiel 1991, 133. The only inland foundation from a client ruler over this region prior to Antiochus appears to be Dometiopolis by Cleopatra, a town that seems to have been named after a partisan of Antony, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (Jones 1971, 207-8; Syme 1986b, 161. Cf. Lenski 1999, 435).
\textsuperscript{176} May, 38 CE according to Paltiel (1991, 163).
Antiochia ad Cragum, Iotape, and Philadelphia are also attributed to him. And in the long-term, it worked, as it seems that the region would remain at peace until the 3rd century.\textsuperscript{177}

\textbf{Census of Drusus 12 BCE}

In many ways it is a blessing and a curse that we have any accounts that disclose resistance to the census that Drusus ordered in Gallia Comata in 13/12 BCE. Because imperial family members had spent a significant amount of time in Gaul since the start of the Principate, we are broadly informed of the types of administrative changes that occurred in Gaul in this period. Since there was such a high imperial focus on Gaul and Germania in this period, we are also reasonably well informed of the frequency of incursions from beyond the Rhine and unrest in Gaul after Caesar.

With that being stated, we are often reduced to short notices of the unrest because ancient authors were largely interested in other narratives. So, even though there are three sources that mention either Drusus’ census or resistance in Gaul at this time, very few details survive, some of which are contradictory. The \textit{Periochae} of Livy’s books 138 and 139 are the only source that directly links

\textsuperscript{177} Paltiel 1991, 203; Lenski 1999, esp. 420, 435; Borgia 2013, 91, 97n60; Jones 1971, 204, 211.
resistance in Gaul in 13/12 BCE to Drusus’ census (\textit{tumultus qui ob censum exortus in Gallia erat componitur} - Liv. \textit{Per}. 139.1). Cassius Dio, in opening his account of Drusus’ German wars, states that the Sugambri led a raid into Gaul because Augustus had left the region and the Gauls were restless (Cass. Dio 54.32.1).\textsuperscript{178} Claudius, in a speech before the senate concerning admitting Gauls from Gallia Comata into the Senate, disagrees with the other two sources and states that the Gauls had not only remained quiet, but that they allowed for a secure peace within the provinces despite troubling circumstances. The implied troubling circumstances were the census, which Claudius stated was novel and unfamiliar to the Gauls, and the incursions of Germans, which required his father Drusus to interrupt his census to campaign across the Rhine.\textsuperscript{179} There are reasons, however, to be wary of Claudius’ portrayal of Gaul in 13/12 BCE.\textsuperscript{180} As this was a speech in support of allowing Gallic elites from Gallia Comata the right to be elected to the Senate, it was therefore important that Claudius present Gauls, and especially their loyalty to Rome, in the most positive light. In this regard, he suppressed any evidence of Gallic resistance after Julius Caesar, including Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt of 21 CE. In the case of the latter, one of its leaders, Iulius Sacrovir, came from one of Rome’s oldest allied tribes in the region (see further, pages 201-36). While surely not every member of the Aedui participated in the revolt, nor did all participants do so willingly (Tac. \textit{Ann}. 3.43), Claudius’ omissions make us question his presentation of Gaul in 13/12 BCE. While the other sources suggest unrest in Gaul in this

\textsuperscript{178} τῶν τε γὰρ Συγάμβρων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων αὐτῶν διὰ τε τῆς τοῦ Ἀγριόστου ἀποσιάν καὶ διὰ τῶν Γαλάτων μὴ ὑπελειποῦσαν πολεμήσανσιν σφίσι/ The Sugambri and their allies having resorted to war on account of Augustus’ absence and because the Gauls were restive with their subjection.

\textsuperscript{179} \textit{CIL} 13.1668, Col. 2, Lines 29-32: Ili patri meo Druso Germaniam | subigentii tutam quieta sua securamque a tergo pacem praes[iterunt, et quidem cum adcensus novo tum opere et inadsue]to Gallis ad bellum avocatus esset.

\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Contra} Kuttner 1995, 120; Le Teuff 2012a, 440. Both Kuttner and Le Teuff use Claudius’ account to play down resistance.
period, he emphasizes cooperation and loyalty. It is therefore necessary to use Claudius’ portrayal of events with extreme caution.\textsuperscript{181}

Two other factors from this year are worth mentioning as they illuminate possible reasons for the unrest: the extensiveness of resistance, and how Drusus sought to ameliorate the situation. Drusus’ census only really seems to have been recorded by ancient authors because of its association with the beginning of Rome’s wars across the Rhine, which began with Drusus’ campaign late in the season after repulsing the Sugambri raiders and their allies in 12 BCE (Cass. Dio 54.32).\textsuperscript{182} From the \textit{Periochae} it appears that some of these allies were tribes along the west bank of the Rhine, even possibly some of those tribes settled by Agrippa (Liv. \textit{Per.} 139.1).\textsuperscript{183} As Transrhenic peoples had been invading Gaul from the period of Caesar’s conquest down to 12 BCE it is important to consider the role that such invasions had in destabilizing Gallic communities. All the raids and revolts in this period could have weakened Rome’s grasp over the region and threatened Roman security of Gaul. The fluid border between Gaul and Germania also presented opportunities for discontented peoples in Gaul to join forces and collaborate with those tribes beyond the Rhine in resisting Roman domination.\textsuperscript{184} As for the second event, both Cassius Dio and the \textit{Periochae} of Livy mention the dedication of an altar to Augustus in 12 BCE just outside of Lugdunum and the inauguration of a \textit{concilium galliarum} to oversee it. This move appears to have been a political gesture aimed at a Gallic love for gatherings and conferences in order to ensure their loyalty (especially in the face of Drusus’ needing to take at least part of his army out of the provinces) and unite indigenous elites from Gallia Comata. This council could

\textsuperscript{182} On campaigns from 12 BCE – 16 CE, see pages 62-5, 278-82 (12 BCE – 9 CE), 268-71 (Varian Disaster), 208-13 (9 – 16 CE).
\textsuperscript{183} Polak and Kooistra 2015, 404. See further “Gallia Comata from Caesar to Drusus” below.
\textsuperscript{184} Another issue is the potential for cisrhenic peoples to seek assistance from transrhenic peoples, and vice versa, in dealings against Roman control. This then could also suggest less a destabilization of local control but an already existing resentment among (some) Gauls prior to the census.
then meet to discuss issues as a body and convey them to Roman agents. This may have been why Drusus summoned Gallic leaders in 12 BCE, under the pretext of a festival celebrated yearly after that (Cass. Dio 54.32.1; Liv. Per. 139.2);\(^{185}\) they were likely summoned to address their communities’ issues with the ongoing census and to ameliorate the problems before he embarked on his campaign.\(^{186}\)

**Why was there unrest at the census in 13/12 BCE?**

Most scholars follow traditional claims for why there was resistance to the census of Drusus, namely following Claudius’ presentation to assert that unfamiliarity with census procedures was one cause. And as there is a tendency to ascribe resistance to the first census operation in a given region, there are claims that the census of Drusus was the first full census for taxation purposes in Gaul, and that the census of Augustus was either limited to Gallia Narbonensis or that its purpose was merely to identify communities’ boundaries and statuses.

I will argue, however, that 27 BCE was the first full census in Gaul and that the regional disruptions and general unrest plaguing Gallia Comata in the lead up to the census were the key factors in creating the conditions for mass resistance in 13/12 BCE. I also contend that there is some merit for the link between census and taxation possibly contributing to unrest, given that Drusus’ census occurred when Rome was preparing to wage war across the Rhine. As the next chapter will show, wars in neighboring regions could lead to real or perceived increases in impositions for populations of the hinterland and create the circumstances for anti-fiscal revolts.

In 13/12 BCE, Gauls could very well have suspected that impositions placed on them either had

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\(^{185}\) Drinkwater 1983, 111; Wells 2003, 115; Kuttner 1995, 118; Johnston 2017, 113-6. The date of this yearly festival is August 1\(^{st}\), which is the anniversary of Augustus’ victory in Alexandria (Drinkwater 1983, 111; Polak and Kooistra 2015, 397).

\(^{186}\) As Barbara Levick notes, it was this council’s initiative for permission to stand for election into the Senate that forms the basis of Claudius’ speech (2000, 180).
increased or would increase to support this war and took the opportunity to protest when they were summoned for the census.

**Gallia Comata from Caesar to Drusus**

This section will focus on two issues for events in Gaul in this period. The first revolves around Rome’s extension of its control and the degree of administration that it had implemented since Caesar’s conquest. It is not entirely certain if Caesar had imposed regular taxation in Gaul during his conquests. But if he had, it is likely that regular tribute was only imposed on subdued tribes or those that had broken their *fides*. Administration in Gaul under Caesar was mainly limited to grants of honors and rights to tribes and their leaders. Beginning with Agrippa’s first governorship of Gaul, 39 BCE, Rome began tightening its grip over Gallia Comata through increased human and financial exactions, though these would have been *ad hoc* in nature until 27 BCE. The second issue is the frequency of revolts between 52 and 13 BCE. There appear to have been several campaigns waged in Aquitania and Belgica in this period, showing that Gauls continued to fight Rome off and on for decades. The period from Caesar to Drusus reveals that the real process of incorporating Gallia Comata into the empire was a long-term project and that Gauls were repeatedly subdued and pacified. One of the possible reasons for continued disruptions in Belgica and Aquitania could be the fact that they were fringe regions abutting areas beyond Roman hegemonic control, which comprised peoples from the same ethnic and cultural groups as those within the empire; Celto-Iberians in Aquitania, Asturia, and Cantabria, and Germans and Celts on both sides of the Rhine. It appears that, until the regions immediately

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neighboring these places were brought to terms or subdued by Rome, there was continued resistance in Aquitania and Belgica.\textsuperscript{189}

After Caesar left Gaul, the first uprising attested was that of the Bellovaci in 46 BCE, which was suppressed by Decimus Brutus (Liv. \textit{Per.} 114).\textsuperscript{190} In 45/44 BCE, Aulus Hirtius appears to have campaigned in Gaul and was hailed \textit{imperator}. Given the location of coin finds bearing his name, he had probably campaigned in the northeast, possibly against the Treveri (Cic. \textit{Att.} 12.37.4, 14.9). Around 44 BCE, L. Munatius Plancus marched from Gaul against the Raeti just beyond the province (\textit{CIL} 1\textsuperscript{2}, p76).\textsuperscript{191}

Next, Agrippa campaigned in 39 and 38 BCE during his first governorship, for which he was awarded a triumph (Cass. Dio 48.49.4). While it is certain that he had campaigned in Aquitania (App. \textit{BCiv.} 5.92; Etur. 7.5) and across the Rhine (Cass. Dio 48.49.3), it is possible that Roman interventions were required elsewhere (cf. App. \textit{BCiv.} 5.75\textsuperscript{192}; Cass. Dio 48.49.2-4). It is also during this period that Agrippa likely began the Roman road network of Gallia Comata (Str. 4.6.11).\textsuperscript{193} Furthermore, this may have been when Agrippa settled the Ubii west of the Rhine after they had been fighting with the Sugambri. Regardless, Rome appears to have really begun to intervene administratively in Gaul only around 44-38 BCE.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{189} Woolf 1998, 32. Though revolts continue in the Rhineland after Rome’s Germanic wars (12 BCE – 15 CE), aid from those tribes beyond the Rhine appear to be largely lacking when a cis-Rhenian tribe revolts after 12 BCE.

\textsuperscript{190} This Belgic tribe was previously defeated by Caesar in 57 BCE (\textit{BGall.} 2.4.5, 2.13-15), had joined Vercingetorix’ revolt (Caes. \textit{BGall.} 7.63, 7.75), and resisted Rome again in 51 BCE (Caes. \textit{BGall} 8.6-22).


\textsuperscript{192} ὁ μὲν Καίσαρ ἐς τὴν Κέλτικὴν ἐξώρμα ταρασσομένην. It may also be noteworthy that Octavian was also in Gaul for at least part of this period.

\textsuperscript{193} See further, Chapter 3; Chevallier 1997. Though see Reddé, who places very heavy emphasis on Agrippa’s second governorship, because roads would have been difficult to create in a period of resistance (2015, 8-9). Such routes, however, could have been started after putting down the revolts, and it was surely a long-term process. We may also envision only the artery from the south to Lugdunum being formed in this period.

\textsuperscript{194} Woolf 1998, 31n24; Strobel 2007, 209-210; France 2009, 168-9. Strobel places the resettlement of Tungri, Batavi, and maybe the Cugerni to this period. Scholarship is divided on when the Ubii were settled across the Rhine. See below for opinions of this occurring later.
Issues of stability and control on the fringes of Gallia Comata continued into the early 20s BCE. In the years before the census of 27 BCE a series of campaigns was waged in the northeast and in Aquitania. In 30 BCE, C. Carrinas earned a triumph for fighting against tribes such as the Morini in northern Gallia Belgica and preventing the Suebi from settling in Roman territory (Cass. Dio 51.21.5-6; CIL 1, p76). Either in 30 or 29 BCE, M. Nonius Gallus put down a revolt of the Treveri, who had received support from trans-Rhenic tribes (Cass. Dio 51.20.5; ILS 895). To this period belongs a destruction layer at the Titelberg oppidum, chief place of the Treveri, and a Roman camp on the Petrisberg constructed in spring 30 BCE near the future location of Trier. Rome’s presence at this site was meant to dissuade the Treveri from further resistance and to prevent tribes from across the Rhine supporting them. Then, finally, M. Valerius Messala Corvinus received a triumph ex Gallia for his actions against the tribes of Aquitania (CIL 1, p50; App. BCiv. 4.38; Tib. 1.7, 2.1, 2.5). As Augustus would set about conquering northwestern Spain shortly afterwards, it is very likely the whole Pyrenees region was disturbed in this period. It is in the context of these revolts and regional disruptions that Augustus decided to intervene further in Gaul and hold the first provincial census. At this time, he was also settling disputes at a conventus held at Narbo (Cass. Dio. 53.22; Liv. Per. 134).

After 27 BCE, the situation appears to have been more settled in Gaul. Rome was engaging in the final conquest of neighboring Spain, 26-19 BCE, and that seems to have helped settle Aquitania. While there were no indigenous revolts until 12 BCE, Rome did have to intervene in northeast Gaul a few more times. Around 25 BCE, Marcus Vinicius led a retaliatory...

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195 Wightman 1974, 475; Dyson 1975, 154; Pekáry, 1987, 136; Woolf 1998, 31n24; France 2009, 168-9; Strobel 2007, 221-3; Drinkwater 1983, 121. The site on the Petrisberg overlooked the area until its abandonment, which may have been as late as c.15 BCE.

196 During this war, Rome likely created some of the known early units from Aquitania. This would have removed some young, military age men from the population, which could have helped Rome’s control over the area. See further on this subject, page 187n64.
campaign across the Rhine because some Germans had captured and slain Roman traders (Cass. Dio 53.26.4). During Agrippa’s second governorship, 20-19 BCE, the roads were extended to the Rhineland, perhaps to deal with continued issues in the region.\textsuperscript{197} Agrippa was also likely active in the northeast in this period, if Polak and Kooistra’s hypothesis is correct that the Usipetes and Tencteri had invaded Gaul at this time. It is possible that Agrippa may have resettled the Ubii to the left bank of the Rhine at this point, rather than during his first governorship, and founded the oppidum Ubiorum (cf. Tac. Germ. 28). Furthermore, Agrippa may have also resettled the Batavi at the same time, and allocated territory to the Chatti on the east bank of the Rhine. This may explain the camps founded shortly after his second governorship at the Hunerberg in Nijmegen, at Neuss (Novaesium), and Asciburgium, all of which are placed in the territories of recently settled tribes. Here, the extension of the road towards the Rhine may suggest an expansion of supply routes destined for these new camps.\textsuperscript{198}

In either 17 BCE or early in 16 BCE, Sugambri, Usipetes, and Tencteri killed Romans in their territory, plundered across the Rhine, and defeated the governor of Gallia Comata, M. Lollius, in the process capturing the eagle of Legio V Alaudae (Cass. Dio 54.20.4-6; Vell. Pat. 2.97.1).\textsuperscript{199} According to Velleius Paterculus, it was the Lollian Disaster that drew Augustus to his second stay in Gaul, 16-13 BCE (2.97.1). While some scholars see planned imperial

\textsuperscript{197} The first bridge across the Mosel dates to 18/7 BCE (Morscheiser-Niebergall 2009).

\textsuperscript{198} Polak and Kooistra 2015, 395; Eck 2007, 127-8; Strobel 2007, 209-10; Wolters 2015, 3; Morscheiser-Niebergall 2009, 132. One should note though there are other opinions on when the Chatti were settled by Rome. Strobel, for instance, urges a date of 10 BCE in the context of Drusus’ campaign (2007, 209-210). Polak and Kooistra also remind us of the potential offensive roles of the camps at the Hunerberg, Neuss, and Asciburgium (to face outwork as well as inwards). Neuss and Asciburgium face the Sugambri across the Rhine, and both of the latter camps’ foundation “relates to the events of 16 BC” (2015, 397).

\textsuperscript{199} Syme places the disaster in 17 BCE (1986a, 402- against Cassius Dio). Rather, Syme uses Julius Obsequens for the dating (71- \textit{insidii Germanorum Romani circumventi sub M. Lollio legato graviter vexati}). I do wish to suggest, however, (partially against Syme) that it is possible that Tiberius was a mid-year replacement, such as 16 BCE, leaving the possibility for a late 17 or early 16 invasion (see Syme 1986a for Tiberius being sent as a replacement for Lollius (402)). Augustus set out for Gaul (after June 29) in 16 BCE (Cass. Dio 54.19.1). The settlement of the Chatti, and possible Roman direct interventions and extractions across the Rhine, may explain the presence of Roman soldiers east of the Rhine in 17/6 BCE.
expansion and conquest in response to the Lollian Disaster, first with the Alpine campaigns then in Germania, recent studies do not see a causal relationship between the Lollian Disaster and the Alpine campaigns. Rather, actions since 25 BCE suggest that Augustus was already seeking to secure Italy’s northern borders and the routes into Gaul and Illyricum. Meanwhile, on the Rhine frontier, this invasion and several earlier events show that tribes east of the Rhine could easily penetrate deep into Roman Gaul, and that tribes in Roman territory could act in concert with them. Rather than a planned conquest as far as the Elbe river, it is more likely that Augustus had decided that it was time to act and secure peace for Gaul. It is clear that the region was unsettled in this time: Suetonius describes Gaul as restive due to incursions and “dissensions of its chiefs” (Tib. 9). In 16 and 15 BCE Augustus had Tiberius with him (Suet. Tib. 9), and later, from 13 BCE at the latest, Drusus, which suggests that he expected either to cross the Rhine or be invaded himself. It may be that Augustus initially planned for an attack on those peoples who typically caused problems and possibly to engage in diplomacy with the tribes beyond them. In support of this, Augustus spent time re-organizing and securing Gaul (Cass. Dio 54.21.1, 25.1); he brought troops from Spain to Gaul, first to the interior, then to the frontier; and he ordered a census, which, as argued above, would make the resources of Gaul known (on censuses being ordered around a time of war, see above pages 101-7).

During Augustus’ stay in Gaul from 16-13 BCE, he was also active founding colonies (Cass. Dio 54.23), giving and removing individual and communal privileges and freedoms, encouraging urban developments, and extracting money and resources from subject

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201 As Tiberius had campaigned against the Raeti and Vindelici from Gaul, the Alpine campaigns do impact Gaul. For the Alpine campaigns and the impact that warfare in neighboring regions had on communities near a front, see pages 169-201, 242-4. In 16 BCE, Publius Silius subjugated Noricum after they and some Pannonians had invaded Istria (Cass. Dio 54.20.1-2). The involvement of Pannonian tribes in the invasion of Istria may have been the motivation for Tiberius’ Pannonian Wars a few years later (see pages 244-8).
While Augustus was busy with these endeavors, Licinius, a freedman from Gaul serving as procurator in Gallia Comata, was causing issues with the locals. According to Cassius Dio, he was targeting leading Gauls, procuring not only the funds for his office, but abusing his position so that he and his friends might profit too. He appears to have saved his skin when some Gauls eventually brought Licinius’ activities to the emperor’s attention by presenting the stores of gold and silver he had procured to the emperor and explaining that he had done it to prevent the Gauls from revolting (Cass. Dio 54.21.2-8; Sen. Apoc. 6). Harold Mattingly plausibly connected Licinius’ activities with Augustus’ foundation of the imperial mint at Lugdunum in 15 BCE, since large quantities of gold and silver would have been needed to start minting coins. Surely this mint was established to provide a coin supply for the troops garrisoned in the region, just as there had been a mint active in Spain during the Cantabrian Wars.

When was the First census in Gaul and why does that matter?

There is an ongoing debate between scholars on which census was the first real census, Augustus’ in 27 BCE or Drusus’ in 13/12 BCE. This has real implications for our understandings of census resistance because the standard treatment runs on the assumption that only first censuses caused resistance. So, when some scholars have suggested that it was the very act of the census itself that caused unrest, they can explain away why it was the census of Drusus, and not Augustus’, that was being resisted. Here, such scholars can claim that the purpose of the census in 27 BCE was only to identify communities and sort out their statuses. This idea has been succinctly stated recently by Frédéric Hurlet: “we know that there was previously, in 27 BCE, a census in Gaul, the first to be attested in this region, but we are not aware of any revolt at that

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204 Mattingly 1917, 62-3.
time, perhaps because this first step was limited to identify the cities and to delimit their new territories without creating too many constraints for individuals.” In the view of such scholars, the first full census is the one in which taxation follows.

One must ask however, is such a system sensible? There are several points one could make in favor of abandoning this view. 1) To my knowledge, this is the only pair of censuses that scholars have argued for the first attested census not being a full census. 2) In the chapter above, I made a modest attempt to estimate how long Rome waited to enact its first census after annexing a region. Gaul presents a particularly difficult case because of the period of civil wars that followed its conquest. Roman interventions and the introduction of administrative apparatuses appear largely ad hoc until the time of Augustus’ census in 27 BCE. The pattern presented in that chapter, however (pages 108-14), suggests that Rome typically consolidated its control for roughly two or three decades prior to introducing the census, and the time between Caesar’s final conquest of Gaul and Augustus’ census certainly falls into this pattern. 3) Why is there a need for a first census to be merely a “fact-finding” mission? There is the possibility that Rome could have been delimiting the boundaries between civitates in the twenty-five years between Caesar and the first census. Even if this was not done, it is entirely possible that borders between communities could be marked, and a census held simultaneously. It would not have been the job of one man to go around and delimit all the territories; Augustus would have divided the task up between civil and military officials to go to each civitas, mark their boundaries, while others conducted the census. It is impossible to say how long the process would have taken, but it is feasible that it could have been done at one time. This is much more

205 Hurlet 2017, 208.
206 For instance, Dam 1978, 67; Kuttner 1995, 118; Le Teuff 2012a, 443.
207 Being that this was the first provincial census imposed by Augustus, it may have set the general trend of consolidating territory before imposing a census.
logical than to accept a process where the first census was reduced to demarcating boundaries, indicating which center would serve as a *civitas* of x tribe, and then waiting fifteen years to hold a census for tax purposes. Furthermore, the tribute abuses of Licinius and the probable creation of *auxilia* units with census information in the years between 27 and 13/12 BCE all suggest that Roman extraction schemes were already in operation prior to Drusus’ census.\(^{208}\)

It is important to remember that these early censuses were unlikely to have been as sophisticated as those of the high empire, and the range of information one could potentially extract in these circumstances could have been significantly less than in the more mature institution of later centuries. For instance, we may have to presume a limited knowledge on the part of the Roman administration as to the precise extents of towns or individual properties. Despite this issue, Rome had vast experience in extracting tribute and resources from its subject territories (pages 93-5). One must recall that provincials provided the information to Rome in the form of self-declarations. In the absence of precise boundaries for each property, Roman agents could easily, and simply, ask locals questions such as the quantity of items/crops produced or owned in the year of the census and derive from that information the amount of tax that would be owed. It is entirely reasonable to believe that a farmer would know how much grain he harvested that year or more generally on average. Knowledge of the extent of property, amount of acreage for instance, may not have been necessary at first, though certainly would have been helpful. The

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\(^{208}\) On possible units raised in this period see Chapter 2, pages 104-6, and Appendix 4. See also the limitations of applying dates to unit foundations, especially prior to the reign of Claudius (104, 187, 196-7). It has been suggested that units were created in Aquitania after the revolt in 28 BCE (Holder 1980, 111). As Chapter 3 reveals, units were often created in the lead up to a new war, and we may suspect that the earliest time that Aquitanians would have been levied then, would be Augustus’ Cantabrian War, which means that they would have been raised after Augustus conducted his census. The *Cohors Aquitanorum* may have been raised after Augustus’ to serve locally before being transferred to Sardinia sometime between 6 and 19 CE. *Ala I Gallorum Atectorigiana* was raised between the 30s and 16 BCE, which presents the possibility that it was raised utilizing census data. The *Ala II Gallorum* from Lugudunensis was likely either raised at this time to serve in Spain or was raised a decade later and sent to Spain to replace units moved to Gaul. (On these units, see Appendix 4, pages 371-2, 380-1).
time and expense in money and manpower to do a wholesale cadastral survey is prohibitive.\textsuperscript{209} Rather, at this early stage I am more inclined to suggest that such surveys were carried out primarily for the creation of colonies (and their subordinate hinterland territories), foundations \textit{ex nihilo}, and former Roman military camps turned towns. From there, the spread of this practice was surely an organic and piecemeal development. Over time, with the steady spread of cadastral surveys, locales were able to track and provide more intricate and sophisticated levels of information through which Rome would have been able to more efficiently and effectively tax locals.

\textit{Motivations for the census and the cause of unrest in 13/12 BCE}

As the chapter above suggested (pages 101-7), the likely motivation for conducting these two censuses in Gaul was to gather information to support planned campaigns. In 27 BCE, it is difficult to gauge whether Augustus was really considering an invasion of Britain, or if he was already planning to intervene in northern Spain (Cass. Dio 53.22.5).\textsuperscript{210} In 13/12 BCE, however, it is quite clear that Augustus was planning to secure Gaul by campaigning across the Rhine. However, one should note that Drusus may have been forced to start earlier than planned because of the Sugambrian invasion in 12 BCE. In any case, with these censuses Roman agents could unlock the human and natural resources of the Gallic provinces more effectively and utilize the information to determine conscription quotas, requisitions, or even to create \textit{ad hoc} taxes (on conscription and requisitions see Chapter 3). Censuses were also an ideal time to reconsider and address the statuses of individuals and communities, as well as to reevaluate provincial structures

\textsuperscript{209} Scott 1998.

\textsuperscript{210} One may note that Augustus’ motive for leaving Rome could be that he was giving Romans time to adjust to the first settlement, and more importantly, “to demonstrate how seriously he took the responsibility that had been delegated to him” for Gaul and Spain, “namely to subdue areas in which lasting peace had still to be established” (Eck 2007, 61). This does not though, detract from the point that he did \textit{go} to Gaul for the reason ascribed above.
and organization, which Augustus was doing in 16-13 BCE (Cass. Dio 54.21.1, 25.1). In either of these censuses, Gauls could have feared increased taxes or burdens from the simple act of censuses being implemented, given the links between census and taxation.

Roman issues with regional stability and control in Gallia Comata after 27 BCE played a key role in the occurrence of census resistance in 13/2 BCE. If Roman taxation was justified in this period on the premise that provincials had to pay for their own security, and Rome was unable to prevent frequent raiding, meddling, and migration attempts from tribes beyond the Rhine, then this may have been grounds for provincials to resist measures related to taxation, such as the census (Cic. Q. fr. 1.1.34; Tac. Hist. 4.74). But other issues such as the increased presence of soldiers and their likely participation in the census operations, a fear of new or higher taxes, and the form of census operations also played a role in creating the circumstances for indigenous populations to resist Drusus’ census. In the decade leading up to 12 BCE there was a drastic increase in the garrison size of Gallia Comata, largely prompted by the transfer of units from Spain as the Cantabrian Wars were gradually concluding. Over the course of this decade it appears that Roman forces were initially dispersed across central Gaul before being transferred to the Rhine frontier, which necessitated new camps and road building activities in the northeast. These road extensions were intimately linked to supplying, recruiting, and arming efforts in the lead up to the war beyond the Rhine. Not only would the concentration of forces would have made it more challenging for local communities to support these garrisons (increased presence means a consequential increased in upkeep), but all these actions could have given rise to fears that new taxes or heavier burdens were coming. As will be seen in the next chapter,

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211 Wolters 2015, 4.
212 See further, pages 97-8. On the close link between taxation and census see pages 109n112.
213 One could add to these actions Augustus’ reassessments of communal honors and statuses between 16 and 13 BCE (Cass. Dio 54.21.1, 25.1). These reassessments not could have bred resentment for the loss of privileges, but
wars were very burdensome and expensive for communities near the war front. So, a fear of new taxes or higher burdens was surely a serious concern of Gauls prior to the census of Drusus.

Furthermore, the increased military presence unintentionally increased the potential for unrest among the garrisoned subject communities. Soldiers were not only potent reminders of Roman subjugation, but they are widely attested using the asymmetrical power dynamics between themselves and provincials to the detriment of the latter. While this is not mentioned by the source material as an issue in Gaul in this period, the increased presence and cost of the military in the region could have been a cause for some discontent.214 Related to the increased presence of soldiers in Gaul is the use of military officers in census operations during the early Principate. Such officers were utilized in circumstances where Rome perceived that it could not entrust operations to local elites.215 While there were surely many communities in Gaul where the urban elites were entrusted with census operations, it is likely that Roman officers took over census operations in areas of Gallia Belgica where there had been frequent resistance and where urban centers along Roman lines were in their infancy.216 With Roman officers supplanting indigenous elites in civil administrative operations there was a risk of tension between the two parties that could foment dissidence.217

There was also a series of other disruptions in Gallia Comata in this period that could have contributed to resentment and restlessness among the locals. There were the abusive extortions of the procurator Licinius. Regardless of whether or not he was extracting vast quantities of gold and silver from the Gauls in connection with a new mint at Lugdunum, his...

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214 On abuse, see pages 17-21.
215 See further pages 31-50-72, and 114-20.
216 On urban development in Gaul, see the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir case study, pages 224-30.
217 Cf. case study of the Frisii in Chapter 1.
actions had caused so much displeasure among the locals that Augustus had to intervene (Cass. Dio 54.21.6; cf. Suet. Tib. 9). Around the same time, Augustus was founding colonies in the region, which may have caused disruptions and displacements of locals.\textsuperscript{218} This period was also marked by frequent stays of imperial members. While such visits would have been a mark of honor for the region, especially given the frequency of such visits in the Augustan period, it also could have caused issues for some Gauls. Not only would these visits have disrupted day-to-day activities and operations across Gallia Comata, hosting and supporting the imperial court as it traveled across the region would also have been expensive.\textsuperscript{219} It is easy to imagine how the stays of Agrippa, Augustus, Tiberius, and Drusus could have impacted individuals and communities in the seven years leading up to the unrest at Drusus’ census.

But despite the mass unrest at the time of the census, it does not appear that military intervention was necessary. Rather, Drusus handled the situation by calling together the leaders of the \textit{civitates} of Gallia Comata where they likely aired their grievances and Drusus settled them. After this, Drusus felt Gaul was secure enough to lead a punitive campaign across the Rhine. He would not have been able to do this if the unrest was violent or still ongoing. The lack of stability and general disruptions of the years leading up to the census created the conditions for unrest, but it was the actual operation of the census that provided the communal platform to give voice to the unrest and the opportunity for the turbulence to boil over.

\textbf{Census of Quirinius 6 CE}

The events that played out during the census of Quirinius receive vast scholarly attention despite the rather small scale of the resistance that occurred because the evangelist Luke links this


\textsuperscript{219} Drinkwater 1983, 25.
census to Jesus’ birth and because Josephus explicitly blames the ills of his days on the preaching of Judas the Galilean. The essence of events surrounding the census of Quirinius and the resistance to it led by Judas the Galilean and Saddok the Pharisee is as follows. In 6 CE, Augustus deposed the client ruler Archelaus, son of Herod the Great, after an embassy of prominent Judaeans sought Archelaus’ removal in favor of direct Roman rule (Joseph. BJ 2.111; AJ 17.342-4). This resulted in Augustus annexing Archelaus’ territory, placing it under the
control of a prefect, and attaching it to the province of Syria (Joseph. BJ, 2.111, 2.117; AJ 17.355). As Syria was undergoing a census at this very time, the census was naturally extended to Judaea (CIL 3.6687; Joseph. AJ 17.355, 18.1-2). While the population was initially hesitant to register property assessments, seemingly even opposing to register, the high priest of the Great Temple, Joazar, aided the new Roman administration in convincing an unknown portion of the population to participate in the census (Joseph. AJ 18.3). Then, two eminent men, Judas the Galilean and Saddok the Pharisee, at some point during the census registration process managed to persuade numerous Jews to not enroll in the census. Here they contended that it would be a mark of slavery if Jews submitted to Rome by enrolling in the census. Furthermore, they advocated that Jews should refuse to pay tribute to Rome or to Jewish agents acting on Rome’s behalf, and finally to not recognize any government without Yahweh’s sanctioning (Joseph. AJ 18.4, 18.23; BJ 2.118). These were among the basic tenets of what Josephus refers to as the fourth philosophy of Jewish thought (see further, Joseph. AJ 18.11-25; BJ 2.119-166).

Scale and Form of Resistance

There is quite a bit of debate on the scale and form of resistance that took place during Quirinius’ census. The issue of what to call the events of 6 CE boils down to Josephus’ imprecision in the language of resistance. But, in the case of Josephus’ accounts, it is further complicated by how Josephus linked this incident to later events. After stating that the populace responded gladly to

221 Josephus uses the term sophist to describe Judas and Saddok, which may in fact have a negative connotation here (BJ 2.118 calls Judas a sophist) (cf. Henten 2011, 251). One may also note that Josephus refers to Judas as a Galilean in one account (BJ 2.118) and a Gaulanite in the other (AJ 18.4) (Mason 2016, 246).
223 This is a common issue with Roman narratives of revolts and resistance. See for instance Woolf 2011; Lavan 2017.
the arguments of Judas and Saddok, Josephus transitions to blame Judas, and the so-called fourth philosophy, for the later ills of Judaea up to and during the Great Jewish revolt (66-73 CE):

“Since the populace, when they heard their appeals, responded gladly, the plot to strike boldly made serious progress; and so these men sowed the seed of every kind of misery, which so afflicted the nation that words are inadequate. When wars are set afoot that are bound to rage beyond control, and when friends are done away with who might have alleviated the suffering, when raids are made by great hordes of brigands and men of the highest standing are assassinated, it is supposed to be the common welfare that is upheld, but the truth is that in such cases the motive is private gain. They sowed the seed from which sprang strife between factions and the slaughter of fellow citizens. Some were slain in civil strife, for these men madly had recourse to butchery of each other and of themselves from a longing not to be outdone by their opponents; others were slain by the enemy in war. Then came famine, reserved to exhibit the last degree of shamelessness, followed by the storming and razing of cities until at last the very temple of God was ravaged by the enemy’s fire through this revolt” (Joseph. AJ 18.6-8; Louis Feldman trans.).

For us, the issue then becomes, what parts of this passage, if any, belongs to the events of 6 CE?

This is a divisive issue among modern scholars. There are those who take Josephus’ account to suggest that there were physical manifestations of resistance or civil strife in 6 CE, though not necessarily aimed at Roman agents and census officials on the ground. Lily Ross Taylor treated the events of 6 CE as a “considerable revolt which was remembered in later times.” Other authors follow Josephus, at least to a degree, to suggest that there was social and civil strife in 6 CE, namely that Judas’ and Saddok’s followers led punitive attacks on those Jews, and their property, who complied with Rome (Joseph. AJ 18.6-8; BJ 2.53-5). Even in these treatments though, modern scholars assert that Rome managed to suppress the disturbances

224 After this passage is where Josephus explicitly blames the events of his day on Judas and Saddok: “Here is a lesson that an innovation and reform in ancestral traditions weighs heavily in the scale in leading to the destruction of the congregation of the people. In this case certainly, Judas and Saddok started among us an intrusive fourth school of philosophy; and when they had won an abundance of devotees, they filled the body politic immediately with tumult, also planting the seeds of those troubles which subsequently overtook it” (Joseph. AJ, 18.9; Louis Feldman trans.).

225 Taylor 1933, 121.

226 Gabba 1999, 133; Dąbrowa 1998, 28-9; Millar 1993, 47; Brunt 1990d, 284. for Brunt it was an issue that progressively got worse until it reached its summit in the Great Jewish revolt.
quickly, especially given that Quirinius was not prevented from completing the census (Joseph. 
AJ 18.26).  

On the other hand, there are those scholars who seek to minimize the form and scale of 
resistance to the census in 6 CE. These authors are wary of how Josephus rhetorically tried to tie 
events in 6 CE to later events with a summary of the ills that plagued Judaea in the years leading 
up to the Great Revolt. The resistance to the census in 6 CE is remembered then in Josephus’ day 
for being the first bout of resistance to Rome since Augustus’ annexation, but not because of the 
scale and seriousness of events in 6 CE itself. Typically, Josephus relished opportunities to 
report and detail opposition to Rome or its client-rulers, but in the case of 6 CE Josephus did not 
expound on events nor how the movement progressed during the census operation, let alone how 
Rome responded to it (if it even did at all). In the end, it may be better to err on the side of 
caution and to affirm that the only certain form of resistance that occurred in 6 CE was passive, 
namely refusals to register (Joseph. AJ 18.3-5; cf. BJ 2.118), and that one cannot know the 
scale of the population involved. It is possible though that, if there was any violence, it was 
likely aimed at those Jews who supported Rome.

Cause of the Unrest

Beyond the traditional arguments for census resistance outlined at the beginning of these case 
studies, scholars have variously assigned the cause of census resistance to any combination of 
the following: the presence of soldiers, Jewish religious qualms with population censuses, class

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230 Le Teuff 2012a, 441.
division in Judaea, and finally, a reaction to Judaea’s loss of status within the region as a direct result of annexation. Each of these will be taken in turn.

Recently, the role that soldiers played in early census operations at the local level has been explored by Béatrice Le Teuff. In the early Principate, soldiers and officers were more frequently utilized in governing (ch.1) or conducting administrative operations at the local level, such as the census, in situations where local elites could not be relied upon to ensure that Roman needs were met. This was especially the case for first censuses, and officers were certainly used in the case of Syria/Judaea in 6 CE (CIL 3.6687). While, for Rome’s part, it may be asserted that using soldiers already stationed locally for census operations allowed Rome to administer its provinces more closely than usual, their presence could cause or incite unrest among provincials. Soldiers acting as census agents at the local level would surely have added to the negative perception of the census among provincials (on which, see pages 74-5). They were frank reminders of Roman domination, which the census also represented (as Judas points out above), and their presence increased the likelihood for tensions and frictions between provincials and imperial agents. Furthermore, there was the risk of soldiers sparking resistance by abusing their positions of power during sensitive operations.232

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231 Le Teuff 2012a, 401-2, 443; Paltiel 1991, 61; Taylor 1933, 131. Q. Aemilius Secundus, praefectus cohortis of the Cohors II Classica was possibly stationed at Berytus when he conducted a census at Apamea in Syria (CIL 3.6687; Spaul 2000, 485). One should note, however, that Paltiel played down the role of officers such as Secundus in these operations by suggesting that they did “no more than table the reports of established municipal officials” (1991, 61). Given the contexts and places where these officers operated, it is unlikely that Paltiel’s suggestion is correct. The use of soldiers in census operations was likely meant to replace local officials rather than compliment them. Three other officers are attested at first census operations. Given the paucity of attested censuses and which ones constituted the first in any given province, this number is suggestive of a broader pattern. T. Clodius Proculus in Lusitania was a tribunus miltitum of either Legio X Gemina or VI Victrix conducting the census in either 27 or 15-12 BCE (CIL 10.680; cf. Cass. Dio 53.22.5, 54.23.7, 25.1). T. Haterius Nepos, a praefectus equitum, likely conducted the first census over the Anavionenses in northern Britain sometime around 92-103 CE (CIL 11.5213; cf. Tab. Vindol. 2.232). Finally, Priscus, a praefectus equitum, was operating at Rabbath Moab during the first census of Arabia in 127 CE (P. Yadin 16; XHev/Se 61 frg. A+B).

232 Le Teuff 2012a, 401-2, 443. For instance, the actions of Roman agents while recruiting among the Batavians during the tense events of 68-9 CE was in part responsible for sparking the Batavian revolt (though it was not an underlying cause; see pages 188-91; Tac. Hist. 4.14).
In terms of religious qualms with the census, scholars associate them with Roman attempts to count the population to impose a capitation tax. According to biblical texts, counting the Jewish population, as would occur in provinces subject to capitation taxes or auxilia conscription, invites divine punishment from Yahweh because the population must be incalculable. While these biblical texts may suggest that some Jews could reject the Roman census on religious grounds alone, scholars tend to pair a religious cause of unrest with either an economic or political cause. Here, such scholars cite an issue with (heavy) tribute or a regional loss of status for Judaea.

For both the religious and economic claims for why resistance occurred, it is important to recall the intimate link between census and taxation. In some ways the provincial census represented Roman domination writ large. Mass resistance towards the introduction of the census could be aimed not just at the institution itself but also towards any of the operations that the census could support. Scholars who take an economic angle suggest that the resistance to the census, often in addition to the religious issue, was due to a Judaean resentment that they would pay more taxes under Rome as the price of removing Archelaus. There is a tradition deriving from Josephus that Jews had experienced heavy tribute already under the Herodian dynasty. The portrait often painted is that Herod had heavily taxed the population to both pay for Roman tribute and to support his building programs and euergetism in Judaea and abroad. And when

\footnote{Men may only count what belongs to them and Israel belongs to Yahweh (Exod. 30:11-16, especially at 30:12). See also the census of David (2 Sam. 24; 1 Chron. 21f). Le Teuff 2012a, 444; Smallwood 1981, 152n38; Unruh 2001, 21-2; Gabba 1999, 133.}

\footnote{One should note though that either of these paired causes may be cited as the cause of resistance by other scholars independently of a religious issue.}

\footnote{Le Teuff 2012a, 442. Cf. France 2009, 171.}

\footnote{Le Teuff 2012a, 444; Smallwood 1981, 150-2; Udo 2005. This portrayal is summarized well in Udo, who rejects this representation of Herodian taxation, on which see pages 154-5 (Udo 2005, 113-206).}
Rome introduced the census, they argue that the population feared heavier taxes, especially because a census implied the creation of a capitation tax.\textsuperscript{237}

Meanwhile, the political claim for unrest to the census in 6 CE rests largely on Judaea’s change in status in 6 CE more so than a direct rejection of Roman rule. Prior to Pompey’s conquest in 63 BCE Judaea had been an independent kingdom in control of large parts of Coele-Syria. From 63 BCE down to 6 CE, Judaea was a client-kingdom under Hasmonean and Herodian control. With the removal of Archelaus in 6 CE, however, Judaea would fall under the direct control of Rome. While portions of the Judaea’s population petitioned for Roman direct rule twice (4 BCE, 6 CE) there were other portions of the population that would be unhappy with such a change (see below). When Quirinius and Coponius arrived in 6 CE and imposed a census, it was proof that Judaea had lost its regional preeminence and was now just another part of Syria. From such a point of view, the census and the taxes that would be derived from it then were their marks of submission to Rome, or, in harsher terms, their marks of enslavement to foreigners.\textsuperscript{238}

In such arguments, the form of the census did not in itself invite unrest, it was the very fact that Rome was raising taxes in Judaea at all that caused the unrest (cf. Joseph. BJ 7.253).\textsuperscript{239}

Steve Mason argues a very closely related political cause for the unrest, namely that class division was ultimately behind the issues in 6 CE. At one end there were the aristocrats and priestly class, who sought an end to monarchial rule because they perceived themselves as the proper Jewish leaders. These families also had a revenge angle as Herod had treated them with

\textsuperscript{237} The only known capitation tax in Judaea prior to that was destined for the Great Temple to pay for daily offerings, which was not payable to the client rulers (Smallwood 1981, 150-1).
\textsuperscript{239} Schürer 2014, 419. It is worth noting that Mason to an extent rejects Josephus’ religious portrayal of Judas’ objections in favor of more political and practical view of Judas’ cause, on which see (2016, 253). It is also worth noting a potential link between Judas and Saddok and other instances where indigenous populations rejected Roman impositions shortly after annexation, even though the Jews’ reasons for rejecting them differs from the examples in the next chapter. In these cases, it was a rejection of Rome’s right to impose tribute, but in the cases discussed in the next chapter, it was often because a population believed that they had yet to submit to Rome (see further, pages 170-1).
contempt. At the other end were Herodian family members and their court, the masses, and charismatic leaders like Judas and Saddok. Mason suggests that while these disparate groups had different motives, there was often a close bond between monarchs and the masses in antiquity because monarchs often curried favor with them as a safeguard against the aristocracy. In Mason’s view, Judas and his followers aimed their ire at those who were willing to cooperate with Rome as much as, or maybe even more than, Rome and its representatives (cf. Joseph. *AJ* 18.4-10, 23-5). In this case, that would be the priestly class and those that Joazar had convinced to register in the census. Men like Joazar had lobbied for the change in rule and were among those that had aided Rome in convincing the populace to accept the census (Joseph. *BJ* 2.80-91, 111; *AJ* 17.300-14, 342). It can be argued that since popular unrest occurred in the context of Archelaus’ dismissal and the annexation of Judaea to Syria that the populace of Judaea may have been just as content with Archelaus’ rule as the populations ruled by Philip and Antipas’ were with them, meaning that the Judaeans were protesting these changes. The average Judaean, then, was not aligned with the interests of Joazar and his compatriots, who were willing to aggrandize themselves at the cost of Judaea’s regional eminence.240

There are problems, however, with some of the prescribed causes of the revolt. First, the economic claims. Rome tended to adapt the previous regime’s tribute schemes after annexing a territory.241 As modern treatments of Roman taxation are predicated on Josephus’ polemical presentation of taxation under Herod, they have contended that there was a heavy exploitation of provincials in Judaea. Recently, however, this view has been shown to be unfounded. While scholars have often presented the Herodian era as oppressive for Judaeans, burdened by Herod’s heavy taxes and Roman tribute, there is no evidence whatsoever that Judaea owed tribute to

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240 Mason 2016, 247-252.  
241 Gabba 1999, 118-9; Paltiel 1991, 60. See pages 93-5.
Rome after 30 BCE.\footnote{Udoh 2005, 198, 207; Gabba 1999, 121. Udoh presents the ancient evidence for the polemics against Herod’s taxes, and shows that they belong to the transition from Herod to Archelaus (Joseph. \textit{AJ} 17.204; \textit{BJ} 2.4) and in embassies to Rome seeking Roman annexation (Joseph. \textit{AJ} 17.306-8; \textit{BJ} 2.85-6). Additionally, similar claims to high taxes are presented in Josephus in places where he assesses the legacy of Herod (Joseph. \textit{AJ} 16.154-56; 17.191, 19.329). The payment to Marc Antony in 37 BCE was a single payment, not an annual levy.} Furthermore, there is evidence that Herod actually reduced the rate of tribute in the decades prior to Augustus’ annexation (Joseph. \textit{AJ} 15.365; 16.64).\footnote{Udoh 2005, 204-6. Cf. Mason 2016, 248-9. See also Udoh (2005, 198-201) for an assessment of the prosperity that Judaea experienced in the second half of Herod’s reign.} Arguments for Jews resisting the census because their tax burden was already too high falter, especially given that Rome likely just continued Herod’s and Archelaus’ tax levels.

Related to this problem is the idea that Rome introduced a poll tax with the census in 6 CE. In this case, the argument would be that Rome was introducing a new tax, and therefore there would be a heavier overall burden under the Roman regime. But, as the form of the provincial census was likely determined by the types of tributes and exactions levied in any given province, this is unlikely. Josephus is very clear that the census in 6 CE was only a property valuation; the population was not counted. The term Josephus used to describe the census was \textit{ἀπογραφή}, which in Josephus’ texts means “to register one’s own property” or “to declare as liable to taxation” (Joseph. \textit{AJ} 18.3, \textit{BJ} 7.253).\footnote{Udoh 2005, 213. Cf. Gabba 1999, 118-9. \textit{τὸ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἐν δεινῷ φέροντες τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀπογραφαῖς ἀκρόασιν/ “the Jews were at first shocked to hear of the registration of property” (Joseph. \textit{AJ} 18.3, Louis Feldman trans.). \textit{ἀπόγονος Ἰούδα τοῦ πείσαντος Ιουδαίου οὐκ ἀλήγους, ὡς πρώτον ἐξ ἐκείνων, καὶ τὴν ἀπογραφήν ἔσηκεν Ἰουδαίων ἐπείμφθη/ “He (Eleazar) was a descendant of the Judas who, as we have previously stated, induced multitudes of Jews to refuse to enroll themselves, when Quirinius was sent as censor to Judaea” (Joseph. \textit{BJ} 7.253, Louis Feldman trans.).} Another passage in the \textit{Antiquities} further shows that the census in 6 CE was a property assessment. Quirinius came to Judaea “to make an assessment of the property of the Jews” (\textit{ἀποτιμησόμενός τε αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας-} 18.3).\footnote{Udoh 2005, 213 with more references.} There is, then, is no evidence that there was a poll tax introduced by Rome in this period. This also affects claims of religious qualms to the Roman census in 6 CE. The biblical passages cited by authors to support such an argument heavily rely on the idea that the census in 6 CE included...
property and population valuations. But, without a reckoning of the overall population of Judaea what would have invited divine wrath in terms of a census?246

Finally, class division may be too clean of an explanation for the deep social, political, and religious divisions within Judaean society in this period. At all levels of society there were those who surely favored the end of Herodian dynasty, as well as those who favored some form of local rule or even a continued Herodian rule. This being the case, this author is not comfortable couching these divisions along classist lines but will instead demonstrate the ways in which these intricate divisions both brought an end to Archelaus’ reign and also played out in the unrest during the census of Quirinius.

I agree with those scholars who highlight how deep divisions within Judaean society, and the presence of soldiers could have contributed to the unrest in 6 CE. To truly understand the resistance movement led by Judas and Saddok, however, there is a need to assess the regional instability and issues of control brought on by these divisions. For control, it is important to assess the quickness of the census being imposed in Judaea compared to other regions, and to take stock of the events that had unfolded from roughly 12 BCE to 6 CE to see how unstable the region of Judaea was by 6 CE. Against typical practice whereby Rome consolidates its hold over a region for two to three decades before conducting a census, a risky decision was made to extend the census being conducted in Syria to Judaea when Augustus annexed it in 6 CE.247 This move was risky not only because the relationship between Rome and the inhabitants of a newly acquired territory was very fragile during the first decades after annexation, but also because of

247 Against the view that censuses came shortly after annexation and the belief that a census was necessary prior to taxation (two ideas prevalent among Judaean scholars) see pages 108-14.
how unstable the region was prior to annexation.\textsuperscript{248} For divisions within Judaean society, Rome may have overestimated the populace’s acceptance of annexation and the level of control the local elites could levy at this time. This may in part be due to the Jewish embassies giving a false sense of how agreeable the populace at large would have been towards Roman direct rule.\textsuperscript{249} Additionally, Rome may have overestimated the capabilities of the high priest and the priestly aristocracy to replace Archelaus and bring a stable control over the local population after annexation.

**Control and Regional Stability**

The Herodian family was never fully accepted by the local Jewish population and this played a role in Rome’s high expectation for a peaceful annexation in 6 CE.\textsuperscript{250} As Herod grew older and weaker, moreover, family members brought chaos into the royal court, and tension mounted in his realm as individuals saw opportunities to rebel against the ailing ruler. This situation grew graver though as Herod had (temporarily) fallen out of favor with Augustus for waging an unauthorized war with the Nabateans by 8/7 BCE, which could have only further encouraged dissent. Instability in the region falls into two categories. The first type followed in the wake of Herodian members vying for power and succession between 12 BCE and 4 BCE. The second category is a series of disturbances that bridged the period between Herod’s last days and the beginning of Archelaus’ rule as ethnarch, which reveals the tensions, anxieties, and restlessness

\textsuperscript{248} Even if Rome was aware of the regional instability, Roman officials did nothing to stabilize the region before conducting such a delicate first census operation (cf. Gambash 2015, 82-86).

\textsuperscript{249} What I seek to show is that a number of prominent Judaean had succeeded in bringing an end to Archelaus’ reign but had done so against the will of another portion of Judaea’s population (which could not have been insignificant) that was content with Archelaus’ rule. when Rome annexed Judaea and initiated a census, members of this latter portion of the population, namely Judas and his followers, aimed their ire at those cooperating with Rome, namely men like Joazar who had prompted the annexation through an embassy to Augustus.

\textsuperscript{250} Gabba 1999, 116-7; Gambash 2015, 82; Smallwood 1981, 114. While the last reference pertains to Archelaus’ reign, the sentiments reflect similar difficulties for how Herod was received by portions of his population.
of the period. The events of this period and how Archelaus handled them played a role in his
dismissal by Augustus ten years into his reign. This unrest and tension were still present in
Judaea when Rome annexed it and conducted its census.\textsuperscript{251}

The final decade of Herod’s life was filled with a dynastic struggle among his sons vying
for supremacy. The maneuvering of Herod’s children led to several of the original heirs executed
(Alexander, Aristobolus, and Antipater) or disinherited (Herod Philip), and Herod’s will being
rewritten several times, the last change occurring in the final week of Herod’s life. This created a
deep uncertainty over the future of the kingdom and the shape that it would take. It also invited
dissenters and pretenders to take advantage of the chaos and incite unrest both as Herod’s heath
was failing and after he passed.\textsuperscript{252}

Problems at court started when Herod brought his son Antipater, son of Doris, to his
royal court c. 13 BCE and added him to the will that already had Alexander and Aristobolus,
sons of Mariamne, in it.\textsuperscript{253} His presence increased tension within the court and resulted in court
intrigue and undermining between the heirs. Antipater twice maneuvered to remove his half-
brothers by convincing Herod that they were plotting against the king in 12 BCE and 7 BCE,
which resulted in Alexander and Aristobolus being condemned to death before Roman agents in
Syria (12 BCE- Joseph. AJ 16.6-11, 66-127; BJ 1.445-54; 7 BCE- Joseph. AJ 16.300-34, 356-
72, 392-94; BJ 1.513-51).\textsuperscript{254} For a time this left Antipater as the primary beneficiary of Herod’s
will, until Herod Philip, son of Mariamne, was added in 5 BCE (Joseph. AJ 16.133; BJ 1.458-9).

\textsuperscript{251} Henten 2011, 243; Gambash 2015, 81, 84.
\textsuperscript{252} Cf. Henten 2011, 243: “dissension motif is clearly connected with the ongoing power struggle within the
Herodian family.”
\textsuperscript{253} This change occurred in the context of the original heirs returning from their education in Rome. Their mother
had fallen from grace, the sons had outspokenly proclaimed that their mother was innocent victim of Herod. Amidst
fears that they were hatching a plot against him, Herod recalled Antipater to court (Smallwood 1981, 100).
\textsuperscript{254} This time the case may have been well substantiated (Smallwood 1981, 101).
While attempting to ratify his succession to Herod in Rome before Augustus, and at the same time undermine another two half-brothers, Archelaus and Philip, he was caught in a plot conspiring against Herod. Upon his return, he was found guilty and sentenced to death in a trial before his father and Varus, governor of Syria. Herod Philip was also implicated and lost all his rights. Initially, Herod named Antipas as sole heir, but, in his final days (February/March 4 BCE), he made a fresh will naming Archelaus King of Judaea, Idumaea, and Samaria, Antipas Tetrarch of Galilee and Peraea, and Philip as Tetrarch of Auranitis, Trachonitis, and Batanaea (Joseph. AJ 17.146, 188-90; BJ 1.646, 664, 668-9).

Herod’s worsening health and the infighting amongst his sons encouraged dissenters to act late in his reign. In late 5 or early 4 BCE, two popular rabbis (σοφισταὶ), Judas and Matthias, incited a group of youths to destroy the golden eagle that Herod had placed over the Great Temple’s doorway (Joseph. AJ 17.149-67; BJ 1.648-55). While Josephus connects qualms with the golden eagle to the Second Commandment, which forbids graven likenesses designed for worship, a figure of an eagle in its own right would not necessarily be forbidden. What likely offended these rebels was that the eagle was a symbol of Roman power (the emblem perched atop legionary standards) and a symbol of Herod’s relationship to Rome. Herod reacted by arresting and executing the leaders and their followers (δημοτικὴ τις ἐπανάστασις - Joseph. BJ 1.649).

257 This interpretation is based from Josephus’ portrayal of the two leaders for their profound knowledge of Jewish ancestral customs (μάλιστα δοκοῦντες ἀκριβῶς τὰ πάτριον) and that these two were well-respected by the people (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἐδίνει μεγίστης ἡξιωμένῳ δόξῃ), in addition to the way he uses the word σοφιστάς (Joseph. BJ 1.648). Smallwood refers to the leaders as rabbis and the followers as pupils, since they were youths (Joseph. BJ 1.649) (Smallwood 1981, 99). For a focused study on the portrayal of these leaders in Josephus’ accounts, see Henten 2011, 251.
258 On the debate of the date, see Smallwood 1981, 104n158. On Herod’s worsening health as an encouragement to act, see Joseph. BJ 1.649.
259 Smallwood 1981, 99; Henten 2011, 251. Note though that Josephus believes that it was “unlawful to place in the temple either images or busts or any representation whatsoever of a living creature” (Joseph. BJ 1.650- H. St. J. Thackeray trans: ἀθέμιτον γὰρ εἶναι κατὰ τὸν ναὸν ἡ εἰκόνας ἡ προτομὰς ἡ γένους ἐπιώνυμον ἐργόν εἶναι· κατασκευάζει. One should, however, see Smallwood for examples of likenesses of creatures being depicted in the temple, which would show fault in Josephus’ portrayal (1981, 99n137).
1.648). He also deposed the High Priest, Matthias, because he was unable to prevent the dissent, and appointed Joazar in his place (Joseph. AJ 17.164-5). 260

Early in 4 BCE, Herod finally executed his son Antipater and then died five days later. 261 Herod’s death set off a complicated series of dissensions, uprisings, and royal family conflicts that boiled over from late in his own reign. For the sake of brevity, the account here will focus on the main events, merely to show the point that the region was in turmoil in the lead up to Roman annexation.

After the customary weeklong mourning period, Archelaus sat on the throne to meet with the people, who were seeking concessions from the new and unexpected king. 262 The uncertainty of what would happen after Herod’s rule surely played into both the population’s hope for changes and the tension that plagued this period. The crowd desired a reduction in taxes, for Archelaus to free political prisoners his father had arrested, and to abolish his father’s sales tax. To this, Archelaus had only stated a willingness to meet these demands when he legally became king (Joseph. AJ 17.200-5; BJ 2.1-4). 263

At the same time, extremists gathered to incite a rebellion to avenge those killed by Herod in the Golden Eagle episode and to remove the new High Priest, Joazar (Joseph. AJ 17.206-7; BJ 2.6-7). With Passover approaching, the leaders stirred up pilgrims arriving for the holy days. As Archelaus desired to go to Rome as quickly as possible, he attempted to nip the potential uprising in the bud by sending soldiers into the temple precinct to maintain order. However, a serious riot broke out when the soldiers were sent in and massacred three thousand

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261 His death likely occurred sometime between February and April 4 BCE (Smallwood 1981, 104n158; Gabba 1999, 127). On the contentions of the dating of events set between the Golden Eagle episode and the revolt that broke out around Passover in 4 BCE see Smallwood 1981.
262 Here he took initiative to meet with the people with no formal powers, though he expected that they would be legitimized by Augustus. One should remember that Archelaus had not been named as a major beneficiary in Herod’s wills until the week of his father’s death.
Jews (Joseph. *AJ* 17.208-18; *BJ* 2.8-13). It is in this context that Archelaus left for Rome to seek his crown (Joseph. *AJ* 17.219-23; *BJ* 2.14-5).  

Archelaus’ absence, and his actions in the interregnum period, invited disturbances throughout Judaea. The governor of Syria, Quintilius Varus, and Sabinus, the procurator of Syria, assessed the situation in Jerusalem and stationed a legion in the Antonia Fortress overlooking the temple precinct in the hopes of suppressing the growing discontent (Joseph. *BJ* 2.40-1; *AJ* 17.251). At the same time, Varus allowed an embassy of Jews seeking Roman annexation to embark for Rome, while he returned to his province (Joseph. *AJ* 17.250-1, 300; *BJ* 2.18, 40, 80). Sabinus, who stayed behind in Jerusalem, incited further unrest around the time of Shavuot (May 4 BCE) when he disregarded previous commands, took possession of Herod’s palace in Jerusalem, and attempted to seize Herod’s treasury and his other fortresses (Joseph. *AJ* 17.221-3; 252-3; *BJ* 2.16-9, 41-2). The unrest that began at the time of Passover (mid-April, 4 BCE) now turned into a full-fledged rebellion after Sabinus’ actions. Sabinus next attempted to disperse a large body of malcontents that had descended upon the city, but made matters worse when his soldiers ransacked the temple after defeating the rebels, which incited the locals.

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264 Smallwood 1981, 105-6; Galba 1999, 127; Henten 2011, 257; Gambash 2015, 80. Cf. Smith 1999, 504 for whole section. Van Henten points out that Josephus treats the unrest after Herod’s death as a new set of disorders separate from the Golden Eagle episode. This is the case even though they are linked as the unrest started with people mourning the loss of those killed in the Golden Eagle rebellion (*νέων θανάτων*; Joseph. *BJ* 2.1; Henten 2011, 257).

265 Smith 1999, 505. It is important to note that these uprisings were not pro-Roman acts. One movement even slaughtered Roman legionaries, a move that will have invited retaliation from Varus. At the same time, they were not anti-Roman either. Rather it is more sensible to see in these movements further representations “of the general fear in Judaea of the continuation of Herodian terror. Sabinus and the Roman legion were thus not targeted as the representatives of the Roman rule, but as the keepers of order on Archelaus’ account” (Gambash 2015, 85).


267 Meanwhile the Herodian house was in Rome vying for the throne. If Archelaus did not leave Jerusalem until the week around Passover, it is likely that deliberations between the Herodians and Augustus did not start until early-May at the earliest. According to Stanford’s ORBIS project, travel from Jerusalem to Caesarea Maritima to Rome in April would have taken roughly 24 days (orbis.stanford.edu).
to rally and lay siege to Herod’s palace with Sabinus and his troops trapped inside (Joseph. *BJ* 2. 42-54; *AJ* 17. 252-65).\(^{268}\)

Tensions also mounted elsewhere that erupted into several localized rebellions at this time, forcing Varus to bring the army of Syria, augmented by client king forces, to help put them down (Joseph. *AJ* 17.251-300; *BJ* 2.39-79). There was the bandit chief (ἀρχιλῃστὴς) Judas, son of Ezekias, operating around Sepphoris (Joseph. *BJ* 2.56; *AJ* 17.271-2).\(^{269}\) In Peraea, a royal slave Simon briefly gathered bandits who plundered and burned stately properties around Jericho (Joseph. *BJ* 2.57-9; *AJ* 17.273-7). There was also the shepherd Athrongaeus and his four brothers who waged a lasting guerilla styled war (into the reign of Archelaus) principally against royalists and the Romans who were aiding them (Joseph. *BJ* 2.60-5; *AJ* 17.278-84). Varus and Judaean royal forces marched against these various movements before reaching Jerusalem. (Joseph. *BJ* 2.68-71; *AJ* 288-91, 296). Jewish rebel camps at Jerusalem dispersed upon the arrival of Varus, but he sent forces out into the countryside to round up thousands of rebels for punishment; the 2,000 most culpable were crucified and the rest imprisoned (Joseph. *BJ* 2.75-7; *AJ* 17.292, 295). Before marching back to Syria, Varus marched on Idumaea where 10,000 rebels surrendered without a fight. Afterwards he sent the leaders to Augustus, where we find out that some of these rebel leaders were relatives of Herod’s family; it is these alone that he punished (Joseph. *BJ* 2.76-79; *AJ* 17.297-8).

Meanwhile at Rome, Herodian family members presented their cases for ascending to the throne, and many who were meant to support Archelaus switched their allegiance to Antipas. It is important to note the dissension within the Herodian family in their attempts to deprive Archelaus of his throne as interfamilial rivalries had surely weakened their hold over Herod’s

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\(^{268}\) One may note that the rebels were augmented by the majority of Herod’s royal army who now were siding the rebels.

\(^{269}\) Likely a different character than Judas the Galilean.
domain and encouraged rebellions. Since some of Herod’s relatives were involved in the insurrections above, this further suggests a link between some of the rebellions and the power struggle within Herod’s family. The issue with continued Herodian rule, and especially a rule by Archelaus, was further complicated by the arrival of two embassies seeking Roman annexation, one from Judaea and the other from Greek cities within Herod’s domain (Joseph. BJ 2.80-91; AJ 17.300). At this time there was a sizeable group of Jews in favor of ending Herodian rule altogether, who presumably sought a return to pre-Herodian theocracy under the supervision of the governor of Syria (cf. Joseph. BJ 2.90-1). In the end though, Augustus affirmed Herod’s final will, except that Archelaus would rule as an ethnarch rather than as a king (Joseph. BJ 2.93-5; AJ 17.317-9).

While passages concerning Archelaus’ reign in Josephus do not reveal any active opposition after the events of 4 BCE, it must be admitted that the accounts are brief (Joseph. BJ 2.111-116; AJ 17.339-41). But, from earlier passages in Josephus we know that during his reign Archelaus had to put an end to the guerilla warfare being waged by Athrongaeus and his brothers. Athrongaeus’ forces appear to have been active across his whole territory, which would be disruptive for populations affected, and the longer they were active the more negatively it would have reflected on Archelaus’ effectiveness as a ruler (Joseph. BJ 2.62, 64-5). And, if this is paired with Josephus’ statement that Archelaus, once in power, remembered old feuds and was a harsh ruler over the Jews and Samaritans, then one may suggest that the ethnarch was struggling to control and govern his territory (Joseph. BJ 2.111). Furthermore, Archelaus’

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271 “Παραλαβὼν δὲ τὴν έθναρχίαν Αρχέλαος καὶ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν πάλαι διαφορέων οὐ μόνον Ἰουδαίως ἀλλὰ καὶ Σαμαρείαν χρησάμενος ὁμέως”/ “Archelaus, on taking possession of his ethnarchy, did not forget old feuds, but treated not only the Jews but even the Samaritans with great brutality” (H. St. J. Thackeray trans). One may note that not all share the view that Archelaus’ reign was fraught with difficulties. For instance, Gambash supposes that Varus’ brutal effectiveness in putting down unrest in Judaea in 4 BCE “must have played a major part in keeping Judea quiet until the return of Archelaus, and, quite likely, well into his decade in reign” (2015, 85. Cf. p86 for
failed attempts to appease and disperse the crowd mourning the losses from the Golden Eagle incident reflect poorly on him as a leader, not only because they incited further resistance (Joseph. *BJ* 2.6-13; *AJ* 17.206-18). After an embassy of Jews and Samaritans appealed before Augustus, his reign was ended in 6 CE. This was the situation in which Rome found itself when it annexed the territory and imposed a census.

**Roman Overestimation of Acceptance and Elite control**

As Gil Gambash rightly points out, not all unrest in Judaea prior to Rome’s annexation in 6 CE was anti-Roman in nature. In fact, the majority of events in 4 BCE was motivated by a desire to bring the Herodian dynasty to an end. While it is not wholly correct to state that deeply rooted divisions within Judaean society caused the unrest in 6 CE, it may not be assumed that a popular desire for the end of the Herodian dynasty in Judaea equaled a wholehearted desire for Roman direct rule. In following Smallwood, even many of those who had sought Roman annexation were likely hopeful of minimal interference in the day to day governing once Rome took over. Rome’s ultimate decision to annex Judaea was to a large extent informed by official embassies from Judaea and reports from the governor of Syria. Here Rome had seen two embassies, in 4 BCE and 5/6 CE, and reports from the governors of Syria. These activities certainly colored the perception of discontent at Herodian rule, which again did not necessarily mean a wholehearted desire for Roman rule. It just means that some Jews preferred Roman rule with local autonomy.

elaboration on the view that there was no active opposition and that it was a stable reign.). But, such accounts do not recall the fact that Archelaus spent some undeterminable period of time dealing with pretenders/brigands such as Athrongaeus, which reveals a continued disturbance and tension in the territory.

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272 Gambash 2015, 28-32.
to rule by a Herodian family member. The Roman government had little reason to suspect mass unrest upon annexation from the biased or slightly distanced information it had received.\textsuperscript{274}

Upon annexation, however, Roman officials may have underestimated the situation, or perhaps lacked enough information, and sent in the governor of Syria along with Judaea’s first prefect and some soldiers to conduct a census. The question then is how did they underestimate the situation? There are two problems that give some insight into this claim. First, from the reaction to Rome’s decision to annex and conduct a census in Judaea in 6 CE, it is entirely clear that not everyone was on board with Roman annexation. It is necessary then to evaluate who had actively sought Roman annexation, because their presentation of the situation surely misled Rome. Second, there is an issue with the way that Rome conducted censuses in scenarios where it could not or did not rely upon local elites at administrative centers. Even though some Jews had sought Roman rule, the heavy Roman presence in this census operation could have disillusioned even those Jews who had initially supported annexation. So, then, Rome’s decision to conduct this operation so early into its regime was an underestimation of how such an administrative act would be received.

We have some glimpses into who had favored Roman (indirect) rule. As far back as Herod’s death there were some Herodian family members who preferred rule by Rome to one by Archelaus. One may also count the members of the two embassies, many of whom surely came from the priestly class and the Judaean aristocracy (Joseph. AJ 17.342). Many members of this latter group resented their treatment under Herod and had much to gain if Rome brought them back to prominence.\textsuperscript{275} Given Joazar’s cooperation with Rome in 6 CE and the fact that he was deposed by Archelaus prior to the latter’s departure for Rome in 4 BCE, it is very likely that he

\textsuperscript{275} Gabba 1999, 116, 129; Mason 2016, 249, 251-2.
was among those pushing for Roman annexation.\textsuperscript{276} At the other end we have to surmise who were not in favor of Roman annexation. Archelaus could likely count less on support from his family for continuing his reign (as they had received their vested interests in their own tetrarchies), but he surely had the support of his royal court. And because this mass movement occurred so quickly after annexation, we may conjecture that a not inconsiderable portion of the Judaean population was quite content with Archelaus’ rule. It is possible that some of the population who resented annexation and the end of Archelaus’ reign could have been further angered by the fact that they would now have to pay taxes to a foreign power like Rome.\textsuperscript{277}

As a portion of the Judaean aristocracy and priestly class were seemingly the primary supporters of Roman annexation, they were partially responsible for Archelaus’ demise because they were conveying their opinions to Rome through embassies. If one reads between the lines in Josephus’ accounts, one may find that Judas and Saddok’s followers were aiming their wrath at those who were supporting the Roman regime, who were likely the very same people who had sought Roman annexation. The principle target of the discontent appears to have been the High Priest, Joazar. As Herod’s last appointment to the office, and from a family powerful during his reign, those discontented with Herod’s reign had demanded that Archelaus remove him from office to show that his reign would be different from his father’s. Once in power, Archelaus ultimately removed Joazar after accusing him of having associated with the faction set against Archelaus (Joseph. \textit{AJ} 17.339).\textsuperscript{278} While Ralph Marcus translates the passage as Archelaus

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\textsuperscript{276} Gambash 2015, 82; Smallwood 1981, 155. Though they do not concern us with the events in Judaea itself, it is prudent to point out that the Jewish population in Rome supported the cause of ending the Herodian monarchy in 4 BCE (Joseph. \textit{AJ} 17.300).
\textsuperscript{277} Gambash 2015, 82; Mason 2016, 247-9, 252; Paltiel 1991, 64; Schürer, 419.
\textsuperscript{278} Paltiel 1991, 64; Mason 2016, 247, 249, 251. Ἀρχέλαος δὲ τὴν ἐθναρχίαν παραλαβὼν ἐπεὶ εἰς Ἰουδαίαν ἀφικνεῖται, Ἰουάζαρον τὸν Βοιθοῦν ἀφελόμενος τὴν ἀρχιερείαν, ἐπικαλῶν αὐτῷ ὡς συστάντι τοῖς στασιώταί (Joseph. \textit{AJ} 17.339).
\end{flushleft}
“blaming him for having supported the rebels,” the passage could equally apply to Joazar supporting the Jewish embassy in Rome, which was in favor of annexation compared to rule by Archelaus; let alone the possibility that he was one of the ambassadors. He was also likely one of the accusers of Archelaus in the second embassy at the end of his reign. By 6 CE, he had either been reappointed by Archelaus at the end of his reign, or Quirinius had reinstalled him as high priest after annexation because he was a known supporter of Rome. His role in supporting the census operation by convincing Jews to participate saw Joazar lose his authority among the people, which ultimately resulted in him being removed once again from office (Joseph. AJ 18.3, 26). Beyond Joazar, there is possible evidence from Josephus that followers of Judas and Saddok led punitive attacks on the persons and properties of Jews who not only supported Rome, but also those who complied with Rome (Joseph. AJ 18.6-8; BJ 2.253-5).

The method and timing of the Roman census in 6 CE exacerbated the divided opinion on Roman rule. Going against typical practice, Rome made the decision to conduct a census immediately upon annexation. Roman decision makers put themselves in a situation where they had to rely on their own agents for the operation (since they had imperfect information concerning who it could rely on to conduct the operation), which probably consisted of soldiers stationed in Syria. This resulted in a very heavy Roman presence at the local level for the census operation. It is also important to remember that this was the very first administrative act of Rome’s rule and it would set the tone for impressions of what it was like to live under Roman direct rule. These factors would have further incensed those who were unhappy with Rome’s ending of Archelaus’ rule. And, under the influence of Judas and Saddok, they were driven both

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279 Loeb Classical Library 410.
280 Paltiel 1991, 61-2, 64; Smallwood 1981, 114-6, 155-6; Dąbrowa 1998, 29; Mason 2016, 247, 249, 251. see further pages 148-50 on the uncertainty of these passages. Because there does not seem to have been a Roman reaction, it is unlikely that these followers dared to attack Roman agents on the ground, who were largely soldiers.
to passively resist the census operation and to channel their ire on those Jews who had caused the ethnarch’s deposition and this situation that had come to pass. It is possible that they also set their sights on those who had also collaborated and cooperated with Rome. Beyond the naysayers to Roman rule, it is also quite possible that the imposition of the census, and the way it was conducted, even disillusioned and made resentful some of those who were in favor of replacing the Herodian dynasty with direct Roman rule. This situation was surely not what those in favor of Roman rule had expected, given that they likely desired a semiautonomous government similar to the pre-Herodian theocracy, which would govern Judaea’s day-to-day affairs with slight supervision from the governor of Syria (cf. Joseph. BJ 2.90-1). The high Roman presence at this operation, in the first days of direct Roman rule, may have given the wrong impression of what provincials should expect in how they would be governed under Rome going forward.

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Chapter 3: Warfare and Burden Levels in the Early Principate

While researching this chapter, it quickly became apparent that there was a discrepancy in the presentation of the impact that provincial exactions and burdens had on indigenous communities between economic historians and scholarly works on indigenous revolts. Among the range of exactions and burdens are direct and indirect taxes, conscription, and provisioning Roman armies. Economic historians, who typically deal with the chronological duration of the Principate, estimate that Roman Imperial tax levels and burdens were moderate, probably about the same as pre-conquest levels.¹ But, for scholars working on indigenous resistance to the Roman Empire, who by nature deal with the episodic or periodic, argue that Roman administration and its representatives were oppressive and that the impositions were too high.²

The goal of this chapter is to bridge these two disparate viewpoints. Rather than continuing the search for precise tax levels to assess the issue of burden, which we may never be able to answer given the evidence, the burden of proof simply must be that the impositions placed upon various provincial communities may be perceived as heavy, regardless if the demands were heavier than before. This chapter will reveal, though, that at times the burden could in fact be heavier for provincial populations.³

¹ Tribute rates were largely static in the Principate. There are only a few moments during the Principate when tax rates were increased across the provinces, such as Vespasian, who was attempting to refill the state’s coffers after Nero’s spending and the civil wars (Suet. Vesp. 16.1; Jones 1974b, 174, 177-178; Hopkins 1980, 121-3; Bang 2013, 442-3).
² Dyson 1975; Goodman 2015; cf. Gambash 2015, 2-3. Corbier argues that the impost was “oppressive for those who had to pay it” but does not seem to suggest that rates were too high (1988, 259-61). To show the oppressive nature of the impost she uses evidence from a later period than here to support these claims, namely Dio Chrysostom and Tertullian (Dio Chrys. Or. 31.46; Tert. Apol. 13.6). Hurlet presents the oppressive nature of Roman representatives and scope for abuse (2017, 212). Marguerite Johnson reveals that Tacitus’ presentation of Britain before Boudica’s revolt is a series of indigenous and tribal grievances against Romans culminating in the abuses against the Icenian royal family at the time of their annexation (2012). It is presentations such as this in the source material that drives our perceptions of why revolts broke out despite the biases and agendas of ancient authors such as Tacitus in their treatment of revolts (cf. Corbier 1988, 261; Lavan 2017).
³ It may be worth quoting A.H.M. Jones here that people will complain about the weight of their burdens, regardless if it is fair or not: "It would be naïve to accept without question the complaints of taxpayers, or even the apologies of
Two patterns emerged from literary episodes of “anti-fiscal” revolts and provincial complaints against tributes and burdens in the Julio-Claudian period. First, that the issues surrounding imperial exactions are complex. While many of these episodes complain about tribute (tributum) specifically in the narrow sense of the word, which would on the surface appear to give credibility to those scholars who claim that tribute rates were high or oppressive in nature, the issues surrounding burdens are in fact multifaceted and should take into account regular and irregular exactions, whether such impositions are in money or kind, or in labor or on the body. When taking these broader categories of imposition into consideration one may see how complicated the relationship is between imperial exactions and indigenous revolts, and provincial complaints. There are those episodes where communities resisted the act of tribute imposition itself, most often shortly after conquest or annexation.\(^4\) In other words, these episodes represent

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\(^4\) This is certainly the case with episode 5, but possibly also episode 2. Though note that in the latter case, the Thebaid frequently resisted taxation in the Ptolemaic period and this might impact our perception of this revolt and its nature (Fischer-Bovet 2012). Episode 3 could pertain to communities recently conquered, in the 30s and 10s
cases where indigenous groups were actively resisting Roman authority to impose exactions over them. Then, there are those communities waylaid by continuous heavy burdens (including tribute). In this category communities seem to have either appealed to Roman authorities for relief or revolted in attempts to free themselves from their predicaments. Finally, there is the Frisian revolt (9) where the issue was specifically an increase in the rate of the tribute burden, namely the size of the skins demanded by Rome.

Second, a significant pattern emerged that most “anti-fiscal” revolts and complaints against tributes and burdens in this period were in the context of wars, either within a decade or ongoing, in neighboring regions. Episodes 1 and 2 are within the context of Octavian’s civil war with Antony (it is quite possible that Gyarus’ financial difficulties are due to impositions from Antony or due to disruptions from the war). The Dalmatian revolt (3) broke out during the Pannonian Wars of 12-9 BCE, but the Dalmatians were surely impacted by regional campaigning from at least 16 BCE. Auxilia recruits bound for Tiberius’ war against Maroboduus in modern day Bohemia initiated the Great Illyrian revolt (4). The length of the Great Illyrian revolt and the number of Roman forces involved impacted provinces far and wide. Irregular units from Germania Magna seem to have served in the war only to return home and revolt (5 – see pages 200-1 and 276-7). Achaia and Macedonia may in part have been impacted by the war as well, especially in the costs of supplying Rome’s forces and their appeal to Rome six years later is indicative of this (6). Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt is absolutely connected to Roman warfare.

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5 Communities sending embassies to Rome, the emperor, or local authorities are found in episodes 1, 6, 7, and 10. 4, 8, and possibly 3 (it was not just an issue of the introduction of Roman extraction, but that Dalmatia surely played a heavy role in supporting Roman army efforts during the aforementioned Augustan conquests of the 10s BCE). Cf. Corbier 1988 for strategies employed by communities and individuals in response to fiscal issues.

6 France 2009, 168-9. On the Frisian revolt, see pages 64, 68-9, and 71. The Frisii present an interesting case in that they first had appealed for relief (as episodes 1, 6, 7, and 10 had done), but when that failed, they successively sought violent means to free themselves from their situation.
across the Rhine from 12 BCE – 16 CE, with the years from 9 CE – 16 CE likely having the
most impact (8 – see case study below). Byzantium had been exhausted by 53 CE because of
their support in Rome’s recent wars in Thrace and the Bosporus (10).7 Suetonius Paulinus was
campaigning in northwestern Wales when the Boudican revolt broke out c.60 CE, but there was
frequent campaigning in the region since Claudius’ conquest (11).8

This second pattern is what ultimately informed the approach for this chapter. As this
chapter will reveal, active and recent warfare could have a significant, yet temporary, fiscal
impact on populations in the hinterland.9 In addition to the impact, active warfare beyond a
frontier could provide the opportunity for revolt in the hinterland as most of the garrisoning
forces would have been absent on campaign.10 It is then not a coincidence that many revolts
occurred around the time of military campaigns in neighboring regions as wars could
substantially affect populations behind the lines of operations. This chapter approaches the issue
of large-scale resistance to exactions and burdens in two ways. The first is a survey of Roman
army logistics, namely how Rome obtained supplies as well as human and animal labor, at the
frontiers of its Empire in the Julio-Claudian period, and how those methods impacted
communities at various distances from the campaign zone. The second examines the impact of
auxilia recruitment and conscription on provincial communities, which was heaviest during
active warfare.11 The impact of either explanation is unlikely to have been burdensome enough
on its own to have caused large-scale resistance; it is only the cumulative effect that these

8 See pages 298-301 for a review of campaigns prior to Boudica’s revolt.
9 If the time between the end of wars and the complaints is taken into consideration, then the chronological
framework is limited to a decade. This is even the case for the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir in 21 BCE, where
Rome’s long wars across the Rhine had just ended six years earlier (12 BCE - 16 CE- see pages 278-82 [12 BCE – 8
CE], 268-71 [9 CE] and 208-13 [for events from 10-16 CE]). Furthermore, one may look to the heavy costs of
imperial journeys on specific communities as a comparison for the issues discussed here (on the former, one may
see, for instance, Halfmann 1986, 125-9; Cioffi 2016, 11-3.
10 Episodes 3, 4, 5, and 11.
11 Bang 2013, 420-422.
explanations had on top of routine Roman extraction schemes that could create the type of large-scale resistance examined in this project (either real or perceived heavy burdens being the cause).

Logistics

While scholars have long portrayed the Roman army as having a negative effect on the economy due to oppressive demands for local goods or requisitions exacerbating tax burdens, Mauro De Nardis argues that the demands of the army unlikely resulted in a “considerable increase in the burden of provincial taxation” because the overall yearly food production increases required to support the Roman army in any given province was negligible, only .5-5%. One of the ambitions of this chapter is to push back against views such as this to show that in certain circumstances, especially during active warfare, Roman armies did in fact temporarily have a real impact on the burden levels of provincials. A quick glance at the range of burdens and impositions, both regular and ad hoc, shows that the Roman army and government impacted provincial communities in more ways than just supplying food (figure 5).

![Figure 5: Types of Burdens](image)

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12 Nardis 2015.
13 Herz 1992, 44-5.
Furthermore, one must account for the unevenness of demands and burdens placed upon communities within provinces, as this would have varied based on the proximity of communities to the armies and what relationships they had with Rome (such as federate, free, stipendiary). Finally, it is important to note that active warfare in a neighboring region would impact the production capabilities of the locals, especially given the armies’ increased demands for support. Several actions took men and animals out of fields or diverted the efforts of craftsmen in times of war. Conscription into the auxilia and impressment of civilians into service as porters, drivers, or as oarsmen removed capable workers from households; the former had a long-term human impact in removing young men for up to twenty-five years, the latter had a short-term effect of removing men for a campaign season or a war. Large-scale production of arms, armor, and equipment could at times divert craftsmen from other tasks. Forced purchases of draft animals, horses, and carts all reduced the production capabilities of the farms affected.

To understand how great the impact of these actions was, in addition to the impact of the food supply and regular taxation, it would be wise to present the size of the armies in the regions affected by anti-fiscal revolts, then to relay the sorts of items these forces would have required with a few examples of quantities. Then finally, there will be a brief overview of how the military acquired these goods and items. From the Pannonian War to the Great Illyrian revolt there seems to have been around 50,000 soldiers in Illyricum, including five legions.\(^\text{14}\) Meanwhile, the Rhineland armies had a combined force of 50,000-60,000 soldiers prior to the Varian Disaster in 9 CE, including five or six legions. But, in the decade leading up to Florus and

\(^\text{14}\) Džino 2010, 123: *Legiones XI, XIII Gemina, XIII Gemina, XV Apollinaris*, and XX were likely in Illyricum or nearby northern Italy prior to 6 CE. Radman-Livaja 2012, 162-4: *Legiones IX Hispana, XI, XIII Gemina, XV Apollinaris*, and XX. For the sake of estimates, this chapter uses Tacitus’ statement in the *Annales* that in the reign of Tiberius there were roughly as many auxiliaries as there were legionaries (4.5. cf. Bang 2013, 421; Potter 2013, 323, 323n9). Additionally, provincial forces are rounded up here to even numbers, so five thousand per legion rather than four thousand eight hundred. Estimates for the needs of a single legion, however, are according to a legion of 4,800 men.
Sacrovir’s revolt of 21 CE, the Rhineland armies increased to 80,000 soldiers, including eight legions.\textsuperscript{15} Lastly, in the seventeen years prior to the Boudican revolt in 60 CE, there were four legions involved in the gradual conquest of southern Britain and Wales; the accompanying \textit{auxilia} brought the number to roughly 40,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{16} The amount of food required to sustain armies of these sizes is staggering. Following Jonathan Roth’s model from Roman and comparative evidence,\textsuperscript{17} one can see on this table the weight of rations at various levels, from soldiers, to whole legions and provincial armies. The quantities involved are impressive considering that archaeological evidence from military sites of this period in these regions suggests that the bulk of Rome’s food supply for its frontier armies would have been local (typically within the same province as the camps).\textsuperscript{18}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soldier/ day</th>
<th>Soldier/ year</th>
<th>Legion/ day</th>
<th>Legion/ year</th>
<th>40,000 soldiers/ year</th>
<th>50,000 soldiers/ year</th>
<th>80,000 soldiers/ year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Grain}</td>
<td>850g</td>
<td>310.25kg</td>
<td>4080kg</td>
<td>1,489.2t</td>
<td>12,410t</td>
<td>15,512.5t</td>
<td>24,820t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Meat}</td>
<td>227g</td>
<td>82.885kg</td>
<td>1090kg</td>
<td>397.85t</td>
<td>3,314.2t</td>
<td>4,142.75t</td>
<td>6,628.4t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Vegetables}</td>
<td>40 - 50g</td>
<td>14.6 – 192 – 87.6t</td>
<td>240kg</td>
<td>70.1 – 394.2t</td>
<td>730t – 492.75t</td>
<td>912.5t – 788.4t</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Cheese}</td>
<td>27g</td>
<td>9.85kg</td>
<td>130kg</td>
<td>47.45t</td>
<td>394.2t</td>
<td>492.75t</td>
<td>788.4t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Wine}</td>
<td>160g</td>
<td>58.4kg</td>
<td>768kg</td>
<td>280.32t</td>
<td>2,336t</td>
<td>2,920t</td>
<td>4,672t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Table 4: Weight of Rations}

But the needs of the armies did not stop there. The other items needed by armies at war include clothing, armor, weapons, arrows and missiles, cooking gear, medical supplies, writing

\textsuperscript{15} Herz 1992, 45n9. \textit{Legiones I Germanica, II Augusta, V Alaudae, XIII Gemina, XIV Gemina, XVI Gallica, XX Valeria Victrix, XXI Rapax.}

\textsuperscript{16} Webster 1993: \textit{Legiones II, IX, XIV, and XX.}

\textsuperscript{17} Roth 1999, 9-12, 19, 21, 24, 32, 34, 40, 43, 67. For Roth, an average soldier was thirty years old, roughly five feet seven inches tall and weighed one hundred forty-five pounds. This average soldier would have required 3000 calories per day, but it is worth pointing out that his model more than covers the needs of this average soldier, as his model rations comes out to some 3,390 calories. It is important to recognize that due to the scantiness of evidence, the estimates used by Roth and others for the quantities of food, water, wine, etc. rely on models and comparative data, usually from 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century military manuals (Roth 1999, 3).

materials, and tents. Unfortunately, it is not possible to weigh the burdens of supplying many of these objects because we simply do not know the quantities required. But occasionally there are hints. Through experimental archaeology we now know that it takes roughly thirty calf skins to craft a *contubernium*, a tent for eight soldiers, which means that it would have taken roughly 24,000 calf skins, or 60,070 goat skins, to furnish new tents for a single legion of 4,800 men. One can imagine that after creating new units or after military disasters the amount of leather needed to furnish tents, shoes, shield covers, horse and pack animal harnesses, etc. would have been enormous. Additionally, Roman armies were in need of cavalry horses, draft horses, donkeys, mules, and oxen to accompany them on campaigns. These animals consumed vast quantities of fodder if they were maintained by Rome in winter quarters between campaigns.

The Roman state had to acquire these various items for their armies prior to a campaign and it is essential to understand how this was done. First and foremost, it is important to remember that some of the wars of the Julio-Claudian lasted several years and that many of the processes that will be described were carried out on a yearly basis between campaign seasons.

Prior to a campaign, the Roman state utilized several methods to acquire food, animals, and

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19 Roth 1999, 2.
20 Herz 1992, 66-7. The numbers for the skins required for enough tents for a legion are modified from Herz, who estimates that there were twelve to fourteen *contubernia* per legion, and I am operating with the understanding that each century comprised ten *contubernia*. This in turn reduces the number of tents from his estimate of 840-960 tents (28,000 calf skins or 70,080 goat skins) down to around 800 tents (if one accounts for centurions and high officers). On refurnishing armies after disasters, see pages 178-9.
21 This is something that scholarship is still uncertain about, see pages 182-3. On the variability of the number of animals required for campaigns and the amount of food they carried for themselves and soldiers, see Engels 2013, 354-56.
22 The Germanic Wars were waged nearly every year from 12 BCE to 16 CE, and the slow conquest of Britain prior to the Boudican revolt, 43-60 CE, alternated between phases of conquest and consolidation. The Cantabrian Wars lasted five years (26-22 BCE), and was followed up with periodic campaigns to put down rebels. Similarly, the Balkans were affected by local warfare and campaigning in the Alps from around 16 BCE to 11 BCE, with efforts to mop up disparate rebel groups from 10-8 BCE. Some revolts lasted several years, requiring vast quantities of men, animals, and material to restore Roman control: The Great Illyrian revolt lasted from 6-9 CE, Tacfarinas resisted Rome from 17-24 CE, and the First Jewish revolt lasted from 66-73 CE (though only a few strongholds held out after 70 CE). The point here is, though, that one must remember the cumulative effect that long-term warfare had on the populations of the hinterland.
equipment. While foraging (and grazing) was key in supplying the Roman army with fodder, wood, and water, it was rarely used to fully support an army on campaign.\(^{23}\) Plunder, while it was an important aspect of ancient logistics, will be set aside here as it should not have had an impact on the burdens of provincial, and theoretically friendly, populations.\(^{24}\) So first, there were direct taxes, usually in the form of capitation and land taxes.\(^{25}\) With this tax money Rome often acquired provisions through forced purchases or requisitions, whereby goods such as food and draft animals were bought at a set rate. Note, though, that it is uncertain that set rates for goods and animals were even at the market rates, and evidence from Egypt suggests that such purchases in some cases could have been up to thirty-three percent below the market price.\(^{26}\) This is an extremely important point to bear in mind because when forced purchases were used to supply Roman forces (especially at the scale of invasion forces) it meant that large numbers of producers lost out on potential income by selling below the market rate, rather than holding onto their goods to sell at the most profitable time – for example, hoarding grain until there was a local shortage in order to sell at a higher rate. Furthermore, one must remember that these producers would still have taxes to pay for the following year with this lower income, and if wars dragged on it is possible to see how some producers may have been affected by this process of forced purchases and potentially fall into debt. It could very well be that these forced purchases

\(^{23}\) Roth 1999, 117-141 (with examples).

\(^{24}\) Roth 1999, 117, 118, 129. Note that foraging was usually conducted in enemy territory as it was detrimental to the local economy, so it was ill advised to forage in friendly territory (cf. Livy 40.25.4). There are four verbs used in Latin literature to describe foraging based on the item gathered: \textit{lignari} (to gather firewood), \textit{pabulari} (to gather fodder), \textit{aquari} (to gather water), and \textit{frumentari} (to gather grain).


\(^{26}\) Roth 1999, 141; Herz 1992, 54; Breeze 1989, 228-9; Jones 1974b 168; Adams 2007, 141, 152-5. Sometimes wealthy citizens of provincial communities took the entire financial burden of requisitions in a show of munificence (Roth 1999, 143, 155). Such acts of munificence were part and parcel of local elite competition in the same way as elites taking on the burden of taxes for a year or dedicating public buildings, etc. As Jonathan Roth points out, this kind of munificence could be used as symbolic capital in intra communal rivalries: “such contributions to a passing army were a major local event. The city of Smyrna, vying for the honor of a temple, recalled its enthusiastic support for Sulla’s army more than 100 years earlier” (1999, 143). See Florus’ rivalry with Iulius Indus (pages 204, and 230-5), and Cherusci rivalries in the Varian Disaster (269-70) as possible motivational factors for elites to possibly seek alternative means gaining greater power or esteem at the expense of rivals locally.
are the meaning behind the Gallic complaint of the cruelty and arrogance of governors in the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir (Tac. Ann. 3.40- saevitia ac superbia praesidentium).\textsuperscript{27} Surely it fell to the governor or procurator to make the arrangements for requisitions, or such purchases were made under their direction.

Second, Rome could make contracts with companies or communities to fabricate weapons, equipment, etc.\textsuperscript{28} Third, sometimes goods were delivered voluntarily by allied communities and individuals.\textsuperscript{29} Fourth, there is what could be called compulsory delivery of goods to Roman armies, in the form of \textit{ad hoc} impositions made by the governor upon provincial communities. Compulsory delivery was not only the likely way that armies procured camp equipment and kitchen utensils prior to campaigns and when new units were established, but also how Roman forces acquired large quantities of equipment and animals under short notice, such as after disasters or sudden strategic changes.\textsuperscript{30} While the Roman army could produce some of its own weapons and armor, it lacked the capacity to produce enough equipment to furnish full units.

Incidents in Gaul illustrate how compulsory deliveries worked and how it was a heavy burden for those communities affected by them. First, there were two disasters that befell Roman forces in the twelve years leading up to Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt of 21 CE. In 9 CE Rome lost three legions and nine auxiliary units in the Varian Disaster, and then in 15 CE two commanders experienced heavy losses in supplies, equipment, and pack animals while returning to winter

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\textsuperscript{27} Herz 1992, 55. Words such as \textit{saevitia} (cruelty), \textit{cupiditas} (greed), and \textit{libido} (lust) are common complaints levied against Roman agents in Tacitean revolt narratives (Lavan 2017, 27-30).

\textsuperscript{28} Herz 1992, 64.

\textsuperscript{29} Roth 1999, 143, 155.

\textsuperscript{30} Herz 1992, 64, 66; \textit{idem} 2011, 314; Edmonson 2006, 255. As Jonathan Edmonson has pointed out, “in emergencies (cities) had to muster any supplies that the Roman state demanded” (2006, 255). He also shows that in circumstances such as revolts Rome may require the provisioning of grain from the nearest regions outside the war zone, such as the case of Baetica during Aedemon’s revolt in Mauretania at the start of Claudius’ reign (Cass. Dio 60.24.5) Edmonson refers to this as requisitioning, but it is treated here as a compulsory delivery.
quarters: two legions were caught in a gale as they were marching along the North Sea coast, and four legions were ambushed while marching between the Ems and Rhine rivers.31 Second, in an attempt to avoid further losses of essential equipment and transportation, Germanicus decided in the fall of 15 CE to create a 1,000 ship fleet before the next campaign season to transport the army and all its equipment, animals, and food across open waters into Germania (Tac. Ann. 2.5-6). At the same time, the creation of a large fleet necessitated a massive amount of resources and manpower in its own right.32 After each of these incidents and decisions the governor would have taken the needs of the army and divided the burdens among all the civitates of Gaul based on each community’s resources and capabilities, which was known from an ongoing census in Gaul undertaken by Germanicus (Tac. Ann. 2.6).33 Taking first the example of the new fleet, it is quite obvious that not all the communities of the Three Gauls were engaged in the actual shipbuilding. Here one may expect that only those communities along the channel coastline, or at ports along the major rivers, engaged in shipbuilding. The other communities in Gaul, though, were likely called upon to send money, rope, lumber, sails, and men to aid in production and to serve as oarsmen. By way of a second example, when Publius Vitellius’ two legions lost most of their equipment during a gale on their march home in 15 CE (Tac. Ann. 1.70), it would have fallen to Gallic communities to furnish kitchen and camp equipment, as well as the leather to replace the tents. Even if only half of the tents were lost, it would have involved tens of thousands of skins.34 Compulsory deliveries were a service for which Rome may not even have

31 Varian Disaster- see pages 267-82. 15 CE- Tac. Ann. 1.63-70; Herz 1992, 60.
33 Herz 1992, 70-1. Germanicus had started the census in 14 CE, but it was interrupted by Augustus’ death and the subsequent mutinies of the Rhineland armies (Tac. Ann. 1.31). At the latest, census activities resumed in the Fall/Winter of 15/16 CE.
34 See page 176, n20. Worse off, though, were Caecina’s four legions who lost their baggage train while fighting Arminius (Tac. Ann. 1.65). The baggage train would have kept most of their heavy equipment, entrenching tools, spare equipment, material for medical staff and blacksmiths, the main food supply, tents, etc., and would have
paid; not the labor, not the material and resources, and not the delivery of goods. It was truly a heavy burden.

Beyond the acquisition of goods, one should also consider how these items reached the Roman armies, as transportation may at times be an additional burden. There were three standard methods of how these goods were gathered by the army: 1) communities transported requisitioned goods to the army directly; 2) communities hired contractors to transport requisitioned goods; 3) The army gathered requisitioned goods themselves from the communities. It is important to note that for the first two methods the transport of goods was conducted at the communities’ expenses, not Rome’s. Communities of course could utilize land and sea transport systems to bring supplies to the armies, the latter likely being the cheaper option. It is important to remember that road, riverine, and sea transport are not mutually exclusive, and, depending on the region, many routes utilized a combination of transport methods. When communities utilized the road networks in the early period of Roman rule in the northwest provinces, they were transporting goods on a network laid out and designed largely for the movements and supply of provincial garrisons. While the state was involved in building these roads, it was the responsibility of civitates to maintain the roads and provide wagons, pack animals, and drivers for official use through their territories (vehiculatio). The attendant costs required significant refurnishing of a wide array of supplies (Baggage Trains- Roth 1999, 86-88; Goldsworthy 1996, 294-5).

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37 On Gaul see Herz 1992, 47. On Britain see Bishop 2014.
38 Kolb 2000; Edmonson 2006, 255; Herz 1992, 47-8; Adams 2007, 135ff. There was a grim reality for the abuse of the vehiculatio system by soldiers and other Roman agents throughout the course of the empire (Mitchell 1976; Herz 1992, 48). Herz believes that while the obligation was imposed ‘on a civitas as a whole’, each civitas probably relied on their local elites to provide/pay for the manpower, animals, and wagons of the vehiculatio -- as they were probably the only ones who had the carriages or animals (1992, 50).
of this system were surely dependent not only on the size of a civitas’ territory, but also on the geographic proximity of the civitas to the main routes to the legions. By way of an example, the Treveri held a large territory along the principal route to the Rhineland armies from Lugdunum (see map on page 202). Peter Herz presented a potential burden for the tribe by using an inscription of the Tiberian period from Sagalassos (Mitchell 1976), namely the numbers of carriages and mules and applying it to the number of stations within Treveran territory. There were at least ten stations in their territory, and if there were ten carriages and mules per station, the tribe would have had to provide at least a total of 100 wagons and mules at all times for the vehiculatio service. As Peter Herz reminds us, his calculation for this burden only applies to normal peacetime operations and the costs would have surely been heavier during times of war when provisions were being delivered to armies in large quantities. But as those quantities would have varied by the circumstances of their levying, one simply cannot estimate the transportation costs incurred by communities in times of war. And therefore, such an estimate would merely serve as a baseline of the burden.

Supplying the Roman army impacted provincial communities more deeply than it would seem at a glance. The agricultural impact of providing grain and draft animals to Roman armies in this period appears absurdly minimal, but estimates of quantities consumed against population sizes or total land masses of provinces underrepresent the total impact (see page 173). To illustrate this, long before Nardis’ estimate that provincial armies only required a .5-5% increase in production from their provinces to feed them, R.W. Davies had estimated that 106,000 acres

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40 Herz 1992, 48-9. He assumes that the number is too low for Augusta Treverorum itself. Herz also pointed out that if the Treveri provided horses for wagons the number of animals would have been 400 or 600 depending on whether they used four or six horse wagons.
worth of grain was required to feed the armies of Britain for a year.\textsuperscript{41} If Davies was right that an acre yielded roughly seven to ten bushels of grain, it means that it would have taken seventy acres a week to support a legion of 4,800 men. Davies’ calculations may be applied to Beloch’s land mass estimates for the provinces of Gallia Lugdunensis and Gallia Belgica,\textsuperscript{42} and Illyricum, to estimate the impact of feeding the armies of the other two regions under study. The 80,000 men of the Rhineland armies required the grain yield of 1,120 acres per week. That is 54,250 acres worth of grain per year. While that number appears great, it only represents 219.5 sq. km. a year from the 275,000 sq. km. that made up these two Gallic provinces.\textsuperscript{43} For Illyricum, the 50,000 men garrisoned there would have required the grain yield of 700 acres per week and 36,400 acres (147 sq. km.) per year against a land mass of 140,000 sq. km.\textsuperscript{44} The cost of feeding these armies then would seem miniscule.

Estimates such as this though are illusory. First, not all land was suitable for growing grain, such as rocky or marshy lands,\textsuperscript{45} nor was all suitable land utilized for growing grain. Second, estimates like this do not account for the fodder and grazing needs of cavalry horse or draft animals between campaign seasons.\textsuperscript{46} These animals would have required substantial amounts of land for grazing. For every 10,000 animals on campaign it would have taken 1 sq.

\textsuperscript{41} Davies 1971, 137 n104; Kehne 2007, 326. Note that Davies did not directly provide an estimate for the size of the Roman armies in Britain, nor what period he was referring to, so it is probable that his estimates for the size of forces in Britain are larger than those utilized here (perhaps for the 2nd century army in Britain). It is important to bear in mind that the estimates here are approximates, namely that the sizes of provincial armies are merely doubled.

\textsuperscript{42} For what follows, the seed/grain ratio is assumed to have been 3:1 or 4:1 at best. In the case of the Rhineland armies, it is assumed here that these two provinces were responsible for most of the grain needs of the Rhineland armies by virtue of their location, and because only communities from Gallia Lugdunensis and Gallia Belgica were involved in Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt. Despite its age, Beloch’s work was chosen here because he created population and surface area estimates for each province in a given region (such as Gaul or Illyricum), and that his estimates are for 14 CE rather than for the Antonine period. This alone provided the opportunity to create the estimates for the burdens placed on local populations by Rome’s armies.

\textsuperscript{43} Beloch 1886, 460.

\textsuperscript{44} Beloch 1886, 463.

\textsuperscript{45} One may get a sense of these issues and the ways that Romans thought about uncultivatable land by looking at the cadaster of Arausio or the Roman gromatic texts (on the latter, see Campbell 2000).

\textsuperscript{46} See table in Roth for the daily fodder and forage requirements of donkeys, mules, “pack-animals”, horses, and oxen (1999, 66-7).
km. per day to feed them. While this would not have had a significant impact on its own, the very removal of draft animals from local populations to serve the Roman armies would significantly have impacted the production capabilities of individual farmers. This was a world where most people lived at subsistence level, where farmers had little surplus production, and most of that surplus was consumed by taxes.\textsuperscript{47} So, when Rome removed draft animals from farmers it ultimately affected farmers’ abilities to pay taxes year to year, let alone support themselves. When considering the variability of production year to year because of weather it is easy to see that some, especially poorer provincials could fall behind and go into debt under such conditions.\textsuperscript{48} In other words, just because the burden of supplying the Roman armies appears miniscule at a global or provincial level, it does not mean that the impact was miniscule for those provincials who had to supply Rome’s armies. To be entirely clear, Roman armies had no issues in getting the resources they needed, they would eventually get it from somewhere. Rather, the issue was whether provincials could afford to give up their resources continually for the duration of long wars, such as those in Britain or across the Rhine in the Julio-Claudian period?

Third, any estimate against total populations or land masses of provinces does not account for the fact that the distribution of the burden would have been uneven. Not only did the proximity of communities to the garrisoning armies and the major nodes of transportation to supply them make the burdens uneven, but so did the relationship status of communities with Rome. Rome tended to requisition as much grain and animals as it feasibly could in the vicinity of Rome’s operational bases.\textsuperscript{49} What this should mean is that the communities closer to the war front were more heavily impacted than both those communities who were further away and those

\textsuperscript{47} Hopkins 1980, 104.  
\textsuperscript{48} Jones 1974b, 174. The tax assessment was fixed, meaning that it did not vary with the harvest yields, which could widely fluctuate year to year.  
\textsuperscript{49} Roth 1999.
that were not along the major transportation routes (see Maps of Illyricum [242, 245, and 257], Gaul [202], and Britain [296]). Among those tribes closest to the operational bases along the Rhine (Vetera, Nijmegen, Vechten, Mainz, and Rödgen), three tribes involved in Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt of 21 CE were along these major transportation routes: the Treveri, Sequani, and Aedui. In Illyricum, it was the coastal communities along the Adriatic and those along the major river valleys that were likely the heaviest impacted by Roman impositions. Along the coast this would include Liburnia, the Iapudes, and the Delmatae. During the Pannonian War, tribes south of the Sava River such as the Breuci, Maezaei, and Daesitiates were also impacted by the supply needs of Roman forces as they operated between the Sava and Drava rivers. In Britain, Rome’s operational bases were spread out across the island and shifted as Rome expanded its control prior to 60 CE.51

Shifting away from estimates, there are other important factors in understanding the economic impact. The ability to requisition items was entirely limited by the local availability of supply, and this could change over the course of a war. For instance, by 16 CE the Gallic horse supply for the Rhineland armies was exhausted, and the events of 15 CE necessitated an expansion of the supply network for 16 CE (Tac. Ann. 1.71).52 Likewise, even if Rome could

50 Rödgen as an operational base (Roth 1999, 177). The Gallic tribes most likely to have been heavily impacted by these campaigns were the Ubii, Tungrri, Treveri, Nervii, Mediomatrici, Menapii, Leuci, Lingones, Remi, Aedui, and Sequani. Peter Herz supposes that the burden was especially heavy for the Treveri due to their location for transportation of goods to operational bases by water (Herz 1992; Roth 1999, 193-4, 196). On the road network of the region see: Drinkwater 1983, Mertens 1983, Chevallier 1997. On the riverine networks of Gaul: see Campbell 2012, 226-238. Many of the ‘urban’ foundations of this region belong to the Augustan era and several may have been founded to support logistical efforts (Mertens 1983, esp. 162-4).
51 On the shifting nature of supply burdens, one may look to shifting theaters of wars, which would imply changes in which communities were most impacted (cf. pages 298-301, and 314-5; Hassall 2000, with references).
52 Roth 1999, 135; Goldsworthy 1996, 294. Provisions were required from Gaul, Spain, and Italy, or rather offered by communities in each region. The local circumstances in Aedemon’s revolt meant that Rome could not rely on local supplies for their campaigns and had to impose supply deliveries from Baetica (see note 30 above). The volume of food in a frontier region hosting a Roman army would have been reduced by the consumption of local populations and military forces (Roth 1999, 137). It is under situations such as this that could force Rome to seek supplies from further abroad to guarantee adequate support.
utilize census information to assess local resources (see pages 101-7, and 191).\textsuperscript{53} the potential for crop yields to heavily fluctuate from year to year in any given region could have a tremendous impact on the state’s logistical planning; some years it could be easy to obtain local surpluses and in others there could be little to no surplus available.\textsuperscript{54} In those years with little to no surplus Rome would have to reach further to acquire its supplies for these frontier armies. Furthermore, warfare could have a long-term impact on agriculture. War disrupted regions as it removed workers through conscription and pressed civilians into service as drivers, porters, and even as oarsmen. The removal of men and draft animals adversely affected local planting and the harvesting of crops.\textsuperscript{55} If wars dragged on, iterant conscription and requisitioning exacerbated this situation,\textsuperscript{56} especially if Roman armies met with disaster during their wars. Such disasters would have necessitated massive efforts to refurbish and refill the ranks.\textsuperscript{57} Again, this would have a very detrimental short-term effect on populations impacted by these measures.

Beyond the agricultural impact, one must also account for the burden of producing and transporting weapons, armor, ships, and equipment. These items were not always paid for, but when Rome did pay for the services, it was not necessarily at full value. Simply put, the burden was heavier in wartime than in times of peace. Rome did not maintain its numbers during peacetime,\textsuperscript{58} and could in fact disperse vexillations (or detachments) not only within its province, but throughout the Roman world. Furthermore, one would expect that in peacetime fewer major items would be lost or need replacing, and many of the repairs could have been done in house by

\textsuperscript{53} Roth 1999, 135; Herz 1992, 69
\textsuperscript{54} Hopkins 1980, 103; Jones 1974b, 174. For granaries and the organizational capabilities of the Roman state in accessing surpluses, even if they were not in the area of the armies, see Thomas and Stallibrass 2008, 6.
\textsuperscript{55} Cf. Herz 1992, 54; Roth 1999, 145; Thomas and Stallibrass 2008, 5.
\textsuperscript{56} Roth 1999, 139. On animals perishing through disease, over-use, or poor treatment over course of war see, Goldsworthy 1996, 294.
\textsuperscript{57} Herz 1992. See 60ff., esp. 60-1 and 69-73, for an illuminating discussion of Germanicus’ pitfalls in 15 CE, the re-equipping of his forces in the aftermath, and the creation of a 1,000 ship fleet in 16 CE possibly as a response to the heavy losses of 15 CE.
\textsuperscript{58} Bang 2013, 420-2.
specialists in the camps.\textsuperscript{59} In preparation for new wars and during active warfare, armies had to constantly replenish their numbers, and replace broken or lost items in large quantities.\textsuperscript{60} While forces were typically dispersed across provincial landscapes in times of peace, in wartime there would often be an increased concentration of units in the region as well as an increased need for animals for the baggage trains and supply lines. In short, while it is not possible to truly quantify provisioning the Roman army in a time of war, one may understand that the impact of provisioning the Roman army could actually be great for those provincials living close to a war front.

\textbf{Conscription}

The core argument of this section is that while Roman \textit{auxilia} levying was conducted at sustainable levels, the removal of young men from their local and familial contexts could adversely impact local production capabilities and could strain communal relationships with Rome. For the latter, this sort of strain created the conditions for communal revolts especially in the fragile first decades after conquest. Here sustainability means that Roman conscription efforts did not have a negative impact on Rome’s ability to habitually levy units from the same peoples over time. For this to happen, a levy of 500 men, roughly the equivalent of an \textit{auxilia} cohort, would require a local population of at least 12,500 people.\textsuperscript{61} This is not to state that Rome was concerned with recruiting at sustainable levels, but rather that Rome could only fiscally

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{59} Herz 1992, 63.
\textsuperscript{60} Cf. Herz 2007, 314.
\textsuperscript{61} Spaul 2000, 500. Spaul arrives at this population requirement by using census information from mid-19th century English villages and the average recruitment age for Roman \textit{auxilia} soldiers. He goes on to suggest that “the effect of reducing the male population between the ages of 16 and 25 by more than one half would be that the adult population could not achieve the regeneration rate needed for a stable population. Successive levies on the same scale would be impossible within a period possibly as long as fifty years. Sensible administration would not therefore require a large levy to be made as it would produce fewer recruits than smaller levies held more frequently.”
\end{flushright}
afford to maintain a certain sized military, thus coincidentally limiting the impact that recruitment could have on a province. While conscription was conducted at a sustainable level on the provincial level, it does not mean, however, that the impact of conscription was not perceived as heavy at the tribal or familial levels.

Before embarking on the analysis of this impact there is a significant caveat that one should bear in mind throughout this section, namely that the ability to quantify the number of people conscripted in the Julio-Claudian period, especially prior to Claudius, is severely limited due to the nature of the evidence. Therefore, the estimates provided herein should be regarded as minimums. The focus of this endeavor is on units raised in the periods prior to revolts in Illyricum (6-9 CE), Gaul (21 CE), Thrace (26 CE), and Britain (c. 60 CE). These revolts are at least partially linked to conscription as an issue leading these populations to revolt. Pre-existing units are not studied here because the ability to trace the replenishment of such units is severely limited, especially in this period. Moreover, it is known that Rome often raised new units in preparation for new wars either to serve in the campaigns or to replace units transferred to the war theater. As there seems to be a connection between “anti-fiscal revolts” and recent or ongoing warfare in neighboring regions it makes sense to focus on those units possibly raised prior to the revolts to gauge how much of a burden conscription could be for certain communities.

63 At a glance, the limitations to the evidence include: limits in knowledge of how many auxilia units there were, when they were created, and where they served; difficulties in estimating the size of populations, not just for the empire in this period, but for individual provinces and communities as well; and within many of these units one cannot know the tribal affiliations of all soldiers nor how many from each tribe served in each unit at a given time.
64 Haynes 2001, 63. D.B. Saddington, for example, persuasively argued that auxilia units were not created immediately after conquest in an act of ‘forced removal of young men’, but rather that units were created for specific purposes or events, namely new wars (1982, 167-8). It should be noted, though, that from Rome’s perspective, recruitment could be utilized to strip a recently pacified region of elements potentially threatening to Rome’s nascent control over the region (Isaac 1992, 59; Mattingly 2006, 92, 167-8; Haynes 2013, 120).
Though conscription aided Rome in securing and expanding its empire, there was always a risk for provincial resistance to break out over the act. Dalmatian recruits meant to support the war against Maroboduus in 6 CE initiated a revolt that would last three years (Cass. Dio 55.29). Further down the Danubian region, Thracians rebelled in 26 CE under the rumor that their recruits would be sent further abroad, and that they would cease to be led by their fellow tribesmen; i.e. that they would be incorporated as regular auxilia units (Tac. Ann. 4.46). During the Year of Four Emperors, Tacitus alleges that abuses in the conduct of a dilectus were one of the causes of Civilis’ revolt in 69 CE (Tac. Hist. 4.14). Meanwhile in Britain, resentment over conscription is given by Tacitus in the Agricola as one of the causes for people joining Boudica’s revolt (Agr. 15), and for the desertion of a cohors of Usipi (Agr. 28).

Across these revolts several interwoven issues play a role in their outbreak. Abuses by Roman agents could spark outbreaks of conscription resistance (Tac. Agr. 13; Hist. 4.14), but underlying tensions and grievances were required for large-scale violent resistance to occur (pages 17-21). Opportunism, however, was a major factor in communal revolts against conscription. In fact, Rome’s being distracted by wars, and civil wars, in neighboring regions encouraged people to resist conscription.66 Ongoing civil wars had left the Rhineland garrison in a weakened state and Civilis utilized the furor over the abuses in a recent Roman levy to encourage people to rise up. In Illyricum, an opportunity presented itself to Dalmatian forces raised to fight Maroboduus, because they outnumbered the provincial garrison as Tiberius had already led out most of the garrison to Carnuntum to the north (Vell. Pat. 2.109-110; Cass. Dio

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65 Roman agents selected old and infirm men in the hopes of receiving bribes from the locals to have them discharged, and beautiful boys were taken away for sexual pleasures. We should be weary, however, that Tacitus’ description of youths being taken for sexual pleasures may be a trope.
66 Cf. Haynes 2013, 46-7. Civilis: “Never has the Roman state been in direr straits than now, and there is nothing in their winter camps but booty and old men. Simply lift your eyes and do not fear the empty name of legions” (Tac. Hist. 4.14.4- Clifford Moore trans.), Vell. Pat. 2.109-110; Cass. Dio 55.29.1. Cf. Tac. Agr. 15 on Britons dwelling on their numerical strength over the limited garrison size in Britain prior to the Boudican revolt.
The reported meeting between Bato of the Daesitiates and Tiberius, however, suggests that the revolt was not just opportunistic, but that the provincials had qualms with how Imperial representatives conducted their affairs, which could very well have included the *dilectus* in the lead up to the war.\(^67\)

Perhaps the most striking issues, though found only in the Tacitean corpora, are the interrelated issues of familial separation, service far from home, and local elites concerned about their ability to continue leading their units. In the works of Tacitus conscription is portrayed as being equated to death (Tac. *Hist.* 4.14.4), likely because of the length of the service term and the very real fear among provincials that their kin were going to be sent far from home to serve Roman interests (Tac. *Agr.* 15, 31; *Ann.* 4.46).\(^68\) In the case of the Thracian revolt, the mere rumor that Thracians were to serve far from home was one of the principal causes of the revolt according to Tacitus (*Ann.* 4.46). Scholars such as P.A. Brunt have endorsed Tacitus’ claims, namely that up until 26 CE Thracians served under their own leaders and in the region around Thrace. After the revolt, Thracian units appear all over the Roman world under Roman officers.\(^69\) But, if this is the case, then why were there not more communal acts of resistance to this practice? In other words, was the fear of separation really a cause of revolt at a communal level, or was it just a trope? There is some evidence that Thracian units were already serving abroad prior to 26 CE.\(^70\) In fact, of all the regions studied here, only the Gauls show a significant amount

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\(^67\) Cass. Dio 56.16.3: “Finally, upon being asked by Tiberius why his people had taken it into their heads to revolt and to war against the Romans so long, he replied: ‘You Romans are to blame for this; for you send as guardians of your flocks, not dogs or shepherds, but wolves.’” (Earnest Cary trans).

\(^68\) Saddington 1982, 86; Brunt 1990b, 205. Civilis in a speech equates conscription to death. Among the complaints levied against Roman rule in the famous speech of Calgacus, he bemoans that families’ children and kin, “every man’s dearest objects, were being stripped away to serve elsewhere.”

\(^69\) Brunt 1990b, 205.

\(^70\) Presumably, the four units bearing the epithet Augusta were levied in the Augustan era: Ala I Augusta Thracum, Ala II Thracum Augusta, Ala III Augusta Thracum, and Cohors I Augusta Thracum equitata (Acts: 27.1). But one should note that there is no guarantee that the epithets were awarded in the Augustan era (cf. Spaul 1994, 229). There are a further two units that may have been raised prior to the revolt: Cohors I Thracum (*CIL* 13.7803
of evidence for units serving close to their home provinces; while many units served along the Rhine frontier, several others served in Hispania, Illyricum, Sardinia, Egypt, Africa, and Moesia.\textsuperscript{71}

Based on the epigraphic evidence, Tacitus’ claims for separation, or rather service abroad, as a principal cause of conscription revolts falters.\textsuperscript{72} Rather, the issue may be much more about leadership roles over these units, especially in the Thracian and Batavian revolts. Rome’s system of recruitment encountered less resistance or disruption to local practices when it operated within existing local structures (such as warrior bands) to raise men needed for campaigns. Conscription into regular auxilia units, on the other hand, could breed resentment, which on its own lacked the web of circumstances for full-scale revolts to break out.\textsuperscript{73} Provincial elites, as well as elites in client kingdoms, could fear that service in fully incorporated auxilia units would disrupt local patterns of power and control. In the case of the Thracian revolt, it is noteworthy to point out that the practice of naming units after commanders was a uniquely early phenomenon that seems to have ended right around the mid 20s CE.\textsuperscript{74} One could feasibly suggest that if a decision was being made to create permanent names for units, rather than units being named after their current commanders, then other formalization steps were potentially also being undertaken, such as incorporating local contingents into fully fledged auxilia units led by Roman citizens. If tribal chiefs and other nobles had previously led contingents of their fellow tribesmen

\textsuperscript{71} On Gallic units, see Appendix 3. By my count fifteen Gallic units appear to have served in Gallia/Germania and six in Hispania. The few Illyrian and British units appear to have served outside their home region, only one Pannonian unit served in Pannonia prior to the Great Illyrian revolt (see pages 252-5 and 315-7). Literary evidence used by some authors to suggest the existence of units in Britain serving locally at least initially could feasibly be pointing to the existence of irregular units as much as it could be referring to professional auxilia ranks (see pages 315-7).

\textsuperscript{72} Saddington 1982, 85-6.


\textsuperscript{74} Birley 1978, 262-273; Holder 1980, 21; Haynes 2013, 38-9; Spaul 1994, 218 (with references).
one may infer that they feared losing their local and regional prestige if they were replaced by Roman equites at the helm of *auxilia* units (cf. Tac. *Ann.* 4.46). Martial prowess was a major form of pre-Roman elite competition in many of these tribal societies and leading *auxilia* units was one of the few means of continuing this tradition post-conquest or annexation. The real or perceived threat to this access to this source of social prestige could have been a driving factor behind provincial elites participating in or leading revolts.

**The Operation of Conscription**

As argued in the previous chapter, Rome could assess the human and material resources of a region prior to the start of major military campaigns, such as the censuses of Drusus in 12 BCE and Germanicus in 14 CE at the start of major invasion efforts beyond the Rhine. The information collected from these census efforts allowed Rome: to take into account the obligations of individual communities towards Rome; to assess the capabilities of individual communities to support war efforts; and to determine the (tax, *auxilia* quotas, and/or military supply) burdens for each community in the lead up to campaigns. This process may be seen best in the movement of units, whether new units or those transferred from elsewhere, and supplies moving from the greater region towards the war front. Even in regions where recruitment was utilized but there is no evidence of a Rome census prior to revolts, such as Illyricum (6-9 CE), Thrace (26 CE), and Britain (60 CE), Rome could use systems similar to Roman provincial taxation practices of the Republican era. It was rare for the terms set for subjugated peoples or

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75 Haynes 2001, 71; *idem* 2011, 7; cf. *idem* 2013, 97. See, Millet 2005, 54 for what was at stake for indigenous leaders.
78 Or rather a continuation of Republican era practices. See, pages 93-5 on pre-provincial census taxation, and Speidel (2016) for how Rome maintained lists of what it believed its allies and subject populations could contribute, presumably derived from local knowledge.
allies to include fixed numbers for supporting Rome in wars. Rather, more often the treaty terms simply indicated that communities had to aid Rome in war. In practice, Roman magistrates would inform these sorts of communities before the campaign season of how many soldiers were required from them. The quota was likely determined by educated estimations of a given community’s manpower. It is also possible that Rome used local resources to determine obligations for a campaign season.

While one could always volunteer for auxilia service, conscription was likely the most common form of acquiring recruits in this period. If conscription was the common form of recruitment, then the obligation to provide recruits for auxilia units surely derives from how each community came under Roman control, oftentimes via asymmetrical treaties with Rome or via defeat in war and a subsequent agreement to obey Roman commands. It is possible that when governors conducted levies under the authority of the emperor that there was a form of selective conscription utilized where communities had to supply quotas of fit men within an optimum range of 16-25 years old. For the communities subjected to levies, the burden of conscription

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79 Speidel 2016, 86. Speidel includes a rare example of this practice, namely of King Attalos I from 200 BCE (Livy 31.46.3).
80 For example, MS 2070= AE 2005, 1487 from 46 BCE between Rome and the Lycian koinon stated that “if anyone initiates a war with the Roman people or with their subjects or also with their allies, let the commune of the Lycians help the Roman people by all possible means” (Mitchell 2005, 169-170). For the historical context of the treaty see Mitchell 2005, 231-5.
81 Speidel 2016, 87 with Republican examples.
82 Haynes 2001, 65; idem 2013, 134; Brunt 1990b, 188. Haynes notes that substitutes may also be provided for those conscripted (2013, 99-100, 134). In this period, volunteers certainly did exist, just not in enough quantity to avoid conscription. Volunteering slowly grew into the major form of recruitment only by the end of the 2nd century CE. Saddington, 1982, 140; Ivleva, 2016, 165. Cf. Haynes 2001, 64.
83 Brunt 1974; idem 1990b, 191. On the optimum age grouping see also Holder, 1980 table 8.15. It is important to note that in emergency levies this selectiveness would not exist (for instance see the emergency levies held by Augustus during the Great Illyrian revolt and after the Varian Disaster: Suet. Aug. 25.2; Vell. Pat. 2.111; Cass. Dio 56.23.2-3; Plin. NH. 7.149; Spaul 2000, 50 n1 (CIL 14.2954; PME I 114); Swan 2004, 204-5, 270-2).
likely fell unevenly between rural and urban populations, just as in a pattern already attested for legionaries.\textsuperscript{85}

Just as the burden of supplies for the Roman frontier armies broadly radiated out from the campaign zone, the impact of auxilia recruitment was likely heaviest in the regions immediately bordering on campaign zones, as Rome was inclined to utilize resources from the nearest source as much as possible.\textsuperscript{86} To state it differently, while warfare had an impact far and wide from its epicenter, recruitment would have a greater impact on a population the closer a community was towards a war front. The implications are that preparations for new wars, including but not limited to getting existing units up to strength and creating new units, could strain the local manpower of the regions involved. Under such conditions Rome could be forced to recruit further abroad to the nearest available source in order to obtain the full complement of fresh recruits.\textsuperscript{87} But what this means for those communities near a theater of war is that the agrarian population was both affected most by recruitment into the auxilia and were hit the hardest by the wartime supply needs of Roman forces; a doubling of burdens as it were. As stated earlier, the impact of recruitment on a provincial population alone was typically not a terrible burden.

\textsuperscript{85} Brunt 1990b, 212 with references; Herz 2007, 308; Haynes 2013, 100; Ivleva 2016, 159. Despite the literary topos, on which see Haynes (2013, 100), Vegetius’ description of where recruits come from seems to balance well with what is known from epigraphic evidence. Vegetius follows a long line of ancient authors in holding up rustic, rural virtues over the luxury of urban dwelling, but uses it to state a preference for rural recruits over urban ones. He even follows this up with what must be done to make an urban recruit adequate: “they have to first thoroughly learn how to work, to train (in the sense of marching and maneuvers), to carry a burden and endure heat and dust; they have to accept a moderate, rural way of life, and to camp now under the sky, and now under tents” (primum laborare, decurrere, portare pondus et solem pulueremque ferre condiscant, parco uictu utantur et rustico, interdum sub diuo interdum sub papilionibus commerentur – Veg. 1.3). It is only after this that Vegetius believes that urban recruits may be trained how to use arms.

\textsuperscript{86} Haynes 2001, 66, 67; idem 2013, 134. It must be noted though, that the nearest available source of recruits may at times be far removed from where troops were needed (see further, Haynes 2013, 134). Haynes notes that there is some evidence to suggest “that a disproportionately high number of recruits did come from areas closer to where regiments were based” (Haynes 2001, 67). While this is surely true of existing units, there is little reason to doubt that similar practices were in place for the creation of auxilia units.

\textsuperscript{87} Holder 1980, 121-2; Haynes 2001, 66; idem 2013, 134. Recruitment was heaviest in the lead up to fresh wars or over the course of ongoing wars, as the number of units and the number of members in their ranks were often kept at minimums during times of peace due to the costs of maintaining Rome’s military (Bang 2013, 420-422).
Rather, the age of the men taken away, the duration of their service, and the likelihood that recruits were from rural farming families surely had a greater impact upon individual households and communities to not only sustain themselves but to also afford short-term future imperial exactions.

The Impact of Conscription

To date there have been a few scholarly attempts at estimating the impact that auxilia conscription had on a population, whether it was a tribal, regional, or imperial population. At the imperial level, I.P. Haynes suggests that it would not have been difficult even at lower population estimates for the empire, such as 50 million people, to provide 10,500 fresh recruits yearly to maintain the 215,000-man auxilia forces serving in the first two centuries CE.\textsuperscript{88} The problem is, however, that the burden of recruitment and service was not distributed equally across the empire. In the Julio-Claudian period regions such as Spain, Gaul, Pannonia (after 9 CE), and Thrace (especially after 26 CE) experienced higher level of recruitment than others. These four areas alone accounted for more than half of all auxilia recruits in this period.\textsuperscript{89} It is pertinent to point out that all of these areas of high recruitment levels, except for the Spanish provinces, revolted over issues of recruitment or heavy burdens more broadly. This trend highlights perfectly the notion that the distribution of the burden was unequal across space and

\textsuperscript{88} Haynes 2001, 63. The recruits would be replacing those who died in service and those who were honorably discharged from service.

\textsuperscript{89} Cheesman 1914; Saddington 2005, 64; Haynes 2013, 105. A simple calculation of the table, recruitment location of alae and cohortes prior to 70 CE, in Cheesman reveals that roughly sixty percent of known alae and cohortes in the Julio-Claudian period that were known in 1914 were raised across these four areas. Granted that there have been new alae and cohortes discovered since then, it does not really affect the fact that these were the most important sources of auxilia recruitment in this period.
time. But, even within a region that experienced high levels of recruitment there was an imbalance wherein some populations experienced significant burdens of recruitment while others may have not experienced conscription at all. An extreme example of this is the Batavii, who would go on to revolt in part as a reaction to conscription in the turbulent period of civil war after Nero’s death. As Saskia Roselaar has recently argued, the nine Batavian units mentioned in the works of Tacitus numbered around five or six thousand men out of an estimated overall population of thirty to forty thousand people in the tribe. If the adult male population was eight thousand, then this means that 75% of the adult male population were serving in auxilia units at any given time.

These varied experiences within provinces may reveal how certain communities perceived themselves as being overburdened, while others did not. Furthermore, these various recruitment experiences may partially explain why mass resistance to recruitment could exist in the Roman world despite how low auxilia numbers were in relation to regional population sizes. To illustrate this point, a rough estimate may be presented for what the burden levels of auxilia recruitment were for the two provinces involved in Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt of 21 CE, namely Gallia Lugdunensis and Gallia Belgica. Of the four regions surveyed in this study (Gaul-21 CE, Illyricum-10 BCE and 6-9 CE, Thrace-26 CE, and Britain- c.60 CE) it is Gaul that yields the most evidence to estimate the relationship between conscription and resistance to Roman authority. The rough estimate is made by comparing attested auxilia units from the

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90 Rossignol 2009, 99-100; Haynes 2001, 63; idem 2013, 134. Areas of high recruitment would shift over the course of the Principate. For I.P. Haynes, communities in under urbanized areas of provinces or those that could only marginally contribute agriculturally or industrially often contributed to the empire with human resources instead.

91 Roselaar 2016, 151; cf. Haynes 2001, 69-71; idem 2013, 112. To further the case, Roselaar presents evidence of Batavians serving in non-Batavian auxilia units as well as legionary forces. Additionally, Roselaar points out this level of recruitment was not sustainable in the long-term if half of the men serving did not live long enough to complete their service requirements and return home. In light of this she suggests that it was possible in the case of examples such as the Batavians that neighboring peoples would eventually have to been admitted into such units.
region with Karl Julius Beloch’s population estimates for these two provinces in 14 CE, and then combining this data with Coale and Demeny’s Model West Life Table 3. Due to the incomplete nature of the evidence this estimate should represent a minimum level of impact that conscription had on these communities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late Republic to Early Augustan C. 50 BCE – 15 BCE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ala II Gallorum (Lug.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 BCE – 9 CE</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cohors XI Gallorum (Lug.), Ala Longiniana (Lug.), Ala I Cannanefatum (Bel.), Ala Pansiana (Bel.), Ala Gallorum Sebosiana (Lug.), Cohors I Sugambrorum veterana (Bel.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Augustan to Early Tiberian 9 CE – 21 CE</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Cohors III Gallorum felix equitata (Lug.), Cohors IIII Gallorum equitata (Lug.), Ala I (Gallorum) Petriana/Pomponiani (Bel.), Ala Antiana (Lug.), Ala I Capitontiana (Lug.), Cohors I Ubiorum equitata (Bel.), Ala Indiana (Bel.), Ala I Praetoria (Bel.), Cohors I Septimia Belgarum (Bel.), Ala Augusta Germaniciana (Bel.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian of Uncertain Date</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Cohors I Lepidiana equitata, Ala Augusta Gallorum Proculeiana (Bel.), Ala Classiana (Lug.), Ala Augusta Gallorum (Bel.), Ala Rusonis (Lug.?), Ala Tungrorum (Bel.), Ala Frontoniana (Bel.), Ala Treverorum (Bel.), Cohors IIII Gallorum equitata civium Romanorum (Lug.), Ala Tauriana (Lug.), Ala Agrippiana (Bel.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Units Raised in Gallia Comata in the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius

Table 5 above represents only those Gallic units that were almost certainly raised in this period. Attempts have been made to situate the raising of these units in time, as having occurred in support of certain wars, by drawing on both literary and epigraphic evidence in order to trace burden levels and to contextualize the reasons for units coming into existence. Note,

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92 Beloch 1886, 460; Coale and Demeny 1983. Both of these resources were chosen because they have been frequently used by ancient historians in the past. On the use of these models and their limitations see Frier 2000, 788-9; Lo Cascio 1994, 36-7. The Gallic evidence may be the most complete, though this does not mean that the evidence is not fragmentary in its own right. The literary and epigraphic evidence for the other provinces studied here are simply not sufficient enough to estimate the impact that conscription had on their communities. Attested units for these regions may be found in appendix 3.

93 On these units see further Appendix 3.
however, that much of the pre-Claudian evidence for *auxilia* units relies on inscriptions lacking precise dating formulae, thus making it impossible to verify when individual units came into being. What this table shows is that there were at least twenty-eight *auxilia* units known to have been raised from Gallia Lugdunensis and Gallia Belgica in the Augustan and Tiberian periods prior to the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir. If the average *auxilia* unit had a notional strength of 480 men and an equitate unit had 600, then the minimum number of men recruited in the initial levies of these twenty-eight units would have been 14,040 men. By taking Beloch’s population estimates for these two provinces and removing the slave and free female populations from it, a conservative estimate of 15% for the former and 50% for the latter, there would be 956,250 free men. A population distribution chart can then be made by taking this figure and applying it to Coale-Demeny’s model west level 3, with a growth rate of zero, to see how much of the male population of these two provinces were at the optimum recruit ages for the *auxilia*, and that

*Figure 6: Gallic Age Distribution Model West Level 3*
number is 173,655. The results of this estimate suggest that at least 1-in-every-12 men from the age group 16-25 were conscripted into the *auxilia* in initial levies.

What this estimate clearly shows is that the minimum burden levels across these two provinces were sustainable. Unfortunately, without readily available population estimates for the five tribes involved in the revolt (Turonii, Andecavi, Treveri, Aedui, and Sequani) and more detail on how many men from these tribes served in specific units in this period, this is simply as far as the current evidence can take us. But, the example of the Batavians, who reveal at one extreme a real discrepancy in conscription burden levels, shows that recruitment into the *auxilia* was not evenly distributed across the Gallic provinces. In other words, even if conscription was sustainable at a provincial level, it is entirely plausible that some of these tribes could have faced significantly higher conscription levels than other communities within their provinces. Returning to the Gallic units created before 21 CE, there are hints that tribes like the Treveri experienced significant amounts of conscription, with nearly a quarter of the known units having Treveri serving in them, and this is with some very patchy epigraphic evidence.

Equally important are a series of key points and caveats to the sort of estimate presented here. It must be emphasized again that these calculations merely represent the *minimum* number of Gauls conscripted into service in this period. The calculation only represents the number of men conscripted when the unit was created; it does not include recruits who replaced those who finished their twenty-five-year service terms nor those who died serving, both of which impact

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94 Note that there is a slight discrepancy between the Coale-Demeny model life table age ranges and the optimum recruitment age range for the Roman *auxilia*.

local demographics. Recalling that many of these units under study served in theaters of active warfare, the number of replacements could be far greater than the estimated 5% attrition rate for times of peace. Furthermore, it is important to remember the length of the auxilia service term. Once these young men were recruited, they were essentially permanently removed from their households, thus negatively impacting their families’ labor production capabilities. Furthermore, impacted households may also have been expected to provide a range of goods and services to the Roman armies on top of routine exactions, despite their having fewer members in consequence of recruitment. All of this would have increased the real and perceived weight of burdens for provincials and may have caused provincials at various income levels to seek loans to avoid falling behind. A range of actors could have benefited from providing such loans: local elites, Roman businessmen and senators, and even Roman soldiers and veterans. This sort of scenario may in part explain why the Treveran Iulius Florus attempted to induce an auxilia unit to slaughter all the Roman businessmen at the start of his revolt (Tac. Ann. 3.42), or why Boudica would target towns such as Colchester and London (Tac. Ann. 14.31-3; Cass. Dio 62.1-2. cf. Tac. Ann. 12.32).

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96 It is important to bear in mind that military manpower losses could skew male age structures, and that even low-level warfare could have “considerable demographic consequence” for small communities (Scheidel 2001, 5). As it is argued here, I believe that the permanent removal of young men to serve Rome elsewhere could also affect the age structures of some communities, especially if wars in a region dragged on and Rome had habitually levied recruits from them between campaign seasons. While Scheidel’s analysis here pertains particularly to Republican Rome it is of heuristic value to this study. The attrition brought about by the twenty-five-year service term, and the replacement of losses during those twenty-five years surely impacted the male age structure demographically (not only from that initial cohort of 16-25-year olds, but future cohorts of 16-25-year olds- i.e. those who were too young in the initial levy but who would come of age over the course of the unit’s first twenty-five years.

97 Haynes 2001, 63n2; Herz 2007, 308. One could take for instance the example of the cohoirs I Lusitanorum equitata receiving 126 recruits from Asia Minor to replace losses during ongoing campaigns against rebels in the Second Jewish revolt (Fink 1971, no. 74- September 117 CE). These fresh recruits represented around 20% of the notional strength of an equitate cohort (Herz 2007, 308).

98 One should note that the vast majority of Iulius Florus’ support came from debtors. While Camulodunum and Londinium stand out as clear markers of Roman imperial might in Britain, they also would have been major centers of business activity. Furthermore, one should note that the timing of the revolt came on the back of loan recalls by the emperor and Seneca and that this could be a motivating factor in the locations as being targeted (Cass. Dio 62.2).
Another caveat is that the calculations utilized here do not include known *auxilia* units that may have been raised in this period, but whose surviving evidence does not allow for certain contexts for when they were created. One must also acknowledge that there are simply units that have not left a trace from this early period, and that our records are incomplete. Furthermore, this estimate does not incorporate irregular units, which may be defined as those tribal or militia forces that did not make a living as soldiers. Within this category are those forces provided by chartered towns, single tribes, or foreign allies called away from their places of origin for one of three reasons:99 1) to serve in a singular campaign season, such as the Frisii had done in 12 BCE (Cass. Dio 54.32);100 2) to serve for the duration of a war, as it seems the Cherusci had done in the Great Illyrian revolt (Tac. *Ann.* 2.10);101 3) to be summoned to put down nearby revolts, such as Sacrovir and the Aedui had done in 21 CE (Tac. *Ann.* 3.41).102 To fully understand the impact that serving in the military had on local populations one must compliment epigraphically attested units with local militia, tribal forces, and irregular units attested in literature, but for which it is impossible to venture how many served in individual campaigns. The mere fact that Rome not only recruited provincials for service in the *auxilia* but also utilized temporary levies or local

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99 Speidel 2009, 111; *idem* 2016, 86n45, 91; Haynes 2011, 7; *idem* 2013, 97; Birley 1972/1974, 66; Roymans 1993, 43. Speidel refers to irregular forces as those provided by “chartered towns, single tribes, or foreign allies”, in contradistinction to professional *cohortes* and *alae* who made a living as soldiers. This means that such irregular forces may come from provincial and extra-provincial sources (Speidel 2016, 86). It is important to remember that communities allied to Rome may retain their own forces after subjugation to Rome (Birley 1972/1974; Sparey-Green 2015, 108). For the various ways irregular forces may be referred to as in the source material see, Speidel 2016, 90.

100 In 10 BCE Nervian tribunes, Chumstinctus and Avectius, joined Drusus’ campaigns across the Rhine (Livy, *Per.* 141). Seemingly, Batavians were utilized in Germania in 16 CE, but not as ‘regular’ *auxilia* units (Tac. *Ann.* 2.11). German bands from the west side of the Rhine were collected to serve in campaigns across the Rhine (Tac. *Ann.* 1.56- *tumultuarias catervas Germanorum cis Rhenum colentium*).

101 Arminius is described as *doctor popularium* by Tacitus. Chauci served among Germanicus’ forces in 15 and 16 CE (Tac. *Ann.* 1.60- *Chauci cum auxilia pollicerentur, in commilitium adsciti sunt, 2.17- a Chaucis inter auxilia Romana agentibus*). There was Thracian cavalry serving under the king, Rhoemetalces, in the Great Illyrian revolt (Vell. Pat. 2.113.1, 2.112.4). I.P. Haynes has argued that Illyrian rebels came from both regular auxiliary units (Vell. Pat. 2.110) and irregular units in the Great Illyrian revolt (Cass. Dio 55.29; Haynes 2011, 7).

102 Forces of the client kings Antiochus, Agrippa, and Sohemus aided Rome in the Great Jewish revolt (Joseph. *BJ* 2.18.9). Sparey-Green has suggested that the men who stormed the Icenian position in a small revolt of 47 CE were native forces, and that it is likely that these irregular units came from ‘the stable south and south-east zones’ (Tac. *Ann.* 12.31- *socialis copias*; Sparey-Green 2015, 108).
militias, maintained by individual communities, shows that at times the human military burden in the provinces was greater than typically imagined. Despite the inability to quantify the evidence of their use, the very fact that they were used – and seemingly used frequently in the early Principate – suggests that when Rome utilized them, there were fewer men at home to work on their farms, more men to supply on campaign, and the likelihood that their communities had to pay and arm those non-professional forces serving Rome. This certainly could add to the real or perceived burdens placed on certain provincial communities.

In sum, the conscription of young men, while not having a great impact on the scale of a province, could have a substantial impact on the families and tribes involved. Most likely, this impact was felt the heaviest by those communities near the campaign zones as they were the closest available source of recruits. The long-term removal of young men not only impacted the production capabilities of their families, who still had to pay taxes and possibly some ad hoc impositions, conscription also came at an emotional cost, namely of having kin relations being torn apart by having sons, brothers, husbands, etc. taken far from home, perhaps for the rest of their lives.

Case Studies: Overburdened Communities in Revolt

Revolt of Florus and Sacrovir 21 CE

In 21 CE, five tribes across Gallia Lugdunensis and Gallia Belgica revolted against Rome. According to Tacitus, the revolt broke out over heavy debts. The leaders of the revolt were

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103 Speidel 2016, 89; Birley 1972/1974. Extra-provincial ‘irregular’ forces likely had some sort of standing arrangements for their training and supply of arms. Furthermore, it was the governor who decided whether such forces should be summoned to support regular forces or not before the start of a campaign season.

104 On who paid for these forces see, Speidel 2016, 90-4, 98.

105 *Eodem anno Galliarum civitates ob magnitudinem aeris alieni rebellionem coeptavere*- In the same year, the civitates of Gaul started a revolt on account of the magnitude of their debts (Tac. Ann. 3.40.1).
two Gallic nobles whose families had Roman citizenship: Iulius Florus, of the Treveri, and Iulius Sacrovir of the Aedui. Discontent appears to have been widespread across Gaul. In the lead up to the revolt, Gallic leaders at public assemblies and gatherings complained about the continuous tributes, the grinding rates of interest, and the cruelty and arrogance of their governors.\textsuperscript{106} Despite this discontent, only five tribes appear to have participated in the revolt: the Andecavi, Turoni, Treveri, Aedui, and the Sequani.

While Tacitus suggests that Florus was set to lead and organize the Belgic tribes in the revolt and Sacrovir the less distant Gauls, there really is no evidence that the tribes involved cooperated with each other in their revolts (Tac. \textit{Ann.} 3.40.2). The only possible exception is that

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{igitur per conciliabula et coetus seditiosa disserebant de continuatone tributorum, gravitate faenoris, saevitia ac superbia praesidentium…} (Tac. \textit{Ann.} 3.40.3).
a portion of the Sequani may have aided the Aedui. In fact, as best as this author can venture, it appears that there were four separate movements that happened to have broken out around the same time. The first two tribes to revolt were the Andecavi and Turoni in Gallia Lugdunensis. The governor of the province, Acilius Aviola, led two separate campaigns to put down these revolts. Against the Andecavi, he led the cohort garrisoned at Lugdunum, which was there to protect the imperial mint (cohors I urbana). To put down the Turoni, however, Aviola had to wait for legionary reinforcements from the Lower Rhine armies and irregular forces raised from loyal Gallic tribes, including the soon-to-rebel Sacrovir (Tac. Ann. 3.41). Judging by the scale of the Roman forces involved, the latter revolt was larger. Furthermore, it is unlikely that these two revolts were occurring at the same time. Unless Aviola marched the cohors I urbana from Lugdunum to Mediolanum Santonum, then north towards the Andecavi, he would have had difficulties passing through the territory of the Turoni along the Liger River valley to put down the Andecavi from Lugdunum. While it is common for Roman commanders to lead whatever forces as were available to suppress revolts before they spread, it seems unlikely that Aviola would have taken a single cohort against the Andecavi, via an indirect route, and left a larger-scaled revolt between himself and his reinforcements. It is for these reasons that it is more likely that the Turoni rose up in revolt after Aviola had put down the Andecavi. It is important to remember that the Treveri and the Aedui were still loyal to Rome at this time as the lower Rhine forces seemed to have had no problems reaching the Gallic interior, and that the Aedui were among those tribes that lent aid.

At some point later, though possibly shortly after Rhineland forces from the Rhine moved against the Turoni, Iulius Florus led a revolt among the Treveri. Florus’ hand was forced when

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107 Interim Silius cum legionibus duabus incedens praemissa auxiliari manu vastat Sequanorum pagos qui finium extremini et Aeduis contermini sociique in armis erant (Tac. Ann. 3.45.1).
he failed to induce an auxiliary cavalry unit stationed among his tribe to join him, in the hopes of getting them to murder Roman financiers. As will be discussed below, the majority of Florus’ forces were armed debtors and retainers, and his desire to murder Roman financiers in the area shows that Florus was making an effort to align his interests with the local malcontents. After his initial plan failed, Florus took his small force into the Ardennes Forest, roughly 30 km northwest of Trier, seemingly to carry out raids or hideout while securing more numbers. Regardless, legionary forces from the Rhineland armies intercepted Florus’ march, preventing him from reaching the Ardennes Forest.\textsuperscript{108} The Treveran revolt ended when a rival of Iulius Florus, Iulius Indus, led a local contingent and a legionary attachment against Florus’ forces and dispersed them. Florus slipped away, but ultimately took his own life after being hemmed in by Roman forces (Tac. \textit{Ann}. 3.42).

The final action and, according to Tacitus, the most dangerous of the movements was that among the Aedui, because of their wealth and distance from the Rhineland armies. Iulius Sacrovir had secretly manufactured weapons, and then organized and armed some 8,000 supporters and retainers on the legionary model.\textsuperscript{109} With these armed forces he seized the Aeduan tribal capital, Augustodunum. There, Sacrovir used the noble youths, who were being educated there, as pledges to secure the loyalty and service of their parents and relatives. He also enlarged his forces with a contingent of gladiatorial slaves armed as cruppellarians, a sort of extremely heavily armored gladiator. As to the other 32,000 rebels, they were armed with whatever hunting or farming implements were available. The delay in action between the legates

\textsuperscript{108} It is uncertain if these were the same forces used to deal with the Turoni or if it was other Rhineland forces.

\textsuperscript{109} One could argue that his familiarity with legionary arms, equipment, and organization derived both from his service in putting down the Turoni as well as the production and supplying efforts for Rome’s Rhineland forces during the recent wars across the Rhine.
of the Rhineland armies, who were arguing over whose prerogative it was to conduct the campaign, only served to encourage individuals to swell Sacrovir’s ranks (Tac. Ann. 3.43).

Eventually, Gaius Silius, legate of the Upper Rhine legions, marched towards Augustodunum with two legions and their auxilia and devastated the villages of those Sequani who were aiding the Aedui along the way. Twelve miles outside of Augustodunum, Silius met Sacrovir’s forces and soundly defeated the rebels in battle. Sacrovir and a few supporters escaped after the battle, but eventually took their own lives in a nearby villa, thus ending the revolts of 21 CE (Tac. Ann. 3.45-47).

Why were the Gauls in debt?

The standard argument for how the Gauls fell into debt goes as follows. The financial issues of the Tiberian period were long-term consequences of the free spending economic boom that followed Augustus’ victory at Actium. This idea was initially applied to Gaul by Grenier in 1936, who was following an article by Tenney Frank, “The Financial Crisis of 33 A.D.” For Frank and Grenier, land prices rose with the influx of money being poured into the economy in the wake of Augustus’ victory, but this also led to lower interest rates. Subsequent heavy state spending on monumental, military, and road network projects siphoned off much of the state’s gold and silver, which in turn led to interest rates rising from low quantities of coin in circulation. For many modern authors, Gauls were willing to either sell property or take on loans to engage in urban development (street grids, temples, homes, public structures, city gates and

110 Note, though, that various scholars emphasize different aspects of this argument in causing the debt, but the overall picture is as described above. To my knowledge, the issue of who were the creditors of these loans has not been approached yet, though one may suspect that a range of actors were involved including local notables from the same tribe as the loanees, local notables from other tribes, Roman traders, businessmen, and other agents, possibly even soldiers.
walls, etc.), villa projects, and enter the wine and pottery industries since interest rates were low in the two decades after Actium. In these accounts indebtedness came about later when interest rates rose as currency in circulation dwindled and Gallic communities were subjected to an additional tribute to support the wars of Germanicus, from 14 to 16 CE. These tributes then continued unabated after the wars and pushed Gaels beyond their means.

For other scholars, this complaint of continued tribute is taken as the principal means by which the Gaels became indebted. The burden of these increased demands fell evermore upon the provincial elite, on whose cooperation the Roman state relied for peaceful rule. When the elite could no longer support this burden, or no longer wished to, peace in the province was compromised or faltered.

As far as the special tax is concerned, scholars tend to take the Gallic complaint of continuatio tributorum in Tacitus to support their claim of a special tribute levied to support the war. Here they typically emphasize a statement of Suetonius to explain why a tribe like the Aedui was involved in the revolt. Suetonius wrote that Tiberius removed from communities and individuals old immunities, mining rights, and the ability to levy vectigales. The idea, as suggested by Grenier and many who have come after him, is namely that there was an adjustment to burden levels in this period, likely in the form of this special tax placed on all

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111 Frank 1935; Grenier 1936. See also Greg Woolf for the engagement of wealthy provincials in a broadly speaking common elite culture and its attendant costs (2005, 110-2). Scholars such as Levick (1999, 134) and Goldsworthy (2016, 206-7) emphasize urban development and elite competition as the prime factor in Gallic debt, and the tax burden as a secondary factor (cf. Dyson 1975, 157). It is also worth noting that though Gallic elites had an accumulation of wealth, it was largely in land and livestock, rather than liquid capital. Here, then, Gaels may have relied on Roman negotiatores, or other individuals locally, for loans, possibly at usurious rates, to acquire liquid capital to engage in urban programs or to support the costs of Rome’s wars. This is why the Treveran rebels sought to eliminate the Roman negotiatores at the outset of their revolt; i.e. in an attempt to destroy evidence of their loans and debt (Tac. Ann. 3.42.1; Herz 1992, 57).

112 Some scholars have argued that interest rates steadily rose in the years after 10 BCE, and especially after Augustus’ death (cf. Levick 1999, 133; Herz 1992, 55-6). Both authors suggest a stinginess in Tiberius for coin production, as he was hoarding precious metal for state reserves.

113 i.e. Christopherson, who also emphasizes increasing interest rates along the lines described above (1968, 356).


115 Tib. 49.2. “plurimis etiam civitatibus et privatis veteres immunitates et ius metallorum ac vectigalium adempta.”
communities regardless of status to support the war on top of normal extractions. But as the chapter above explored, taxation was not necessarily the cause of debt. Rather, the pressure may have come from additional burdens to support the army, which may not necessarily have taken the form of a *tributum*, meaning that immunities may be irrelevant. Furthermore, as Levick has pointed out, Suetonius does not mention when nor from whom these immunities were removed, so it is not even certain if Gallic communities were affected by this Tiberian policy.

While urban development and wars in Germany certainly had a negative impact on Gaul, however, the argument for low coin circulation in causing Gauls to take out loans at high rates is fundamentally flawed. Frank’s argument only applies to Italy and there is no reason to suppose that there was a coin shortage in Gaul in this period for two reasons. 1) The imperial mint was in Lugdunum: it was the only place in the Roman world where silver and gold coins were minted at this time. 2) The Rhineland army had 80,000 soldiers who were paid in coin. With this coin the army would have spent money in Gallic markets paying for requisitions, production and replacement of arms, armor, and equipment. In short, if there was one place in the Roman world that would have had money circulating at this time, it was in Gaul. Furthermore, as to the reduced number of coin series produced in the Tiberian period, this does not necessarily mean that there was a correlated reduction in the amount of coins in circulation. Older coins could remain in circulation, rather than being collected, melted down, and turned into new coinage.

There is then a need to approach the complex issues of debts and burdens from another angle. Here, emphasis will be placed on the range of exactions utilized by the Roman state, both

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118 Sydenham 1917; Mattingly 1917. Lugdunum was established as the imperial mint for gold and silver c.14 BCE (cf. Strabo 4.3.2). Copper coinage was also minted starting in 10 BCE and in 2 BCE a new series of brass and copper coinages was inaugurated there that would be minted continually until at least 21 CE (Sydenham 1917, 68, 70, 75; Mattingly 1917, 62).
regular and *ad hoc*, to show that in extraordinary circumstances, such as the period after the Varian Disaster, burden levels were high enough to cause the debt issues for some Gauls. This would largely be in line with scholarly thinking, namely the costs that Roman campaigning beyond the Rhine had on the Gallic communities, but will direct discussion away from a tax-centric approach to the issue of burdens. In this way I will be partially using Peter Herz’ approach to the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir by looking at the range of burdens placed upon provincial communities in the years leading up to the revolt, namely the costs of supporting the Rhineland armies, to see how increased burdens in the years before revolts drove mass resistance against Rome.\textsuperscript{120} Burdens alone, however, may not fully explain why some Gauls were involved in this revolt. As other scholars have emphasized, it is also important to consider the fiscal costs of the reorganization and development of *civitas* centers and the impact this had on the indigenous elite of Gaul. Bearing in mind that the indigenous elites were divided politically, and in their interests and ambitions too, re-organization and development efforts required a certain degree of collaboration. The laying out of roads, the erection of temples, fora, and other amenities (regardless if they are in wood or stone) were expensive ordeals. It is not that Rome demanded these buildings and amenities to be constructed, but this was the new way for elites to compete with each other, as well as show that they belonged.\textsuperscript{121}

**Military Events, 9-16 CE**

After the Varian Disaster (see chapter 4), Rome increased the number of legions from five (or six) to eight: *Legiones I Germanica, II Augusta, V Alaudae, XIII Gemina, XIV Gemina, XVI Gallica, XX Valeria Victrix, XXI Rapax*. In the wake of the disaster Rome needed not only to

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{120} Herz 1992.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{121} Cf. Woolf 1998.}
\end{footnotes}
reinforce the Rhine frontier but to secure and reestablish its influence over Germanic leaders and tribes, and these were the goals of Roman activities from the Fall of 9 CE to 12 CE.\textsuperscript{122}

At some point in early 10 CE, Tiberius was sent with massive reinforcements (Cass. Dio 56.22.2b).\textsuperscript{123} It is likely that Tiberius did not campaign beyond the Rhine in 10 CE (Cass. Dio 56.24.6), but instead he surely spent the year resecuring Gaul (\textit{Gallias confirmat}),\textsuperscript{124} distributing the reinforcements and strengthening the garrison towns and forts (Vell. Pat. 2.120.1).\textsuperscript{125} The following year, Tiberius and Germanicus led a cautious campaign not very far across the Rhine (for fear of disaster) and remained in the area until late autumn (Cass. Dio 56.25).\textsuperscript{126} The season was spent opening up military roads, devastating fields and homes, and possibly engaging in some skirmishes with locals (Vell. Pat. 2.120). Surely, these efforts were aimed at hostile tribes such as the Usipeti, Bructeri, Marsi, and Chatti, or to secure the allegiance of tribes such as the Sugambri and Tencteri. Either in 11 or 12 CE Tiberius and Germanicus led a sea operation in the North Sea, possibly to secure the allegiance of northern tribes like the Frisii and Chauci, as well as to harass the Angrivarii, Bructeri, and Cherusci (Vell. Pat. 2.121). By 14 CE there was a

\textsuperscript{122} Cf. Campbell 2017b, 990. With the exception of Aliso on the Lippe river (Vell. Pat. 2.120.4), all Roman forts beyond the Rhine were either occupied by Germans or destroyed (Cass. Dio 56.22.2a). Lucius Asprenas took two legions to secure the lower Rhine as well as to keep watch over wavering tribes on the left bank of the Rhine (Vell. Pat. 2.120.3). It is uncertain who destroyed them.

\textsuperscript{123} These reinforcements were largely transferred from Illyricum, where Tiberius and Germanicus had just finished quelling the remnants of Illyrian rebels, as well as replenishing ranks with conscripts from Rome (Cass. Dio 56.23.1-2; Tac. \textit{Ann}. 1.31. Also see Cass. Dio 56.23.1-2 for the difficulties in finding fresh legionary recruits). It is unlikely that Tiberius left Rome before the dedication of the Temple of Concord on January 16th, 10 CE (Cass. Dio 56.25.1; Swan 2004, 268). It would have taken roughly a month for troops from Illyricum to reach the Rhineland, traveling 20 miles/day. In theory, Tiberius could have led troops out in late Fall and returned to Rome before January, but it is easier to accept that Roman decision makers took time to decide how to best redistribute their forces. This raises a question, though, of how long the besieged soldiers of Aliso held out against German tribesmen as Zonaras mentions Tiberius’ movement north in conjunction with some of the Germanic forces retiring from the siege upon news of Tiberius’ imminent approach to the Rhineland (Cass. Dio 56.22.2b, cf. Vell. Pat. 2.120.4).

\textsuperscript{124} At the minimum, he had settled dissensions among the Vienenses in Gaul, but there may have been more issues: \textit{Qui concussis hostium viribus classicis peditumque expeditionibus, cum res Galliarum maximae molis accensasque plebis Vienennium dissensiones coercitione magis quam poena mollisset} (Vel. Pat. 2.121).

\textsuperscript{125} Reinforcements were certainly required in the lower Rhineland, because Varus’ forces presumably came from there; cf. actions of the legate of the Upper Rhineland forces above. See Swan on whether Tiberius campaigned in 10 CE (2004, 275, 277-8).

\textsuperscript{126} On the cautiousness see especially Suet. \textit{Tib}. 18.
legionary vexillation among the Chauci minores, a tribe between the Weser and Ems rivers (Tac. Ann. 1.38). It seems that Germanicus also led a campaign in 13 CE, as both he and Tiberius were proclaimed imperator (Vell. Pat. 2.123).127

After the Rhineland armies mutinied in the Fall of 14 CE, Germanicus executed a quick raid late in the year across the Rhine (Tac. Ann. 1.31-49; Cass. Dio 57.6.1).128 Starting from either Xanten or Neuss, Germanicus took 12,000 legionaries, twenty-six cohorts and eight alae into the territory of the Marsi, fanned his troops out into four columns and razed and massacred everything and everyone they could (Tac. Ann. 1.49-51).129 Germanicus’ actions brought the Bructeri, Tubantes, and Usipetes to the field, who attempted to ambush the Roman forces in the forests on their return to the Rhine. Germanicus, however, broke through the ambush and returned to winter quarters (Tac. Ann. 1.51).

In 15 CE, Germanicus led two campaigns into Germania. Seeking to take advantage of the Cheruscan alliance becoming divided between Arminius and Segestes, Germanicus led the upper Rhine legions, and up to 10,000 auxilia and Germanic tribal forces, from Mainz in early spring against the Chatti via Mount Taunus (Tac. Ann. 1.55-6). He moved so swiftly that he caught the Chatti off-guard, burned their tribal capital, Mattium, and laid waste to the countryside. At the same time, Caecina, with the lower Rhine legions, 5,000 auxiliaries, and a few German bands prevented the Marsi and Cherusci from coming to the aid of the Chatti (Tac. Ann. 1.56).

128 Campbell 2017b, 990. Augustus died on August 19th; however, Livia had suppressed news of the emperor’s death until Tiberius could return from Illyricum, meaning that the mutiny could not have broken out until late August or early September. Sage gives Sept 1 or 2 as outbreak of the German mutiny (1982, 306). Then, Germanicus will have had to deal with the mutiny before leading the troops out (note that he was in Gaul conducting a census, so a few days of travel at least were required before descending on the legions at Cologne), maybe not until November, 14 CE (Sage 1982, 306 gives Mid-October for the end of the mutiny; Bishop 1960, 166 November 11 for the raid on the Marsi (new moon); cf. Wilkes 1963, 268n3). Also note that the Marsi were distracted by festivities.
129 On the forts, see Bishop 2012. The legionaries came from lower Rhine forces: Legiones I, V, XX, and XXI.
That summer, Germanicus then led a land and sea invasion, presumably from Vetera (Xanten), along the Ems and Lippe rivers with Germanicus leading forces by sea, Pedo by land with cavalry, and Caecina on foot with his legionary forces. After the forces linked up simultaneously on the Ems, the army laid waste to Bructeran territory as they moved through the Ems to the Lippe (Tac. Ann. 1.60). After visiting the site of the Varian Disaster (Tac. Ann. 1.60-2), Germanicus’ forces followed those of Arminius into Cheruscan territory where they skirmished to a stalemate (Tac. Ann. 1.63).

The return journey for the Rhineland legions was at this point beset by disasters. Caecina was set to lead his forces through the Pontes Longi, a plank road established by L. Domitius Ahenobarbus around 2-1 BCE that led through a swampy bog area. Arminius, however, beat Caecina there and took up positions in the woods surrounding the road (Tac. Ann. 1.63). During the ensuing battle, Caecina’s forces lost their baggage train as they fought their way back to safety (Tac. Ann. 1.64-69). Meanwhile, Pedo’s cavalry marched back the way it came. Germanicus split his forces (to lighten his ships in the event of shallow seas or to help avoid getting grounded at ebb-tide), with half sailing back to the Rhine and the other half (the 2nd and 14th legions) under Publius Vitellius marching on the shore (Tac. Ann. 1.70). Vitellius’ forces got caught in a gale, during which men, packhorses, and equipment were dashed by waves and pulled asunder by eddies. Eventually Vitellius managed to link his remaining forces with Germanicus’ ships and sail home, but they had lost their equipment and other necessities in the gale (Tac. Ann. 1.70).

In between the campaign seasons, Germanicus sent Publius Vitellius and Gaius Antius to continue the census interrupted by Augustus’ death, and Silius and Caecina to oversee the

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130 During these actions Lucius Stertinius was diverted from Germanicus’ forces to act against the Bructeri, who were attempting “to fire their belongings”, and after routing the tribe he discovered the legio XIX’s standard (Tac. Ann. 1.60).
construction of a 1000 ship fleet (Tac. *Ann.* 2.6)- (see further on pages 178-80, 219-21). The island of the Batavians was set as the base for the campaign (Tac. *Ann.* 2.6). In the spring while he waited for the ships to be constructed and conveyed to the Rhine, Germanicus sent Silius to raid Chattan territory where he carried off modest booty and the wife and daughter of the Chattan chief. Meanwhile, Germanicus upon hearing that the Roman camp on the Lippe was invested (Aliso?), set out to relieve the garrison with six legions (the siege was lifted at the rumor of Germanicus’ approach) (Tac. *Ann.* 2.7).

Once the fleet was assembled and the supplies forwarded, Germanicus sailed with his full forces through the lakes and North Sea to the Ems. The troops disembarked at the mouth of the river and marched upstream. *En route* to the head of the river, word arrived that the Agrivarii were rising in his rear and Germanicus dispatched Stertinius to put them down (Tac. *Ann.* 2.8.1). As Germanicus marched towards Cheruscan territory, Arminius awaited Roman forces across the Weser. Germanicus sent Batavians and cavalry across to harass Arminius, but Arminius feigned retreat and overwhelmed these forces (Tac. *Ann.* 2.9, 11). Once they crossed the Weser, Germanicus fought Arminius at Idisiaviso (Tac. *Ann.* 2.12, 16-18), where Arminius and Inguiomerus were wounded in a resounding victory for Rome. Despite their losses, the German forces re-organized and faced Germanicus in a second battle at the border between the Angrivarii and the Cherusci (the so-called battle of the Angrivarian Wall), which was indecisive (Tac. *Ann.* 2.19-21). In the aftermath, the Angrivarii submitted to Stertinius when Germanicus ordered him to open hostilities against them (Tac. *Ann.* 2.22). At the end of the campaign Germanicus sent a portion of the legions home by land, the rest went by ship down the Ems. Like the preceding year, the return journey was difficult, and the fleet was hit by a terrible storm in which soldiers jettisoned war- and packhorses, equipment, and arms in attempts to lighten their ships to stay
afloat. While some ships were lost, more were stranded on islands, where some died of starvation (Tac. Ann. 2.23).

**Logistics and Gaul**

As several scholars have argued, the costs of Roman campaigning beyond the Rhine had a deep impact on the economic stability of Gauls. Among the costs of Roman warfare is logistics, the supplying of the army with its various needs. The chapter above showed that the Roman armies of the region required a large range of items, from food, animals and fodder, to transportation, porters and drivers, and production of arms, armor, and equipment (cf. pages 175-6). It was argued that the costs of supporting Rome’s armies in times of war were a heavier burden for communities residing near the front than scholars have often perceived.

To quickly summarize some of the key points.

Rome acquired supplies primarily through four means: 1) requisition 2) forced purchases 3) contracts with companies or communities (for equipment, weapons, and armor) 4) compulsory deliveries (see below).

Occasionally, communities, especially allied peoples, and individuals would have voluntarily offered to provide necessities as Gallic, Spanish, and Italian communities had done after the disasters faced by Germanicus’ forces in 15 CE (Tac. Ann. 1.71). In the decade prior to Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt there were roughly 80,000 soldiers along the Rhineland.\(^{131}\) The table above shows the quantities of foodstuffs these

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>80,000 soldiers/ year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grain</strong></td>
<td>24,820t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meat</strong></td>
<td>6,628.4t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vegetables</strong></td>
<td>1,168 – 1,460t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cheese</strong></td>
<td>788.4t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wine</strong></td>
<td>4,672t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Table 6: Rations Required for the Rhineland Armies*

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\(^{131}\) Including the *Legiones I Germanica, II Augusta, V Alaudae, XIII Gemina, XIV Gemina, XVI Gallica, XX Valeria Victrix, XXI Rapax.*
forces would have required yearly, and this does not include supplies for slaves, porters, drivers, or the animals on campaign with Roman forces.

Goods destined for the Rhineland armies were received in three standard methods: 1) communities transported requisitioned goods to the army directly; 2) communities hired contractors to transport requisitioned goods; 3) The army gathered the goods themselves. For the Rhineland armies, the most frequent routes for supply involved utilizing the Meuse River or land and riverine transport through Trier, the Moselle and the Rhine. It is also probable that the Seine river valley and routes from there to Trier also provided supplies, ship construction, etc. to Roman forces.

There was an unevenness of demands and burdens placed upon communities within the Gallic provinces, based on the proximity of communities to the armies and on the relationship statuses they had with Rome (such as federate, free, stipendiary). Furthermore, there is another topographic consideration, namely that not all land was suitable for growing grain, such as the marshy lands of the Rhine Delta. As a few camps were near the Rhine Delta, it meant that the Roman forces there had to rely on supplies from the heartland of northern Gaul, which was very suitable for growing grain. That same land in the Rhine delta, however, was suitable for cattle herding, and the impact for animal requisitions would have been heavier closer to the camps. This is so not just because transporting animals from further away would not have been cost efficient, but also because of the available supply (see further below). Based on the major transport routes to Roman operational bases along the Rhine, the tribes likely to have been the

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132 Meuse River to camps at Nijmegen, Xanten, Neuss, and Asciburgium. The latter two camps were supplied by land via Venlo on the Meuse. Though surely the southern route was more important for Mainz, Koln, and Bonn it is possible that items could have arrived from the Meuse basin as well (Polak and Kooistra 2015, 393, 396, 412, 442; Campbell 2012, 228-9). Supplies from further out in Gaul could use a combination of riverine and land transport to reach Lugdunum and thence onward to the Rhineland via the aforementioned routes (Campbell 2012, 228, 232).

133 See Polak and Kooistra 2015 (415) for the connection between Tiberius’ presence in that region in 4 CE and logistics for the Rhineland armies.

134 Polak and Kooistra 2015, 396, 399, 412.
most impacted by logistical support were the Ubii, Tungr, Treveri, Nervii, Mediomatrici, Menapii, Leuci, Lingones, Remi, Aedui, and Sequani. It is important to note that three of these eleven tribes were directly involved in Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt.

While the 54,250 acres worth of grain needed to feed an army of 80,000 men yearly does not represent much of the overall land mass of Gallia Belgica and Gallia Lugdunensis, Roman military needs could have a devastating impact on the production capabilities of locals, especially those both closer to the front and those along the transportation routes to the operational bases (at Nijmegen, Xanten, and Mainz). For instance, conscription removed young men from households for twenty-five years, and the Rhineland armies could also press civilians into service as porters, drivers, and oarsmen for a campaign season or a war. In either case, these actions removed capable workers from households. At times, especially after major setbacks (such as those in 9, 15, and 16 CE), the Rhineland armies required large-scale production of arms, armor, equipment, and ships, and this would have diverted craftsmen from other tasks. If, as was suggested in Chapter 3, these production efforts were compulsory deliveries, Gallic craftsmen and artisans may not have received payment and would have lost income by being diverted from their normal work. In a similar manner, farming families were impacted by the forced purchases of draft animals, horses, and carts required by the Rhineland armies for their campaigns as the loss of these items severely reduced the production capabilities of farmers. As these key items were not necessarily paid for at market price, farmers may have struggled to replace animals and carts that were purchased forcefully by Roman agents (see, pages 177-8). It is important to remember that the removal or diversion of labor and animals not only impacted production capacities, but the ability to continue paying taxes too. One can envision that with the long duration of the Germanic Wars many Gauls, especially poorer ones, could have fallen
behind on taxes, or were unable to support themselves at subsistence level, and were therefore forced to take out loans.\textsuperscript{135}

But there are some further issues surrounding logistics to address, such as: why did supplies not come from further out?; why did compulsory deliveries in Gaul have such a major impact on the economic health of Gallic communities?; and how did the ship building enterprise of 15/16 CE impact local populations? First, the supply chain was determined by both local availability and a preference among Roman agents to acquire goods from the nearest available sources when possible. For example, war horses and draft animals were largely supplied from the immediate hinterland of an army in times of war as it would have simply been too inefficient and costly to transport animals long distance for the armies.\textsuperscript{136} As wars dragged on, though, there was always a risk that local supplies of war horses and draft animals would get exhausted by military demands, which would then require armies to requisition supplies from further afield. Again, utilizing horses as an example, iterant Roman campaigning across the Rhine exhausted the Gallic horse supply by the end of Germanicus’ campaigns in 16 CE (Tac. Ann. 1.71). This certainly had a serious impact on Gallic farming, and on the financial capital of Gallic elites, as war horses were very valuable. Similarly, most of the grain supply required by the Roman armies on the Rhine was capable of being fulfilled locally, though grain from elsewhere does appear occasionally at Roman camps in the archaeological record. Some more exotic supplies such as

\textsuperscript{135} Cf. Hurlet on the role of back taxes being behind the revolt (2017). It was up to local councils to determine how to tax their communities to raise the tribute required by Rome (cf. page 96n70). While we cannot know who were making these loans (whether they were local, provincial, or imperial actors, or some combination of the three), we can speculate on the negative impact that unpaid debts could have on loans given by local magnates. If prominent locals made loans and debtors were unable to pay them back, then this could have created significant issues for the economic welfare of the community, especially given the specific contexts outline in this case study. This in turn could increase the likelihood of powerful local elites aligning their interests with disparaged debtors to revolt against Rome.

\textsuperscript{136} The situation in peace time is obviously different and there is some later evidence of war horses being acquired extraprovincially, on which see Davies 1969.
wine, oil, and garum from Spain and Italy were transported long-distances to the armies on the Rhine.\textsuperscript{137}

There are a couple answers for why the supply burden was not more thoroughly spread out across the Gallic provinces, or why grain did not come more frequently from Spain or Egypt in greater quantities in this period. First, the road network was still in its infancy. The route from the south to the Rhine was still relatively new, while the leg from Trier to the Rhine appears to have been built only in the 10s BCE. Around the same time, the route from Boulogne to Köln via Cassel, Tournai, Bavay, and Tongres was also developed.\textsuperscript{138} The mature road network would gradually come into being several decades after Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt. As M.C. Bishop notes for Britain, the first stage of Roman styled roads had a military origin, typically for the movements of armies. This would then be followed by cross-routes of the main Roman military roads, and finally by a gradual development of roads by civilians “as trade and social interaction led to the development (or, more likely, continuation and expansion) of movement around the province by the indigenous inhabitants and the many non-military occupants.”\textsuperscript{139} Second, the legions were recently established in this region, and the permanent legionary camps did not develop until at least the middle of the first century CE. This means that the legions had not yet fully developed their supply networks and had to rely on local supply very heavily early on. As the camps became permanent, farms aimed at surplus production of cereals did develop near the army, which also made supplying the legions along the Rhineland significantly less burdensome.\textsuperscript{140} To sum up, Rome’s reach was only as good as its networks. The depths to which

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\textsuperscript{137} Grain largely came from the loess region between Köln and Boulogne (Polak and Kooistra 2015, 362, 399, 412). On exotic goods, see Stallibrass and Thomas 2008; Polak and Kooistra 2015, 398.
\textsuperscript{138} Chevallier 1997, 229.
\textsuperscript{139} Bishop 2014, 41-43, quote 43.
\textsuperscript{140} See Kooistra et al. 2013; van Dinter et al. 2014; Polak and Kooistra 2015, 399, 430-1 (animal husbandry and arable farming). It is important to remember that this process often took several decades to happen, and that garrison
Rome could penetrate for requisitions, local supply, and other exactions correlates with how easily Rome could physically access communities. It required urban centers to serve as both markets and collection points for an area, and road and riverine systems to move men and goods to and from those centers. The unfortunate irony here is that if these wars across the Rhine occurred a few decades later then the burdens of the war may have been more evenly distributed across the Gallic landscape.

Compulsory deliveries in Gaul were a heavy burden because Rome utilized them at times when large quantities of items were needed quickly. This meant that artisans had to be removed from their tasks, and corvée labor was likely used in completing the demands of the Roman state, thus diminishing the production and income of Gauls. Four episodes in Gaul between 9 and 16 CE would have necessitated the (re)furnishing of equipment and supplies to Roman forces, and such a frequency of military setbacks must have been costly for the Gauls compelled to aid Rome. First, the Varian Disaster saw the destruction of three legions and nine auxiliary units (see pages 267-82). This event probably had the least impact on Gauls of the four because the replacement units came from elsewhere and they almost certainly brought their equipment with them. This event likely only impacted Gauls in so far as the creation of new auxilia units, which would have required arms, armor, and equipment, and the requisitioning of animals for Rome’s retaliatory campaigns (on which see above).141

As described above, the years 15 and 16 CE were fraught with difficulties for the Roman armies. In addition to soldiers lost at sea or in battle, Roman forces lost a great deal of their arms, armor, equipment, carts, and pack animals in all three of these episodes. For example, Caecina locations were often of a temporary or semi-permanent nature in the early years after the initial conquest. It was only after forces settled into an area that this process could truly take shape.

141 *Ala Capitoniana* (Spaul 1994, 80-1) and *ala Sebosiana* (17 BRGKn216 -Mainz, cf. Holder 1980, 275) were possibly raised between 9 and 12 CE to serve on the Rhine. Other units may have been raised in these years to replace those sent to Germania, see Appendix 3.
lost his baggage carts in an ambush in 15 CE, which would have held the heavy equipment, entrenching tools, spare equipment, material for medical staff and blacksmiths, the main food supply, and tents for his four legions (Tac. Ann. 1.65). In the other two incidents most of the equipment was lost at sea. It should come as no surprise therefore that replacement efforts in these two years would have been extraordinary. Not only would Rome need to recruit countless new auxiliary and legionary troops, but the state would have placed compulsory deliveries on Gallic communities of potentially thousands of basic camp and kitchen equipment, arms and armor, and pack animals. While firm ancient evidence is lacking, estimates based on comparative evidence suggest that each legion required 1,000 pack animals.\footnote{Roth 1999, 82-83.} Given the nature of Tacitus’ descriptions of these events, one can imagine that the Rhineland legions needed a few thousand replacement pack animals in the few months between Germanicus’ campaign seasons. Replacing tents for a legion required some 28,000 leather skins, and one can expect that more than a legion’s worth of tents was lost in just these two campaign seasons. And that is just for the tents, let alone for the countless other leather items used by the army (cf. pages 176).

The impact that these replenishment efforts had on Gallic communities must have been devastating. Rome removed thousands of young men to serve in campaigns in addition to countless others removed as porters and drivers. The loss of capital in requisitioned cattle and pack animals could have been hard to replace for farmers. Artisans and blacksmiths were diverted from their routine production efforts and likely bore the costs of production for the Rhineland armies in these instances. It is important to remember that alongside these tasks, Germanicus had decided in the fall of 15 CE to change his strategy in Germania and required 1,000 ships to be made before the next campaign season. It may be best to understand the naval contingents on the Rhine and North Sea at this time as existing for specific campaigns or wars as
the *Classis Germanica* was unlikely in existence yet. This means that provincials pressed into
service for Roman naval campaigns surely did so only for the duration of a campaign or war; in
other words, they were not conscripted into service for twenty-six-year terms. But because there
was no permanent fleet in the region in this period, it means that Roman commanders had to
have constructed their fleets for each war. To get a sense of the frequency of new constructions,
there were fleets operating in the region in 12 BCE (Cass. Dio 54.32.1-2; Str. 7.290-1), 5 CE
(Vell. Pat. 2.106.2), 15 CE, and 16 CE (see above). One may suppose that the burden of
constructing these fleets was dispersed among those communities along the coast or navigable
rivers, especially if 1,000 ships were constructed between late Fall 15 CE and late Spring 16 CE
(cf. Caes. *BGall.* 3.11.5, 5.5.2). Such an undertaking would have required thousands of men
across the two provinces to construct these ships. Meanwhile, other communities in Gaul were
likely called upon to supply metal, leather, lumber, money, and raw materials for items such as
rope, tackle, and sails.

While these operations were ongoing, tens of thousands of Gauls would have been
pressed into service as oarsmen (*remiges*). This surely would have required “recruits” to engage
in training prior to the summer of 16 CE, further removing men from farming and other forms of
economic production. The fleet was probably a mix of triremes and *liburnae* (Liburnian
ships). Triremes had about 150 oarsmen and *liburnae* had roughly 52 to 68 oarsmen. If full

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143 Saddington 1990, 224-5; *idem* 1991, 398-9. Pictones, Santones, and unnamed others, constructed ships for Caesar (Caes. *BGall.* 3.9.1, 3.11.5; cf. Caes. *BCiv.* 2.18.1). Roman forces could demand delivery of materials for ships (Caes. *BGall.* 5.1) In this latter example, the fleet was built by the army itself over the winter rather than being delivered to the army, though private individuals did also contribute ships (Caes. *BGall.* 5.2.2; 5.8.6). D.B. Saddington further notes some uncertainty as to whether or not a small core of transport ships was maintained during periods of inactivity (1990, 229). Evidence from Caesar suggests that Roman commanders could also requisition ships from local tribes, on top of new construction (*BGall.* 4.21.4).

144 Cf. Raafflaub 2017, 136 n5.5c.

145 Raafflaub 2017, 133 n5.1j.


complements of oarsmen were utilized for Germanicus’ 1,000 new ships, then it would have required at least 50,000 men for the campaign of 16 CE.\textsuperscript{[148]} It is also worth noting that an unknown number of these men would not return home at the end of the campaign season because storms wrecked or stranded much of Germanicus’ fleet. Some would have drowned, and others still would have died of starvation, or have washed up on foreign shores never to return (Tac.\textit{Ann.} 2.23-24).

**Conscription in Gaul**

The chapter above notes that there were at least twenty-eight \textit{auxilia} units raised between 31 BCE and 21 CE in the region. The minimum number of young men levied when these units were created would have been 14,040, meaning that at least one in every twelve men between the ages of 16 and 25 from Gallia Lugdunensis and Gallia Belgica was conscripted into the \textit{auxilia} during the initial levies of these units. At least eleven of these units were raised in the years between the Varian Disaster and the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir. Those units raised to serve beyond the Rhineland were surely raised to replace units transferred during the mass shuffling of units that took place after the Varian Disaster and the end of the Great Illyrian revolt in 9/10 CE.\textsuperscript{[149]} It is difficult to estimate the number of Gauls conscripted yearly to losses, not only for the twenty-eight aforementioned units but for other units on the Rhineland that could have conscripted

\textsuperscript{[148]} It is difficult to properly estimate the human impact of this fleet’s construction because soldiers could have both aided in the ships’ construction (Caes. \textit{BGall.} 5.2.2) and have served as oarsmen too. By having soldiers also row the ships it increased the number of soldiers transported per ship, but the ships would have been left inactive at landing sites meaning that fewer ships could be used for supply chains (Herz 1992, 75). Skilled sailors and helmsmen for these ships (\textit{nautae} and \textit{gubernatores}) were either hired from the south or possibly transferred from existing Mediterranean fleets (Caes. \textit{BGall.} 3.9.1; Saddington 1990, 230; \textit{idem} 1991, 399; Herz 1992, 75-6; Raaflaub 2017, 88 n3.9b).

\textsuperscript{[149]} Germania: \textit{ala} \textit{I} \textit{Petriana} (Gallia Belgica), \textit{ala} \textit{Gallorum Sebosiana} (Gallia Lugdunensis), \textit{ala} \textit{Indiana} (Gallia Belgica), \textit{ala} \textit{I Praetoria} (Gallia Belgica), \textit{cohors} \textit{I} \textit{Septimia Belgarum} (Gallia Belgica), \textit{ala} \textit{Augusta Germaniciana} (Gallia Belgica) \textit{ala} \textit{I} \textit{Capitomiana}? (Gallia Lugdunensis), Spain: \textit{cohors} \textit{III} \textit{Gallorum felix equitata} (Gallia Lugdunensis), \textit{cohors} \textit{III} \textit{Gallorum equitata} (or sent to Moesia. Raised in Gallia Lugdunensis). Elsewhere: \textit{ala} \textit{Antiana} (Syria, raised in Gallia Lugdunensis), \textit{cohors} \textit{I} \textit{Ubiorum equitata} (Illyricum? Raised in Gallia Belgica).
Gauls. I.P. Haynes has estimated that the attrition rate for auxilia units was 5% in times of peace. This would mean that for these twenty-eight units one would expect 702 fresh recruits yearly. It is important to recall, however, that many of these units were serving in theaters of active warfare, and therefore were surely suffering from a higher attrition rate. An example from a later period may illustrate this point. While the cohors I Lusitanorum equitata was fighting against rebels in the Second Jewish revolt, it received 126 recruits to replace losses, representing around 20% of the unit’s notional strength. If this 20% attrition rate is extended to the Gallic units then 2,808 men would need to be recruited yearly to replace losses. However, that number may be exceptional, and we may accept that a lower percentage such as 10% may be more normal in times of war (1,404 recruits/year).

Beyond the auxilia, Gauls were called to serve in irregular and naval forces during Rome’s wars across the Rhine. Rome made use of Gallic and Germanic tribes such as the Frisii, Nervii, and Batavi in singular campaign seasons. Tribes such as the Chauci and Cherusci provided tribal forces for multiple campaign seasons (Chauci- Tac. Ann. 1.60, 2.17; Cherusci- Tac. Ann. 2.10). Irregular forces were also called up to put down nearby revolts, such as when Iulius Sacrovir led Aeduan forces against the Turoni in 21 CE prior to leading his own revolt (Tac. Ann. 3.41). Likewise, tens of thousands of Gauls were pressed into service as oarsmen for Roman naval contingents utilized in Rhineland campaigns from 12 BCE – 16 CE. While it is

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150 Haynes 2001, 63n2.
151 By my count, fifteen of the twenty-eight units were serving along the Rhineland in this period: *ala Rusonis, ala Agrippiana, ala Augusta Gallorum Proculeiana, ala I Capitoniana, ala Classiana, ala Frontoniana, ala Longiniana, ala I Petriana, ala Picentiana* (possibly fought in Illyricum before serving in Germania after 9 CE; see opinions found in Spaul 1994, 185-6), *ala Gallorum Sebosiana, ala I Cannanefatium, ala I Tungrorum* (possibly?), *ala Augusta Germaniciana, ala I Praetoria, cohors I Septimia Belgarum* (see Appendix 3 for details on the units). I am not counting here the *ala Indiana* which was likely raised as an irregular force during the revolt of Iulius Florus and made a permanent unit afterwards.
152 Fink 1971, no. 74- September 117 CE; Herz 2007, 308.
153 Cis-Rhenian Germanic tribes were used in 14 CE (Tac. Ann. 1.56), Frisii in 12 BCE (Cass. Dio 54.32), the Nervii in 10 BCE (Liv. Per. 141), and Batavians in 16 CE (Tac. Ann. 2.11).
impossible to gauge exactly how many men from these two provinces served as oarsmen or on campaigns as irregular forces, the fact still remains that Rome utilized Gauls and Germans for their campaigns quite regularly in this period, and this would have further placed strains on the financial health and productivity of the households impacted by conscription, treaty obligations, and impressment. When Rome called upon irregular forces or pressed provincials into service as oarsmen it meant that there were simultaneously fewer men at home to produce goods and to farm and more men to supply on campaign. Furthermore, there are decent odds that communities had to pay, arm, and feed these irregular forces and oarsmen.\textsuperscript{154}

To sum up, the impact of men serving the Roman military in Gaul in this period is heavier than what it might seem at first sight. First, Rome was removing young men from households, which would impact local production capabilities and possibly also communal relationships with Rome (see pages 188-91 on familial separation). While those men pressed into service or called upon to fight alongside Rome for a campaign season could return home at harvest time, the 16-25-year-old men conscripted into the auxilia had twenty-five yearlong service terms. This means essentially that affected families were permanently losing a source of labor and production, as many of those thousands of young men would never return home (for one reason or another). Insofar as recruitment was probably higher among rural populations, this would have more heavily affected farming families’ abilities to sustain themselves and afford short-term future imperial exactions. Likewise, the burden was not evenly distributed across Gallic communities. Despite very patchy evidence, Treverans appear in five of the twenty-eight known auxilia units known from this period and then continue to serve in the ala Indiana, which

\textsuperscript{154} Speidel 2016, 90-4, 98; Herz 1992, 77
was created during the revolt by Florus’ rival Iulius Indus (Tac. Ann. 3.42, 46). 155 Meanwhile, other tribes, such as the Aedui, appear to have not experienced any auxilia recruitment; though Aeduans could voluntarily serve in the auxilia. This in part explains why certain tribes may have been more aggrieved and willing to revolt.

**Urban development as a plausible cause for native elite debt?**

Beyond the specific realm of Roman warfare, there are two other possible areas that could have contributed to the outbreak of the revolt. While logistics and conscription could impact Gallic society at all levels of wealth and status, one must also consider why Gallic elites like Florus and Sacrovir joined and led these revolts. Were they also indebted? Or were there other reasons for their actions? Bearing these questions in mind, this section is dedicated to two issues that may further explain debt among the Gallic elite, and/or why the Gallic elites would align themselves with dissidents in their communities. The first considers the fiscal impact of the cost of reorganizing and developing civitas centers as a possible explanation for how some of the Gallic elite had fallen into debt prior to the revolt. The second, partially related to the first, considers the role of elite competition in leading Gallic nobles to revolt against Rome. This encompasses both euergetism and martial prowess.

The last three decades of the first century BCE were a time of significant urban development and change in the Three Gauls. This surely reflected imperial ambitions to establish and/or organize centers to collect materials and supplies destined for the Rhineland armies, as well the ambitions of local elite to not only stake their claim to belonging among the provincial

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elite writ large but also to maintain or obtain leading roles within their own tribes.\textsuperscript{156} To this extent, new urban centers were established, or old ones were reorganized along Roman lines.\textsuperscript{157} This may entail local elites establishing new centers to take advantage of new roads created by Rome, shifting sites from hillsides down to neighboring plains, or even the shifting prominence of some existing settlements at the expense of older tribal centers.\textsuperscript{158}

It is difficult to trace the earliest developments in this region, partially because many of the sites are still occupied today, but also because the earliest urban developments were largely built in timber, wattle and daub before later being built-over by stone buildings starting in the mid-first century CE. Typically, one of the earliest developments was the imposition of street grids on urban landscapes. Grid systems are indicative of a foundation or re-foundation of a site, and the costs in time, effort, money, and manpower therein. Though some sites exhibited street grids from an early date, such as the last decades of the 1\textsuperscript{st} century BCE (see Trier below), they were not necessarily imposed at the time of foundation, nor at an early date. Iuliomagus of the Andecavi only had its grid developed around the 20s CE, and many of the urban centers in Belgic Gaul did not have a street grid imposed on them until the mid-first century CE. It is important to bear in mind the social and financial costs of laying out a grid; it involved redistributing land, demolishing and reconstructing buildings around the grid. The decision then

\textsuperscript{156} Cf. Woolf 1998; \textit{idem} 2005. Cf. Johnston 2017. Authors such as Michel Reddé argue that certain sites in Belgic Gaul and the Rhineland had a military intervention, such as Tongres (2015, 14-5; Mertens 1983, 1985; Woolf 1998, 113; Kortüm, 5, 11). Other sites like Autun owe their foundation and development to the Gallic elite (Reddé 2015, 15; Woolf 1998, 119). On the issue of who was responsible for the initiative to develop urban sites, one may see, for instance, Millett 1990; Hanson, 1988, 1997; Hingley 1997; Morscheiser-Niebergall 2009, 133.

\textsuperscript{157} Whereas iron age settlements in this region were predominantly “a uniform occupation by huts and paddocks, interspersed by unoccupied areas, with agricultural and craft activities taking place in all areas indiscriminately,” Gallo-Roman towns would often eventually have temples placed around the forum or at the edge of civitas centers, manufacturing shifted towards the outskirts of towns, and burials excluded from the settlement areas (Woolf 1998, 117). Cf. Johnston 2017, 160-1.

to impose such a grid on a community surely was a collective one made by the tribal elite rather than the act of an individual.\textsuperscript{159}

Roman styled civic centers—which would come to include fora, temples, and basilicas—start to appear in sites across the region in two different phases: in the 30s and 20s BCE and then picking up again starting in the last decade of Augustus’ reign. Fora in this period could be gravel lined spaces where civic and market functions would be conducted, or they could be fora like later periods (with basilicas, temples, and other buildings with dedicated functions) but with wooden buildings.\textsuperscript{160} Meanwhile, many of the earliest monuments were dedicated to the imperial family in the form of altars, temples, arches, memorials – such as the monument erected in commemoration to Gaius and Lucius Caesar at Trier. There are limits to developments in this period, however, as other monumental structures largely do not appear until after our period, such as theaters, amphitheaters, baths, fountains, and aqueducts.\textsuperscript{161}

The high costs of construction and elite competition may be seen beyond tribal elites’ own communities at the complex for the Altar of the Three Gauls at Lugdunum.\textsuperscript{162} The altar itself was made of imported marble and held a gilded inscription. Around the altar were columns bearing statues representing the sixty-four civitates of the Three Gauls. In 19 CE, an amphitheater was underway, being paid for by the chief-priest, C. Iulius Rufus and his family, who were from the tribe of the Santones (\textit{ILTG} 217; cf. \textit{CIL} 13.1036). The reason for the aggrandizement of Lugdunum is that it was the home of the \textit{concilium galliarum} and the aforementioned altar. Importantly, the chief-priests were elected annually from delegates of each

\textsuperscript{159} Woolf 1998, 113, 119, 121; Reddé 2015, 12, 14, 15.
\textsuperscript{160} Reddé 2015.
\textsuperscript{161} Wightman 1985, 51-2; Woolf 1998, 121-2.
civitas, the first being the Aeduan C. Iulius Vercondaridubnus (Liv. Per. 139). This would suggest then that urban development there was woven into the practices of intra-tribal elite competition.

In the case of domestic architecture, elite domus in opus caementicum with tiled roofs and mosaics largely did not appear until after this period, but “La Tene post-built architecture gave way to new styles of construction employing timber and earth, occasionally dried into daub, and half-timbering on stone socles.” This period also saw the rise of differentiation in house sizes within communities of these provinces. Early habitations were apparently not grand and may have resembled the simple rectangular houses which were also found in the minor settlements.

The process of urban development in this region persisted over several succeeding generations of local elites until the 2nd century CE. While the speed of development varied across sites, most had a slow evolution and development that proceeded over multiple generations. It required a concerted effort on the part of Gallic elites to focus their energies on centralized urban settlements. The process of shifting from an old center to a new one could be drawn out over decades. It also involved an enormous cost for Gallic elite to develop urban centers. These costs were not just measured in money, but also in the costs of labor, the employment of skilled architects and artisans, the costs of demolishing and (re-)constructing buildings as space was (re)organized. The fiscal weight of these endeavors must have been enormous on the elites who chose to engage in developing and enriching sites, bearing in mind that elite wealth was likely

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164 Woolf 1998, 123 (Quote).
165 Woolf 1998, 124; Reddé 2015. Cf. Johnston 2017, esp. 159ff. Though a few such as Waldgirmes had extensive development in a brief period (Reddé 2015, 12. On Waldgirmes, see further pages 274, 322.
tied up in land and livestock. This may have encouraged Gallic elites to take out loans to pay for material, labor, skilled craftsmen and architects for their projects.

A strong case may be made for the Aedui that elite debt, if there was any, stemmed from the high attendant costs of urban development because over the Augustan period they developed two sites, first at Bibracte, then at Augustodunum. Bibracte was initially the Aedui’s principal site and it experienced significant reorganization and development in the first few decades after conquest until its gradual abandonment sometime between c. 15 BCE to 5 CE. Once again, one should remember the expenses and activities involved in reorganizing sites: shifts in landownership, demolitions and new constructions, and human and material costs for these efforts (corvée labor, architects, construction material, etc.). Furthermore, due to the limited opportunities for Aeduans to compete with other Gauls through martial prowess (see below), they may have fixated on the forms of competition and advancement open to them, namely euergetism and holding civic and religious offices. Though the site’s topography did not allow for the imposition of a grid pattern, elites did erect a forum complex with temples and a possible basilica on the highest plateau of the site. In the same area, there is also evidence of Mediterranean styled houses. On the lower surfaces of the town there were further residences, though smaller than those on the plateau, and evidence of artisan workshops.

Sometime between c. 15 BCE and the turn of the first century CE, the Aedui founded Augustodunum on a green site about seventeen miles away from Bibracte. This new site was established at a natural crossroads in the Arroux valley, where the Loire, Saône, and Rhone river

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167 Woolf 1998, 115, 117-8; Reddé 2015; 4-5; Szabó et al. 2007. The so-called basilica site appears to have been abandoned around 20 BCE; thus, it was short-lived (Reddé 2015, 4).
168 Reddé 2015, 4; Moore 2012.
basins converge.\textsuperscript{169} The choice of the new site was also attractive because it was on a plain alongside the Agrippan road from Chalon-sur-Saône towards the English Channel, whereas Bibracte was perched on a hilltop, difficult to access, and not on the new Roman route.\textsuperscript{170} Despite the disadvantage of the old capital, Bibracte may only have been abandoned as late as the early 1\textsuperscript{st} century CE, perhaps because Aeduan leaders were reluctant to move after heavily investing in the site.\textsuperscript{171} Like Bibracte, Augustodunum exhibits substantial development during its first few decades, highlighting the investment and dedication of Aeduan elite to utilize their socio-political and financial power in building a city to rival all others in the region. Pomponius Mela, likely writing in the 40s CE, declared the town a major cultural center (3.20). It already had a school by the time of the revolt (Tac. Ann. 3.43), which would have necessitated importing and paying instructors. During the first decade of the 1\textsuperscript{st} century CE, the forum was erected and fragments of a temple architrave in the same area should also belong to the Augustan period. Around the same time the earliest phases of the city walls were laid out, and artisanal zones near the outskirts of the city were established, including bronze metallurgy shops. After these initial developments, the earliest grid plan was laid out at Augustodunum in the last years of Augustus’ reign, but there were further expansions of it throughout the Tiberian period.\textsuperscript{172}

To a lesser extent, a similar pattern of urban development may be seen among the Treveri. Prior to the Roman conquest Titelberg was the principal settlement of the Treveri. It was prosperous due to its location between the Meuse and Rhine rivers. Its position, however, was outstripped by the routes of Agrippa’s roads in the northeast of Gaul, and the eventual location of

\textsuperscript{169} Rebou 1998, 149.
\textsuperscript{170} Bibracte still would have connected to old Gallic routes, but it still was not convenient for communication due to its location on the heights; Reddé 2015, 6; cf. Rebou 1998, 151.
\textsuperscript{171} Woolf 1998, 115; Reddé 2015, 4.
Augusta Treverorum would dominate the new route to the Rhineland.\textsuperscript{173} Despite the bridge across the Moselle dating dendrochronologically to 18/17 BCE, presumably built by Roman soldiers, the beginnings of the town only date to the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{174} Unlike Augustodunum, it does not appear that there was much development in the town prior to the laying out of the urban plan. This initial street grid was Augustan, turn of the century (5 BCE – 10 CE), and encompassed six by eight insulae. Sometime around this period, the Treveri erected a monumental stone dedication to Lucius and Gaius Caesar, and in the late Augustan and Tiberian periods many of the town’s early wooden buildings and habitations were built, which were neither grand nor ornate but did have plaster walls and murals.\textsuperscript{175} It appears, then, that for the Treveri, the urban developments were occurring simultaneously to the Roman campaigns across the Rhine. To an extent, this surely limited the early infrastructural investment of the city, due to both the costs of creating these structures and the costs of supporting Rome’s wars on the frontier. The wars were already placing a heavy burden on the Treveri – remember that Treveri are found in five of the known 28 auxilia units at this time, and that their location along the supply routes to the Rhineland armies had implications for their supply expectations for those forces – and these urban developments may have stretched the resources of some Treverans too thinly.

\textit{Elite competition}

\textsuperscript{173} Wightman 1985, 76; cf. Morscheiser-Niebergall 2009, 133.
\textsuperscript{174} Morscheiser-Niebergall 2009, 132.
\textsuperscript{175} Wightman 1985, 77; Morscheiser-Niebergall 2009, 132, 133; Reddé 2015, 12, 14. A forum was possibly in existence in some form prior to 21 CE, but later superstructures in Trier disturb and cover earlier archaeological horizons (Morscheiser-Niebergall 2009, 132).
Martial prowess and the ability to lead retainers and tribesmen into combat was highly valued among the pre-conquest Gallic elites, and incorporation into the Roman Empire offered limited acceptable opportunities to continue this tradition. This could have strained and exasperated martial competition not only between elites within their own tribes but between tribes too. The constrained competition for military prestige, which also limited advancement opportunities for provincial elite to enter imperial service, may be behind Gallic elites aligning themselves to debtors and other dissidents within their communities. Given that the leaders of the Treveran and Aeduan revolts likely inherited their citizenship, possibly even from fathers or grandfathers who had led forces in earlier decades (Tac. Ann. 3.40.1), they would have belonged to an older tribal elite. A generational gap in auxilia leadership could have placed tribal elite like Iulius Florus at a disadvantage in tribal and regional affairs, and men like him may have feared losing standing among their rivals and peers for local supremacy. The following section breaks up the opportunities for martial competition among Gallic elite based on what sorts of opportunities befell their tribes, which was partially determined by the status of the tribe and partially by if a tribe had access to “national” units (those largely composed of a single tribe) or to composite units (those comprising soldiers of several tribes).

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176 Roymans 1993, 35, 37-43. For Nico Roymans, martiality is “a way of life of a social group, in which warlike behaviour is an essential element, …[and] to a corresponding ideology which sanctions violent behaviour” (1993, 34).

177 It should be noted, however, that the value placed on martial virtues among native societies could vary not just within a region but in how soon martial values dropped out of favor and replaced by other forms of distinction and competition (Roymans 1993). A case will be made for the tribes involved in the revolts of 21 CE that elite competition had at least a partial role in the cases of some Gallic elites such as Florus and Sacrovir to revolt.

178 Cf. Roymans 1993, 40; Johnston 2017, 181. It is implied that neither Florus nor Sacrovir had led an auxilia units (though the latter had led tribal forces in putting down a revolt in 21 CE). Additionally, as Andrew Johnston reminds us via the series of Aeduan leaders in the Calenus family, a prominent Aeduan leader during the events of 68-70 CE, that “local power in Roman Gaul was not necessarily transmitted with ease from one generation to the next; status was expensively won and maintained” (2017, 180).
National units/Treveri

In the early Principate, there were some units akin to “national” units, units named after a tribe or those whose members mostly came from a single tribe. Here, one may expect that in the early period tribal elites had some access to leading such units if they existed for their tribe. This would have been the case for many of the tribes in the northeast of Gaul; Treveri, Ubii, Cannanefates, Tungri, and Sugambri all have evidence of units from this period.

Despite the Treveri appearing to have several units associated with the tribe, there is nothing to suggest that Iulius Florus ever had a unit of auxilia himself. It is possible that this could explain why he aligned himself with debtors. If a local notable aspired to move beyond local offices and priesthoods and start an equestrian career (cf. chapter 1), he likely needed to obtain imperial favor. One of the key ways to do this in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius was through leading auxilia units. It may be that in an attempt to compete with those tribal elites who were ascendant among the Treveri through leading auxilia units, Florus aligned himself with debtors and sought to alleviate Gallic debt issues to advance his place among his peers.

Now this is just conjecture, but one can guess that after attempting and failing to solve the debt issue through formal means (appealing to the governor, procurator, emperor, etc.- see examples on pages 59, 69, and 171), it was at this point that Iulius Florus attempted to induce an auxiliary unit to slaughter all the Roman businessmen at the start of his revolt (Tac. Ann. 3.42). If Roman

180 Cohors I Ubiorum equitata.
181 Ala I Cannanefatium.
182 Ala I Tungrorum.
183 Cohors I Sugambrorum veterana.
184 Obviously, there were other means of obtaining the favor of important imperial agents and family members, but those are beyond the scope of this study (cf. pages 24-5).
businessmen were the ones profiting from the loans and Florus destroyed the evidence of the loans, then the debt problem would theoretically have been solved.

If one follows the career of Florus’ rival, Iulius Indus, and the latter’s likely son-in-law, Gaius Iulius Alpinus Classicus, it is possible to see how quickly a family might advance with both opportunity and patronage. Because Florus revolted, Iulius Indus had the opportunity to lead Treveran irregular forces against Florus (Tac. Ann. 3.42).\textsuperscript{185} After this service, an ala was created and named after him, which suggests that Indus even led the unit initially.\textsuperscript{186} His daughter, Iulia Pacata I[ndiana/nduta?], married another Gaul, likely also a Treveran, Gaius Iulius Alpinus Classicianus, who was appointed procurator of Britain after the Boudican revolt (RIB 12; Tac. Ann. 14.38).\textsuperscript{187} Not only does Iulia’s name attest to the favor that her father likely received for his actions during the revolt of Florus (Pacata), but that her family’s connection surely helped her husband rise to a prominent procuratorship a few decades after Indus started his own career serving the empire.

**Composite Units**

While Gallia Belgica shows evidence of “national” units, no such units existed in Gallia Lugdunensis. Rather, there were composite units such as the alae and cohortes gallorum, which theoretically had Gauls from several tribes serving in each unit.\textsuperscript{188} For tribes such as the Turoni and Andecavi this type of unit was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, if a composite cohort had members from several smaller tribes in it, then it surely would have reduced the strains of conscription on each of those tribes. On the other hand, that also meant that only one

\textsuperscript{185} One cannot rule out, though, that he had previous experience leading armed forces.

\textsuperscript{186} See, Birley 1978.

\textsuperscript{187} On the daughter of Iulius Indus, see also CIL 13.3737 found at Trier. On the likely Treveran origins of Classicianus, see Grasby and Tomlin 2002, 65, 67; Birley 2005, 304; Gambash 2015, 109-110.

\textsuperscript{188} Cf. Gayet 2006, 76.
Gallic elite from those tribes would get to lead that unit. In other words, the formation of this type of unit restricted the number of opportunities for nobles in Gallia Lugdunensis to lead auxilia units, and thereby possibly limiting their opportunities for imperial advancement. This could in part explain why some elites, maybe from the Turoni and Andecavi, would ally themselves with other dissidents in leading revolts.

**Allied Tribes/Aedui**

Local elites from allied tribes such as the Aedui or Frisii had some limited opportunities to lead their fellow tribesmen into combat when they supplied invasion forces or were summoned to put down revolts in their region. The Aedui, as a federate tribe (Plin. *NH* 4.107), could have been exempt from conscription and there are no known Aeduan units. This may explain the rare appearances of Aedui in auxilia units. Those who did choose to serve in the auxilia voluntarily were unlikely to rise in Roman society because they had little chance to attain leading positions in their units. Rather, Aeduan elites occasionally were called upon to lead their fellow tribesmen into combat by Rome, such as Iulius Sacrovir had down in 21 CE (Tac. *Ann.* 3.41). Incidentally, his leadership role earlier in 21 CE may be why Iulius Sacrovir had a stockpile of arms and armor (Tac. *Ann.* 3.43). An argument could be made that a man like Sacrovir aligned his interests with Aeduan discontent because he was frustrated by his opportunities for advancement and prestige among Gallic communities. His tribe seems to have been in better financial state than the Treveri in Tacitus’ account, so it is unlikely that debt is what motivated him. Not only did

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189 Speidel 2016, 94-5.
190 For Nico Roymans, martial virtue may have quickly dissipated among those tribes with limited access to leading their fellow tribemen into combat, and that emphasis shifted to other forms of competition such as euergetism, and civic and religious offices (1993).
191 Gayet records only five known soldiers from the Aedui from the end of the Republic through the Severan period (2006, 105).
Sacrovir stockpiled weapons, but he also made use of gladiators in his revolt. This all suggests that the Aedui were less affected by the demands of Rome’s long wars in Germania than some other tribes. Yet, Sacrovir led a revolt: why? The Aedui were one of Rome’s oldest allies in Gallia Comata (Caes. BGall. 1.33.2) and it is possible that they were losing their standing among their peers to upstarts with better opportunities for advancement or feared that they were being eclipsed by others. This may in part explain why Aeduan elite had developed Augustodunum as much as they had in its early years. Because there were very limited means for Aeduan elites to attain martial values, if an Aeduan elite wanted to maintain his status among his peers beyond his tribe, he had to advance within the provincial system. This is a tribe that had furnished the Altar of the Three Gauls with its first chief priest, C. Iulius Vercondaridubnus (Liv. Per. 139). It is possible that it was becoming more difficult for someone like Sacrovir to stand above his peers and so he revolted in an attempt to change his situation.

**Conclusion**

Long-term campaigning across the Rhine had a remarkably detrimental effect upon the population of the hinterland. These wars removed young men, animals, and food from various Gallic communities and the longer warfare dragged on across the Rhine, it both incrementally increased the burden on locals as well as increased the risk for more Gauls to fall into debt. Authors have tended to emphasize the costs of only the last three years of the German Wars, the campaigns of Germanicus from 14-16 CE, as playing a major role in overburdening the Gauls. But I think we need to go back further to explain why those years in particular were so devastating. From Drusus to the Varian disaster it seems that Gallic communities could handle

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the strains of supporting Rome’s forces along the Rhineland, but the increase in soldiers after the Varian Disaster in 9 CE, and the three major setbacks that befell Roman forces in 15 and 16 CE must have really drained Gaul’s resources. To recoup losses, Rome had to carry out special impositions after such events. One of the Gallic complaints in the lead up to the revolt was continuous tributes, and if scholars are right in suggesting that these tributes were the *ad hoc* impositions and tributes from the last years of the war and Rome continued these tributes even after the fighting in order to replenish the state’s coffers, then I think we can really see how the Gauls were overburdened by 21 CE. Despite this, only five tribes revolted. Surely Rome’s military efforts beyond the Rhine impacted more than just the five tribes that risked everything by revolting. With that in mind, I think that there was a sizeable portion of the Gallic population that was sympathetic to the causes of the Turoni, Andecavi, Treveri, Aedui, and Sequani. With that being stated, though, the leaders of other tribes probably weighed their options and determined it was not worth the risk or, some were simply waiting to see if those rebels would be successful before possibly joining. In the end, the movements of the rebels were not unified to an extent to have caused Rome any serious issues.

**Revolts in Illyricum: Dalmatian Revolt (10 BCE) and the Great Illyrian Revolt (6-9 CE)**

As Chapter 3 had relied upon Gallic evidence to analyze the burden levels placed upon indigenous populations in regions neighboring a war front, the following two case studies are informed by the example of Gaul. Like Gaul, Illyricum experienced Augustan era expansion within its borders, but was also a staging ground for military campaigns beyond the province. In the wars of expansion in this region Rome would have relied on support from the populations of Illyricum, Macedonia, northern Italy, and Gaul. While this would have distributed the burden of
impositions, a large part of that burden, however, would still have been placed on the populations of Illyricum due to its proximity to the war fronts and Roman operational bases. The five legions stationed in Illyricum for most of the period would have required supplies for campaigns and winter quarters, to be (re)furnished with military equipment, animals, porters, etc., and these needs would have largely been met by populations close to the military camps. Whereas Gaul had a nascent road system that could be utilized to extract materials from local populations for the armies, Illyricum did not. Its first Roman roads would not be completed until around 19 CE. Like Gaul, though, Illyricum had rivers that were equally useful in supplying the armies. But one may note that the spread of revolt in Illyricum in 6 CE was more significant than in Gaul, and it had required a major effort on Rome’s behalf to quell it. The rebels in the Great Illyrian revolt also appear to have been more unified in action than in the case of Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt. Service in the auxilia or even in irregular units alongside Roman ones in the years prior to the revolt may have fostered this unity. In these case studies, the focus will be on a survey of military campaigns in the periods prior to and during revolts in Illyricum to show which communities were most heavily burdened with impositions at different points in the Augustan era in an attempt to better understand why these two revolts occurred.

Dalmatian Revolt, 10 BCE

First, the Dalmatian revolt of 10 BCE. Little has been written of this revolt, probably because Cassius Dio left scholars with only very meagre details: “the Dalmatians rebelled against the exactions of tribute.” When this revolt is treated by scholars, it is done so in the context of the Pannonian War (12-11 BCE). This was a war of (re-)conquest engaged in the land between the

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193 Dyson 1971, 252-3.
194 “οἱ Δελμάται πρὸς τὰς ἐπαράξεις τῶν χρημάτων ἐπανέστησαν” (Cass. Dio 54.36.2- Earnest Cary trans.).
Sava (*Savus*) and Drava (*Dravus*) rivers, and the Dinaric Alps. Prior to this point, Roman territory in the region largely comprised the coastal cities and tribes of the Adriatic coastline, and a portion in the interior up to Segestica that had recently been conquered by Octavian (35-33 BCE).\(^{195}\) According to Cassius Dio’s accounts, the Roman campaigns in the late 10s BCE were a response to revolts against Rome among peoples beyond Roman direct control. This then, has led scholars recently to suspect that Augustus had received formal submissions from the tribes beyond the city of Segestica in 35 BCE, and that when some tribes had raided Roman territory twenty years later, Rome had perceived the situation as allies in revolt. As these tribes had come to terms with Rome without a fight during Octavian’s War in the 30s BCE, the subsequent war was, then, seemingly regarded by Romans as a war of reconquest, but in reality it was a war against peoples that Rome had not fought previously.\(^{196}\) The war that ensued was difficult, and Roman tributary exactions may have caused unrest not only in the territories annexed by Octavian in the 30s BCE, but possibly even in the coastal cities that had been under Roman control for over a century.\(^{197}\)

As one will see from an overview of Octavian’s war in Illyricum, many communities in Illyricum were already tributary to Rome prior to 10 BCE. It is difficult to assert, however, that the tribes subject to tribute exactions had tribute imposed on them regularly until the 10s BCE. Illyricum had only become a regularly appointed province in the wake of Octavian’s conquest, probably at some time between 32 and 27 BCE,\(^{198}\) which means that when the Dalmatian revolt broke out in 10 BCE, it was a relatively new province. As the integration of new provinces into the framework of Roman administrative apparatuses could be a lengthy process, it would be no

\(^{195}\) Džino 2010, 113.

\(^{196}\) Džino 2012, 465, 471-2, 475


surprise that tribute would only begin to be regularly exacted in the 10s BCE. A case will be made that Rome was seeking to exert closer control over the region after 16 BCE, which not only led to the Pannonian War, but was also the first effort to incorporate Roman territories in Illyricum into the empire’s extraction schemes. This would involve not only annual tribute exaction but also include ad hoc impositions to support Rome’s wars in the region.  

Illyricum from 40 BCE to 10 BCE

War of Octavian (35-33 BCE)

Regardless of Octavian’s motives for the campaigns, he waged a war that was a combination of retaliation and conquest in Dalmatia.

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199 On the lack of military interventions in the region between 33 and 16 BCE, see Džino 2010, 119; Kovács 2014, 25.
between 35 and 33 BCE. As a prelude to this war, Octavian was leading operations in Dalmatia around 39 BCE to harden his forces (Vell. Pat. 2.78.2). These activities may have been aimed at tribes like the Delmatae who still held standards captured in battle against A. Gabinius in 48 BCE. In 35 BCE, the principal targets of Octavian’s campaign were the Iapodes and Segestici. There were also simultaneous operations conducted in the Adriatic against island communities accused of piracy, and in northeast Italy against tribes such as the Carni and Taurisci to the northeast of Aquileia who were threatening the security of Italy (App. Ill. 16; Cass. Dio 49.35.1). Octavian’s operation initially moved along the coast down to the port at Senia on the Adriatic. From here he moved eastwards into the Dinaric Alps, taking hillforts along the way (App. Ill. 16; Cass. Dio 49.35.1). After crossing the Alps, he took the chief place of the transalpine Iapodes at Metulum (App. Ill. 17, 18-21; Cass. Dio 49.35.2-4; Suet. Aug. 20). Next, he advanced on to Segestica via the Kupa river valley (Colapis), where he conducted a 30-day blockade of the city in order to receive its surrender (App. Ill. 17, 22-4; Cass. Dio 49.36.1, 37). Tribes neighboring Segestica then submitted to Octavian without a fight (Cass. Dio 49.37.6). Presumably, it is these unnamed tribes neighboring Segestica that Roman agents would have to (re)conquer twenty years later in the lead up to the Dalmatian revolt of 10 BCE.

Octavian was called back into the region when the Segestici and Dalmatians rebelled. Upon arriving, he found out that the garrison left in Segestica had recovered the position (App. Ill. 24; Cass. Dio 49.38.1-3), so Octavian then set about securing the region to the south of the Iapodes. The year 34 BCE saw Octavian and Agrippa campaign against the Delmetae in the

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201 The Iapodes had plundered the colony at Tergeste and led raids against Aquileia in the years prior to Octavian’s campaign in 35 BCE (App. Ill. 18).
202 Wilkes 1969, 48-51; Kovács 2014, 24; Mócsy 1974, 22; Radman-Livaja 2012, 182; Šašel Kos 2013, 188-92. On the map, I assume that the fleets operating in the Adriatic had come from Sicily after the War with Sextus Pompeius rather than from ports in Italy.
hinterland of Salona (App. *Ill*. 25; Str. 7.5.5). After the Delmetae surrendered to Octavian in the winter of 34/33 BCE, he marched against the neighboring regions and accepted the submission of several tribes.\textsuperscript{203}

Octavian’s conquests in Illyricum had extended Roman control over the eastern Adriatic coast into its immediate hinterland (up to the foothills of the Dinaric Alps) and brought a more effective control over tribal coalitions like the Iapodes and Delmetae. This territory was soon consolidated and organized as a regular province, placed under Senatorial control in 27 BCE. As part of the consolidation process colonies were founded or strengthened along the coast at Pola, Iader, Salona, Narona, and Epidaurum.\textsuperscript{204} Movements into the interior against the Carni, Taurisci, and, especially, the Segestici brought new peoples into Rome’s orbit, many of whom would fall under tighter Roman control only in the 10s BCE. Roman intervention was significantly minor in this latter region. It is possible that the tribes that had submitted to Octavian without a fight were set to pay tribute to Rome, but there is no certainty that it had been imposed regularly given Rome’s inactivity in the region over the following years: Rome’s presence in this part of Illyricum was minimal and it was more concerned with consolidating its hold over the hinterland of the Adriatic coast. In other words, Rome exercised no direct control over the populations in the frontier zone. It is known, though that some sort of formal relationships or alliances were made with the tribes near Segestica that had submitted to Octavian, with or without a fight, because Cassius Dio presents Roman interventions in Illyricum in the late 10s BCE not as conquests but as putting down rebellious tribes. In the period between Octavian’s war and the Pannonian War, 32-14 BCE, Rome appears to have been satisfied with

\textsuperscript{203} Wilkes 1969, 51, 53-5; Radman-Livaja 2012, 183; Mőcsy 1974, 22; Šašel Kos 2013, 192-3. Džino equates Appian’s Daisioi with the Daesititates as one of the peoples Rome established a relationship with at this time. This tribe would later be heavily involved in the Great Illyrian revolt. He supposes either a campaign or that Rome had received a *deditio* without a fight (Džino 2012, 465).
\textsuperscript{204} Wilkes 1969, 57; Džino 2010, 124; *idem* 2012, 463.
indirect control over the tribes in and beyond the Dinaric Alps so long as they did not threaten the security of the coastal Adriatic or northern Italy. But, by 16 BCE a new generation was coming to power among the tribal elite that was willing to challenge the status quo with Rome.\textsuperscript{205}

**Regional warfare (16-14 BCE)**

Around 16 BCE, the regions bordering the province of Illyricum were disturbed by continued raids from Alpine and Pannonian tribes. This situation necessitated Rome to transfer more forces into the region and for the governors of Illyricum to campaign in the Alpine region and the lands beyond Octavian’s conquests in Illyricum. These wars would have required increased levies in financial, human, and natural resources to support these operations. It is in this context that Illyricum would likely have been integrated into Rome’s routine provincial extraction schemes; in other

\textsuperscript{205} Džino 2010, 124; idem 2012; Kovacs 2014, 25.
words, the indigenous population of Illyricum was not only experiencing routine annual extractions from Rome for the first time, but at a time when Rome was also frequently imposing ad hoc levies to support military operations; i.e. a high risk for perceived or real overburdening of the indigenous populations. In 16 BCE the governor of Illyricum, Silius Nerva, took the forces of Illyricum, probably operating from Aquileia, to campaign against the Cammunes and Vennones in the foothills of the central Alps (Cass. Dio 54.20.1). In his absence, Noricans and Pannonians (likely Taurisci and other peoples neighboring Istria) raided Istria but were defeated by Silius and his legates upon their return (Cass. Dio 54.20.2). The kingdom of Noricum was probably annexed at this time as a result of the invasion. Further to the
east, the Scordisci and Dentheleta invaded Macedonia, which would require Roman campaigning to secure Macedonia’s northern border (Cass. Dio 54.20.3).206

The following year, Tiberius and Drusus led a coordinated attack on the Raeti and Vindelici, the latter likely using Aquileia as his operational base. Drusus probably utilized the forces of Illyricum for this campaign, which means that it would have been supported in part by communities there and in northeastern Italy. In either 15 or 14 BCE, a commander, possibly Tiberius, was sent against the Scordisci and neighboring Thracian tribes who were causing problems for Macedonia (Vell. Pat. 2.39.3; Euseb. Chron. 167f).207 While Mócsy seems to suggest that the campaign could not have been conducted without Rome possessing Siscia, it is more probable that the campaign was conducted from Macedonia as Rome did not yet control the route through the Savus valley to the Scordisci.208 Regardless, the legionary forces in Illyricum were likely occupied with Drusus’ Alpine campaign in 15 BCE, and Macedonia still had a legionary garrison of its own at this date. This campaign against the Scordisci was important because it brought the town of Sirmium into Roman control, which would serve as an important operational base in the Pannonian War and the Great Illyrian revolt.

**Pannonian War (13-11 BCE)**

After these campaigns, Augustus had determined that further actions were required in order to gain firmer control over the peoples between the Sava river and Dinaric Alps. Previously, some of the indigenous populations within this region were loosely bound in relationships to Rome.

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206 Wilkes 1969, 59; Džino 2012, 469; Mócsy 1962, col 540-1; Kovács 2014, 27. Noricum may have been attached to Illyricum for military affairs, Džino 2010, 140.
207 Kovács 2014, 27; Mócsy 1962, col. 540-1; Džino 2012, 469; Wilkes 1969, 61. On the debate over who was the commander see Džino 2010, 128-9; idem 2012, 469n32; Wilkes 1969, 61. From Aquileia Drusus would have marched into the mountains via Tridentum in the Adige river valley (Atesis), then through either the Brenner or Reschen Passes and into the Inn valley (Aenus).
208 Mócsy 1974, 23; Wilkes 1969, 61; Džino 2010, 129; Syme 1933a, 23-4; idem 1934, 118.
The Pannonian War was broadly consistent with the previously mentioned campaigns aimed at securing northern Italy and Macedonia.²⁰⁹

Pannonians had raided Istria in 16 BCE, and some Dalmatians rebelled in the same year (Cass. Dio 54.20.1-3).

Pannonians then rebelled in 14 BCE but were quickly subdued (Cass. Dio 54.24.3). Initially, Augustus sent M. Vinicius in 13 BCE to campaign against the tribes living between the Drava and Sava, maybe against the Breuci (Flor. 2.24).²¹⁰ The situation, however,

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²⁰⁹ Kovács 2014, 27; Eck 2007, 129; Džino 2012, 461, 467; idem 2014, 222.
²¹⁰ Wilkes 1969, 63. He also notes that this may be when the camp at Poetovio was founded.
appears to have been serious enough to warrant Augustus to send Agrippa with supreme command over operations late in 13 BCE, with Vinicius to stay on as his second in command (Cass. Dio 54.28.1; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.96.2). His arrival in the region over the winter 13/12 BCE prompted Pannonian tribes to cease fighting, but his death soon thereafter led to renewed rebellion (cf. Cass. Dio 54.31.2-3).211

In Agrippa’s place, Augustus appointed Tiberius to lead the campaigns (Cass. Dio 54.31.2; Vell. Pat. 2.96.1). His first campaign appears to have been against tribes to the west of the Scordisci, such as the Breuci and maybe the Andizetes, as Tiberius called upon the Scordisci to aid him in the campaign (Cass. Dio 54.31.3; Suet. Tib. 9.2). This likely resulted in a pincer movement with the Scordisci approaching the Sava and Drava valleys from the east, and Tiberius from either Poetovio or Siscia. After his victory, Tiberius broke his foes’ weapons and sold the men of military age into slavery to prevent further disturbances; such a harsh treatment was also intended to scare other tribes into cooperation/submission (Flor. 2.24; Cass. Dio 54.31.3).212

In the final year of the Pannonian War, Tiberius campaigned against both Dalmatians and Pannonians. While Cassius Dio suggests that the operations were in response to two separate revolts – the latter taking advantage of the army’s absence (Cass. Dio 54.34.3) – there is evidence in his account to suggest that Tiberius had already planned for coordinated campaigns from the north and south in this year. As Cassius Dio states that Tiberius moved against both groups simultaneously, shifting from one to the other (Cass. Dio 54.34.3), it is likely that

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212 Wilkes 1969, 63; Mócsy 1962, col. 540-1; Džino 2012, 470-1; Kovács 2014, 28; Syme 1933a, 23-4; Goodman 2012, 93 (state terror); Brunt 1990c, 256. Kovács suggests a pincer movement from Italy and Macedonia, but the Scordisci under the command of one of Tiberius’ legates from Sirmium, and Tiberius from Poetovio or Siscia is equally viable. Brunt and Goodman argue that Tiberius’ measures after the campaign were done to ensure the compliance of others and to assure the submission of the Breuci themselves.
Tiberius was waging war on communities south of the Sava river and to the interior of the Dalmatian coast. Here, one may envision operations being conducted from Siscia in the north, and maybe Burnum and Tilurium in the south against tribes such as the Ditiones, Maezaei, and Daesitiates. But, it is also possible that the southern operation may have been conducted against the Delmetae.\textsuperscript{213} After this campaign, Augustus made Illyricum an imperial province because he perceived a continued need to maintain an armed garrison and to deal with potential threats, internal and external (Cass. Dio 54.34.4).

After the war, Tiberius left Illyricum to join Augustus and Drusus in Gaul, but in his absence two incidents brought him back in the spring of 10 BCE. First, Dacians crossed the frozen Danube (\textit{Danuvius}) over the winter and raided Pannonian peoples (Cass. Dio 54.36.2). Raids such as this could have a destabilizing effect on the local population, and this may have been the intent of the Dacians.\textsuperscript{214} Roman campaigns in the region from 13-11 BCE would likely have resulted in Rome establishing pro-Roman indigenous elites in power. It is possible that factions within some Pannonian tribes could have collaborated with Dacians across the Danube, but it is equally plausible that this was a Dacian initiative. Regardless, it yielded the same result, political instability in a recently conquered territory. Second, some communities in Dalmatia rebelled against the exaction of tribute (Cass. Dio 54.36.2). There are two plausible explanations for why this rebellion occurred. The first is that this was a rebellion conducted by the tribes in Dalmatia that Tiberius had just (re-)subjugated in 11 BCE. If this was the case, then it would have been an anti-fiscal revolt against Rome’s right to impose tribute over them (see pages 170-1). The second explanation is that the populations already under Roman control were rebelling because they were overburdened by the recent wars. While the first scenario requires no further

\textsuperscript{213} Džino 2012, 470; Wilkes 1969, 64; Kovács 2014, 28-9.
\textsuperscript{214} Džino 2012, 471, 473 with references. On raids destabilizing other regions, see census of Drusus case study, pages 131-46.
analysis, it is necessary in the second scenario to assess the probable logistical and recruitment burdens Rome’s armies had on Illyricum since 16 BCE, when campaigns in the region resumed in earnest.

**Logistics in Illyricum, 16 – 11 BCE**

It is difficult to state with any sort of confidence how large the garrison of Illyricum was between Octavian’s war in 30s BCE and the end of the Cantabrian Wars in 19 BCE, but one to three legions are a suitable conjecture. It is likely, however, that when Augustus shifted legions after the Cantabrian Wars, the garrison of Illyricum, including those legions stationed around Aquileia, was increased to five legions prior to the Alpine campaigns in 15 BCE.\(^{215}\) This is the same number of legions as there were in the province in 6 CE, at the start of the Great Illyrian revolt. For the sake of simplicity, if one uses Tacitus’ statement that there were roughly as many auxiliaries as there were legionaries, then this would suggest that there were roughly 50,000 soldiers operating in Illyricum in this period (Tac. *Ann.* 4.5; see further page 174n14). On top of the garrison’s annual nutritional needs (on the table above), the soldiers would have needed an unknown amount of food and fodder for their animals, and arms, armor, and equipment for soldiers. They also needed an equally unknowable number of porters and drivers, draft animals, cavalry horses, ships for transporting men and supplies. These items would have been largely provided via requisitions, contracts, and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army of Illyricum/year</th>
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<td>50,000 soldiers</td>
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| Grain | 15,512.5t |
| Meat | 4,142.75t |
| Vegetables | 730-912.5t |
| Cheese | 492.75t |
| Wine | 2,920t |

*Table 7: Rations Required for the Army of Illyricum*

\(^{215}\) Wilkes 1969, 62; Radman-Livaja 2012, 162-3; Syme 1933a, 23.
compulsory deliveries. The impressment of civilians and requisitioning of animals would have deeply impacted communities and their abilities to endure further extractions. As descriptions of the campaigns involved are so brief it is impossible to specify how heavy the burden was for the population of Dalmatia to provide Illyricum’s forces with its needs over the course of recent wars, though it is safe to assume that the burden levels would have been heavier than the years prior to 16 BCE.

The legions in Gaul described in Chapter 3 for the most part maintained a certain number of summer and winter camps along the Rhineland for the duration of the period studied. In Illyricum, however, the legions were likely just as concentrated as those in Gaul (split between one and three camps at a time) but shifted to different areas of the province as needs arose. This situation probably continued until the very last years of Augustus’ reign. The frequent shifting of legions across the province means that it is more difficult to analyze the logistical burden levels of communities than Gaul. Nevertheless, nevertheless an attempt will be made.

The first task is to hypothesize where the legions were located during the six years of campaigning prior to the Dalmatian revolt. From this, it is possible to make educated guesses on what communities were the most impacted by supply demands. In the six years prior to the Dalmatian revolt the army of Illyricum campaigned yearly along the frontiers of the province. In 16 and 15 BCE, the armies likely operated out of camps around Aquileia against Alpine tribes. To deal with a Pannonian revolt in 14 BCE, legions probably operated out of Aquileia or Siscia. During the Pannonian War, 12-11 BCE, Illyricum’s armies probably operated from a range of camps at Poetovio, Siscia, Sirmium, Tilurium, and Burnum. Marcus Vinicius’ campaign in 13

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216 See further pages 178-80 for examples of how military setbacks could significantly impact local communities.
218 Many of the camps in Illyricum are notoriously difficult to date, and one must accept a certain level of conjecture (Radman-Livaja 2012, 164; Wilkes 2005, 149). Segestica/Siscia was occupied during Octavian's war in the 30s.
BCE probably used Siscia and/or Poetovio as operational bases. Tiberius’ first campaign involved a pincer movement, likely from Sirmium and Siscia/Poetovio. In his second campaign, Tiberius probably used Siscia from the north, and maybe also utilized Burnum and Tilurium in his southern operations.219

In Gaul, the role of the emerging road system had a profound impact on supply burden levels as it opened more communication routes through the interior of Gaul, which allowed the state to more thoroughly extract people and resources from Gallic communities than before. A military road system would not come into being in Illyricum, however, until after the Great Illyrian revolt; in fact, the first roads would not be completed until around 19 CE.220 As a result Roman forces were forced to rely heavily on the riverine system of Illyricum for the movement of supplies.221

BCE, and it was likely occupied throughout the rest of the Augustan period with varying garrison sizes (Wilkes 1969, 91; Radman-Livaja 2012, 183; Mócsy 1974, 43). Sirmium was certainly in use by 12 BCE and continued to be an important military site during the Great Illyrian revolt (Wilkes 1969, 61-2; idem 2006, 149; Mócsy 1974, 42; Đžino 2012, 471; Radman-Livaja 2012, 163-4). Poetovio was likely founded in the context of the Pannonian Wars, or possibly in the years immediately before it (Wilkes 1969, 63, 92; Radman-Livaja 2012, 162-4). Some have argued that Burnum was occupied as early as Octavian’s campaigns, and the site was occupied by Legio XX after the Great Illyrian revolt. This leaves it highly plausible as a site utilized during the Pannonian Wars (Šašel Kos 2006. But see Wilkes 1969, 57, 91-2). There is a lot of debate on when the camp at Tilurium was founded, but the latest plausible date is 9 CE. Most scholars date the occupation of Tilurium to when Legio VII (nicknamed Macedonica, later Claudia Pia Fidelis) first arrived in Dalmatia; most propose 7-9 CE for the date of the legion’s arrival in Dalmatia (Mitchell 1976a; Sanader and Tončinić 2010, 45- with further discussion of the literature). It is possible, however, that other forces occupied Tilurium prior to Legio VII, namely either during Octavian’s War or by the start of the Pannonian War (Radman-Livaja 2012, 162-4; Sanader 2017, 402-3- suggests Legio IX Hispana prior to Legio VII (CIL 3.13977), cf. Šašel Kos, 2006; Wilkes 1969, 57, 91-2). A few military sites belonging to various periods of the Augustan era have been recently discovered along the route between Aquileia and Siscia via Mt. Ocra that reveal the importance of this route for the movement of men and supplies to and from the Sava river Valley (for instance see Mason (2008) and Guštin (2015), both with references to the growing literature on sites in this region. cf. Mráv 2010-2013).

220 For instance, Đžino 2010, 141.
While Aquileia and Siscia/Poetovio were the most utilized camps in this period, it is not likely that tribes such as the Carni, Taurisci, Breuci (after 11 BCE), nor Istria were involved in the revolt. Cassius Dio is explicit in declaring that the anti-fiscal revolt broke out in Dalmatia. By this he surely means the province of Dalmatia as it existed in his day, which would rule these places out. This then leaves the tribes of Dalmatia. In the north, the Iapodes, Colapiani, and Segestici would have been among the likely communities burdened with supplying camps at Aquileia, Poetovio, and Siscia. Along the coast to the south tribes like the Liburni, Delmatae, and Naresii could have supplied Aquileia via the ports on the Adriatic, and the camps at Tilurium and Burnum in 11 BCE from their hinterlands. All these tribes, especially those on the coast are the most likely candidates for the revolt if it was caused by war time burdens. With the exception of the Colapiani, all of these tribes had major urban centers accessible along routes to and from the camps of the period. Most of the urban centers in Illyricum in this period were concentrated on the coast, with notable exceptions such as Metulum among the transalpine Iapodes and Segestica among the Segestici. Urban centers in the interior of Illyricum were largely not founded until Claudius or the Flavians. As Rome relied on obtaining supplies through a mixture of taxation and requisitions from urban centers, which eased the burden of acquisition by being focal points for gathering natural, financial, and human resources, the absence of centralizing urban centers and Roman military roads would have made it difficult for Rome to effectively extract goods and money from the populations of Dalmatia’s interior. This then would suggest that Rome relied

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222 These three camps would likely have been partially supplied from transpadane Italy. Aquileia had the advantage of being on the Adriatic and could be supplied by land and sea. Like Poetovio and Siscia, Aquileia could be supplied by Iapodes, Taurisci, Carni, and Segestici through rivers and routes leading to and from depots like Emona. Recent camps in the area between Nauportus/Emona and the Sava river reveal the movement of men and goods from northeast Italy or the interior of Illyricum (see n218 for references on these camps). See references in previous note for potential routes to Aquileia, the Sava, and Drava.

223 Cf. Syme 1933b, 69.

heavily on the urban centers of the Adriatic coast and the few centers located on the major rivers of the interior for the needs of Rome’s forces in Illyricum in this period.

This argument cannot be stretched too far, though, for there always remains the distinct possibility that tribes from the interior, like the Maezaei, Ditiones, and Daesititates, revolted in the years immediately following their conquest because Rome attempted to impose tribute over them (i.e. not due to burden levels). There will always be the possibility that the Dalmatian revolt of 10 BCE was an instance where indigenous populations were actively resisting Rome’s authority to impose exactions over them; the sort of situation that most often occurred shortly after conquest or annexation.225

Conscription (20s BCE – 6 CE)

Conscription and auxilia service in Illyricum is poorly attested epigraphically prior to the Great Illyrian revolt of 6-9 CE. With that in mind, this brief section will apply evidence to both the Pannonian revolt and the Great Illyrian revolt. Scholars argue that the majority of auxiliary units known from Illyricum in the early Principate were raised in the aftermath of the Great Illyrian revolt.226 This would apply to the vast majority of indigenous units known from Illyricum such as the eight cohortes Breucorum, eight cohortes Pannoniorum, one cohors Varcianorum (Varciani), and a cohors I Latobicorum et Varcianorum (Latobici and Varciani).227 There are some tantalizing clues, however, to suggest that there were at least some auxiliary units raised in the region prior to the Great Illyrian revolt and that irregular forces were utilized as well. The reason for the general lack of evidence of Dalmatian and Pannonian units in Illyricum in the

225 See pages 170-1. One can also see possible parallels in the Varian Disaster in 9 CE, pages 267-82, and to a degree in the Cietan revolt in 36 CE, pages 123-31.
226 This is a situation similar to Thracian units being raised after the Thracian revolt in 26 CE. for instance, see Holder 1980, 112; Ferjančić 2018.
227 Kovács 2014, 28.
Augustan period may be twofold. First, the epigraphic habit of soldiers, especially *auxilia*, was quite rare in the Augustan period across the whole empire. Second, Dalmatian and Pannonian units had a very brief stay in Illyricum (c.16 BCE – 9 CE), because they were sent out of the province in response to the Great Illyrian revolt. This may in part explain the rarity of early evidence from auxiliary units while they were serving in Illyricum itself.

Statements in Velleius Paterculus’ account suggest that units were already in existence by the start of the Great Illyrian revolt. Not only did they have infantry and cavalry trained at arms, but they were familiar with Roman discipline (Vell. Pat. 2.110). I.P. Haynes argues that this portion of the rebel forces came from regular auxiliary units. Beyond the literary evidence, there are two cavalry units that were likely created sometime between 16 BCE and 6 CE. The *Ala I Pannoniorum* served in Illyricum in the Augustan period as evidenced by *CIL* 3.2016. The deceased was a *duplicarius* in the unit and had died after serving for eleven years during the Augustan period, which means that the unit was created in 3 CE at the latest. As most units were created in the lead up to a war or during one, it is likely that the unit was either established for one of the campaigns in the region between the Pannonian War and the campaign of Gn. Cornelius Lentulus (Augur) (13 BCE-4 CE). The second probable unit from this period is the *Ala II Pannoniorum*, which Spaul has suggested was already serving in Syria by 7/8 CE, but firm evidence is lacking. It is important to recall that *auxilia* service lasted for twenty-five years, so families affected by conscription basically forever lost the production capabilities of a household member in the prime of their years.

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228 Haynes 2013, 122-3.
229 Holder 1980, 283; Spaul 1994, 174, 261. See also *CIL* 2.4227 and 4228 for soldiers who were recruited in the Augustan period, but died during Tiberius’ reign after twenty-three years’ service.
Beyond this, there is literary evidence of irregular units being utilized twice between 16 BCE and 6 CE. In the first instance, the Scordisci assisted Tiberius in his campaign against the Breuci in 12 BCE (see above). The tribe had recently been pacified and their treaty or submission to Rome likely stipulated that the tribe could be called upon to aid in wars. In the second case, the Great Illyrian revolt began when Dalmatians were summoned to campaign with Tiberius in Bohemia, and they realized their strength (Cass. Dio 55.29.2). It is likely that these were not isolated incidents, and that allied and subject peoples in Illyricum were called upon from time to time to serve in campaigns or for the duration of wars as irregular forces. Compared to conscription into the full-time auxiliary units, service in irregular forces would have had a short-term impact on the populations affected. If the military aged men survived their brief service to Rome, they still would have been removed from production activities for the duration of campaign seasons, if not longer. The more frequent the call to serve Rome, the greater the impact it would have had on subject and allied populations; the same may be said for iterant conscription to create or replenish auxilia units.

There is still one more wartime factor that would have impacted subject populations in the years following the Pannonian War. In addition to the likely use of allied and subject tribes as irregular forces during these wars, Tiberius sold prisoners of war in 12 BCE as slaves beyond the province (Cass. Dio 54.31.2-4). Tiberius’ action here was not only meant to make an example out of the Breuci to deter other tribes from resisting Rome, but was also done to ensure that the Breuci would be incapable of fighting against Rome again for some time. The wholesale removal of young men and adults of military age from a tribe would have had an enormously detrimental impact for the communities affected, not just in terms of familial grieving, but in the

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231 Haynes 2013, 122.
232 Džino 2012, 471. See page 246n212 above for further references.
fiscal and humanistic capabilities to endure further burdens such as taxes, conscription, impressment, requisitions, etc. As will be discussed in more detail below, it is then not wholly surprising that when the next generation of young boys grew up and was summoned for war, it took the opportunity to revolt against the heavy burdens that had been placed on their tribe since Tiberius sold the prisoners of war into slavery.

**Great Illyrian revolt**

The final revolt under review here is the Great Illyrian revolt that lasted from 6 to 9 CE, and had required ten legions, a third of Rome’s legionary power, to deal with it. While there are two relatively complete ancient narratives of the revolt, by Velleius Paterculus (who had served under Tiberius during the revolt) and Cassius Dio, it is impossible to reconstruct the exact chronology or sequence of events, so the narrative of the events in the revolt portrayed below should be taken as an approximation.\(^{233}\)

Cassius Dio is very clear on both what had sparked the revolt and what was the underlying cause, and this is largely reflected in how scholars have approached this revolt previously.\(^{234}\) The occasion that sparked the revolt was Valerius Messalla Messalinus’ summoning *auxilia* and irregular tribal forces to campaign north of the Danube against Maroboduus in Bohemia. Some of the tribesmen realized the opportunity that the unified strength of these summoned soldiers represented and incited the revolt (Cass. Dio 55.29.1-3).

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\(^{233}\) Šašel Kos 2015, 71.

\(^{234}\) Kovács 2014, 31; Dise 1991, 32-3; Wilkes 1969, 69- adds to Cassius Dio by stating that “a new generation had grown up eager to recover the freedom lost by their fathers” (in other words, it was a freedom movement); Mócsy 1974, 37- emphasizing conscription, citing that this was the first time Pannonians were enlisted in the Roman army; Zaninović 2010, 28- focusing on conscription; Džino 2010, 142, who adds to Cassius Dio’s claims by stating that the population between the Drava river and the Dinaric Alps were growing resentful over socio-cultural and provincialization changes. Young power-hungry nobles, who had greater links to Roman socio-political culture latched onto the discontented conservative elements within their society (Džino 2010, 142-4- influenced here by Dyson 1971; see also Šašel Kos 2015, 72). On aspects of acculturation, see further pages 16-7.
Cassius Dio, however, recognized that opportunity alone would not have caused the revolt, and that there must have been some underlying tensions present in Illyricum. The tension he supplied as the cause of the revolt was that the Dalmatians were chafing under the tributes levied by Rome (Cass. Dio 55.29.1). As was examined in the chapter above, tribute alone rarely incited mass resistance, especially on the scale of the Great Illyrian revolt. This was the case because Rome often levied tribute and taxes at preconquest levels (or lower) and would rarely raise the rates. Rather, it was revealed that anti-fiscal revolts often broke out around wartime contexts in neighboring regions as iterant conscription, military supply needs, requisitions, and ad hoc levies contributed to a real or perceived sense of being overburdened. Steady warfare in the areas bordering Octavian’s coastal province of Illyricum in the 10s BCE had two consequences relevant to this study. The first is that Roman campaigning on the fringes of Illyricum placed a heavy burden on the local population and was surely the cause of the Dalmatian revolt of 10 BCE. The second, is that regional instability required Rome to directly control the tribes between the Dinaric Alps and the Sava. This created a new frontier zone, opened new supply routes for Illyricum’s armies, and expanded who was liable for supporting these forces. As will soon be shown, most of the tribes that were involved in the Great Illyrian revolt were recently annexed during the Pannonian War and were among those indigenous communities most heavily burdened with supporting Rome in its wars along the new frontier zones in the years preceding the revolt. It is also important to remember that the Pannonian War had devastating effects on the indigenous populations, especially the Breuci (see above), and that this would have affected their capabilities of bearing Roman levies in the long-term.

By Dalmatia, Cassius Dio means those people living within the province of his day, Dalmatia in the 2nd century CE; he was not using it as an ethnic identifier because several of the rebel tribes were ethnically Pannonian. Cf. Džino 2014, 222; idem 2012 473, 475. Džino suggests that one of the outcomes of the Pannonian War was that Rome had a stronger regional presence, had replaced tribal leadership with other elites who had a pro-Roman stance, and had created “tighter conditions of alliance” with the tribes they had campaigned against (2012, 475).
Military Events 9 BCE – 5 CE

After the Dalmatian revolt in 10 BCE, Romans had to campaign twice in the region.

Before late summer in 9 BCE, Tiberius campaigned against rebelling Dalmatians and Pannonians (Cass. Dio 55.2.4). Given that recent campaigns had been waged between the Dinaric Alps and the Sava river, Wilkes has plausibly suggested that this was where Tiberius was active in 9 BCE. After Drusus’ death, Tiberius was transferred to the Rhine frontier and Sextus Appuleius became governor of Illyricum, who then campaigned against Pannonians in 8 BCE, possibly

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237 Wilkes 1969, 65; cf. Syme 1933b, 70. Tiberius completed the campaign in 9 BCE prior to Drusus’ fatal horse-riding accident.
in the area between the Drava and Danube rivers.\textsuperscript{238}

While primary sources become very fragmentary in the period between 8 BCE and 6 CE, there is enough evidence to suggest that legates from Illyricum were very active campaigning around the Danube frontier prior to the Great Illlyrian revolt. Again, such campaigns would have negatively impacted the burden levels of the population of Illyricum. Iterant conscription and calls for tribal forces to accompany Rome on campaign would likely have occurred alongside ordinary tributary extractions, requisitions and impressments, all of which could have contributed to a sense of being overburdened by Roman demands. While Dise has argued that the tribes north of the Dinaric Alps were only integrated into Roman provincial extraction schemes at the time of the Great Illyrian revolt on the grounds that Rome was preparing for a major campaign against Maroboduus,\textsuperscript{239} the same argument may be made that these tribes were already experiencing Roman extractions by 5 BCE at the latest.

In these years there was a perceived growing threat to Roman security across the Danube in the form of the Marcomanni, who had recently migrated eastwards from the Main river (\textit{Mœnus}) region of Germania Magna to Bohemia (Flor. 2.30.23; Oros. \textit{Hist.} 6.21.15). Once there, their leader, Maroboduus, began carving out an empire. Roman activity beyond the Danube in this period may have been efforts at isolating or limiting the expansion of Maroboduus’ empire, as well as moves to drive a wedge between him and potential Dacian allies. This period of frequent campaigning would be the likely time for Rome to begin extracting human, natural, and financial resources from the populations north of the Dinaric Alps to support Roman campaign needs because they were among the tribes closest to Rome’s operational bases. First, L. Domitius

\textsuperscript{238} Cassiodorus Chron. 588-90- \textit{Per Sextum Apuleium Pannonii subacti} (590); Wilkes 1969, 66. Cf. Džino 2010, 140 for alternative views on when this region came under Roman control. It is unlikely that he had brought this whole region under Roman sway if this was in fact where he was campaigning.

\textsuperscript{239} Dise 1991, 32-3.
Ahenobarbus, probably between 5 and 2 BCE, marched west out of Illyricum (either from Poetovio or Aquileia) to cross the upper reaches of the Danube. Once there, he settled the migrating Hermunduri on the western fringes of Marcomannic territory. Afterwards, Ahenobarbus ended his campaign by leading his forces across the Elbe river (Albis) and entered into terms with tribes in the area (Cass. Dio 55.10a.2-3). Second, a fragmentary inscription from Tusculum provides insight to a campaign of another legate, maybe M. Vinicius, who fought tribes dwelling between Maroboduus and Dacian tribes; the Cotini, Osi, and Anartii (ILS 8965. cf. Str. 7.3.13). This campaign was likely conducted from Sirmium and may be conservatively dated to 10 BCE – 1 CE (but likely after Ahenobarbus). Third, in the years leading up to Rome’s intended campaign against Maroboduus (post 9 BCE, but likely between 6 BCE and 4 CE), Cn. Cornelius Lentulus led an operation from Illyricum to push Dacian and Sarmatian tribes back to the north side of the Danube (Tac. Ann. 4.44; Flor. 2.28-9). This was likely a move intended to prevent these tribes from intervening in a Roman war against the Marcomanni.  

**Overview of the Revolt, 6-9 CE**

With the Roman conquests in Germania Magna suitably advanced, and the Marcomanni increasingly isolated around the Danube region, Rome was ready to begin a major war on two fronts against Maroboduus; G. Sentius Saturninus from Mainz (Mogontiacum) and Tiberius with the Illyricum garrison from near Carnuntum. After Tiberius had taken the legions out of Illyricum, tribal and auxilia forces were assembling behind the frontlines to join the Roman commanders on the campaign. Under the influence of Bato of the Daesititates, some of these tribal forces took advantage of the garrison’s absence and revolted, angered by imperial...
exactions (Cass. Dio 55.29.1-3; cf. 56.16.3). Though it is known who started the revolt, it is difficult to ascertain where it began. All that can be stated is that it likely broke out wherever Roman agents had told the tribal and auxilia forces to gather for the campaign against Maroboduus, which was not necessarily in a rebel tribe territory nor at one of Rome’s existing camps. The revolt gained traction only after the rebels defeated remnants of the Roman garrison. This is when the Breuci, a generation after Tiberius had sold military age men into slavery, joined the revolt under the leadership of Pinnes and another Bato.\textsuperscript{242} Other tribes neighboring the Daesitiates and Breuci soon joined the revolt, which caused Rome to lose control of Illyricum

\textsuperscript{242} Wilkes 1969, 69; Kovács 2014, 31; Džino 2010, 142, 144.
between the Sava and the Dinaric Alps. By the end of the revolt, tribes such as the Andizetes, Amantini, Maezaei, Ditiones, and Delmetae would require Roman action.\textsuperscript{243}

To keep matters brief, only a broad sketch of the revolt is presented here.\textsuperscript{244} Rather than retreating to a defensible position, rebel leaders initially sought to press their advantage and seize key strategic points on the Adriatic coast and Sava river to cut off Roman operational and supply routes into the heartland of rebel territory (Vell. Pat. 2.110.4, cf. 2.112.2; Cass. Dio 55.29.3-4, 30.2.\textsuperscript{245} After the failure to capture points like Sirmium, Salona, and Siscia (presumably), the rebel forces largely turned towards a more defensive strategy of holding hillforts and strong points (Cass. Dio 55.30.2-4), leading raids against populations not in revolt (to damage Roman support and compel people to join the revolt- Cass. Dio 55.30.4-6), and ambush Roman forces (Vell. Pat. 2.112.4-6; Cass. Dio 55.32.3-4). This resulted in a long and difficult war for Tiberius where he would have to divide his forces and send them to trap rebel cells and force the latter into pitched battles (Vell. Pat. 2.112.3; Plin. NH 3.148), to capture numerous strong points (often in sieges), and to wear rebels down through plundering their territories and the famine that ensued (Cass. Dio 55.32.4, 33.1).\textsuperscript{246} To deal with the events of 6 CE, additional forces were sent from the east and emergency recruitment measures were taken at Rome to supply fresh soldiers

\textsuperscript{243} Wilkes 1969, 69; Đžino 2010, 144; Šašel Kos 2015, 71-2. cf. Vell. Pat. 2.110.2; Str. 7.5.3. Velleius Paterculus asserts that Pannonians started the revolt, but Dalmatians joined later. Actions by rebels suggests that some of the tribes listed above would have been compelled to join the revolt (Đžino 2010). Tribes such as the Liburni and Iapodes were largely prevented from joining the revolt with a prefect placed over them. The Transalpine Iapodes, however, may have been involved in the revolt as Germanicus captured Raetinium at the end of the war, on which see below (Šašel Kos 2015, 76). The Iasii may also have been involved in the revolt as prefects are attested over the tribe later in the Julio-Claudian period. On the relationship between praefecti civitatum and tribes possibly involved in the revolt see further pages 41-4 and 352-8; Đžino. 2010, 144, 149.

\textsuperscript{244} See further Wilkes 1969; Swan 2004, 212-5; Đžino 2010; Kovács 2014; Šašel Kos 2015.

\textsuperscript{245} Radman-Livaja and Dizdar 2010, 48; Šašel Kos 2015, 71-3; Đžino 2010, 147-8 (who takes a slightly different perspective). Rebel strategy at the onset of the revolt reveals not only how coordinated the rebels were but also a keen awareness of how Rome would eventually proceed against them. One may also note that within the early stages of the revolt, rebel forces had defeated a sizeable force of legionary veterans stationed in Illyricum and massacred Roman citizens and traders (Vell. Pat. 2.110.3. Wilkes 1969, 70; Kovács 2014, 32; Đžino 2010, 145).

\textsuperscript{246} One may also see the Boudican revolt for another example of how a large-scale revolt could lead to famine (Tac. Ann. 14.38).
to serve in Illyricum (Vell. Pat. 2.111.1-2, .4; Cass. Dio 55.31.1; Suet. Aug. 25.2; Macrob. Sat. 1.11.32), which resulted in Tiberius briefly having ten legions, seventy auxilia cohorts and fourteen alae, 10,000 veterans, volunteer forces, and the cavalry of Rhoemetalces camped in one place (Vell. Pat. 2.113.1-2).247

By the end of 8 CE it appears that Roman strategy, famine, and discord among rebels had broken the core of those in revolt. One group of rebels, under the previously unmentioned rebel leader, Scenobarbus, possibly surrendered at Siscia (Cass. Dio 55.33.1-2), then, after a campaign led by Tiberius, Bato of the Breuci captured Pinnes and surrendered to Tiberius on the Bathinus river (probably the Bosna river) on August 3rd (Cass. Dio 55.34.4; Vell. Pat. 2.114.4).248 Rome would still have to continue to fight against

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247 Legions of Moesia were IV Scythica, VIII Augusta, and probably XI, while Galatia was probably V Macedonica and VII. Silvanus had likely just finished waging the Isaurian war mentioned by Cassius Dio (Cass. Dio 55.28, see also pages 127-31; Syme 1933a, 27n95; Mitchell 1976a). The early events of the revolt had caused panic back at Rome, and there was a shortage of willing and able men. The men sent to Illyricum were a mixture of conscripts, veterans pressed back into service, and freedmen requisitioned by the state to serve Rome. 6 CE was a year filled with warfare and unrest in many parts of the Roman world. Italy was suffering from famine and a fire had just raged in Rome (Cass. Dio 55.26.1-5). Rome was waging war in Africa, Germany, Isauria, and campaigning was required in Sardinia (Cass. Dio 55.28). Rome was busy annexing Judaea and conducting a census there and in Syria. Augustus was struggling to meet the financial requirements of his army, including lump sum payments for veterans, let alone the conduct of wars (Cass. Dio 55.24.9-25.6, 31.4; Suet. Aug. 49.2; Swan 2004, 173-207).
Bato of the Daesitiates, who had captured and murdered his namesake of the Breuci after the latter submitted to Rome (Cass. Dio 55.34.4-5), and other rebel forces in the Dinaric Alps and Dalmatia until late summer in 9 CE (Cass. Dio 55.34.5-7, 56.11-16.4; Vell. Pat. 2.115.2-4, 116.2; Flor. 2.25.).

Logistics

The logistical situation in Illyricum from 9 BCE – 6 CE was very similar to that described above for the period between 32 BCE and 11 BCE. The needs of Illyricum’s armies were the same, and the armies were the same size in both periods, meaning that the average peacetime burden levels were consistent throughout the period. Likewise, these armies would have required similar numbers of draft animals, porters, drivers, and ships for transport, or cavalry horses, arms and armor, and equipment for campaigns. Military needs were met in the same way, namely through requisitions, contracts, and compulsory deliveries. In both periods, the Roman military road system had yet to take shape, and Rome had to rely heavily upon river, valley, and pre-Roman routes through to the interior of Illyricum. Finally, in the years prior to both revolts Rome was active campaigning in neighboring regions.

What is more important though is what had changed between these periods. The frontier had shifted north and east at the end of the Pannonian War. While most of the same camps were in use in both periods, the territory under Rome’s control had grown, and with that the most heavily impacted populations had changed. For instance, Rome could still partially supply Siscia or Poetovio from Transpadana Italy, but it would more heavily rely upon the tribes living near

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248 Džino 2010, 151; Wilkes 1969, 73; Šašel Kos 2015, 75. On the date see the Antium calendar in Ehrenberg and Jones (1955, 50). A four-folio lacuna in Dio’s text leaves the interpretation on Scenobarbus uncertain (Swan 2004).

249 In the peace agreement with Tiberius, Bato of the Breuci had become appointed the leader of the Breuci and of the tribes subjected to him. Bato appears to have initially secured compliance with his rule and peace with Rome by taking hostages from the tribes subject to him.

the Sava or Drava, respectively, to meet most of the armies’ logistical needs. In the years between the Dalmatian revolt and the Great Illyrian revolt Rome was actively campaigning on either side of the Danube river. It is also in this period, after 8 BCE, that Rome had likely begun regularly extracting resources from tribes between the Sava and the Dinaric Alps for Roman military campaigns. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus likely operated out of Poetovio or Aquileia. The legate from *ILS* 8965, possibly M. Vinicius, probably conducted his campaign against tribes between the Marcomanni and Dacians from Sirmium, though Poetovio is also plausible. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus campaigned against Dacians and Sarmatians, probably also from Sirmium. All these campaigns were probably waged in the decade or so prior to the revolt. When one includes the mass preparations for the major war planned against Maroboduus in Bohemia, then it becomes more readily apparent that Roman military needs had (temporarily) increased the burden levels of provincials in Illyricum, especially those dwelling between the Dinaric Alps and the Sava river as the majority of campaigns began at operational bases along the Sava and Drava rivers. This would include the Breuci, Maezaei, and Daesititates, who were all heavily involved in the Great Illyrian revolt. Supplies could also reach the camps along the Sava and Drava from the Adriatic coast via the Neretva/Vrbas (*Naro/Urbanus*), and Krka/Una (*Titius/Oeanus*) river valleys through the Dinaric Alps. If tribes such as the Delmetae and Pirustae were also relied upon for the conscription and logistical needs of Rome's armies, this may help explain their participation in the revolt.

While details are scarce on the course of Rome’s campaigns in this period, it is safe to assume that a range of impositions were likely levied on the populations closest to the camps along the Sava and Drava river valleys. In the course of the decade prior to the revolt, it is likely that Rome would have raised new units for these campaigns, or at the least brought existing
auxilia units up to strength. This would have been the most natural time for new units to come into existence, especially in the lead up to a major war. It is also important to consider that Rome was probably utilizing tribal forces for at least some of these campaigns. Both regular auxiliary units and tribal irregular forces were going to be utilized in 6 CE, so it would not be a surprise to see both operating in the campaigns prior to 6 CE either. Velleius Paterculus’ statement in his opening passage on the revolt about the rebels’ familiarity with Roman (military) discipline would only make sense if the local population had been serving Rome (Vell. Pat. 2.110.5).251 During campaigns one can imagine that the indigenous elites commanding either auxiliary units or tribal forces had to receive training in how Rome marched, organized campaigns, and fought, or at the very least they had learned through experience. The number of rebel leaders who had Roman military experience is impressive. Just from this project alone, there is Bato of the Daesitiates, Iulius Sacrovir of the Aedui, Arminius of the Cherusci, G. Iulius Civilis of the Batavi, Iulius Classicus and Iulius Tutor of the Treveri (Batavian revolt), and Tacfarinas of the Musulami.252 The military experience of these leaders gave them insights into how best to proceed against Rome. In the case of the Great Illyrian revolt, the previous military experience of the Batos and Pinnes surely influenced their strategical decisions when the revolt started.

The removal of young men to serve in these campaigns, as well as the porters, drivers, or oarsmen to transport the armies and supplies would have had a detrimental effect on the production capabilities of families involved. This would especially be the case for those serving in the auxilia, because families affected by conscription would have lost a family member for twenty-five years. Farming families would also have been impacted by Roman agents forcibly purchasing their draft animals, horses, and carts for logistical needs, which would have further

252 See further 276, 277, 283-4 (knowledge of Roman army); 243, 338-9 (unity through joint auxiliary service).
reduced the production capabilities of families affected by Roman demands. Furthermore, the production of arms, armor, equipment, and ships for Roman armies would have diverted craftsmen and artisans from their routine work and would have impacted them as well. Through examining the potential impact of Rome’s frequent campaigning along the frontiers of Illyricum, even with the modest evidence available, one may begin to understand why the indigenous populations of the province were chafing under tribute levies by 6 CE.
Chapter 4: Varian Disaster (9 CE), Tacfarinas’ Revolt (c.17-24 CE), and the Boudican Revolt (60/1 CE)

Varian Disaster 9 CE

For many scholars, Varus’ defeat at the hands of Arminius was the major turning point in imperial plans for conquests beyond the Rhine. Because of the significance and fame of this disaster it was referenced frequently in antiquity.¹ It was referenced by Manilius in comparisons of comets to wars in that they can both come suddenly and treacherously like the Varian Disaster (Astr. 1.896-9.05). Ovid wrote of imagined triumphs during the campaigns after 9 CE (Ov. Tr. 3.12.45-50, 4.2.1-74), and Strabo wrote frankly about how the tribes most trusted by Rome in Germania were those who dealt the heaviest blows to Rome (Str. 7.1.1-4 in reference to the Cherusci). Tacitus in his Annales looks back to events in 9 CE while covering Germanicus’ campaigns in 14-16 CE. In fact, it is Tacitus who provided the other name for the Varian Disaster, the battle of Teutoburg Forest (saltus Teutoburgiensis, Tac. Ann. 1.60). But, for our purposes there are three narratives of the Varian Disaster: the contemporary account of Velleius Paterculus; the second-century account of Florus; and the lengthy third-century narrative of Cassius Dio. These accounts all differ in scale and details, often contradicting one another in how the revolt played out, though generally in agreement on its causes (see below). Most scholars follow the more detailed account of Cassius Dio while utilizing aspects of other accounts in describing the outline of the revolt, and that model will be followed here.²

¹ This case study will avoid the debates surrounding the location of the Varian Disaster because it has no bearing on the causes of unrest. For some debates and literature on Kalkriese and the Varian Disaster one may see, Timpe 2012; Wolters 2015.
² On the reliability of the circumstances of the disaster as well as the geographical and topographical descriptions see, Timpe 2012, esp. 629-32.
Narrative of the Revolt

The story of the revolt picks up in the summer of 9 CE while the governor P. Quinctilius Varus was camped amongst the Cherusci with three legions and six auxiliary units. The state of the territory in 7-9 CE, and Varus’ activities during his first two years as governor may be inferred by details left in our sources. These sources suggest that when Varus arrived in Germania, Rome and its agents believed they had thorough control over Germania, perhaps up to the Weser – or at least including the Cherusci beyond that river (Cass. Dio 56.18.1; Flor. 2.30). By this stage it appears that Roman forces were occasionally wintering beyond the Rhine (i.e. Tiberius at Anreppen in 4/5 CE), and that administrative centers were being founded; Waldgirmes was in existence as early as 4/3 BCE. Cassius Dio then suggests that the acculturation process of the indigenous population was going well until Varus had attempted to expedite that process (Cass. Dio 56.18.2-3). The new governor was charged with protecting Rome’s gains in Germania. It is important to bear in mind that Rome’s campaign against Maroboduus in the previous year had not gone as planned because a major revolt erupted in Illyricum, so there would have been concerns that Maroboduus would break his peace treaty and wreak havoc in Germania or Illyricum. To this end Varus had dispersed portions of his forces throughout the region to protect and watch local populations. Varus was also likely tasked with introducing several administrative tasks in Germania including holding assizes (holding court), extracting routinized tribute, and, according to some modern authors, a plan to implement a census (Cass. Dio 56.18.2-4; Flor. 2.30; Vell. Pat. 2.117.3-4).

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3 This line of reasoning is supported by the statements of authors like Florus or Cassius Dio writing in hindsight that parts of Germania were in its control, but not whole regions.
The sources suggest that there was growing discontent among portions of the indigenous communities towards the changes implemented by Varus. Within Varus’ own camp, there was a young, ambitious, local elite named Arminius serving as a commander of a Cheruscan contingent, who was hatching a plot to ambush the governor. Timpe has plausibly suggested that Arminius returned to Germania after serving under Tiberius during the Great Illyrian revolt, perhaps in 7 or 8 CE, and that he was recommended to Varus by the future emperor (Tac. Ann. 2.10; Vell. Pat. 2.118.2). In fact, several Cheruscan leaders had gained Varus’ trust and were even his constant dinner companions (Cass. Dio 56.18.5, 19.2). Using his experiences serving Rome’s military, he developed a plan to ambush Roman forces on terrain that would be most difficult for Roman armies to operate on, thus creating advantages for the more lightly armed indigenous warriors. One may never know what Arminius’ precise motives were, but he was a charismatic leader capable of uniting the discontent of several neighboring tribes and coordinating a devastating blow to Rome’s ambitions in the region.

Like all revolts, factionalism played a role in the sequence of events. Not everyone within any given community sided with rebels or conspirators for a slew of personal and agonistic reasons. Arminius’ brother Flavus, though not mentioned in the events of 9 CE, served under Germanicus in his campaigns against Arminius in 14-16 CE (Tac. Ann. 2.9-10). Arminius’ uncle Inguiomerus was initially against the plot but would join his nephew after his success. Then finally, there was Segestes, Arminius’ father-in-law, and likely rival leader within the tribe.

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4 Many modern authors view this as resistance to Romanization, see below.
5 Timpe 1970. It is uncertain if it was an auxilia unit or an irregular tribal force, though the latter is the preferred interpretation taken in Chapter 3, page 200; cf. Saddington 2005, 66.
6 Dyson 1971, 255. Arminius was later accused of aiming for kingship, which may have been one of his motives for acting against Rome (Tac. Ann. 2.88). Arminius’ decision to avoid a pitched battle in 9 CE was surely based off of lessons learned from recent Roman campaigning against indigenous populations in Germania and perhaps Illyricum, where it is assumed that Arminius had served Rome as an auxiliary leader. It is always plausible too that Germanic populations were aware of Gallic communities attempting pitched battles against Caesar a couple generations earlier.
Arminius had seized his daughter and taken her for his wife, which created personal animosity
between the two. Though Segestes disapproved of the conspiracy, he went along with it, but not
before warning Varus of the plot (Tac. Ann. 1.55; Vell. Pat. 2.118.4; Flor. 2.30. cf. Cass. Dio
56.19.3). Varus, however, had no reason to suspect treachery and disregarded the warning as
factionalism and infighting among rival tribal leaders.

Soon thereafter, a report reached the camp of an insurrection (Cass. Dio 56.19.3). This
insurrection was Arminius’ ruse to draw out Varus and his forces into the path of his ambush,
which was set in supposedly friendly territory where he could hope to catch Rome’s forces as
off-guard as possible. Cassius Dio tells us that the route taken by Varus does not appear to have
been one usually taken by the Roman army; again, Arminius took advantage of his knowledge of
the Roman army and local geography. En route, Arminius and his vanguard requested
permission to leave the march to gather more allies to aid in the campaign, but in reality, they
excused themselves to join the other rebels at the designated place for the ambush.

To keep matters brief, Arminius selected uneven, wooded, and marshy terrain that
prevented Roman forces from being able to get into their optimal battle formations (Vell. Pat.
2.119.2; Flor. 2.30; Cass. Dio 56.19.5-20.3). Arminius sprang his trap while Varus’ troops were
spread out attempting to clear paths and navigate the difficult terrain (Cass. Dio 56.20.2-4).
Despite taking heavy casualties, Varus showed enough poise to get his troops out of immediate

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7 Varus reacted to the insurrection in the precise manner that Arminius expected, as he was aware of Roman
practice: he led out whatever forces he had at hand to act quickly before the unrest could spread (which he also did
in Judaea in 4 BCE). This is similar to Furius Camillus’ reaction to the Tacfarinian revolt in 17 CE (page 284),
Petilius Cerialis’ reaction during Boudica’s revolt (pages 296-7), and Caesar more generally throughout the Gallic
Wars (Goldsworthy 1998; Gambash 2015, 62-4, 66). Arminius avoided setting the ambush in “enemy” territory with
the understanding that the Roman army would be more difficult to overcome because they would march in closer
and more organized order the closer they were to their foes.

8 As Roman armies typically returned from the Weser by a route along the Lippe, this would suggest that the
planned “insurrection” was among one of the tribes to the north or west of the Cherusci who would participate in the
revolt: Marsi, Bructeri, Angrivarii, or Chauci; cf. Cass. Dio 56.18.5.

9 Remember that it was commonplace in the Roman army to allow advance parties in a marching column to go
further ahead and clear the way or scout for the bulk of the army.
danger and construct a camp, so he and his officers could devise a way out of their dire straits (Cass. Dio 56.21.1). The next day they attempted to break out for solid ground, but they were harassed and harried the whole day by Arminius' forces. Worn down from heavy fighting and marching throughout the second night (Cass. Dio 56.21.1-3), Varus and his forces would succumb on the third day of fighting as they attempted to reach safety (Cass. Dio 56.21.3-22.2). Cassius Dio suggests that after the Varian Disaster all Roman camps beyond the Rhine were lost apart from Aliso (probably Haltern), but the soldiers there too would have to break out to reach the Rhine, which was still secured by the two legions of the Upper Rhine army. The garrisons dispersed across Germania by Varus were murdered by the communities they were placed among (Cass. Dio 56.19.1, .5).

Proposed Causes of Revolt

Provincialization/Romanization

Most representations of the Varian Disaster closely follow the accounts of Velleius Paterculus, Florus, and Cassius Dio for the cause of the revolt, namely within a Romanization / Provincialization paradigm. To this end, many follow the character assassination and scapegoating of Varus as a governor in Velleius Paterculus and Florus, who charged him with slothfulness, with being more interested in administering justice than fighting (Flor. 2.30; Vell. Pat. 2.117.3-4, 118.1), and with extortion (Vell. Pat. 2.117.2; Cass. Dio 56.18.2-3). But such assessments overlook both the likelihood that his introduction of Roman law and tribute

10 Cf. Timpe 2012, esp. 638-9, 645 for an overview of modern accounts. The negative connotation in this charge is the belief that the only way to subdue Germans specifically was to defeat them thoroughly in warfare. This is especially the case for Velleius Paterculus’ account here.
exactions were surely imperial directives as well as the fact that Varus was an experienced and able governor of difficult provinces such as Africa Proconsularis and Syria.\textsuperscript{11}

Nonetheless, the socio-cultural and political changes brought about before and during Varus’ governorship oft mentioned in scholarship are ripe for examining the Varian Disaster within the Romanization/Provincialization paradigm because the revolt erupted in the transitional phase between conquest and incorporation. Between 7 BCE, when some argue that Germania became a province in some form,\textsuperscript{12} and 9 CE Rome was coopting locals for military service, developing urban centers, instituting a provincial cult among the Ubii, exploiting lead mines, and during Varus’ governorship was introducing regular taxation, the assize circuit system, and markets.\textsuperscript{13} What scholars harp on the most is Cassius Dio’s accusation that Varus had attempted to speed up the process of incorporation (Cass. Dio 56.18.1-3).\textsuperscript{14} The period between conquest and incorporation was tumultuous for the relationship between indigenous communities and the imperial center, let alone the disruptions brought about by the war of conquest, which in some parts of Germania had only ended four years before the revolt (see pages 21-4). It was a time of great socio-cultural and political upheaval within indigenous societies which could have disrupted pre-conquest norms and caused unrest as new forms of agonistic elite competition and administrative practices came into being. This period created opportunities of social, political,

\textsuperscript{11} See further Judaea and Tacfarinas’ case studies; Eck 2009b, 12; Timpe 2012.
\textsuperscript{12} Eck 2009b, 8; Wolters 2015, 12 with further references. While there is no real rigorous argument for why 7 BCE may be when Germania became a province, one may suspect the date is chosen because this was the end of Tiberius’ campaigns in the region. One must also note, though, that some scholars seem to accept the testimonies of authors such as Vellius Paterculus that Germania never really became a proper province, or that it was in the process of becoming one in 9 CE when the revolt occurred. Regardless of one’s opinion on the matter, what is important here is that Rome had been exerting its authority in Germania since 8/7 BCE at the earliest, was incorporating its gains with the creation of settlements since at least 4 BCE (Waldgirmes), and had been extracting resources and men for quite some time in parts of Germania Magna before Varus had attempted to implement tax and judicial changes.
\textsuperscript{13} On military service see Chapter 3, 192-207. Urban development is attested at Waldgirmes east of the Rhine, and at sites such as Cologne and Nijmegen in the Rhineland (See further pages 322-3). On the provincial cult, see below. On lead exploitation, see Eck 2009b, 10-1.
\textsuperscript{14} For example, Dyson 1971, 253; Unruh 2001, 52; Timpe 2012 (with references). For a criticism of this claim, see Timpe 2012, 643-5.
and economic advancement for some, while others lost or risked losing their status, lives and livelihood. It was not just a time of friction between provincials and empire, but within indigenous societies too. As scholars emphasize each socio-cultural and administrative change differently, they will be taken in turn.

First, tribute and census. Cassius Dio is quite clear that Varus was beginning to impose tribute upon the peoples of Germania (56.18.3). Prior to his governorship, Rome was establishing routes through the supposedly pacified territory and developing urban centers beyond the Rhine (see below). Aside from urban centers, military camps of a semi-permanent nature, such as Haltern, created focal points for tribute to be collected. If tribute incited unrest around 9 CE, it would unlikely have been due to the rate of tribute, but due to the very fact that it would be imposed at all. When indigenous populations resisted Roman attempts to regularly impose tribute (annual taxation), it was typically against Rome’s right to impose it. In a way it was an issue of control, which is further supported by Rome’s history in Germania. While some have argued that Rome had established a province in Germania as early as 7 BCE, resistance to the initial conquest persisted right up to 5 CE, just a few years before Varus first imposed tribute regularly on the local populations.

Very much related to the imposition of tribute is the assumption by some that tribute impositions required a census beforehand (on this issue, see pages 108-14). In the specific case of Germania, authors tend to reference a passage in Cassius Dio to suggest that Varus attempted to conduct a census (in order to implement regularized taxation), which was a cause for the

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15 Dyson 1971; Timpe 2012, 638. On provincial elite and intra-communal competition post conquest one may see, for instance, Ando 2012, 223-4 (with references to broader literature).
resistance (56.18.3). Given the length of time between the initial conquest and Varus’ governorship it is not out of the realm of possibilities that he could have been planning to conduct a census, though one was not necessary for tribute or conscription to operate. The process of conducting a census would have been difficult in many parts of Germania, though, because there was a general lack of centralizing urban centers, especially beyond the Rhineland. Unruh, however, has created a novel solution. In the territory beyond the Rhine, he believes that the assizes mentioned by Cassius Dio (and Velleius Paterculus) were largely conducted at the *principia* of camps or at the basilicas of recently founded towns like Waldgirmes. In his opinion Varus could have conducted a census alongside holding assizes as he was traveling from tribe to tribe in the region. And to help carry out this process in the absence of local elites he could utilize his soldiers traveling with him.

Second, justice. Recently Hurlet made a case that one of the many reasons for Rome’s failure in Germania was that the Roman justice imposed by Varus was not accepted by the local population (Vell. Pat. 2.118.1). The Roman provincial assize system was a principal piece in how Rome sought to maintain order in the provinces. Here, Rome superimposed an imperial jurisdiction on top of local civic jurisdictions to handle appeals, capital cases, and disputes between communities. Governors spent a significant amount of time traveling to assize centers to administer justice, and being that the province appeared to be peaceful, Varus was dedicating

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17 For instance, Unruh 2001, 52. “When Quintilius Varus became governor of the province of Germany, and in the discharge of his official duties was administering the affairs of these peoples also, he strove to change them more rapidly. Besides issuing orders to them as if they were actually slaves of the Romans, he exacted money as he would from subject nations. To this they were in no mood to submit, for the leaders longed for their former ascendancy and the masses preferred their accustomed condition to foreign domination” (Cass. Dio 56.18.3-4, Earnest Cary trans.).
22 Hurlet 2017, 214-5; Richardson 2016, 119-21; Bryen 2012, 772-3, 779. See also Ando 2016.
time to incorporate Germania into the provincial system while administering justice at tribal
centers or military camps as he moved throughout the region. Hurlet argues, rather persuasively,
that while the administration of justice could create tension, because one of the parties would be
unsuccessful at the trial, it was unlikely that it would lead to an uprising. In his view, the
problem was that Varus was breaking with traditional customs “which favored the settlement of
conflicts by means of private justice and arms,” and that this would have aroused suspicion and
probably hostility. In other words, for Hurlet, Rome was unable to establish a way to administer
justice that was compatible with local customs, which was usually a hallmark of Roman
provincial administration.  

Third, unity. An observation made by Stephen Dyson, which is perhaps
underemphasized in many accounts of the Varian Disaster, reveals how a charismatic leader such
as Arminius was able to create a tribal coalition to act in concert against their Roman conquerors.
He points out that Rome’s establishment of a provincial altar at Cologne (Ara Ubiorum) and
Rome’s use of locals as auxilia and irregular forces in campaigns fostered a unity that Rome had
underestimated. In existence by 9 CE, but most likely founded during Drusus’ campaigns (12-9
BCE), the Ara Ubiorum was surely intended to be a provincial cult center of Germania dedicated
to Roma and Augustus. For Rome, the goal of provincial cults at Lugdunum and Ara Ubiorum
(Cologne) was to secure the loyalty of provincial elites through assemblies attached to the cult. It
provided an outlet for elite competition, namely for membership in the assembly and the role of
chief priest, and provided a suitable venue for interactions with Roman agents. It is possible,

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102) for the potential frustrations of provincials who had to travel to places for justice to be administered and
sometimes had to wait for an uncertain length of time for their cases to be heard.
case study.
however, that such assemblies provided indigenous elites a platform to develop “a sense of unity against Rome.”\textsuperscript{26} It provided discontented elites a ready-made space to vent their frustrations, and a place to realize that others shared similar views and to form plans against Rome. In 9 CE, the chief priest was Segimundus, a Cheruscan and son of Segestes, who abandoned his post to join Arminius in revolt (Tac. \textit{Ann.} 1.57.2). Is it possible that Segimundus was involved in spreading Arminius’ conspiracy through his position as chief priest (cf. Vell. Pat. 2.118.3)?

As chapter 3 has highlighted, Rome made frequent use of tribes in Germania as irregular forces from 12 BCE – 9 CE: Frisii in 12 BCE (Cass. Dio 54.32); Nervii in 10 BCE (Livy, \textit{Per.} 141); Cherusci prior to 9 CE (Tac. \textit{Ann.} 2.10); German warbands in 14 CE (Tac. \textit{Ann.} 1.56); Chauci in 15 and 16 CE (Tac. \textit{Ann.} 1.60, 2.17); Batavi in 16 CE (Tac. \textit{Ann.} 2.11) (see further, pages 200-1). While some scholars posit that regular auxiliary units were being raised from tribes in Germania at this early date, the claim is too conjectural for our purposes because scholars rely on the later existence of units to claim that they were in existence as regular units in the Augustan era.\textsuperscript{27} Given the high flexibility in regular and irregular \textit{auxilia} forces in the Augustan era, which was a major period of change and development, it is more likely that the irregular forces called to serve in the Augustan era would develop later in the Julio-Claudian or Flavian periods into fully professionalized regular \textit{auxilia}. Service to Rome in military campaigns not only provided Germanic elites with access to obtaining martial virtues but also allowed Germanic forces to bond during campaigns against shared foes, which could have fostered unity between tribes that typically would have resisted Rome individually. It is known

\textsuperscript{26} Dyson 1971, 256. While Johnston argues that “pan-Gallic sentiment in the pre- and post-conquest Gaul” has been overstated (2017, 115), that need not negate what is being stated here. As Johnston illustrates well that pre-Roman bonds (and rivalries) between kinship groups, tribes, and culturally similar peoples continued to interact after conquest, local elites could use transcommunal councils, cults, and festivals to foster relationships and interest in unified actions.

\textsuperscript{27} Spaul 1994, 2000, with references; Timpe 1970; Dyson 1971; Unruh 2001, 52-3.
that Arminius served Rome militarily (Tac. Ann. 2.10; Vell. Pat. 2.118.2), and it is in this context that he led a revolt against Rome. It is highly plausible that Arminius formed his conspiracy within Varus’ camps and that he had shared his plans with those tribal leaders with whom he had shared military experiences. Therefore, one should not underestimate the opportunity that service in Rome’s military alongside other tribal formations created for developing bonds of fellowship, which could unite previously disparate peoples for or against the Roman state. The deep familiarity with Roman military tactics and techniques provided leaders such as Arminius, Bato of the Daesitiae, and Tacfarinas with insights into how to successfully act against Rome.

**Control over the territory?**

Related to the claims that Romanization/Provincialization caused Germanic unrest is an implied claim that Rome had overestimated its control over the region when it had pushed to incorporate Germania during Varus’ governorship. While Roman decision makers perceived that Germania was sufficiently subdued after Tiberius’ campaigns in 4 and 5 CE, Roman authors writing after the fact suggest the opposite. Cassius Dio states outright that Rome was only holding portions of Germania (56.18.1). Meanwhile, Velleius’ criticism of Varus spending time administering justice rather than campaigning implies a view from hindsight that Rome was not fully in control over Germania (2.117.3). Rome certainly had leveraged a relatively stable control over certain tribes, especially those that Rome had established alliances with or campaigned against closer to the Rhineland, largely during campaigns between 12 and 7 BCE. These tribes had long experiences of Roman interventions and organizational measures, and all of them remained

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28 Dyson 1971, 256; Timpe 1970.
30 On stereotypical governor criticisms in antiquity, see Timpe 2012, 638-9.
31 Wolters 2015, 12.
loyal after the Varian Disaster. The same, however, cannot be said of the tribes further to the east, who persistently required Roman military intervention after initial campaigns like the Cherusci, Chatti, and Chauci. Prior to Varus’ governorship, it is unlikely that these tribes in the interior experienced anything other than military interventions, apart from very recent military levies in 5 or 6 CE (on military levies see pages 186-201). To an extent, this could verify Cassius Dio’s opinion that only parts of Germania were firmly in Rome’s control, as well as explain the geographical limits of Arminius’ coalition, all of which comprised tribes of the interior.

**Regional History**

This situation is made clearer with a brief description of the Roman conquest from 12 BCE to 5 CE. In 12 BCE Drusus began a series of wars across the Rhine that would persist into the early years of Tiberius’ reign. In the first year of Drusus’ campaigns, he repulsed an invasion of the Sugambri and their allies, then attacked the Usipetes and Sugambri (and possibly the Tencteri) before sailing against the Chauci and probably the Bructeri (Cass. Dio 54.32.1-3; Str. 7.1.3). The next year Drusus crossed the Rhine in the early Spring against the Usipetes again, then he bridged the Lippe (*Lupia*) where he crossed through the territory of the Sugambri to invade the Cherusci as far as the Weser (*Visurgis*) (Cass. Dio 54.33.1-2; Flor. 2.30). After enduring a difficult march back to the Rhineland, Drusus built strongholds at Haltern (?) or Oberaden and another among the Chatti “on the bank of the Rhine,” possibly at Mainz or Wiesbaden (Cass. Dio 54.33.3-4). In 10 BCE, Roman efforts were concentrated on the Chatti, who were now allied to the Sugambri (Cass. Dio 54.36.3. Cf. Liv. *Per.* 131; Flor. 2.30). In 9 BCE, in Drusus’ final

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32 A campaign against the Tencteri in this year, rather than in 11 BCE may be more plausible, given their role in the invasion of Gaul in 13/12 BCE (Liv. *Per.* 140). For a fuller account of this campaign, see the Frisian case study.

33 The first camp was at the confluence of the Lippe and the Eliso (maybe modern day Alme River- so Powell 2011, 89-90; Campbell 2017, 988; Gruen 1996, 181; Aßkamp 2014, 30. Dendrochronology dates Oberaden to late summer 11 BCE)
campaign, he waged war against the Marcomanni and Chatti (maybe also the Tencteri) around the Main Valley before marching northeast against the Cherusci, then crossed the Weser and advanced as far as the Elbe (*Albis*). On the return journey to the Rhine Drusus was severely wounded in a horse-riding accident and died by the end of the year (Cass. Dio 55.1.1-3; Flor. 2.30).

After Drusus’ death details become murkier on Germania, though activity is frequently mentioned. In 8 BCE, Tiberius appears to have marched across Germania. By combining Velleius Paterculus’ account with Cassius Dio’s, we may suspect that there was little fighting, aside from an operation against the Sugambri (who were supposedly the only tribe still refusing peace - Cass. Dio 55.6), and it is possible that Tiberius was largely engaging in diplomacy (Vell. Pat. 2.97.4; Cass. Dio 55.6; Aufidius Bassus F4 (Cornell= Peter
This is further evidenced by Tiberius forcibly settling a combination of Sugambri and Suebi on the left side of the Rhine after the campaign season (Suet. Tib. 9- 40,000). In the following year there were disturbances across the Rhine that led Tiberius to campaign once again, but we are lacking further details (Cass. Dio 55.8.3. Cf. 55.9.1). In any case, this may be the moment that Rome perceived that it had gained a new province.

With Tiberius absent from public affairs between 6 BCE and 4 CE there are few details on events in Germania. Sometime between 3 BCE and 1 BCE, Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus set about trying “to secure the return of some Cheruscan exiles” but met with a reverse that may have fomented unrest among the tribes in the region (Cass. Dio 55.10a.3). Shortly thereafter, under the governorship of Marcus Vinicius (c.1-3 CE), Velleius Paterculus claims that there was an immense war being waged that would only be brought to a close by his successor Tiberius (Vell. Pat. 104.2). Upon his adoption by Augustus, Tiberius was sent back to Germania to campaign in the area (Cass. Dio 55.13.1a-2). In 4 CE, marched against the Attuarii and Bructeri before subjugating the Cherusci again (Vell. Pat. 2.105.1). This may have been a significant moment in Rome’s relations with the recalcitrant tribe, the Cherusci, where the terms of the treaty made during this campaign may have established requirements for the tribe to provide men for either irregular or auxilia forces (cf. Str. 7.1.4). These are the conditions in which Arminius would gain his valuable experience and connections under the Roman army over the next few years, that he would then use to defeat Rome in 9 CE. But, this was not the end of Tiberius’
campaign in 4 CE. He penetrated the region beyond the Weser up to the Elbe, and campaigned in Germania until December, at which point he wintered at Anreppen, at the source of the Lippe (Vell. Pat. 2.105.3; Cass. Dio 55.28.5-6). Meanwhile, Gaius Sentius Saturninus was also operating in Germania, but oversaw expeditions “of a less dangerous character” against unnamed tribes (Vell. Pat. 2.105.1). In 5 CE, Tiberius subjugated the Chauci again, defeated the Langobardi, and fought against previously unknown tribes (Vell. Pat. 2.106, 107.3). After this campaign, it seems that Roman decision makers perceived that the only part of Germania left to conquer was the kingdom of Maroboduus in Bohemia. While Tiberius began his campaign in 6 CE around Carnuntum on the Danube, G. Sentius Saturninus took two/three legions from Mainz along the Main valley (presumably via Marktbreit), with the intent of making a pincer movement against the Marcomanni. The outbreak of the Great Illyrian revolt, however, overshadows details of what Saturninus and Tiberius achieved in 6 CE, but also what Varus, Saturninus’ successor, had done in Germania in 7 and 8 CE (Vell. Pat. 2.108-110.2).

From this campaign history, one can see that the invasion routes (faint red colored lines on Map 15 above) allowed Rome to assert a closer control over the peoples as far north as the Lippe River valley. As evidenced by which tribes participated in the revolt or were attacked by Roman armies after 9 CE (Cherusci, Marsi, Bructeri, Chatti [perhaps only those living closer to the Weser River], Chauci, and Angrivarii), Rome’s control over the peoples of northern and north-central Germany was less secure than those peoples closer to the Rhine (Frisii, Cananefates, Batavi, Usipetes, Sugambri, Tencteri, and possibly the portions of the Chatti who dwelled closer to the mouth of the Main River). As Varus was among the Cherusci in the summer of 9 CE it is quite likely that he was implementing administrative changes not just in those areas that were more thoroughly subdued, but also in places (re-)subjugated in the previous

38 Aßkamp 2014, 31-2.
five years. To an extent then, the claims Rome was enacting changes too quickly are correct.

Roman decision makers overestimated how pacified the whole region was when they ordered the integration of Germania into the broader structures of imperial administration.

**Tacfarinas’ Revolt 17-24 CE**

From at least 17 CE until 24 CE Tacfarinas led a revolt against Rome in Africa Proconsularis. Tacfarinas was a Numidian who came to lead a group of bandits after deserting an auxiliary unit.\(^3^9\) He would train this force like *auxilia*, and, after some time of successful fighting, he would become regarded as the wartime leader of the Musulamii (*Tac. Ann*. 2.52).\(^4^0\) Over the course of the ensuing revolt he found allies at various times in the Mauri, Cinithii, Garamantes, and Gaetuli, who would support Tacfarinas’ core of trained warriors (*ILS* 939; *Aur. Vict. De Caes*. 2.3; *ps. Aur. Vict. Epit.* 2.8).\(^4^1\)

While the revolt is mentioned in a few sources, Tacitus provides our only surviving narrative.\(^4^2\) One issue is how seriously one should view this revolt, the scale of actions, or how did Rome set out to handle it? While some have followed Tacitus’ portrayal of the revolt as just a series of raids and skirmishes, a pair of factors suggests otherwise. First, Rome appears to have

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39 Some of these “bandits” may have been fellow deserters. Whether Tacitus meant Numidian in a broad or narrow sense is uncertain. Throughout passages of the revolt the Musulamii, Garamantes, and Cinithii are all referred to as Numidians. Gambash is right to point out that while many scholars assume that the rebel leader was a Musulamian, given that he was regarded as a *dux* of the Musulamii, this does not mean that he had to be from this tribe. For a parallel example of how it is possible for men esteemed for their martial prowess and leadership qualities to assume a wartime leadership role among different tribes one may look to Caratacus of the Trinovantes, who took a position of primacy among tribal forces in Wales during the Roman conquest of Britain (*Gambash 2015*, 71-2; cf. *Dyson 1975*, 163). Since we cannot prove that Tacfarinas was a Musulamian it may affect the strength of some earlier arguments for why the revolt broke out (see further below).

40 *OLD* s.v. “Dux” definition 4. This need not mean that he was a Musulamian noble (*pace* Bénabou 1977 and those following him), but more likely means that he was appointed or even chosen to fulfill this role (*Gambash 2015*, 72; *Wolff 2014*, 58; *Dyson 1975*, 163). On why Tacfarinas and his band of followers are referred to as bandits in Tacitus’ narrative see *Grunewald 2004*, esp. 39-43).

41 Saddington 1982, 88; Grunewald 2004, 38; Wolff 2014, 55. Dyson would call the collaboration of Tacfarinas’ bandits with the pre-desert tribesmen as a symbiotic relationship (1975, 163).

“approached (it) as a significant threat…throughout its duration” in that it would bring additional forces into the region to help fight the rebels and appoint men experienced in fighting revolts (and their aftermaths) as proconsuls. While Tacitus appears to criticize Tiberius for granting triumphal ornaments to three of the proconsuls who fought Tacfarinas because rebels were still fighting, the fact that such awards were granted suggests that the fighting was fiercer than merely skirmishes and raids. Second, the longevity of the revolt and the territorial extent of areas affected by Tacfarinas’ and his allies’ actions suggests that the revolt threatened Roman regional security and interests in certain ways (cf. Tac. Ann. 3.32). While Africa Proconsularis was likely never truly at risk of being lost to rebels, it did threaten to interfere with grain production. It is important to remember that the great extent of territory affected by the revolt would have had an impact on farming, and that Rome did heavily rely on north Africa for its grain supply. Furthermore, it is no coincidence that Tiberius decided to send reinforcements to Africa Proconsularis shortly after there were issues with the corn supply in Italy (Tac. Ann. 3.9, 2.85, 87).

The Revolt

43 Gambash 2015, 70 (quote), 112-3; Whittaker 1996, 595.
44 Gambash 2015, 70; Wolff 2014, 54, 60; Vanacker 2015, 345-6; Grunewald 2004, 39, 42. Security, cf. Whittaker 1996, 592, but see also Gruen 1996, 167. Rome could rely on the aid of auxilia raised in the province, such as Musulamian ones mentioned by Tacitus (Ann. 4.24), or auxilia forces belonging to Juba II; though note that some of the Mauri serving Juba II would join Tacfarinas after the former’s death (Wolff 2014, 55). Aside from Legio IX being in the region from 20-3 CE (sent from Pannonia), Catherine Wolff suggests that other troops were possibly transferred to Africa to aid in putting down the rebellion, such as a cohort of Lusitanians transferred from Sardinia (2014, 54). These troops in Sardinia were in turn replaced by Jews conscripted into the auxilia when Tiberius kicked out Jews and followers of the cult of Isis from Rome during a grain shortage (Tac. Ann. 2.85, 87).
45 On the threat to Africa, see for instance, Grunewald 2004, 39; Whittaker 1996, 594. On grain, see Whittaker 1996, 586; Erdkamp 2013, 268-9, 271. While Tacitus presents these two events separately, I hope to show in a future paper the impact that Tacfarinas’ revolt had beyond Africa Proconsularis.
The outline of the revolt is as follows. In 17 CE, Tacfarinas led a coalition of forces including some Mauri (led by Mazippa), Cinithii, Musulamii, and his own organized troops. The proconsul Furius Camillus reacted quickly by taking his legion and whatever auxilia he had at hand and defeated Tacfarinas in a pitched battle (Tac. Ann. 2.52).\(^{46}\) This was the only pitched battle of the whole revolt.

With Tacfarinas’ defeat in 17 CE, the Cinithii and Mauri ceased to fight with Tacfarinas, which in part determined the rebel leader’s shift towards unconventional warfare (guerilla warfare and raids/razzias).\(^{47}\) It seems that for the next several years, 18-22 CE, Tacfarinas operated with reduced numbers with varying success. He led both surprise attacks on Roman forces/strongholds (Tac. Ann. 3.20-1) and raids/sieges on villages, towns, and their

\(^{46}\) Gambash 2015, 64, 70 – this is a good example of a governor’s quick reaction to revolts, which may be seen in other examples on pages 270n7, 296-7.

\(^{47}\) One should note that the transition to raiding and guerilla warfare after 17 CE was a return to the local population’s traditional mode of combat, razzias. In other words, they had attempted to use the Roman way of fighting in 17 CE, but after suffering defeat the rebels opted to return to their mode of fighting.
hinterlands (Thala and coastal areas [Tac. Ann. 3.21], Lepcis Magna [Tac. Ann 3.74; IRT 330; AE 1961, 108], and Oea [AE 1961, 107]). In these endeavors he plundered as much as possible whenever he could but did experience setbacks (cf. Tac. Ann. 3.21, 73). The situation was serious enough that reinforcements were required, with Legio IX arriving from Pannonia in 20 CE. At one point Tacfarinas was so confident of his situation that he sent an embassy to Rome with demands for concluding the war (Tac. Ann. 3.73). Tiberius responded by refusing terms for Tacfarinas and ordered the governor “Blaesus (to) offer amnesty to any other rebel willing to lay down their arms,” the success of which chipped away at Tacfarinas’ support base.

In the later stages of the conflict, Rome responded to Tacfarinas’ unconventional styled warfare by operating against him with small detachments spread across the north African landscape (cf. Tac. Ann. 3.74). To pile further pressure on Tacfarinas, Blaesus ceased sending Roman forces into winter quarters (Tac. Ann. 3.74). Despite Blaesus’ successes during his governorship (21-2/3 CE), the situation deteriorated when several changes took place. After Blaesus left the province – seemingly Legio IX left with him – Juba the client-king of Mauretania died (Tac. Ann. 4.23-4). His successor, Ptolemy, appears to have alienated many of his Mauri

48 Gambash 2015, 73; Wolff 2014, 56, 59. This was surely the coastal areas in the east of the province (Vanacker 2015, 340-1).
49 Gambash 2015, 73, 75-6; Vanacker 2013, 712-3; Dyson 1975, 163. Tripolitania as a whole was surely threatened at one point by rebel actions as Lepcis Magna and Oea were threatened. One could add Cirta to the list as Roman forces had perceived a threat to it and so placed a force between the town and Tacfarinas (Tac. Ann. 3.74; Vanacker 2015, 341).
50 Their arrival is dated by events surrounding Piso, who overtook the legion marching towards Rome in 20 CE (Tac. Ann. 3.9). The decision to transfer forces to the area, though, may date to late 19 CE as a measure to help secure Rome’s corn supply which was low at the time (Tac. Ann. 2.87; cf. 2.85).
51 Gambash 2015, 77.
52 Gambash 2015, 69; Le Bohec 2014, 28. Le Bohec suggests that Blaesus operated from Haïdra (Ammaedara) in the heart of Musulamian territory, while Cornelius Scipio with Legio IX was in Tripolitania (presumably around Lepcis Magna), and Blaesus’ son operated from around Cirta. It is from these places that Roman forces, which were further divided into smaller units led by centurions, could lead counter-attacks against Tacfarinas (Le Bohec 2014, 28; cf. Whittaker 1996, 595).
53 Gambash 2015, 69; Vanacker 2015, 339. Prior to this it seems that the Roman forces had been wintering in Africa Vetus around the coastal zone. In other words, Roman forces were now operating year-round in the final years of the revolt.
auxilia, the latter then choosing to fight with Tacfarinas rather than serving Ptolemy (Tac. Ann. 4.23).\textsuperscript{54} A combination of these factors led to a resurgence in support for Tacfarinas, which would also count Garamantes among his numbers.\textsuperscript{55} Tacfarinas took his increased forces and ventured a siege of a large town, called Thubuscum by Tacitus (Tac. Ann. 4.24).\textsuperscript{56} In what may have been a quick sequence of events,\textsuperscript{57} Dolabella (Blaesus’ replacement) arrived with his forces and raised the siege (Tac. Ann. 4.24). Once he found out where Tacfarinas had retreated to, the governor decided not to wait for reinforcements and hastened to attack the rebel leader at Auzia (modern day Sour El-Ghozlane) where he led a surprise attack at dawn which resulted in Tacfarinas’ death (Tac. Ann. 4.25).

**Causes of the Revolt**

While Tacitus does not ascribe a cause for the revolt, he does place the blame for it on Tacfarinas. There are two moments, however, where Tacitus may allude to Tacfarinas’, or his followers’, motives for revolting. When Tacfarinas’ emissary went to Rome he demanded a settlement/place for himself and his army (Tac. Ann. 3.73). This has had a profound impact on modern interpretations of why the revolt broke out.\textsuperscript{58} The second possible motive that Tacitus

\textsuperscript{54} Whittaker 1996, 595; cf. Le Bohec 2014, 28. Gambash feels that the motivations for those Mauri who joined Tacfarinas at this late stage were different than those in 17 CE, namely that the latter were motivated by their disaffection with the new client king of Mauretania (2015, 73).

\textsuperscript{55} On the role of transitions between client-kings and governors being tumultuous periods see further, pages 299, 305-6, 312, 328-9; Gambash 2015, 73.

\textsuperscript{56} Thubuscum could be Thubursicum Numidarum (modern day Khamissa, Algeria), Thubursicum Bure (modern day Teboursouk, Tunisia), Tubusuctu (near Saldae), or none of the above (Whittaker 1996, 594; Vanacker 2015, 341-2; Syme 1951). The two most likely candidates may be Thubursicum Numidarum (Syme 1951) or Tubusuctu (Mommsen CIL 8, p489, p754; Vanacker 2015, 341-2; Gambash 2015, 73-4).

\textsuperscript{57} Gambash 2015, 74.

\textsuperscript{58} Cf. Shaw 1982, 37. “...sedemque ultro sibi atque exercitui suo postularet” (Tac. Ann. 3.73). For example, Dyson perceived behind this request social and economic issues for the pre-desert tribes in the wake of Roman expansionism (1975, 163-4).
presents is an appeal for freedom (Tac. Ann. 4.24), but this may easily be discounted as a trope in revolt narratives.  

Earlier scholarship on native resistance in North Africa oftentimes relegated locals to being mere “passive receptors of civilization.” In this way mass resistance was typically described as “unremitting military and cultural resistance to Rome, akin to the liberation and nationalist movements of the twentieth century.” These studies were often framed within a “Romanization” paradigm, which has since largely been reframed or fallen out of fashion in accounts of resistance. In the case of the Tacfarinian revolt it was often treated as a clash between incompatible ways of life, the pre-desert nomadism versus Roman sedentarism, or relatedly as resistance to colonization. The argument here would be that Rome sought to spread agriculture in the region to the detriment of nomadism. Against such views, however, is the fact that pre-desert tribes such as the Musulamii were not only semi-nomadic, but portions of their populations already lived in settlements. Furthermore, there is no evidence of Rome establishing, or attempting to establish, colonies in the pre-desert region at any time around the revolt.

Similarly, many arguments suggest that Tacfarinas and his allied tribes were reacting to Roman attempts to block or cut off the migration routes of nomads in the region. This was a matter of controlling the movements of peoples in the interest of protecting property rights,

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59 Vanacker 2015, 337.
60 (Quotes) Mattingly 2011, 43. Mattingly and Hurlet both contrast French scholarship’s treatments of episodes in Roman Gaul and Roman North Africa to cast light on how differently these two regions have been studied and treated in the past (Mattingly 2011, 43; Hurlet 2017, 204-5). As an example of cultural resistance, one may look to the studies by Bénabou (1976, 1977), who analyzed “the revolts against Rome from the point of view of the defense of local…identities against” Roman attempts to impose new modalities. This study flipped the earlier pattern that Mattingly mentioned on its head by presenting locals as not passive entities in regard to “Romanization”, but he was still trapped within the pattern of presenting indigenous populations “as animated by an irreconcilable national sentiment with an imperial belonging” (Hurlet 2017, 204-5).
61 Dyson 1975, 163; Wolff 2014, 60-1; Vanacker 2015, 337-8 with references to earlier literature. On Greco-Roman ethnographic divisions between nomads (pastoralists) and sedentarists, which surely influenced earlier modern views, see Shaw 1982/3.
63 Le Bohec 2014, 27; Vanacker 2015, 336 with references.
presumably of immigrants looking to settle on agricultural land, while simultaneously delimiting lands for nomadic peoples to use as pastures. Some scholars advancing the above arguments have looked at Tacfarinas’ demands in Tacitus to suggest that Tacfarinas and his followers desired a guaranteed stake in the province if they could not return to their pre-Roman free migrations (Ann. 3.73).

These views, however, have been augmented or supplanted by other theories more recently. But, to understand some of these views on the Tacfarinian revolt one must look back to Roman expansionism in the region in the decades before the revolt. While earlier generations of scholars saw Roman expansion, from 34-19 BCE and at the turn of the 1st century CE, as a response to constant antagonism between sedentarism and nomadism where Rome sought to restrict the pathways of the pre-desert peoples, it is more fruitful to understand Rome’s southward expansionism in this period as efforts in securing the province and extending its interests in the region. In the case of Africa Proconsularis, Rome was deeply invested in land and the grain it produced, and threats to that land could, in a way, threaten the city of Rome because North African grain was an important source of food for the capital. Rome’s interest in land may be reflected in the extensive colonization efforts under Augustus in Africa Proconsularis and Mauretania, which comprised both veteran and civil settlements in rural and urban districts (such as Carthage and Cirta). Such settlements represented a marked increase of Roman presence in North Africa. The landscape of Africa Proconsularis was greatly impacted by Roman conquest through survey projects that led to centuriation and boundary markers assigning/dividing lands to individuals, towns, tribes, and the state. While knowledge of land

64 Dyson 1975, 163.
65 For example, Levick 1999, 131.
66 The intermittent threat of raiders from the south is very similar to those raids from east of the Rhine into Roman Gaul. In both regions, Augustus sought to secure Roman provinces by campaigning against the raiding tribes.
extent/quality could be used by the Roman state to assess taxes, these survey projects could have profoundly impacted pre-Roman land tenure practices and regimes (in positive or negative ways on a case-by-case basis). While no colonies were placed around the tribal territories of those that revolted under Tacfarinas, Rome’s efforts to secure and support its regional interests throughout the Augustan period “provoked (indigenous) resentment and retaliation.” And when Rome would consolidate its control over gains made in the early 1st century CE, one would expect similar reactions.

Through a long series of wars that culminated in the Gaetulian War (c.3-6 CE), Rome slowly extended its control over the pre-desert tribes with varying levels of success. Around 3 CE, the Gaetuli rebelled against Juba II’s rule in Mauretania that required Roman intervention to suppress it (Cass. Dio 55.28.3-4; Flor. 2.31; Oros. 6.21.18). This war, which appears to have ended in 6 CE, threatened Roman interests and stability in the province because the disturbance spread beyond Juba’s borders with peoples such as the Musulamii and Marmarides joining the Gaetuli (Flor. 2.31). Though the sources for the war are poor, it seems clear that this was a serious war given the length of time required to finish it, and that there is evidence of Rome bringing additional forces to Africa to fight in the war. As will be discussed below, the war was followed by a period of consolidation which was evidenced by Legio III Augusta’s move south to Ammaedara (in Musulamian territory) and the construction of roads through the heartlands of

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69 (Quote) Gruen 1996, 168-9; Dyson 1975, 162; Shaw 1982, 38; Lepelley 1998, 81. For a comparison, one may look to Roman expansion around the Cilician highlands prior to the outbreak of the Homonadesian War (pages 127-30).
70 Gambash 2015, 43; Goodman 2012, 301; Lepelley 1998, 80; Whittaker 1996, 591-2. Like the Gaetulian War and the Mauri in the Tacfarinian revolt, the wars of this period were partially the consequences of political instability in Mauretania caused by the death of Bocchus (33 BCE) and the appointment of Juba II (25 BCE) (Whittaker 1996, 590-1; Goodman 2012, 302; Le Bohec 2014, 26).
71 Leptis Magna appears to have been threatened by tribes attacking near the coast (AE 1940, 68).
72 Gambash 2015, 44. Juba returned from Cappadocia to campaign, bringing along his auxiliary forces. There is also evidence that a legion was transferred to Africa briefly for the war, or at least a part of it (ILS 8966–Legio XII Fulminata).
tribes involved in the war. For many recent assessments of Tacfarinas’ revolt, it is these consolidation efforts after 6 CE that created the circumstances for indigenous revolt.

As scholars have begun to recognize that the armies of the provinces were armies of occupation (rather than frontier defense forces), they have consequently begun to see those forces’ roles in sparking revolts. After the end of the bellum Gaetulicum, Rome enacted two measures that revealed the state’s expansionist ambitions in the pre-desert area: the camp of Legio III Augusta moved south to Ammaedara, which lay in the southeastern portion of Musulamian territory, and a new road was finished in 14 CE that connected Ammaedara to the coast at Tacapae via Capsa (CIL 8.5205, 10018, 10023; AE 1905, 177). This latter development sparked a long-dominant explanation for the mass resistance in North Africa under Tacitus, which was proposed by Lassère. For Lassère, and many who follow him, Roman roadbuilding did several things that could have been perceived as threats by the indigenous populations. First, Rome and its regional forces could use the road to effectively monitor and control indigenous migrations. Some scholars have gone further to suggest that Rome actually cut off pre-Roman migration routes. This road, and others – such as the one from Lepcis Magna, provided Rome with quick access to the heartlands of the pre-desert tribes, allowing Rome to enforce such a policy. Second, Rome used it to separate tribes that could potentially unite against Rome, such as the Musulamii, Cinithii, and Garamantes, two of which were recently involved in the Gaetulian War. Third, Rome could use the road to protect settlements and their hinterlands from raids or damages caused by nomads pasturing their herds. Finally, the road could have been seen a

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73 Gambash 2015, 44, 101; Dyson 1975, 162; Goodman 2012, 302; Whittaker 1996, 592.
74 Gambash 2015, 5, 45.
75 After Asprenas finished the road from Ammaedara to Tacape, L. Aelius Lamia, around 15/16 CE, constructed a second road in a southwesterly direction from Leptis Magna for forty-four miles (ILS 151; IRT 930; Levick 1999, 131-2; Zocchi 2018, 52). See Zocchi 2018, 65-6 for more details on this route.
symbolic marker of the extent of Rome’s authority, and as such could have represented a threat to the independence of its neighboring tribes.\textsuperscript{76}

This view, however, has been recently falling out of favor. Roads are not effective barriers against migrations in and of themselves, but rather they facilitate movement.\textsuperscript{77} Even if some roads had deep drainage ditches, they were obstacles which may have been easily overcome by groups determined to cross them. Furthermore, Rome did not have the manpower to monitor the whole length of the road and prevent tribesmen from crossing it. Therefore, it is hard to see the road here as a means to cut off the movements of the Musulamii or Cinithii. As far as roads being used to merely monitor and control these movements, it has been argued that it is unlikely that such measures “would have produced even minor clashes and disputes that could plausibly have escalated into a widespread rebellion.”\textsuperscript{78} Gambash notes that the link between the road and unrest among the Musulamii may not be as strong as others have suspected, because there were Musulamii serving alongside Rome against Tacfarinas (Tac. Ann. 4.24). Furthermore, if we cannot prove that Tacfarinas was a Musulamian (Tacitus calls him a Numidian and a man who became a wartime leader of the Musulamii), then arguments revolving around Tacfarinas (and his tribe, the Musulamii) reacting to Rome constructing a road through their territory lose their strength.\textsuperscript{79}

In the past decade arguments have shifted more towards explaining the revolt as negative reactions to the burdens imposed by Rome in the region after Rome’s victory in the Gaetulian War. One argument looked to the costs of road construction as the cause of the revolt. In this

\textsuperscript{76} Vanacker 2015, 338 with references; Lepelley 1998, 81; Whittaker 1996, 592-4; Levick 1999, 131-2; Le Bohec 2014, 27. Cf. Wolff (2014, 61-2) who follows this view to a large extent, but states that it may have been the triggering moment for the revolt rather than the underlying tension.

\textsuperscript{77} Hurlet 2017, 213-4; Gambash 2015, 45-7; Vanacker 2015, 338-9 with references; cf. Isaac 1992, 103.

\textsuperscript{78} Quote: Vanacker 2015, 338-9; contra Lassère 1982.

\textsuperscript{79} Gambash 2015, 47, 71-2.
instance, the burdens of supplying human, animal, and material resources could have been too
great for the local population to handle.\textsuperscript{80} Other arguments have looked to the introduction of
Roman provincial institutions in the decade after the Gaetulian War to explain the revolt. Here,
various arguments have used a combination of taxes, conscription, and cadastration (related to
the road construction) to argue their respective cases. As stated earlier, Rome’s advances into the
pre-desert region brought with it several changes: an extension of Roman forms of land tenure,
Roman appropriation of lands, the imposition of taxes, and obligations of communities to
provide recruits for the \textit{auxilia} based from treaties and terms of peace.\textsuperscript{81}

Turning first to the imposition of \textit{auxilia} service, we know that tribes in this region were
already subject to \textit{auxilia} service given that Tacfarinas was a deserter from the \textit{auxilia}, and
presumably at least some of his core rebel warriors were deserters too (Tac. \textit{Ann}. 2.52). Tacitus
also reveals that the Musulamii provided \textit{auxilia} for Rome by this point because some had fought
on the Roman side during the revolt (Tac. \textit{Ann}. 4.24). It is possible that this tribe, and perhaps
neighboring ones too, were obligated to provide young men for \textit{auxilia} service, in regular full-
time units as a result of terms made after the Gaetulian war, rather than as irregular forces.\textsuperscript{82}

For cadastration and taxes the arguments are built up around Rome’s activities in the
region after 6 CE. In the wake of the Roman victory in the Gaetulian War, Roman governors
seemingly sought to integrate this region more closely into the province. But also because of
Rome’s long-standing interests in Africa’s grain production, it seems that they also intended to at

\textsuperscript{80} Kath 2009. While Vanacker believes that this argument does not work because the local population did not revolt
during the road’s construction, comparisons with other instances of overburdening suggest that it could take years,
even up to a decade, after heavy impositions or requisitions before the full-impact of them may be realized
(Vanacker 2015, 342; Chapter 3).
\textsuperscript{81} Whittaker 1996, 593.
\textsuperscript{82} Shaw 1982, 37-8; Whittaker 1996, 593; Gambash 2015, 47; Wolff 2014, 55-6; Gambash 2015, 45.
least nominally expropriate some land too. The first step of this process was moving *Legio III Augusta*’s camp south to Ammaedara. The next step was to conduct a large-scale land survey, which was conducted by some of the legionaries who were trained as surveyors. This survey was used in part for the road emanating from the legionary camp to Tacape. A *gromae locus* discovered near Ammaedara confirms that land measurements were taken at some point before the revolt. For Vanacker, the next phase would have been delimitations and tax impositions, but this was the point at which the locals revolted. Tacfarinas then found support from various communities who shared similar concerns towards Rome’s newly established control in the region.

What is appealing about these more recent approaches is the recognition that Rome’s policies would have impacted indigenous pastoralists and agriculturalists alike; it is no longer a binary negative reaction of (semi-)nomadic peoples to Roman efforts at expanding sedentarism. When Rome entered the pre-desert region it found a complex semi-nomadic society with villagers, farmers, and long-distance and sedentary pastoralists rather than a fully nomadic people without urban centers (*contra* Tac. *Ann.* 2.52). So, Rome’s cadastral efforts and impositions would have disrupted and damaged the state’s relationships with not just the migratory portion of the population, but the more sedentary elements as well. In this instance,

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83 Vanacker 2015, 346. As detailed above, the pre-desert had fertile, cultivatable land. By the time of Rome’s intervention in the territory of the Musulamii, barley, wheat, olives, wine, and figs were being grown for some time. Parts of the region had enough yearly rainfalls to “provide respectable wheat yields” (Vanacker 2015, 347), and where there was not enough rain the locals often resorted to irrigation (adopted a form of irrigation from Egypt). There was a diversified regional economy where agriculture played an important role wherever it was environmentally feasible alongside of long-distance herding. Vanacker points out that both herding animals and sedentary animals found on farms, such as pigs and cattle, appear in the archaeological record (2015, 346-8).

84 This was the first of three major cadastral operations that were conducted in the region; the second operation was conducted after the revolt, c.29/30 CE, and the third was in the Trajanic period (Vanacker 2015, 350; Whittaker 1996, 593; Hurlet 2017, 213-4).

85 Vanacker 2015, 346, 348-51; Hurlet 2017, 213-4. The absence “of direct traces of cadastral activities (such as border stones and cadastral markers) from the Augustan or Tiberian period also indicates that at that time the heartland of the Musulamii was not the scene of an effective expropriation or taxation property” (Vanacker 2015, 351).
tribes like the Musulamii could have seen their traditional forms of land tenure threatened by the state’s expansion and cadastral operation. They also could have faced some degree of land losses and tax impositions in the years right before the revolt. But, it is also worth considering the role of razzias as an ordinary means of profit for the semi-nomadic populations in the pre-desert region in escalating the scale of the conflict. Rome’s cadastral operations linked to the recent road construction and Roman expansion efforts in the region surely created new opportunities for indigenous populations to profit at the expense of Roman interests via raiding and plundering. It is quite possible that some had joined Tacfarinas’ forces simply to profit from these endeavors. A similar situation may have occurred on the borders of Galatia and Rough Cilicia around the turn of the 1st century. There, recent Roman colonial foundations and expansion on the steppes and lowland areas near the Taurus mountains seem to have encouraged indigenous raiding from the Homonadeis and Isauri that resulted in two wars with the highland populations (see further, pages 127-9).

Furthermore, political instability in the client-kingdom of Mauretania surely played a role in the revolt too, especially among the Mauri joining forces with Tacfarinas in 17 and 24 CE, just as it had done in the outbreak of the Gaetulian War (Cass. Dio 55.28.3-4). Not only were the Mauretanian kings involved in helping Rome fight the revolt from the start, but there is numismatic evidence to suggest that “they were actually involved in military activities before the Roman campaigns began,” likely an internal conflict with semi-nomadic tribes within his domains. It is easy to understand how a conflict in a border region could catalyze conflict on the Roman side of the border, especially under circumstances where Rome was incorporating recently conquered territories more directly into the empire.87

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86 Vanacker 2015, 346-50.
87 Vanacker 2015, 352 (quote); cf. Vanacker 2013.
Boudica Revolt c.60 CE

In 60 CE while Paulinus was attacking the isle of Mona (modern day Anglesey),\(^{88}\) which was an important Druidic center, a revolt erupted in southeast Britain after the Roman procurator Decianus Catus annexed the territory of the Iceni (Tac. Agr. 14; Ann. 14.29-30; Cass. Dio 62.7.1). Narratives of the revolt survive in a short account in Tacitus’ Agricola, a longer account in the Annales, and an account of Cassius Dio which survives in the work of Xiphilinus. While both authors emphasize Boudica’s role in rallying discontented Britons to her side, they strongly differ in the immediate context of the revolt. For Cassius Dio it was an economic cause, namely the recall of a series of loans at the same time (Cass. Dio 62.2.1-2). On the other hand, the immediate context in Tacitus appears to be the death of the Icenian client-king Prasutagus (Tac. Ann. 14.31). With his death, Rome began the annexation of their territory under the procurator Decianus Catus but did so in an oppressive manner. Soldiers and slaves under his command had whipped Prasutagus’ wife, Boudica, raped their daughters, beaten other important elites and stripped them of their estates.\(^{89}\) According to Tacitus, these outrages prompted the Iceni to form around Boudica and revolt *en masse* (Tac. Ann. 14.31). In the earliest stage of the revolt Boudica’s followers fell upon Roman forces in the area, which probably were the garrisoning forces placed to secure the recently annexed tribe (Tac. Agr. 16).\(^{90}\)

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\(^{88}\) On the debate over the length and timing of the revolt one may see discussions in Mattingly (2006, 106-7), Adler (2008, 175n11), and Gambash 2015 (67). The evidence seems fairly clear that the revolt broke out during the military campaigning season of 60 CE. My hypothesis is that Paulinus also defeated Boudica in the same year, but it is likely that Paulinus’ mopping up operations continued into 61 CE, thus explaining why Tacitus treated the revolt in 61 CE.

\(^{89}\) Collingridge 2006, 183; Adler 2008, 176; Johnson 2012, 31. Here one may see a relatively parallel case in how Sabinus went about securing properties and assets after Herod’s death in 4 BCE, on which see further below. See also pages 161-2; Brunt 1990a, 165.

\(^{90}\) Collingridge 2006, 199. While Hingley and Unwin think that Tacitus contradicts himself here because Boudica attacks forts and garrisons in the Agricola but avoided such places in the Annales (14.33), these two passages are not necessarily mutually exclusive (2005, 50). These two passages may simply be referring to different phases of the
After this the revolt began in earnest as members of other tribes discontent with Roman rule, such as the Trinovantes, began to coalesce around Boudica. According to Tacitus, the Trinovantes joined the revolt because their lands were confiscated around Colchester (Camulodunum) by veteran settlements and settlers further encroached upon more land thereafter. Additionally, they were resentful of the Temple of Claudius, which they surely had to help pay for and maintain (Tac. Ann. 14.31).

Colchester’s symbolic value as a Roman colony (it was also probably the capital of Britain), and the fact that it was ill-defended made it ripe for attack. After two days of fighting,

revolt. The one in the Agricola may refer to the outset of the revolt when locals attack Roman garrisons and forts as a unifying act (a point of no return if you will). One may see other examples in the Frisian revolt, the Great Illyrian revolt, and Varian Disaster. The passage in the Annales appears in Tacitus’ narrative after the destruction of Colchester, and therefore leaves open the possibility that from that point forward there was an overall strategy of seeking easy targets.

91 One may see references in Adler for earlier scholarly posits on which tribes were involved in the revolt, however these lists are purely conjectural (2008, 176n18).
Colchester was burned to the ground (Tac. Ann. 14.31-2; Cass. Dio 62.7). Petilius Cerialis, the legate of *Legio IX*, coming from Longthorpe attempted to rescue Colchester but arrived too late. To make matters worse, Boudica defeated him and destroyed most of his infantry (Tac. Ann. 14.32).  

As soon as word reached Paulinus of the revolt he raced south, with perhaps only light forces, to London (Londinium), which was under the imminent threat of Boudica after she razed Colchester. Once there, he assessed the situation and determined to abandon the defenses of London and St. Albans (Verulamium) in order to link up with his forces still marching south and to fight Boudica at a place of his choosing. As Tacitus puts it: Paulinus’ forces were too few to defend either of these cities, so he sacrificed them to save Britannia (Tac. Ann. 14.33; cf. Cass. Dio 62.8.1).  

After destroying London and St. Albans it appears that Boudica chased after Paulinus (Tac. Ann. 14.33; Cass. Dio 62.7). Boudica tracked down Paulinus and met him on a ground of his choosing. Using the terrain to negate Boudica’s larger forces and secure his rear from being surrounded, Suetonius Paulinus broke the main opposition to Rome in a pitched battle somewhere in the Midlands, maybe at Mancetter or Paulerspury (Tac. Ann. 14.34-7; Agr. 16; Cass. Dio 62.8.1-12.5). Boudica appears to have died sometime shortly after the battle, either by poison (Tac. Ann. 14.37) or illness (Cass. Dio 62.12.6- perhaps from a wound). Paulinus meanwhile spent the rest of the year and perhaps part of 61 CE oppressively mopping up any

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92 Wacher 1996, 509.
93 Suetonius Paulinus also led out as many people from these places as were willing and able to go with him. The forces he was meeting up with were those that he had at Mona, namely the *Legio XIV*, a vexillation from *Legio XX*, and their attendant *auxilia*.
94 Tacitus and Cassius Dio disagree on the number of cities sacked by Boudica, but this may be an issue of perception of civic status rather than the actual number of places sacked as all three sites exhibit a destruction layer in this period (for instance Crummy 2001, 79-82; Wallace 2016, 120-1; Tac. Ann. 14.32.2-3, 14.33; Cass. Dio 62.1.1).
remnants of resistance while enacting reprisals for the rebels’ actions during the revolt (Tac. *Ann.* 14.38-9; *Agr.* 16)\(^95\)

**Background**

As most interpretations of Boudica’s revolt rely on interactions between Britons and their Roman conquerors from 43 CE onwards, it is necessary to provide an overview of the period before discussing the most recounted causes of the revolt. In the period between Caesar and Claudius, late Iron Age society in southeastern Britain had gone through profound socio-political changes, such as increased power networks (detectable through coins) whereby a few tribal leaders managed to place themselves at the head of broader tribal groupings with centralizing proto-urban centers.\(^96\) While Rome’s relationships with individuals appears to largely have secured their interests on the island, it became increasingly more likely by the late 30s CE that Rome would seek a more direct control over the peoples of Britain. This would be realized by Claudius’ invasion of Britain in 43 CE.\(^97\) In that year Aulus Plautius set out from northern Gaul to conquer the territory of the Catuvellauni, Trinovantes, and their allies, tribes which had formed the territory of Rome’s former client-king, Cunobelinus, now ruled by his sons Caratacus and Togodumnus. During the invasion, Rome’s 40,000 soldiers defeated British forces at two river crossings (including one at the Thames), before advancing on Colchester, the capital of the so-called Eastern Kingdom.\(^98\) The emperor Claudius participated in the capture of the urban

\(^95\) Johnson 2012, 50-1.

\(^96\) These developments are broadly understood in relation to not only Caesar’s invasion but to continued Roman interest and interaction with Britain. For further insights into socio-political and cultural developments in this period and for Roman political arrangements with individuals in the region see: Creighton 2000; *idem* 2006; *idem* 2009; Mattingly 2006, 63-84; Hingley and Unwin 2005, 17; Rogers 2016, 745, 746-7.

\(^97\) On the circumstances, or supposed causes, of Rome’s invasion in 43 CE including Cunobelinus and his sons, the exile of Verica, and Caligula’s plans and preparations for an invasion of Britain, see: Barrett, 1989; Braund 1996; Rutledge 2013, 228-30; Mattingly 2006, 72-5, 94-5.

\(^98\) On army size, see further below; Rutledge 2013, 230; Wacher 1996, 507.
center and received the surrender of eleven British kings before returning to Rome (Cass. Dio 60.19-21, 23.1; Suet. *Claud.* 17; *CIL* 6.40416 = 6.920). At this time Claudius confirmed or appointed several client-kings, including Ti. Claudius Cogidubnus, who was given control over what is commonly called the Southern Kingdom, comprising the later territories of the Atrebates, Regni, and Belgae.⁹⁹

The following three/four years appears to have been spent in the conquest of southeast Britain, roughly as far north as the Humber and Severn estuaries (perhaps in a line along the river Trent). To expedite the conquest, Plautius divided up his invasion force into four groups with three carrying out operations against tribes like the Corieltavi, Dobunni, Dumnonii, and Durotriges while the fourth secured earlier gains (Suet. *Vesp.* 4; Cass. Dio 60.20.2, 21.5; Tac. *Agr.* 14).¹⁰⁰ During this same period Caratacus appears to have escaped west where he would fight on as a war leader over a range of tribes in western Britain.¹⁰¹

The transition period between governors could always be fragile periods,¹⁰² and Caratacus appears to have invaded Roman territory around the beginning of Ostorius Scapula’s governorship in 47 CE (Tac. *Ann.* 12.31). In an effort to secure his rear and prevent the peoples in Roman territory from joining Caratacus, Ostorius disarmed the communities within the province, which sparked a seemingly small-scale resistance from a portion of the Iceni. Roman *auxilia* found and defeated those who refused to give up their weapons (Tac. *Ann.* 12.31-2).

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⁹⁹ Rutledge 2013, 230; Mattingly 2006, 99. It is highly probable that leaders of the Iceni and Brigantes became client-rulers at this time as well (Birley 2005, 23). The surrender of these kings and the appointment of some client-kings made Rome’s immediate campaigning needs and consolidation efforts easier (divide and conquer if one will) (Hanson 1997, 70; Mattingly 2006, 95). For an argument for Cogidubnus being made client-king later see, Birley 2005, 29. Cf. Hassall 2000, esp. 61. The answer may be that Claudius did appoint him as a client-king in 43 CE and that Cogidubnus’ territory was extended during Scapula’s governorship.

¹⁰⁰ Mattingly 2006, 95, 97-9; Birley 2005, 23; Rutledge 2013, 231. Unless the Catuvellauni had surrendered during the campaign of 43 CE, they should be included among the conquests up to 47 CE. There appears to be little to no disruption at St. Albans, the central site of the tribe, between the pre-Roman and Claudian periods and this may suggest that the tribe had willingly settled with Rome early on (Wallace 2016, 127).

¹⁰¹ Webster 1978, 57; Mattingly 2006, 95. See these two authors for why Caratacus was so easily accepted as a war leader in Wales.

¹⁰² Johnson 2012, 30; Webster 1978, 58.
Some scholars place tremendous weight on this incident for bringing about the Boudican revolt some thirteen years later. To this end they highlight the intrusiveness of Scapula’s measure or emphasize it one of a series of perceived injustices between the tribe and the Roman Empire that would eventually boil over into a mass movement.\footnote{For instance, Webster 1978, 59; Collingridge 2006, 184-5 (see further below). As Webster points out, the Roman agents would likely have been “rummaging around huts, shifting and pulling down haystacks, beating obstructive locals while looking for hidden storage places of arms” (1978, 59). P.A. Brunt suggested that the disarmament of local populations was not necessarily common but was likely only done in circumstances where submission was not certain (1990c, 256).}

With his rear now secured, Ostorius could begin the long conquest of Wales, by leading his forces against the Ceangi. He had to leave the task incomplete and turn back to deal with an uprising of the Brigantes. He appears to have handled it quickly, and he pardoned all but those who were responsible for starting hostilities (Tac. Ann. 12.32). In order to pursue war against tribes in Wales more effectively, and to prevent further incursions into Roman territory, the governor moved \textit{Legio XX} forward from Colchester in c.48 CE to a new camp at Kingsholm/Gloucester. To help secure southeast Britain in the army’s absence, he also settled veterans at a new colony on conquered lands at Colchester (Tac. Ann. 12.32; Agr. 14).\footnote{Webster 1978, 58-9; Bishop 2012, 88-9; Hassall 2000. On the role of Caratacus shaping Rome’s decision for further expansion rather than consolidating gains under the previous governor, Plautius, see: Gambash 2015, 86-7. By the time of the Boudican revolt \textit{Legio XX} had moved west again, to Usk c.57 CE (Hassall 2000; Manning 2000).}

The creation of the colony and how these veterans would interact with the locals would later play a significant role in the Trinovantes joining Boudica. One should note, however, that this incident and Scapula’s disarming of the indigenous tribes occurred over a decade before the revolt, and it is important to bear this in mind when we move forward to assess how much weight should be placed on these moments in Boudica’s revolt breaking out.

Next Scapula attacked Caratacus, who had the support of the Silures and Ordovices, and defeated him in a major battle (Tac. Ann. 12.33-5). Caratacus escaped and sought refuge among the Brigantes, but their queen, Cartimandua (who was a Roman client-ruler), arrested Caratacus.

Causes of the Revolt

A great deal of ink has been spilled in efforts to attribute the cause of Boudica’s revolt. This situation is largely due to scholars placing differing levels of emphasis on details in Tacitus’ and Cassius Dio’s accounts, neither of whom seem to agree about the cause of the revolt nor about certain details of its course. Tacitus’ account in the Annales presents a series of abuses against the Iceni and Trinovantes wherein both the Roman and modern reader are meant to sympathize with the tribe and the rebel leader (Tac. Ann. 14.31, 35). As described above, Tacitus provided a running list of injustices in 60 CE as well as older ones. Prasutagus left a will naming his two

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106 Rutledge 2013, 232; Birley 2005, 36. Also during Aul. Didius’ tenure, he had to send troops to intervene in Venutius’ insurrection against his former wife Cartimandua, the client-queen of the Brigantes (Tac. Ann. 12.40).
107 Adler 2008, 176. Recent treatments of Tacitus’ version of the causes of the Boudican revolt in the Agricola argue persuasively that it was not based on known historical events, but nonetheless his account there fits well within Greco-Roman historiographical traditions of presenting revolts; in other words it was a generic, schematic description of indigenous resistance to a new situation they found themselves in (Hingley and Unwin 2005, 45; Gambash 2015, 21).
daughters and Nero as his heirs.¹⁰⁸ Not only was the will presumably ignored by Roman authorities, Roman agents whipped Boudica, raped her daughters, pillaged the realm and Prasutagus’ estate, and, finally, confiscated the estates of other Iceni elites. Thirteen years before that the governor Ostorius Scapula had attempted to disarm several tribes, and some Iceni saw this as an affront and resisted. Lastly, for Tacitus, the creation of the colony at Colchester not only led to the Trinovantes being pushed off their land but opened up the locals to the abuses of the settlers. The knowledgeable reader, however, is aware that Tacitus’ accounts of revolts fit into the author’s broader themes portrayed through episodes to assess the quality of certain emperors, good vs. bad governance, and slavery vs. freedom; episodes in the provinces reflect the quality of the emperor.¹⁰⁹ Like any author, Tacitus’ agenda played a major role in not only how he portrayed episodes in Britain between 43 and 61 CE, but also which events and details he would include. For example, Tacitus was aware that Seneca was accused of usury in the provinces but does not mention it in relation to Boudica or the revolt in Britain.¹¹⁰

In the other surviving account of the revolt, Cassius Dio emphasizes a charismatic leader and two underlying tensions as the cause for Britons rising up in revolt. First, the procurator Decianus Catus confiscated money that had been granted to prominent Britons by Claudius. While this sum of money may have been offered by Claudius to help secure compliance, it seems that these monetary grants were later perceived by Claudius’ successor Nero as a loan rather than a gift. Second, apparently concurrently with the financial confiscations, Seneca the Younger recalled a forty million sesterces loan he had made for Britons. Cassius Dio makes it very clear

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¹⁰⁸ A recent take on the exclusion of Boudica from the will of Prasutagus is worth mentioning here. In her book, Marguerite Johnson speculates that Prasutagus did not name his wife as heir because she may have already been known to harbor anti-Roman sentiments. This would fit the Tacitean narrative well because Boudica and her daughters were singled out “for public humiliations of the worst kind” and such a move could represent “a very open and drastic response to a woman who had been known to despise the Romans” (Johnson 2012, 46-7).
¹⁰⁹ See further pages 61-2; Lavan 2017; Adler 2008; Johnson 2012; Hingley and Unwin 2005, 43, 59.
¹¹⁰ Johnson 2012, 80. This might in turn partially explain the discrepancies between Tacitus’ Agricola and Annales, but also between Tacitus and Cassius Dio more generally.
though that the principle cause of the revolt for him was Boudica and her entreaties to the indigenous populations of Britannia (Cass. Dio 62.2.1-2).\footnote{Mattingly 2006, 107; Adler 2008, 176, 191; Johnson 2012, 80-1, 86. For more economic complaints in her speech, focusing here on taxes rather than loans, see also Cass. Dio 62.3.2-5. Adler points out that Cassius Dio’s description and speech of Boudica does not portray her sympathetically, but rather barbarously. His speeches also emphasize the freedom/slavery paradigm, but Cassius Dio used it to a different effect than Tacitus (Adler 2008; Lavan 2013; Johnson 2012; cf. Gambash 2015, 21).}

\textit{Stacking of abuses or oppression}

When it comes to modern scholars attributing the causes of the revolt, they tend to stack injustices that in their view escalated provincial antagonism towards Rome and its agents. Here, scholars tend to combine incidents portrayed by Tacitus and Cassius Dio to explain the outbreak of the revolt: the disarming of conquered tribes, the forcing of people off their lands (especially at Colchester), the establishment of the temple of Claudius (with required contributions and maintenance), the persecution of Druids (see below), the calling-in of loans, and the mishandling of the Iceni’s annexation.\footnote{Gambash 2015, 10; cf. Johnson 2012, 31. For examples of this trend, see for instance Webster 1978; Collingridge 2006; to an extent Mattingly 2006; Rutledge 2013; cf. Dunnett 1975 for the Trinovantes. Gambash in his treatment of the revolt opts to look at Roman policy and urges the “need to examine Roman understanding of and consideration for local sensibilities even before we look into the actual moment of injurious action” (2015, 11).} Portrayals of how the revolt came about such as these appear to be heavily influenced by Tacitus’ approach towards explaining the outbreak of resistance in the \textit{Annales}; individual abuses were not causes per se, but components of a series of righteous grievances that boiled over into a major uprising. While one should be wary of following Tacitus’ presentation that the revolt stemmed from a series of egregious injustices, this should not equally mean that abuses could not have contributed to individuals joining the revolt.\footnote{See especially Mattingly 2006, 93, 107-8.} However, abuses often served as the spark that ignited the flames of revolt rather than the root causes of them (see pages 17-21). Considering that, there may be some more compelling explanations for the Boudican revolt.
Religion

Some scholars emphasize the suppression of the Druids, which culminated in Suetonius Paulinus’ invasion of Anglesey in 60 CE, as a major factor for mass resistance to Rome in 60 CE (Tac. Ann. 14.29-30). The underlying premise of this view is that Anglesey was noted for its importance as a Druidic center and that it was likely serving as a refugee point for those fleeing Roman control. Furthermore, it is suspected that the Druids held significant political and religious authority over the local populations, and therefore they could have organized resistance movements. These factors would have been seen as a potential threat to Roman security, hence Paulinus’ invasion of the island. In turn, so the argument goes, Britons revolted of their own volition, offended by the assault of a sacred site. Alternatively, the Druids used their influence to mobilize indigenous populations against Rome as a response to the attack. Some scholars such as Webster and Collingridge assert that the Druids were the driving and organizing force of resistance to the Roman conquest going back to Claudius’ invasion in 43 CE. The problem with this argument, however, is that Druids are somewhat enigmatic, and it is difficult to state with any authority what degree of political influence the Druids could leverage in Britannia at this point. It will always remain plausible that Rome’s invasion of Anglesey played some sort of role in influencing portions of the population to revolt against Rome; it is, however, impossible to quantify.

Iceniæ Resistance to Annexation

One fruitful way to examine the revolt, at least as far as the Iceni are concerned, is to approach it from the perspective of resistance to the act of annexation itself. Like the transitional period between governors, the death of any leader is a fragile and potentially volatile period. It would be a time of great uncertainty for the future and for the prospects of leading families. And this situation could only have been heightened by the fact that the Iceni were being annexed as a result of Prasutagus’ death. A comparative example of the volatility of a king’s death and potential annexation of a client-kingdom is the death of Herod in Judaea in 4 BCE (see pages 159-62). In both cases a procurator entered client territory with soldiers and slaves. Here, they were used by the procurators to secure the property and assets of the royal families, and apparently in the case of Decianus Catus to seize the property of some local notables too. It is possible that in the latter case the confiscation of elite property was related to Cassius Dio’s statement that Seneca’s loans were exacted forcibly (Cass. Dio 62.2.1). The very presence of soldiers suggests though that the procurators expected violence; Judaea was already turbulent and riotous at the end of Herod’s reign and a portion of the Iceni had rebelled the last time that Roman agents had tried to confiscate personal property (Scapula’s disarming measure in 47 CE—see above). The clumsy and oppressive way the governors used these soldiers in both instances only incited (further) resistance.

Here then, the question may be raised of what role did the abuse of the royal family have in massing support around the personality of a tribal royal? It is entirely likely that too much emphasis has been placed on Boudica and her daughters being oppressed as the catalyst for the revolt. As seen above, Tacitus’ portrayal of events focuses on retribution for righteous grievances, especially utilizing gender and slavery themes to engender outrage among readers.  

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117 Mattingly 2006, 75; Gambash 2015, 83-4.  
118 See above. Also see, Adler 2008; Johnson 2012, 46, 51-2.
Boudica’s position within her tribal society was weak as it was propped up by Roman support. She was not the tribal leader like Cartimandua was over the Brigantes, but the widow of a client-king. Normally, rival tribal elites had the prospect to benefit by the annexation as it could grant new opportunities for advancement locally and regionally (see page 163). But, in this case, Rome had seemingly lost the support base of the indigenous elite as Roman agents beat local leaders and confiscated their estates during annexation. This factor is overshadowed by the focus on Boudica and the issue nearly gets lost within treatments of the outbreak of the revolt. By upsetting not just the royal family and their supporters, but by confiscating the properties of all elites, Rome lost the support of every person who could have helped to mitigate the situation and prevent a full-scale uprising. Rome’s treatment of the elite during the annexation may partially explain why the Iceni rose up *en masse* against the annexation.

**Confiscated Land**

In following Tacitus’ account, scholars often cite three reasons for why the Trinovantes joined Boudica’s revolt, all revolving around the colony at Colchester (Camulodunum). First, some Trinovantes lost some prized lands to the colonists settled at Colchester. Second, those very same settlers exacerbated the situation with their rapaciousness towards the tribesmen in the decade after the colony’s foundation. Third, an issue of a more financial nature arose, namely that the brunt of the construction and maintenance costs of the Temple of Claudius in the colony surely fell upon the tribe, who were the main target of Claudius’ invasion in 43 CE. This situation also would have been exacerbated by the recall of loans right before the revolt mentioned in Cassius Dio.\(^\text{119}\) As Mattingly points out, “land was routinely ‘confiscated from defeated enemies and

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\(^{119}\) Dunnett 1975, 48; Collingridge 2006, 200. On financial issues see further below.
accrued to the territory of Rome.” 120 While land was often returned to its previous owners, that condition was subject to both the terms of surrender to Rome and the acquiescence of the peoples conquered in the years following conquest. But, some seized lands could still be reallocated to colonists, become state land or imperial estates regardless of the behavior of recently conquered peoples. 121 An argument may easily be made that while the creation of the colony occurred over a decade prior to the revolt, this does not mean that they still could not harbor resentment on a massive scale towards their loss of property. The uprising of the Iceni presented an opportunity for them to latch onto an existing movement and gain retribution against a population that had aggrieved them. These sentiments may also be applied to those in other tribes whose properties were appropriated by the military for camp constructions and the road network. The number of Britons affected by such confiscations can never be known, nor the numbers that flocked to Boudica after her initial successes, but this point is still worthwhile to make.

That being stated, the issue of land confiscations is a complicated issue in the instance of Colchester. Before the creation of the colony, the land of the colony itself had already been appropriated by the state for a legionary camp. What had presumably changed in 49 CE, for some scholars, is that Rome confiscated more land for the territorium of the colony, which could have been quite substantial. 122 The site of the colony, and hence the legionary camp before it, was adjacent to two preconquest sites (Gosbecks and Sheepen), and while Rome appeared to have been respectful of those sites by building on unused land, the same cannot be guaranteed when the territorium of Camulodunum was laid out. Nor can it be guaranteed that the colonists did not appropriate plots belonging to either of these occupation sites near the colony. But, it is

120 Mattingly 2011, 141.
122 Dunnett 1975, 46; Wacher 1997, 17. Dunnett hypothesizes that the colony at Camulodunum may have eventually included up to 200 sq. mi. of territorium, with only 50-60 acres of this being the urban center (1975, 46). On the rare use of agri captivi for veteran colonies see Gambash 2015, 37-8.
equally plausible that the *territorium* granted to the colony was the exact extent of the legion’s *territorial/prata* (lands for use of the army), meaning that no new lands were confiscated by the state when the colony was founded.\(^{123}\) In this case, the issue then was not Rome’s policy of creating colonies out of conquered land, but how private individuals behaved during and after the colony’s creation, which created a hostile situation. More recent colonists may have found a shortage of land available to them after the initial settlement and resorted to encroaching on neighboring lands.\(^{124}\)

*Overburdened*

There are hints in the source material that some communities in Britain were overburdened by the demands of the Roman state. A passage in Tacitus concerning the Temple of Claudius at Colchester may suggest either that some local elites were spending beyond their means on the imperial cult or that levies were being imposed on the population (either by the state or by priests of the cult) to support the construction of the temple (Tac. *Ann.* 14.31.4). The costs of its construction would have been massive, given the size of the temple.\(^{125}\) When this passage is combined with Cassius Dio’s focus on financial causes for the revolt and fiscal complaints (in Boudica’s speech—Cass. Dio 62.3.2-3), broader claims may be staked. While Cassius Dio may be using taxation and slavery rhetorically in his speeches, and some of the complaints he provides Boudica in her speech are generic ones against life under Rome, it does not mean that there was

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\(^{123}\) Gambash 2015, 40. There are some potential weaknesses to this view, as there is not enough evidence to suggest that all forts had such lands, nor are we certain that *territorial/prata* were properties of the military. In other words, the army may have had the right to appropriate or use such lands without ownership of them (Nardis 2015).\(^{124}\) Gambash 2015, 41.

\(^{125}\) Wacher 1996, 509; Dunnett 1975, 46-7; Fishwick 1995, esp. 14-5. Whether this spending was done willingly or not, one cannot say, but the result would be similar. On the temple, see Crummy 2001, 59-60. To gain an appreciation of the size of the temple, Colchester Castle lies on top of the foundations of the temple. But also, this space would have been surrounded by a massive enclosure, 180m x 120m, but we must note that this colonnaded enclosure may postdate the revolt (Fishwick 1997, 34).
not some truth to the reality of taxes or the loans in his statements. Taxes were used to support
the province’s military garrison, while local taxes were used also for embellishment projects by
local councils. Loans meant to finance further urban amenities and secure the loyalty of local
notables were forced and recalled on indigenous elites by emperors and Roman elites like
Seneca. As the argument would go, when those loans were called in, local elites may have
lacked the capital to pay them back at once. These claims, however, may be augmented and
extended by an examination of the impact that supporting the Roman garrison in Britain would
have had on the communities of southern Britain prior to the revolt, especially being that it was a
period filled with campaigning along the province’s frontier. A quick examination of the types of
urban developments that were ongoing in Britain in the first decades of Roman rule could also be
used to make a case that the heavy costs of developing urban centers along Roman lines, though
done willingly by local notables, could have contributed to a sense of being overburdened when
combined with routine exactions and military demands. These issues will be examined in the
final chapter.

126 Johnson 2012, 86; Hanson 1997, 76; Millett 1995, 63-4; Dunnett 1975, 48.
Chapter 5: Provincial Revolts in the Julio-Claudian Period

Using the causes of revolts against imperial institutions attributed by ancient authors as a guide, we are now able to detect broader patterns in provincial revolts of the Julio-Claudian period. Furthermore, lessons derived from these systemic studies open up insights into the circumstances that allowed for provincial revolts to break out in the early decades of Roman rule, whether it was an obscure revolt such as the one in Dalmatia in 10 BCE (chapter 3) or a more well-known and researched revolt such as the Varian Disaster or Boudica’s revolt (chapter 4). In what follows, the major revolts presented in Chapter 4 (Varian Disaster, Tacfarinas’ revolt, and Boudica’s revolt) will be approached through the patterns and lessons discovered in Chapters 1-3. This presents an opportunity to add fresh perspectives to the causes of these three revolts.¹

Roman Military: impacts of conquest, governing, and conscription

Throughout this dissertation the Roman military and its activities were ever-present, and this was no mere coincidence. As chapter one has shown, there was a heightened military presence in the decades after conquest as Rome sought to secure its recent gains. Beyond the role of securing the province both within and without, the army played a significant role in conducting invasive and delicate tasks such as the census (chapter 2), conscription (chapter 1- no.31 [ILS 9195]; chapter 2- T. Haterius Nepos [CIL 11.5213]),² assessing and collecting tribute (Frisian revolt), land delimitations (cf. chapter 1 no.29), and even day-to-day administration of towns, tribes, or subregions of provinces (praefecti civitatum and related titles- chapter 1).³ As local elites could not always be relied on in the decades immediately following conquest, military officers were

¹ Ancient and modern authors have variously ascribed one or more of the following as the cause(s) of these revolts: imperial institutions, directives, and regional or empire-wide circumstances.
² Saddington 2005, 64 n.10.
selected for such roles because they often represented the nearest and most convenient resource with administrative experience available to the Roman government.

The use of the military in administering the empire, however, also had the potential to create friction between the state and local communities. Soldiers were constant reminders of the conquest, and the invasiveness of their tasks contributed to the potential for unrest.⁴ The injection of soldiers into the fabric of provincial communities disrupted local practices and fragile socio-political hierarchies, causing friction between local elites and Roman agents. With soldiers conducting various tasks, local elites could perceive a loss of freedom in certain practices: the ability to determine communal policies in local councils, including setting the tributary rate of their communities; the right to settle local disputes; and the right to collect taxes and the profits therein.

Additionally, the asymmetrical power relationship between soldiers and local populations left plenty of scope for the former to abuse their positions. Since these officers often had command of soldiers, they had the means to coerce local populations. It is important to note, though, that it is often difficult to differentiate between soldiers bungling imperial orders and soldiers seeking personal profit through their positions of power; nor need these be mutually exclusive concepts. In the Frisian revolt, Olennius had set a difficult standard for the Frisii’s tribute and when they could not pay, he confiscated their cattle and land, before finally enslaving their women and children. When Rome annexed the client-kingdom of the Iceni after Prasutagus’ death, Roman agents beat and abused the local nobility and royal family while simultaneously confiscating property. In both cases officers and their comrades were carrying out tasks delegated to them. The way these agents acted on the ground, though, greatly contributed to

⁴ Namely, these soldiers operated at a more local level than most imperial agents in ideal circumstances. See further, pages 31-5, 52-5, 58-72, and 114-20.
unrest in their respective regions and increased the potential for mass resistance. The same may be said for the way in which Roman agents acted in conscripting Batavians in the lead up to the Batavian revolt. In blatant abuses of power for personal profit, Roman agents selected the elderly as a means to receive bribes for not conscripting them, while at the same time dragging off children for sexual purposes (Tac. *Ann.* 4.14).

But in all these cases mass resistance only erupted because there was an undercurrent of tensions present within provincial communities, as well as charismatic leaders to unite the abused and discontented to act against Rome. Taking an example from the last chapter, there were numerous issues present when Boudica revolted. Periods of transition, especially regime changes, are fragile periods of uncertainty and change that could explode into riot or rebellion. The Roman conquest of Britain was a lengthy process and the costs of supporting Rome’s military and its campaigns could have overburdened indigenous communities, providing yet another tension point in the province when the revolt erupted. This situation would have been exacerbated by the sudden recall of loans around the time that the Iceni were annexed. Despite these underlying tensions, it is the propensity for soldiers to engage with locals with a heavy hand on a large-scale that would help spark these revolts and allow for individuals from disparate backgrounds and tribes to coalesce around rebel leaders like Boudica (see further below).

Provincial armies also had the capacity to cause unrest with the weight of demands it could levy on local populations in times of war. As Chapter 3 has shown, Roman campaigning had the potential to temporarily increase the burden levels of the population behind the war front to unsustainable levels, especially if campaigning dragged on for several years. Wars disrupted regions as Rome removed or diverted young men, animals, and resources from communities to
serve or support its armies, thus impacting the production capabilities of locals. As we saw through the examples of Gallia Comata and Illyricum, the demands for these burdens were unevenly distributed across the landscape. These burdens were determined both by the relationships communities had with Rome and their proximity to the war front and major nodes of transportation there. The longer that wars dragged on, the harder it probably would have been for locals to keep paying routine Roman exactions in addition to levies for the armies in the region. Especially in the early decades of Roman rule, a situation such as this had the potential to strain communal relations with Rome and create the conditions for mass resistance.

The impact of Roman campaigning would have been even greater in recently conquered regions, such as Illyricum, Germania Magna, and southeastern Britain. In such places we must remember that Rome was extracting taxes and the human, animal, and material requirements of the military from communities that were conquered just a few years earlier, and this surely would have had a greater impact than in those places that were within the Roman Empire for longer periods. Unlike Gallia Comata in Chapter 3, Germania Magna was impacted by foraging and grazing during the wars of conquest from 12 BCE to 9 CE. Tribal communities were plundered, and lands were devastated by Roman armies marching through. Bearing in mind that these wars were a series of conquests and re-conquests, the impact of Roman warfare in Germania Magna

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5 Personal businesses and trades were impacted as artisans had to divert their energy towards producing and constructing items for the military. In rural areas the loss of men and draft animals adversely affected local planting and harvesting. Existing units would be brought up to strength, while new units would be created before and throughout the duration of wars. As these young men have 25-year service terms, the iterant removal of young men represented a permanent loss in the local/familial workforce.

6 The obligation to provide recruits for *auxilia* service likely derived from how communities fell under Roman control, oftentimes via asymmetrical treaties with Rome or via defeat in war and a subsequent agreement to obey Roman commands (Saddington, 1982, 140; Ivleva, 2016, 165. Cf. Haynes 2001, 64).

7 This is especially the case when one considers the variability in production from year to year due to weather and the impact that poor yields could have on strained economies (cf. Jones 1974b, 174).

8 Places within the empire longer would have had time to recuperate from the trauma and impact of the conquest itself. Rome also would have had more time to develop communication and supply networks to distribute the burden of supply a little more evenly. And the longer an army remained in place the greater the likelihood that local populations would adapt and intensify their agricultural practices towards surplus production to meet military and market needs (cf. Hopkins 1980; Nardis 2015).
would have been drastic for the lives and property of the indigenous population. After defeat, tribes were often compelled to pay indemnities to Rome (money, supplies, prisoners, etc.). But after all this devastation and loss, communities in Germania Magna and Britain were expected to contribute to further Roman conquests in the region.\(^9\) In Germania this is most explicitly evidenced through tribes providing soldiers for campaigns (pages 200-1, 276-7). With so little time to recuperate from the act of conquest itself, it is difficult to see that the tribes of Germania Magna could have borne the burdens of wartime exactions for long in this period, in addition to the introduction of taxation.

When evaluating the impact of Roman exactions in the case of the Boudican revolt, we must remember the extreme loss of life that would have occurred in the conquest period prior to 60 CE. D.J. Mattingly supposes that the conquest period, 43-83 CE, resulted in the deaths of 100,000-250,000 Britons.\(^{10}\) The complicated web of relationships between Rome and individuals on the island would also have played a role in the weight of burdens. In the early years after conquest there were several client-kings on the island, of whom we only know a few. It is not entirely certain if such rulers would have been tasked with provisioning Rome’s armies to the same degree that conquered tribes were. This leaves open the possibility that subject peoples may have been responsible for a heavier share of supplying military needs. Additionally, the state’s reach in Britannia was far deeper in the years after conquest than other case studies surveyed here. While Germania Magna and Illyricum had little to no Roman roads in the years

\(^9\) Even though most of the Rhineland armies’ supply needs would have been met through the communities of Gallia Comata, the indigenous population of Germania Magna would still have been affected by Roman demands.

\(^{10}\) Mattingly 2006, 93.
following conquest, and Gallia Comata’s road network was more developed only in certain locales, the road network in Britain already thoroughly crisscrossed the landscape prior to Boudica’s revolt (see page 296).\footnote{On the roads of Britain, see Bishop 2014, esp. 41-3. The main roads in Britain largely followed the courses of pre-Roman routes but were improved upon by Roman forces along the main routes of advance after conquest. Roads from Richborough to London (Londinium) and London to Colchester (Camulodunum) were likely built a few years after the Claudian invasion in 43 CE. Meanwhile, roads from London to Lincoln (Lindum), London to Wroxeter (Viroconium), and London to Exeter were all in place probably around 55 CE. One should note though that many of these later roads would likely have begun far earlier as Roman forces advanced northwest and west. For instance, the road from London to Exeter was surely in existence shortly after a semi-permanent camp was established at Lake Farm (near Dorchester) around 49 CE (on camp dates, see discussion in Hassall (2000) with earlier literature). The road destined for Wroxeter (which passed through St. Albans) was begun in London in 47/8 CE at the earliest, which is consistent with early developments in London around 49 CE (Wallace 2016, 122). The Fosse Way, which linked Lincoln to Exeter, was part of the second phase of road development in the province, whereby Rome linked routes to various military camps to easier facilitate the movement of men and supplies across the landscape (Bishop 2014, 42).} This means that Rome was more capable of extracting human, animal, and material resources from the whole of the province than in other provinces at such an early date. This may be due to the size of the province in comparison to Illyricum or Gallia Comata, but it may also be due to the near constant state of campaigning in the first four decades of conquest. The high frequency of campaigning in Britain should alert us to the heavy burdens that would have been placed on subject communities in this period, especially given the fact that these communities were themselves simultaneously subjected to Roman conquest.

In addition to furnishing supplies, communities in Africa Proconsularis, Britannia, Gallia Comata, Germania Magna, and Illyricum were also required to furnish young men to serve for twenty-five years in auxiliary units or seasonally in irregular forces, while others were impressed to work as porters, drivers, and rowers for Roman armies (chapter 3). In Britain there is scant evidence of irregular forces and conscription prior to the Boudican revolt.\footnote{On North Africa and Germania Magna, see Chapter 4, pages 276-7, 292; Gallia Comata and Illyricum Chapter 3, 195-8, 200-1, 221-4, 252-5. One should note that the rebel leaders Bato of the Daesitiates, Arminius, Iulius Sacrovir, and Tacfarinas all had military experience under Rome.} Tacitus suggests the use of irregular forces with the phrase \textit{socialis copias} (allied/auxiliary forces) in describing the force that put down Icenian rebels in 47 CE (Tac. \textit{Ann.} 12.31). The same author also suggests
that Britons were subject to service in the auxilia by 60 CE, and even cited it as a cause of the
revolt in the Agricola (Tac. Agr. 13.1; 15.3).\textsuperscript{13} While Tacitus’ claims in the Agricola are largely
discounted as being generic (see page 301n107), recruitment patterns attested elsewhere and
epigraphical evidence confirms that conscription was in use before 60 CE. There are four
regular auxiliary units that may be securely attested in the period before the Boudican revolt.
Scholars suggest that the evidence shows that conscription into these (and possibly other units)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohors I Brittonum\textsuperscript{14}</th>
<th>As early as 60 CE</th>
<th>CIL 16.31</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cohors II</td>
<td>As early as 56-59 CE</td>
<td>RMD 5.327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brittonum/Britannorum\textsuperscript{15}</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cohors III</td>
<td>As early as 61 CE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brittonum/Britannorum\textsuperscript{16}</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ala I Brittonum\textsuperscript{17}</td>
<td>As early as 45/6 CE, plausibly Neronian</td>
<td>RMD 5.324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Table 8: Attested Auxilia Units Raised from Britons before 60 CE}

\textsuperscript{13} Sparey-Green 2015, 108; Dobson and Mann 1973, 198. The uprising in 47 CE occurred after the governor
Ostorius had tried to disarm Britons before he invaded Wales.
\textsuperscript{14} Ivleva 2012, 91; \textit{idem} 2016, 161; Dobson and Mann 1973, 198n37; Spaul 2000, 195-7. Diploma dated to 85 CE. It
is uncertain whether this unit would later become \textit{Cohors I Aelia Brittonum milliaria} or \textit{Cohors I Ulpia Brittonum}
(see further Ivleva 2012, 91, 101). \textit{Cohors I Brittonum} may have been stationed in Britain until the early to mid-80s
CE (Ivleva 2012, 101-2).
\textsuperscript{15} Ivleva 2012, 108, 142; Spaul 2000, 198. Diploma dates to 81-84 CE. Perhaps only transferred from Britain
sometime around 69 CE. This unit and the following were initially called \textit{Brittonum} based on variations in how they
are labelled in diplomas. \textit{Cohors II} was labelled \textit{Brittonum} on diplomas from the 80s and 100 CE, but usually called
\textit{Britannorum} thereafter. Ivleva makes a case that the name change was due to changes in the unit’s composition after
the Dacian Wars, where the unit would be garrisoned afterwards. Initially the unit was composed of recruits from
Britain (cohort of Britons), but in the second century recruits largely came from Dacia, so the name was changed to
reflect the geographic origin of the unit (Ivleva 2012, 91, 142-3; \textit{idem} 2016, 161).
\textsuperscript{16} Ivleva 2012, 120, 122-3. Diploma dates to 86 CE. Catavignus, son of Ivomagus, and Paternus (his heir) were
soldiers who served in the unit very early on (possibly initial recruits), the former likely dying before 69 CE (\textit{CIL}
5.7717).
\textsuperscript{17} Ivleva 2012, 67-73, 140, 142-3. Diploma dates to 71 CE, though several scholars doubt that the unit would have
been raised so shortly after conquest. Thus, scholars often prefer a Neronian date for when the unit was levied.
However, there is no reason that these soldiers could have been raised from allied or client tribes shortly after the
invasion. We see local forces levied to support Roman campaigns in Germania shortly after conquest (on which see
pages 276-7).
followed on the back of Roman advances after 43 CE, and that they comprised tribesmen from southeastern Britain before 60 CE. In fact, Tatiana Ivleva has persuasively argued that the attested units were all raised in a single moment, sometime between 55 and 59 CE, plausibly for campaigns in Wales under Quintus Veranius and Suetonius Paulinus. We must recognize the possibility that despite the paucity of evidence, large-scale recruitment in southeastern Britain just a few years before Boudica’s revolt, where tribes such as the Iceni and Trinovantes resided, could have played a role in its outbreak, especially when combined with other factors outlined in chapter 4.

Around the turn of the 1st century in Germania and after 43 CE in Britain it is also clear that Rome was establishing camps of a more permanent nature that would have pulled resources from the surrounding countryside (such as Haltern in Germania; Colchester, Exeter, Kingsholm, etc. in Britannia). The costs of these endeavors are largely invisible to us, but we must remember that Rome was confiscating land not only for the camps, but oftentimes space around them too. The state was surely requisitioning some of the supplies and the transportation of the materials for construction: iron, leather, and possibly timber or stone. Even if one were to suggest that the Roman army harvested all the materials themselves, the state was expropriating vast quantities of natural resources in the construction of these camps, thus meaning that such resources would no longer be available to the local population for their needs.

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19 Ivleva 2012, 142-3. Units raised from native Britons served very briefly in Britain before being sent out to the continent, mostly by 69 CE. The hard fighting during the conquest of southeast Britain and during the Boudican revolt surely influenced the decision to avoid keeping trained Britons locally because they posed a security threat (Ivleva 2016, 160-1; Haynes 2013, 122-3).
20 Patterns attested elsewhere in the empire should confirm the likely scale of auxilia recruitment that would have taken place after conquest. See Haynes 2013, 104-110. On Gallia Comata, see pages 195-201, 221-4. On Thrace, see pages 189-90n70. On northwestern Hispania, see Meyer 2013; cf. Str. 3.3.8; Saddington 2005, 64-5.
21 Perring 2013, 2-3; Thomas 2008, 44-6.
22 Mattingly uses the legionary fortress at Inchtuthil (Scotland) as an example (2006, 161). It was still incomplete when it was abandoned, after roughly four years of construction. He estimates that timber requirements for it were
The situation in Germania Magna and Britannia is like that in Gallia Comata in the years before Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt. War’s impact was devastating for communities affected, and the introduction of regular tribute shortly after the wars from 12 BCE to 5 CE had ended – let alone the personal anguish from the wars itself – could have inspired many to join in Arminius’ plan. In a similar manner, the costs of supporting wars on top of routine exactions and costs of early urban projects in Britain could be among the reasons why Britons (or communities) took loans from Romans such as Seneca. When the loans were suddenly recalled, some Britons surely found themselves in no position to pay the sum in full. It is possible that the combination of heavy exactions (human, animal, and material) during wartime coupled with the inopportune timing of loan recalls could have incited some Britons from southeastern tribes to join Boudica’s revolt.

Urban Development and Anti-fiscal resistance

The level of centralizing urban development was a significant factor in several processes examined throughout this project. Rome’s preferred method of governing in the provinces was administration through cities where local elites would self-govern locally, raise and collect taxes for the state, maintain the peace of their communities, and serve as intermediaries between indigenous communities and the imperial center. Urban centers were also used by imperial agents in the administration of justice and in conducting censuses. At the same time, urban centers served as extraction points not only because they could serve as marketplaces, but also

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23 One must note that local representatives handled most applications of justice, but imperial officials handled appeals, capital cases, and disputes between communities.
because they were convenient points to draw resources in from the surrounding countryside.\textsuperscript{24} To elaborate on this last point, \textit{civitas} centers were often along major communication routes or close to them, which efficiently facilitated the movement of money, people, animals, and resources once these resources were pooled into these urban centers.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, Rome and its agents encouraged urban development. The level of development and presence of local elites in and around \textit{civitas} centers partially determined whether Rome could rely on the latter for local administration and census operations. If these were lacking, then army officers were often given these tasks (Chapters 1 and 2).\textsuperscript{26} Local engagement in (re-)organizing and building up these administrative centers was part of elite competition in the post-conquest period as local notables staked claims of belonging to the provincial elite writ large and sought to maintain or rise to leadership roles within their own tribes.\textsuperscript{27} High levels of spending on urban development in the decades following conquest could be a cause of debt among indigenous elites, which in turn could play a role in elites joining or inciting anti-fiscal revolts, especially when it occurred alongside a period of heavy burdens (cf. Chapter 3; Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt). In Britain specifically, the heavy costs of maintaining the imperial cult at Colchester has been cited as a cause of Boudica’s revolt.\textsuperscript{28}

In Britain urban development was slow after conquest, but the tribes of southeastern Britain were already developing centralizing proto-urban centers prior to Claudius’ invasion, for instance at Gosbecks and Sheepen (near Camulodunum), Silchester (Calleva), and St. Albans

\textsuperscript{25} Woolf 1998.
\textsuperscript{26} Corbier 1991; Hanson 1997, 75; Perring 2013, 4; Garnsey and Saller 2015, 35-54.
\textsuperscript{27} Cf. Ando 2012, 222-3; Woolf 2005. On whose initiative the urban development was see for instance, Millett 1990; Hanson, 1988, 1997; Hingley 1997; Morscheiser-Niebergall 2009, 133; Perring 2013, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{28} Wacher 1996, 509. Due to the difficulty in ascertaining who paid for the construction and embellishments of the cult center, it is not possible to determine what role the costs of the imperial cult actually played in inciting the Trinovantes to revolt. The presence of the cult among the Trinovantes, however, may have antagonized the indigenous population.
In the period between 43 and 60 CE, there were few major construction projects in the territories of the two tribes certainly involved in the revolt, the Iceni and Trinovantes. While other sites show some engagement in urban projects prior to Boudica’s revolt, they may have been conducted under unusual authority: client kings carrying out projects at Chichester, Silchester, and Winchester; Roman citizens (and foreigners) doing the same at London; praefecti or client kings possibly leading projects at St. Albans and Canterbury. While Colchester was a military colony, its community included Trinovantes (incolae) “who were obliged to participate in and contribute financially to the development of the town.”

In Britain and Germania Magna, the types of developments were limited in the first decades after conquest and were largely made in wood and wattle and daub. Places like St. Albans, Silchester, and London only had small nuclei of street grids early on. Meanwhile, Colchester’s street grid was an augmented version of the one used in the former legionary fortress on the site. It was a major social and financial cost to lay out a grid and the decision to

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29 Creighton 2006, 24; Hingley and Unwin 2005, 12, 15; Perring 2013, 1-2; Mattingly 2006, 266-270; Rodgers 2016; Wallace 2016, 121-2, 128-9. This process had begun already a few decades after Caesar’s invasions in the 50s BCE. “Oppida in southern Britain were large, polyfocal sites, enclosed and subdivided by extensive networks of banks and ditches that housed elite (and royal) residences, mints, ceremonial centres and high-status burial grounds. It is less certain that oppida were places of commerce and industry, although politically controlled crafts such as the minting of coins were housed here, and they lacked the density of populations and social institutions that characterised the cities of Rome” (Perring 2013, 2).

30 Mattingly 2006, 277. It is only beginning in the Flavian period that fora, street grids, and more conventional urban government were established across much of the province. Silchester, which was part of Togidubnus’ client-kingdom, has evidence of tiled roofs by 60 CE, along with a pre-Flavian era bath structure, and a massive wooden structure arranged around a courtyard that has been interpreted as a proto-forum dating to the Claudian era. Again, it is worth pointing out that Silchester stands out from some other sites in that it was under the rule of a client-king who could in theory wield more authority and resources to engage in these projects in a relatively short period. On pre-Roman developments at Silchester see Creighton (2006) and Rodgers (2016, 755-6). One should note though that London, like Colchester, surely would have had an indigenous population not only living in the town, but who were also likely engaged in construction projects and conducting business there (cf. Wallace 2016, 121, 122-3).

31 Mattingly 2006, 271 (quote); Crummy 2001, 65-7. There was a dual nature to the site, namely as a colonial settlement and as the civitas capital of the Trinovantes (Hurst 2000, 108). Settlers reused both the principal streets and many of the buildings from the legionary fortress, which further limits the indigenous costs of construction post conquest (Crummy 2001, 55-6).

32 As the three main sites affected by the revolt in Britain only originated around 49/50 CE (London, Colchester, St. Albans), the limited development at these sites may be explained by the very limited timeframe for local elites to engage in major urban projects before the loans were recalled and the revolt broke out.
impose one on the landscape was likely a communal decision rather than an act of an individual; it involved redistributing land, demolishing and reconstructing buildings around the grid, and it would have required specialists to lay out the grid itself.\footnote{Crummy 2001, 56; Woolf 1998, 113, 119, 121; Reddé 2015, 12, 14, 15; Rodgers 2016, 756; Wallace 2016, 122, 123. Cf. Johnston 2017, 5. The process of urban development persisted long after these early decades of Roman rule through several succeeding generations of local elites (with the exception of Germania Magna east of the Rhine) (In Britain the height of urban development, like in Gallia Comata, occurred after this period, namely in the late 1st century to 2nd century CE (see for instance, Perring 2013, 1-3; Mattingly 2006).} St. Albans has evidence of timber buildings, including shops and workshops, lining streets by c. 50 CE. In Colchester, some new houses were constructed, replacing some of the barracks that were being used for housing. In this period fora could either be simple gravel lined spaces where civic and market functions could be conducted, or they could have wooden buildings with dedicated functions. In Colchester the \textit{Principia} of the fortress was likely reused as a basilica/forum complex.\footnote{Mattingly 2006, 270-1, 278; Wacher 1996, 512; Crummy 2001, 56, 57, 59; Rogers 2016, 752-3; Wallace 2016, 121-2. See also p328n30 for a possible forum at Silchester in the Claudian period. London had “a gravelled ‘proto-forum’ area” prior to the Boudican revolt (Wallace 2016, 122).} The eastern end of the same town was largely used for public buildings from around the mid-50s CE, including the Temple of Claudius, where the imperial cult in Britannia would have met, and maybe a theater before 60 CE.\footnote{Fishwick 1997; Crummy 2001, 56, 58, 60; Rogers 2016, 752-3. The eastern end of the town comprised the annex of the former legionary fortress. A theater is attested in Colchester, but its date is uncertain, and it is unknown if there was an earlier phase underneath it.} At the west end of the city there was also a monumental arch, most likely from the 50s CE. One should not overlook the significant level of construction on the site within five years of the revolt because it could have negatively impacted the native population around the town because of the costs of such projects.\footnote{Woolf 1998, 119, 123; Wightman 1985, 77; Herz 1992, 57; Mattingly 2006, 270. Cf. Rogers 2016, 753. See also Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt, pages 224-30. Crummy (2001, 61) believes that the eastern grid likely did not come into existence until the mid-50s. The same is said for the Temple of Claudius, which likely was not started until after that emperor’s death in 54 CE, though he makes room for the possibility that an altar to Augustus and Roma could have been on the site before that time. For an alternative viewpoint on when the temple was started, as well as the challenges of completing this structure before 60 CE, see Fishwick 1995, esp. 12-4.} When bearing in mind that elite wealth was surely tied up in land and livestock, the lack of liquid capital may have encouraged Gallic and British
elites to take out loans to support their urban projects. These loans surely came with interest rates, which were not necessarily usurious, but may have been difficult to pay off in the short-term, especially when combined with state and military exactions. This may explain the relationship between Cassius Dio’s citation of loans as a cause of the Boudican revolt just as local debts were cited by Tacitus as a cause of the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir (Cass. Dio 62.2.1-2; Tac. Ann. 3.40).

While in Germania Magna neither debt nor overburdening was given as causes of the Varian Disaster, urban development along the Rhineland and further east could nonetheless have contributed to discontentment in the region. It was one change among many taking place within Germanic communities in the period after Roman conquest – changes that could have disrupted indigenous norms, practices, and socio-political and religious hierarchies as new forms of agonistic elite competition and administrative practices came into being. The site at Waldgirmes was founded around 3 BCE. By 9 CE, the town was developed and contained mixed used half-timber buildings on stone foundations (split between housing and tabernae), atrium styled houses, a forum and basilica with pedestals for one or more equestrian statues, paved streets, and the whole site was protected by a wooden palisade and two ditches. Meanwhile, at sites in the Rhineland like Ara Ubiorum, the earliest monumental structures are in evidence from around the

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37 Hanson 1997, 76. Cf. Rodgers 2016, 756-7. Hanson and Millett both point out that the Roman government could help support projects and the emperor might directly grant money or allow a community to retain some tax revenues collected for the state to spend on civic projects (Hanson 1997, 76; Millett 1995, 63-4). Hanson also points out that during the first century CE there is evidence in north Africa and Sardinia of Roman agents making funds available for local projects, such as street and drain improvements (IRT 330-331; ILS 5350; cf. tac. Ann. 14.31). At the same time, we must note that when private individuals like Seneca were providing loans to provincials they were not doing this out of the kindness of their hearts but were hoping to receive financial return on these investments (Millett 1995, 63-4).

38 Becker 2017, 614. The site is dendrochronologically dated by wood from a well. The high proportion of Germanic pottery at the site suggests that local tribesmen resided at the site, but surely alongside of Roman and Gallic traders (Creighton 2006, 91).
turn of the 1st century CE, including the Ubier Monument and probably the Ara Ubiorum, which would serve as the provincial cult in the new province.  

**Integration: Stability, Control, and Timing**

Throughout the case studies, the regional and empire-wide contexts of revolts have been key to understanding when and why provincial populations engaged in mass resistance towards various imperial institutions (census, taxation, conscription, etc.). Behind this, a series of questions has been crucial in broadening our understandings of individual revolts. How firmly were places under Rome’s control when it attempted to integrate them into the broader structures of the empire? Broadly speaking, how long would Rome wait after the initial conquest before it would venture integrating recently annexed areas? When Roman agents conducted tasks (such as the census or conscription), how stable was the region? This is an issue not just for the first time that a task was implemented, as the resistance towards the census of Drusus showed (pages 140-3). Finally, what else was happening at the time of these revolts, or just prior to them, that could have disrupted Roman efforts? Roman campaigning in frontier regions, unrest in neighboring areas, tribal incursions from beyond the empire, and environmental or economic issues could all greatly increase the risk of mass resistance when Roman agents would be engaging in routine administrative tasks.

In the case of the census, there were several factors that could incite unrest when it was carried out. The information required of provincials was intrusive as was the higher imperial presence in early operations. The link between the census and various forms of extractions could lead to provincials’ resisting the census. This project has claimed that the main factor causing

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39 Creighton 2006, 91; Eck 2009, 10; Rasbach 2013, 19, 21; Becker 2017; Hanel 2014. Fragments of the equestrian statues have been found across Waldgirmes, seemingly they were intentionally destroyed prior to a Germanicus era occupation of the site (Becker 2017, 613-5).
census resistance, however, pertains to Rome’s control over the region when it conducted the census. While Rome often consolidated its control over a region for two to three decades before conducting a census, censuses in Judaea (6 CE) and in the client-kingdom of Archelaus II in Cilicia (36 CE) were conducted before Rome or its representatives had consolidated control over these territories. As was shown in chapter 2, there is evidence to suggest that Archelaus II had exerted little control over the Cietae before he attempted to assert his authority over them by imposing a census and taxation. Against typical practice, when Augustus annexed Judaea in 6 CE, a decision was made to extend the ongoing census in neighboring Syria to this new territory. Meanwhile in Gallia Comata, Germanic tribes from across the Rhine River had been raiding the province for several years prior to Drusus’ census in 13/12 BCE. It is natural that this sort of disruption could cause locals to question Rome’s ability to protect them, especially as Rome partially justified taxing provincials because provincials had to pay for the soldiers who protected them (Cic. Q. fr. 1.1.34; Tac. Hist. 4.74. See pages 144, cf. 97-8). The rarity of large-scale resistance to the provincial census is best understood then, as not being brought about by the modus operandi of the census, or else we would expect more instances of resistance over the course of the Principate. Instead, resistance to the census occurs in contexts where Rome overestimated its control over the region in question.

The timing of administratively incorporating recently annexed areas into the empire, then, could play a significant role in the outbreak of mass resistance. A few scholars have linked the Varian Disaster to an attempt by Rome to impose a census, most likely stemming from a belief that taxation in the Principate required a census first (see pages 106, 273-4). While a census was not necessary for taxation, it is still plausible that Varus could have been conducting a census in Germania Magna between 7 and 9 CE, because the length of time after the initial...
conquest fits within broader patterns observed in Chapter 2 (pages 112-3, Table 1). Regardless of whether there was a census or not, Rome was integrating the region into the empire around 9 CE when Varus began levying taxes and administering justice there (Cass. Dio 56.18.3; Vell. Pat. 2.118.1). Rome was also already extracting human and natural resources prior to this point (irregular forces and mining), and there was already a provincial cult at the future site of Köln. While Rome may have perceived the initial conquest complete around 7 BCE, the timing of integration, 7-9 CE, was not ideal. There was a series of revolts led by the tribes of the interior that were only put down in 5 CE (pages 280-1). Additionally, Rome was distracted by a major revolt in Illyricum that was ongoing since 6 CE (Great Illyrian revolt, pages 251-66). Both factors played a role in the resistance movement led by Arminius in 9 CE. Elsewhere in the empire, Rome implementing a census in Judaea upon annexation, rather than waiting to consolidate its hold over the already turbulent region, was a major factor in sparking unrest in 6 CE. Similarly, the timing even of annexing a former client territory could play a role in encouraging discontented subjects to revolt; the mishandled annexation of Prasutagus’ kingdom took place while the governor was campaigning on the opposite end of Britannia.  

One of the problems in provinces like Illyricum and Germania Magna was that Rome perceived that these regions were both stable and firmly under their control. These were large provinces where the territories most under Rome’s sway were those tribes closest to the Rhine River and the North Sea coast in Germania, and the Adriatic coastline and Sava and Drava river valleys in the interior. In both cases the hinterland was marginally under Roman control, though Rome perceived it to have been subdued because the tribes in these regions submitted to Rome when they first campaigned in the area (either willingly or after battle). It is largely these tribes

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40 If the procurator waited until after the campaign season to carry out the annexation of the Iceni, for instance, locals may have been more hesitant to openly resist Rome because the province’s garrison would not have been distracted by affairs elsewhere (see below for more thoughts on opportunism).
in the hinterland that continually resisted Roman extractions and expansion of control in the years leading up to the Varian Disaster and the Great Illyrian revolt (see pages, 277-82 and 257-9, 263-6). This is again similar to what was seen in the cases of census resistance. When Rome attempted to impose institutions or extract resources from communities not thoroughly under Rome’s boot there was a greater risk of being stabbed in the foot.

Relatedly, there was a higher risk of mass resistance when Rome was extending its control over regions, especially those communities on the fringes of Roman campaigning that had made terms with Rome and were, for a time, indirectly under Rome’s sway. Several revolts erupted when Rome was extending or strengthening its hold over a region: Gallia Comata between 39 and 27 BCE, Dalmatia in 10 BCE, the Varian Disaster in 9 CE, Tacfarinas’ revolt (17-24 CE), and Frisian revolt in 28 CE. Rome could attempt to extend its control over a region in several ways. First, Rome could impose prefects on indigenous tribes, which would displace local elites to an extent. Here, prefects could replace, or override, indigenous elites in certain key roles such as determining and collecting local taxes (as well as determining how to raise funds to pay imperial direct taxes), settling local disputes, and determining the communities’ policies. Second, the state could extend control by moving military forces into a region, which could create friction and unrest between Rome and indigenous communities. The relocation of *Legio III Augusta* to Ammaedara after the Gaetulian War, the increased garrison size at Flevum in the lead up to the Frisian revolt, and the establishment of camps at Poetovio and Sirmium a few years before the Pannonian Wars all brought their surrounding regions under closer control. The presence of units of Roman soldiers, however, and the impositions placed on local communities unaccustomed to routine Roman extractions, increased the risk of violent reactions from the locals. A sudden uptick in extraction, even if was at moderate levels, could invite a knee-jerk
reaction from local communities, which is what happened in Illyricum in 10 BCE. A similar situation occurred among the Frisii in the 20s CE when Rome was extending its control over the tribe with an increased garrison and a prefect set over the tribe. In turn, the Roman prefect increased the tribe’s burden by imposing a high size and quality standard for the Frisii’s tribute, in the form of leather hides, which ultimately resulted in the Frisian revolt (pages 58-72).

Third, Rome could consolidate or expand its control over regions by building roads. Roads facilitated the movement of Roman forces into potentially troublesome places and allowed the state to monitor the movements of semi-nomadic and transhumant populations. But the creation of roads in north Africa (from 6-14 CE) and Galatia (from 6/4 BCE – 6 CE) saw increased indigenous raiding shortly thereafter, in the form of the Tacfarinian and Isaurian revolts. Fourth, Rome could begin to consistently and regularly impose taxation on peoples, or, relatedly, begin routinely extracting human, animal, and natural resources from populations on the fringes of Roman territory. In Germania, it was the introduction of taxation, Roman law procedures, conscription, etc. ten years after the initial conquest that pushed the less thoroughly conquered tribes to overthrow Roman control. Similarly, in Gallia Comata from 39-27 BCE. Rome began to consolidate earlier gains through the early phases of Agrippa’s road network, through engaging in increased human and financial exactions, and through garrisoning forces among potentially rebellious tribes such as the Treveri (pages 136-40). It is possible that the revolts recorded around 30 BCE were related to Rome expanding its grip over the region. Meanwhile, Illyricum had only become a regularly appointed province from around 32-27 BCE and Rome would only rarely intervene administratively in this region before the

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41 The period between Agrippa’s first governorship and Augustus’ census.
42 C. Carrinas had to deal with the Morini (Cass. Dio 51.21.5-6; CIL 1², p76), M. Nonius Gallus put down a Treveran uprising (Cass. Dio 51.20.5; ILS 895), and M. Valerius Messala Corvinus campaigned in Aquitania (CIL 1², p50; App. BCiv. 4.38; Tib. 1.7, 2.1, 2.5).
Dalmatian revolt (10 BCE) and the Great Illyrian revolt (6-9 CE).\textsuperscript{43} For instance, it was beginning with Rome's Alpine and Balkan campaigns, 16-11 BCE, that Rome regularly exacted tribute and made \textit{ad hoc} impositions on the locals. In other words, Rome only began to integrate Illyricum into the empire’s extraction schemes because it had transferred more forces there to secure the region and the state needed local populations to support Roman campaigning needs. So, in this instance, not only was the indigenous population of Illyricum experiencing routine annual Roman extractions for the first time, but at a time when there would have been frequent \textit{ad hoc} levies to support military operations.

**Closing Remarks**

I would like to close out this project with a few closing remarks on the occurrence of provincial revolts more broadly. The fact that there were at least three revolts in the Julio-Claudian period against the very act of annexation of states formerly run by Roman clients (Judaea, Mauretania, and Iceni) speaks volumes about how fragile transitional periods were.\textsuperscript{44} Under the right circumstances, the uncertainty revolving around incorporation into the empire at all levels of local societies could be utilized by capable and charismatic individuals to foment mass resistance to Rome. Judaea was already a tumultuous place in Herod’s final days, and the uncertain future of the kingdom and chaos following his death encouraged several rebellions in the interregnum, each one revolving around unifying actors. The Iceni were surely restless in the uncertain future of their people after Prasutagus’ death, but the way Roman agents mishandled the subsequent annexation of their territory thoroughly alienated all levels of Icenian society and created the

\textsuperscript{44} Of course, one must bear in mind that these states were client-states only from Rome’s perspective and that locals were reacting against the very act of direct Roman rule. On the dangers of transitional periods, see further pages 159-62, 299, 305-6, 312.
platform for a charismatic leader like Boudica to step in and lead her people against Rome. Aedemon was a freedman of Ptolemaeus, the last client king of Mauretania, and he led a revolt upon Roman annexation.\textsuperscript{45} One may observe from these three incidents that close followers of former leaders had much to lose by annexation if Rome sought to utilize local elites not associated with the former leaders. People like Aedemon could whip up portions of local populations to resist Roman annexation, preying on fears of what change could bring. Death of rulers or periods of incorporation are times of great change and uncertainty, which could easily turn into mass resistance with the presence of a capable and charismatic leader. In all three cases there was no war of conquest that could feed local resentment, but incorporation could mean a real or perceived loss of status, a fear of higher taxes, or oppression at the hands of Roman agents.

This understanding allows us to gain more insights into why some populations opted to revolt against Rome. Any time that Rome was implementing new structures or tax regimes would have been periods of uncertainty and change for local populations. Will the census bring new taxes? Will the imposition of a prefect disrupt local hierarchies? Will these \textit{ad hoc} impositions continue after the war ends? Could local leaders maintain their positions in society after conquest or annexation, or will Rome favor new elites (see revolt of Florus and Sacrovir, pages 224-35)? Likewise, Roman campaigning in neighboring regions and local elite competition could place strains on local societies. Both of these scenarios created the conditions for revolt but would not necessarily lead to them. Even with underlying tensions and mass discontent present within provincial societies, revolts still required one or more catalyzing agents for them to materialize. Sometimes the catalyst was abuse of provincials or a mishandled operation. Other times a charismatic leader could use the underlying tensions, fears, \textsuperscript{45}See, Vanacker 2013.
uncertainties, and weighty burdens within their communities to rally the discontented to act in concert against Rome. In yet other circumstances, opportunism played a contributing role in encouraging discontented provincials to revolt against Rome. The Dalmatian revolt broke out during the Pannonian Wars of 12 to 9 BCE. The Great Illyrian revolt erupted in 6 CE while Rome was campaigning against Maroboduus in modern-day Bohemia. The scale of soldiers active in Illyricum in 6-9 CE and their needs would have impacted provinces near and far. Irregular units from Germania Magna seem to have served Rome in its efforts to suppress rebels in Illyricum only to return home and revolt against Rome while the latter was busy wrapping up events in Illyricum. Suetonius Paulinus was campaigning in northwestern Wales when the Boudican revolt broke out in 60 CE. While Rome was engaged in civil war after Nero’s death, Iulius Civilis led the Batavian revolt. These examples suggest a keen awareness on the part of provincials of affairs elsewhere, and this knowledge surely played a role in the timing of revolts. The populations are aware of Roman forces being moved for campaigns elsewhere or Rome being distracted by major events elsewhere, as much as they were surely aware of, and drew lessons from, previous attempts by populations to revolt or resist Rome (failed or successful).\(^{46}\) But, by the same token, such knowledge may have been utilized by indigenous elites in attempts to deter their communities from rising up.\(^{47}\) Despite the relatively high frequency of indigenous revolts in the Julio-Claudian period (compared to other periods of Imperial Rome), one should note that not every population disgruntled with Roman rule chose to revolt and many more

\(^{46}\) Such as Germanic tribes choosing to revolt while Rome was busy wrapping up the Great Illyrian revolt, or Boudica attacking Colchester while the governor was off campaigning at the far side of the island. One may also note that provincials in the west could look to Arminius, Vercingetorix, the Batos, and even possibly Maroboduus, among others, for lessons or inspiration.

\(^{47}\) Perhaps the most famous instance of an indigenous leader attempting to dissuade a population from revolting against Rome derives from Josephus on the eve of the Great Jewish revolt, Joseph. *BJ* 2.365-387.
communities seem to have managed to form a peaceful coexistence with Roman rule (or perhaps acceptance of Roman rule) from an early date.
### Appendices

#### Appendix 1: Prefects Mentioned in Chapter 1, Organized Chronologically

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Emperor</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Contemporary Command</th>
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<td>L. Marcius Optatus</td>
<td>Augustan-</td>
<td>Augustus</td>
<td>praefectus Asturiae</td>
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<td>M. Iulius Cottius</td>
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<td>Augustus</td>
<td>praefectus ceivitatium…</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tiberian</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Augustan-</td>
<td>Augustus</td>
<td>praefui [prouinciai]/iapudiae et Liburn(iai)</td>
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<td>Sex. Iulius Rufus</td>
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<td>Augustan-</td>
<td>Tiberius</td>
<td>praefectus Raetis, Vindolicis et Vallis Poenina et levis armatur(ae)</td>
<td>Raetia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hirratus</td>
<td>Tiberian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Olennius</td>
<td>Augustan-</td>
<td>Tiberius</td>
<td>e primipilaribus regendis Frisiis impositus</td>
<td>Germania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tiberian</td>
<td></td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>C. Baebius Atticus</td>
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<td>Tiberius-Claudius</td>
<td>praef(ectus) civitatum Moesiae et Treballia[e]</td>
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<td>C. Baebius Atticus</td>
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<td>Tiberius-Claudius</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Q. Gavius Fronto</td>
<td>Julio-Claudian</td>
<td>Claudius-Nero</td>
<td>Praef(ectus) Civitatium Scordisc(orum) et Breuco(rum) et lasorour</td>
<td>Dalmatia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>L. Calpurnius Fabatus</td>
<td>Julio-Claudian</td>
<td>Claudius-Nero</td>
<td>[pra]aeffectus...[et]nation(um) Gaetulicar(um) sex quae sunt in Numidia</td>
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<td>Possibly</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>L. Pomponius Lupus</td>
<td>Julio-Claudian</td>
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<td>praef(ectus)...Baliarum insularum</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Emperor</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Albanus</td>
<td>Julio-Claudian</td>
<td>Cottius II or Nero</td>
<td>praef(ectus) Capillat(orum) Sauincat(ium)</td>
<td>Maritime Alps</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Marcellus</td>
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<td>Nero</td>
<td>praef(ectus) civitatis Maeze[iorum item Daesid]iatum</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Antonius Naso</td>
<td>Julio-Claudian</td>
<td>Nero</td>
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<td>Pannonia</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Junius Secundus</td>
<td>Julio-Claudian</td>
<td>Nero</td>
<td>ἔπαρχος ἐθνος</td>
<td>Syria/Judaea</td>
<td>Possibly</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Ignatus CIL 3.15065</td>
<td>Julio-Claudian</td>
<td>Augustus-Nero</td>
<td>praef(ectus) civitatis</td>
<td>Dalmatia</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Calpurnius Mallianus</td>
<td>Julio-Claudian</td>
<td>Claudius-Nero</td>
<td>praef(ectus) ---</td>
<td>Dalmatia(?)</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>[Q.] Burrenus Firmus</td>
<td>Julio-Claudian</td>
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<td>praef(ectus) nati[on]um</td>
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<td>Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>L. Volcacius Primus</td>
<td>Flavian?</td>
<td>Nero-Vespasian</td>
<td>praef(ectus) ripae Danuvi(i) et civitatium duar(um) Boior(um) et Azalior(um)</td>
<td>Pannonia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Flavian?</td>
<td>Nero-Vespasian</td>
<td>praefectus earum</td>
<td>Alps</td>
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<td>Flavian</td>
<td>Vespasian</td>
<td>praef(ectus) Gall[aeciae]</td>
<td>Hispania Tarraconensis</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Ti. Claudius Pollio</td>
<td>Flavian</td>
<td>Domitian</td>
<td>praef(ectus) gentium in Africa</td>
<td>Africa Proconsularis</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ignatus AE 1973, 654</td>
<td>Flavian</td>
<td>Domitian</td>
<td>praefectus...gentis Mazicum</td>
<td>Mauretania Caesariensis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Charetus</td>
<td>2nd Half 1st Century CE</td>
<td>M. Iulius Agrippa II</td>
<td>στρατηγὸς Νομάδων</td>
<td>Aurantis</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>M. Clodius Martialis</td>
<td>Flavian</td>
<td>Vespasian-Domitian</td>
<td>praef(ectus) insularum [Baliarum praef(ectus) insularum</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>T. Claudius Paulinus</td>
<td>Flavian-Antoine</td>
<td>Flavian</td>
<td>praef(ectus) insularum</td>
<td>Hispania Tarraconensis</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ti. Flavius Macer</td>
<td>Trajan-Hadrian</td>
<td>Trajan</td>
<td>praef(ectus) gentis Musulamiorum</td>
<td>Numidia</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Victor Martialis</td>
<td>Trajan-Hadrian</td>
<td>Trajan</td>
<td>civitates LXIII pagi Thuscae et</td>
<td>Africa Proconsularis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Emperor</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Contemporary Command</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Publilius Memorialis</td>
<td>Trajan-Hadrian</td>
<td>Trajan-Hadrian</td>
<td>[praef(ectus) gentis Numidar(um) dilictat(or) [tir]onum ex Numidia lecto(rum)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Crepereius</td>
<td>Antonine</td>
<td>Antoninus Pius (?)</td>
<td>Επαρχός έθνους Δρομ[- - -]</td>
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<td>Antonine</td>
<td>Antoninus Pius</td>
<td>praeffectur[ae---]</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>L. Egnatuleius Sabinus</td>
<td>Antonine</td>
<td>Marcus Aurelius</td>
<td>praef(ectus) gentis Cinithiorum</td>
<td>Africa Proconsularis</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Ignotus AE 1992, 1766</td>
<td>Antonine</td>
<td>Marcus Aurelius - Commodus</td>
<td>pra[ef(ectus) gentium Musulamiior[um et Musunior[um regionorum]</td>
<td>Numidia</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Alezeiveus Rogatus</td>
<td>Severan</td>
<td>Septimius Severus</td>
<td>prae[f(ectus) g(entis) Nabuxor(um)]</td>
<td>Mauretania Caesariensis</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>P. Juventius Rufus</td>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian</td>
<td>Augustus</td>
<td>ΕΠΑΡΧΟΥ ΒΕΡΝΙΚΗ</td>
<td>Aegyptus</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>L. Pinarius Natta</td>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian</td>
<td>Tiberius</td>
<td>praefectus Berenicidis</td>
<td>Aegyptus</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>L. Iunius Calvinus</td>
<td>Flavian</td>
<td>Vespasian</td>
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<td>Aegyptus</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>M Trebonius Valens</td>
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<td>Vespasian</td>
<td>prae(ectus) Bernic(idis)</td>
<td>Aegyptus</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>L. Antistius Asiaticus</td>
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<td>Domitian</td>
<td>prae(ecto) Beren(ices)</td>
<td>Aegyptus</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Caesellius</td>
<td>Flavian</td>
<td>Vespasian - Domitian</td>
<td>praefectus item Ber[enices]</td>
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<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>D. Severius Severus</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>???</td>
<td>prae[. prae]sidiorum et montis Beronices</td>
<td>Aegyptus</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Annius Equester</td>
<td>Trajan-Hadrian</td>
<td>Trajan</td>
<td>(centurio) regionario</td>
<td>Britannia</td>
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<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Valerius Maximus</td>
<td>Trajan-Hadrian</td>
<td>Trajan</td>
<td>(centurio) reg(ionario)</td>
<td>Britannia</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>T. Floridius Natalis</td>
<td>Severan</td>
<td>Severus Alexander</td>
<td>c(enturio)...regi[onis]</td>
<td>Britannia</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Emperor</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Contemporary Command</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Aelius Antoninus</td>
<td>post-Severan</td>
<td>Gordian</td>
<td>c(enturio)...r(egionis)</td>
<td>Britannia</td>
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<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>C. Baebius</td>
<td>Late Republic</td>
<td>Late Republic</td>
<td>praef(ectus) ora[e marit(imae) H]span(iae) Citer[ioris b]ello Actiens(i)</td>
<td>Hispania Citerior</td>
<td>No (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Q. Pomponius Rufus</td>
<td>68-70 CE</td>
<td>Galba</td>
<td>praef(ectus) orae marit(imae) Hispan(iae) citer(ioris) Gallia[e] N[arbo(nensis) b]ello qu[od] Imp(erator) G[alla pro [re p(ublica)] gessit</td>
<td>Hispania Citerior et Gallia Narbonensis</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>L. Titinius Glaucus Lucretianus</td>
<td>Julio-Claudian</td>
<td>Nero</td>
<td>praef(ectus) pro legato insular(um) Bal(arum)</td>
<td>Hispania Tarraco(nensis)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>Ignotus (Hep II, 62)</td>
<td>1st Century CE</td>
<td>???</td>
<td>[praefectus p]ro leg(ato)</td>
<td>Hispania Tarraco(nensis)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Ignotus (AE 1926, 82)</td>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian</td>
<td>Tiberius</td>
<td>praefect[us --- C]ommag(en)</td>
<td>Commagene</td>
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Iulius Tutor</td>
<td>68-70 CE</td>
<td>Vitellius</td>
<td>ripae Rheni a Vitellio praefectus</td>
<td>Germania</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Ignotus (CIL 11.5744)</td>
<td>2nd Half 1st Century CE</td>
<td>Claudius – Vitellius (?)</td>
<td>praefectus)...item or[ae maritumae] in Maure[tan(ia) Caesariensi]</td>
<td>Mauretania Cesariensis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 See Appendix 3, pages 367-8 (Ala Antiana).
Appendix 2: Prosopographies of Praefecti Civitatium, Organized Geographically

Alpine Region (Raetia, Maritime Alps, Cottian Alps)

*M. Iulius Cottius (no. 2)*

M. Iulius Cottius became *praefectus ceivitatium* of fourteen *civitates* sometime around 14 BCE, during the Augustan conquests of the Alpine region (*ILS* 94). Cottius, who was designated a king prior to his prefecture (cf. *Vitr. De arch.* 8.3.17), appears to have initially resisted advances in the region until he was accepted into Augustus’ friendship, and six *civitates* that were within his prefecture are in fact listed on the Tropaeum Alpium of 8/7 BCE (Amm. Marc. 15.10.2; *CIL* 5.7817). After the end of the war, most likely contemporaneous to campaigns in the region between 16 and 14 BCE, Cottius maintained his prominent position locally as he was made *praefectus civitatum* of his former kingdom with some *civitates* added to it. His selection as prefect is important to note. The Ligurians, who were conquered at the same time, had an equestrian prefect set over them (Str. 4.6.4; cf. Cass. Dio 54.24.3), who was unlikely an indigenous leader. The Salassi, their neighbors to the north, were conquered a decade earlier and had 36,000 of their population sold into slavery (Str. 4.6.7; cf. Cass. Dio 53.26.2-5). The lack of heavy reprisals from Rome and the fact that the communities were still led by their former king suggests that any resistance on the part of Cottius was not serious, and that Cottius may have willingly entered into a relationship with Rome.²

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¹ Cornwell 2015, 52; *idem* 2017, 52-53. The goal of these campaigns seems to revolve around controlling the Alpine passes for communicative and economic purposes. Ammianus Marcellinus provides only a hint of the relationship between the peoples of the Cottian Alps with Rome between Caesar and the 10s BCE: “*quas rex Cottius perdomitis Gallis, solus in angustiis latens, inviaque locorum asperitate confisus, lenito tandem tumore, in amicitiam principis Octaviani receputus ...*” (*There King Cottius, after the subjugation of Gaul, lay hidden alone in their defiles, trusting to the pathless ruggedness of the region; finally, when his disaffection was allayed, and he was admitted to the emperor Octavian’s friendship...*” (Amm. Marc. 15.10.2 – John Rolfe trans.).

² Cornwell 2015, 46, 49; *idem* 2017, 52-54, 58-59; Baccolini 2007, 130. The rather harsh treatment of the Salassi seems to derive from the tribe using their control of the Great and Little Saint-Bernard Passes to extract money from several successive Roman armies seeking to pass through the region (Str. 4.6.7; Cornwell 2017, 57).
During his prefecture Cottius extended and improved the road network through his territory, which Hannah Cornwell recently argued may have helped keep the former king in power (he allied his interests with those of Augustus). One must bear in mind that these routes were essential for communications and the movement of troops to Spain and Gaul, both of which were key centers of Augustan activity in the 20s and 10s BCE.³

There is some question as to whether Cottius had command over any soldiers as part of his prefecture. While there are no units directly known to have served in the region, there are two pieces of evidence that suggest the presence of soldiers in the region. (i) on the Arch of Segusio, dedicated in 9/8 BCE, the main north and south friezes detail a procession that had infantry and cavalry on it;⁴ (ii) during riots in Pollentia, Tiberius sent a cohors from Cottius’ territory to aid in ending the rioting (Suet. Tib. 37: a Cotti regno).⁵ While historical reliefs cannot be taken for granted that they reveal an event as it happened, the second piece of evidence lends some credence to the idea that there were some units in the area, at least from the Tiberian period.

C. Iulius Donnus (no.6)

Son of M. Iulius Cottius, C. Iulius Donnus was prefect of the same civitates as his father at some point between the reign of Augustus and the start of Claudius’ reign (AE 1976, 264)⁶. It is under his prefecture that Tiberius requested aid from a cohort stationed in the Cottian Alps to end rioting in Pollentia (Tib. Suet. 37). This means that there were some units serving in Donnus’ prefecture, but it is uncertain if Donnus had command over these units or not.

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⁴ Cornwell 2015, 57; Letta 2002, 2095.
⁵ Haeussler 2016, 187; Cornwell 2017, 60.
⁶ When M. Iulius Cottius II was made a king by Claudius (Cass. Dio 54.24.4).
He seems to have inherited this position from his father, similarly to some successions of client kings. This reveals a certain drastic difference between these two prefects and the other prefects detailed below. For the members of the Cottian dynasty the prefectures may have been hereditary and held for life. But for other equestrian officers, these prefectures were held for a finite term and were often held as part of the tres militae, a series of three military posts accessible to those equestrians seeking to advance into important equestrian posts (praefectus annonae, praefectus Aegypti, etc.).

**Sex. Pedius Lusianus Hirrutus (no.7)**

In the reign of Tiberius, prior to Germanicus’ death in 19 CE, Sex. Pedius Lusianus Hirrutus was praefectus Raetis, Vindolicis et Vallis Poenina et levis armaturae (CIL 9.3044). Of the seven known praefecti civitatum in the region, Hirrutus is the only one that definitely had a contemporaneous command over troops (though see no. 2, 6, and 10). He may have been chosen as prefect of this territory because of his previous military experience in Raetia, which would have made him somewhat familiar with the people and geopolitical situation of the region. As primipilus of the Legio XXI Rapax he had served in Raetia, probably stationed at Augusta Vindelicum, at some point after the campaigns of Tiberius and Drusus in 15 BCE. The size of the region he was charged with was quite large in comparison to other praefecti civitatum, and he may have held this prefecture prior to the formation of the Raetian province. If this is the case, Hirrutus would have been subordinate to the legate of the Upper Germany legions.

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7 Cornwell 2017, 59-60, 63; Baccolini 2007, 212-213.
8 Faoro 2011, 91, 132-3; Baccolini 2007, 212-213: post 9 CE.
9 Faoro 2011, 132-133; Wrobel 2009, 77, 78, 80-81; cf. Demougin 1992, no.227. He definitely served in Raetia before c. 9 CE when the unit transferred to Xanten in Germania Inferior.
10 On the question of when Raetia became a province see Wrobel 2009, 77, with literature. Hirrutus’ early date is secured by the irregularity of his cursus, namely that he is one of the few known praefecti who was a centurion.
Another possible *praefectus civitatum* is Pro[, from Tergeste (Pupinia tribe), in the 1st century CE (*CIL* 5.536).\(^{11}\) After serving with the Legio XXII Primigenia, founded in 39 CE by Caligula, in Germania possibly as a *tribunus militum*, he held his post that is of interest here. The fragmentary nature of the inscription has yielded two diverging restorations. The two lines read: ---praef. Gaesa---|---|um Helvet---. Devijver has restored the lines as *[pr]aef(ectus) gaesa*(torum Raetorum Helvet[iorum], while Saddington proposed *[pr]aef(ectus) gaesa*(torum civitatum Helvet[iorum].\(^{12}\) In either case, this post would have been in Raetia. *Gaesati* are soldiers who use a certain type of Celtic spear, usually recruited from Raetia.\(^{13}\) If he was a *praefectus civitatum*, then his prefecture was held at the same time as his prefecture over a unit of *Gaesati*.

*C. Baebius Atticus (no. 9)*

C. Baebius Atticus, from Iulium Carnicum in Italy, came to his post as *praefectus civitatum in Alpibus Maritumis*, sometime between the reigns of Tiberius and Claudius (*CIL* 5.1838).\(^{14}\) At this point, Baebius was in the middle of a lengthy career, which had started in the early Tiberian...
period when he had served as primipilus of the Legio V Macedonica and praefectus civitatium Moesiae et Treballiae.\(^{15}\) Unlike his previous post, Baebius’ prefecture in the Maritime Alps lacked a contemporaneous military command. With a low risk of revolt and the presence of units in the neighboring prefecture of the Cottian Alps, it is possible that none of the prefects in the Maritime Alps had command over soldiers (cf. Str. 4.6.3 for prefects, and Cass. Dio 54. 24. 3 for the conquest in 14 BCE).

**Albanus (no. 14)**

Albanus most likely became praefectus Capillatorum, Sauincatium, Quariatium, Bricianiorum during the reign of Cottius II, or possibly as late as Galba (AE, 1994, 1142).\(^{16}\) Albanus was likely an indigenous notable like the other prefects of the Cottian Alps, but not a member of the Cottian dynasty.\(^{17}\) The scope of his prefecture overlaps with a portion of Cottius I’s prefecture, which suggests to Hannah Cornwell that Albanus might have been “a subordinate prefecture to the Cottian administration.”\(^{18}\) Though the earlier prefects in the Cottian Alps may have had soldiers under their command, there is no evidence that Albanus had any military experience or soldiers under his command. This would make a date as late as Galba seem less likely, as it is difficult see Galba giving control over two of the major Alpine passes, let alone securing them, to a local notable lacking military experience.

\(^{15}\) Demougin 1982; Pflaum 1960, no. 11. Cf. no. 5, and 7 above on the rarity of centurions being promoted to equestrian posts.

\(^{16}\) Updates CIL 12.80. Cottius II was appointed king at some point under Claudius and died in 63 CE. There is a possibility though that Albanus held this prefecture as late as Galba (Cornwell 2017, 69 n89; Baccolini 2007, 132, 212-213). Letta 2002, 2095, places him in the late Neronian period between Claudius’ ‘restoration of the kingdom’ and when the kingdom became a procuratorial province.

\(^{17}\) AE, 1994, 1142; Letta 2002, 2095: did not have equestrian status.

\(^{18}\) Cornwell 2017, 69n89.
Egnatius Calvinus (no. 22)

A Roman citizen without any troops attached to his command, Egnatius Calvinus, held a prefecture over at least a portion of the western Alps at some point between 63 and 79 CE (Plin. N.H. 10.134- praefectus earum).

Iberian Peninsula and Baleares Islands

L. Marcius Optatus (no. 1)

L. Marcius Optatus (no. 1), from Iluro in Hispania Tarraconensis, held a series of local magistracies before becoming praefectus Asturiae prior to 10 CE, when the Legio II Augusta left Spain (CIL 2.4616). While scholars are agreed that his inscription is in direct order,¹⁹ there is some debate as to whether Optatus held his prefecture in conjunction with his military tribunate of the Legio II Augusta or if he held the latter post after finishing his prefecture. The difference between these two possibilities is significant because there is a distinct difference in how Optatus may be received by the local communities depending on whether it was a military occupation of a recently conquered territory headed by a prefect familiar with the region and with troops at his disposal, or a local elite from a settled portion of the province, with Roman citizenship, governing the area in Rome’s interest without command over Roman troops. Knowledge of which of these possibilities provides us with a better understanding of how Rome incorporated the region into the empire as well as how secure Rome perceived its control over the area was. Hubert Devijver has posited that the posts were held in succession, while more recently Davide Faoro has suggested that the posts were held simultaneously.²⁰ The matter, however, could be

¹⁹ This means that offices and positions held were listed in chronological order from first to last, whereas in an inverse order inscription the first listed post is the most recently held.
²⁰ Devijver 1989, 94; Faoro 2011, 128.
settled. D.B. Saddington has shown that when praefecti civitatum were seconded from units to carry out their tasks, the conjunction et was often used between their prefecture and their unit, and that the prefecture was often listed first (nos. 4, 13, 15, 25, 26). He also presented a case for prefects being seconded from units when the prefecture and his unit were merely juxtaposed without a correlative conjunction. Even though this suggests that Optatus could hold both positions at once, this alone cannot prove that he did so because there was no definite pattern for how these officers epigraphically commemorated their careers. Looking at the patterns detectable for these praefecti in the Julio-Claudian period, however, there is a greater tendency to make use of active soldiers or former soldiers in these posts regardless if they have units attached to their command or not (see Figure 4, page 57). To my knowledge, only in the Cottian Alps there were praefecti in this period that may not fit this pattern because they came from the former royal house. With this in mind it is therefore highly improbable that Optatus would have served as a prefect prior to his first military experience.

The case is strengthened by the fact that northwestern Spain was also a very difficult region to conquer and pacify. After the initial conquest, which saw several phases between 29 and 19 BCE and utilized no less than seven legions in the process, there were issues with unrest in the recently conquered territory as well as the more pacified portions of the Iberian Peninsula: a revolt put down in 16 BCE (Cass. Dio 54.20.3); an insurrection in Baetica prior to 2 BCE (ILS 103); a praetorian iuridicus, L. Calpurnius Piso was assassinated in 25 CE (Tac. Ann. 4.45); the restlessness of the people of Baetica at the time when there were revolts in Gaul and Africa, 21

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21 Saddington 1987, 268-269.
23 Legio I Augusta - left sometime around 16 BCE, in Cologne 9 CE; Legio II Augusta - left by 10 CE for Mainz; Legio IV Macedonica - left for Mainz sometime between 39 and 43 CE; Legio V Alaudae - left for Gallia Belgica around 19 BCE; Legio VI Victrix - left in 69 CE for Germania Inferior; Legio VIIIII Hispana - left sometime between 19 BCE and 9 CE for either the Rhine or Danube border or both; Legio X Gemina - left for Carnuntum probably c.63 CE (Morillo 2006, 87; Keppie 1998, 175-176, 177, 178).
CE (Tac. Ann. 3.44); resistance among the Astures in the late 50s CE required the sixth legion to put it down (ILS 2648). Due to the difficulty of the conquest and incomplete pacification of the region there was still a heavy military presence in northwestern Spain at the end of the Augustus’ reign (when L. Marcius Optatus was praefectus Asturiae), three legions (after the 2nd legion left); two legions in Asturias (Astorga- Legio X gemina, and León- Legio VI victrix) and one legion among the Cantabrians (Herrera de Pisuerga- Legio IIII Macedonica) (Str. 3.4.20). It is therefore more likely that Optatus held his prefecture over Asturias at the same time that he was a military tribune of the Legio II Augusta.

*Ignotus, CIL 2.3271 (no.23)*

By the time that the ignotus of the early Flavian period --- his cursus dates somewhere between 70 and 83 CE--- was praefectus Galleciae there was only one legion in Spain, Legio VII at León, suggesting that the region was more pacified at this point (CIL 2.3271). This suggestion is supported by two further points. The prefect, who may have been from Baetica, held no previous military posts. Combined with the ongoing Flavian municipalization of Spain there appears to have been a transition towards more normalized civic self-government in northwestern Spain.

*L. Pomponius Lupus (no. 13)*

25 Morillo 2006, 89.
26 There used to be some debate on the order of his inscription, direct or reverse order, which has some bearing on whether this prefect had some military experience prior to his prefecture or none at all. Until an article by Pflaum, it was contended that this prefect’s inscription was in reverse order, which would support an argument that he had some military experience before his appointment. Since Pflaum, however, the consensus is that the inscription is in direct order, meaning that he had no military experience, which would suggest that Rome considered the region to be less likely to revolt (Fishwick 1970, 97-99; Faoro 2011).
In his reverse order inscription, L. Pomponius Lupus was praef(ecto) coh(ortis) equitatae Macedonum et coh(ortis) Lusitanor(um) et Balirum insularum most likely in the reign of Nero (CIL 11.7427). This prefect, who may have been from Italy, is the only attested praefectus insularum Baliarum that had a contemporaneous military command. In fact, there is only other piece of epigraphic evidence attesting to troops on the islands, a votive offering from a random soldier. This suggests that the military nature of this post was exceptional. As explored in Chapter 1 (pages 39-41), the context of Lupus’ prefecture is most likely to secure the island in a period of instability or to keep watch over exiles on the island.

**M. Clodius Martialis (no. 27)**

After holding a series of civic and religious posts M. Clodius Martialis entered an equestrian career first as praefectus fabrum and then as praefectus insularum Baliarum (RIT 168). Not much more may be written about this prefect who held his post in the Flavian period (though potentially held as late as the Antonine period), other than that he gained entrance to an equestrian career by becoming praefectus fabrum, whereas his peers treated here typically held one of the tres militae as their first equestrian post.

**T. Claudius Paulinus (no. 28)**

At some point in the Flavian to Antonine periods T. Claudius Paulinus became praefectus insularum Baliarum et orae maritimae after holding local magistracies (AE 1956, 22). There is no evidence that he had any military experience prior to this posting, given that praefecti orae.

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28 Zucca 1998, *Baliare*, 191- Claudius or Nero; Baccolini 2007, 128- prefers a broader date range from Claudius to Flavian. See below for why a Neronian date is preferred here.
29 Zucca 1998, 191
30 Baccolini 2007, 129-130. Cf. Zucca 1998, 137. See page 40n20 for the possibility that Clodius was appointed in the Year of the Four Emperors.
maritimae in Spain seem to have only existed in periods of instability; C. Baebius (no. 49) in the Actian War and Q. Pomponius Rufus (no. 52) in Galba’s reign. Given the contexts of the appointments of the other two praefecti orae maritimae that in part concerned the Balearic Islands, Paulinus’ dual appointment suggests that he served at a time of instability on the island, or perhaps in the western Mediterranean more broadly. With these posts it has been conjecturing that he played a military function to control the population, patrol the coast, and/or deter bandits in the area. But without being able to date Paulinus’ tenure on the island more precisely it is hard to state the circumstances of his appointment.  

Balkans

Dalmatia

Ignotus, CIL 5.3346 (no. 3)

The ignotus of CIL 5.3346 (no. 3), possibly from Verona (where the inscription was found), held his prefecture over the Iapodes and Liburnia during the Great Illyrian revolt (6-9 CE). The fragmentary nature of the inscription prevents a certain identification of his status or his military command, though he must have had some sort of military force at his disposal given the context of his appointment; he was set over populations not only at risk of rebel invasion, but populations that could possibly join the rebels (see further, pages 259-63).  

31 Zucca 1998, 137; Baccolini 2007, 129.

32 Saddington 1987, 268. Note that Faoro feels that he was likely an equestrian (2011, 133). On large numbers of equestrians and senators being called up for this war, see Vell. Pat. 2.111. M. Suić has argued that “the region could have constituted a provisional province during the Illyrian insurrection of 6-9 CE” (AE 1993, 774). A temporary province is always a possibility (though it was not a necessity), but there is enough contemporary evidence of prefects taking command over districts of provinces (rather than being an equestrian with an independent provincial command) to justify his inclusion in this study (cf. Džino 2010).
incursions of rebel forces, and perhaps to prevent these two tribes from joining the revolt (cf. Vell. Pat. 2.110-111). He was likely appointed to his command by either Augustus, as the emperor, or by Tiberius, as the leader of Roman forces charged with putting down the revolt.\textsuperscript{33}

**Q. Gavius Fronto (no. 11)**

Q. Gavius Fronto was a *praefectus civitatum Scordiscorum et Breucorum et Iasorum* very likely simultaneously to his centurionate (*primus pilus*) in the *Legio XIII Gemina*. Fronto probably held this prefecture during the reigns of Claudius or Nero when *Legio XIII Gemina* was stationed at Poetovio. His subsequent post in the *Legio IV Macedonica* must date before 70 CE when the legion was rebranded as a punishment for having sided with Vitellius. To lend more credence to this reconstruction, the inscription was found in the forum of Aquae Iasae, a town in the territory of the Iasi near Poetovio.\textsuperscript{34} As for the tribes he was set over, the Scordisci fell under Roman control in 15 BCE and aided Tiberius in the Pannonian War (12-9 BCE), the Breuci were heavily involved in the Great Illyrian revolt, and it is possible that the Iasi were in some manner involved as well.\textsuperscript{35}

**Marcellus (no. 15)**

Marcellus, an Italian from Bovianum, served as *praefectus civitatis Maezeiorum et Daesitatium* most likely when he was a centurion of the *Legio XI Claudia pia fidelis* (*CIL* 9.2564). The argument is strong for Marcellus having held these two posts simultaneously. The direct order inscription dates to 75 CE and Marcellus’ legion had left Dalmatia by 69 or 70 CE. After his

\textsuperscript{33} Baccolini 2007, 140; Faoro 2011, 133.
\textsuperscript{34} Kušan Špalj et al. 2014, no.64.
\textsuperscript{35} Mócsy 1974, 34. Among those involved in the Pannonian War were the Breuci. The potential involvement of the Iasi in the Great Illyrian revolt is based on Mócsy’s argument that only tribes south of the Drava were involved in the revolt.
prefecture, Marcellus was prefect of two cohorts and held a civil magistracy by 75 CE. This would suggest a Neronian, rather than early Vespasianic, date for his prefecture. Furthermore, his selection for the post would have been made all the more easily as the legion was based at Burnum along the Adriatic Coast, which was within 100 miles of the Maezaei and Daesitiates. The importance of this post is twofold. First, both tribes were involved in the Great Illyrian revolt: the Daesitiates provided one of the revolt’s leaders (Bato of the Daesitiates) and the Maezaei were defeated by Germanicus in 7 CE (Cass. Dio 55.32.4). Second, Rome was very interested in the mining resources of the region. After his prefecture Marcellus was stationed at Andetrium as the prefect of the cohors III Alpinorum, where he may have held a similar role among the Delmatae as he had previously done among the Maezaei and Daesitiates.

**Ignotus, CIL 3.15065 (no. 18)**

An inscription found at Privlica reveals that the Iapodes possibly had another prefect set over them at some point during the Julio-Claudian period, the *ignotus* of CIL 3.15065. It is presumed that the prefecture would have been over the Iapodes due to the find spot of the inscription. The very fragmentary nature of the inscription, however, makes it impossible to discuss the origin and status of the prefect, let alone the historical circumstances of his appointment.

**Pannonia**

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36 Matei-Popescu 2010, 130. This calculation is based on the premise that these equestrian posts were held on average between three to five years, and, for the sake of the argument, the lower average was used to suggest that the prefecture most likely held in the mid-60s CE at the latest.  
37 Wilkes 1969, 169, 289. Baccolini believes that Marcellus held the prefecture after serving in the legion (2007, 142). Faoro believes that the posts were contemporary or that he held them in quick succession (2011, 134-135). Džino backs a Julio-Claudian date without argumentation (2014, 224). Summerly places his service in *Legio XI* between its assumption of the title *Claudia Pia Fidelis* c.42 and 69 CE when it left Dalmatia (1992, 32).  
39 Džino 2014, 224.
Antonius Naso (no. 16)

Antonius Naso, possibly a second generation colonist from Heliopolis, was a centurion of the Legio XIII Gemina when he was praefectus civitatis Colaphianorum in the Neronian period, prior to 66 CE (CIL 3.14387 = ILS 1349). The Colapiani were located along the Sava River around the border between Pannonia and Dalmatia, and the Roman designation of the tribe’s name appears to have been created after Rome broke up the Breuci into several civitates after their prominent role in the Great Ilyrian revolt. The prefect’s legion was stationed at Poetovio, along the Drava River, about fifty miles north of the Colapiani. While the region had first come under Roman control around 35 BCE, it seems clear that the location of the Legio XIII Gemina was to keep watch among the tribes of the region who had revolted or been first conquered in 6-9 CE. The presence of prefects like Antonius Naso further attests to the ongoing pacification and transitioning towards civil government in the region even fifty years after the last major resistance.

L. Volcacius Primus (no. 21)

The second praefectus civitatum in Pannonia is L. Volcacius Primus, who was simultaneously praefectus Ripae Danuvi and praefectus civitatium Boiorum et Azaliorum (CIL 9.5363). The two tribes were located around the big southern bend of the Danube River in northeastern Pannonia, a region that was most likely incorporated into the province during the Claudian era. This late annexation of the region may explain why officers were present among these tribes in the

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40 Devijver 1989, 343, 349; Baccolini 2007, 138. 66 CE when Antonius Naso became military tribune of Legio I Italica (Devijver 1989, 352). Mócsy (1974, 69) places Antonius Naso in the Claudian period, though there is no reason to doubt the consensus.

41 Wilkes 1996, 579; Faoro 2011, 135; Fitz 1995, 177; Mócsy 1974, 69.
Neronian to Vespasianic periods, aside from the fact that the tribes were located along the Danubian border where Rome’s military forces in the region had recently concentrated.  

There are some questions as to whether the prefect’s posts were contemporaneous to his post as prefect of the *cohors I Noricorum*, as well as when served his prefecture over the Boii and Azali. There is some evidence to suggest that L. Volcacius Primus was seconded from his unit to serve as the *praefectus Ripae Danuvi* and *civitatium Boiorum et Azaliorum*. András Mócsy has suggested that the *cohors I Noricorum* was stationed at Arrabona, which was in between the two tribes. This would explain why a prefect of this unit was chosen for these dual prefectures, and why he could be seconded from this unit to be the prefect of the Danube River (or at least this section of it) and prefect of the *civitates* of the Boii and Azali. A somewhat more flexible dating may be required for this prefect, though, as the auxiliary camp at Arrabona is archaeologically attested from at the middle of the 1st century CE, which could support that Volcacius Primus’ unit, *cohors I Noricorum*, was already in the region in the late Julio-Claudian period, thus fitting a Neronian or Vespasianic context. His post as *praefectus ripae danuvi*, if similar to a *praefectus orae maritimae*, may indicate a period of instability or a need to protect the riverine region. Like those in Gaul, Spain (see pages 40-1), and the Rhine (Tac. *Hist*. 4.55), this would fit a civil war context or the years immediately following Vespasian’s rise to power.  

**Moesia**

42 Mócsy 1974, 47-52, 55. It is uncertain if the northeastern portion of Pannonia was annexed via conquest or peacefully via diplomacy. The Azali, according to András Mócsy, were a tribe originally located further south in the Sava Valley and were moved to the northeast of Pannonia likely after the Pannonian War, 12-9 BCE, to break up the power of tribes in the region.  

43 On doubts see Saddington 1987, 268; Faoro 2011, 135. Both seem to suggest that he held the cohort prefecture afterwards even though the inscription is in direct order and this post is listed after his dual posts.  


C. Baebius Atticus (no. 9)

There is one prefect attested in Moesia, C. Baebius Atticus, who was *primipilius* of the *Legio V Macedonica* while he was *praefectus civitatum Moesiae et Treballiae* (*CIL* 5.1838 = *ILS* 1349). The two tribes were located along the Danube, south of Dacia, roughly forty miles west of *Legio V Macedonica*’s base at Oescus. While such a prefecture could have been in existence since the late Augustan era, an independent province of Moesia probably did not come into existence until the early Claudian period. Baebius’ post would most likely then have ultimately been dependent upon the consular legate of Macedonia and Achaia. According to Dise, the presence of *praefecti* like Baebius Atticus may to be due to a lack of political centralization among the tribes in the region. Also, the location of both the prefect and the legion may be partially explained by the mineral resources that Rome exploited in the region from an early date. As to when Baebius held his prefecture, it can only be narrowed down between the 20s CE, when there is evidence for the Moesiae and Treballiae being organized as *civitates*, and Claudius’ reign, when Baebius Atticus ended his career as a *procurator* in Noricum.

Africa

*Africa Proconsularis*

*Ti. Claudius Pollio* (no. 24)

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46 Saddington 1987, 269. *Contra*, Demougin 1992, p.405; Faoro 2011, 140. These two scholars argue that he served with the legion in Macedonia and followed this with his prefecture in Moesia. While there is no *et* connecting his centurionate to his prefecture, the proximity of the two posts geographically and positionally in the inscription should not rule out the contemporaneity of these two posts (Saddington 1987). Soldiers could frequently be seconded from their units for a variety of tasks, so why not for a prefecture located 40 miles away?

47 Mócsy 1974, 69.

48 Whately 2016, 11. Note that some believe that there was an independent province as early as 6 CE.


Ti. Claudius Pollio held his prefecture over tribes in Africa during the reign of Domitian (CIL 6.31032 = ILS 1418). He had prior military experience early in Domitian’s reign, serving as praefectus Alae II Flaviae milliariae (Geminae) in Syria.\footnote{Pflaum 1960, no.54, 124-5; Baccolini 2007, 35. A letter of Pliny verifies that his inscription is in reverse order (Plin. Ep. 7.31; Pflaum 1960, no.54, 124-5). It is possible that the ala II Flavia gemina had served in Germania prior to Syria, and it is under Domitian that the unit was sent to Syria; meaning that Pollio may very well have been the first prefect of the unit after its move to the east (Spaul 1994, 113). Cf. Baccolini (2007, 35) for the debate on whether Pollio’s praefectus gentium and praefectus alae roles were contemporary or not.} There is a serious issue over the extent of his command and over which tribes he was prefect. Baccolini and Leveau have pondered whether his prefecture was over all of the tribes in Africa Proconsularis or over a federation of tribes not specified by the language of the inscription (praefectus gentium in Africa). Meanwhile, Whittaker sees this post as a possible counterpart to Calpurnius Fabatus’ in Numidia (over the Gaetuli).\footnote{Baccolini 2007, 35; Leveau 1973, no.40, 177; Whittaker 1996, 526.} Though one may simply never know, it is most probable that his command was over tribes in the south or southwest of Africa Proconsularis, as this is where Rome had been expanding its control and influence in recent decades.

\textit{Victor Martialis (no. 30)}

In 113 CE, Victor Martialis administered LXIII pagi Thuscae et Gunzuzi. The inscription was found at Mactar, the chief city of the pagus, where two other inscriptions attest to the continued use of prefects in the area until at least the reign of Antoninus Pius (CIL 8.622 and 11781; 8.23599- nos. 33 and 34). The final line of Martialis’ inscription has been read as et (centurione), suggesting to Leveau that he was either a centurion seconded from his unit for the prefecture, or, as Leveau favors, that he was a former centurion. Regardless of interpretation, Victor Martialis seems to have had military experience, but his successors did not.\footnote{Leveau 1973, 177-178 ; Lepelley 1979, 2.289-290.} This sequence fits in with a broad pattern attested across the known praefecti, where prefects with military experience are

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attested over communities earlier and prefects with no military experience or chosen from the region are attested later. There is not enough information to speculate why a prefect was necessary, but it is clear from how late the praefecti are attested at Mactar that local elites were not entrusted with self-government of the pagus for quite a long time after annexation.

L. Egnatuleius Sabinus (no. 35)

L. Egnatuleius Sabinus held a prefecture over the Cinithii in the late 2nd century CE after holding a series of local offices and priesthoods, and serving as a tribune of two legions; the first is unknown and the second was the Legio III Scythica, stationed at Zeugma (CIL 8.10500 = ILS 1409). The Cinithii, who dwelt around the coast of Syrtis Minor, were involved in the Tacfarinian revolt of Tiberius’ reign, and a continued prefecture over the tribe may be partially explained by this (Ptol. 4.3.22, 27; Tac. Ann. 2.52). Later, the Flavians settled the tribe, placing their civitas center at the port of Gigthis. It is possible that the continued use of prefects here until the late 2nd century was to keep watch on the semi-nomadic population beyond the town, i.e. to monitor their movements. Egnatuleius was from Thysdrus, up the coast from the tribe, and would certainly have been familiar with the tribe and the region. As the tribe had previously resisted Rome, his military experience may have added to his qualifications to serve as prefect over this tribe. He likely served this role towards the end of Marcus Aurelius’ reign, c.175 CE. Béatrice Le Teuff has linked his subsequent post as procurator Augusti ad census

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54 See Pflaum 1960, no217. He suggests that the inscription was in inverse order and the post were not simultaneous.
56 Leveau 1973, 178-179 no44. On Thysdrus, see Lepelley 1979, 2.318-322.
acciendos Macedoniae to other census operations across the empire around 176-177 CE, which should serve as a terminus ante quem for his prefecture.57

**Numidia**

**L. Calpurnius Fabatus (Neronian) (no. 12)**

L. Calpurnius Fabatus, from Comum, held a joint command as praefectus cohortis VII Lusitanorum and prefect over six Gaetulian tribes sometime between the late Claudian and early Neronian periods (ILS 2721 = CIL 5.5267).58 The Gaetuli stretched across the south of Numidia around the Aures Mountains, and it is uncertain over which nationes Calpurnius was prefect. In spite of the vagueness of the phrasing on the inscription (praefectus…nationum Gaetulicarum sex quae sunt in Numidia), a few scholars have postulated a feasible scope of his command. Yann Le Bohec believes that the nationes were to the north and east of the Aures Mountains. With the Cohors VII Lusitanorum being stationed at Mascula, modern Khenchela, in the east end of the Aures Mountains, Le Bohec’s hypothesis is plausible. Jehan Desanges a few years earlier had identified the Nattabudes, Sabarbares, Nicives, Vamacures, Marchubi, and Massyli as possible nationes of Calpurnius’ command, mostly to the north and east of the Aures Mountains.59 The greater context of this prefecture appointment revolves around Rome’s increasing grip over the region towards the former client-kingdom of Mauretania, and possibly as a consequence of the tribal disturbances that led to the future emperor Galba being appointed

57 Le Teuff 2012b, 76. More conservatively, Pflaum (1960, no217, 568-569) shows that his cursus belongs between the reigns of Hadrian and Commodus, which is followed by Leveau (1973, 179), and Baccolini (2007, 40).
58 Faoro 2011, 98; Baccolini 2007, 34 n21. Calpurnius Fabatus definitely held his prefecture prior to 65 CE, when he was forced to retire after being implicated in a conspiracy (Tac. Ann. 16.8; Leveau 1973, 175 no38). Cohors VII Lusitanorum arrived in Africa around the middle of the 1st century CE, corroborating the dating of Fabatus’ appointment (Spaul 2000, 67). L. Calpurnius Fabatus was also Pliny the Younger’s father-in-law (Plin. Ep. 5.11).
59 Spaul 2000, 67; Desanges 1957, 36 n119; Baccolini 2007, 34.
proconsul of Africa Proconsularis c.44-46 CE. Not by coincidence, this is also around the time that the *cohors VII Lusitanorum* appeared at Mascula, and would explain the appointment of a prefect over the unit and neighboring *nationes* with vast military experience, including being military tribune twice of the *Legio XXI rapax*, and *praefectus fabrum* prior to his appointment.

**Ti. Flavius Macer (no. 29)**

Ti. Flavius Macer was a local elite, possibly a son of a Flavian veteran, who became *praefectus gentis Musulamiorum* during the reign of Trajan. Macer’s family was from Ammaedara, a colony set inside of Musulami territory and their “rangelands,” where he was *duumvir* and *flamen perpetuo* prior to his prefecture. Until their move to Theveste in the Flavian era, Ammaedara was also the site of the *Legio III Augusta*’s camp after the Gaetulian War, a war which had also involved the Musulami (Flor. 2.31; Cass. Dio 55.28.3-4; *CIL* 8.10018, 8.10023; *ILS* 151-14 CE- see further pages 289-94). As for the Musulami, they were a very large tribe or confederation that spanned westwards into the domains of the former client-kingdom of Mauretania and eastwards into Numidia and Africa Proconsularis. Beyond their involvement in the Gaetulian War, they were led by Tacfarinas in his revolt (Tac. *Ann.* 2.52- see pages 282-94) and may have been involved in the troubles in Africa that caused Galba to be sent around 44-46 CE (Suet. *Galba*, 7, 8). The tribe underwent a delineation project under Trajan, possibly partially

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61 Baccolini 2007, 37; Leveau 1973, no41, p177; Whittaker 1996, 529. *Cohors I Musulamiorum equitata* is one possible unit, which could have been raised as early as 41 CE, which served in Syria until the reign of Hadrian. In addition, there is a diploma dating to 88 CE for the unit (Spaul 2000, 472). Another possible unit is the *Cohors I Flavia Musulamiorum*, which was serving in Mauretania Caesariensis in the early 2nd century (diploma from 107 CE) (Spaul 2000, 471).
62 Baccolini 2007, 37; Leveau 1973, no41, 177. As the inscription is dedicated by the people of Calama, a town raised to municipal status in this period on the coast, it appears that Flavius Macer had gained citizenship of Calama as well (Lepelley 1979, 2.91; Baccolini 2007, 37).
63 Lepelley 1979, 2.64-65; Gambash 2015, 45; Baccolini 2007, 78.
by Macer himself.\textsuperscript{64} This could explain why a man without military experience but with regional ties was chosen for the post of prefect over a tribe like the Musulami who had resisted Rome more than once. It would have been more prudent to have a local elite carry out the sensitive task of demarcating between Musulami lands and colonial lands, imperial estates, and lands of other tribes.\textsuperscript{65}

**Publilius Memorialis (no. 31)**

Like Calpurnius Fabatus, Publilius Memorialis had significant military experience before his prefecture in the reign of Trajan or Hadrian; he was a *praefectus fabrum, praefectus cohortis III Cyreneicae sagittariorum* (Cappadocia), and *tribunus militum legio X fretensis* (Judaea).\textsuperscript{66} Also, like Fabatus, Memorialis has similarly left difficulties in interpreting over whom he held his prefecture; it is uncertain if the genitive *Numidarum* refers to Numidian peoples or to the tribe Numidae. It is worth noting that Leveau and Whittaker have interpreted Memorialis’ command as over the Numidae.\textsuperscript{67} If the latter proposition is correct then there are some questions that need to be answered. After being designated as the *civitas Numidarum* in the Flavian era, Thubursicu Numidarum was granted municipal status in the reign of Trajan, around the time of Publilius Memorialis’ prefecture. Generally, prefects like Memorialis cease to be appointed when a community receives local self-government (see pages 52-3), and during this period, the chiefs of the Numidiae (*principes gentis*) are attested as magistrates in the *municipium*. So here there could be a military officer operating as *praefectus gentis* while there are local elites holding magistracies at Thubursicu Numidarum. There are two possible explanations for why this

\textsuperscript{64} Baccolini 2007, 36, 37, 78; Whittaker 1996, 529; Syne 1951.
\textsuperscript{65} Baccolini 2007, 37; Leveau 1973, no41, p177; Whittaker 1996, 529.
\textsuperscript{67} Baccolini 2007, 39 n46; Leveau 1973, 180 no43; Whittaker 1996, 528.
happened that are not mutually exclusive. One is that his recruitment role (*dilectator*) was contemporaneous to his prefecture, and Rome desired to have an experienced agent preside over this delicate task. The other was that he was keeping watch on those Numidae beyond the *municipium* and his command excluded Thubursicu Numidarum.68

**Ignotus, AE 1992, 1766 (no. 36)**

Like Flavius Macer, the *ignotus* of *AE* 1992, 1766, may have been from Ammaedara where he was *duumvir* and *flamen perpetuus* before his prefecture over the Musulami and Musuni Regiani. As stated above, Ammaedara was located in the eastern end of the territory of the Musulami. The Musuni Regiani were located around 40 miles south-southeast of Ammaedara. Like his predecessor Flavius Macer, our prefect here lacks any evidence of military experience and may have been chosen because of his familiarity with the tribes and the region of his command. The inscription is dated paleographically to the 170s or 180s CE,69 showing either that Rome had continued concerns with the Musulami or that a new need for a *praefectus gentium* arose between the early and late Antonine periods.

**Mauretania Caesariensis**

**Ignotus, AE 1973, 654 (no. 25)**

The *ignotus* of *AE* 1973, 654 was *praefectus alae Thracum piae fidelis* while also serving as *praefectus gentis Mazicum* in either the late first or early second century CE.70 The tribe was located near Oppidum Novum in the Chelif Valley, where the people of the town dedicated this

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68 Cf. Whittaker 1996, 528.
69 Baccolini 2007, 41, 42, 78
70 Leveau 1973, 190-191- Domitian to Trajan; Weiβ 2006- 11st century; Baccolini 2007, 41- 2nd century; Faoro 2011, 99- end of 1st century CE.
inscription.  The Mazices were a powerful group who were long resistant to Rome, and the town, a Claudian era praesidium, represents Rome’s early attempts to penetrate the tribe’s territory and establish control over them. The extraordinary commands of Sex. Sentius Caecilianus in 75 CE and C. Velius Rufus around 84-86 CE attest to disturbances in Mauretania in the Flavian era (Caecilianus: CIL 9.4194 = ILS 5955; AE 1941, 79; Rufus: AE 1903, 368=ILS 9200). Not only were these disturbances taking place in the first decades after Rome’s annexation of the client kingdom of Mauretania, but more specifically at a time when Rome was attempting to establish and consolidate its grasp on the southern reaches of the province. This would explain the presence of the prefect as well as the ala Thracum pia fidelis. The unit operated at the provincial capital, Iol Caesarea, some twenty-five miles from Oppidum Novum, in the second half of the 1st century. This unknown prefect fits a general chronological pattern that when a prefect has simultaneous command over a military unit and a district (civitates or gentes), his command was around the beginning of Rome’s control over an area. The presence of such a prefect with military support at the end of the 1st century CE, maybe in the reign of Domitian, could be an indicator that the Mazices were involved in some of the disturbances outlined above, as well as the likelihood that the tribe did not have local elites on which Rome could rely.

Alezeiveus Rogatus (no. 37)

[71] Baccolini 2007, 41. The town was in the eastern part of the plain, a plain that was dominated by mountainous slopes at its northern and southern ends.
[73] Leveau 1973, 191; Baccolini 2007, 41; Spaul 1994, 232. Spaul outlines the arguments for the arrival of the ala II Thracum at Caesarea, and when and where the unit moved in the 2nd century (1994, 232-233). He proposes that the unit arrived either in 40 CE, or shortly thereafter, and served as part of the occupying forces, and that there is no definite evidence on when they moved in the 2nd century, though Rapidum remains a possibility.
Alezeiveus Rogatus, *praefectus gentis Nabuxorum*, had no military experience when he took on his prefecture in 197 CE (*AE* 1992, 1909). He may have been from modern Naciria, where the inscription was found. Baccolini has proposed that the Nabuxi may be equated with the *Nakmousioi* of Ptolemy in Mauretania Caesariensis (2.4.5). Given the date of the inscription, the lack of previous military experience, and no military units under his command, Rogatus most likely was a local elite from either the tribe or the surrounding region.75

**Sardinia and Corsica**

*Sex. Iulius Rufus (no. 4)*

In the late Augustan era an *evocatus*, Sex. Iulius Rufus, served simultaneously as *praefectus I cohortis Corsorum* and *praefectus civitatum Barbariae* in Sardinia (*CIL* 14.2954 = *ILS* 2684).76 He seems to have been from Praeneste, or at least this appears to be where he retired after his prefecture. The term *evocatus* means that Rufus was recalled to serve after completing his regular term of service.77 This suggests that he was at a mature age but still capable of carrying out a demanding command. The historical context should place his term as prefect to 6 CE or shortly thereafter.78 The fact that he sent an *evocatus* – who was a member of a special, small corps utilized in diverse and delicate tasks in Rome, Italy, and occasionally in the provinces (Cass. Dio 54.28.8) – highlights the necessity of an experienced and competent man for the prefecture.79 It is also important to bear in mind the recruitment difficulties of this period due to

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75 Baccolini 2007, 43. Note that this is during a time of civil war, and though none of the wars seem to have occurred in the area, it may explain why a praefectus of local origin was there.
76 The phrase *evocatus divi Augustus* is evidence that he had earned this status under Augustus, and that Rufus died after the former’s death (Faoro 2011, 51).
77 Faoro 2011, 51; Spaul 2000, 50. *Evocati* were mainly recruited from the praetorian guard but could also be recruited by the emperor from retiring *principales* in the legions (Faoro 2011, 51-2; Swan 2004, 171-172; Baccolini 2007, 134 n417).
78 Faoro 2011, 51-52; Spaul 2000, 50. Spaul places Rufus career to c.10-30 CE.
the calling up of senators, equestrians, and re-enlisting veterans to serve in the Great Illyrian revolt (Vell. Pat. 2.111; cf. Cass. Dio 56.23.2-3). The presence here of an evocatus serving as a prefect of an auxiliary cohort and over civitates in Barbaria, rather than an equestrian at the start or middle of his career, is evidence of both Augustus’ difficulties in finding enough equestrian recruits to serve in these sorts of commands at this time, and also the impact that the Great Illyrian revolt had on Rome’s pool of personnel resources.80

Turning to the scope of Rufus’ command, the auxiliary troops he was in charge of were Corsi, a population residing in northeastern Sardinia and Corsica (Ptol. 3.3; Plin. NH 3.85). It was not entirely uncommon for units to serve in the same region in which they were raised in the early Principate.81 While the precise region of where the cohors I Corsorum served (Barbaria) is debated, it is most likely the mountainous interior of the island. As military camps have been found surrounding that area and there are descriptions of continued brigandage and instability in the late Empire from the same district, scholars such as Zucca and Saddington have presented a case that Rufus’ command was in modern day Barbagia. Given the difficulties ascribed to the mountainous portions of Sardinia (Str. 5.2.7) and of this period on the island more broadly (Cass. Dio 55.28.1), it is clear that Rufus was there to control, and administer, the communities of the region, to fight against brigandage, and essentially to pacify the interior of the island.82 The province continued to have a military nature at least through the reign of Tiberius (Tac. Ann. 2.85.4) and remained an imperial province throughout the rest of the Julio-Claudian period.83 In fact, there is a fragmentary inscription referring to a governor of Sardinia (praefectus provinciae

80 Spaul 2000, 50 n1; Swan 2004, 271.
82 Wrobel 2009, 80 n28; Zucca 1987; Saddington 1992, 268; Faoro 2011, 52; Spaul 2000, 50.
83 Wrobel 2009, 80. The full title of the equestrian prefects from the reign of Claudius and onwards was procurator Augusti et praefectus provinciae Sardiniae. See for instance, Sex. Subrius Dexter in the reign of Vespasian (CIL 10.8023f), and Sex. Laecanius Labeo in the reign of Domitian (ILS 5350).
Sardiniae) and the civitates Barbariae (AE 1921, 86). Faoro proposes that this inscription represents a dedication from the civitates Barbariae to Tiberius at the future site of Forum Traiani, dating to c.20-25 CE, perhaps attesting to a certain level of success in exerting control over the region.84

L. Vibrius Punicus (no. 5)

In the late Augustan to Tiberian period the island of Corsica received its own prefect, L. Vibrius Punicus, presumably for the same reasons that Sardinia became an imperial province (CIL 12.2455). Unlike the other prefects described here, Punicus was not given charge over civitates or gentes, but rather to a geographically defined district. In this way he may be considered as an equivalent to the prefects of Judaea, or the prefect of Commagene (no. 53), both of which were sub-governorships ultimately dependent on the legate of Syria. Punicus, like Rufus, would have been dependent on the prefect of Sardinia, and would have conducted similar tasks.85 But, like most prefects of this early period, Punicus had plenty of military experience prior to this post: praefectus equitum, primus pilus, and tribunus militum.

Germania

Olennius (no. 8)

At the time of the Frisian revolt in 28 CE Olennius was described by Tacitus as impositus regendis Frisiis, which has been taken by scholars to mean that he was either a praefectus gentis, or at the least, the equivalent to one (Tac. Ann. 4.72).86 Tacitus further reveals that Olennius had

84 Faoro 2011, 50
85 Faoro 2011, 75, 78.
previous military experience, namely that he was a former *primipilari* (Tac. Ann. 4.72).\(^{87}\) The choice of a former centurion rather than an equestrian for this particular post may have been due to the fact that the Frisii were close to the lower Rhine legions, and here Rome may have relied on former officers familiar with the tribe and the region for the task.\(^{88}\)

As for the tribe, the Frisii had a largely harmonious relationship with Rome up until the events of 28 CE. They had entered into a treaty with Drusus and joined him on his first campaign across the Rhine in 12 BCE (Tac. Ann. 4.72; Cass. Dio 54.32.2-3).\(^{89}\) Baccolini equates the treaty and its tribute as a submissive status to Rome. From that time, the Frisians had economic ties with the local Roman camps in supplying Roman forces. This would be in addition to the conditions of Rome’s treaty with the tribe whereby “the Frisians paid an annual tribute of a number of ox hides to the tax collector.”\(^{90}\) From Tacitus’ account it appears that part of Olennius’ task was overseeing the collection of the tribe’s tribute, which was conducted by troops under his command (Tac. Ann. 4.72).\(^{91}\) His responsibilities, though, likely extended to governing and monitoring the tribe more broadly (this would fit in with the title afforded Olennius by Tac. Ann. 4.72). It is possible that the relationship between the Frisii and Rome had declined prior to 28 CE. There are two points that may support this. First is Olennius’ presence among the Frisii. Most of the attested prefects were placed over tribes and *civitates* that had a history of resistance to Rome or had been difficult to conquer. Here though, the Frisii had willingly entered into a treaty with Rome. Second is the fact that the camp at Velsen I had

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87 Baccolini 2007, 177; Bowman et al. 2009, 157-158; contra Saddington 1987, 266; Martin and Woodman 1989, 256. Saddington had suggested that Olennius was an active *primipilari* in 28 CE and that he was the commander of the legionary and auxiliary forces that Olennius fled to when the revolt broke out. Tacitus, however, describes the prefect as *e primipilaribus; ex* in a military context denotes a soldier’s final rank upon discharge (*OLD*, ex, 13 B). Even though Olennius had command over some soldiers, these would have been attached to his prefecture, rather than the prefect being the commander of the troops at Flevum (unless Tacitus left that detail out of his account).


89 Martin and Woodman 1989, 226; Lendering and Bosman 2012, 64; Baccolini 2007, 177.

90 Lendering and Bosman 2012, 65 (quote), 70, 71; Tac. Ann. 4.72.

expanded from holding 500 soldiers to 1,000 soldiers at some point in the 20s CE (but prior to 28 CE, see pages 58-72). The increase in the camp’s size may be an indication of tensions in the region (it may also be a response to the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir in 21 CE, pages 201-236).

Prefects Over Uncertain Peoples

Jinius Secundus (no. 17)

Formerly restored as [G. Pl]inius Secundus, the prefect of IGR III 1015, discovered at Arados in Syria, will be labeled here as Jinius Secundus as there is no direct evidence to support Mommsen’s reconstruction. Prior to his possible post as praefectus gentis Secundus was praefectus cohortis I Thracum (this is most likely cohors I Augusta Thracum [equitata civium Romanorum]). In this period the unit was attested in Agrippa II’s client-kingdom and, towards the end of the 1st century CE, in southern Judaea. Secundus’ second post has been reconstructed as either a prefect of an ala or cohort or as a praefectus gentis. Hubert Devijver proposed this post to be reconstructed as ἐπαρχος Ἦθος Ιουδαίων. Such a reconstruction is very attractive. He could have held this post simultaneously to his post as praefectus cohortis or have been promoted from it locally as the unit was either in Agrippa II’s kingdom or Judaea at this time. Additionally, his following post was in Judaea, where he served as a subprocurator of Tiberius Iulius Alexander, who was prefect of the army in Judaea during the siege of Jerusalem in 70 CE. Given his military experience and the historical context, it is quite probable that Secundus was a praefectus gentis over a community during the Great Jewish revolt – perhaps a

92 Lendering and Bosman 2012, 71.
93 Syme 1991.
95 Baccolini, 2007 147; Devijver 1975, no108; idem 1989, 1.158, 164; Saddlington 1980, no.113, p43.
community that had been recently subdued during the revolt or for which there was a fear that it would join the revolt.

*Calpurnius Ma*[ (no. 19)

Calpurnius Ma[,] often restored as Maximus, was from the colony of Salona in Dalmatia. After a centurionate with an unknown legion, Calpurnius held a prefecture, possibly of a *civitas*. His final post was *praefectus cohortis I Lucensium*, which was stationed at Bigeste in Dalmatia from at least 31/41 CE until 80 CE.97 As his hometown was Salona, and his promotion to a *praefectus cohortis* was in Dalmatia, it is entirely possible that his whole career was spent there. As for the date of his prefecture a wide range of dates has been proposed: late 1st century BCE to early 1st century CE, Tiberian or early Vespasianic, or Pre-80 CE.98 Since the three tombstone inscriptions of soldiers from the *cohors I Lucensium (equitata)* found at Bigeste date from between 31/41 CE to 68 CE (*CIL* 3.8486, 9834, 8492), I would tentatively suggest that Calpurnius was *praefectus (civitatis)* in the reign of Claudius or Nero. This would also be in line chronologically with two other *praefecti civitatum* in Dalmatia, nos. 12 and 17.99

*[Q] Burrenus [Fi]rmus (no. 20)*

The inscription of *[Q.] Burrenus [Fi]rmus* was discovered in Philippi, Macedonia where his family had settled in the colony created after the battle of Actium. Due to the fragmentary nature of the inscription and the vague descriptions of Burrenus’ career very little can be stated about

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97 Baccolini 2007, 136; *PME* C 59; Holder 1980, 83; Summerly 1992, 19; Zwicky 1944, 14; Spaul 2000, 82; Meyer 2013, 43. One should note though, that the unit was likely brought to the region either during the Great Illyrian revolt or shortly thereafter (Meyer 2013, 44 with references).
98 Baccolini 2007, 136; Spaul 2000, 82n1; Zwicky 1944, 14.
99 On the dates of the soldiers see, Meyer 2013, 43-4. Given the pre-Claudian dating for *CIL* 3.8492, it always remains a possibility that Calpurnius held his prefecture late in the reign of Tiberius or Caligula.

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his prefecture. The only secure post of his career was his military tribunate of the *Legio IV Macedonica*. The legion was stationed in Hispania Tarraconensis from the reign of Augustus until it moved to Germania Superior around 43 CE. The legion was rebranded in 70 CE as punishment for its role in the civil wars. This should firmly place his career somewhere in the Julio-Claudian period.\footnote{Demougin 1992, 618-619; *PME* B 34; Baccolini 2007, 146. Demougin has suggested that his family was of Italic origin.} Demougin has proposed that after his service in the IVth legion Burrenus was either a *praefectus cohortis* or *alae*, then *praefectus nationum*, and finally *praefectus equitum* or *fabrum*.\footnote{Demougin 1992, 618-619; contra Collart 1933, 321-6. Collart had proposed an inverse order for the cursus.} Since one cannot restore likely auxiliary units or which *nationes* he was *praefectus* over, it is impossible to state whether he held his second and third posts simultaneously or in succession. What can be stated, however, is that Burrenus is potentially the only *praefectus nationum* attested outside of Africa.\footnote{Baccolini 2007, 146.} Regardless of where his prefecture was, he had plenty of military experience when he became *praefectus nationum.*

**Charetus (no. 26)**

Charetus was an *eparch* (prefect) of a *cohors Augusta*, presumably of either the *cohors I Augusta Ituraeorum* or *cohors I Augusta Thracum (equitata civium Romanorum)*,\footnote{The latter is more securely attested in Agrippa II’s client-kingdom, but the former must remain a possibility prior to the unit’s move to Pannonia during the reign of Vespasian (Spaul 2000, 440, 355-356).} and *στρατηγὸς Νομάδων* during the reign of M. Iulius Agrippa II. This would place Charetus’ prefecture in the second half of the 1st century CE. His post as *στρατηγὸς Νομάδων* has been taken as an equivalent to a tribal prefecture, and a break in the inscription prevents one from knowing over whom precisely Charetus was prefect. It is possible, however, to deduce where Charetus operated. At a broad level it may be assumed that his prefecture was placed somewhere in
Agrippa’s realm as both of the probable cohorts at some point formed part of Agrippa II’s army. With the inscription being discovered in Eitha, Syria, it may be posited that Charetus was a local elite from the region of Aurantis, located at the southeastern end of Agrippa’s kingdom. From this it may be suggested that Charetus was responsible for the security of the border region of Aurantis, an area of interest to Rome as it was part of an important caravan route between Damascus and the Red Sea. Both the caravan route and the region were liable to nomadic raids, and this would explain the need for the presence of a cohort there.

Crepereius (no. 32)

A member of the Crepereius gens, found in Attaleia, Pamphylia, was a praefectus gentis of an unknown tribe (Δρομ[---]) in the mid-2nd century CE, most likely during the reign of Antoninus Pius. This was a senatorial family from Attaleia, Pamphylia, but this member of the gens had an equestrian military career. Before becoming praefectus gentis over an unknown tribe, Crepereius was a praefectus cohortis III Britannorum in Raetia, then tribunus militum of the Legio XV Apollinaris in Satala, Cappadocia, and praefectus alae I Dardanorum in Moesia Inferior. von Domaszewski proposed to place his prefecture of a gens in Cappadocia along the Euphrates frontier, but given the geographic spread of his military experience it is impossible to determine where he held this post.

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104 Baccolini 2007, 148.
105 Engels 2007, 91.
106 Devijver 1989, 1.326; Baccolini 2007, 146-7; Pflaum 1960, no147, p347
107 Baccolini, 147; Levick and Jameson 1964, 102; Devijver 1989, 1.326; Pflaum 1960, no 147, p347-348; Spaul 2000, 202; idem 1994, 102-103
108 Pflaum 1960, no147, 348.
Appendix 3: Auxiliary Units Discussed in Chapters 2 and 3

This appendix provides brief examinations of the auxilia units discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 to modestly outline plausible contexts for when these units were levied, to support arguments made on the impacts that conscription had on indigenous populations and the connections between the census and auxiliary service. In the analyses below, it is generally assumed that auxiliary units with the title Augusta were levied during Augustus’ reign, though it is plausible that some were given the epithet at a later date.¹ Furthermore, it is assumed that units named after their commanders were raised between the time of Julius Caesar and the 20s CE. There were very few auxilia units, especially alae, that had permanent names during the reign of Augustus; numerous units were then named after their commanders. When units were named after commanders as such, they bore the commander’s name in the genitive (such as Ala Rusonis) until some point in the 20s CE (perhaps sometime between 21 and 26 CE), when Tiberius decided to give alae permanent names. After this point these sorts of units used an adjectival form (such as Ala Antiana). We can then assume that inscriptions with units bearing commanders’ names in the genitive are earlier than those bearing commanders’ names adjectivally.² As a final note, for the sake of space only a sample of the plausible units related to issues raised in Chapters 2 and 3 are surveyed here. As the Gallic provinces and the Rhineland feature heavily in this project and that this region experienced heavy auxiliary recruitment in the early Principate, only evidence from these regions are provided here.

Alae

¹ Following Spaul 1994.
Ala Agrippiana

Raised in Gallia Belgica in the Augustan or early period from the Treveri, among others, the Ala Agrippiana initially served in Germania Superior. The earliest attested soldier of the unit is one Partus, who served for fourteen years in the Tiberian period, which makes it plausible that the Ala Agrippiana was levied during or shortly after Germanicus’ census in 14/6 CE. The most plausible candidate for the early commander who gave this unit its name is L. Nasidienus Agrippa, a tribune of Legio XIII Gemina.

Ala Antiana

The earliest plausible attestation for this unit is an ignotus who was prefect of an ala Anti[--- in the late Augustan or Tiberian period before serving as a praefectus Commagenis under Tiberius (AE 1926, 82- Antiochea, Pisidia). Scholars have frequently endorsed the opinion of Eric Birley that the ignotus’ first prefecture was with the ala Anti[anae…. Being that Commagene was an imperial province from 17-38 CE, and that the Ala Antiana would later be combined with a Thracian unit after 26 CE – certainly by 29 CE based on a constitution of 54 CE (CIL 16.3), the ignotus had served in the unit before that point. We may go one step further, though, and note the likely link between this unit and one of the men tasked with conducting the census of 16 CE, C.

3 CIL 13.6235 (Worms): Partus Mutii f(ilius) | eques ala Agrippiana natione Trever | annoru(m) XXXV stip(endiorum) | [X]III hic sit(us) est | fratres posuerunt.

4 Birley 1978, 265; Spaul 1994, 24-6; Holder 1980, no.331; Gayet 2006, 90. Other scholars such as Antony Birley and Ernst Stein endorse the view that this unit is named for Herod Agrippa II, but as Spaul points out, this latter view “conflicts with the idea that personal names for units are derived from the first or early commander of a Gallic unit” (1994, 25). Between the dates suggested by the Epigraphische Datenbank Heidelberg (20-41 CE- HD075803), hereafter abbreviated as EDH, and Paul Holder (Recr. Tib., Died Tib./Claud.), Partus was probably enlisted sometime between 6 and 27 CE.

5 Followed in P.M.E. incerti no. 65; Holder 1980, 21, E41; Keppie 2000, 322-3; Faoro 2011, 95; Pflaum 1982, no. 7A. AE 1926, 82: ---] | [trib(uno) mil(itum) leg(ionis) ---] | [praefec]t(o) alae Anti[anae pr]aef(ecto) veteranorum leg(ionis) XII praefect(o) | [--- C]ommageni[s] | [praef(ecto) Ti(beri)] Caesaris Aug(usti) | [col(onia)] Caes(area)

6 Keppie 2000, 322; Demougin 1981- see also Appendix 1, page 335.
Antius (Tac. Ann. 2.6.1). If we follow the opinions of Lambrino and Ernst Stein this would suggest that the unit was raised during the census and named after C. Antius. Based on the diploma and the fact that Thracian units were serving in Syria in the early Principate, Spaul hypothesized that the Ala Antiana was serving in Syria soon after it was raised.7

Ala Augusta Gallorum

In the first century CE, inscriptions call this unit Ala (I) Augusta, though it was surely raised in Gaul in the Augustan era. The earliest attestation of the unit is an inscription for C. Terentius Bassus, praefectus alae Augustae, which is dated to 40 CE (Clunia, Hispania Tarraconensis; PME T8).8 The Ala Augusta most likely served in Spain for most of the first century CE before transferring to Mauretania Tingitana by 88 CE, maybe transferring there in the Claudian period (CIL 16.159).9

Ala Augusta Gallorum Proculeiana

Between the honorific epithet Augusta and the fact that the unit is named after an early commander, the Ala Augusta Proculeiana was probably raised in the Augustan era in Gaul. It is unknown where it served before Britain, where it is first attested under Trajan (RIB 606 = CIL 7.288), though many suspect that this unit had initially served somewhere along the Rhineland.10

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7 Spaul 1994, 27-8; Gayet 2006, 78.
8 CIL 2.5792: C(ai) Laecanio Basso | Q(uinto) Terentio Culle|o|ne co(n)s(ulibus) | Clunienses ex Hispania | ceteriore hospitium fe|cerunt cum C(ai) Terentio | Basso C(ai) f(ilio) Fab(ia) Mefanate | Etrusco praefecto alae | Augusta|e liberis posteri|que eius sibi liberis posteri|sque suis | egerunt leg(ati) | C(aius) Magius L(uci) f(ilius) Gal|eria| Silo | T(itius) Aem|i=L>lius Fuscus. The epithet Gallorum does not seem to appear as part of its name on diplomas until the 2nd century CE (for instance RMD 1.33, 1.53).
10 Jarret 1994, 41; Gayet 2006, 77-8; Spaul 1994, 55-7. Birley proposed C. Proculeius, a well-known equestrian friend of Octavian (1978, 268), though Spaul is right to point out that it is possible that someone else gave his name to the unit (1994, 56).
**Ala Augusta Germaniciana**

This unit was likely raised after 9 CE. According to Spaul, it may have been created during Germanicus’ service in Germania between the end of Augustus’ reign and the start of Tiberius’. In fact, it may have been created in part from those Treveri who were set to watch over Germanicus’ family during the mutiny along the Rhine in 14 CE and was thus named after their service towards Germanicus (Tac. Ann. 1.40-1). It is also plausible, however, that the unit received its name for service to Germanicus while he was on his mission in the east (17-19 CE), where the unit would later serve. Regardless of preference, a late Augustan date is likely for the unit’s creation.\(^\text{11}\)

**Ala I Cannanefatum**

The unit may have originated around the time of Drusus’ campaigns, but there is no certainty that the tribe would have been subject to the latter’s census. This is the case because Drusus may have only entered treaty terms with the Cannanefates at the same time as he did with the Frisii, namely during the campaign season of 12 BCE (i.e. after the census of 13/2 BCE).\(^\text{12}\) In this light a cautious approach may be better and the unit may at first have been an irregular unit that became a regular, professional, auxiliary unit later, certainly by 28 CE (Tac. Ann. 4.73).\(^\text{13}\)

**Ala I Capitoniana**

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\(^{11}\) Spaul 1994, 137.

\(^{12}\) Cf. Powell 2011, 74-5; see also page 63.

\(^{13}\) Spaul 1994, 77-9.
Raised by the end of the Augustan period, possibly after the Varian Disaster based on an Aeduan slave being recruited (AE 1912, 187- Variana, Moesia Inferior). Both Spaul and Holder point out that slaves were only enrolled after the Varian Disaster according to Suetonius (Aug. 25).

The unit was named after one of its early commanders, probably C. Herennius Capito (AE 1941, 105), who is known to have been a praefectus alae. Evidence suggests that the Ala (I) Capitoniana served in Moesia since the reign of Tiberius (AE 1912, 187- Augusta, Moesia Inferior; AE 1967, 425- Variana, Moesia Inferior).

Ala Classiana

This unit was raised in Gaul, possibly in Gallia Narbonensis as the nomen Classius is attested there. It was later combined with a Thracian ala, very likely after the Thracian revolt of 26 CE. Note, however, that Gayet proposes that these units combined after 46 CE when Thrace became a province. While it is only first attested in Britain in the 2nd century CE, it had likely served in Germania early on like many units raised in Gaul.

Ala Frontoniana

14 AE 1912, 187: Iulius Saturio Iuli libertus | dom(o) Haed(ius) | missic(ius) ala(e) | Capit(oni?) v(ixit) an(nos) LXXX | mer(uit) an(nos) XXXVI | h(ic) s(itus) e(st) | Agat(h)o lib(ertus) | f(aciendum) c(uravit).

15 One should note that it is rare for prefects of cavalry units in the Augustan and Tiberian periods to name what unit they commanded given that many units did not yet have a permanent name (Saddington 1980, 23). One may also note that Demougin doubts that C. Herennius Capito was the first commander of this unit on the grounds that the cognomen Capito is common among the equestrian order in this period (1992, no. 320).

16 Gayet 2006, 80; Matei-Popescu 2010, 181; idem 2013, 214; Spaul 1994, 80-1; Holder 1980, 272. AE 1967, 425: Primus [---] | Asalus d[up(licarius) alae] | Cap(itonianae) vix(it) a[n(nos) --- mil(itavit)] | an(nos) XXV h(ic) s(itus) e(st) | Stephanu[s ---] | f(aciendum) c(uravit). EDH dates Asalus’ inscription to 31-50 CE (HD014983), while Paul Holder argues that he was Recruited under Augustus and died under Tiberius (Holder 1980, no. 362). This could mean that Primus Asalus was recruited sometime between 6 and 25 CE given his length of service before his death.

17 Birley 1978, 266; Spaul 1994, 87-8; Gayet 2006, 79.
The Ala Frontoniana was created from the tribes of Gallia Belgica under Augustus or Tiberius and served throughout the Julio-Claudian period in Germania where it is attested at Bonn (BRGK 58, 162), Duisburg (AE 1931, 30–a Triboci), and Neuss (CIL 13.8558). The three earliest soldiers were seemingly all recruited under Tiberius and it is plausible that they were conscripted in the late 10s CE with information derived from Germanicus’ census. Eric Birley has proposed that L. Iulius Fronto was whom the unit was named after (CIL 12.2393, Augustum Vicus, Gallia Narbonensis).

**Ala II Gallorum**

Paul Holder assumes that all regiments entitled Gallorum were not only raised in Gallia Lugdunensis, but that all of alae belong to the Augustan era, with the sole exception of the Ala Indiana. The earliest inscription attesting to the unit belongs to [Q.] Atatinus Modestus (PME A172; CIL 9.3610), who commanded the unit in Spain after serving as military tribune of Legio X Gemina for sixteen years. Given the length of his military tribunate it is assumed that he started his career in the Tiberian period, which was known for some lengthy appointments. Despite the lack of earlier evidence, it is plausible that the unit was created to support Rome’s wars in Spain in the 20s and early 10s BCE or created to replace units transferred to the Rhine.

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18 Spaul 1994, 118-9. BRGK 58, 162: *Reburrus Frion(tonis) f(ilius) eques al(ae) | Fr(on)tonianae an(norum) -----*. Holder suggests that Reburrus was recruited under Tiberius or Claudius and died under Nero, and EDH dates the inscription to 51-70 CE (Holder 1980, no.863; HD 017086). AE 1931, 30 = BRGK 27, 242: [---? Li]cin[u?]s Dacraio[n]is f(ilius) Tribocus aeques(!) alae | [Fro]ntonianae an(nio)rum | [L?] st[ipe]ndi(orum) XXIV hic situs | est her(es) fu(nus) f(aciendum) c(uravit). Paul Holder argues that he was recruited under Tiberius and died under Claudius or Nero after serving for twenty-four years (1980, no. 862). CIL 13.8558: *M(arcus) Lucilius Secundus decurio | mis(sicius) ex ala Front(oniana) | domo Camppiti | Luciliae M(arci) libertae | Blando liber(to) h(eredes) e(x) t(estamento) f(aciendum) c(uraverunt). Holder suggests that Secundus was recruited under Tiberius, discharged under Claudius, and had died by the end of Nero’s reign (1980, no. 861).

19 Birley 1978.
20 Holder 1980, 111.
21 CIL 9.3610: *trib. mil. leg. X Geminae in Hispania annis XVI, prae. Ala II Gallor. in eadem provincia....

Demougin 1992, no. 511.
frontier c. 15-12 BCE – though one cannot rule out a Tiberian date for Ala II Gallorum’s foundation.23

**Ala I Gallorum Atectorigiana**

Evidence of this unit is very thin in the early Principate, though we are fairly certain that it was named after the tribal chieftain or king Atectorix. It appears to have been raised in Aquitania either before or during the Augustan period and initially had Pictones among its members (*CIL* 13.1041 – Mediolanum Santonum, Gallia Aquitania). C. Iulius Macer, a *duplicarius* whose father had received citizenship, is the earliest known soldier of the unit.24 He was made an *evocatus* in command of 600 Raeti gaesati after serving in the Ala Atectorigiana for thirty-two years, which he could have only done after 16 BCE (when Raetia was annexed). This suggests to many scholars that Macer must have been recruited early in Augustus’ reign, if not earlier. Therefore, if the Ala Atectorigiana was not created in the Late Republic, the creation of the unit could fit within a context of the 27 BCE, when Rome surely needed troops to support campaigns being conducted in neighboring Spain.25

**Ala (Gallorum) Sebosiana**

Likely named after an unknown Sebosius, this unit was levied at some point in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, maybe as early as the census of Drusus, but perhaps more likely in the early 1st century CE. The earliest known recruit is Tiberius Iulius Diviacus, who, according to

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Paul Holder, was recruited under Augustus and received citizenship during Tiberius’ reign.²⁶ The Ala Sebosiana served initially at Mainz and Worms in the Rhineland (Mainz- BRGK 17, no. 216; Worms- CIL 13.11709, 6236).²⁷

**Ala Indiana**

The Ala Indiana is named after Iulius Indus, who was involved in putting down a portion of the Gallic revolts in 21 CE (Tac. Ann. 3.42, 46; see further pages 204, 233). It is difficult to state whether the unit was a local militia, an irregular unit raised in response to the revolt, or if it was a preexisting Treveran unit renamed after the conclusion of the revolt to honor Iulius Indus. Early on, Treveri and Nemetes served in the unit during its stays at Worms (CIL 13.6230) and Mainz (BRGK 17, no.352). It then seems to have participated in the Claudian invasion of Britain (RIB 108) before being transferred back to Germania under Vespasian.²⁸

**Ala (II) Longiniana**

The Ala Longiniana was raised in Gaul under Augustus or Tiberius as it was named after an early commander. Its first station was likely Chalon-sur-Saône among the Aedui – a stele for Samorix attests to its service there (CIL 13.2615), perhaps being placed there in the aftermath of Florus and Sacrovir’s revolt. Around 39 – 43 CE Ala Longiniana was transferred to Bonn, where it would serve until it was disbanded in the Flavian period (CIL 13.8095, 8092-6- Bonn). As

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²⁶ BRGK 17, 216: Ti(beriae) Iuliae | Ti(beri) Iuli Diviciaci l(ibertae) Sme|rtucae an(n)o(rum) XXVII de al|a Sebosiana | et Sperato | filio eius | patronus | p(osuit).

²⁷ Spaul 1994, 198-9; Holder 1980, 275 (nos. 441-3); Gayet 2006, 83. CIL 13.11709: Leubius Claupi | f(ilius) eq(ues) missicius | ala Sebosiana | an(norum) LXXV h(ic) s(itus) e(st) | Gratus f(ilius) miles | ex t(estamento) f(ecit).

EDH dates Leubius’ stele to 41-68 CE, while Holder adds that he was likely recruited under Tiberius, discharged in Claudius’ reign, and died in the Neronian period (HD022945; Holder 1980, no. 442). CIL 13.6236: M(arcus) Semp[roni]ius L(uci) f(ilius) d[omo] | Term[estinus] | an(norum) XX--- | dec(urio) eques alae | Sebosianae | h(ic) s(itus) e(st)]. There is some discrepancy in dating this inscription as EDH argues 14-37 CE, while Holder argues for Sempronius’ death belonging to the reigns of Claudius or Nero (HD075808; Holder 1980, no. 443).

Samorix’ tombstone uses the adjectival form Longiniana, it is likely that he had died sometime between 26 CE and 43 CE at the latest (see page 366). Being that Samnorix had served twelve years before his death, the unit’s creation could fit within the context of either Germanicus’ census or possibly as late the census of 30 CE.

Ala Pansianana

Very little is known about the Ala Pansianana, and it is even listed as a suspect unit in Spaul’s work. The only attestation of the unit is the epitaph of the Treveran Tiberius Iulius Acutus, who died near Oescus in Moesia Inferior (AE 1960, 127). Acutus seems to have been recruited around the turn of the 1st century CE and served for thirty-six years. The most likely candidate for whom the unit was named is C. Vibius Pansa, even though it is unknown if he had ever commanded a cavalry unit (CIL 6.3542; PME V 102).

Ala Petriana/Pomponiani

29 CIL 13.2615 (Chalon-sur-Saône): Samorix Liamari f. Remus eq. ala Longiniana an. XXXI stipen. XII h.s.[e. -->] et Singu[--..] fr[---. While Holder suggests that Samnorix had died under Claudius or Nero, it is very likely that the unit was transferred to Bonn either in the lead up to the invasion of Britain or shortly afterwards, meaning that his death surely occurred prior to 43 CE (Holder 1980, no.394; Gayet 2006, 76; Spaul 1994, 156. Cf. Gechter 2006, who points out that the previous garrison of Bonn served there until the reign of Claudius.

30 As Gallia Comata was also covered by Augustus’ census in 27 BCE, and L. Volusenus Clemens conducted part of the census in 14/6 CE in Gallia Narbonensis and Aquitania (CIL 11.6011), it is relatively safe to assume that all of Gaul was subject to a census in 30 CE, when Torquatus Novellius Atticus is attested conducting one in Gallia Narbonensis (CIL 14.3602). If this is the case, it could be linked to this census, or possibly to the census of Germanicus. It is highly likely that Biturix, who served in the Ala Longinia for over twenty years before dying at Bonn (CIL 13.8092), was recruited while the unit was still at Chalon-sur-Saône. Being that Holder believes he died in the Claudian period, and EDH similarly provides a date of 31-70 CE, it is likely that Biturix was recruited in the early 30s CE at the latest, but surely no earlier than 21 CE (Holder 1980, no. 393; HD078561). This provides a further possible link between his recruitment and either of the above censuses.

31 AE 1960, 127: Ti(berius) Iulius Icci | f(ilius) Acutus dup[licariu[s! al]a(e) | Pansia(nae) dom(o) | Trever(orum) f[y]ixit | an(nos) LX mer(uit) ann(os) | XXXVI || h(ic) s(itus) e(st) | heres f(aciendum) c(uravit).

The Ala Petriana was raised in the Augustan period and it is attested having served at Strasbourg around 5 – 15 CE (CIL 13.11605). At Strasbourg, an eques of the unit, Fittio, had dedicated an altar to Mars Loucetius before the legionary camp was founded around 15 CE. It is next attested at Mainz in 56 CE (CIL 13.06820). If the Ala Petriana did not transfer from Strasbourg to Mainz under Tiberius it surely served elsewhere in the Rhineland in the interim, possibly Bonn. The Ala Pomponiani, which is evidenced by a solitary inscription at Bonn that must surely date to the 20s-37 CE at the latest (given name being in the genitive), may be the same unit as the Ala Petriana. It can be no mere coincidence that there is a known praefectus equitum from the late Augustan to early Tiberian period named T. Pomponius Petra, who seems to have served under Germanicus (presumably in the Rhineland between 11 and 16 CE). If T. Pomponius Petra was the founding commander of the Ala Petriana/Pomponiani then we may propose the following: it was created between 11 and 14 CE (from the Treveri, Nemes, and possibly other Rhineland tribes) and briefly served at Strasbourg before transferring to Bonn where it remained until the around the Claudian invasion of Britain, whence it was moved to Mainz. Why Niger labels his unit Ala Pomponian, however, must for now remain a mystery.

Ala I Praetoria

33 Reddé et al. 2006. CIL 13.11605: Marti | Loucet(io) | v(otum) s(olvit) l(ibens) l(aetus) m(erito) | Fittio Cond(ollis) f(ilius) eq(ues) a(lla) Petri(ana) Trever(orum). There is a certain Augustan military presence at Strasbourg in the form of six parallel ditches with walls of stakes, but these do not seem to date to the Oberaden horizon (11 – 8/7 BCE). Rather, three of the fosses contain ceramic finds dating to 5 – 15 CE, and dendrochronology further attests to the site being abandoned in 15 CE.

34 Spaul 1994, 179-82; Gayet 2006, 76.

35 Birley 1978, 263; Holder 1980, 21. CIL 13.8097: Niger Aetoni f(ilius) | Nemes a(lla) Pomponi(an) anno(rum) L | aera(rum)(!) XXV | h(ic) s(itus) e(st). Note, however, that EDH dates the inscription from 31-50 CE (HD078221), and Holder merely suggests that Niger was recruited under Augustus and died in the Tiberian period (1980, no.701).

36 Cassone 2017; Spaul 1994, 179. On praefecti equitum without listing the unit they commanded, see page 370n15. CIL 11.969- Regium Lepidi: T(itio) Pomponio T(itii) F(ilio) Pol(lia) | Petrae | aedil(i) II viro praef(ecto) fabr(um) III | trib(iunus) milit(um) leg(ionis) X Gemin(ae) | praef(ecto) equitum praef(ecto) | Germanici Caesaris II viro | quinq(uennali) q(uaestori) D(ecreto) D(ecurionum) | patrono.
This unit was possibly raised from Belgic communities in the late Augustan or early Tiberian period and served in Germania Inferior for the rest of the Julio-Claudian period (CIL 13.8310 Köln). Michael P. Speidel used a passage in Tacitus, Ann. 2.16.3, to suggest “that horsemen from Köln served as Germanicus’ body-guard during his campaign against the Germans,” a view that is now endorsed by Spaul.37

**Ala Rusonis**

Named after an unknown early commander, this unit was created by the last two decades of the Augustan period at the latest. The only attested soldier of the Ala Rusonis is Adbogius from Aquitania, who served ten years before dying at Mainz.38 Noting the genitive Rusonis, it is highly probable that Adbogius served in this unit before auxiliary cavalry units began receiving permanent names, sometime after 21-6 CE (see above, page 366). This then could suggest that the unit was levied from Aquitanian populations to support Rome’s wars in Hispania and Germania at some point between 19 BCE and 16 CE.39 As it is not attested beyond the Julio-Claudian period, the Ala Rusonis was probably either merged with another unit or experienced a name change after Adbogius’ service.40

**Ala Tauriana**

37 Quote Spaul 1994, 188.
38 CIL 13.7031: Adbogius Co[n(agi) f(ilius) ] na(tio) Petr|ucorius eq(ues) al(cae) | Rusonis an(norum) | XXIX st(pendiorum) X | hic situs est | ex testamento libertus | fecit.
39 Mainz had a military occupation since 13/2 BCE at the earliest, and especially from 10 BCE onwards, which leaves open the possibility that if this unit was recruited in the early 10s BCE, it had served briefly outside of the Rhineland. As many units were transferred from Hispania to Gallia after the Cantabrian Wars, then onto the Rhine frontier, it must always remain a possibility that this unit could have been among those units transferred to the Rhine from further west.
Raised in Gaul under Augustus or Tiberius and named after a commander, either a Taurus or Taurianus. The first certain attestation of where the Ala Tauriana was serving is a reference in Tacitus to it being at Lyons in early 69 CE (Tac. Hist. 1.59).\(^{41}\) Christol and Le Roux think that the unit was in Spain prior to that and brought to Gaul by Galba (though it is not certain that the unit was originally stationed there).\(^{42}\) The earliest known soldier is a Tiberius Claudius Fronto, whom Holder argues was recruited under Tiberius, received citizenship and was discharged under Nero, and died at some point in the Flavian period.\(^{43}\) As Fronto had served thirty-five years before being discharged, he would have been recruited somewhere between 19 and 33 CE. If he was among the earliest recruits, the unit may have been created after the census of 14/6 CE (less probably after the one in 30 CE because it is named after a commander), though one cannot rule out an earlier recruitment.\(^{44}\)

**Ala Treverorum**

Raised under Augustus or Tiberius, and Gayet suggests that it was in existence at least before the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir. He then proposes that it was this unit which was tempted into joining the rebellion, but it ultimately remained loyal and participated in the campaign against the Sequani (Tac. Ann. 3.42, 46). As the unit is attested at Mainz a few decades later, could it have been serving there around 21 CE?\(^{45}\)

\(^{41}\) Spaul 1994, 217; Christol and Le Roux 1985, 18; Gayet 2006, 81. Dating based on the unit being named after a commander. The unit was possibly named after the father or grandfather of T. Antonius Taurus (Spaul 1994, 218). Later appellations of the unit include Gallorum, thus verifying that the Ala Tauriana was raised in Gaul (such as CIL 16.169. Spaul 1994, 217; Christol and Le Roux 1985, 18).

\(^{42}\) Christol and Le Roux 1985 20-1; Spaul 1994, 218.

\(^{43}\) Holder 1980, no. 451. **ILER** 6412 (Emerita, Lusitania): *Ti(berius) Claudius Fronto | P(a) p(eria) veter(anus) eq(ues) ala Ta[u]riana prodecuro | signifer aerorum XXXV | annor(um) LXXX sibi et suis | h(ic) s(itus) e(st) t(ibi) t(erra) l(evis).


**Ala Tungrorum**

Following the arguments of H. Lieb in *Annee Epigraphique* and D.B. Saddington, the stele of the Ubian Severus attests to an unnumbered Ala Tungrorum. Saddington perceives that this unit is the same as the Ala Frontoniana, which appears in Dalmatia in the 70s CE after serving in Lower Germany before that. But as *Annee Epigraphique* provides an earlier date for the inscription, 20-40 CE (see n.49 below), it is possible that we are dealing with a unit completely separate from the Ala Frontoniana, which did later merge with an Ala I Tungrorum in the 2nd century CE. If that is the case, then we have here a unit that was created in the Augustan or early Tiberian period. If the deceased had preferred an ethnic name to the unit’s official name, as Saddington had argued, then this soldier belonged to the Ala Frontoniana in the 70s CE.

**Ala I Tungrorum**

Spaul maintains that this unit had formed part of Claudius’ invasion force in 43 CE and suggests that it was in existence prior to that serving in Germania. This, however, may be too speculative. While there was an unnumbered Ala Tungrorum in existence by Tiberius’ reign at the latest, see the previous unit above, it is so far inconclusive if it has any link to this Ala I Tungrorum. Furthermore, there is no evidence of this unit in Germania, and no certain evidence of the Ala I

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48 Holder notes that the deceased should be of an early date as the tombstone type is a door, which he suggests “would have been produced in the workshop of Legio VII which left Dalmatia in the reign of Claudius” (2005, 80n14).

49 Spaul 1994, 120; Holder 2005, 80. Holder endorses the view that Ala Tungrorum and Ala I Tungrorum are one in the same (2005, 80). But one must also note that it has also been speculated that it is the unnumbered Ala Tungrorum that had amalgamated with the Ala Frontoniana. Hopefully, future discoveries may shed some light on this issue.
Tungrorum in Britannia prior to the diploma of 98 CE (CIL 16.43). If this diploma is the earliest evidence for the unit, it is quite possible that the Ala I Tungrorum was raised during the censuses of Vespasian attested from 73-4 CE. There was a massive recruitment movement in the Rhineland in the early Flavian period and this unit could very well have been one of many units created in that period (see Appendix 4 and pages 104-6). These units could have been levied as a response to the Civilis or in preparation for Flavian expansion in Britain; these ideas are not mutually exclusive.

**Ala Vocontiorum**

As the tribal designation attests, the Ala Vocontiorum was initially levied from the Vocontii in Gallia Narbonensis. The earliest known soldier of the unit was the *ignotus* of CIL 13.3463 (Arlaines). Being that Arlaines was a military site since the reign of Tiberius – though possibly as late as Claudius – it is plausible that this *ignotus* was levied using census information from either the census of Germanicus or the one taken by Torquatus Novellius Atticus in 30 CE (CIL 14.3602), with the latter perhaps being the more probable. While Gayet argued that both Vocontian *alae* may have been raised either during Agrippa’s first governorship or in the first years of the Principate (38-26 BCE), there is no evidence of this unit prior to this inscription, and so a later date is cautiously accepted here.

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51 CIL 13.3463: [-]—Jus Secc f(ilius), [A)rvernu|s, eques ala Vo(con)tiorum | an(nis)(viginti quinque), stipend(iis) | (septem), h(ic) s(ilus) e(st).
52 Spaul 1994 240; Holder 1980, no. 891; on Arlaines, see Reddé 1985.
53 Gayet 2006, 72. It must be noted, however, that some later evidence describes this unit as the Ala Augusta Vocontiorum, and therefore one cannot rule out a foundation date during Augustus’ reign.
Cohortes

Cohors I Aquitanorum Veterana

It could have been raised as early as 27 BCE or as late as the early Tiberian period. The unit served in Germania or in Sardinia before transferring to Moesia at some point in the second half of the 1st century CE. It is possible that all of the cohortes Aquitanorum had served, at least briefly, in Sardinia to combat brigandage on the island after 6 CE. Where any of the Aquitanian cohorts were prior to that is difficult to state. But, if this unit, and the following, was raised after the census of 27 BCE, it is possible that it had served locally for some time, either in Aquitania or in Spain (for the Cantabrian Wars).54

Cohors Aquitanorum

This unit is attested by four inscriptions in Sardinia under Augustus and Tiberius, and as one of the inscriptions belongs to a soldier of the Cohors III Aquitanorum, all four may belong to the same unit.55 There is some variation in opinion for when the unit was created. For Paul Holder, it was likely raised after the suppression of the revolt of the Aquitani in 27 BCE (On this revolt, see page 137). Meanwhile, Frédéric Gayet asserts that the unit is only attested on the island from the Tiberian period, and Rowland Jr. only ascribes an early imperial date to the inscriptions.56 With these inscriptions we are certainly dealing with soldiers who were levied at different times. It is possible that Silus (AE 1988, 651) and Tiberius Iulius Capito (AE 1988, 652) were levied sometime between the census of Augustus (27 BCE) and the turn of the 1st century CE,57 while

54 Spaul 2000, 141-3; Gayet 2006, 73.
55 Though see unit above. It is more certain though that Silus served in the same unit as Capito, given that the two inscriptions were found at the same site.
57 AE 1988, 651 = AE 1980, 533 (Iscia Cunzada, Sardinia): Silo Tε|renti | filius| tur(ma) E[ll]i | Faus|tilli a|n(norum) LX | mil(itavit) an(nos) | XXXV | h(ic) s(itus) e(st). EDH dates the inscription to 1-30 CE (HD004072)
Decumus Ciniensis (ILSard n222) and Rufus Valentinus (CIL 10.7596) were possibly raised in the Tiberian period, maybe sometime after the census of Germanicus.\(^{58}\) In the case of the latter two recruits, we know that Sardinia was still experiencing difficulties with brigands as it was under the control of a prefect (see pages 47-8, 358-60) and that Tiberius was sending more conscripts to the island in 19 CE (Tac. Ann. 2.85). One can venture to guess that this unit was likely maintained near full-strength in this period to deal with the issues on the island.

**Cohors I Baetasiorum**

First attested in a diploma of 103 CE (CIL 16.48). If the soldiers had served for twenty-five years, it means that the unit was raised by 78 CE at the latest. It is possible that the Cohors I Baetasiorum had served early on at Manchester, but as the inscription could also belong to a Severan context we cannot rely on it as testimony for where the unit served in the Flavian period (RIB 581 = CIL 7.216). Scholars seem to think that several units were created in the aftermath of the Batavian revolt, believing that many such units were levied by Q. Petillius Cerialis in 71 CE and sent to Britain to serve or support troops there during the early stages of Flavian expansion in Britain.\(^{59}\) It is possible, however, that some units such as this one were actually raised a few years later, after the censuses in 73-4 CE. This then makes it possible that this unit, and several

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\(^{58}\) ILSard n222 = AE 1920, 96 (Bitti, Sardinia): Decumus Cirneti | f(ilius) C(i)niensis c(o)hort(is) | Aquitanorum | annorum XXXIII | stupendiorum(!) | XV h(ic) s(itus) e(st). CIL 10.7596 (Carales, Sardinia): Rufus Tabusi f. Valentinus ann. XXX stip. XI ex cho. Aquit. h.s.e. faciendum quravit Spedius frater SVS. Both were recruited and died under Tiberius (Holder 1980, no. 1081-2).

\(^{59}\) Spaul 2000, 236-7; Holder 2006, 161. Paul Holder is a major proponent of this argument (1982).
of the following, was sent to Britain with Sextus Iulius Frontinus, and not with Quintus Petillius Cerialis.

**Cohors I Cugernorum**

This unit, like many others, could have been raised after the census of 73-4 CE (cf. Cohors I Baetasiorum), and is first attested from a diploma for Britain in 103 CE (*CIL* 16.48). The diploma would suggest that the unit was levied by 78 CE at the latest. It is uncertain where the unit was initially stationed in Britain.\(^{60}\)

**Cohors I Frisiavonium**

Raised from the Frisiavones of Germania Inferior, this unit is attested in Britain by 105 CE (*CIL* 16.51). If the constitution was awarded to soldiers who had served a full twenty-five-year term, then this unit was in existence by 80 CE at the latest, meaning that it could have been raised from information derived from Vespasian’s census in 73/4 CE (cf. Cohors I Baetasiorum). It is possible that building inscriptions at Manchester with the Cohors I Frisiavonium on them may belong to the original construction of ramparts there and would show that the unit was already there in the late 1\(^{st}\) century CE (*RIB* 577-80).\(^{61}\)

**Cohors III Gallorum felix equitata**

If Spaul is correct in asserting that the unit was serving in Spain prior to 40-2 CE, when it was found at Valkenburg in the lead up to the Claudian invasion of Britain (*AE* 1975, 633), then it may have been raised in the late Augustan or early Tiberian period and support the claims made

\(^{60}\) Holder 1982, 115; *idem* 2006, 161; Spaul 2000, 239-40.\(^{61}\) Holder 1982, 116; *idem* 2006, 161; Spaul 2000, 241.
here.\textsuperscript{62} It is worthwhile to note that Paul Holder ascribes Tigernilus’ recruitment to the Tiberian or Claudian period. Being that at least one series of \textit{cohortes Gallorum} was raised in the Augustan period (see Cohors XI Gallorum below), it shows that some of the \textit{cohortes Gallorum} were in existence by the end of the Augustan period.\textsuperscript{63}

\textbf{Cohors III Gallorum equitata}

Nothing is known of this unit prior to a diploma from Moesia dated to 75 CE (\textit{RMD} 1.2). It was possibly raised at the same time as the unit above and served in Moesia prior to the diploma.\textsuperscript{64}

\textbf{Cohors III Gallorum equitata civium Romanorum}

Raised under Augustus or Tiberius and served in Spain, as attested by a boundary stone at Soto de la Vega from the Claudian period.\textsuperscript{65}

\textbf{Cohors XI Gallorum}

Likely raised either around 12 BCE or the turn of the 1\textsuperscript{st} century CE to serve in Illyricum. As Holder posits that the \textit{ignotus} of \textit{CIL} 3.8439 (Narona, Dalmatia) was recruited and had died in the Augustan period after fifteen years of service,\textsuperscript{66} this leaves open the possibility the unit was levied with information from Drusus’ census in 13/2 BCE. This would also work within the context of the frequent regional campaigning in and around Illyricum from c.15 BCE – 9 CE (on

\textsuperscript{62}Spaul 2000, 161-2. \textit{AE} 1975, 633 (Valkenburg, Germania Inferior: \textit{Tigernilo mil(i)ti} | \textit{c(o)hors(tis) III Gallor(um) e(quitatae)}).
\textsuperscript{63}Holder 1980, 111, 309 (no. 1491). Holder also points to another series of \textit{cohortes Gallorum} serving in Germania from around the same date (Tac. \textit{Ann}. 2.17.4).
\textsuperscript{64}Spaul 2000, 163-5; Gayet 2006, 85.
\textsuperscript{65}Spaul 2000, 167, 169; Gayet 2006, 87; Holder 1980, 111.
\textsuperscript{66}\textit{CIL} 3.8439 (Narona, Dalmatia): \textit{------. | M(?)|V|L|--- | D} | \textit{c(o)hors(tis) XI Gall(orum) | domo Patavi | ann(orum) XLVI stip(endorum) | XV}. Spaul supposes that this unit had a very short career, perhaps it was disbanded after the Great Illyrian revolt (2000, 172)?
which see pages 242-8, 257-63). This unit likely had a very short career as it is attested only by this one inscription.\textsuperscript{67}

**Cohors I Lepidiana equitata**

The Cohors I Lepidiana equitata was probably raised under Augustus or Tiberius given that it appears to be named after an early commander, and it may have served in Pannonia, where it is found until 80 CE. As most units of this type come from Gaul, it is likely the same for this unit.\textsuperscript{68}

**Cohors I Lingonum eq.**

While the Cohors I Lingonum is not attested until it was recorded on a diploma for Britain in 105 CE, the Cohors II Lingonum appears on one for 98 CE for the same province (\textit{CIL} 16.51-105 CE). Given that there is a sequence of \textit{cohortes Lingonum} that are first attested between 98 and 114 CE, it is likely that they were raised at the same moment, surely sometime between 70 and 73 CE. As noted above for the Cohors I Baetasiorum, Paul Holder had argued that several units were created in the aftermath of Civilis’ revolt (seemingly as a form of punishment) and sent to Britain with Cerialis in 70/1 CE. Spaul attempted to counter Holder with an argument from silence, namely that Lingones could have been recruited at any moment in the Julio-Claudian period, such as when their neighbors, the Aedui, were in revolt in 21 CE. From that moment they could have served in Germania, Raetia, or Noricum before the 70s CE.\textsuperscript{69} While it is true that Lingones could have been recruited prior 70-3 CE, there is zero evidence of such units existing. It is perhaps more probable that there were irregular units comprising Lingones in existence at various moments in the Julio-Claudian period that were only formalized as regular auxiliaries.

\textsuperscript{67} Holder 1980, no. 1551; Spaul 2000.
\textsuperscript{68} Spaul 2000, 155.
\textsuperscript{69} Holder 1982, 118; \textit{idem} 2006, 161; Spaul 2000, 174.
units early in Vespasian’s reign. It is also possible that the *cohortes Lingonum* were levied after the census in 73 CE and sent to Britain with Iulius Frontinus. As Frontinus had received the surrender of 70,000 Lingones without a fight during the suppression of Civilis’ revolt in 70 CE (Frontin. *Str*. 4.3.14), it is tempting that he used his positive relationship with the tribe for recruitment efforts prior to the start of his governorship of Britain in 74 CE. Furthermore, Rome rarely responded to communities in revolt with harsh punishments. This would especially be the case for a tribe like the Lingones that had returned to Roman order without a fight. Harsh punishments were usually reserved for those peoples who had fiercely resisted Rome, and, even then, harsh measures were rarely taken against such communities in revolt against Rome. This may suggest then that the levying of these units was not necessarily a punishment for the participation of some tribes in a revolt, but rather the Roman state was in desperate need of fresh recruits after the civil war, especially in light of planned campaigning in the broader region.

*Cohors II Lingonum*

This unit is first attested on diplomas for Britain dating to 98 and 105 CE (*CIL* 16.43, 51). It is uncertain where this unit had served early on in Britain. See Cohors I Lingonum for more information.

*Cohors III Lingonum*

The Cohors III Lingonum is first attested in Britain on diplomas for 103 CE and 98/114 CE (*CIL* 16.48; *RMD* 3.151). There is little epigraphic evidence for this unit, and none of it aids in

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70 Knight 1991. The same may be said for many of the tribes of the Rhineland.
71 Cf. Gambash 2015, 69-90. Despite the way Rome often responded to the end of revolts, it must remain a possibility, however, that these units were created as a punishment for their involvement in the revolt and that some captives from various tribes were conscripted and sent to Britain immediately after the revolt in 70/1 CE.
determining where it served in Britain in any period. See Cohors I Lingonum for more information.

**Cohors IIII Lingonum**

This cohort is first attested in Britain in a constitution of 98/114 CE (*RMD* 3.151). See Cohors I Lingonum for more information.

**Cohors I Menapiorum**

There is no evidence of this unit from inscriptions, it is only attested on four diplomas from Britain, the earliest being the one dated to either 98 or 114 CE (*RMD* 3.151). This unit was also most likely created in the early Vespasianic period, between 70 and 74 CE (cf. Cohors I Baetasiorum). This unit, or the Cohors I Morinorum may be recorded on a leather offcut from the 97-103 CE phase at Vindolanda (*RIB* 2245.1). This, however, would not prove where the unit was stationed precisely at that time, but would confirm that the unit was likely in northern Britain at the end of the 1st century CE.72

**Cohors I Morinorum**

Attested by a constitution for Britain dated to 103 CE and a prefect of the unit from the Flavian era, the Cohors I Morinorum was created by 78 CE at the latest, making it a viable candidate for a unit created during the censuses of 73/4 CE (cf. Cohors I Baetasiorum).73 This unit may also be

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recorded on a leather fragment from Vindolanda, belonging to a 97-103 CE, on which see the unit above.

*Cohortes I and II Nerviorum*

Like the *cohortes Lingonum*, the cohorts raised from the Nervii were likely created at the same time.\(^{74}\) While this unit is first attested on a diploma for Britain dating to 105 CE (*CIL* 16.51), based on a diploma for Cohors II Nerviorum (*CIL* 16.43 CE), it is plausible that these units were created at the same moment, by 73 CE at the latest.\(^{75}\) This would then suggest that both units were raised around the time of the Vespasianic provincial censuses of 73/4 CE (cf. Cohors I Baetasiorum). The Cohors I Nerviorum seems to have briefly served at Caer Gai in Wales, possibly in the late 1\(^{\text{st}}\) century CE (*RIB* 418).\(^{76}\)

*Cohors I (Septimia) Belgarum*

There are numerous contentions about this unit, including issues with when it was raised, debates on if it was raised from the Belgae in Britain or from peoples in Gallia Belgica, and if the unit was numbered or not early on in its existence.\(^{77}\) Here, it is assumed that the epithet Septimia is an appellation awarded to the unit in the Severan era, rather than a signal that the unit was levied that late.\(^{78}\) This is further supported by the fact that a man named Aprilis, from the Lingones

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\(^{74}\) N.B. It is generally assumed that a whole series of Nervii units were levied at one time, but I have only included those units which were most certainly levied in the 70s – early 80s CE (i.e. units attested in diplomas for 98-105 CE).

\(^{75}\) Cohors II Nerviorum is also attested on a constitution of 96/108 CE (*RMD* 2.83). If soldiers were discharged in 96 CE for completing their twenty-five-year service, then these units may have been created prior to the censuses of 73/4 CE, which would then lend further support to Paul Holder’s arguments for units being raised immediately after the suppression of the Batavian revolt.

\(^{76}\) Holder 1982; *idem* 2006, 161; Spaul 2000, 218. It is possible, however, that cohors I Nerviorum served in Wales during the first half of the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) century CE.

\(^{77}\) See for instance: Spaul 2000, 187-8 (with earlier references and debates); Gayet 2006, 92.

\(^{78}\) *Contra* Gayet 2006.
tribe, served as a centurio cohortis I Belgicae in the Julio-Claudian period.79 According to Paul Holder, Aprilis was probably recruited in the Tiberian period. As this early inscription refers to the unit as Cohors I Belgica, it is possible to see that the unit was created in Gallia Belgica (as it was in existence prior to the Claudian invasion of Britain), but the unit’s name also suggests that it was likely created from existing units (maybe a few understrength units were combined at some point in the Tiberian period?).80

_Cohors I Sugambrorum veterana_

The Cohors I Sugambrorum is very likely an Augustan creation. It was certainly levied at some point after 8 BCE when the tribe was transported across the Rhine in 8 BCE (Tac. _Ann._ 12.39; Suet. _Aug._ 21; see further pages 279-80). It appears to have served early on in Moesia where it was involved in putting down a Thracian revolt in 26 CE (Tac. _Ann._ 4.47.3).81

_Cohors I Tungrorum_

It appears that several Tungrian cohorts, and maybe the Ala I Tungrorum (389-90), were all enlisted in the early 70s CE (cf. Cohors I Baetasiorum). A constitution of 103 CE for Britain suggests that this unit was created by 78 CE at the latest (CIL 16.48). It may have been one of the Tungrian cohorts mentioned in Tacitus’ account of the battle of Mons Graupius of 83 CE (Tac. _Agr._ 36.1). Two tablets from Vindolanda c. 90 CE show that the unit was stationed at Vindolanda at this time (Tab. _Vindol._ 2.154+add., 4.857), and the unit became milliary by 103 CE when it is described as such on CIL 16.48. As the fort at Vindolanda in this period was not

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79 CIL 13.7038 (Mainz, Germania Superior): Aprilis Soi(filius) |(centurio) c(o)ho(ris) | <I> Belgica(e) | natione | Li(n)gauster | ann(orum) XXII | h(ic) [s(itus) e(st)].
80 Holder 1980, no. 1171. On the distinctions between designations such as Belgarum vs Belgicae, or Brittonum vs Britannica see Cheesman 1914; Kennedy 1977; Holder 1980; Ivleva 2012, 141ff.
large enough for a unit of that size, it is possible that the unit was divided up between Vindolanda and Coria, where many of the absentees were located on a strength report of the time (Tab. Vindol. 2.154+add.).

**Cohors I Ubiorum equitata**

The attestation of M. Vergilius Gallus Lusius, who was a *primus pilus legionis XI* in Dalmatia before becoming prefect of this unit, shows that this unit was in existence by the early Tiberian period at the latest as he had received *dona militaria* from both Augustus and Tiberius. Florian Matei-Popescu hypothesizes that as M. Vergilius Gallus Lusius was serving in Dalmatia with *Legio XI* maybe Cohors Ubiorum was stationed in the same province. It is difficult to state with any certainty, though, that this cohors Ubiorum peditum et equitum is the same unit as the Cohors I Ubiorum attested in Moesia at the end of the 1st century CE.

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84 Holder 1980, no. E 56; Demougin 1992, no. 301; Spaul 1994, 252-3; Matei-Popescu 2010, 222.
## Appendix 4: Auxilia Units Potentially Raised Around the Time of Provincial Censuses (31 BCE- 79 CE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Province Raised In</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Augustan (possibly 27 BCE)</td>
<td>Cohors I Aquitanorum Veterana</td>
<td>Gallia Aquitania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan (possible 27 BCE)</td>
<td>Ala I Gallorum Atectorigiana</td>
<td>Gallia Aquitania</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 13.1041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan (possible 12 BCE)</td>
<td>Ala (Gallorum) Sebosiana</td>
<td>Gallia Lugdunensis</td>
<td><em>BRGK</em> 17, 216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan (possible 12 BCE)</td>
<td>Cohors XI Gallorum</td>
<td>Gallia Lugdunensis</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 3.8439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian (possible 12 BCE or 14/6 CE)</td>
<td>Ala Rusonis</td>
<td>Gallia Aquitania (?)</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 13.7031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian (possible 14/6 CE)</td>
<td>Ala Agrippiana</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 13.6235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian (14/6 CE)</td>
<td>Ala Antiana</td>
<td>Gallia Lugdunensis (?)</td>
<td><em>AE</em> 1926, 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian (possible 14/6 CE)</td>
<td>Ala Frontoniana</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>BRGK</em> 58, 162, <em>AE</em> 1931, 30, and <em>CIL</em> 13.8558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian (likely 14/6 CE)²</td>
<td>Ala Petriana / Pomponiania</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 13.11605, and <em>CIL</em> 11.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian (possible 14/6 CE)</td>
<td>Ala Praetoria</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>Tac. Ann.</em> 2.16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian (possibly 14/6 CE, less likely 30 CE)</td>
<td>Ala (II) Longiniana</td>
<td>Gallia Lugdunensis</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 13.2615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian (possibly 14/6 CE, less likely 30 CE)</td>
<td>Ala Tauriana</td>
<td>Gallia Lugdunensis</td>
<td><em>ILER</em> 6412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustan-Tiberian (Possibly 14/6 or 30 CE)³</td>
<td>Ala Vocontiorum</td>
<td>Gallia Narbonensis</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 13.3463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasianic (possibly 73/4 CE)⁴</td>
<td>Ala I Tungrorum</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 16.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasianic (73/4 CE)</td>
<td>Cohors I Baetasiorum</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 16.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasianic (73/4 CE)</td>
<td>Cohors I Cugernorum</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 16.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasianic (possibly 73/4 CE)</td>
<td>Cohors I Frisiavonium</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>RIB</em> 577-80, and <em>CIL</em> 16.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Alternatively, this unit could have been raised closer to the turn of the 1st century CE.
² It remains possible that the unit could have been raised just a few years before 14 CE.
³ One must note that the unit may predate either census given that some later inscriptions include the epithet Augusta.
⁴ There is the existence of an unnumbered Ala Tungrorum in existence in the Julio-Claudian period, and there remains a distinct possibility that this Ala I Tungrorum is the same as the unnumbered unit.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cohorts/Units</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vespasianic (73/4 CE)</td>
<td>Cohortes I, II, III, IIII Lingonum</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 16.43, 48, 51, and <em>RMD</em> 3.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasianic (73/4 CE)</td>
<td>Cohors I Menapiorum</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>RMD</em> 3.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasianic (73/4 CE)</td>
<td>Cohors I Morinorum</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>AE</em> 1971, 148, and <em>CIL</em> 16.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vespasianic (73/4 CE)</td>
<td>Cohortes I, II Nerviorum</td>
<td>Gallia Belgica</td>
<td><em>CIL</em> 16.43, 51, and <em>RIB</em> 418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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