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The Politics of Public Transportation: Public Transit Design and Black–White Neighborhood Segregation in Chicago

Project description
This research aims to explore many commonly asserted connections between public transit routes and ethnic separations in Chicago neighborhoods. It investigates potential political intentions behind design decisions and aims to examine isolative effects of both transit design to limit movement and transit design to create boundaries. The relationships between the government, the transit authorities, local political culture, existing ethnic divisions, and route designs are also discussed.

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The Politics of Public Transportation: 
The Relationship Between Public Transit Design and Black-White Neighborhood Segregation in Chicago

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I- Introduction

What is the best kind of urban community? Los Angeles Engineer and specialist in urban land economics Henry A. Babcock addressed this question in his papers for the UCLA Southern California Institute. He wrote, “’It is one in which each individual has the maximum opportunity to pursue economic, social, cultural, and recreational advantages’…one in which the expeditious movement of persons between these areas is accomplished by a comprehensive integrated system of transit facilities.”¹ This is precisely the accepted premise upon which the following research is conducted and the foundation of the reasons for its pursuit. The political and social implications of a transit system are crucial to a city’s sociological and socioeconomic development.

Accessible transportation determines the movement of groups across a space. It can connect populations and encourage diverse interaction or effectively isolate them, ultimately determining the physical ability of individuals to pursue all economic, social, cultural, and recreational advantages available. Lawmakers often institute transit around existing neighborhoods to meet an established demand. For example, Chicago’s original Northwestern ‘L’ line was built in 1893 between Franklin and Orleans Street, preceding CTA Rapid Transit, with the purpose of linking then 32-year-old Northwestern University and downtown.² Further, neighborhoods often grow around newly instituted transit routes, as there exists demand for easy access to transportation and the ability to travel freely to other parts of the city. The Garfield Boulevard ‘L’ line construction to Englewood sparked residential development north of Garfield Boulevard.³ Additionally, the boom in 1890s ‘L’ construction generally reinforced the ‘loop,’ permanently drawing the commercial center of the city away from the original spot on Wabash.⁴ Finally, transit is often built with the clear intention of linking significant populations and locales—to improve accessibility—as the South Side Alley ‘L’ was built between 35th and State St in the 1890s to connect the Loop with Jackson Park and the Columbian Exposition.⁵ Thus, it is
reasonable to question the possibility for transit design decisions to be motivated by the inverse as well—to prevent the linking of populations and locales, and to hinder accessibility. With Chicago’s long history of ethnic tensions, machine politics, segregation among neighborhoods, and a systemic limiting of opportunity for black populations, community assertions of potential ethno-political agenda in transit design are worth exploring.

Utilizing the city of Chicago as the selected, overarching case study, the following questions will be explored. Is the layout of the public transportation system in Chicago a dependent variable of isolative spatial organization among ethnic and socioeconomic groups in neighborhoods? What, if any, role do political motivations play in the spatial organization of the Public Transit System? Does the Transit system favor certain groups over others through service or accessibility? Is the layout of the public transportation system in Chicago an independent variable for the exacerbation of the isolation of socioeconomic groups with regards to spatial organization in neighborhoods? Does the transit system impact the interaction between black and white populations through varying levels of accessibility or restriction of movement across the city? Essentially, were there political motivations to design public transit a certain way, what were these (economic, racial, etc.), and how has its design affected or accentuated racial separations overtime?

With reference to Chicago’s long history of black-white segregation and isolative housing tactics, the proposed hypothesis is as follows. Segregation in Chicago neighborhoods and the geographical isolation of Chicago’s black population existed prior to the establishment of the public transportation system due to various political and economic forces. Economic factors linked to the disproportionate distribution of poorer populations contributed some to the design of the mass transit system (affecting demand and ridership), as well as the transit system’s
evolution, but it is difficult to prove malice in motives even if they did exist. Public transit design does play a role in the perpetuation of segregation, however, by limiting and promoting interactions between different groups.

First, relevant political and social contexts will be examined, as well as confounding socioeconomic factors that shed light on pre-existing segregation in Chicago neighborhoods. Various examples of clear or asserted connections between transit or transportation routes and ethnic separations will then be explored. These can be categorized into two groups: transportation design that limits movement and transportation design as neighborhood boundaries. Examples of designs that limit movement include the Howard Stop between Rogers Park and Evanston, the Purple Line Express Skip-Stop service, and the 1996 closing of the Jackson Park Green Line extension. Examples of design that act as ethnic or neighborhood boundaries include the Brown Line’s proximity to the old Cabrini-Green Public Housing Project, the relative lack of rapid transit on the South and West Sides, and the Dan Ryan Expressway’s division of Bronzeville and Bridgeport. Each of these case studies have been asserted by members of the community to be evidence of isolative political intentions. The aim of this research is to explore each and reveal as much about intention in design decisions, notable political circumstances, and socioeconomic and isolative effects in the following years. It is important to note that findings on intention rely heavily on perceived coincidence and circumstantial evidence, as public records would most likely fail to openly disclose mal-intent of local lawmakers or political bodies. Thus, various resources will be used, including historical maps to chart the evolution of the transit system and the formation of neighborhoods.

Following the analysis of these specific cases, relationships between political bodies, the transit authorities, and the community will be evaluated. The role of economic, political, and
cultural forces will be analyzed, as illuminated by discoveries regarding the cases, and the
influence and interaction between the government, the political culture, existing ethnic divisions,
and route designs will be discussed.

II-Context and Pre-Existing Factors
Chicago Transit began in the mid-nineteenth century as individual franchises divided
along the three branches of the river. Core population and employment opportunities were
concentrated in the Central Business District, what would become the “loop.” Each of the three
sides were initially owned by different companies: Chicago City Railway was chartered in 1859
with rights to the South Side, North Chicago Company was chartered in the same year with
rights to the North Side, and Chicago West Division Company, chartered in 1861, took the West
Side. The north and west holdings were purchased in 1899 and consolidated as the Chicago
Union Traction Company by a group of New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago capitalists. By
1902, the Referendum league succeeded in efforts to put the general question of the public
ownership of street railways up to a popular vote, and results came back 143,000 for, 28,000
against, representing a general community hostility towards the traction companies. The vote
did not extend to the state legislature, due to franchise interests, until 1902, when the Muller Bill
gave Illinois cities their own power to own and operate street railways or to instead lease them to
other parties. The franchises expired in the same year, leaving a mess of inter-company legal
relations, duplicate rail lines, the properties relatively devastated, and a large sum of watered
stocks and bonds that transit boss Charles Yerkes bequeathed. The Chicago Transit Authority,
or CTA, was created by the General Assembly of Illinois on April 12, 1945, with the stipulation
that half of profits must come from rider fares. In 1947, five privately-owned Chicago transit
companies were consolidated under the Authority after much research and planning under Mayor
Edward Kelly. All five were managed by trustees of persons appointed by the United States
District Court due to bankruptcy. It is clear that from the beginning of its history, Chicago public transit was fighting both political and financial uphill battles.

The 1950s brought an era of development along transportation routes, but an era of suburbanization and white flight as well. Employment opportunities began to move towards the suburbs, and transportation goals shifted towards higher profit opportunities to connect the suburbs with the central business district in the interest of wealthy working whites.\textsuperscript{11} This shifted public priorities towards the building of highways as the automobile’s popularity boomed and industrial technologies advanced. Public Transportation and the CTA struggled, expectedly, to adapt physically and economically to these changes, and now served a disproportionately lower socioeconomic population, often non-whites and immigrants. By 1954, the CTA was reporting a deficit, although this phenomenon was not unique to Chicago, for nine of the 35 largest urban transit systems reported deficit in this year as well.\textsuperscript{12}

Meanwhile, Chicago had established itself as an ethnic melting pot, famously drawing significant immigrant populations beginning in the nineteenth century. As these groups settled within the city, they established themselves in specific neighborhoods, building tight-knit communities united and geographically bounded by a common heritage, cultural solidarity, and oftentimes a common religion. These ethnic neighborhoods still survive. By 1950, the North Side was home to large populations of Germans, Poles, Swedes, and Scandinavians, with communities of Czechs, Poles, and Italians to the West. The Irish, Polish, and Lithuanian communities resided in the South, and bordered the narrow “Black Belt,” a highly concentrated, narrow strip in which black populations began to settle after WWII (See Map \textsuperscript{13}).\textsuperscript{14}

Discriminatory redlining by Federal and Chicago Housing Authority in which these organizations explicitly and openly refused to back loans to blacks exacerbated neighborhood
segregation in the Black Belt. Blacks often did not have any opportunity to settle outside of this area or relocate, save for segregated public housing projects like the infamous Cabrini-Green Homes on the North Side. This disparity was accentuated by de-concentration and depopulation in South Side neighborhoods as well. The outmigration of non-poor blacks and non-blacks alike, especially during 1960s suburbanization, have contributed to heavy poverty concentrations, a dwindling of political influence, and the departure of many businesses in these areas. After comparing every United States urban region with over 2.5 million residents, The Chicago Urban Leagues’ modern socioeconomic survey of Chicago affirms that "disparities between blacks and whites are far greater in Chicago than in any other major metropolitan area in this country." It was reported that, relative to the other U.S. cities, Chicago's black population is ranked the lowest for median family income, labor force participation rate, and percentage of residents living below the poverty level. Furthermore, Chicago blacks were ranked second to last for percentage of adult high school graduates, and owner-occupied housing statistics.

The ethnic concentrations, solidarity, and cultural values prevalent in local neighborhoods bred complex patronage networks. Chicago Machine Politics emerged as a system contingent on electoral strongholds over Chicago neighborhoods. For example, a 1982 survey of the agency of Edmund Kelly, Democratic Machine Leader and Chicago Park District Superintendent from 1972 to 1986, revealed that “out of 400 top-paid employees, almost 90 percent were white and all were male. With only one quarter the park acreage of New York City's park system, the Chicago Park District had twice as many administrators.” In addition, it was reported that park employees "had no protection against arbitrary firing and demotion and thus were required to do political work to keep their jobs."
In office from 1933 to 1976 when both the CTA and Chicago’s modern socio-ethnic borders were taking shape, Mayors Edward J. Kelly, Martin H. Kennelly, and Richard J. Daley emerged as icons of the Chicago Machine. All were well-known for clientelist leadership, patronage politics, and support for the Irish Democratic coalition. Daley, however, remains the most infamous for his urban infrastructure overhaul and astounding 21 years in office. Supported by his personal network of Irish Catholic Chicagoans, Daley operated on a system of mutual obligation, frequently awarding government jobs and contracts as separable goods for political support, expanding the Irish Catholic municipal political presence. Mayor Daley is often still criticized for his treatment of black Chicagoans and his alleged role in systemic segregation in public housing and public schools. Adam Cohen and Elizabeth Taylor assert that Daley’s Chicago was, in fact, built upon a commitment to racial segregation, working to preserve white neighborhoods by building racial separation into its urban infrastructure through housing, highways, and schools “as a barrier between white neighborhoods and the black ghetto.”

The controversy stemming from the socioeconomic consequences of Daley’s projects was evident in the election of Chicago’s first black Mayor, Harold Washington, in 1983, representing a refusal by Chicago’s black population to be dominated by the machine any longer. Washington faced many obstacles among corrupt local politicians, including the blocking of Washington’s administrative appointments from office and machine boss, Alderman E.R. "Fast Eddie" Vrdolyak changing majority voting requirements to two-thirds majority on certain measures when he himself controlled 29 of 50.

The Black Elite played a complex role in the machine administrations. Daley utilized a system within which he would call upon only men of high standing in the black community: “elites” who possessed little political experience. William Grimshaw writes in Bitter Fruit that
“this virtually assured Daley that his black elite would make few demands on the organization’s resources.”

Tension between black machine alderman and leadership also often came to a boil during the height of the civil rights movement. It is said that one black alderman opposed Mayor Daley’s nominees to the school board in a city council committee session during this time, and even after the vote was recanted later, Daley instructed his precinct captains to sit out of the election and the alderman was defeated. Many black politicians have earnestly played a role in leadership’s inner circles, however. Daley cultivated strong relations with black areas in the near south side, far south-east, and far south-west side wards over the presence of catholic parishes, but shed this new commitment to black leaders after the 1963 Civil Rights riots. Mayor Richard M. Daley, Richard R. Daley’s son, also kept many Bronzeville leaders within his inner circle during his time in office from 1989 to 2011.

It is important to remember, however, how local nuance can affect the appearance of coalitional government. While acknowledging a constancy of segregation in Chicago by the machine, one must consider the variation between political transformations in specific neighborhood areas versus the city as a whole. Individual black wards and black alderman have certainly been more and less powerful at different points depending on when they were relied upon by leadership.

Black Electoral influence in Chicago has also evolved overtime, although municipal resources did not always follow as expected in machine years. The black wards provided the Republican Party’s main electoral stronghold in the 1920s, with three South Side black wards providing Mayor William Thompson with 70% of his winning margin in 1927. Blacks lost much political influence in the 1930s and 1940s, as the same three wards provided only 7% of the winning margin for Mayor Kelly in 1939. By 1955, during Richard J. Daley’s first election, the
black wards realigned so strongly that they “displaced the poor white immigrant wards as the machine’s electoral stronghold.” However, the new majorities did not create any increase in black influence over the machine. Grimshaw writes that Daley allowed “few non-Irish in the machine, and virtually no blacks in particular, benefitted in significant ways from his leadership.” In fact, it was observed that an increased disassociation between productivity and rewards occurred under Daley. As the black wards became the most “productive” and electorally deliverable units, their black alderman possessed a larger claim on machine resources, but often stayed silent, failing to demand them. Thus, these resources were never realized.

III- Case Studies
Transportation Design to Limit Movement
a. The Red and Purple Lines at Howard

The Howard Station sits at the cross section of Paulina and Howard Streets in the Rogers Park neighborhood on Chicago’s North side. It exists as the northern terminus of the Red Line and the southern terminus of the Yellow Line, as well as the southern terminus for the Purple Line during non-rush hour times on both weekdays and during the daytime on weekends (See Map 2). The northern branch of the Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad, originally built in 1885, was taken over in 1908 by the Northwestern Elevated Railroad, which constructed the Howard station as one of a series of new additions, extending service into Evanston. The earlier extensions of the Northwestern Elevated Railroad coincided with Rogers Park’s annexation into the city of Chicago in 1893, as the region was originally a separate municipality from Chicago, incorporated as a village of Illinois in 1878. After being consolidated into the Chicago Railways Trust in 1924, the CTA purchased the line in 1947.

Local residents of the Howard community have spoken of a common local historical account asserting that, as Howard necessitates a changing of L lines from Red to Purple in order
to keep traveling north, the station is an unofficial attempt to limit movement of Chicago black populations into Evanston, especially those from immediate neighbor Rogers Park.\textsuperscript{34} The first assertion of evidence in this is that the Purple line platforms at Howard are too short for Red line trains, purportedly to prevent the extension of the Red line route.\textsuperscript{35} There appears to be some evidence for this, as the 1949 station renovations in preparation for new skip-stop express service engendered the building of a track loop at Howard to be the southbound turning point for Northbound express trains. This project required the new loop to permit more trains operating to and from Howard St., as well as longer platforms for “expected changes in riding and transfer habits of passengers.”\textsuperscript{36} CTA General Manager Walter J. McCarter also announced at this time that the train stops on the outside loop track would be rearranged; “the Ravenswood trains...will stop at the forward end of the platforms, while Evanston Expresses and North Shore line trains will stop at the rear positions” in attempts to equally distribute passengers.\textsuperscript{37} However, six cars were added to the Evanston Express morning and rush hour service in 1949, beginning at Linden Avenue in Wilmette, to remedy a severe overcrowding issue caused by skip-stop service.\textsuperscript{38} McCarter announced in 1950 that the North Shore line trains would use outer loop tracks because the volume of rider traffic had not been sufficient to keep both loop tracks open, offering an economic justification for the limiting of service to Howard residents.\textsuperscript{39} The disparity in platform lengths appeared to be further remedied in 1955 (eight years following the CTA takeover), as the Chicago Tribune reported that the Evanston Express Rush Hour L trains on the North Shore Line each received an additional car to handle increased patronage.\textsuperscript{40}

Moreover, practices of racial segregation were not uncommon to early twentieth century Evanston. White real estate brokers of the northern suburb practiced informal tactics of racial
zoning similar to those of the Chicago and Federal Housing Authorities. Loans to settle in the affluent, white sections of Evanston were refused to blacks and thus, black populations were only able to settle in a specific section of the town on the west side. In 1922, Evanston residents founded the ‘West Side Improvement Association’ whose mission stood to “preserve [the area south of the black district] as a place for white people to live;” a “syndicate” was formed to buy properties that were “at risk of being sold to African Americans.” Although still uncommon in Evanston relative to South Side Chicago, some suburban property owners also signed racially restrictive covenants that created a legal obligation to refuse black purchasers. Black families near railroad tracks or the edges of the city were then displaced further westward, as their property was forcibly converted for industrial and commercial use.

Thus, it is not surprising that many Evanston community members showed outrage over a possible CTA reroute through Rogers Park during a series of 1949 station closings and route reorganization. The proposed elimination of Jarvis as an Evanston Express Stop, instead reinstated as an A Stop on Howard-Jackson Park trains, caused much protest from the community, documented in public hearing transcripts. The arguments against such a change that were offered up included a decrease in service and a hazardous reverse in traffic flow, but centered around the mandatory transfer in Rogers Park. CTA Engineer L.M. Traiser publicly denied that the change would increase traffic hazards at the Rogers Park station and admitted to a decrease in service, but argued a sufficient repayment in the form of reduction in waiting and running time that would benefit 95% of riders.

The evolution of Roger’s Park’s racial makeup sheds light on the potential for racially-charged design motivations, however. Supposedly, the Howard design intended to hinder the movement of blacks from a stretch of Rogers Park that bordered Evanston to the north known as
“Juneway Terrace,” nicknamed “the Jungle.” According to the Chicago Tribune, the “Juneway Jungle” was a predominately black, low-income, and blighted, high-crime area, one whose residents white and well-to-do Evanstonians most likely did not want to intermingle with. The area was also subject to a decade long neighborhood revitalization project beginning in 1978. This project included a successful mid- to low- income housing project called Northpoint.44 This section of the neighborhoods appeared to take shape throughout the latter decades of the Twentieth Century, however, as the Roger’s Park black population jumped from 0.1% in 1960 to 30.2% in 1990.45 Due to this timeline discrepancy, it appears that any racially-motivated efforts to limit movement at the Howard stop would have had to take place almost a century after the station was built and almost half a century after the CTA took it over. Considering the only station renovations to Howard occurred in 1921 and from 2006 to 2009, it does not appear likely that the tracks and the station was structurally intended to keep blacks out of Evanston.

b. The Purple Line Express

In 1949, the CTA established the Purple Line as a massive reorganization of the north-south rapid transit systems. Skip-stop service was established on June 29th of the same year, along with the closing of 24 pre-existing stations. Local service was limited between the Linden and Howard stations and weekday rush hour service became express. North Side station closures included: Wilson Ave Lower Level, Buena, Grace Clark-Roscoe, Wrightwood, Webster, Halsted, Larrabee, Schiller, Division, Oak and the North Water Terminal, and Ravenswood on the Ravenswood branch. South Side station closures included: the State-Congress terminal, Congress-Wabash, Roosevelt Rd. L station, 18th, 26th, 29th, 31st, 33rd, Pershing Rd. Princeton and Parnell on Englewood branch.46 Walter J. McCarter publicly declared that reductions in wait time would range up to three minutes, benefitting 95% of riders.47
There is an assertion that the Purple Line express intentionally skips all stops in primarily black or racially mixed neighborhoods, making its first stop at the relatively white and affluent Belmont. In the modern day, stops are beginning to be selectively added along the Purple Express line. It has been argued that these additions correlate with patterns of gentrification in uptown neighborhoods, such as the new express stop at the newly renovated Wilson station.

The Skip-Stop service was initially recommended on December 7th, 1948, but drew substantial controversy. Described by board members as “the most sweeping change yet made by the authority,” the reorganization was accompanied by CTA plans to substitute with continuous shuttle service for the 15 stations and service to Evanston and Wilmette stations during non-rush hours. The CTA Service Committee faced seven months of public hearings, at which many residents voiced protest at the closing of the 24 ‘L’ stops. Two specifically focused on closings between Wilson and Armitage Avenues. Each with 125 attendees, the hearings consisted of CTA arguments asserting that growth prospects looked grim and that “more passengers are inconvenienced by trains stopping at these stations than are conversed...more cars stop than passengers are picked up.” Residents in attendance, primarily of the Wilson-Armitage area, protested that they faced discrimination for the benefit of passengers who resided north of Wilson Ave. They argued that the change would be incomparable to the earlier, successful project at Lake Street “because the Lake St. area is serviced by street car and bus service running parallel and near to the “L” and that surface transportation under this proposal was inadequate,” (this project is visible in Map 3). Chicago residents pleaded that the closing of stations would reduce property values, inconvenience Illinois Masonic Hospital visitors, hurt local businesses near the stations, and extend blighted areas of the city. Groups represented included Alderman Young of the 46th district, Superintendent of Illinois Masonic Hospital William H. Tenney, city...
engineer Thomas E. Flanigan, and representatives of DePaul University, the Lake View Civic association, and the Lake View Kiwanis club.\textsuperscript{51}

Map 4 shows all 23 of the 1949 purple line stop closures overlaid with the relevant 1950 ethnic concentrations depicted in Map 1. It appears that stop closures in 1949 did not correspond directly with black neighborhoods at the time, although the only five stops within any close vicinity to the Cabrini-Green Housing Project, started in 1942, were closed. Interestingly enough, areas where more stops were closed showed growth in non-white populations after 1950, especially on the North Side. This growth is visible in Map 5, depicting the percent increase in non-white population between the 1950 and 1960 Census Periods.\textsuperscript{52} This could be due to a decrease in property values after the closing of the stops at a time when whites remained undoubtedly most affluent. Map 6 shows that, in 1965, blacks did not reside in these North Side neighborhoods, as areas of black concentration coincide closely with the areas of late 1950’s Urban Renewal displayed in Map 7. Thus, it is reasonable to see the Purple Line Express 1949 station closures as a motivation to limit black movement from the Cabrini-Green Homes and isolate the area. However, it is relatively difficult to argue that the closings were intended to isolate blacks or exclude Purple Line service from many other black neighborhoods. Further, social and physical isolation of Cabrini-Green occurred because of its neglected structures and high crime rates regardless, so arguments for isolation by the Purple Line may be somewhat weak for even that region as well. The closings may have had an effect on the isolation or growth of other non-white population concentrations along the North Side, although the correlation does not prove causation.

An interview with the CTA’s General Manager of Customer Information Graham Garfield shed light on economic and engineering reasons for these closings. He highlighted that
many stations were closed in the first five to eight years of the CTA’s founding. When the CTA merged the two bankrupt private transit companies, it assumed intense financial and logistical crises, tasked with creating a coherent transit system of a jumble of often duplicate lines. The immediate goals were of modernization and unity, attempting to prioritize economy and better serve the ridership. For the sake of efficiency, leadership prioritized rapid transit for long-haul trips and surface transit for short-haul, often closing stations that served mostly low capacity, short-haul trips, and instituting higher levels of surface and bus service. This data-driven approach overlooked many qualitative issues, but was a product of the CTA’s dire circumstances. Garfield said that while it was “not the end all be all of how to plan a good city…they were inheriting a crisis system. They needed to make fast changes that were going to have a lot of return.”

With regards to later additions of stops to the Purple Line Express, it appears that timing and stops chosen to be reincorporated into the route do correspond with some neighborhood gentrification. Other stop closings occurred in 1976 when additional stops after Howard were eliminated and the Evanston Express ran direct from Howard down to the Loop. Official reasons for this included complaints in service delay. The re-addition of stops initially occurred in January of 1989, when the express train began stopping at Belmont and Fullerton stations to relieve passenger congestion on the Brown Line. It is notable that Lakeview, the neighborhood in which the Belmont station is located, underwent significant gentrification in the mid-1970s, and Fullerton’s Lincoln Park was already considered a relatively well-to-do area. Other than emphasizing these coincidences, however, there is little evidence revealing intentions behind these or more recent additions.
c. The Jackson Park Green Line

The 1996 Closing of the eastern stretch of the South Side Green Line is still well-known for its controversy among community members and activists. Initially, service on the Jackson Park Green Line was suspended in the early 80s after a routine inspection in which it was discovered that the ‘L’ tracks over the Illinois central railroad were structurally deficient. The city decided instead to restore service only to the University stop, publicly intending to re-extend service to Dorchester Avenue. From 1994 to 1996, the entire Green line was closed for repairs, and the fate of its service was once again reevaluated. After reopening the line, the stretch east of Cottage Grove remained closed, and its fate was brought into question by the CTA.

This caused much community contention. Certain South Side community leaders, specifically Bishop Arthur Brazier of the Apostolic Church of God and Reverend Leon Finney Jr. of the Woodlawn organization, openly opposed the re-opening of the line. They argued that ‘L’ presence would “doom 63rd Street to be nothing more than a glorified alley over which that track runs.” Further, they argued that the line contributed to the perception of crime in the neighborhood by darkening the street beneath it, interfering with development and continuing blight in the neighborhood. However, there existed a large community contingent that argued that the destruction of the ‘L’ line would limit redevelopment and community growth. These local residents argued that transportation is the key to the growth of the community, good for business, public amenities, attracting new residents, and political influence.

After a public hearing on March 12th, 1996, it was reported to the Federal Transit Administration by Chicago city officials that 56% of local residents favored demolition. The Chicago Tribune reported that residents opposed to demolition claimed that officials were misrepresenting relevant data, citing fraudulent survey numbers, and ignoring the wishes of the community. It was also asserted by some that demolition was designed to permit Brazier and
his Apolistic Church, at the 63rd and Dorchester stop, to continue purchasing city-owned parcels of land along 63rd street, as both Brazier and Finney were supposedly hoping to suburbanize Woodlawn. The CTA voted to demolish the section of L track in June of 1996. Debate continued after the 1996 vote, and the CTA left the structure intact until September of the same year. The Tribune quoted CTA spokesperson Stephen Mayberry, reporting that the CTA’s decision to demolish this branch of the Green line was primarily based on declining ridership and community support.

As a South Side and predominantly black neighborhood, it is reasonable to argue that Woodlawn residents probably lacked the same level of political clout as more affluent areas with closer political ties to local government. Pre-existing amenities in white neighborhoods could have been a motivation to divert CTA resources elsewhere, to locations with higher ridership levels, although the line had already cost $7 million and had never, ultimately, been opened or used. The roles of Brazier and Finney are also relatively compelling in the context of community power structures, for their social and religious platforms could have been seen as politically influential enough to sustain electoral control in the neighborhood.

The closing of this branch of the Green Line proved only to further isolate the Woodlawn community and stifle local economic growth, a recently revisited topic of discussion in the midst of recent planning around the Obama Presidential Library. The Director of the Center for Economic Policy Analysis Arthur Lyons stated that the agency conducted research that suggested economic benefits of keeping the branch, stating that “it was always our view that it would have helped development in that corridor.” The demolished extension stretch could have allowed for increased access to leisure and labor opportunities for Woodlawn residents, eliminating some spatial mismatch.
Garfield spoke of the closing as one with which media accounts have controlled the primary narrative. Described the issue as “complicated” and “murky,” he asserted that many different accusations came to play regarding background actors and motivations.\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, community rumblings over the L structure dated back to as early as the 1980s. Furthermore, Garfield emphasized that the city (not the CTA) put $2 million of federal funds into renovations of the King and Cottage Grove Stations on 53\textsuperscript{rd} by 1992, and eventually built an expensive extension to Dorchester, reopening the line in 1996. He continued that it was “ill advised to shut down these stations,” for the city had to let value amortize.\textsuperscript{64} Garfield also offered an interesting anecdote about Leon Finney, in which Finney told the Chicago Tribune in an interview that he opposed the line, but did not believe it would be torn down, so he then expressed a desire for the city to invest in it fully.\textsuperscript{65}

Recently, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel has been publicly discussing the possibility of reopening the Green Line. Emanuel reported that his first meeting with President Donald Trump’s senior staff consisted of a push to rebuild the line, including the Garfield station. The Mayor argued that the Green Line would cater to infrastructure build up and interests on both the South and West sides.\textsuperscript{66} It was publicly acknowledged by city press secretary Matt McGrath that the extension would provide increased accessibility to jobs and economic opportunity for the Woodlawn community. He wrote that “rebuilding the Green Line is one way the administration could ‘send in the feds,’ create jobs, and help improve public safety.”\textsuperscript{67} Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this infrastructure issue for the Woodlawn community and the link between tearing down the Green Line and economic opportunity was also considered by the 1996 leadership.
Transportation Design as Neighborhood Boundaries

a. Cabrini-Green Housing and the Brown Line

The Brown Line stretch towards Sedgewick station divides the affluent Gold Coast neighborhood from the infamous Cabrini-Green Federal Housing Project to the west. This is depicted in Map 13, where the brown line is a visible barrier in between both areas who sit level with each other just less than a mile apart, reinforced by the Red line and Purple Express Line. The reason for the divide may come from the Cabrini-Green homes’ unique location, as it was virtually the only of Chicago’s public housing to be situated in an affluent neighborhood, sitting in between the apex of Clybourn Ave and Halsted Street, bordered by North Larrabee, Chicago Avenue, and Hudson Street to the east.

The Brown Line was constructed much earlier than the homes. The Brown Line was constructed in May of 1907 as the Ravenswood branch of the Northwestern Elevated Railroad, serving the main line to Western Avenue. The terminus at Kimball was not completed until December of the same year. A Brown line expansion project was completed in 2010 in which various stations were renovated. First constructed in 1942 and with the last of the buildings finally torn down in 2011, the Cabrini-Green homes are remembered as one of the most violent and infamous public housing projects of all time. Mid- and high- rise apartments totaled over 3,600 units and acted as the home of 15,000 people. Known for gang violence, crime, CHA neglect, and poor infrastructure, partly due to the quality of WWII resources, it would make sense that somehow separating this area from the affluent Gold Coast would be a priority for economic and political reasons, so as to keep wealthier and more politically influential whites more content.

As the Brown Line was constructed earlier, any intentional spatial isolation with regards to the Brown line would have to have been determined by those who chose the location for the
homes. The Chicago Housing Authority, who built and oversaw the homes, is governed by a Board of ten Commissioners, all appointed by the Mayor.\textsuperscript{71} Old machine boss Edward Kelly served as Mayor during the time of early construction, and Richard J. Daley served for the last seven years of building. This provides interesting circumstantial evidence for questionable motivations in the choosing of location, for it is understood that the Democratic Party has a vested interest in preserving public housing projects due to its existence as a Democratic stronghold in whatever ward it is located.\textsuperscript{72} Perhaps Cabrini-Green as a Democratic coalition in the 42\textsuperscript{nd} ward was a motivation for its location? The CHA publicly admitted to the negative health and welfare impacts of public housings when the organization ceased further construction in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{73} This public acknowledgement is interesting, for it shows an awareness of the undesirability of association and location for neighbors. Furthermore, unlike Chicago’s other housing projects, Cabrini-Green cannot be seen from any of the major expressways, arguably implying an existing level of intentional isolation.\textsuperscript{74}

Furthermore, there came to be a machine precedent of using middle class housing as a buffer between public housing and neighboring well-to-do neighborhoods. 1950s Lincoln Park and Gold Coast residents conveyed much worry at the thought of eastern and northern spread of the Cabrini-Green ghettos. In fact, the North-South racial split between Lincoln Park was so severe with blacks and hispanics to the south that North Avenue was often referred to as the area’s ‘Mason-Dixon line.’ As a solution to this vocalized concern, Daley declared the construction of the Clark-LaSalle Redevelopment project and invited bids for middle class housing. The Carl Sandburg village was developed between 1960 and 1974 “unmistakably to insulate Lincoln Park and the Gold Coast,” according to Cohen and Taylor.\textsuperscript{75}
In the Nineteenth Century, the area of the Lower North Side where Cabrini-Green would come to be built was known as ‘Little Hell,’ a well-known Italian ghetto. This gangland neighborhood possessed a crime rate 12 times that of other neighborhoods. Thus, with the expectation of gang activity, crime, and poverty of public housing projects after prior experience, the CHA’s decision to place a new grouping of homes in this area could have been viewed as relatively non-disruptive. Isolation between neighborhoods may have already existed at the time of Cabrini-Green’s location selection as well.

It does appear that the CTA may have adjusted Brown line service to be less accommodating to this area in the years since Cabrini-Green came to be. As aforementioned, the 1949 Purple Line Express Station Closures eliminated the five closest stops to Cabrini-Green to the North. Map 3 of 1939 Transit Lines and Transfer Stations (three years before Cabrini-Green construction) and Map 4 of the 1949 closings (seven years after) depict the existence of these shared Brown, Red, and Purple Line stops along the stretch that falls in between Gold Coast and where Cabrini Green came to be located. In contrast, these lines parallel to Cabrini-Green do not stop along that same stretch today. The only stations that currently serve that specific section are Sedgewick to the north and Merchandise Mart to the south.

The effect of Cabrini-Green has been a complete isolation of the Lower North Side, yet it is unclear how large a role the Brown Line-divide played. By the mid-1980s, the area still did not possess a single supermarket, hospital, department store, or movie theater. Most Chicagoans steered clear of the Cabrini-Green area because of the housing project, but it is reasonable to assume the Brown Line “other side of the tracks” boundary accentuated seclusion, especially with no ‘L’ stops along this stretch.
b. Lack of Rapid Transit on the South and West Sides

The CTA network structure and the Metra Commuter Rail Lines were developed around the central business district, and serving this area in which a massive number of riders needed to travel to and from their work. By 1973, after decentralization and the rise of the automobile, the public transit system still carried out 23.2% of work trips. Northwestern University Transportation Center summarized that the rapid transit system is essentially radial, moving away from the CBD loop and “all sectors of the City are reasonably well covered except the south-west.” This is visible in Map 2, where the official Chicago Transit Authority Route map contrasts municipal Chicago in white with surrounding suburbs in brown. The cropping of the map excludes the bottom section of Chicago proper, as there are no ‘L’ lines reaching farther than the Red Line’s terminus at 95th/Dan Ryan. However, the map depicts immediate suburbs to the north, where the Purple and Yellow Lines extend into Wilmette and Skokie. Thus, there is a relative and blatant lack of rapid transit service to the south-west and south sides of the city. However, one must consider that Transit lines in the south-west side were not established because they would not serve large enough populations traveling to the central business district. Considering the privately-owned birth of the lines, initial route design perhaps catered to rider demand or ability to pay, which would be greater in more northern neighborhoods with populations of higher socioeconomic levels.

Poor transit accessibility in the south and west sides is also exemplified in where stops are located (and not located). For instance, despite the presence of a major research University, the world-class Museum of Science and Industry, Frank Lloyd Wright’s Robie House, and other notable landmarks, the Red line does not have a station in the neighborhood of Hyde Park. If one wishes to ride the Red line, riders must travel far west to the Garfield Station through Washington Park. Stops to the north and south on both the Green and Red lines are 47th street on
the northern border of Hyde Park and 63rd in Woodlawn. There is no ‘L’ station in Hyde Park where riders from poorer surrounding neighborhoods could stop. This could be seen to limit interaction between groups in each community, especially in consideration of high crime rates in Woodlawn and Washington Park and safety concerns at the University of Chicago.

Prior to the South Shore Line’s assumption of passenger service in 1989 by a non-CTA Indiana Commuter Service, a 1979 Transportation Needs Study was conducted to determine if a sociodemographic change required a change to the local transportation network.79 This indicates an acknowledgment of the connection between sociodemographics and areas of travel, places of work, areas in which their work is situated, and transit needs. In South Shore, there are no rapid transit lines running through the neighborhood, but nine CTA buses, as it is common for neighborhoods without nearby ‘L’ lines to have heavy bus service schedules. Most of these bus routes in the South Shore community area transport riders to other rapid transit lines, with three routes serving stops on Dan Ryan rapid transit line and four go to the Jackson Park.80 There is one express bus to the city.81 Eight of these nine buses operate seven days a week, so accessibility appears to be good.82

A South Shore community survey revealed that community members believed that their community was underserved in comparison to other neighborhoods. Interviews with community leaders revealed that they believed there was a lack of service and comfort on the #6 express bus, with an “inadequate service of evenings and weekends, crowding, bunching of buses on route, and unequal distribution of equipment relative to other communities.”83 2950 residents were surveyed about personal problems with modes of transportation, different trip types (work, grocery, and non-grocery), specific destinations, and suggested capital and service improvements most needed.84 It was found that the majority of work locations are outside of the central
business district and South Shore neighborhoods: 41.4% employed in CBD, 8% employed in South Shore, 44% employed elsewhere in Chicago, 6.4% in suburbs.\textsuperscript{85} Most work trips are auto-related, but most work trips downtown are on the CTA rail, bus, or Illinois Central Railroad.\textsuperscript{86} Interestingly, new CTA lines are not an explicit ask from the community. This is perhaps because CTA lines are seen as a more unrealistic ask due to their increased level of permanence, or perhaps because the buses are, in fact, preferred. Instead, most recurrently mentioned transit problems were frequency of service and travel time, safety, parking at transit stations, traffic congestion on buses. However, the most common complaint was most notably improvements in bus service downtown—weekend downtown express, rush hour downtown express service, etc.\textsuperscript{87}

Those on the far south side and sections of the west side appear to have always been located further from transit than Chicagoans in other areas of the city, and are thus, serviced less. It appears that in Mayor Kelly’s original 1937 \textit{Transportation Plan for the City of Chicago}, the recommended plan of adoption, Plan A, acknowledged an underserving of the south-west and deep south sides. This is evident in attached ‘Map 14’ in which it is shows the areas that would be brought into a 35-minute travel zone under Plan A in yellow. Secondly, areas in orange would be brought within the 35-minute travel zone through coordination with suburban railroads. Evidently, the deep South Side does not benefit in either way from the plan, not yellow nor orange on the Map.\textsuperscript{88} As evident in the attached Map 3, the south-west side and southern-most section of Chicago is relatively absent of rapid rail transit lines and Chicago Motor Coach Routes in 1939.\textsuperscript{89} It is also visible in Map 8 that the density of transit routes lies around the loop, north of the loop, and west of the loop in 1951, and that some of the transit provided to the south-west side by the Motor Coach lines in 1939 is no longer there.\textsuperscript{90} It is evident in Map 11 that current south siders and those residing in the Western neighborhoods of Garfield Ridge, Clearing, and
Archer Heights are some of the only populations in the city not located within a half mile of high frequency, around the clock transit. These areas are also less serviced by high frequency full day transit than everywhere else in the city as well, as depicted in Map 12.91

c. The Dan Ryan Expressway

The Dan Ryan Expressway, named after the late President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, Dan Ryan Jr., first opened to the public in 1961 as the first expressway to serve the South Side of the city. Previously, drivers were forced to use Lake Shore Drive, the Chicago Skyway, and other local streets for long distance trips into neighborhoods to the South.92 Known initially as the “South Route,” the route alignment exactly parallels a historic black-white divide along Wentworth Avenue, visible in Maps 7 and 8 depicting the areas of 1865 black residence and 1957 “urban renewal” public housing,” respectively. It follows the border between the 11th and 3rd wards almost exactly until 35th street. The racial divide is marked by the heavily Irish Bridgeport to the west and the predominately black neighborhoods of Bronzeville, Grand Boulevard, and Washington Park to the east.

Bridgeport has been historically characterized by the dynamics of its heavily Irish population and their intense networks of community solidarity and patronage. Part of the Stockyard District, Bridgeport became a magnet for immigrants with massive early waves of Irish and German settlements, followed by influxes of Poles, Slovaks, Czechs, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Jews, Southern whites and blacks.93 The ethnic solidarities are reinforced by numerous religious parishes that sit within neighborhood borders, playing a crucial force in the social and economic health of the community by reinforcing patronage networks and influencing cultural and group attitudes.94 Furthermore, Bridgeport is infamous for its role as a home to many legendary ethnic gangs of Chicago, including Ragen’s Colts and that of Al Capone. As an early bastion of the Democratic Party and Irish South Side, Bridgeport is home to a large number
of local government leaders—Richard J. Daley, Richard M. Daley, Dan Ryan, U.S. Representative John Kluczynski—and has become known as the unofficial “home for Chicago mayors” since 1933. The home in which Richard J. Daley spent his entire life sits at 3526 S. Lowe, and is often still visited as a Chicago landmark and symbol of blue collar strength.

Richard J. Daley’s choice of Bridgeport to draw his political base immediately following his 1955 mayoral election catapulted the community’s role in local political influence. It was asserted that the community was rewarded for its political support, for “city services were excellent during the Daley-Bilandic years. Local government became a large employer during that period...[and] gave local politicians a definite influence with private employers.”

Bronzeville and its immediate neighbors to the south are predominantly black neighborhoods with a history of racial tensions. Initially a heavily white and Irish neighborhood, Washington Park became predominantly black when the WWI extension of the Black Belt led white families to flee. White ethnic neighbors in Bridgeport grew increasingly unsettled, and violence eventually broke out during the infamous 1919 Race Riots when struggles between Irish and Black community residents for control of the Douglas neighborhood to the north came to a boiling point. By 1930, 60% of Chicago’s Black Population lived in these three neighborhoods. By 1950, approximately 175,000 black people lived in these communities in which there were no high rises, leading to incredibly crowded and undesirable living conditions. The concentration of Black populations east of LaSalle and the stretch of Irish to the west are depicted in Map 1 of 1950 ethnic populations in the city.

The Dan Ryan Expressway was coupled with the Robert Taylor Housing Project as a form of public improvement program, as Daley announced the Dan Ryan within a month of City Council’s approval of the homes. In the 1950s, housing surveys began consistently documenting
theses eastern black neighborhoods as “blighted slums” and local politicians reacted strongly. Among its aforementioned redlining policies, the CHA built new high-rise public housing projects, including the infamous Robert Taylor Homes: an island of 28 brick buildings bounded by 39th street, state street, 54th street, and the Rock Island Rail Road. The homes opened in 1960 as a segregated project with 27,000 black residents. It is notable that this decision to locate the massive public housing projects in the Black Belt appears highly intentional by CHA and the local government, for the public housing land costs in Chicago were far higher than most other cities because as much as $2,000 of the cost of each unit was for the location. The 1961 opening of the Dan Ryan Expressway further isolated the homes by paralleling the racial neighborhood divide and further boxing in the grouping of public housing. The concurrence of the construction of the expressway and public housing projects delivered a shocking response to increasing black-white racial tensions, especially in the context of intense neighboring ethnic insularity and patronage networks with inroads to political power.

Who, then, determined the Dan Ryan’s final route alignment, and was this ethnic divide at all a consideration? Finally agreed upon on June 6th, 1956, according to the Chicago Tribune, the final route took years to confirm. Supposedly, Mayor Richard J. Daley was reluctant to accept the Cook County Highway Department design for a widely separated dual elevated highway. It was reported by the Tribune that the county’s original alignment had followed the ICRR railroad tracks near State Street. However, this design needed to be altered so as not to physically interfere with the new Robert Taylor Homes which sat in the way of that alignment. Cohen and Taylor report that the original route crossed the Chicago River almost directly north of Lowe Avenue, Daley’s own street, and the turned east for a few blocks, and then south again. Daley’s realignment “was a less direct route, and it required the road to make two sharp curves
in a short space…” The Tribune also reported that Mayor Daley expressed desire to build rapidly, with intentions to have the contractors work double shifts in order to improve upon the construction times of the other expressways before it. Cohen and Taylor also assert Mayor Daley is responsible for the Dan Ryan’s route, with full awareness and intention of its adherence to the racial boundary. In addition, public documents show that city officials began using the Expressway as a defined border in public documents before the route even opened in 1951, evident in Chicago Land Clearance Commission’s Proposed Re-development Project concerning land to the East.

The Dan Ryan appears to have reinforced an existing pattern, but allowed vastly more accessibility to the south-west side than had previously existed beforehand and much more opportunity and mobility to South Side residents to travel into and across the city. Although the circumstantial findings are strong for political intention behind the route, maps drawn from 1950 census data show suggest that blacks were moving west and south of Bridgeport before the Expressway was constructed. It could be argued that other factors accentuated the Dan Ryan’s divisive effect as well, such as the close-knit nature of the ethnic Bridgeport communities, gang violence, and railyards.

IV-Relationships between local Government, Transit Authority, and the Community

With these case studies in mind, the roles of the government, local political culture, existing ethnic divisions, and various economic, political, and cultural factors considered in route design can be analyzed. When discussing segregation as an independent variable, it is important to identify an agent of such motivations, understanding fully the complexities of planning, execution, and general authority in selecting such transit route alignments.

By Illinois law, the CTA operates as a self-governing, self-regulating governmental agency, operating in many ways like a privately-owned and financed operation. It is subject
only to the one legal requirement that it must provide “modern, attractive and convenient service at actual cost.” Thus, there are no profits of the operation and all excess income must be reinvested in service and capital improvements. First established with no public subsidy, tax breaks, or federal grants, the CTA initially fully met all of its own operating costs, modernizing costs, and bonds repayments with fare box revenue. Private companies could not raise fares or close stations without city council, which led to the fare remaining a nickel from opening into late 1910s, increasing only after legal battle with the city. As a public entity, the CTA could be statutorily independent from city council, although Garfield mentioned that “politically, this may be another question.”

The role of the Transit Authority and the public official must be examined and distinguished. The public official possesses influence over the CTA through Chicago Transit Board appointments. The Mayor of Chicago appoints four of seven members, and the governor of Chicago appoints the other three. Each term is seven years long. There is then a “transit man” General Manager placed in charge of day-to-day operations by the board. Therefore, the Mayor’s office, nor the average public official, cannot exert direct or arbitrary pressure over the CTA to position a route or alter service to satisfy a political agenda. However, it is not illogical to foresee a possibility for indirect pressure and corruption in the form of patronage networks and clientelist governing. For instance, Daley famously maintained close friendship with Illinois Governor Richard B. Ogilvie. Public Officials do also play a major role in concurrent factors involved in the de facto segregation of certain neighborhoods, namely, CHA Housing policies and the creation of isolated public housing projects for black Chicagoans.

Expressways like the Dan Ryan are not governed by the CTA and do operate under direct influence of the mayor and municipal government. Such highway systems do receive Federal
Assistance, such as that given by the Federal Aid Highway Act during the time of the Dan Ryan Expressway’s planning phases in 1956. Highway planning and operating is aided by the Federal Highway Administration.

Milton Pikarsky, the first chairman of the Regional Transit Authority, published observations of the political underpinnings of transit operations that shed light on the role of politicians in CTA and transit decisions. He noted that “the choices as to which priorities will receive consideration and what funding decisions will be made depend on many socioeconomic considerations that the engineer would not have taken into account.” This is not surprising in itself, but possesses relevant implications in its acknowledgement that contextual socioeconomic and political considerations play a factor in transit construction. Furthermore, Pikarsky emphasized the role of consensus-building in voting, for racist policy governing route design may have been difficult to gain support for, especially if one cannot openly publicize it. However, the CHA’s redlining practices and Chicago’s public housing projects demonstrate an ability to successfully circumlocute and re-frame a questionable project or stance. In addition, votes are commonly traded for other goods or favors in patronage networks commonplace to Chicago’s history. Pikarsky mentions that large agencies ideally seek the same goals of the people, but are not always in accordance, as the bureaucracy is often affected by how decisions affect political careers of those involved, personal networks, and voting behavior.

The Purple Line Express and Green Line cases evoke questions of the role of the Federal Transit Administration and public hearings. Public comment can be made at after screening and speaker selection at Board meetings once a month, unless at a hearing held by the CTA Service Committee, often conducted for more controversial issues. The Federal Transit Administration serves to offer financial and technical assistance to local systems. FTA’s involvement in the
Green Line Closure controversy is most likely due to the large investments up for discussion. Pikarsky addresses Federal Authority as well, remarking that complex regulatory limitations, bureaucracy, and allocation of federal funds can often hinder the CTA’s self-government.\textsuperscript{116}

**V-Leadership and Ties to the Machine**

Racism among machine members and proceedings has been well-documented. At a time when southern politicians publicly promoted segregative laws, Daley was much more discreet about his racial preferences, but those close to Daley and his inner circle assert that “behind closed doors...racism was widespread within Daley’s inner circle.”\textsuperscript{117} Dr. Eric Oldberg, president of Chicago Board of Health and eventual friend of Daley’s eventually spoke of the ingrained prejudice he witnessed among those in power in Chicago’s municipal government at the time: “It was automatic; it was born and bred in them to think the same way about everything—including prejudice toward the blacks and things like that.”\textsuperscript{118}

It is additionally important to recognize specific transit leadership with notable connections to the Machine or otherwise. The CTA’s first General Manager, Walter J. McCarter, worked in the same position on the transit system in Cleveland, another city known for segregation design, through housing practice and urban infrastructure.\textsuperscript{119} Michael Cardilli, CTA Chairman from 1982 to 1986, possessed intense ties to the Machine. Activist and Board member under Cardilli, James Charlton, stated that Cardilli "hired hundreds of people, mostly in administration but throughout the system, who knew absolutely nothing about what they're supposed to do."\textsuperscript{120} In addition, Daley’s former law partner William Lynch was appointed to be the general counsel of the Chicago Transit Authority during Daley’s time in office.\textsuperscript{121} Cohen and Taylor cite 1964 studies documenting the large number of patronage employees being supported by Chicago taxpayers, writing that “The Better Government Association charged that more than twenty thousand—or almost 30 percent—of the employees of Chicago’s six main local
government units were outside civil service, and that the vast majority of these were patronage hires.” They explicitly state that many patronage workers of the same vein worked in the Chicago Transit Authority and other organizations with “payrolls the machine had access to.”

The CHA leadership was also almost entirely machine-controlled after certain non-cooperative members were forced out under Mayor Kennelly, revealing the potential for questionable intention behind public housing location and their correspondence with transit boundaries. Elizabeth Wood of the CHA was working intensely towards implementing racial integration in housing until Kennelly appointed William Kean as the new CHA head and worked to restructure the organization to prevent such progress. Wood then publicly accused the board of officially supporting policies of open housing, but “privately issuing instructions thwarting those policies.” She was then fired. After this change in leadership, the CHA became obedient to the city’s dominant political establishment.

**VI-Machine Control of Municipal Services to Neighborhoods**

Loyal wards are supposedly sometimes “rewarded” with superior services for deliverability and political support. It is understood that the machine hands down service decisions to the bureaucracy. They then execute orders “in accordance with a scheme that seeks to wring maximal political advantage from the distribution of finite service resources,” according to the theories of Samuel Kimball and Louis Masotti. This is supported by interviews both researchers conducted with alderman, who spoke of deals cut with higher level administrators for services to the ward each represented in return for votes: “if you want something from the bureaucracy I just tell them there are six voters in that house—get it fixed.” Ticket balancing and the providing of services then reinforces ethnic identification with the machine, producing further support. The Electoral ‘Deliverability’ of each of Chicago’s wards can actually be
measured and used strategically with an assigned score, representing the percentage of voting adults.\textsuperscript{128} For instance, Bridgeport has a 60.3 deliverability score as the 11\textsuperscript{th} ward.

Understanding that Chicago’s diverse populations and 50 wards produce conflicting demands, the machine cannot always accommodate all desires by patronage distribution and materials resources. Instead, leaders must work to balance decisions by appeasing groups that comprise its electoral support while accommodating supporters. This would imply that no ward can be blatantly disregarded or punished.

This system of service reward possesses discriminatory implications with regards to race and socioeconomic status, as conflict between white ethnics and blacks has been both a historical theme in Chicago and recurring issue for the machine.\textsuperscript{129} Considering the machine’s close ties to white ethnics, it has been historically acknowledged that maintaining the Democratic coalition in Chicago necessitated satisfying white ethnic’s desires for cultural dominance, especially in conflicts with other groups. For example, the Democratic voter precinct captain sent out a letter to the 38\textsuperscript{th} ward in 1977, writing “I have property interests in this neighborhood as all of you do. So let’s try to keep this area as nice as it is now,” and asking voters to vote for Mayor Michael Bilandic over black candidate and future mayor Harold Washington.\textsuperscript{130}

\textbf{VII-Municipal Spending and The Political Dynamics of the Allocation of Funds}

A link has been found between urban areas with a strong Irish presence and higher municipal budgets. This includes an increased number of available jobs in municipal government, but is especially true for services like police and fire. Considering the Chicago Irish’s historical prominence and political influence, this link may shed light on municipal spending and allocation decisions within the city, including those related to transportation. Sociologist Terry Clark has found that this pattern is found to hold across all data sets from 1880 to 1968 and the variable of percent of Irish residents is found to be the strongest in many of the
tested expenditure regression models.\textsuperscript{131} Irish populations are found to have access to resources in their large number, Catholicism, social conservatism, a social solidarity reinforced by church and democratic party, shared English language, and a clear ethic of non-ideological particularism, a tendency to treat people in terms of personal characteristics and continuing social acts orientated towards completing the job at hand.\textsuperscript{132} Irish political leaders have been found to govern with heavy “patronage politics” and use of separable goods, resources allocable to distinct individuals and social sectors: favors, votes, government jobs. This is true in the history of Chicago’s Political Machine and its large Irish populations, heavily centralized in Bridgeport. Daley was infamous for trading favors like government jobs, zoning variances, and government contracts for continued financial and electoral support, his authority constantly reinforced by his network of personal contacts structured by his neighborhood, his parish, and the Democratic party. The same study confirmed that the evidence does not support a Downsean application to this association between Irish and municipal spending, for Irish citizens do not necessarily favor spending more than any other citizens.\textsuperscript{133}

Does the city of Chicago spend more municipal resources on certain neighborhoods and for certain populations? The notable in-group preference for Irish communities could imply preferred allocations and special treatment to these groups of residents and the neighborhoods in which they live, i.e. Bridgeport’s separation from “blighted” disproportionately black neighborhoods to the east as in the Dan Ryan case study. Kenneth Mladenka’s 1943 research revealed that machine decisions about resource distribution were made upon technical-rational criteria rather than political criteria. Although economic vitality of Chicago may depend on pleasing middle and upper classes with higher levels of service, so as to prevent “white flight,” resource allocation was found to be little influenced by electoral outcomes, income levels, or the
racial composition of a given neighborhood.\textsuperscript{134} Thus, there is weak support for the assertion that the “political machine in Chicago plays a significant role in the distribution of public services” or that urban services are used to reward loyal supporters (voters) or specific groups over others.\textsuperscript{135} This is reasonable considering the strong incentives of public administrators to avoid conflict.\textsuperscript{136} Analyzing parks and rec services, fire protection, refuse collection, education, and government response to individual demands for service across Chicago’s 50 wards, the relationships between income, racial, and electoral characteristics and spending did not appear discriminatory. Park acreage was equally distributed throughout the city, although parks located in white and wealthy neighborhood were favored in terms of facilities.\textsuperscript{137} Black and lower income neighborhoods were actually closer to fire stations than whiter and more affluent neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{138} Refuse collection was the only major service linked to ward structure of the city government, and the only service with significantly fewer trucks assigned to black wards and the fewest assigned to welfare wards.

It must be acknowledged that transportation as a municipal expenditure is fundamentally different in nature than parks and rec services, fire, education, and the other analyzed services. Transportation is a much more permanent system, only altered with massive investment and construction, excluding the rerouting of buses. However, municipal spending for transit may be measured in the frequency of service, maintenance, cleanliness, and specific improvement projects. However, the role of the political machine in transportation decisions cannot be studied in this same way with consideration to transportation routes as a mechanism to limit movement or act as neighborhood boundaries. One could really only look at accessibility or precedent. There may be slightly more national precedent for highways as boundaries and as a means of allocation within American cities like the Dan Ryan, exemplified by the the Cross-Bronx in New
York city that bisected the Bronx neighborhoods and caused mass migrations of non-poor families.  

**VIII-Accessibility**

By measure of accessibility, Chicago public transit as a whole (including bus routes), does not appear to underserve any specific neighborhood, racial group, or socioeconomic class. The Center for Neighborhood Technology’s research indicates that 99.8% of low-income (less than $50,000/year) populations live within ½ mile of Chicago transit.  

68% of the minority population resides within a ½ mile of some transit stop, relative to 32% of whites, perhaps reflecting mid-twentieth century white flight amongst suburbanization growth. Maps 9 and 10 display this accessibility reach. As aforementioned in the ‘Lack of Rapid Transit Service to the South West Side’ Case Study, the south-west side is one of the only areas relatively underserved in terms of high frequency full day and around the clock transit, depicted in Maps 11 and 12.

The problem of spatial mismatch, or distance from work, has often been discussed in the context of urban inequality and transportation. Sociologists have long attributed a long commute and separation from labor opportunity to socioeconomic inequality on the South Side, and specifically to more isolated and poorer black neighborhoods. A 1988 Urban Poor and Family Life Survey found that blacks saw a clear spatial mismatch of jobs, not from South Side to other areas in the city, but to the suburbs where they saw increased work opportunities. As the survey found that only 28% of participating jobless individuals had access to an automobile, and only 18% in the South Side ghetto that was surveyed, transit appears to play a greater role in black South Side communities where unemployment is higher. It was expressed by those interviewed, however, that accessibility was not the main problem, but instead time and travel expense. One participant said that “the bus go out there but you don’t want to catch the bus out there, going two hours each way…then when wintertime come you be in trouble.” It has not
been cost effective for many inner city dwellers to commute to the suburbs, and South Side blacks also used to face much racial harassment in the white suburbs as yet another deterrent.\textsuperscript{144}

\textbf{IX-Psychological and Emotional Perspectives}

Adequate consideration should also be given to the qualitative experiences of using mass transit for residents of the different neighborhoods discussed in the case studies, dependent on transit design and locations. The limitations of movement and creation of boundaries by transit have certainly contributed to the way that residents think and feel of their own neighborhoods, individually and in relation to others. Transit as boundaries may certainly cause residents’ to a neighborhood as more isolated. While physical accessibility to transit may be good, true accessibility and value of transit may have depreciated overtime due to psychological and experiential barriers caused by transit design that limits movement, crime, varying degrees of maintenance, different frequencies of service schedules, and selective allocation of new equipment.

Varying degrees of service allocation play a large role in how riders view their own mobility via transit. If a neighborhood is less serviced than another, riders may regard it as a non-priority by the city. For example, from the Jackson stop on the Red Line, there are significantly more trains going south towards 95\textsuperscript{th}/Dan Ryan on weekday mornings than north from there, and significantly more going north in the afternoons. This is consistent with work trip service to the North, but not the South Side, potentially due to ridership levels.\textsuperscript{145} If certain stations are old and neglected in terms of maintenance, there is a decreased sense of security for riders, as well as a lesser sense of the station as a valid public place. Mayor Richard M. Daley proved savvy about renovating specific South Side ‘L’ stretches to improve legitimacy and efficiency, working with alderwoman Dorothy Tillman to renovate parts of the Green Line in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} ward in 2007. This
decreased the need to process risk when traveling to work for community members, validating that their cares were worthy of resources, arguably part of a 1990s shift in attitudes.

**X-Economic motivations in Route Design**

It is crucial for a true understanding of the proposed issue to understand alternate economic and technical reasons for CTA route design. Ridership levels have always been a consideration, for lack of rapid transit on the south-west and far south sides could be explained by higher ridership levels in the north, although lower socioeconomic levels on the South Side prompt increased use of public transit for work trips. Medium and high density corridors are often prioritized, for evident reasons. Financial viability also remains a major motivating factor, especially considering historic CTA financial struggles and reliance on major Federal Grants and tax relief programs, with rider fare only covering about 50% of costs. Concerted efforts to improve transit popularity may explain some design decisions as well, for increased service and speed were among the listed goals of the 1949 Closing of Purple Line Stations and the introduction of Skip-Stop service.\(^{146}\) Finally, for a new line to be constructed there must be political support. The CTA will not spend millions of dollars building through an area that does not want it, such as more recent experiences with the Yellow and Orange Lines.\(^{147}\)

Considering that the divide between the suburbs and the city can be seen very much as a racial divide, 1960s suburbanization and white flight proved to be a motivating factor in route design considerations as well. Accommodations for white suburbanite work trips proved important for the economic wellbeing of the business district and more easily met with affluent, paying customers. In addition, a consequential population drop created an incentive for local leaders to favor affluent residents in the hopes of keeping them in the city, as well as one to keep close connection to the suburbs. Thus, the Northern Edens Expressway was the first to be built, prioritizing northern and western suburbanites before accommodating South Siders with the
South Route. As whites and white ethnics often proved central to the economic vitality of the city due to historically higher socioeconomic status, the city has been known to prioritize their interests for economic reasons as well as political ones.

**XI-Conclusion**

After concluding research, it is argued that the layout of the public transportation system in Chicago is in part a dependent variable of pre-existing spatial organization among ethnic and socioeconomic groups in neighborhoods, for such social and economic factors affect ridership, economic incentive for service, and natural neighborhood boundaries. It appears that the public transit system contributed to a general isolation of Black Chicago, especially a clear separation between the black South Side and the rest of the city. Many surveys have shown that large percentages of South Side blacks who grew up in poorer and more segregated neighborhoods had never ventured into the neighboring Loop, nor even outside of their own neighborhoods. This does not appear to be due to lack of transit accessibility. Further, even CTA routes that can be seen to act as neighborhood boundaries also often provide increased accessibility for the neighborhoods it sets up unofficial limits around. However, this isolation appears to be caused instead by a general isolation of black neighborhoods, caused by many factors including public housing locations, poverty concentrations, crime rates, lack of transit reach, and transit as boundaries, among others. As Cohen and Taylor write, the distance between the Black Belt and the rest of the city is “psychological as well as physical” (189).

Political motivations can play an overarching role in the spatial organization of the public transit system, although these are often dependent on timing of construction due to inflexibility and relative permanence. Granted, the Chicago machine did have much control through most of the twentieth century in determining extensions, additions, and closings, although not original routes. The transit system does not appear to favor certain groups over others through service and
accessibility, with the exceptions of highway projects catering to suburban working whites. The Machine does not appear to reward or punish different groups and neighborhoods with the distribution of municipal services, although electoral support can often be a major consideration.

With regards to segregation as an independent variable, it appears that certain ill-intended political and racial motives could have been at play in certain transit design, especially when considering the role of the political machine and pre-existing racial tensions. However, most evidence is circumstantial at best, if not coincidental. This is hardly surprising, as any ill-intended individuals would have been most likely to be cautious in putting anything in writing. Ultimately, anecdotal evidence, clear patterns revealed in the analysis of maps, and historical knowledge of racial controversies surrounding the Chicago machine can only shed light on potential intention, rather than prove specific motivation. Considering the nature of the birth of the CTA as an organization of consolidated transit lines, already designed, the neighborhood growth and design decisions around existing CTA routes (public housing, highways, additions or lack of, etc.) appear much more damning with regards to isolation and intention.

It appears that the proposed hypothesis is partially correct. After looking closer at the case studies of “Transportation to Limit Movement,” these assertions appear relatively fragile, as the timelines are not completely sound and most coincidences can be explained by economic or other justifications. However, after delving into core controversies of the machine, especially Daley’s infrastructural overhaul and asserted racial attitudes, it is reasonable to assert that some of Chicago Transit and highway routes could have been designed with social and political intentions regarding the isolation of low-income blacks, especially those in the far South side and the State Street Corridor. Further, the Brown line was not constructed as a barrier, but later unofficially used in this way to insulate the Gold Coast and Lincoln Park neighborhoods from
bordering black populations, as well as crime and blight created by the construction and isolation of blacks in the public housing project. Thus, Chicago public transit has played a role in the perpetuation of segregation by limiting interactions between different groups, less through physical divides and more so through the creation of psychological ones.

There are many opportunities for further study on this topic. Building upon Mladenka’s research on the connection between municipal spending by the machine and certain wards (by race, machine support, socioeconomic status, etc.), one could attempt to measure the correlation between municipal spending by the machine for transit in various locations. This would necessitate considerations of the relative permanence of many transit projects and the lack of flexibility in terms of construction, although measures like service, maintenance, and distance could be more comparatively measured. Additionally, one could further emphasize personal experience of individuals in various neighborhoods discussed in the presented research. Current residents of neighborhoods of interest like Bronzeville, Bridgeport, Evanston, Rogers Park, the far South Side, and the South-West Side could be asked of personal interactions and struggles with public transit, in addition to how they feel public transit has shaped their neighborhoods. I believe that supplementing this historical and geographical research with more emotional and cultural perspective could shed even more light on the intention and true impact of transit on the racial, cultural, and spatial evolution of the city. Finally, it may be interesting to expand the scope of this research to include Latino populations in Chicago, looking at cases in which mass transit has disrupted their movement or bounded neighborhoods. For instance, one could analyze the 1950s construction of the Kennedy Expressway and its splitting of the Puerto Rican population in Wicker Park or the Orange and Pink Lines as supposed boundaries between Latino middle class areas and incoming whites. It would be interesting to observe the same dynamics
between city, CTA, and community when a different ethnic group is surveyed. Perhaps various attitudes of leadership, a different narrative of evolving ethnic tensions, and differing rates of deliverability and political relationships would add new color to the understanding of the motivation and effect of transit presented here. Perhaps, this broader analysis would add more nuance to the way the role of transit in black-white relations and neighborhood segregation is read, accounting for additional history and community perspective.
XII-Appendix

Map 1-Community Settlement Map for 1950

Map 4-1949 Stop Closures Plotted
Map 6- Areas of Black Residence in 1965

Map 7-Urban Renewal Projects

Map 9- Current Number of households within a half mile of transit with income less than $25,000

“Number of households within a half mile of transit with income less than $25,000.” All Transit. https://alltransit.cnt.org/gap-finder/.
Map 10-Current Number of households within a half mile of transit

“Number of households within a half mile of transit.” All Transit. https://alltransit.cnt.org/gap-finder/.
Map 11- Current Number of People Residing within a Half Mile of High Frequency around the Clock Transit

"Number of People Residing within a Half Mile of High Frequency around the Clock Transit." All Transit. https://alltransit.cnt.org/gap-finder/.
"Number of Households within a Half Mile of High Frequency Full Day Transit." All Transit. https://alltransit.cnt.org/gap-finder/.
Map 13-The Brown Line in Relation to the Gold Coast and Cabrini Green Areas
Map 14-Increase in Present Area and Population Within 35 Minute Travel Zone Under Proposed Plan “A”
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EDUCATION

The University of Chicago
Bachelor of Arts in Law, Letters & Society
Certificate in Chicago Studies
Cumulative GPA: 3.86/4.00
University Merit Scholarship Recipient, Dean’s Merit Scholarship Recipient, Delta Gamma Foundation, Eta Zeta Chapter Merit Scholarship Recipient, Dean’s List 2014-2015, 2015-2016, 2016-2017
Chicago, IL

University of Chicago Center in Paris
European Civilization Program, French Language study
Paris, France

North Shore Country Day School
Diploma, GPA: 4.05/4.00
Winnetka, IL
Jun. 2014

WORK EXPERIENCE

University of Chicago Hospital Department of Surgery (Trauma & Acute Care Surgery)
Administrative Assistant
Chicago, IL
Sep. 2017-Present
- Execute and support various projects for Trauma Team recruitment, data entry, and office management
- Work with Trauma surgeons to coordinate various clinic, ICU, and other call schedules
- Initiate routine and non-routine correspondence and other written materials

Workday
Corporate Sales Development Intern
Salt Lake City, UT
- Collaborated with managers and team members to effectively prospect into 3,000 potential customers
- Developed sales opportunities and arranged meetings with key decision makers (via roughly 300 calls and emails weekly)
- Generated pipeline and provided support for CSD representatives in the Healthcare and Financial Services Industries

Associate Financial Sales Intern
Chicago, IL
Jun. 2015-Sep. 2015
- Analyzed customer data to present predictions for software upgrades and optimal pursuit of accounts
- Assisted with Workday Financials Overview Presentations
- Created multiple Value Management Hypothesis Presentations for Sales Representatives to pitch to clients
- Assisted in account information retrieval and proposal creations

University of Chicago Panhellenic Council
Panhellenic Recruitment Director
Chicago, IL
Nov. 2016-Present
- Organized, directed, and executed 60 individual 30-60 minute events for ~250 women and 480 affiliated members over four days
- Led an executive team of 5 and 20 more in individual recruitment counselor groups
- Served on the Panhellenic executive board representing 700+ women to manage University relations and govern campus activities

Delta Gamma Fraternity
Vice President of Membership, Director of Social Activities
Chicago, IL
- Planned, led, and coordinated ~15 individual 30-60 minute events for 250 incoming women and 120 affiliated members
- Served on the organization’s executive board to help coordinate logistics and lead weekly activities for 140 women

Highland Park City Council
Student Commissioner, Historical Preservation Commission
Highland Park, IL
- Worked side-by-side with city planners and city council representatives to analyze city codes and plan community events
- Attended monthly committee meetings to hear and rule on citizen proposals and appeals regarding to the demolition and renovation of local buildings and homes

LEADERSHIP ACTIVITIES

University of Chicago Senior Class Gift 2018
Committee Member
Chicago, IL
Oct. 2017-Present
- One of approximately 50 students of the 2018 College class to be nominated by peers for active involvement on campus
- Execute outreach to fellow class of 2018 students to reach a goal of 1,050 donors and meet alumni pledge benchmarks
- Serve on the Events Committee to plan and help execute outreach and senior class events

Seeds of Justice
Student Cohort Member
Chicago, IL
- Accepted into selective first year program through the University of Chicago Service Center composed of 20 students that centers on studying and visiting sites of social justice issues in various Chicago Neighborhoods

SKILLS & INTERESTS

- Technology: Proficient in Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint), Salesforce CRM, Workday Overviews, InsideSales; Basic in R/RStudio, Adobe Photoshop, Marketo
- Interests: Local History, Urban Policy, Writing, Hiking
- Language: Conversational in French, Basic in Mandarin