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Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Rwanda and Burundi

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Abstract

Why do some post-conflict states achieve stability and economic growth while others remain poor and unstable? Rwanda and Burundi, two neighboring states, experienced similar colonial histories, ethnic tensions, civil wars, genocides, cultures, and pre-civil war poverty. Prior to the end of their most recent civil wars, the two states seemed to be on similar trajectories. Yet Rwanda has achieved incredible success in implementing stability, economic development, and poverty alleviation in their post-war period under President Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front while Burundi has remained unstable and poor under its power-sharing agreement following the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi that ended its civil war. By comparing public administration, economic, and civil society reforms in both states, this paper argues that the centralization of power in President Kagame as well as the complete removal from political institutions of the Hutu regime that instigated the Rwandan Genocide has allowed Rwanda to institute reforms that have not be possible in Burundi, due to rent-seeking encouraged by the power-sharing agreement implemented there.

Introduction

Why are some post-conflict states able to gain stability and obtain and maintain economic growth and poverty alleviation while others fail? Post-conflict states often remain unstable, poor, and weak even after the fighting has ended. This increases the likelihood that conflict breaks out again and leaves most of the population with a low quality of life. Additionally, weak states have a negative impact on other states in the region, with issues including refugee populations, disruption of trade, and terrorist organizations affecting the stability of neighbors. Furthermore, the potential for terrorist organizations to appear and operate in weak post-conflict states poses a
threat to even far-off states. By examining the causes and solutions to instability after conflict, these risks can be minimized in the future.

There have been some states and autonomous zones, such as Rwanda, Kurdistan, and Somaliland have had some success in these aims, while other states, such as Burundi and Iraq have failed on all accounts and still others, such as Cuba, have achieved relative stability but neither sustained economic growth or poverty alleviation. Using the case study of Rwanda and Burundi, I hope to show why Rwanda has managed to achieve stability, economic development, and poverty alleviation, while Burundi has struggled across all three measures.

The specific case of Rwanda and Burundi provides a unique opportunity to isolate variables affecting the different outcomes in each state. Both states share much in common in terms of geography and culture. Both states suffered similar conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis, and both suffered a genocide committed against Tutsis. Yet Rwanda has achieved much higher rates of stability, economic development, and poverty alleviation than Burundi. Furthermore, ethnic tensions and violence have continued in Burundi while they are largely absent in Rwanda. By examining what differences in post-conflict reconstruction have led to these different outcomes, it can perhaps glean information for policy decisions that can be applied to other post-conflict states.

The most obvious difference between the two in the post-conflict period is the manner in which the civil wars ended. The Rwandan Civil War ended with a sole victor who was able to centralize power, while Burundi’s civil war ended with a power-sharing agreement and a government in which power is divided between Hutu and Tutsis. This paper argues that the centralization of power has allowed Rwanda to pass reforms allowing for economic development, while the power-sharing agreement in Burundi has encouraged rent-seeking which
has prevented economic growth and stability. To test this hypothesis, I will examine public administration, economic policies, and policies aimed at reducing ethnic tensions and increasing trust in both states to see if the centralization of power in Rwanda has allowed more flexibility in instituting reforms while power-sharing in Burundi has prevented those same reforms.

**Literature Review**

There are three primary models that have been proposed (with various versions of each): the economic model, the state-centric model, and civil society model (Kage 2010). The most basic version of the economic model is that states with more economic resources will have a faster and better recovery (Kage, 2010). More complex versions of the economic model focus on economic reform, such as Inglehart and Wetzel (2009), who argue that modernization and export-oriented strategies bring about economic development and poverty alleviation. The most common state-centric models is democratization. Olson (1993) argues that authoritarian regimes always have a short-term interest in reaping benefits for themselves, which prevents long-term growth, while democracies which respect human rights have the ability to focus on long-term goals that allow for sustained economic development (Olson, 1993). While Olson does not specifically address post-conflict societies, their argument forms the backbone of democratization arguments in the post-conflict literature.

I argue that these models not only fail to create stability and economic growth in post-conflict states, but, as pointed out by North, Wallis, Webb, and Weingast (2007), democracy and economic reforms that are useful elsewhere, such as liberal market reform, are inhibited in limited access orders (LAOs) (which includes post-conflict states), in which rent-seeking provides incentives for powerful actors to remain peaceful, as violence risks them losing their
rent. Competition, markets, and democracy, however, threaten rent-seeking, which can cause these actors to sabotage reforms or even resume violence in order to protect their interests (2007). As such these models, at least on their own, make stability more difficult to achieve. However, this rent-seeking also cannot be ignored, as noted by Englebert and Tull (2008), who argue that in many post-conflict African states (including Burundi) “the prize of politics remains the failed state itself, now made even more attractive by the rents from reconstruction, the former incumbents and rebels have no incentive to engage in real reconstruction and some incentives to sabotage the process” (124).

The civil society model, as introduced by Kage, posits that post-conflict states with a stronger civil society connected by weak ties will have a faster reconstruction when combined with economic resources (2010). While Kage argues that her model will work in any post-conflict society, she bases her argument in Japan, a state with high levels of trust and little ethnic tension; therefore, I argue that this model will fail to translate to states such as Rwanda and Burundi, as weak ties break down when there is a lack of trust between actors (2010).

**Historical Context**

*Colonial legacies in Rwanda and Burundi*

Rwanda and Burundi both came under colonization as part of German East Africa in 1894 (Uvin 1999, 255). Prior to colonization, each region had a monarchy, which was allowed to remain as part of the German policy of indirect rule (255). After the first World War, the Treaty of Versailles assigned Rwanda and Burundi to Belgium, who combined them into the colony of Ruanda-Urundi (United Nations, 2021). Both the Germans and Belgians separated the people of Rwanda and Burundi into the Tutsis (which included the king of Rwanda) and the Hutus,
developing a system in which the Tutsis acted as a ruling class in order to control the majority Hutu population (it is debatable whether or not these groups were salient prior to colonization as separate ethnicities or if they were simply different stratifications of socioeconomic status that the colonizers turned into ethnic groups, but either way this distinction was codified and enforced by both the Belgians and Germans) (Uvin 1999, 254). While the precolonial kingdoms included Hutus in the governing system, the Belgians completely subjugated them under the Tutsis, causing many Hutus to resent the Tutsi (United Nations, 2021).

_Rwanda in the post-colonial period_

Rwanda gained its independence from Belgium in 1962, a year after the Tutsi Monarchy was overthrown by Hutu (Uvin 1999, 256). Violence between the Tutsi and Hutu had already begun prior to independence, with Hutu activists killing Tutsi, causing between 140,000-250,000 people to flee to neighboring states (256). In 1973, Juvénal Habyarimana took power in a military coup (United Nations, 2021). During his regime, there were some 480,000 Rwandan refugees (mostly Tutsi) in neighboring states who Habyarimana refused to take in (United Nations, 2021). In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel group comprised of Tutsi refugees invaded Rwanda from Uganda, sparking the Rwandan Civil War (United Nations, 2021). Habyarimana and the RPF agreed to a ceasefire in 1993, but this ended in 1994 when a plane carrying Habyarimana and the Burundian president was shot down, killing both presidents (United Nations, 2021). This served as the catalyst for the Rwandan genocide, during which between 800,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsi were killed over the course of around 100 days (United Nations, 2021). During this period, the Hutu government used radio to spread messages of hate against Tutsi, causing Hutu civilians to turn on their neighbors (United Nations, 2021). The
genocide only ended when the RPF took complete control of Rwanda in July of 1994, causing the Hutu government and its supporters to flee to nearby Zaire where they formed armed groups (United Nations, 2021).

**Burundi in the post-colonial period**

Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in 1962, though its monarchy remained intact, helped by the fact that Prince Louis Rwagasore and his party won elections both before and after independence. The prince was soon killed by opposition though, causing his party to fall apart (though the monarchy still remained after his death) (Uvin 1999, 256). Two groups of Tutsis, the Tutsi-Hima and the Tutsi-Banyaruguru (which included the monarchy), as well as a small Hutu elite began competing for political power in Burundi after the assassination of Rwagasore (256). In 1966, Michel Micombero, a Tutsi-Hima, launched a successful coup and monopolized power under a military dictatorship, which excluded Hutu and other Tutsi from political power, using the military when necessary to keep his power and privileges (256).

Civil war broke out in 1972, as Micombero sent the Tutsi-controlled army to a southern province of the state in response to a Hutu rebellion (258). During this time, the Tutsi military killed between 100,000-150,000 Hutus (almost all of whom were educated-teachers, nurses, and administrators) and 150,000 more Hutus fled (258). 2 successive Tutsi-Hima military regimes occurred after Micombero: Bagaza, who ruled from 1982-87 and Buyoya, who ruled from 1987-1983 (256-257). After a Hutu farmers killed up to 3,000 Tutsi peasants in 1988, the Tutsi military killed up to 20,000 Hutus (259). After this, Buyoya formed a “government of national unity…formed with twelve Hutu and twelve Tutsi ministers, including a Hutu prime minister,” though “the functions of president of the republic, president of Uprona, and minister
of defense, and the departments of justice, interior, police, and the army remained under Tutsi control (261).

In 1990, Buyoya started the process of democratization, with elections occurring in June 1993 which were won by Ichor Ndadaye, a Hutu, who took over as president as Buyoya resigned (262). However, Ndadaye was killed in October 1993 by low-level members of the Tutsi military, starting a new civil war, with a brief reprieve in January 1994 when a new president was chosen (262). However, as in Rwanda, the 1994 shooting down of an airplane containing both the new Burundian president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, and the Rwandan president Habyarimana increased the violence occurring (262). Buyoya retook power in 1996 as the civil war continued, until 2003 when Domitien Ndayizeye - a Hutu under a 3-year power-sharing agreement (BBC 2018). Later in 2003, President Ndayizeye and the main Hutu rebel group, the Forces for Defence of Democracy (FDD) signed a peace agreement, which all but the smaller Hutu rebel group, the Forces for National Liberation (FNL) participated in in 2005 (the FNL later signed a peace agreement in 2009) (BBC 2018).

*Post-conflict period in Rwanda and Burundi*

Burundi and Rwanda were on similar paths prior to their post-conflict periods, but since then Rwanda’s GDP per capita has continued to rise at a fast pace, while Burundi’s has barely returned to pre-war levels of GDP per capita, as can be seen in figure 1. Burundi’s GDP growth has remained low due to ongoing political instability (Nkurunziza 2015). Following the end of the civil war, a power sharing agreement between the various factions was ratified in the form of a democratic constitution. Under this, it was agreed that 60% of the legislature would be comprised of Hutu representatives and the remaining 40% comprised of Tutsi (with 3 separate
seats reserved for Twa) (Burundi’s Constitution of 2005, Article 164). The presidency was occupied by Pierre Nkurunziza, a Hutu and former leader of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), who controversially remained in power from 2005 to his death in 2020 (his announcement to run for a third unconstitutional term in 2015 led to major unrest and violence, a failed coup, and tens of thousands of people fleeing Burundi) (BBC 2018). Even with the end of the civil war, ethnic violence continued by both the government and non-state actors (though Janvier Nkurunziza points out that this violence is often political in nature, as various political parties when in power have been known to target members of opposition parties of the same ethnicity in addition to those of the opposite ethnicity) (Nkurunziza 2015).

![GDP Per Capita in Rwanda and Burundi](image)

**Figure 1**

*Source: Data from World Bank World Development Indicators (2020)*
Janvier Nkurunziza ascribes two major factors to this instability: “a zero-sum neopatrimonial system of governance which conflates public and private affairs, using political resources to access economic resources” in which “the leadership captures the state and the economy to benefit small elites at the expense of the population at large” and “grievances of the victims of unpunished repressions and crimes committed by the state to safeguard the interests of the governing elites; they eventually led to revolts which were in turn repressed with overwhelming violence, creating even more grievances” (Nkurunziza 2015, 2). Furthermore, most post-conflict societies experience a “peace dividend” in which they experience very high rates of economic growth due to the low starting base; however, the average rate of GDP growth in Burundi from 2004-2013 was 4.1%, compared to 9.8% in Rwanda from 1995-2013 (13). Furthermore, foreign donors have been reluctant to provide Burundi with aid due to rising corruption, thus further limiting the potential for economic growth (17).

Rwanda, on the other hand, has fared incredibly well in the post-conflict period. Following the end of the war and the complete ousting of the former Hutu government, the RPF took over control of the government with Kagame as its head (though he did not become President until 2000, he still acted as the de facto leader as Vice President and Minister of Defense from 1994-2000). Kagame began rebuilding Rwanda’s political institutions while instituting massive reforms that aimed at reducing corruption, poverty, and ethnic tensions while promoting economic growth, reconciliation, and a united Rwandan identity. “As a result of extensive economic and governance reform measures, taken between 1995 and 2008, annual GDP growth averaged over 8.6 percent. By 2005, the proportion of poor people had declined to 57 percent of the population” (IDA 2009, 2). Furthermore, by 1998 Rwanda’s GDP had already recovered to its pre-1994 levels (2). Rwanda has also seen relatively little ethnic violence since
the end of the civil war within its borders, though Kagame has backed rebel militias and has forces in the DRC to combat the former Hutu forces (these forces have been known to target civilian populations in the DRC) (United Nations, 2021). This is not to say all has been well, as political repression still remains an issue, with opponents of Kagame, as well as those who discuss tribe and ethnicity too openly find themselves facing imprisonment ((Jones and Murray 2018).

**Argument**

As can be seen by looking at the history of these two states, they have far more in common than they do differences, this being reinforced even more strongly by their intertwined histories, having been part of a common colony and with violence and refugees pouring across both borders into one another. Yet they have widely diverged in their post-war period. Looking at what differences may have caused this divergence, the biggest difference is how their respective civil wars ended. Burundi’s civil war ended with a power sharing agreement, in which various roles were given to powerful actors, each being able to appoint political bureaucrats with those loyal to them, and with the previous governing group still holding some of the power in the aftermath. Due to this, Burundi still suffers from the problems of LAO’s, as any threat to rent-seeking risks a return to violence, thus preventing the same political and economic reforms (discussed below) that have occurred in Rwanda to happen in Burundi. Additionally, the previous regime, whose institutions were largely based on colonial institutions, still has significant power in Burundi, despite having proved to be incompetent in both eliminating poverty and maintaining peace prior to the civil war. Furthermore, because many of these groups
are based around ethnic identity, they still seek to weaken other actors (at times even resorting to violence again).

The Rwandan Civil war, on the other hand, ended with a clear single victor, the RPF, and involved the previous regime completely fleeing, without maintaining any grip on power within the state. Thus, the RPF was forced to completely rebuild political institutions and was given wide flexibility in doing so, as there were no other powerful actors who could stop them. This was assisted by the fact that the RPF, while have close internal ties in Rwanda during the war, lacked large patronage networks typical of regimes in the Great Lakes Region, thus allowing reforms to be passed without much opposition and placing strong limits on rent-seeking (Jones and Murray 2018, 14). Additionally, the RPF was not merely an armed group attempting to seize power, but rather espoused a “liberation ideology,” intent primarily on liberating Tutsis, both in Rwanda and the diaspora, but also to liberate Rwandan’s broadly from poverty and divisive governance (this should not be confused with communist liberation ideologies, who, although espousing similar goals, operate under a different understanding of economics and history) (15). Furthermore, due to a combination of his effective leadership of the RPF during the civil war and genocide, as well as his successes in governing Rwanda, Kagame is seen as being an “unusually able, committed, and compelling leader,” earning the loyalty of both the military and general populace, meaning that he generally does not need to worry about defections or unpopular decisions resulting in any serious threat to his power (15-16). In fact, Kagame has so centralized both political and financial power in himself (as opposed to spreading power to several individuals, even those under him), that even when high ranking members of the RPF defected or were removed in the late 1990s they were “unable to take resources or loyalty with them with which they could later challenge the state, instead becoming pariahs” (22).
Given that the divergence appears to happen quickly after the Rwandan Civil War, I propose two hypotheses as to how this occurred:

Hypothesis 1: While Burundi’s political transitions have kept many post-colonial institutions in place, the scope and scale of the Rwandan Civil War and Genocide all but destroyed those institutions, allowing for new institutions to be built.

Hypothesis 2: While Burundi’s Civil Wars have ended in power sharing agreements between rival groups, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had complete victory over the Hutu government, allowing more flexibility in creating new institutions as well as limiting or eliminating the common problems of rent-seeking and spoiler effects in LAOs.

Empirics

In order to test these hypotheses, I will first look at whether or not the centralization of power in Kagame and the necessity of building new institutions allowed him to create political reforms that are generally problematic in LAOs. To do this, I will look at reforms in public administration in Rwanda and how it compares to Burundi. Afterwards, I will turn my attention towards alternate explanations in order to test whether or not they have merit. If they do seem to have merit, I will then examine whether or not they are dependent on the centralization of power by Kagame, or if they seem separate from it. If they do seem to be dependent on the centralization of power by Kagame, then the hypotheses will still stand.
Looking at public administration is a useful way at looking at whether or not a state has overcome the problems of LAOs, as civil servant positions are a common form of rents. Thus, one would expect a post-conflict society to have poor public administration, as positions are given based on loyalty and friendship rather than experience and capabilities. Through this I will examine whether or not Rwanda’s public administration has benefitted from his centralization of power compared to Burundi’s power-sharing agreement.

Rwanda’s CPIA quality of public administration rating (which measures on a scale of 1-6, with 6 being the highest quality of administration), was 3.5 from 2005 (when the data dates back to) through 2017 (except in 2010 when it was 4), and has been back to 4 in 2018 and 2019 (the most recent year data was collected), compared to Burundi which has scored 2.5 every year from 2005-2019 (compared to an average of 2.8 for all of Sub Saharan Africa in 2019 (World Bank World Development Indicators 2020). Burundi’s low score is not due to a lack of well-trained civil servants, but rather that “many capable and experienced civil servants are now

<table>
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<td>Governance</td>
<td>Power-sharing</td>
<td>Centralized autocrat</td>
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<td>Public administration</td>
<td>Rent-seeking and patronage due to the necessity of rewarding allies</td>
<td>Meritocracy due to lack of other powerful actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita at end of Civil War</td>
<td>$221.096</td>
<td>$219.637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign aid over first 4 years after end of civil war</td>
<td>$1,822.4 million</td>
<td>$2,101.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reforms</td>
<td>Unable to occur due to threatening rent-seeking</td>
<td>Regime faces no opposition to instituting reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic tensions</td>
<td>Relatively low due to inclusivity and quotas of Hutus and Tutsis</td>
<td>Relatively low due to inclusivity and unified Rwandan Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust toward opposition parties</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No opposition parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2

Public Administration

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unemployed or not in influential positions” (Nkurunziza 2015, 17). This is largely due to the fact that public employment is seen as an important form of rents for rewarding friends and allies, made worse by the fact that following the end of the civil war, many followers of powerful individuals, as well as former rebels, were rewarded for their loyalty by being placed in high-ranking civil servant positions regardless of their capabilities (17).

Public Administration Reforms in Rwanda

Rwanda had an initial benefit in terms of public administration, as a large diaspora returned to Rwanda, many of whom had been trained at elite foreign universities, who the RPF was able to recruit as high-ranking civil servants (with the additional benefit that they lacked strong bases of support in the local population, meaning that they did not pose a threat to Kagame’s power) (Jones and Murray 2018, 15). Additionally, due to their inability to maintain employment or advance, many capable and experienced Burundian civil servants, “engineers, university professors, doctors and others, migrated to Rwanda during the period of heightened tension in Burundi, training a large number of current Rwandan civil servants,” as Rwanda offered well-paying jobs, was welcoming to them, had a similar culture, and was situated geographically near Burundi (Nkurunziza 2015, 17).

In 1998 the Rwanda instituted several reforms to improve public administration including “highly centralised hiring to reduce patronage, centralized and computerised payrolls, a physical civil service census to identify unpaid and ghost workers and taking stock of human resource gaps, and requirements that vacant posts be advertised publicly and with clear qualification requirements” (Jones and Murray 2018, 23-24). Additionally, Rwanda has placed several policies regarding hiring civil servants to ensure they are based on merit, including “‘blind’
marking of tests, video recording of interviews, public posting of failed and successful candidates, and a channel for appeals” (41). Additionally, high ranking officials, as well as several lower positions, are appointments by Kagame himself and (due to the trust he places in them based on their proven capabilities) are given considerable authority to decide how to implement policies as well as innovate to improve them (35). Many such appointments are hard to refuse, meaning that Kagame is able to draw many of the most capable individuals from the private and non-governmental sectors (35). Additionally, in order to ensure that public officials remain competent, Rwanda has invested in data collection infrastructure to monitor the effectiveness of government employees and of the government more generally (38).

Furthermore, while the populace is not truly able to make their voices heard through democratic elections (at least at the national and provincial levels), the government regularly holds public forums in order to receive feedback from individuals, as well as private consultations with private organizations, allowing the government to discover and respond to various issues (38-39). However, it cannot be said that Rwanda fully escapes the problems of LAOs, as Kagame does not just promote those who prove capable: they must also show their loyalty towards him, thus potentially preventing voices from rising who may be more capable (42). However, overall, Rwanda’s high record of public administration has benefitted greatly from the pre-war regime completely vacating institutions as well as Kagame’s centralization of power ensuring that he is not dependent on providing rents to incompetent allies, friends, or other powerful individuals.

**Alternative Explanations**

Looking at the three main alternate explanations, these case studies only lend themselves to testing the economic and civil society models. While researching the democratic model is
important for the literature of post-conflict state reconstruction, these particular case studies are ill-suited to testing it, as neither state is particularly democratic in any real, meaningful sense (at least at the national and provincial levels), and thus cannot be the causal mechanism as to why these two states have had vastly different outcomes.

**Economic Model**

The economic model can be operationalized in two ways. One would be to look at the economic resources both states had during post-war reconstruction, by looking at GDP per capita, as well as aid from foreign states and IGOs. Rwanda’s GDP per capita at the end of the war in 1994 was $219.637 compared to $221.096 in Burundi in 2005 (World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2020). Thus, their starting resources were about equivalent at the beginning of the post-war period, meaning it likely had no impact on their differing trajectories.

| Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$ in millions) |
|---------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Burundi                        | 311.1   | 286.9   | 110.5   | 56.4    | 68.7    | 75.0    | 93.3    | 139.2   | 171.9   | 227.6   | 358.8   | 365.5   | 432.0   | 504.5   | 520.4   |
| Rwanda                         | 711.7   | 694.7   | 465.3   | 229.7   | 350.1   | 373.1   | 321.4   | 304.6   | 359.5   | 335.9   | 491.1   | 572.7   | 605.3   | 780.0   | 935.5   |

Data from database: World Development Indicators

*Figure 3*

Figure 3 shows the total amount of aid received by both Burundi and Rwanda from 1994-2008. As can be seen, Rwanda has consistently received more money than Burundi, a sign that economic resources may be a contributing factor to its success compared to Burundi. However, comparing the first three years following the end of their respective Civil Wars (1995-1997 for Rwanda and 2006-2008 for Burundi), they both received similar amounts of aid, with Burundi having received $1,822.4 million and Rwanda having received $2,101.4 million, with Burundi actually receiving more per year once 2 years had passed from each civil war (around the same time it took for Rwandan’s economy to start taking off). Thus, it seems less likely that aid had a
strong impact on their outcomes. Furthermore, the reason why Rwanda consistently receives more aid each year than Burundi is two-fold: Rwanda has enacted policies that donors prefer and Rwanda has achieved outcomes that donors measure. Therefore, their higher aid has been contingent on them raising GDP and lowering poverty rates, meaning that the potential correlation is possibly one where the causal variable is the economic development and the dependent variable is the aid received. Though this still cannot fully be dismissed as a potential variable in the difference of outcomes, as Rwanda has at times made themselves seem better to donors than they may actually be, such as having the highest representation of women in parliament in the world (at 50%) even though it is a rubber-stamp parliament that simply enacts Kagame’s will, or seemingly putting in place decentralization by allotting large portions of the budget to provinces, even though power is largely centralized in Kagame; thus Rwanda has received more aid than they may have otherwise despite not truly achieving meaningful results.

An additional possibility is that Rwanda’s pillaging of the Democratic Republic of the Congo provided it with the resources needed to increase its GDP per capita. Looking at figure 1, GDP per capita begins to rise at a faster pace around the year 2000. That same year, the price of coltan, one of the minerals Congo has the largest export market for, temporarily skyrocketed (relating to the release of the PlayStation 2, for which coltan was a key component). While it cannot be ruled out that Rwanda did not benefit from this spike due to stolen coltan from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in a similar manner to how colonial powers benefitted from the natural resources of their colonies, it seems unlikely to be the primary difference in the outcomes of Rwanda and Burundi, as Rwanda’s GDP per capita was already on the rise prior to this sudden change in the price of coltan.
The second method of operating the economic model is to look at economic policies. Since my argument is not that economic reforms are not useful for economic growth, but rather that they are often unfeasible in post-conflict societies, I will examine power-sharing agreements in Burundi. If the power-sharing agreements and rent-seeking that occurs through them seem to be a strong obstacle to instituting economic reforms, then it would still hold that the economic model is at best dependent on the centralization of power in Rwanda. If, however, these agreements do not pose a serious impediment to economic reforms, then that leaves the door open for these reforms to be the primary explanatory variable. Additionally, I will examine whether or not the RPF having completely control over Rwanda has allowed them to pass economic reforms by reducing or eliminating rent-seeking.

Burundi’s Economy under Power-Sharing

As has already been discussed above, Burundi’s power-sharing agreement has led to many public-sector jobs being given out based on rents and not competence. These rents, however, extend beyond jobs in public administration, but also include “rents associated with the allocation of foreign aid, tax revenue, government employment, awarding of public contracts, and other benefits that come with political power” (Nkurunziza 2015, 6). This is especially important in economic development, as “the small size of the private sector in Burundi implies that the public sector is the major source of wealth, making these rents particularly attractive,” meaning that the primary way to become rich in Burundi is through government contracts (6). This has caused Burundi to be viewed as highly corrupt, which, combined with perceptions of it being unstable, insecure, having institutional deficiencies, and the politicization of the legal system, has dissuaded potential investors from investing in Burundi (16). This has been
particularly problematic, as capital accumulation is an important indicator of physical
reconstruction, yet Burundi has been maintaining negative rates of capital accumulation
(Rwanda, on the other hand, rebuilt its capital stock at a very fast rate after their civil war ended)
(16). Another example of poor mismanagement was in March 2012, when “water and electricity
increased fivefold and threefold, respectively, in about one year” (17). While there was hope the
new elite (in the form of the ruling CNDD-FDD) would manage the country better than the old
elite (now primarily in the opposition group Uprona), it has instead captured rents for its own
benefit, even as most Burundians become poorer (17).

Economic Reforms in Rwanda

After taking power, the RPF quickly began economic reforms, including introducing a
new currency in order to curb inflation, liberalizing the exchange and interest rates, removing
price controls, cutting import tariffs by half (combined with tax reform to increase government
revenue from other sources), and limits on government spending were introduced (Jones and
Murray 2018, 30-31). The RPF also recognized all pre-existing property rights before the war,
including those of both Tutsi who fled during the genocide and Hutu who fled as the war ended,
setting a precedent for businesses that property rights would be respected under the new regime
(31). Furthermore, the RPF inherited a number of state-owned monopolies, including mines,
coffee and tea plantations, and cement factories, but began allowing competition in the 2000s,
and officially passed a privatization law in 2006 to begin privatizing these companies (32).
Additionally, Rwanda is currently ranked 38th globally on the World Bank ease of doing business
rank, and 2nd in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank Doing, Doing Business 2020). This is in large
part due to Rwanda decreasing the input costs, simplifying the process of starting a business,
formally titling almost all plots of land, and simplifying the process of transferring ownership of land (Jones and Murray 2018, 46).

That these reforms occurred without a return to violence shows that Rwanda has become closer to an Open Access Order as described by North, Wallis, Webb, and Weingast than the Limited Access Order one would expect in a post-conflict society (2007). This is likely due to the same reason Rwanda has been able to place effective civil servants in place: while Kagame values loyalty, power ultimately resides fully in him, meaning that he is under no obligation to provide rents to other powerful actors, as there is no one who can threaten his power. Thus, unlike Limited Access Orders, such as Burundi, Kagame has been able to institute these economic reforms without a return to violence. And since Kagame values progress highly, he is additionally willing to institute these reforms rather than simply reward friends with rents (as strong men in other contexts have been known to do).

Civil Society Model

Once again, since my argument is not that a strong civil society is not useful, but rather that it is unlikely to exist in many post-conflict states, I will look at whether or not ethnic tensions in Burundi have prevented a strong civil society there, as well as if Kagame’s centralization of power has helped Rwanda ease ethnic tensions. By civil society here, I mean the ability of information to spread from various populations to the government, as well as from the government to various populations. Because I argue that having some base level of trust is important for this spread of information, I will focus on whether or not trust exists (particularly through the lens of ethnic tensions/reconciliation).
Ethnicity and Trust in Burundi

At the end of the Burundian Civil War, it was agreed that Hutus and Tutsis would share power in the new government under an accommodationist approach to dealing with ethnic tensions (in which ethnic groups are recognized and accommodations are made to ensure each one’s security and place in society/government) (Vandeginste 2014). The new legislature would be split 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi. Additionally, each political party must “must present blocked lists (i.e. with candidates ranked in a fixed order) that respect a minimum degree of ethnic (and gender) balance” in which the top three candidates can only contain two candidates of the same ethnic group, and of the top four at least one must be a woman (Vandeginste 2014, 268). As a result of this, even parties who historically have been associated with a single ethnic group (such as the ruling CNDD-FDD being predominately Hutu and the opposition Uprona being predominately Tutsi) must attract candidates from the other ethnic group in order for them to run for election (268). Thus, “there is general agreement among observers that, as a result, the 2010 Burundian elections were no longer a matter of primarily ethnic competition,” a large achievement for a state that was in the midst of violent ethnic conflict only 5 years prior (268). The Senate is similarly divided by ethnic groups, with each province having 2 senators, one of whom must be Tutsi and one of whom must be Hutu (which is particularly important, as the Senate is in charge of ensuring that the ethnic and gender requirements of the constitution are represented in all of Burundi’s public sector) (268). The executive branch also follows similar requirements, as the elected President appoints two Vice-Presidents, one of whom must be a Hutu from a predominately Hutu party and one of whom must be a Tutsi from a predominately Tutsi party (268). These criteria are also extended to lower levels of government, including “ethnic parity within the army, the policy and the intelligence service during a number of years...
to be determined by the Senate,” as well as the Minister of Defense and Minister of Public Security having to be from different ethnic groups and “public administration officials and state owned company managers as well as for the justice sector, the Constitution requires ethnically proportionate representation” (269). Perhaps most importantly, these requirements were respected as of the 2005 and 2010 elections (269).

In order to look at trust more in depth, the Afrobarometer survey has several categories relating to trust (mostly in terms of government and other leaders) (2014/2015 was chosen as it was the most recent data on Burundi available; additionally, Rwanda has not been included in any of the Afrobarometer surveys, so their levels of trust cannot be compared directly). As can be seen in figure 4, Burundians have a surprisingly high degree of trust for a state that is considered to be as unstable as it is. Nearly all categories have close to or over 50% of the population having a lot of trust, with the second highest percentage for all but trust in opposition parties being that the respondent somewhat trusts the institution. Even the tax department has a combined 51.2% of respondents that either trust them somewhat or a lot. Between the relatively high levels of trust shown through this survey, as well as the fact that the constitutional requirements regarding ethnicity in government and public administration have been respected, it may seem that a lack of trust may not have affected the ability of civil society to assist in reconstruction efforts.
There is, however, one category in which more 54% of respondents answered that they trust it either just a little or not at all, with the most responded answer being not at all: opposition political parties. This seems to fall in line with Nkurunziza’s reasoning that “once in power, politicians from either group do not hesitate to use violence against members of their supposedly own group” (2015, 2). An example of this was after the elections in 2010, in which state security forces and the ruling CNDD-FDD, a primarily Hutu party, appeared to be behind the assassination of 40-300 people from the Front National de Libération, another Hutu dominated party in the opposition (2). Thus, while ethnic tensions may not be nearly as bad as they used to be and trust in government seems to be held by a majority, this new tension based around political lines may instead still be preventing the full use of civil society in Burundi’s post-conflict reconstruction and economic growth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Just a little</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust president</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust parliament/national assembly</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust your elected local government council</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust traditional leaders</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust police</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust army</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Courts of law</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust national electoral commission</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust the ruling party</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust tax department</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust opposition political parties</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust religious leaders</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>80.6%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer 2014/2015

Figure 4
Rwandan Ethnic Reconciliation

Rwanda opted for a different strategy of overcoming ethnic tensions, which Vandeginste describes as “ethnic amnesia,” in which the RPF has focused on forming a common national identity or “Rwandan-ness” and erasing ethnic differences (2014, 269). The preamble of the 2003 Rwandan Constitution (with amendments) makes reference that Rwandans “enjoy the privilege of having one country, a common language, a common culture and a long shared history which must enable us to have a common vision of our destiny” as well as committing to “to preventing and punishing the crime of genocide, fighting genocide negationism and revisionism, eradicating genocide ideology and all its manifestations, divisionism and discrimination based on ethnicity, region or any other ground” (8). This latter commitment has generally be interpreted in part as discussing tribe/ethnicity in public as being punishable by the law (Vandeginste 2014, 269).

This is not to say Rwanda has not worked towards ethnic reconciliation in other ways though. Rwanda under the RPF began working towards ethnic reconciliation soon after taking power. Already in 1994 Rwanda instituted the Igando (solidarity) integration program, which reintegrated former Hutu members of the previous regime’s military into the new military, with all members undergoing political education that emphasized “the pre-colonial role of the army to serve all citizens, and the historical unity of Rwandans,” followed by deploying the recruits with pre-genocide members of the RPF in order to create cohesion between the Hutu and Tutsi (and, in particular, former enemies), and then ultimately deploying the recruits in their home communities, where they were to spread news “of equality and integration under the new government” (Jones and Murray 2018, 18). Additionally, by 2000, many former-combatants and Hutus were given positions in public administration and the military, and the government passed
several measures to ensure that punishments and favors would not be given out on ethnic lines, thus building trust with both the Tutsi and Hutu populations and helping bring about unity (17).

That Rwanda was able to create and instill reconciliation, unity, and trust through these policies, rather than through the accommodation method, seems likely to be due to the fact that political centralization rests in Kagame and that the former government completely vacated their political institutions. The former regime had committed genocide, and thus any government containing them would be subject to ethnic distrust, particularly by Tutsis who had suffered due to the genocide they incited. Furthermore, Kagame benefitted from not having other powerful actors that could threaten his power. Kagame did not have to worry about a Hutu rival who could incite unrest in the majority ethnic group, nor a fellow Tutsi rival who could act as a spoiler against reconciliation reforms by splitting off RPF supporters who may want reprisals against the Hutu population broadly. Thus, Kagame was free to enact these reforms without fear of their potential lack of popularity leading to a threat against his power.

Discussion

Looking at public administration in both Rwanda and Burundi, it is clear that having a power-sharing agreement has left Burundi worse off than Rwanda in its ability to promote competence in public-sector employees. While the constitutional mandate of maintaining parity in public-sectors in Burundi was meant to address ethnic concerns of the Tutsi against a tyranny of the Hutu majority (and has, as discussed above, seemed to be effective in easing ethnic tensions), it has turned into a way of rewarding allies and friends at the cost of not hiring and promoting those that prove competent and willing to serve the public good rather than simply collecting rents. On the other hand, Rwanda’s centralization of power in Kagame means that he
has no need to provide rents, freeing him to hire and promote individuals on merit, leaving public administration in Rwanda one of the best in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Similarly, the same system of rent-collecting in Burundi has left its economy in shambles, as the corruption and mismanagement resulting from public-sector bureaucrats and government contracts being given to friends rather than competent individuals has caused many foreign investors and aid organizations to avoid or limit capital flow towards Burundi. Thus, capital accumulation rates have remained negative, and GDP per capita remains below pre-war levels. Rwanda, however, has achieved incredibly high economic growth, once again due to Kagame’s ability to not rely on paying out rents to allies or other powerful individuals. Thus, he was able to implement a wide variety of economic reforms without fear of repercussions from those who lose out on rents. This has attracted significant investment in Rwanda, as investors believe Rwanda to be a stable state with straightforward and standardized rules with competent bureaucrats.

In terms of the civil society model, both states have made incredible process in easing ethnic tensions, especially given the scope and recency of ethnic conflicts and genocides in both states. While each state has gone about this in different methods, represented by their respective ways of ending their wars (accommodation in Burundi following a power-sharing agreement and ethnic amnesia in Rwanda following a complete victory for the RPF), both methods seem to have eased ethnic tensions and increased the general level of trust. However, to say that the civil society aspect of reconstruction was therefore not affected by this difference may be misleading. While ethnic tensions in Burundi seem to have eased significantly, it has been replaced with tension and at times violent conflict between political groups regardless of ethnicity, thus explaining why a majority has little or no trust for rival political parties. Rwanda, however,
seems to have avoided this issue, as Kagame’s leadership is unquestioned, and while there are a multitude of political parties that run for elections and win, they are still all ultimately reliant on Kagame’s approval of policies, and effectively forced to adopt any policies Kagame puts forward to the legislature. Thus the potential for the same level of violent conflict is less likely in Rwanda (though, a caveat should be put in place that those who oppose Kagame are certainly at risk of violence, though due to Kagame’s proven record and reputation of being an effective and competent leader has limited his opposition).

*The Rational Case for Kagame*

While this paper has discussed what factors allowed Rwanda under Kagame to succeed where Burundi has failed, it has not explained why Kagame took advantage of these factors. There are certainly examples of other leaders who have centralized power choosing to put friends in powerful bureaucratic positions and not achieving the same success as Rwanda (for example, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Fidel Castro in Cuba, and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe). One possible answer to this is simply that Kagame is the proverbial “wise, benevolent king.” However, this theory does not hinge on this possibility as Kagame’s actions can also be explained through a selfish, rational model using Olson’s understanding of stationary bandits (Olson 1993).

If it is the case that Kagame is primarily motivated by selfish, rational reasons, then his choices to increase the welfare of the Rwandan people still makes sense. Slater and Fenner point out that “the state matters because state power matters” and that by increasing state capacity it also makes the regime more durable (2011, 18-19). Thus, by placing competent civil servants into high positions, it increases the state capacity of Rwanda, making his hold on power that much more secure (as opposed to Burundi, where political leaders are still at risk of losing power
due to the ongoing instability). Additionally, “extraction provides regimes with stores of capital that can help them ride out or even preempt crises,” such as economic downturns (21). High state capacity also allows for taxation policies and institutions that do not stifle economic growth, as “an effective tax agency will be able to calculate a sustainable tax rate for citizens and private enterprise, filling state coffers without destroying the economy in a fragmented frenzy of prédation” (21). Additionally, “taxes allow states to reap the rewards of industrial booms that might otherwise benefit only private capitalists,” thus allowing Kagame to earn more revenue for his regime than if GDP per capita were kept low (21). Additionally, as noted above, Kagame has been able to increase foreign aid toward Rwanda by meeting criteria the international community values. This is in part dependent on him continuing to meet those criteria and show that he is achieving the desired results stipulated by conditional aid. Thus, it remains within his interests to continue improving the well-being of Rwandans even if he is fully motivated by selfishness.

**Game Theoretical Model of Burundi and Rwanda**

The inherent flaws in Burundi’s power sharing agreement can be understood as a multi-game series between two political parties, in which each political party can choose either to cooperate for the good of Burundi (such as by placing competent persons in public administration) or defect (such as by placing allies and friends in public administration positions). While Burundi has multiple political parties, this model uses 2 parties for simplicity, though the principles behind this simplification still apply to the multiple parties that exist in Burundi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Sharing</th>
<th>Party 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party 1</td>
<td>1, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>5, -1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 5*
If both parties cooperate in any given game, the payoffs for cooperate/cooperate and
defect/defect increase by 1 for each party; additionally, the payout for the defecting party in
defect/cooperate increases by 2. Thus, there are 2 Nash equilibriums; one “good” equilibrium in
which the entire state ends up better and one “bad” equilibrium in which no gains are made to the
broader population. If each party both believes that their opponent will cooperate and that there
will be enough future iterations of the game that the incremental increases will lead to higher
payoffs over the long-term, then cooperate/cooperate acts as a Nash equilibrium, which will also
leave the broader population better off. However, if each party believes their opponent will
defect, or that there will not be enough future iterations of the game such that defecting will lead
to higher payoffs over the course of the series, then defect/defect serves as a Nash equilibrium,
additionally leaving the broader population without dividends.

Given the high levels of political violence, Burundi has fallen into the “bad” equilibrium
of defect/defect. Each party believes the other party will defect (as each game has resulted in
defections thus far), thus encouraging each party to continue defecting. While one party could
potentially cooperate in order to signal cooperation in the future, the fact that a single
cooperate/defect game can leave a party in a bad enough difference in relative standing that they
risk violent attacks against them by other groups prevents any party from taking that risk. This is
made worse in that cooperating (by not placing an ally or friend in key positions) can cause that
party to lose key allies and friends, meaning they not only do not gain any utility, but actually
become weaker relatively and absolutely.

Because Rwanda does not have any other powerful actors besides Kagame, he is able to
avoid the above dilemma. Yet there are certainly other centralized authoritarian strong men who
have chosen to collect rents for themselves and their friends rather than improve the well-being of the population at large. To explain why Kagame may have acted differently than these other strongmen, I will adjust the multi-game series model from above, in which the centralized autocrat will reap the total of the payouts that each party above receives in the cooperate/cooperate when the autocrat cooperates and gain the total of the payouts that each party above receives in defect/defect when defecting. Because these strongmen do not need to worry about other parties or powerful individuals, they will instead play against the population, who can either cooperate (obey the autocrat) or defect (revolt against the autocrat). The population was excluded in the above model, as each party can pass the blame to the other party, thus ensuring that the portion of the population that supports them does not turn against them, while in the centralized autocrat model, all negative feedback from the population is directed towards the autocrat. The autocrat can either cooperate (ensure the economic well-being of the population) or defect (capture rents from the population at their expense).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centralized Autocrat</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocrat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>2, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>4, 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a single game in this model, the Nash equilibrium will result in the autocrat defecting and the population cooperating (assuming both are concerned with maximizing their utility and not concerned with relative standing). However, at the end of each game, the payouts of the next game are changed depending on what choices were made similar to the above model, except the autocrat receives the increases both parties received in the above model as they have no one to share the rents with. If the autocrat and population both cooperate, then the payout for the autocrat increases for both cooperate/cooperate and defect/cooperate by 2 and the payout for
both autocrat and population decreases for both cooperate/defect and defect/defect by 2. If the
game results in defect/cooperate, then the payouts remain the same (it is possible for the game to
have a payout of 4, -1 instead of 4, 0 for defect/cooperate, in which case the payout for the
population defecting in either case increases by 1). If the population defects, then it results in
Civil War, thus resulting in an entirely new game. Under this model, there are 2 Nash
equilibriums one “good” in which the autocrat and population both cooperate and one “bad” in
which the autocrat defects and the population cooperates. There are 2 cases where the autocrat
will choose to cooperate rather than defect (at least for a time being): if they believe there will be
enough iterations of the game in the future such that the incremental increase in payouts for
cooperating will lead to higher long term payouts, then the autocrat will choose to cooperate so
long as they believe they will continue to be able to benefit from this marginal increase each
game; alternatively, if the payout for the population if they defect increases to 0 (or worse, a
positive number), then the autocrat risks a civil war and would either continue defecting if they
believe they will win without incurring too high a cost or will choose to cooperate until the
payout decreases below 0. On the other hand, the “bad” equilibrium will occur if the marginal
increase in payouts for cooperating is not high enough relative to the payout of defecting each
game, and if the risk of civil war is low (or the autocrat believes they will win without incurring
too high a cost) then they will choose to defect.

Drawbacks of Centralized Authoritarianism in Rwanda

This is not to say that this model, even with a ruler such as Kagame, does not have its
faults. While public administration is well above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa, it’s top-
down approach, in which Kagame pushes through his policy initiatives and in which promotion
is in part based on loyalty, combined with criticism of the government potentially leading to jail time, can limit the amount of feedback the government (and Kagame specifically) receives (Jones and Murray 2018, 60). This has at times caused certain policies aimed at reducing poverty to be mishandled or deprioritized because proper feedback was not received (60). Additionally, while Rwanda’s centralization of power can create a stable environment for businesses due to standardized and clear processes, but it also can raise the cost of doing business, prevents certain streams of profit from being accessed, and means that Kagame has the ability to change policies quickly without fear of reprisal after investments have occurred (61).

Additionally, “aspects of Rwanda’s use of violence have received criticism from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and others for lack of due process (such as extrajudicial killings) and/or amounting to torture.” (Jones and Murray 2018, 55). Strict punishments are generally given out for crimes that the government views as existential threats (56). While Rwanda generally respects freedom of speech, this does not extend to outright criticism of the government, and specifically Kagame (while public forums do allow for a degree of feedback, including areas the government is lacking in, that feedback is limited in scope for fear of imprisonment or worse). Additionally, while Kagame’s policies have aimed at achieving ethnic reconciliation, it has in part done this by trying to eliminate the categories, in particular by banning people from discussing their ethnicity or tribe (though this effectively only applies to talking in public as people still discuss their tribe/ethnicity in private), with those caught discussing their tribe or ethnicity, even in non-negative terms, risk imprisonment. These harsh punishments can also extend into other spheres, including during the Covid-19 pandemic, in which those caught breaking the stay-at-home order were forced to spend the night in open air
football stadiums with others who also broke the order (who may or may not have been exposed to Covid-19).

*Potential of Power-Sharing Agreements*

Additionally, while this paper has focused on the flaws of power-sharing agreements and the problems they create, they still should not be disregarded as a tool for ending violent conflicts. In many cases there is no one party which has the capability to take complete control of the state and enforce its will effectively while controlling violence across its entire territory. In these cases, power-sharing agreements are an important tool for stopping the violence, bringing peace, and establishing a government that has at least some degree of legitimacy both internally and internationally. As ending conflict and having a stable/legitimate government are important prerequisites for economic development, it is likely still better to enter into a power-sharing agreement than to continue fighting and wait for there to be a sole victor, an outcome that may never come. Instead, more research should be done into how power-sharing agreements can either overcome or work around their problems and weaknesses.

There are two general avenues of this research that may prove useful. The first would be to look at what policies would allow known political and economic reforms to occur either without threatening powerful actors or allow powerful actors to, overtime, become either more amiable to reforms or lose their ability to act as spoilers. One such example would be Myerson’s theory of federalism in state-building. Under this theory, local governments are determined democratically and given some degree of autonomy, while at the national (and perhaps provincial level) the power-sharing agreement determines the nature of the government (Myerson). This allows for the local government to provide a check on the national government,
as the national government will in part be dependent on these local governments (Myerson). Furthermore, powerful actors will be encouraged to provide tangible results in improving people’s lives, as their ability to continue collecting rents depends somewhat on winning these local elections (Myerson). Thus, over time, reforms that are general out of reach of post-conflict states with power-sharing agreements may be able to be instituted without a return to violence.

Alternative Methods of Development

The second avenue would be to look into alternative methods of economic development that would work within the framework of a power-sharing agreement without threatening their power or ability to collect rents. Nunn (2019) poses potential alternative methods of economic development outside of policy reform (though he does not refer specifically to post-conflict societies, these examples can still be used to show that alternative methods may still exist and warrant further research). The first potential alternative Nunn proposes is allowing for greater labor mobility between states, as remittances back to extended family causes “increased human capital accumulation, less child labour and more entrepreneurship and self-employment” (11). Additionally, particularly successful migrants often provide money for “public goods and other large-scale projects in the origin villages” (11). Additionally, increased migration to developed countries provides sending countries with more foreign direct investment, international business links, and greater knowledge flows, resulting in increased productivity and output in the sending countries (11).

A second strategy Nunn proposes is the use of consumer purchasing power, in which consumers switch to fair-trade products, putting pressure on corporations working in developing states to increase wages and work standards (13). This method seems to have worked in
Indonesia in the 1990s, when consumers demanded Nike start paying their workers in Indonesia better, which led to a 400% increase in minimum wage without reducing productivity or the number of jobs (13). Thus, with an increase in demand from consumers for fair trade goods, economic development could occur without internal reforms in a developing state (additionally, consumers have been shown to be “willing to pay significantly more for a product that they believe to have been produced in a manner that improves the well-being of the producers who are in less developed countries”) (13).

These two methods Nunn proposes are based off of developing states broadly and not post-conflict states specifically, and likely would have issues in states like Burundi. However, they exist to show that there are other ways at going about development, meaning that there may still be ways to achieve economic development in post-conflict states operating on a power-sharing agreement such as Burundi. Nunn additionally provides a framework for researching alternative methods of development in his paper. Specifically, he recommends research experiments that focus on the local rather than the universal, as without the local context “at best, our understanding is incomplete, and, at worst, it is completely off the mark” (17). It is thus important to look beyond the current successes in economic development (as well as commonly written about failures in economic development such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and examine and run tests and experiments in a variety of contexts, especially those which tend to be woefully overlooked (Nunn, 2019). including states such as Burundi. Therefore, if a solution to the issues found in economic development in Burundi under the power sharing agreement, more research, tests, and experiments need to be done in and on Burundi.
Conclusion

Rwanda and Burundi, despite their many historical, cultural, and ethnic differences, have widely diverged since the end of the Rwandan Civil War. Rwanda has benefitted from having a competent leader who has the power and freedom to enact reforms for the betterment of the general population while Burundi has suffered mismanagement from the rent-seeking encouraged and allowed under its power sharing agreement. However, this does not necessarily mean that international powers should adopt a policy of ensuring civil wars end with a sole victor, nor does it mean power-sharing agreements should be dropped as a tool for peace. Rather, more research should be done to understand how to perform post-conflict reconstruction in a variety of different contexts and outcomes.
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