THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE PHARISEES AND FIGURED SPEECH IN LUKE-ACTS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVINITY SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
JUNE 2016
# Table of Contents

**Tables** .................................................................................................................................................. vii

**Introduction** ........................................................................................................................................ 1

**Part One: Contextualizing the Question**

Chapter One: Defining Figured Speech ........................................................................................................... 6

1. Allusion (ἐμφασις) ................................................................................................................................ 9

2. Discretion (ἐυπρέπεια) ....................................................................................................................... 15

3. Security (ἀσφάλεια) ............................................................................................................................ 17

4. Freedom of Speech (παρρησία) ......................................................................................................... 20

5. Irony (εἰρωνεία) ................................................................................................................................ 21

6. Indirect Speech (ὁ πλάγιος λόγος) .................................................................................................... 23

7. Figured Speech as an Art (τέχνη) ..................................................................................................... 26

Chapter Two: Methodological Approach ......................................................................................................... 30

1. Redactional Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 30

2. Intertextual and Interconceptual Analysis .............................................................................................. 33

3. Rhetorical and Literary Analysis ........................................................................................................... 35

4. Historical Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 41

5. The History of Reception ..................................................................................................................... 49

Chapter Three: Scholarly Perspectives on the Historical Pharisees ............................................................ 52

1. The Authority of the Pharisees: Political, Religious, Neither, or Both? ............................................. 54

2. The Pharisees in the Roman Empire ..................................................................................................... 70


1. Judea .................................................................................................................................................... 81
2. Ephesus ............................................................................................................ 84
3. Antioch in Syria .................................................................................................. 86
4. The Question about Diaspora Pharisees .............................................................. 95

Chapter Five: Luke and His Readers ..................................................................... 103
1. Authorship and Date .......................................................................................... 103
2. Luke and Ethnic Perspective .............................................................................. 109
4. The Question about Pharisaic Readers .............................................................. 127

PART TWO: THE PHARISEES AND THE SUPPRESSION OF FREE SPEECH

Chapter Six: From Figured to Free Speech............................................................... 132
2. The Lukan Pharisees as Spies ............................................................................. 140
3. Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 150

Chapter Seven: Paul and Other Former Pharisees .................................................. 152
1. Paul’s Feigned Ignorance about the High Priest (Acts 23.5) .............................. 153
2. Ananias as Ruler of the People ........................................................................... 162
3. Paul’s Appeals to his Pharisaism (Acts 23.6; 26.5) ............................................. 166
4. The Lukan Paul and his Alleged Roman Citizenship ........................................... 176
5. The Other Former Pharisees (Acts 15.5) ............................................................ 179
6. Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 186

Chapter Eight: Gamaliel and the God-fighters ......................................................... 188
1. Theudas, Judas, Gamaliel, and Their Respective Followers ............................... 193
2. Obedience to God versus Obedience to Gamaliel .............................................. 197
3. The Sanhedrin among Other God-fighters .................................................. 200
4. Distinguishing Gamaliel from the Apostles .............................................. 202
5. Theudas, Judas, and Jesus ........................................................................ 205
6. Persecution for (Speech in) the Name ....................................................... 213
7. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 221

PART THREE: LUKE’S MORAL DIAGNOSIS OF THE PHARISEES

Chapter Nine: The Initial Symptoms of Illness ........................................... 224
2. The Folly of the Scribes and Pharisees (Luke 6.6-11) ............................ 228
3. The Textual Variant at Luke 5.17c ............................................................. 235
4. The Lukan Jesus as a Doctor of the Soul (Luke 4.23; 5.31-32) ............. 238
5. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 242

Chapter Ten: The Passions of Injustice ......................................................... 244
1. The Passion for Money ............................................................................. 245
2. The Passion for Glory .............................................................................. 247
3. The Passion for Luxury ............................................................................ 249
4. Passions of Injustice in Moral Philosophical Traditions ....................... 252
5. The Rulers of the Pharisees and the Question of Justice ..................... 261
6. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 269

Chapter Eleven: The Evil Eye and its Cure ................................................. 271
1. The Pharisees and the Evil Eye of Predatory Greed ............................... 272
2. Curing the Evil Eye .................................................................................... 276
3. The “Some” and “Others” in the Beelzebul Controversy ........................................ 280

4. Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 291

PART FOUR: THE PHARISEES AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

Chapter Twelve: The Kingdom within Reach ............................................................ 294

1. Previous Interpretations of ἐντὸς ὑμῶν (Luke 17.21) ........................................ 295

2. The Kingdom “within you” ................................................................................... 298

3. The Governing Part of the Soul .......................................................................... 302

4. The Kingdom “among you” ................................................................................ 307

5. The Lukan Jesus as Kingly Benefactor ................................................................. 309

6. Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 313

Chapter Thirteen: Simon the Pharisee and the Feet ................................................. 315

1. The Repetition of πόδας ....................................................................................... 315

2. Psalms of Solomon 8 and Luke 7 ......................................................................... 318

3. The Pharisees in Luke 7.24-50 .......................................................................... 323

4. Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 328

Chapter Fourteen: The Pharisees and the Abandoned House ............................. 330

1. Inside and Outside the House (Luke 13.22-14.24) ............................................. 330

2. The Function of ὑμῖν (Luke 13.35a) ..................................................................... 337

3. “This Fox” and the Pharisees .............................................................................. 339

4. Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 343

Chapter Fifteen: The Pharisees and the Kingly Entrance ..................................... 345


2. The “Citizens” and the Nobleman ...................................................................... 351
3. Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 366

Chapter Sixteen: Zacchaeus and the Pharisees ............................................................. 368

1. The Sycamore Tree .................................................................................................... 369

2. To Climb and Come Down ....................................................................................... 375

3. Zacchaeus and Yohanan ben Zakkai ......................................................................... 379

4. Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 391

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ........................................................................ 393

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 402
Tables

Table 1: Sitting and Standing in Luke 5.17-32 .......................................................... 225
Table 2: Comparing Psalms of Solomon 8 and Luke 7 ............................................ 319
Table 3: Chiasm signaled by ιδού ................................................................. 325
INTRODUCTION


observes that the author’s presentation of the Pharisees is “puzzling” and “complex.” Although claiming that in his Gospel, the author does not “turn antagonists into friends,” Carroll also holds that in Acts not once “does Luke portray Pharisees as antagonists.” Similarly, Anthony Saldarini explains that “Luke’s attitude toward the Pharisees is complex and cannot be simply characterized as friendly or hostile.”

David Gowler opens his study on the Lukan Pharisees with the statement that “the text of Luke-Acts seems to paint an ambiguous portrait of the Pharisees,” but then he concludes that the “portrait of the Pharisees in Luke is primarily negative, whereas the portrait of the Pharisees in Acts is primarily positive.” In asking whether the author and his contemporary readers might have encountered Pharisees, Mary Marshall explains, “His differing portrayals in the Gospel and Acts may indeed cultivate an ambivalent attitude to actual Pharisees (which may represent his own attitude) but if his contact with actual Pharisees was limited, then this ambivalence may have had only limited practical implications.”

And in a recent survey of the Lukan Pharisees, Amy-Jill Levine asserts, “Whether approached primarily by literary or

about the Pharisees “is sometimes negative,” at other times “neutral,” and in other cases “potentially positive” (Dining with Pharisees [Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2004], 80). So also Leo Michel Abramí claims that the author “is ambivalent with respect to the Pharisees” (“Were All the Pharisees ‘Hypocrites’?” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 47 [2012]: 427-35, here 428).


historical questions, Luke’s Pharisees elude clear answers,” which leads her to conclude that this author’s view of the Pharisees “will remain debated.”

What these previous evaluations of the Lukan Pharisees have left unanswered is why the author would present himself as ambivalent toward these characters, and also what might lie behind the rhetorical effects of “ambiguity.” Was he undecided or vacillating in his attitude toward the Pharisees? Did he view some of them positively and others negatively? When we analyze the evidence, it becomes clear that even in those seemingly positive characters, there is also an element of negativity in their portrayals. Can we therefore explain these ambiguous depictions on rhetorical grounds, and if so, what are those rhetorical grounds more specifically? If we can attribute this ambiguity to a deliberate rhetorical purpose, does this purpose also point to the author’s position on the Pharisees?

One piece of evidence that may inform these questions appears in Demetrius, De elocutione 287-95, where he explains what is “so-called figured [ἐσχηματισμένον] in speech” (Eloc. 287). In some instances, Demetrius explains, statements can carry ambiguity (ἐπαμφοτερίζειν) and leave hearers uncertain about what the speaker meant. As an example, Demetrius describes Aeschines’ characterization of Telauges. “Almost the entire account [διήγησις] about Telauges,” Demetrius states, “might cause confusion as to whether it is admiration or ironic mockery [χλευασμός]. Such an ambiguous [ἀμφίβολον] form of speech, although not irony [εἰρωνεία], nevertheless has some hint [ἔμφασις] of irony” (Eloc. 291). Does the ambiguity scholars have noticed in the portrayals of the Lukan Pharisees reflect the author’s use of this kind of speech? This dissertation aims to reevaluate the Lukan Pharisees in order to

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8 Unless otherwise noted, all translations of ancient sources are mine.
answer whether, and if so how, the author has applied figured speech in depicting these characters.

An attempt to answer these questions first requires that we define more fully what Demetrius refers to as being “figured.” Therefore, in PART ONE of this study, we shall begin by analyzing figured speech as discussed among ancient Greco-Roman rhetoricians. A broader statement about our methodological approach in this investigation of Luke-Acts will then follow. We shall proceed to contextualize our question further by surveying what scholarship has informed us about the historical Pharisees. Then, in asking whether the author may have had direct contact with “Pharisees,” we shall hypothesize a provenance for Luke-Acts and also evaluate what we know and do not know about the author, his initial readers, and the relationship they seem to have had with Judaism.

In PART TWO, we shall analyze one aspect of figured speech that the author may use for framing his narrative more broadly—namely, that his readers may have “security” (Luke 1.4) until “full freedom of speech without hindrance” (Acts 28.31) becomes realized. Taking our cue from the ancient rhetoricians who prescribe using figured speech in dangerous situations, we shall evaluate to what extent Jesus, Paul, and other apostles speak circumspectly in the presence of Pharisees, and also to what extent the author writes cautiously in depicting certain Pharisees. Furthermore, we shall address whether the protagonists of Luke-Acts serve as a template for the author and his readers and what evidence exists that they may have been persecuted for their speech.

PART THREE will then analyze those scenes in the Gospel where the author juxtaposes the Pharisees with characters who receive physical healing. Here we shall evaluate whether these healings serve as analogs or points of contrast for diagnosing the moral health of the Lukan
Pharisees. Some statements from within these contexts would suggest that the author regards the Pharisees as morally just. Yet we see a tension in the fact that the author also applies to the Pharisees certain passions that within moral philosophical traditions often typify unjust persons. We shall closely examine whether any of these statements and depictions would qualify as figured speech, and if so revisit the question of possible consequences for using free speech, as opposed to figured speech.

In PART FOUR, we shall examine whether the author uses figured speech in order to position the Pharisees in relation to the kingdom of God, which includes the question of where they stand on the kingship of Jesus. On more than one occasion within the Gospel, the Pharisees appear sincerely to offer Jesus advice that would enable him to avoid the kind of peril that might result from politically subversive speech. Yet each time, Jesus responds by differentiating his own position from that of the Pharisees and furthermore by lamenting over Jerusalem. Accordingly, we shall evaluate what significance these characters may have had for Christian readers during the wake of 70 CE, and also to what degree the author conflates the Pharisees with or distinguishes them from Christians.
PART ONE: CONTEXTUALIZING THE QUESTION

Chapter One: Defining Figured Speech

When Demetrius discusses figured speech, he uses the terms ἐσχηματισμένον, “figured,” and σχῆμα, “figure,” almost interchangeably (Eloc. 287, 293), which suggests that the former is coextensive with the latter. Similarly, Quintilian begins his discussion of figurae by equating them with what the Greeks call σχήματα (Inst. 9.1.1). He then proceeds to draw a distinction between speech that is ἀσχημάτιστος, “figureless,” and ἐσχηματισμένη, “figured.” Zoilus, he explains, defined ἐσχηματισμένη in a narrow sense, “because he thought that a schema appeared only in cases where the speaker pretends to say something other than what he actually says,” and furthermore “that this is also a commonly held view” (Inst. 9.1.13-14; cf. 9.2.65). Yet Quintilian proposes a broader definition: “let a figure [figura] be a form of speaking that is invented by some artistic means” (9.1.14).

Quintilian here associates Zoilus’ view of schema with “figured problems” (figuratae controversiae, 9.1.14) and notes that he will suspend his discussion on this topic until later in the work. When he does take it up more fully, he explains that it is from schema that figured problems derive their name and furthermore that schema is a figure “we now use frequently” (Inst. 9.2.65). Demetrius similarly says, “The rhetors of our day ridiculously use what is so-called figured [ἐσχηματισμένον] in speech” (Eloc. 287). As scholars have recognized, the rhetorical style that Demetrius and Quintilian are describing in these contexts (Eloc. 287-95 and Inst. 9.2.64-99, respectively) has more extensive expositions in two treatises from Pseudo-
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ars Rhet. 8–9). Corresponding material under the heading, περὶ (τῶν) ἐσχηματισμένων προβλημάτων, “concerning (the) figured problems,” appears also in works attributed to Apsines and Hermogenes.

When we read the rhetorical instruction on figured speeches alongside that on figured problems, it is evident that there is much overlap between the two. In the Rhetores Graeci, some brief instruction on ἐσχηματισμένος λόγος from an anonymous author is almost identical to what appears in those writings attributed to Apsines and Hermogenes, which have the heading, περὶ...
(τῶν) ἐσχηματισμένων προβλήματων. From Quintilian’s discussion on figured problems, it becomes clear that what he refers to by this designation is what Apsines and Hermogenes are calling ἐσχηματισμένα προβλήματα. For example, a controversy about an alleged sexual transgression of a father appears in all three authors, with varying details. These προβλήματα or controversiae are scenarios or (simulated) controversies, that is, (fictive) situations or disputes that in some cases served as material for rhetorical instruction in the schools (Quintilian, Inst. 9.2.67; cf. 9.2.81). Because Quintilian points out that figured problems are named after schema, it would be inaccurate to equate ἐσχηματισμένοι λόγοι with ἐσχηματισμένα προβλήματα. What we can claim, however, is that figured speech may appear within ἐσχηματισμένα προβλήματα and thus that there is likely much to learn about figured speech by evaluating the rhetorical instruction on the προβλήματα.

The designation λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος, “figured speech” (along with its Latin equivalent, oratio figurata), has become somewhat conventional in the scholarly literature when referring to this rhetorical style; and for the sake of consistency, we too shall employ this label throughout this evaluation. When the ancient rhetoricians define figured speech, they do so by

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3 In Spengel, Rhetores Graeci (Leipzig: Teubner, 1856), 3:118, we read: Ἡ ἐσχηματισμένος λόγος, ὅταν τὸ ἐναντίον οὗ λέγομεν κατασκευάζωμεν, ἢ ὅταν μετὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ ἄλλο τι περάν ο λόγος; ἢ ὅταν τι λέγειν μὴ δυνάμενοι διὰ τὸ κεκωλύσθαι καὶ παρρησίαν μὴ ἔχειν ἡ σχήματι ἄλλης ἀξιώσεως ἐμφαίνουμεν κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν τοῦ λόγου, καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐξὸν εἰρῆσθαι, ὡς εἶναι τε νοῆσαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιλήψιμον εἶναι τῷ λέγοντι. Cf. Apsines (Spengel and Hammer, 330 = Patillon, 112); and Hermogenes, Inv. 4.13 (Rabe, 204-06 = Kennedy, 188-90).

4 Quintilian, Inst. 9.2.69-71; Apsines (Spengel and Hammer, 331 = Patillon, 113); and Hermogenes, Inv. 4.13 (Rabe, 206, 208-10 = Kennedy, 190, 192-96).

describing how figured speech is used, the situations in which it is used, and what this type of speech then achieves for both speakers and hearers.

1. Allusion (ἐμφασίς)

When Demetrius begins his discussion on what is ἐσχηματισμένον, he does so by explaining how the rhetors used it μετὰ ἐμφάσεως ἀγεννοῦς ἁμα καὶ οἶον ἀναμνηστικῆς, “accompanied by low-brow and, so to say, suggestive allusion” (Eloc. 287). While this description does not necessarily mean that ἐσχηματισμένον and ἐμφασίς are equivalent, it does indicate that there is a close relationship between the two, as the rhetors conceived of and used them. This relationship we see also in the fact that Demetrius turns to his discussion of ἐσχηματισμένον immediately after a statement about whether allegory, hyperbole, and allusion (ἐμφασίς) are poetic (Eloc. 286).

Within the discussion on ἐσχηματισμένον, however, Demetrius provides an example of this form of speech from Plato’s Phaedo. In one instance of that dialogue, as Demetrius reads it, Plato chooses not to reproach the other characters in an open and explicit fashion, but rather through an allusion. According to Demetrius, this allusion is not to diminish the forcefulness of

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what is spoken—which is an important point, since his discussion of ἐσχηματισμένον falls under the broader heading of δεινότης, “forcefulness” (Eloc. 240-304). Plato’s statement, Demetrius explains, “is much more forceful because of the force of the subject matter itself that is alluded to [ἐμφαίνειν], not because of the force of the speaker” (Eloc. 288).

Quintilian also observes a close relationship between emphasis and what Demetrius calls ἐσχηματισμένον and λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος. He discusses emphasis immediately before expounding upon the type of schema he had earlier associated with Zoilus (i.e., pretending to say something other than what is actually said); and in transitioning from one to the other he claims that emphasis is “either similar to or the same as” this schema (Inst. 9.2.64-65). Here he qualifies emphasis as “when something hidden [latens] is drawn out from something said” (9.2.64). It may be helpful to specify emphasis as a figure of thought, as opposed to a figure of speech (Inst. 9.1.15-18). Such a figure is concerned primarily with conceptions or meanings (i.e., thought) derived from statements (i.e., speech). These conceptions or meanings, however, do remain grounded within the actual speech and are even conditioned, if not determined, by what the speaker intended to communicate. In conveying such a figure, Quintilian remarks, “through something suggestive we intend our hearers to understand what we do not say.” While the speaker attempts to insinuate the meaning through speech, the hearers are then expected to uncover that meaning. As Quintilian explains, this schema is “something else that is hidden [latens] also for the hearer to discover, as it were” (Inst. 9.2.65).

Quintilian had earlier discussed emphasis under the heading of stylistic ornament (ornatus, Inst. 8.3.1), claiming that it has some resemblance to brachylogy (i.e., brevity that says nothing more than what is necessary, Inst. 8.3.82). Here he defines emphasis as that which “shows a deeper meaning than what the words alone actually express.” He then explains further
that there are two kinds of *emphasis*: “one kind signifies more than what it says, and the other signifies even that which it does not say” (*Inst.* 8.3.83). An example of the first, Quintilian explains, would be when Menelaus said that the Greeks “descended” into the wooden horse. Menelaus here indicates the size of the wooden horse through the one verb, “descended” (*Inst.* 8.3.84). In the second kind of *emphasis*, the speech is “either entirely suppressed or even cut off” (*Inst.* 8.3.85).

Hermogenes may also help in defining ἔµφασις, as he prefaces his discussion on figured problems by saying: “As for figured problems, some are expressed by saying the opposite, some are indirect statements, and some are expressed by allusion [ἔµφασις].” What Hermogenes goes on to say about ἔµφασις sheds light upon the ambiguity that hearers might perceive in figured speech. For to use figured speech is to present oneself in the guise of holding one opinion, but then the speaker only intimates what he or she would really say if “freedom of speech” (παρρησία) were possible. Hermogenes states, “in the figure [σχῆμα] of a different opinion we allude to [ἔµφασιν], by the composition of the speech, even what is not said expressly, so that the hearers understand and the speaker is not liable to censure.”

Hermogenes further explains that “the figure by allusion [κατὰ ἔµφασιν σχῆμα]” can appear when “someone speaking openly about the matter does not seem to speak it.” He then gives an example in which a father is rumored to have been having sex with his son’s wife, who then becomes pregnant. Hermogenes explains that the son “ought to reveal the current rumor of adultery by allusion [ἔµφασις], so as to reprove the father irreproachably and decorously, but without openly saying, ‘he is committing adultery with my wife,’ and making clear that this is

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6 *Inv.* 4.13 (Rabe, 204 = Kennedy, 188).
7 *Inv.* 4.13 (Rabe, 206 = Kennedy, 188-90).
8 *Inv.* 4.13 (Rabe, 208 = Kennedy, 192).
the case. Therefore in this way we made use of such a figure and, speaking openly, we seemed not to say it."

This example of ἔμφασις slightly differs from those that Demetrius and Quintilian offer. According to the examples from the latter two, ἔμφασις is to allude to some meaning without openly saying it. The opposite is the case in this example from Hermogenes, which shows that one may also say something openly as though it were not said at all. Hermogenes does, however, offer other examples of ἔμφασις that more closely cohere with those in Demetrius and Quintilian.

For instance, he shows also that in certain situations a speaker may allude to something by using language that can be understood in more than one way. He states, “It is necessary in such cases, those by allusion [ἕμφασις] I mean, that the words also be able to supply a double meaning [διττά], to show both what is irreproachable and what is significant.” The example he gives illustrates how one might accomplish this figure by capitalizing upon the polysemous capacity of the word συνεῖναι, meaning both “to have intercourse with” and “to live with.” There was a rumor, he illustrates, that a father was having intercourse (συνεῖναι) with his daughter. The mother related the rumor to her son and then hanged herself. When the father asked the son about the rumor that led to his mother’s death, the son would not say, and as a result the father renounces him. The son then declares, “Now as for this renunciation I have little concern. But I am distressed for my father, since after having such a large family he will be with [συζήσεται] his daughter alone and live with her [συζήσεται].”

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9 Inv. 4.13 (Rabe, 209 = Kennedy, 194).
10 Inv. 4.13 (Rabe, 209 = Kennedy, 194).
11 Inv. 4.13 (Rabe, 209-10 = Kennedy, 194).
Quintilian appears to be much more restrained about the use of such a figure. According to him, a figure that depends upon the double meaning of a word is “the most trivial kind” (Inst. 9.2.99). Even though he appears not to think highly of figures that create ambiguity either through individual words or through word-arrangement, he does nonetheless provide some examples within his discussion; and the examples he cites probably attest to broader usage of such figures. He furthermore concludes his treatment of this type of schema with an example of an ambiguous statement that Cicero made against Clodia: “especially when everyone thought she was the amica of everyone rather than the enemy of anyone” (Inst. 9.2.99). Here, as Butler notes, the figure turns on the word amica, which could mean that she is everyone’s “friend” or everyone’s “mistress.”

Earlier in his discussion, Quintilian provides an example of a controversia with a double meaning as he advises against making a figure too obvious—claiming that “a figure without a veil loses that which actually makes it a figure” (Inst. 9.2.69). Here he explains that one way to avoid making the figure too transparent is to steer away from the kind of figure that is “based upon words of dubious or double meaning, as is the case in [the controversia about] the suspected daughter-in-law: ‘I married the wife who was pleasing [placere] to my father’” (Inst. 9.2.69). Presumably the speaker is addressing a controversy about an affair between his wife and father. The statement in one sense means that the woman “was pleasing” to the father as a suitable wife for his son, and in another that she “was pleasing” to the father sexually.

Related to this example is one that Quintilian regards as “much more tasteless” (multo ineptius)—namely, a case in which a double meaning is conveyed through ambiguous word-arrangement or, as he calls it, “ambiguous compositions” (compositiones ambiguae). The

example is a *controversia* in which a father is thought to have had sexual desires for his virgin daughter, who has been raped. When the father asks who raped her, she answers, *Tu, pater, nescis?* This reply allows for two meanings: “Father, do you not know?” or “You did, father, do you not know?” (*Inst.* 9.2.70).

We see a similar example in the *controversia* about the rapist who, in order to escape the death penalty, must secure pardon within thirty days from both the father of the victim and his own father. The rapist obtains pardon from the father of the victim but not from his own; and as a result, he accuses his father of madness. If the father now promises to pardon his son, there is no longer a dispute. But if he holds out no hope for his son, although he may not seem mad, he will certainly appear to be cruel and will turn the judge against himself. Quintilian explains that Latro offers the best solution to this *controversia*. The rapist asks his father, “Will you kill me then?” And the father replies, *Si potero*, “If I can” (*Inst.* 9.2.90-91). The ambiguity in this statement appears in the word *potero*, which here we could translate more specifically, either “If it is within my power” or “If I can bear it.”

For Quintilian, this particular *controversia* serves as an illustration for the kind of “innuendo” (*significatio*) that is “hidden” (*latens*)—one that provides “some hope for clemency, not openly [*palam*], since we should not bargain, but through some plausible suspicion [*suspicio*]” (*Inst.* 9.2.90). That a *significatio* would serve to raise some *suspicio* in the minds of the hearers is an idea we see also in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, where the author explains, “Innuendo [*significatio*] is that which leaves more in suspicion [*suspicio*] than was put down in the speech” (4.67). Caplan seems right to view *significatio* in this handbook as the author’s term
for ἔμφασις. While the author does not use the term *emphasis*, his description of *significatio* does have other points of contact with Quintilian’s instruction on this *schema*. For example, in illustrating ἔμφασις, what Quintilian says about speech being “cut off” (*abscissa*) seems to correspond to *abscissio* in *Rhet. Her. 4.67*. Also, Quintilian’s statement about how a *schema* is something hidden for the hearer to discover (*Inst. 9.2.65*) appears to echo a similar point in *Rhet. Her. 4.67* about *significatio*—namely, that it “allows the hearer himself to suspect [*suspicari*] something when the orator has held it back.” This rhetorician also explains that one way a speaker may create *significatio* is “through ambiguity [*per ambiguum*], when a word can be taken in two or more senses, but is nevertheless taken in the way that he who spoke it intends” (*Rhet. Her. 4.67*).

2. Discretion (*εὐπρέπεια*)

In discussing ἐσχηματισμένον, Demetrius explains that “the true figure [*σχῆμα*] of speech is spoken with these two aims, discretion [*εὐπρέπεια*] and security [*ἀσφάλεια*]” (Eloc. 287). What he means by *εὐπρέπεια* may not be entirely clear at first, since the term can be used for stylistic “beauty,” as well as for “speciousness” in speech. Based on the example he gives from Plato’s *Phaedo*, however, his usage of *εὐπρέπεια* in this context appears to refer to “discretion” or “circumspection” in speech and not merely ornamentation in style. Plato is modeling *εὐπρέπεια*, Demetrius explains, when he wishes to reproach (λοιδορεῖν) Aristippus and Cleombrotus but then restrains himself from doing so “explicitly” (διαρρήδην). When Plato speaks “discreetly” (*εὐπρεπῶς*), he is able to imply his meaning and at the same avoid putting himself at risk. Even

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though he might have reproached his hearers explicitly “without there being any danger
[ἀκίνδυνος], Plato reproaches them by a figure [ἐν σχήματι]” (Eloc. 288).

In the next example that Demetrius provides, the speaker uses “a figure of speech out of
necessity” (ἐξ ἀνάγκης σχήματος λόγου), that is, to avoid putting himself in danger while
addressing a tyrant. When Demetrius of Phalerum was before the Macedonian ruler Craterus, “he
used a figure [σχηματίζειν] and said reproachfully, ‘We ourselves once welcomed these
ambassadors and this Craterus [Κρατερὸν τοῦτον].’ For in using the demonstrative ‘this’
[τοῦτον], all the arrogance of Craterus is alluded to [ἐμφαίνει] and reproached by a figure [ἐν
σχήματι]” (Eloc. 289).

Understanding εὐπρέπεια as a kind of “discretion” in speaking finds support also in the
first treatise on figured speech from Pseudo-Dionysius of Halicarnassus. This author explains
that one type of figure involves saying what one wishes, “but needing to use discretion
[εὐπρέπεια], either on account of the reputation of the persons to whom the speech is delivered
or for the sake of security [ἄσφάλεια] against the hearers” (Ars Rhet. 8.2). Similarly, in the
second treatise on the “figured form of speeches” (ἐσχηματισμένη ἰδέα λόγων) from Pseudo-
Dionysius (Ars Rhet. 9.1), the author invokes Homer as showing an example of a character who
seeks “to speak discreetly” (εὐπρεπῶς λέγειν). According to this rhetorician, when Poseidon is
angry with Zeus, Iris advises Poseidon “to speak with more discretion [εὐπρεπέστερον λέγειν],
so that his speech will be with less danger [ἀκινδυνότερος].” The rhetorician goes on to explain
that Iris gives this advice—which she also offers “in a discreet way” (τὸ εὐπρεπές)—so that
Poseidon will restrain his παρρησία, “freedom of speech” (Ars Rhet. 9.3).

To place restrictions upon παρρησία would naturally make it more difficult for the hearer
to detect any overt criticisms that might prove dangerous for the speaker. What the speaker really
thinks about a given matter is thus partially concealed through the figured speech. As Pseudo-Dionysius explains, to speak “discreetly” (ἐὐπρεπῶς) about an issue is “to hide” (κλέπτειν) one’s opinion (Ars Rhet. 9.10). This author shows that although one instance of figured speech may appear to be “more naked” (γυμνότερος) than another, speaking “discreetly” (ἐὐπρεπῶς) to whatever degree remains one of the aims of figured speech (Ars Rhet. 9.15).

3. Security (ἀσφάλεια)

In addition to εὐπρέπεια, Demetrius explains that the second aim of the true figure of speech is ἀσφάλεια, “security” (Eloc. 287). For Demetrius, the purpose of ἀσφάλεια is to provide a safeguard against those members of the audience—as he calls them, “powerful men and women” and “tyrants” (Eloc. 289, 292, 293)—who might take offense at criticism and retaliate with some form of punishment. He explains that Plato employed figured speech when addressing the tyrant Dionysius. While Dionysius “was reproved for his falsehood,” the speech is “at the same time elevated and secure [ἀσφαλής]” (Eloc. 290). And correspondingly, this kind of speech is especially necessary when addressing such rulers as Philip of Macedon and Hermeias of Atarneus, who were easily provoked to anger by supposed references to their physical traits. In giving these particular examples, Demetrius explains that he wishes “to allude [ἐμφαίνειν] especially to the tyrannical character, since doing so especially calls for secure speech [λόγος

14 Tacitus attests that orators and authors living at the end of the first and beginning of the second centuries CE would need to use their words with caution when he contrasts the reign of Domitian with that of Trajan by describing the latter as “a time when it is permitted to feel what you wish and to say what you feel” (Hist. 1.1; cf. 3.54). Thus Dio Cassius remarks about that emperor: “To accusations he gave no regard, to anger he was no slave” (68.6.4). And as Epictetus shows—whose teachings of course stem from the reign of Trajan—many seem to have taken advantage of their newfound freedom of speech: “Do people ever stop reviling Caesar? What then? Does not Zeus know about this? Do they not report to Caesar what is said? What then does he do? He knows that if he punishes all who revile him, he will not have anyone to rule” (Diatr. 3.4.7-8). Under Roman law, one could undergo punishment for dicta, “things said,” as well as for scripta, “things written” (Dig. 48.19.16). See also Dio Cassius, 77.11.1.
ἀσφαλὴς], which is called figured [ἐσχηματισμένος]” (Eloc. 293). In addition to addressing tyrants in this fashion, Demetrius explains that “great and powerful democracies” also require figured speech. In such a context, he states, “to flatter is shameful, and to rebuke is dangerous [ἐπισφαλῆς]; but the best approach is that between the two, that is, what is figured [ἐσχηματισμένον]” (Eloc. 294).

As we saw above under εἰρρήσεια, Pseudo-Dionysius affirms this point in remarking that an orator will apply figured speech “for the sake of security [ἀσφάλεια] against the hearers” (Ars Rhet. 8.2). The author notes that sometimes a speaker may defer παρρησία about a matter as though to address it on another occasion (Ars Rhet. 8.4). In the second treatise on figured speech in Pseudo-Dionysius, this author too explains, “One must observe that figured speeches [οἱ σχήματισμοί] are invented in dangerous situations [κίνδυνοι]” (Ars Rhet. 9.5). Accordingly, one particular λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος can offer “a secure [ἀσφαλῆς] display of what will be said before the free speech [παρρησία] that is later to be said, forestalling the distress of its hearing.”

Homer made this rhetorical move in one instance when Achilles and the seer in turn address Agamemnon. As this example shows, Achilles provided the initial ἀσφάλεια against Agamemnon, which then allowed for the seer’s later παρρησία when speaking to Agamemnon.

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15 Philostratus relates how Herodes Atticus behaved when standing before Marcus’ tribunal and implies that only an insane or untrained individual would neglect to use figured speech when addressing an Emperor’s misdeeds: “For he came and brought accusations against the emperor; and he did not even figure [σχηματίζειν] his speech, though it seems like a man trained in such rhetoric would have controlled his anger” (VS 561). Fronto praises Marcus himself for using rhetorical figures (σχήματα) in his speeches to the Senate—explaining that though he spoke briefly and indirectly, his words remained forceful and did not stir up the city toward violence (Ad M. Ant. Imp.et invicem 1.2.6; LCL 2:40). The editions of Fronto’s correspondence cited here are those of M. P. J. van den Hout, M. Cornelii Fontonis. Epistulae (Leiden: Brill, 1954); and C. R. Haines, The Correspondence of Marcus Cornelius Fronto (2 vols.; Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1919).

16 The kind of λόγος ἐσχηματισμένος that is based upon ἀσφάλεια—a species of figured speech this author identifies as χρῶμα, “color” (Ars Rhet. 2.8.2)—places restrictions upon παρρησία (2.8.3).
For this rhetorician also, ἀσφάλεια and εὐπρέπεια go hand in hand. Both Achilles and the seer attend to what is discreet (τὸ εὐπρέπες) in their speeches. Because Achilles speaks “in the figure of investigating [ζήτησις] and being at a loss [ἀπορία],” he provides ἀσφάλεια for the seer (<ἐν> ἀσφαλείᾳ πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως), as well as for himself (τὸ ἀσφαλές προδιοικουμένου). The rhetorician states, “This is one example of discretion [εὐπρέπεια] in figured speeches, to speak through enigmas [αινίγματα] what one thinks, to say so both in the discourse and in the foreshadowing of the speeches, before saying so—thus showing in the prooemion what is about to be distressing” (Ars Rhet. 9.7).

Later in this treatise, the rhetorician shows also how an author may figure her or his writing on two levels, invoking an example from Euripides’ play Melanippe the Wise. According to this rhetorician, the character Melanippe uses figured speech, while Euripides himself is also applying figured speech to the play as a whole. The rhetorician explains, “it has a double figure [διπλοῦν σχῆμα], that of the poet on the one hand, and that of the character in the play, Melanippe, on the other.” There is accordingly some interplay between these two uses of figured speech, as he states, “the one who speaks figuratively must come as close as possible to dissolving the figure with the security of the figure [τοῦ λῦσαι τὸ σχῆμα μετὰ τῆς ἀσφαλείας τοῦ σχήματος]” (Ars Rhet. 9.11).

It is initially unclear what this rhetorician means by “dissolving the figure with the security of the figure.” Yet Hermogenes also advises against “dissolving the allusions” (λύειν τὰς ἐμφάσεις) to the extent that the λόγοι appear γυμνοί, “naked.” And here we are reminded of Quintilian’s point that if there is no veil, then it is not actually a figure (Inst. 9.2.69).

Furthermore, in the first treatise on figured speech from Pseudo-Dionysius, that rhetorician

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17 Inv. 4.13 (Rabe, 208 = Kennedy, 192).
explains that one way to escape notice in speaking is to figure a figure, which is itself a kind of double figure *(Ars Rhet. 8.16)*. If the rhetorician in the second treatise has a similar aim in view when he refers to “dissolving the figure with the security of the figure,” the statement would appear to capture the tension between concealment and revelation in the application of figured speech. In such cases, there is never complete concealment, just as there is never full revelation. Both the concealment and the revelation must maintain their proper limits in order for the speech to remain secure and at the same time to achieve its end. In other words, an author or speaker must not reveal more than what would otherwise violate the “security” of the writing or speech. And at the same time, he or she must not conceal to the extent that readers or hearers would fail to grasp the meaning that is conveyed through figured speech.¹⁸

4. Freedom of Speech (*παρρησία*)

As our discussion has already indicated, figured speech appears to be the opposite of *παρρησία*.¹⁹

According to the discussion on “figured problems” from the writings attributed to Apsines and Hermogenes, ἔμφασις is the particular rhetorical figure applied “whenever we are unable to speak because we are hindered [κωλύειν] and do not have freedom of speech [παρρησία].”²⁰

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¹⁸ Cf. what Mitchell calls the “veil scale” in her reading of the Corinthian correspondence. As she states: “Paul continually and strategically adjusted the focus between clarity and obscurity (saphêneia, asapheia) depending upon the hermeneutical, rhetorical and theological needs of the case at hand. Those who followed him and saw him as exegetical mentor would do the same” *(Paul, the Corinthians, 77)*.

¹⁹ Cf. Quintilian: “For what is less figured than true freedom?” *(Inst. 9.2.27)*.

²⁰ Apsines: κατὰ ἔμφασιν δὲ ἐστιν, ὅταν λέγειν μὴ δυνάμενοι τῷ κεκωλύσθαι καὶ παρρησίαν μὴ ἔχειν ἐν σχήματι ὀλλής ἀξιώσεως ἐμφαίνωμεν κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν τοῦ λόγου (Spengel and Hammer, 330 = Patillon, 112); and Hermogenes: Κατὰ ἔμφασιν δὲ ἐστιν, ὅταν λέγειν μὴ δυνάμενοι διὰ τὸ κεκωλύσθαι καὶ παρρησίαν μὴ ἔχειν *(Inv. 4.13 [Rabe, 206 = Kennedy, 188])*). Ahl states, “isegorie, ‘equality of speech,’ and what the Greeks more generally called parrhesia, ‘the right to say everything,’ is for most of us, as it was for Herodotus, ‘the first requisite of a state.’ Repression of ‘equality of speech’ is normally associated with tyrannical regimes, with ideological or religious absolutism” (“Art of Safe Criticism,” 174). And similarly,
This particular figured problem corresponds closely with one of the figuratae controversiae Quintilian describes as a situation in which “it is unsafe to speak openly” (Inst. 9.2.66), a scenario for speaking he also claims was “commonly taught in the schools” (Inst. 9.2.67; cf. 9.2.81). When such a schema is applied under conditions of tyranny, he elucidates, the speaker not only evades danger (periculum) through “the ambiguity [ambiguitas] of the meaning,” he or she also wins favor among the audience through such a display of craftiness (Inst. 9.2.67-68). He explains that one can actually speak against tyrants as openly as one wishes, “as long as the speech is able to be understood also in another way” (Inst. 9.2.67).

In contrast to a situation in which a speaker uses figured speech for the purpose of making verbal abuse appear benign, Pseudo-Dionysius explains that one may also feign anger and παρρησία in order to speak in favor of someone. A speech in which Diomedes reviles Agamemnon serves as “an example of speaking in support of someone by accusing him, making use of figured speech” (Ars Rhet. 8.13).

5. Irony (εἰρωνεία)

The rhetoricians do not appear to be in full agreement on the relationship between εἰρωνεία and the figure that is associated with ἔμφασις. When Demetrius explains how Aeschines characterized Telauges, he notes that nearly the entire διήγησις “might cause confusion as to whether it is admiration or ironic mockery [χλευασμός]. Such an ambiguous form of speech, although not irony [εἰρωνεία], nevertheless has some hint [ἔμφασις] of irony” (Eloc. 291). Quintilian also points to the similarity between this schema and εἰρωνεία, but then he delimits

Chiron remarks: “On a, avec la théorie du discours figuré, l’un des principaux modes de survie d’une rhétorique argumentative compatible avec un univers politique où la liberté d’expression a disparu” (“Le logos eskhematismenos,” 252). Julian, e.g., praises Constantius for granting the privileges of both ἰσηγορία and παρρησία (Or. 1.17b).
εἰρωνεία as a sense that is “the opposite” (contrarium) of what is stated and the other schema as “something else that is hidden also for the hearer to discover, as it were” (Inst. 9.2.65).

That Demetrius and Quintilian distinguish this figure from irony reflects the attempt of each rhetorician to be precise in his instruction, given the similarity between the two figures. Yet this need to distinguish might also indicate that some of their contemporaries conflated these figures in how they were understood and applied. Indeed, in the second treatise on figured speech from Pseudo-Dionysius, the author states: “To put it briefly, every figure of irony [ὅλον τὸ τῆς εἰρωνείας σχῆμα] is a sign of figured speech [ἐσχηματισμένου λόγου σημεῖον]” (Ars Rhet. 9.1).21 By this statement he may mean that the allusive quality in irony is an indication that one is veiling her or his true position on a given matter.

According to the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum attributed to Anaximenes, “Irony [εἰρωνεία] is saying something while pretending not to say it, or calling things by the opposite [τὰ ἐναντία] of their actual names” (Rhet. Alex. 21.1). Hermogenes explains that indignation is sometimes conveyed when a speaker thinks an opponent is “worthy of names or deeds that are the opposite [τὰ ἐναντία] of those stated. Such are ironic statements [αἱ εἰρωνεῖαι],” he goes on to explain (Id. 2.8.19-21). The Rhetorica ad Herennium (4.34.46) and Quintilian offer similar expositions regarding contrarium within their broader discussions on allegory. As Quintilian remarks, “when the opposite [contraria] is expressed, it is irony [ironia]; they call this mocking [illusio]” (Inst. 8.6.54).

This understanding of irony—to convey meaning that is the opposite (τὰ ἐναντία) of what is actually expressed in words—is noticeably similar to the figured problem “according to the opposite” (κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον), as discussed in Apsines and Hermogenes. It is curious, however,
that nowhere in their respective treatments do they apply the designation εἰρωνεία to this problem. Are they referring to the use of εἰρωνεία without actually calling it by name? They explain that such problems are “whenever we argue for the opposite of what we say.” Pericles then serves as an example of one who speaks the opposite of the position he actually holds.

When the Athenians asked for peace from the Lacedaimonians, the Lacedaimonians asked for Pericles in return. As the Athenians are deliberating about whether to hand over Pericles, according to Hermogenes, Pericles says, “send me,” although he really believed “that he ought not to be sent.” The statement, “send me,” would appear to be ironic, as εἰρωνεία is defined in antiquity. Rather than specifying the statement as irony, however, Apsines and Hermogenes use the more general designation, σχῆμα λόγου, “figure of speech.”

6. Indirect Speech (ὁ πλάγιος λόγος)

As Apsines and Hermogenes explain, what are similar to, yet distinct from, problems according to the opposite are those that are πλάγια, “indirect.” Such a problem is “whenever, while arguing for the opposite, the speech accomplishes something else as well.” As Hermogenes explains, problems that are ἐναντία and those that are πλάγια “differ only in this respect—the opposite

22 Apsines: Ἐναντία μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, ὅταν τὰ ἐναντία κατασκευάζωμεν οὗ λέγομεν (Spengel and Hammer, 330 = Patillon, 112); Hermogenes: Ἐναντία μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, ὅταν τὸ ἐναντίον κατασκευάζωμεν, οὗ λέγομεν (Inv. 4.13 [Rabe, 205 = Kennedy, 188]).

23 Apsines: ἤτησαν Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ Λακεδαίμονιοι εἰρήνην, οἳ δὲ ἀντήτησαν Περικλέα· βουλευομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων αὐτὸς ὁ Περικλῆς ἀξιοὶ ἀπίεναι. Ομολογουμένως γὰρ ὁ Περικλῆς, εἰ καὶ λέγει πέμπεσθαι, ἀλλὰ σχῆματι λόγου χρήται (Spengel and Hammer, 330 = Patillon, 112); Hermogenes: ἤτησαν Ἀθηναίοι παρὰ Λακεδαίμονιοι εἰρήνην, οἳ δὲ ἀντήτησαν Περικλέα, βουλευομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων αὐτὸς ὁ Περικλῆς ύβρισσατον ἐπὶ τῇ βουλῇ ἄξιοι ἀπέρχεσθαι· ομολογουμένως γὰρ ὁ Περικλῆς, εἰ καὶ λέγει ‘πέμψατε με’, σχῆματι μόνον λόγου λέγει, ἔπει δὲ καὶ μεταχειρίσει χρήται ταῖς κατασκευαζούσαις, ὅτι οὐ χρή πεμφθῆναι αὐτὸν (Inv. 4.13 [Rabe, 205 = Kennedy, 188]).

24 Verbatim in Apsines (Spengel and Hammer, 330 = Patillon, 112) and Hermogenes (Inv. 4.13 [Rabe, 205 = Kennedy, 188]): ὅταν μετὰ τοῦ κατασκευαζέων τὸ ἐναντίον καὶ ἄλλο τι περαίνῃ ὁ λόγος.
ones deal with one matter, and the indirect ones carry a double meaning [διπλοῦν ἐκφέρειν τὸν νοῦν], and often even more.”

The example we see in Apsines and Hermogenes is that there was a rich man who promised to feed the city during a time of famine if he could in return slaughter a poor man. While the people of the city did not hand over the poor man, the poor man delivers a speech to give himself up. The poor man wants the opposite of what he says in the speech. He actually does not want to die and, by speaking “indirectly” (ἐκ πλαγίου), maintains that there is no grain and, if there is, it should be acquired without such an exchange. The poor man’s point appears to be that there actually is grain and that it can be obtained without his being slaughtered—that is, they can simply take it from the rich man.

In the first treatise on figured speech in Pseudo-Dionysius we also find instruction on how to present a figure “in indirect speech [πλάγιοι λόγοι].” To use such a figure, according to this author, is to employ “the art of escaping notice” (τοῦ λανθάνειν ἡ τέχνη)—an art he defines as consisting of two methods, “the addition of pathos” and “an interweaving [συμπλοκή] of proofs.” When using the first method, one may speak indignant complaints and thereby “deceive the audience [κλέπτειν τὸν ἀκροατήν]. For the hearers think that he is out of control and does not use precise speech but is rather delivering this in a state of passion. This too is the method of figuring this figure in order to escape notice” (Ars Rhet. 8.16).

Invent. 4.13 (Rabe, 206 = Kennedy, 190).

Apsines: πλούσιος ἐν λιμῷ ὑπέσχετο θρέψειν τὴν πόλιν, εἰ λάβοι πένητα πρὸς σφαγήν· οὐ δέδωκεν ὁ δήμος, ὁ πένης ἑαυτὸν πρὸς σφαγήν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον ὁ λόγος βούλεται καὶ ἐκ πλαγίου κατασκευάζει τὸ μὴ εἶναι σῖτον καὶ ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον βούλεται οὗπερ λέγει· ἀποθανεῖν γὰρ οὐ βούλεται, κατασκευάζει δὲ ἐκ πλαγίου καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸν σῖτον καὶ τὸ εἰ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς λαβεῖν (Inv. 4.13 [Rabe, 205 = Kennedy, 188]).

See Kennedy, Invention and Method, 189, note 273.
In the interweaving of proofs, which the author qualifies as “the greatest method of figures,” we see once again how figured speech can communicate a two-fold meaning. Here, “the same statements you would have spoken in a single-sensed proposal [ἅπλὴ ὑπόθεσις] accomplish the figure in indirect speech—establishing your private argument with the public one [ὁ οἰκεῖος ἀγών τῷ κοινῷ], as you learned from Demosthenes, from Thucydides, from Plato.”

The rhetorician concludes:

And on the whole, you must also know that figures are not obstacles [προσκρούματα] that are spoken in ambiguities of expression [ὁνομάτων ἀμφιβολίαι], but rather entire arguments are arranged by the art of interweaving. For the distribution of the figures is a single-sensed procedure, and the establishment of each of the heads accomplishes the indirect speech [πλάγιοι λόγοι] for those who are carried along [πορευόμενοι], as though through single-sensed speech. (Ars Rhet. 8.16)

In this closing statement, this author shows that in figured speech there may be a tension, if not a barrier, in the communication between speaker and audience. Even though the author is

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28 We may compare Pseudo-Dionysius on this point to what Leo Strauss calls “exoteric” writing—literature produced through a technique that enables an author to communicate both privately and publicly through one and the same text. As Strauss explains, persecution “gives rise to a peculiar technique of writing, and therewith to a peculiar type of literature, in which the truth about all crucial things is presented exclusively between the lines. That literature is addressed, not to all readers, but to trustworthy and intelligent readers only. It has all the advantages of private communication without having its greatest disadvantage—that it reaches only the writer’s acquaintances. It has all the advantages of public communication without having its greatest disadvantage—capital punishment for the author” (Persecution and the Art of Writing [Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988], 25). Although Strauss does not indicate that Pseudo-Dionysius in particular informed his thinking, he does mention that this technique is “buried in the writings of the rhetoricians of antiquity” (ibid., 24). See also what James C. Scott calls “the public” and “the hidden transcript” (Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990], passim). For example, the Brer Rabbit stories contain hidden, encoded meanings while also appearing on the public stage (ibid., 19, 162-66). We must acknowledge, however, that Scott’s public and hidden transcripts do not necessarily appear simultaneously within one given story or text. The hidden transcript may at times appear only within a private space, while at other times it may take public stage; and the public transcript can be a form of silence. According to Scott, many or perhaps most hidden transcripts remain hidden from public view (ibid., 5-6, 16). Scott does nevertheless observe cases in which the meaning of a publicized text, echoing Strauss, “is rarely straightforward; it is often meant to communicate one thing to those in the know and another to outsiders and authorities” (ibid., 184).
explaining how one may “escape notice” through figured speech, one does nevertheless make a “private argument” in using it. Accordingly, the author clarifies that the figures are not meant to create mere “ambiguities” that would stand in the way of comprehension, or in other words, “obstacles” that would hinder the movement of “those who are carried along.”

Earlier in the treatise, the author acknowledged this potential problem in cases where a speaker says the opposite of what he or she means. He writes, “there is a great danger that it will not be detected by the hearers that you are using art [τεχνάζειν] in order to express your opinion by means of opposition [ἐναντίωσις]; for if the art [ἡ τέχνη] is not exposed, what will happen is they will be eager to accept what the rhetor pretends to say, not what he wants them to figure out” (Ars Rhet. 8.4).

7. Figured Speech as an Art (τέχνη)

When we read the rhetoricians, what we do not find is a standard list of figures within the rhetorical style that they classify as figured speech. What we do find, however, is that these rhetoricians tend to agree more or less upon certain figures or aspects of style that can serve speakers or writers in accomplishing figured speech (e.g., allusion, indirect speech, and irony). There are, however, other figures that receive less air time, as it were, but that nonetheless appear within their discussions on figured speech. We saw in the second treatise from Pseudo-Dionysius, for example, that Achilles is said to have spoken “in the figure of investigating [ζήτησις] and being at a loss [ἀπορία],” which is how he provides security (τὸ ἀσφαλές) for himself in addressing Agamemnon (Ars Rhet. 9.7). As rhetorical figures, we could not claim that ζήτησις and ἀπορία are used exclusively for the purpose of escaping notice; but as this example illustrates, for this rhetorician these figures may serve the speaker who aims toward secure speech.
We notice also in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* that a speaker may create *significatio* not only “through ambiguity,” but also “through hyperbole [*exsuperatio*], when more was said than the truth allows, for the purpose of increasing suspicion,” and “through consequence [*consequentia*],” that is, “when the things that might follow from some other thing are mentioned, from which the entire matter is left in suspicion.” In other words, a figure through consequence appears when the premise is unstated, as in the example this rhetorican gives: “if you should say to the son of a fish seller: ‘Be quiet, you, whose father would customarily wipe his nose on his forearm’” (4.67). Left unmentioned is perhaps that the father’s hands would smell like fish.

Moreover, in the first treatise from Pseudo-Dionysius, that rhetorician explains how a speaker may “interweave” (συμπλέκειν) and “mix” (μιγνύναι) different rhetorical “themes” (ὑποθέσεις) and “headings” (κεφάλαια) in the use of figured speech. “For the blending [*κράσις*] within the speeches,” he states, “is the art of the figure [ἡ τέχνη τοῦ σχήματος].” As he shows, a speaker may combine the tools of encomia (ἐγκώμια), from epideictic rhetoric, with those of offering an exhortation (προτρέπειν), from deliberative rhetoric. Thucydides, for instance, uses a παραβολή, which is “a heading in encomia,” when he gives advice (συμβουλευτικοί λόγοι) to his audience about the war (*Ars Rhet.* 8.9).

Even though his term παραβολή is the same as that used throughout the Synoptic Gospels for certain sayings and stories attributed to Jesus, it becomes clear that this author is describing not what the evangelists mean more broadly by “parable,” but rather what other rhetoricians call a σύγκρισις, “comparison.”

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those who are praised alongside other popular individuals” (Ars Rhet. 8.9). This definition corresponds closely to Theon’s definition of σύγκρισις, that is, “speech that sets the better or the worse side by side.” 30 As Theon advises, in using a σύγκρισις, “we must either not make censorious remarks or keep them as brief as possible.” One of the primary aims of a σύγκρισις, he explains, is to show the superiority of one over another. 31 Some parables of Jesus may indeed contain elements of σύγκρισις (e.g., the two sons, Luke 15.11-32; the rich man and Lazarus, 16.19-31; and the Pharisee and the tax collector, 18.9-14), but many parables are also closely akin to allegories (e.g., Luke 19.11-27)—that is, a written story whose purpose is to convey another, unwritten “story” in the minds of hearers or readers (i.e., for the one “with ears to hear,” Luke 8.8; 14.35; cf. 9.44-45). 32 In a σύγκρισις, on the other hand, usually both parts of the comparison appear written within the text.

Figured speech, however, does appear to have some similarity to allegory. Apart from the double meanings conveyed through “indirect” speech, for example, the rhetoricians indicate that figured speech more generally may carry a meaning beyond what is explicitly stated. As we noted above, in his discussion on schema, Quintilian explains that “through something suggestive we intend our hearers to understand what we do not say” (Inst. 9.2.65). While this statement alone would not necessarily suggest that a schema has a double meaning, later in the discussion, Quintilian remarks that “the whole attempt at saying one thing while intending that something else be understood is similar to allegory [allegoria]” (Inst. 9.2.92). We may compare

31 Prog. 10 (Spengel, 112-13 = Patillon, 78-79).
32 We should also distinguish between, on the one hand, how such parables are allegorical compositions and, on the other, how later interpreters exegeted them allegorically. See further Hans-Josef Klauck, “Allegorische Exegese im Frühjudentum und Urchristentum,” in Cornutus, Die Griechischen Götter: Ein Überblick über Namen, Bilder und Deutungen (SAPERE 14; ed. Heinz-Günther Nesselrath; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 179-205, esp. 196-200.
this part of Quintilian’s instruction to what the author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* says about *similitudo*, which appears within his discussion of *significatio*. He explains that *significatio* is conveyed “through analogy [*similitudo*], when we speak by some analog that conveys nothing more, but from it we insinuate what we might be thinking” (4.67).

All of these examples show that figured speech may take a number of different forms. Accordingly, if we explore Luke-Acts in the attempt to answer whether and how the author uses figured speech in depicting the Pharisees, we would seemingly need to remain open to the possibility of that author employing a variety of figures that might achieve his rhetorical goals. Moreover, rather than limiting ourselves to a search for ambiguous words or arrangement of words, for instance, a more comprehensive investigation would take into account the overall aims of figured speech (i.e., to write securely and discreetly) and thus entail analyzing the texts for possible signs of “hidden” meanings or allusions, however they might surface. Even though such an investigation would require us to locate isolated instances of figured speech in those scenes involving Pharisees, we must attend also to a point that Pseudo-Dionysius makes emphatically and persistently throughout the first treatise on figured speech—namely, that entire λόγοι may be figured (*Ars Rhet.* 8.1). Are there indications that the author of Luke-Acts has figured his two λόγοι (Acts 1.1) more broadly? An approach at asking such questions would ultimately acknowledge rhetoric as an art whose subtleties might find expression in multiple ways, both on smaller and larger scales.
Chapter Two: Methodological Approach

In performing this exegetical investigation into the Pharisees of Luke-Acts, we shall attempt to uncover and analyze whatever evidence is available for understanding these texts during the period in which they were written. Ultimately, it is perhaps best to allow the nature of the evidence to dictate the approach we then take in evaluating that evidence. As we proposed already, studying the Lukan Pharisees with the help of ancient rhetorical instruction on figured speech may yield some positive results for understanding how the author is portraying and possibly conceiving of these characters. This approach will therefore occupy much of our analysis; and throughout we shall ask whether we can identify any particular aspect of figured speech that the author may be applying. There are, however, other interpretive questions that will demand our attention and that may offer further insight into the larger problem.

1. Redactional Analysis

Scholars take for granted that the author of Luke-Acts used sources in composing his books, especially the Gospel (Luke 1.1-3). We can be confident that the author had the Gospel of Mark among his sources; and based on the material that Luke’s Gospel and Matthew’s Gospel share, but is absent in Mark’s, we can hypothesize that he used at least one more source, which scholar’s conventionally designate Q (i.e., a two-source hypothesis). While it remains possible that the author of Luke-Acts knew Matthew’s Gospel or that the author of Matthew’s knew Luke’s, a more convincing argument demonstrating such knowledge would be required.¹

In depicting the Pharisees, to what extent does the author of Luke-Acts revise and develop his sources, and to what rhetorical end? In comparison to Mark, for example, has the author “hidden” or “alluded to” any clues about the Pharisees in composing those characters into his own Gospel? The tools of source and redaction criticisms will at times become essential in order to answer such questions.

A number of scholars argue on redaction-critical grounds that the author of Luke-Acts presents a more favorable portrait of the Pharisees than do Mark and Matthew. They hold that

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because the author at times tones down what appears within the synoptic parallels as rather vitriolic invective against the Pharisees, he is not as invested in depicting those characters as villains as are the other evangelists or is even favorable toward at least some members of the sect, if not all of them. This view, however, is not without its problems, because it is based on the assumption that each of these authors employs invective in the same or at least a similar way; and those who hold this view approach the texts by using a standard gauge for testing “hostile” or “friendly” attitudes among all three evangelists.

These redaction-critical studies on the Pharisees are also limited because they typically evaluate only those instances where there is a synoptic parallel with which Luke differs and then scarcely account for the unique portions of the Lukan Gospel narrative, such as his frequent comparisons between Pharisees and tax collectors. We may concede that performing synoptic comparisons is necessary for determining how the author retained or changed the material he draws from his sources. Yet that the author revises the overtly antagonistic material of his sources in creating what appears to be a less vituperative depiction of the Pharisees does not necessarily mean that he holds those characters in high esteem or wishes his audience to think positively of them. Even though the author of the Lukan Gospel consulted sources in writing his own, most scholars rightly acknowledge that among the three, Luke is the most stylistically distinctive.\(^3\) His own endorsement on rhetorical grounds—claiming to have carefully researched and arranged the material (1.3-4)—already distinguishes his narrative from the others and calls

for analyzing, on the author’s own terms, whether and to what extent his rhetorical method is unique, including in his characterizations of the Pharisees.4

2. Intertextual and Interconceptual Analysis

Closely related to source and redaction criticisms is intertextuality, since each can at times assume an earlier text upon which the author is drawing in putting together her or his own text(s). Scholars take for granted that the Septuagint and other writings influenced the author of

Luke-Acts. Does the author use and invoke such writings in his depictions of the Pharisees; and if so, how and to what effect?

In this study, we shall conceive of intertextuality as the relationship between texts that is initiated either by the author or the readers, or else one that is mutually established by each party. In one scenario, for example, an author may intentionally invoke or refer to a text, in which case readers may or may not recognize the reference. In another scenario, an author’s words may evoke another text into the minds of her or his readers—that is, a text that the author her or himself had not intended to invoke. In yet another scenario, an author may intentionally invoke or refer to a text; and then the readers also recognize that reference and perhaps read the author’s text in light of the earlier one. Yet it is often difficult to know with absolute certainty whether an author intended to invoke a given text. And it is of course impossible to know whether an author’s initial readers (who left us nothing in writing) would have appreciated that author’s “references” to an earlier text.

There are nonetheless different levels of probability when trying to determine whether the author of Luke-Acts uses a given text from the Septuagint, for example, in composing his own. We can say with full confidence that when Jesus unrolls the scroll of Isaiah and reads from it in Luke 4.17-19, the author of the Gospel (or less likely, an author of an earlier source) is using LXX Isaiah 61.1-2 (combined with echoes from Isa 58.6) in composing this material. Less certain, however, are possible “references” to texts that the author chooses not to “cite.” In chapter nine we shall ask whether there is a relationship between Exod 14.16-29 and Luke 6.6-11, based on a number of significant lexical parallels. Scholars have already convincingly demonstrated that in the corresponding scene from Mark 3.1-6, that evangelist presents a
typology of the crossing of the Red Sea. Does the author of the Lukan Gospel recognize this typology, and does he in any way develop it with details from Exod 14.16-29 that are absent in the Markan account? Similarly, in chapter thirteen we shall evaluate a possible relationship between *Psalms of Solomon* 8 and Luke 7 on the basis of some parallels between those two texts. Does the closeness in these parallels between them—as well as the number of parallels within such a small context in each—suggest at least some probability that the author is invoking *Pss. Sol.* 8 in composing this material?

The principle that the author and readers initiate the relationship between texts is one that applies also in what we are here calling “interconceptuality.” The difference between intertextuality and interconceptuality is that in the latter the author may not be drawing upon or referring to any one particular text (or a reader identifying a parallel text). He or she may rather be invoking a concept that is widely attested in their shared cultural milieu in order to convey some point to readers. We would nonetheless in many cases know about such a concept from other texts. But because the concept may be so commonplace, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to identify any particular text the author may be pointing to. In such cases, it may be safer to assume that conceptual parallels, as observed among the texts, reflect a broader tradition, trend, or social convention that multiple authors and readers share.

3. Rhetorical and Literary Analysis

What stems from and overlaps with the above analytical approaches are questions related to how Luke-Acts functions rhetorically as a literary “narrative” (διήγησις, Luke 1.1) in its final form.

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Even though the author draws upon sources, the fact that we have an abundance of unique material (especially throughout Luke 9.51-19.44; and Acts as a whole) shows that he is a composer in the true sense of the term and not merely a compiler. Yet we must not ignore the apparent albeit puzzling relationship between the Third Gospel and Marcion’s Gospel, a problem that has received much attention in recent years.⁶

In attempting to compare the Third Gospel to Marcion’s Gospel, one of the lingering questions is how significantly their wording overlapped in their parallel passages. If the wording in these parallel passages is as similar as some scholars have suggested, then this similarity may be an argument for the priority of the Third Gospel. The author of this Gospel seems to be too much of a rewriter to accept that he left so much of an earlier source unaltered. His revisions of Mark (and parts of the Pauline letters and the writings of Josephus) illustrate how much he departs from his sources in rewriting. If he did accept much of a “Proto-Luke” without making significant changes in the wording of such a source, we would then need to account for why he left so much intact.

The practice of attributing the unique material in the Third Gospel to a source (e.g., the hypothetical “L” source or “Proto-Luke,” which some scholars associate with Marcion’s Gospel) is often problematic in not allowing for the possibility that the author could have created much of his own material. This practice appears to stem from the larger problematic assumption that

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whatever the author included in his Gospel must have come from an earlier source. Yet if we must attribute every piece of material to a source, then we would also have to attribute that source to an earlier source, and that earlier source to an even earlier source, and so on. This approach would presuppose that authors never invent and only discover the materials that make up their writings. It is therefore important to concede that the author is competent enough to create and compose his own material, which may include significant portions of the unique material in his Gospel, as well as in Acts.

The question of whether the author “invented” or “discovered” (both acts fall under εὕρεσις in ancient rhetoric) the material that he incorporates into his narrative is often important—especially, for our purposes, if he has discovered a text or source that we can then analyze intertextually. Yet the next questions to ask are perhaps why he chose to include his material and thus how it ultimately functions within his two-volume narrative. To hold that the author would have presented material that does not appear to cohere within the larger context of his writings seems also to operate with the assumption that he was somehow subject to his sources and did not feel at liberty to revise them. Yet based on how he revises his Markan source and even chooses not to include everything from within that source (e.g., Mark 6.45-8.26), it is safer to assume that if this author had disagreed with his sources he would have either changed the material to suit his own purposes or omitted it altogether. Perhaps the author of Luke-Acts believed, as Aristotle did, that “if what is present or what is absent makes no visible difference, then it is not a relevant part of the whole” (Poet. 8.4). If so, it would then follow that when the author includes material also found in his sources, he is affirming its content rather than adhering to it out of obligation.

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7 See, e.g., Bovon: “A few pericopes belong neither to Q nor to Mark.” This fact leads him to conclude: “Thus Luke possesses additional materials” (Luke 1, 6).
Because the term “literary” has been variously used in the study of biblical narratives in recent centuries, it is important to specify how we are applying the term here. We do not mean what the source critics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries meant when they referred to their critical approach as “literary.” Nor do we mean the still popular interpretive method that applies modern literary theory to the study of biblical texts—that is, the approach that became increasingly popular during the latter half of the twentieth century, often called the “new literary criticism.”

There is clearly some overlap between the two criticisms that in the guild of biblical studies we often call “rhetorical” and “literary.” Broadly speaking, what rhetorical and literary approaches hold in common is that both seek to analyze texts carefully and judiciously. The goal of such an approach is what Greek-speaking authors called ἀκριβεία, “precision” or “accuracy,” which is perhaps the nearest equivalent to what modern academics seek to achieve in the task of “close reading.” Accordingly, both aim to engage the “narrative” of Luke-Acts in a way that informs the reading of it. And both ask questions about how characters appear within that narrative.

To give a more concrete example, when we read Luke-Acts through the lens of ancient rhetoric, the rhetorical figure called σύγκρισις might offer insight into whether and if so how the author situates his Pharisees in comparison to other characters, especially tax collectors. While scholars who apply a literary-critical lens may not necessarily identify the comparison as a rhetorical σύγκρισις and then ask what that means in antiquity, they may nevertheless recognize

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the similarities and differences between the portrayals of characters and thus appreciate the rhetorical effects of such portrayals, as perceived when reading the texts in their final form.

While there has been much we have learned and may continue to learn from studies on Luke-Acts that employ modern literary theory, an investigation into the question of figured speech in these two books requires that we contextualize them within ancient rhetorical instruction. Our approach here therefore will be to study Luke-Acts as ancient literary texts, working with the hypothesis that the author of these texts had likely received some form of rhetorical education.9

The instruction from the ancient rhetorical handbooks shows that authors would draw upon recognized rhetorical techniques when composing works of literature. Even though the instruction was often aimed primarily at students learning the craft of public speaking in the courtroom, the handbooks are replete with examples from literary texts—including the Homeric epics, the historical narratives of Thucydides, and the philosophical dialogues of Plato. Quintilian explains that among the first subjects a rhetorician should teach are three types of narrative (narratio), besides the kind used in a judicial setting—namely, fictitious narrative (such as tragedies and poems), artistic narrative (as in comedies), and historical narrative (Inst. 2.4.1-2).10 It appears that students of rhetoric would not only read such narratives in order to learn from skilled writers (Inst. 2.5.18-26), they would also practice writing them, especially the historical narrative (Inst. 2.18.5).11 Moreover, Theon explains that “training in the exercises is

10 See also Quintilian, Inst. 2.5.18-26; 2.18.5.
11 See also Theon, Prog. 1 (Spengel, 60 = Patillon, 2).
absolutely necessary, not only for those who are to become public speakers, but also for anyone who wishes to pursue the arts of poets, prose-writers, or any other craft involving words. For these make up the foundation, as it were, for every kind of verbal expression.”

If we evaluate Luke-Acts with attention to ancient rhetorical education, we would in part be studying the author’s style of composition and broader rhetorical aims and not merely the story he presents. Even though many modern literary scholars are disinclined to ask questions about “authorial intention,” as we observed already in defining figured speech, the ancient rhetoricians were unhesitant in attending to what a speaker or writer might “want” or “intend” an audience to understand through the process of communication. For these rhetoricians, it appears that the intention of a speaker or writer is foundational, and if that intention is not realized then the attempt at communicating is unsuccessful.

Our attention to what the author possibly wanted to convey, however, does not preclude an interest also in how readers might have received or understood Luke-Acts. As we saw in Quintilian, the use of figured speech actually invites audience participation in allowing hearers to discover what the speaker does not expressly say (Inst. 9.2.65, 92). Upon encountering such a figure, he explains, “the hearer enjoys comprehending and applauds his own genius and praises himself for someone else’s speech” (Inst. 9.2.78). Pseudo-Dionysius likewise appears to have both of these assumptions about a speaker’s intention, on the one hand, and a hearer’s understanding of that intention, on the other, when he refers to what a speaker “wants” hearers “to figure out” (Ars Rhet. 8.4). Perhaps the clearest example appears in the Rhetorica ad Herennium where the author explains how significatio may be conveyed through ambiguity,

12 Prog. 2 (Spengel, 70 = Patillon, 15).
13 The terms are 
velle (Rhet. Her. 4.67; Quintilian, Inst. 9.2.92) and βούλεσθαι (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ars Rhet. 8.4).
“when a word can be taken in two or more senses, but it is nevertheless taken in the way that he who spoke intends” (Rhet. Her. 4.67).

4. Historical Analysis

When reading the scholarly literature on the Pharisees in Luke-Acts, there are at least four broad questions that emerge in the attempt to decipher what is historical about them. First, do the interactions Jesus and his followers have with Pharisees represent exchanges the historical Jesus and his followers had with the pre-70, historical Pharisees? Perhaps with the exception of some interpretations of Luke 13.31-33, few scholars in recent decades would give a positive answer to this question.¹⁴

Second, to what extent are the Lukan Pharisees mere caricatures, and then to what extent do the caricatures belie any historical reality? Some have indeed persuasively argued that at least some aspects of the Pharisees are caricatures.¹⁵ The next step in the question, however, is to ask

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whether and how such a caricature might function within a historical context. It would of course be problematic to assume that caricatures in literature cannot point to historical persons, or that actual historical persons cannot become subject to literary caricature.\(^{16}\)

Showing how the Lukan Pharisees may be caricatures is nevertheless important, as it helps us to see that the historical Pharisees were not necessarily and characteristically the villainous persons the author at times makes them out to be. The accusation that they were “lovers of money” (Luke 16.14), for example, is a common charge used against intellectual or political rivals—as we will discuss in more detail in chapter ten. It is unlikely that the historical Pharisees were more immoral than the historical Christians of that period were. It is, however, highly possible that the Pharisees during the author’s day held more religious authority among Jews than the Christians did. This likelihood would perhaps explain why the author devotes so little attention to the Sadducees (who may have ceased to exist after 70) and focuses on the Pharisees as the group that chiefly rivaled the Christians.

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\(^{16}\) Judith Lieu articulates the issue in her study on second-century Christian literature: “Recognition of the stereotyping and of evidence of real contact, even in the same author, means we must speak about ‘image and reality’ in some form of interaction. When this literature speaks of Jews and Judaism there is a contemporary reality, one of which, in differing degrees, its authors are aware. Yet their own needs, the logic of their own argument, and the tradition they draw on, especially the ‘Old Testament’, help create and mould the terms in which they speak—to create an ‘image’.” She continues, “our primary question regarding the presentation of Judaism must be the elucidation of its rhetorical role; investigation of the historical reality can only then follow, always remembering the interaction between the two just described” (Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of the Christians in the Second Century [London and New York: T&T Clark, 1996], 12-13).
Third, do the Pharisees in Luke-Acts represent Jewish Christians with whom the author was at variance on certain issues (e.g., table fellowship with Gentiles and circumcision)? Jack Sanders has argued that the Pharisees in Luke’s Gospel are “prototypes of traditionally Jewish Christians (like the Pharisees in Acts 15.5).”¹⁷ He elaborates, “these Pharisees in the Gospel are the prototypes of the Christian Pharisees in Acts 15.5 who likewise advise that those desiring admission to the church should strictly follow the Law of Moses and not rely merely on their ‘belief’ (Luke 7.50) to get in.”¹⁸

The fact that Sanders takes his cue from the Pharisees in Acts 15.5, whom he regards as “Christian Pharisees,” is itself problematic. The designation “Christian Pharisees” of course does not appear in the text. And we shall evaluate in greater detail in chapter seven whether the author regards the Christians in Acts 15.5 as still belonging to the sect of the Pharisees, or whether they are former Pharisees. If they are former Pharisees, the next question to ask is whether their emergence from the sect of the Pharisees might offer some insight into the nature of their opposition.

The characters in Acts 15.5 also provide the basis for Sanders’ understanding of the statement about “the leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy” in Luke 12.1. He claims:

when the Lucan Jesus admonishes his followers (i.e., the church) to beware the Pharisaic leaven of hypocrisy (Luke 12.1), he must have in mind the Christian Pharisees, not the non-Christian ones, for what else can this warning mean to the Lucan church? We have seen that the way in which the warning is put is distinctively Lucan. What situation can Luke have in mind in the early Christian church that would justify this warning against the leaven of Pharisaic hypocrisy, if it is not the problem of the traditionally Jewish Christians within the church? Leaven works within the dough, not outside it.¹⁹

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This interpretation of the metaphor, however, is not the only viable answer. Even if we are to understand the metaphor along the lines that Sanders proposes, could we not rather typify the dough as the heritage of Israel, into which the Pharisees, as the evangelist views them, were attempting to add leaven that was uncharacteristic of their foregoing tradition? If so, it is possible to explain the conflict rather as one between two religious groups within Judaism—that is, the Pharisees and the Christians. Here we might compare the so-called parable of the wineskins in Luke 5.37-39 and the metaphor of the old wine (i.e., that belonging to the disciples of John the Baptist or the ones of the Pharisees, 5.33) as compared to the new wine (i.e., that to the disciples of Jesus). This parable appears to address concerns after the life of Jesus—that is, in days “when the bridegroom is taken away from them” (5.35). While it would be difficult to maintain that this parable and the corresponding parable of the garment (5.36) point to a break with Judaism, the two parables do suggest that the disciples of Jesus have no continuity with “the disciples of John” and “the ones of the Pharisees” (5.33) at least on issues pertaining to table fellowship.

A fourth question about the historicity of the Lukan Pharisees is, do they represent the sect of the Pharisees in a context after 70; and then does this sect have continuity or at least some close ties with emerging rabbinic Judaism? In his study of the Fourth Gospel, J. Louis Martyn has well articulated the view that the conflicts between the followers of Jesus and the Pharisees in that Gospel point to conflicts between Christians and Jews after 70, and not necessarily before. For example, when “many rulers” believe in Jesus but then refuse to confess it out of fear that the Pharisees would expel them from the synagogue (John 12.42), Martyn proposes that this and corresponding scenes (7.32-36; 9.1-41) contain elements reflecting “actual experiences of the
Johannine community.” During this period, according to Martyn, “the reins of Jewish authority are held to a large extent by the Pharisaic Bet Din in Jamnia, and, on the local scene, by a Gerousia, the majority of whose members are (or appear to John to be) Pharisees.” The more general and overarching claim of Martyn’s argument has been widely accepted, even though some scholars have disagreed with, modified, and developed some of its parts.

Other scholars read the Matthean Pharisees in a similar way. As Saldarini views the evidence in Matthew 23, the author “seeks specifically to delegitimize rival Jewish leaders and legitimate himself and his group as the true leaders of Israel, accurate interpreters of the Bible and the authentic messengers of God’s will.” According to Saldarini, the “origin, structure, and tone of the attack on the Pharisees and scribes strongly support the thesis that the author of Matthew is engaged in lively and serious controversy with the dominant leadership group in his Jewish community and that this leadership is strongly influenced or partly constituted by a rival reform movement which was on its way to becoming rabbinic Judaism.” In surveying the scholarly views about the Pharisees in Matthew more broadly, Davies and Allison explain, “perhaps most have believed that the original readers would have identified the scribes and Pharisees as ciphers for emerging rabbinic Judaism or its leaders.”

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21 Martyn, *History and Theology*, 86.
22 Urban C. von Wahlde says about Martyn’s “two level” drama, “In the articles appearing since 1982, scholars have continued to find Martyn’s theory helpful with only a few dissenting voices” (“The Jews’ in the Gospel of John: Fifteen Years of Research (1983-1998),” *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* 76 [2000], 30-55, here 41).” See also Raimo Hakola and Adele Reinhartz, “John’s Pharisees,” in *In Quest of the Historical Pharisees* (ed. Jacob Neusner and Bruce D. Chilton; Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2007), 138-43.
especially in chapter 23, they support this view and claim to “detect an ongoing response to post-70 Judaism.”

In his evaluation of the Pharisees in Luke-Acts, Robert Brawley places emphasis upon “the Pharisees’ status in Luke’s environment.” He holds that “Luke writes in an environment where the Pharisees hold a rather respectable position for both Luke and his readers.” Yet it is not entirely clear from Brawley’s analysis what that environment might have been historically. He concludes merely that “Luke takes over the Pharisees in a historical, cultural, and religious context in which they demand admiration and assigns them a commensurate role.” While the claims that the Pharisees hold a “respectable position” and that “they demand admiration” might suggest that Brawley means to associate the Lukan Pharisees with the early leaders of rabbinic Judaism, he nowhere makes such a claim. He in fact shows some resistance toward any interpretative approach that views the “primary characters” in Luke-Acts “as pointing beyond themselves to the unfolding story of the church.”

This hesitation to historicize the Lukan Pharisees in any way becomes more pronounced in the analyses by John Darr and David Gowler. Their treatments of the Lukan Pharisees are both based on the assumption that scholars should not simultaneously use the tools of historical criticism and literary analysis in the attempt to answer how the author of Luke-Acts presents his Pharisees. Darr dismisses the possibility of detecting some relationship between “real world and

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story world.”

Gowler similarly voices skepticism toward an interpretive method that seeks to illuminate “the specific historical situation behind what is supposedly reflected in the text.”

He further claims that the “enigmatic portrayal of the Pharisees in Luke-Acts is a literary problem, and literary-critical tools should be used to examine it.”

Mary Marshall also “deliberately eschews the historical enterprise” in her study of the Pharisees in the Gospels and Acts. She suggests “that Luke is not primarily interested in conveying his attitude toward the Pharisees as Pharisees but uses them to address other broader...
and overarching concerns in each book.”  

We may accept that the Pharisees are not the author’s primary interest. Yet he is interested enough in basing certain characters upon historical persons who were thought to have been Pharisees, namely Gamaliel and Paul; and he calls attention to the Pharisaic identity that each seems to have had. Even though we cannot take the portrayals of those characters at face value when asking questions about the historical Gamaliel and the historical Paul, we can at least ask how their identification as Pharisees might have been relevant within the historical context occupied by the author and his first readers.

While conceding that the question about the Lukan Pharisees should be evaluated with literary and, we might add, rhetorical sensibilities, what is less certain is that we must perform such analyses to the exclusion of historical contextualizations. Many pieces of literature, Luke-Acts included, may be compromised when their readers ignore the historical settings in which they were created and to which they are possibly responding. Readers could perhaps derive entertainment or edification from such narratives and the fictional or real worlds they depict; but a given author’s perspective—including what motivates her or his choice in characterization and what issues he or she seeks to address (even if indirectly) through writing—may remain unappreciated outside a historical context.

Furthermore, Darr holds that viewing Luke-Acts as “a window on a specific phase of the church’s evolution” leads critics to reach their conclusions “by means of simplistic allegorization.” Although he rightly identifies a limitation in redaction criticism—that is,

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35 Even though he does not seek to answer historical questions, Gowler does grant the following: “Since texts are produced by particular writers working in particular cultures at specific historical moments, the text is, in part at least, created and influenced by those factors. Therefore the readers of the text need a sense of the historical and cultural processes which influence the text and which are assumed by the text” (*Host*, 14).

36 Darr, *Character Building*, 90.
reading Luke-Acts merely as a response to the author’s own setting—if the author is using figured speech, we might actually expect parts of his narrative to have some semblance to allegory (e.g., Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.92). Perhaps then we should not dispense with either history or allegory, but rather ask how they may coexist for both the author and his initial readers. The task of those readers would then be to appreciate the underlying significance of the narrative for their own historical setting, viewing the events and characters (whether historically based or not) with the rhetorical sensibilities that sometimes but sometimes not call for allegorization.

5. The History of Reception

Along such historical lines, we must be cautious in suspecting that the author of Luke-Acts had an anti-Jewish bias and assuming that any possible negativity toward the Pharisees is part of that. It is undeniable that some of his later readers applied their own anti-Jewish lens to his narrative and its parts. Yet there is nothing that requires us to rule out the possibility that the author was himself a Jew, or at least a God-fearer who had high respect for Judaism, as we shall discuss in chapter five. Furthermore, as the author presents it from the Roman authorities’ point of view—through the speech of Gallio (Acts 18.14-15), Lysias (23.29), and Festus (25.18-19)—the conflict between the Christians and their Jewish rivals is a debate *within* Judaism. Whether the ways had already or had not yet fully parted during the period the author is writing will remain an open question throughout our study.

Despite the sometimes unfortunate consequences set in motion by the Lukan writings and their readers, their interpreters at other times offer some penetrating insights into the more positive aspects of the human spirit and experience and intellect, as well as into the writings themselves. Each of the interpretive approaches we shall employ throughout this investigation into Luke-Acts is in some way represented throughout their history of reception. While tracing
the history of a text’s reception has and continues to become increasingly popular among scholars in many fields of literature, trendiness alone does not warrant such an approach in a study of the Lukan Pharisees. It may prove fruitful, however, for an investigation into figured speech, since many earlier readers of Luke and Acts remained sensitive to the rhetorical figures and concepts they had inherited from their intellectual forebears; and thus their interpretive voices may at times inform certain questions about the author’s rhetorical style.\(^{37}\)

While we recognize that interpreters from the late antique and medieval periods greatly differ from those in the modern period, there are enough similarities (on some points of interpretation) to include the works of these earlier interpreters among the “secondary” literature on Luke and Acts. Accordingly, when interpreters of Luke and Acts are cited in this study, the sequence is generally chronological, beginning with the earliest interpreter, as many interpreters repeat and develop the points of their predecessors. For example, Chrysostom is often echoed in Theophylact; and both of these exegetes are then read by later interpreters such as Erasmus and Juan Maldonado. Every interpreter of the Lukan writings has a historical context and a unique presuppositional framework within which he or she works. And thus one could conceivably analyze any piece of writing about Luke or Acts—whether homily or paraphrase or commentary—as a primary text in its own right.\(^{38}\) For the present study, however, Luke and Acts will remain the primary texts and centerpiece around which these later interpreters gather.


\(^{38}\) Margaret M. Mitchell establishes such a mandate for interpreting John Chrysostom, as Chrysostom interprets Paul (“Reading Rhetoric with Patristic Exegetes: John Chrysostom on Galatians” in Antiquity and Humanity: Essays on Ancient Religion and Philosophy Presented to Hans Dieter Betz on his 70th Birthday [ed. Adela Yarbro Collins and Mitchell; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001], 333-55, esp. 336-39). Introductory biographies, as well as bibliographies, on
The Greek text of Luke and Acts that is here analyzed is the eclectic text conventionally designated “Nestle-Aland,” which is currently in its twenty-eighth edition. Although this text will serve as our basis, there may be need to devote some attention to variants that are directly relevant to the study of the Lukan Pharisees. In those cases, we shall ask first, whether a given variant might represent the earlier reading, and secondly, what the variant might contribute to our understanding of how Luke and Acts were “read” as texts during an earlier history of transmission, which is sometimes another kind of question into the history of interpretation.
Chapter Three: Scholarly Perspectives on the Historical Pharisees

Before we set out to answer whether the author of Luke-Acts uses figured speech in his depictions of the Pharisees, we must first take a survey of the primary and secondary literature in order to contextualize who the historical Pharisees may have been and thus their possible significance as characters within the Lukan narrative. As for the secondary literature, we shall limit our discussion here to some of the most influential evaluations of the Pharisees that have appeared since the mid-twentieth century. It was around this time that the Dead Sea Scrolls were coming to light, and also that Morton Smith published an important article that greatly impacted scholarly hypotheses about the Pharisees. The work already carried out by scholars and the conclusions they reach may inform our investigation of the Pharisees, as they appear in Luke-Acts. In turn, perhaps the subsequent evaluation of the Lukan Pharisees will in the end address certain ongoing questions and offer further support to some scholarly proposals about the Pharisees.

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1 Solomon Zeitlin was able to claim even in 1938, “The Literature on the Pharisees would make a complete library” (“The Pharisees and the Gospels,” in Essays and Studies in Memory of Linda R. Miller [ed. Israel Davidson; New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1938], 235-86, here 235). This interest in the Pharisees has continued up until the present day, as Lester L. Grabbe recently notes, “Perhaps more has been written on the Pharisees than any other ancient Jewish group” (An Introduction to Second Temple Judaism: History and Religion of the Jews in the Time of Nehemiah, the Maccabees, Hillel and Jesus [London and New York: T&T Clark International, 2010], 51). For a helpful discussion of the scholarly literature, see Steve Mason, “The Problem of the Pharisees in Modern Scholarship,” in Approaches to Ancient Judaism: New Series (vol. 3; ed. Jacob Neusner; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 103-40. The most thorough analyses of scholarship on the Pharisees are those by Roland Deines, Die Pharisäer: Ihr Verständnis im Spiegel der christlichen und jüdischen Forschung seit Wellhausen und Graetz (WUNT 101; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997); and Hans-Günther Waubke, Die Pharisäer in der protestantischen Bibelwissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts (BHT 107; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998).

Although there is much uncertainty and disagreement among modern scholars on specific matters pertaining to the study of Pharisaism, perhaps what is agreed upon most is that the Pharisees held, or at least aspired to hold, significant authority among their Jewish contemporaries; and they were able, or perhaps attempted, to influence a majority of the Judean population. One version of this view appears in the new edition of Emil Schürer’s classic work (revised by Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar, and Matthew Black). There the Pharisees are said to have been the group that “made the greatest impact on the ordinary people.” They “had the masses as their allies” and “held the greatest authority over the congregations, so that everything to do with worship, prayer, and sacrifice took place according to their instructions.” After the destruction of the Temple, “the survivors of the Pharisaic movement became the only dominant force in the life of the Palestinian Jewish community, and were solely responsible for the revival and recodification of the ancestral traditions in the form of rabbinic Judaism.”

Similarly, Ellis Rivkin proposes that “the Pharisees must have been the authoritative teachers of the two-fold law, the written and the unwritten, which governed the overwhelming majority of the Jews from the time of the Hasmonean Revolt through the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E. and beyond.”

The claim that the Pharisees held so much authority is made partly on the basis of passages from Josephus. And Josephus may indeed be our most reliable source on the sect, since he claims to have lived as a Pharisee himself (Vita 12); to have had personal dealings with

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3 Schürer, History of the Jewish People (ed. Vermes, Millar, and Black), 2:388-403, here 402-03.


5 B.J. 1.110-14, 571; 2.162-66, 410-11; Ant. 13.171-72, 288-98, 401-23; 15.3, 368-71; 17.41-47; 18.4-23
certain Pharisees (21, 190-93, 196-98); and he also occupies a space in time both before and after 70 CE, when the Pharisees are sometimes thought to have been in their prime.\(^6\) As important as the evidence in Josephus is, scholars have cautioned against taking everything he says about the Pharisees at face value; for even within his corpus we notice various representations of the sect and its members, which do not leave us with a unified, composite understanding of them. As a result, one of the ongoing debates carried out in the scholarly literature is over whether the Pharisees truly did hold as much authority as some of the sources would suggest, or whether they merely attempted to gain power. A second part of this debate is then over what kind of authority the Pharisees possessed or at least tried to possess. Was it political or religious authority, or some combination of the two? And yet a third part of the debate is over when they were most powerful as a sect, if ever at all.

1. The Authority of the Pharisees: Political, Religious, Neither, or Both?

Many scholars argue that we can see references to early Pharisaism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, specifically in the derogatory sobriquet, “Seekers after Smooth Things” (دورשים החלקות). The name is based upon Isaiah 30.10, where Judah is castigated for making an alliance with Egypt (cf. CD I, 18).\(^7\) Part of Judah’s rebelliousness and faithlessness is that they tell their prophets not to prophesy what is right but rather to speak “smooth things” and illusions. Have the writers behind

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the Dead Sea Scrolls applied this designation to their contemporaries at least partly because they view them as correspondingly rebellious, and for political collusion in particular?

Among the Dead Sea Scrolls, the Seekers appear most prominently in Pesher Nahum (4Q169). As Albert Baumgarten reads the evidence from that text, the Seekers are an “organized group” who “are the heart of a violent government, in league with the gentiles,” and “are accused of misleading kings, princes, priests, ordinary members of the nation, as well as proselytes.”

From the perspective of Pesher Nahum, the Seekers do hold some form of power. In addition to their role as counselors, the author refers to “the rule [מלשלה] of the Seekers after Smooth Things, that from the midst of their assembly the sword of the Gentiles will not depart” (4Q169 3-4 II, 4-5). The Seekers are also identified with “the city of Ephraim” (4Q169 3-4 II, 2), which may be a derogatory name for Jerusalem; for Pesher Isaiah locates the Seekers in Jerusalem (Q163 23 II, 10-11). It is also possible that we can identify the Seekers with “his envoys” (צוירו, interpreting והמלאכיי, “and his messengers,” cf. Nah 2.14) mentioned in Pesher Nahum (4Q169 3-4 II, 1). Yet it is not entirely clear to whom the pronominal suffix “his” may refer.

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refer in this context. What we do see is that the “voice” of these envoys “will no longer be heard among the Gentiles” (4Q169 3-4 II, 1), which may correspond to the later detail that the “counsel” of the Seekers “will perish” (4Q169 3-4 III, 7).

In the attempt to identify the Seekers, one important clue is that Demetrius, “king of Greece,” took “counsel” from this group in his efforts to enter Jerusalem (4Q169 3-4 I, 2). Scholars have identified this king as Demetrius III on the basis of events that Josephus reports (B.J. 1.92-98; Ant. 13.376-83). According to him, when the subjects of Alexander Jannaeus opposed his rule, they appealed to Demetrius for help in dethroning Alexander. Although Demetrius won the initial battle, in time Alexander regained the support from many of his subjects; and Demetrius was forced to withdraw. Yet because many of Alexander’s subjects still opposed him, he killed a large number of them and took others captive to Jerusalem. From among the captives, he crucified eight hundred in the middle of city and slaughtered their wives and children before their eyes. This measure sent eight thousand of Alexander’s opponents into exile, not to return until after his death.

Partly because of the almost too neat numerical sequence in “eight hundred” and “eight thousand,” some scholars have raised doubts about whether we can believe all that Josephus narrates in these accounts. Yet even if the numbers are not fully credible, it would be too

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drastic a move to dispense with all that Josephus relates. Since the publication of Pesher Nahum, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the “young lion of wrath” in that text is a sobriquet for Alexander; and the statement “who would hang men alive” (4Q169 3-4 I, 6-7) is a reference to his crucifying of the rebels, however many there may have been. In the attempt to understand this statement about hanging men alive, Yigael Yadin argues that we see a parallel in the passage from the Temple Scroll that prescribes execution by hanging as punishment for a political crime, that is, for betraying one’s country (11Q19 LXIV, 6-13).

It is important to acknowledge, however, that in Pesher Nahum, there is an unfortunate lacuna at the beginning of this line. Although the Seekers are named immediately before the statement about the hanging of men, we cannot be fully certain what role they play at this point. If the מות at the edge of the lacuna (and before בדורshi החלקות, “on the Seekers after Smooth Things”) is a full word (i.e., “death”), then the fate of the Seekers becomes somewhat clearer. And even if מות is the end of the word נק[ו[ (i.e., “vengeance”), as some propose, the outcome for the Seekers could be the same. We also have clues from elsewhere in the text indicating that the Seekers are to meet a dreadful end (4Q169 3-4 II, 4-6) and that their congregation will be dispersed (4Q169 3-4 III, 7). It thus appears that the Seekers are the men envisioned as being hung alive.

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14 Yigael Yadin, “Pesher Nahum (4Q pNahum) Reconsidered,” *Israel Exploration Journal* 21 (1971): 1-12. These crimes “of a political nature” he explains are: “passing on information to the enemy and causing (or intending to cause) the surrender of the nation to the enemy; evading the judicial process in cases involving capital punishment, and escaping to enemy territory and, once there, cursing one’s own nation” (ibid., 8-9). Cf. Berrin, *Pesher Nahum Scroll*, 165-92.
15 See Berrin, *Pesher Nahum Scroll*, 53-54.
While we have no ancient text that explicitly identifies the Seekers as Pharisees, further
details from Josephus may allow us to link the two—specifically his depiction of the Pharisees as
later getting revenge upon Alexander’s administration. Once Alexander had died, his wife
Salome Alexandra began to rule, and “alongside her the Pharisees grew in authority [ἐξουσία]”
(B.J. 1.110). Having obtained such power, their first particular course of action, according to the
Bellum, was to execute Diogenes, a “friend” of Alexander who had purportedly advised the king
to crucify the eight hundred rebels. And they also sought out any others who were involved in
the massacre (1.113; cf. Ant. 13.410-11).\textsuperscript{17}

James VanderKam points to further evidence in the “deathbed discussion between
Alexander and Alexandra,” which we see in the Antiquitates.\textsuperscript{18} There Alexander tells her not
only to yield some ἐξουσία to the Pharisees and thus to avoid his mistakes (13.401-02), but also
to allow the Pharisees to do with his corpse as they pleased (13.403-04). VanderKam states:

The story about Alexander’s body supplies the missing link for identifying as Pharisees
the eight hundred men whom he had crucified. Alexander had mistreated the bodies of
the crucified men; here we find the most specific confession about abusing the bodies
of his enemies, whereas regarding all the others we learn only of their deaths, not how
they died. Now he was allowing their fellow Pharisees to avenge his brutality against
their colleagues by turning over his corpse to them, to be treated as they wished. The
gesture seems to be a case of quid pro quo: he invited surviving Pharisees to mistreat
his body as he had abused the bodies of the eight hundred Pharisees whom he hanged
alive.\textsuperscript{19}

The logic in VanderKam’s argument goes accordingly: if the eight hundred whom Alexander
crucified were Pharisees and Pesher Nahum calls them Seekers after Smooth Things, then the
Seekers after Smooth Things are Pharisees.\textsuperscript{20}

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\textsuperscript{17} See also Baumgarten, “Seekers After Smooth Things,” 858; and VanderKam, “Pesher
Nahum,” 308; and VanderKam, “Pharisees and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 228-33.
\textsuperscript{18} VanderKam, “Pharisees and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 231.
\textsuperscript{19} VanderKam, “Pharisees and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 232.
\textsuperscript{20} VanderKam, “Pharisees and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 233.
Identifying the Seekers as the Pharisees assumes that when the unnamed persons in Josephus “called upon” (ἐπικαλεῖν) Demetrius and then “joined their allies [οἱ σύμμαχοι] around Shechem” (B.J. 1.92), or “sent to” (πέμπειν πρός) him, “entreating him toward an alliance [συμμαχία]” (Ant. 13.376), it is at that time that Demetrius, according to Pesher Nahum, “sought to enter Jerusalem at the counsel [בקש לבוא ירושלים בעצת] of the Seekers after Smooth Things” (4Q169 3-4 I, 2). Josephus, however, says nothing about Demetrius going as far south as Jerusalem. He tells us only that Demetrius encamped near Shechem and that Alexander took his forces out to meet him (Ant. 13.377). While it remains possible that Demetrius had planned to enter Jerusalem and that Alexander routed him before he had the chance, Josephus gives no indication of such a plan.

Perhaps a more precise dating of Pesher Nahum would make a difference in our efforts to understand the statement about Demetrius attempting to enter Jerusalem at the counsel of the Seekers. Paleographical studies have dated the manuscript to the second half of the first century BCE. And the conflict between Demetrius III (95-88/7 BCE) and Alexander Jannaeus (103-76 BCE) we can assign to around 88 BCE.

The next question then is whether the author knows about Pompey’s entry into Jerusalem in 63 BCE. One indication that Pesher Nahum was probably written after the Roman invasion led by Pompey appears in the statement: “from Antiochus until the coming of the rulers of the

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Kittim” (i.e., “Kittim” serving as a sobriquet for the Romans, 4Q169 3-4 I, 3). Of course Pompey had been in Judea at least for some time before entering the city (Josephus, B.J. 133-41; Ant. 14.48-57). Yet marking the frame of time with “Antiochus,” on the earlier end, and “the Kittim,” on the later, seems to assume that “the Kittim” now have dominion. If the author does know about the invasions of both Demetrius III and Pompey, it is possible that he understands and recounts the former invasion in light of the more recent one. That is to say, just as some opened the gates for Pompey in the recent past, about twenty-five years before some had also invited Demetrius to enter the city.

Whether the Pharisees may have played a role also in Pompey’s entry into Jerusalem is itself a question raised when we read the Psalms of Solomon. Although scholars once commonly held that these psalms were composed by Pharisees, more recent scholarship has challenged and disputed this view. In an analysis of Pss. Sol. 8, Kenneth Atkinson argues that the author even


24 A number of scholars agree that Pesher Nahum post-dates Pompey’s conquest in 63 BCE. See, e.g., Dupont-Sommer, “Commentaire de Nahum,” 73-74; Flusser, Judaism, 1:220-21; Knibb, Qumran Community, 209; Lawrence H. Schiffman, Reclaiming the Dead Sea Scrolls: The History of Judaism, the Background of Christianity, the Lost Library of Qumran (Philadelphia and Jerusalem: The Jewish Publication Society, 1994), 228, 238; Eshel, “Demetrius III Eukerus,” 1:189; Eshel, Dead Sea Scrolls, 123; Lim, “Kittim,” 470; and Berrin, Pesher Nahum, 222-24, 228-31; and Berrin, “Pesher Nahum, Psalms of Solomon and Pompey,” in Reworking the Bible: Apocryphal and Related Texts at Qumran (STDJ 58; ed. Esther G. Chazon et al.; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 65-84.


26 Scholars holding that the Psalms of Solomon is a collection of Pharisaic psalms include: Herbert E. Ryle and Montague R. James, Psalms of the Pharisees, Commonly Called the Psalms of Solomon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1891; repr., Eugene, Oreg.: Wipf and Stock, 2006 ); Joachim Schüpphaus, Die Psalmen Salomos: Ein Zeugnis Jerusalemer Theologie und Frömmigkeit in der Mitte des vorschristlichen Jahrhunderts (ALGHJ 7; Leiden: Brill, 1977); and Mikael Winninge, Sinners and the Righteous: A Comparative Study of the Psalms of Solomon and Paul’s Letters (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1995), 170-80. For arguments against this view, see, e.g., James H. Charlesworth, review of Joachim Schüpphaus,
denounces the Pharisees for their pro-Roman stance.\textsuperscript{27} He and others have convincingly shown that \textit{Pss. Sol.} 8 reflects the events when Pompey (i.e., “the one who strikes mightily,” 8.15) entered Jerusalem and, from the perspective of many Jews, desecrated the temple.\textsuperscript{28} Yet what remains uncertain based on the evidence from within \textit{Pss. Sol.} and Josephus is the contention that the Pharisees supported Hyrcanus II and that together they made up a pro-Roman faction.\textsuperscript{29}

We can be certain that οἱ ἄρχοντες τῆς γῆς, “the rulers of the country,” who ἤνοιξαν πύλας ἐπὶ Ιερουσαλημ, “opened the gates to Jerusalem,” for Pompey and his army in \textit{Pss. Sol.} 8.16-17 are the same persons Josephus identifies as the supporters of Hyrcanus II, whom he claims were in favor of ἀνοίγειν Πομπηίῳ τὰς πύλας, “opening the gates for Pompey” (\textit{B.J.} 1.142). As Josephus would later describe, “to some it seemed good to hand over the city to Pompey, but the supporters of Aristobulus advised him to shut Pompey out and to wage war


\textsuperscript{27} Atkinson, \textit{Cried to the Lord}, 55-87.

\textsuperscript{28} Scholars have noticed allusions to Pompey especially in \textit{Pss. Sol.} 2, 8, and 17. As Trafton synthesizes some of the evidence: “\textit{Pss. Sol.} 2, for example, speaks of a ‘sinner’ who forced his way into Jerusalem with a battering ram (v. 1), after which ‘Gentile foreigners’ defiled the Temple (v. 2; cf. vv. 19-24). Later this ‘dragon’ was killed dishonorably in Egypt, his body being left unburied (vv. 25-27).” These details match closely what the ancient historians Josephus (\textit{Ant.} 14.4; \textit{J.W.} 1.7) and Dio Cassius (\textit{Roman History} 42.5) tell us about Pompey” (“The Bible, The \textit{Psalms of Solomon}, and Qumran,” 428, note 3). So also “the lawless one” of \textit{Pss. Sol.} 17.11 is thought to be a reference to Pompey. See further Joseph L. Trafton, “Solomon, Psalms of,” \textit{ABD} 6:115-17; Atkinson, \textit{Cried to the Lord}, 15-87, 129-79; Eshel, \textit{Dead Sea Scrolls}, 151-61; and John J. Collins, \textit{The Scepter and the Star: Messianism in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls} (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2010), 52-57.

\textsuperscript{29} Atkinson, \textit{Cried to the Lord}, 82-84.
against him” (*Ant.* 14.58). It was thus the former group that “received the army and entrusted the palace to Pompey” (14.59).

A number of scholars hold that the supporters of Hyrcanus II were Pharisees, and also that those of Aristobulus II were Sadducees. 30 We must, however, be cautious not to assume such a sharp, neat categorization and identification of these parties, since the evidence itself does not in fact name the associates of Hyrcanus II as Pharisees, nor the associates of Aristobulus II as Sadducees. According to Josephus, John Hyrcanus I (i.e., the grandfather of Hyrcanus II) was a μαθητής of the Pharisees and later broke his ties with that sect and sided with the Sadducees (*Ant.* 13.288-96). But about Hyrcanus II and his membership among or association with either of these sects, Josephus says nothing directly. Josephus does, however, relate that Salome Alexandra appointed her son, Hyrcanus II, as high priest at the same time that she conferred ruling authority to the Pharisees (*B.J.* 1.109-14; *Ant.* 13.408-15). This concurrent delegation of power to Hyrcanus II, on the one hand, and the Pharisees, on the other, may imply some joint rule between them. But this evidence alone is too tenuous to draw any conclusions.

It is nevertheless possible to see some correspondence between οἱ ἄρχοντες τῆς γῆς, “the rulers of the country,” in *Pss. Sol.* 8.16 and the Pharisees, whom Josephus describes, during the reign of Salome Alexandra, as the διοικηταὶ τῶν ὅλων, “administrators of all the affairs,” and as having αἱ ἀπολαύσεις τῶν βασιλείων, “the enjoyments of royal power” (*B.J.* 1.111). Josephus says, “While she was ruling over [κρατεῖν] all others, the Pharisees were ruling over her” (1.112); and, “While she held the title of Queen, the Pharisees held the power [δύναμις]” (*Ant.* 13.409). “In no way,” Josephus continues, “did they differ from despots [δεσπόται]” (13.409). Yet this possible correspondence between οἱ ἄρχοντες τῆς γῆς in *Pss. Sol.* 8.16 and the statements in Josephus would require the Pharisees to have maintained their political authority even after the death of Alexandra, when Pompey came up against Jerusalem. While this continuation of Pharisaic influence and power is quite possible, the evidence is once again only suggestive.

There may be an indication that they did maintain some form of power from the account Josephus later gives about Herod attempting to enter Jerusalem. As he relates, it was “the Pharisee Pollion and his disciple Samaias” who advised the citizens of Jerusalem to receive Herod when he had the city under siege (*Ant.* 15.3). This detail in itself is suggestive of Pharisaic influence among the people of Jerusalem. And one clue that Pollion and Samaias might have played a political role is that when Herod was on trial for his life, “this Pollion” (ὁ Πολλίων οὗτος) predicted to Hyrcanus and the judges that, if they spared Herod’s life, Herod would later antagonize them all (15.3; cf. *Ant.* 14.172-176; 15.368-70). Was Pollion serving in an advisory position to Hyrcanus II? It is possible that he was, even though Josephus does not expressly say so.
Furthermore, is it merely a coincidence that Demetrius III attempted to enter Jerusalem at the counsel of the Seekers after Smooth Things (4Q169 3-4 I, 2), that the “rulers of the country” opened the gates for Pompey (Pss. Sol. 8.16-17), and that Pollion and Samaias advised the people to receive Herod into the city (Josephus, Ant. 15.3)? To what extent are these examples of (supposed) Pharisees inviting a political figure to enter Jerusalem historically credible accounts, and to what extent do they involve literary polemic? While granting that polemical texts may point to historical realities, their highly subjective nature should at the same time invite caution. Whether Luke-Acts may inform these questions we shall delay until chapter thirteen.

As for our question here about what type of authority the Pharisees may have held, Jacob Neusner has famously argued that the Pharisees had earlier been a political party involved in the Hasmonean dynasty and later transformed into a mostly pietistic movement. Even though “the group seems to end its political life as a sect with the advent of Herod,” there may have been some individual Pharisees who continued to play a political role. ³¹

In response to Neusner, Anthony Saldarini disagrees “that the Pharisees ceased to be a politically active group, left the political arena during the time of Herod and the Romans and took on more sectarian characteristics.” He argues rather “that they were always interested in political power and always a factor in society at large.”³² The Pharisees in Josephus, Saldarini claims, “are not the governing class, but a part of the retainer class, subordinate to the governing class. Josephus mentions them in times of turmoil and weakness among the governing class, when retainers like the Pharisees could be expected to gain political power.”³³ If we can follow Tessa Rajak’s suggestion that “Bannus led a politically radical group, similar to others

³¹ Neusner, Politics to Piety, 66.
³³ Saldarini, Pharisees, Scribes and Sadducees, 114.
mentioned in Josephus,” Saldarini says, the fact that Josephus ultimately chooses the Pharisees “would have been a rejection of revolution and acceptance of accommodation to the empire.”

E. P. Sanders reaches similar conclusions in his work on the Pharisees. “Given the chance,” he claims, “the Pharisees would have run the country.” Yet they never actually acquired the power they desired, and nor did they “control any aspect of Judaism before 70, except during the reign of Salome Alexandra.” Although they were “popular with the crowd” and were respected for their “piety, learning and scrupulousness with regard to the law,” Sanders explains, “this did not give them power.” According to Sanders, after 70 the Pharisees “led the reconstruction of Judaism, giving up their party name, becoming more catholic, and taking the title ‘rabbis’, ‘teachers’.

On the question of whether the Pharisees were as politically ambitious as Saldarini and Sanders suggest, Roland Deines holds a different view:

In the New Testament the Pharisees are not accused of striving for political power or of seeking influence through key figures in society. Furthermore, they are not accused of collaborating with the mighty ones, even though it is clear in the New Testament that Pharisees did have connections with influential networks in society like scribes, Herodians, Sadducees, High Priests and the Sanhedrin (in Acts).

Deines argues that if the Pharisees were influential in the political realm, it was unintentional on their part. As he interprets the evidence in the New Testament, “the topics the Pharisees are

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35 Sanders, *Judaism*, 404.
36 Sanders, *Judaism*, 412.
37 Sanders, *Judaism*, 403, 412.
38 Sanders, *Judaism*, 412.
interested in are, with one exception, religious.”  Even though the Pharisees in Josephus might at first “give a different impression,” Deines claims that “a closer look shows that Josephus mostly describes the Pharisees as being invited to partake in court and government affairs.” According to Deines, the initiative came “from the ruling elite and not from the Pharisees,” which was taken based upon “their enormous influence on the population.”

Deines and Martin Hengel in another venue offer a more full-scale response to Sanders and there claim that he “has underestimated the influence of the Pharisees on Jewish society during the period he covers.” While they endorse Sanders’ attempt to identify a “common Judaism” in the study of the sources, they disagree with his “marginalizing of the Pharisees” in relation to other Jews. Deines states his position more emphatically elsewhere when he defines Pharisaism as

*the fundamental and most influential movement with Palestinian Judaism between 150 B.C. and A.D. 70. It includes everything that belongs to the Torah tradition, and everything that is new can be integrated by the representatives of this movement, as long as it does not conflict with the principle of the normativity of Torah tradition as understood by the Pharisees.*

Deines furthermore holds that after 70, the rabbis succeeded the Pharisees and continued as an authoritative religious group within Judaism, thus constituting a “common Judaism.” He states:

In the consciousness of the majority of the people, the Pharisees were the religious group that determined the boundaries of what was still and what was no longer Jewish. This is why the Pharisees and their rabbinic successors increasingly pursued the

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41 Deines, “Social Profile,” 120.
43 Hengel and Deines, “E. P. Sanders’ ‘Common Judaism’,,” 2-4.
isolation of Jewish Christians. This, however, also explains their interest in Jesus from the days of his ministry. It was part of people’s expectation that they must take a position regarding the new teacher from Galilee.\footnote{Deines, “The Pharisees Between,” 503-04.}

Hengel and Deines critique Sanders also because he did not include in his analysis the period after 66 CE, that is, when the Pharisees are often thought to have made their most “decisive developments.”\footnote{Hengel and Deines, “E. P. Sanders’ ‘Common Judaism’,” 52.} It appears that they are referring in particular to the role the Pharisees may have played in the founding and maintenance of the rabbinic school at Yavneh. If the Pharisees were involved at Yavneh, we could then propose that their interests were at least partly religious. Neusner argues along these lines and identifies the Pharisees as a small group within Palestinian Judaism, a philosophical school with a particular set of beliefs and religious practices. They claimed the right to rule all the Jews by virtue of their possessing the ‘Oral Torah’ of Moses, that is, the body of traditions not written in Scriptures, but revealed to Moses at Mount Sinai along with the written Torah.\footnote{Neusner, \textit{Politics to Piety}, 11.}

According to Neusner, “the Pharisees were much like any other Hellenistic philosophical school or sect” and furthermore “produced the rabbinical masters who, after 70 A.D., defined the law and doctrine that became normative for the Judaic tradition. Judaism as it is now known begins with the Pharisees of the two centuries before the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in 70 A.D.”\footnote{Neusner, \textit{Politics to Piety}, 11.} Immediately after 70, the Pharisees who survived the destruction assembled at Yavneh under the leadership of Yohanan ben Zakkai and formed an “academy” that lasted until \textit{ca.} 125. “The historical importance of the academy at Yavneh cannot be overestimated,” Neusner explains. “The rabbis of Yavneh laid the foundations for the classical form of Judaism which

\textit{\footnote{Deines, “The Pharisees Between,” 503-04.}}
\textit{\footnote{Hengel and Deines, “E. P. Sanders’ ‘Common Judaism’,” 52.}}
\textit{\footnote{Neusner, \textit{Politics to Piety}, 11.}}
\textit{\footnote{Neusner, \textit{Politics to Piety}, 11.}}
predominated from the first century to the twentieth and is likely to characterize the Judaic religious tradition so long as Judaism endures.\textsuperscript{49}

Yet the degree to which the Pharisees were involved at Yavneh is itself another question. Shaye Cohen has convincingly argued that the line drawn from the Pharisees to the rabbis is not as clear as is sometimes assumed. He concludes that at least some of the rabbis were “latter-day Pharisees” or “the descendants of the Pharisees,” but they “had no desire to publicize the connection,” partly because of “the rabbinic abnegation of historical study” and partly because of “the tendency of all sects to refuse to see themselves as sects.”\textsuperscript{50}

But even if we can accept that there was at least some continuity between the Pharisees and the early rabbis, we still could not be confident that their interests were exclusively religious. Steve Mason’s reading of the Pharisees in Josephus assumes that the group held some political influence, even during Josephus’ day. According to Mason, Josephus had “disdain for the Pharisees” and regarded their popularity with the masses as unfortunate.\textsuperscript{51} As Mason reads the passage in \textit{Ant.} 13.401-02, “Josephus portrays the reestablishment of Pharisaic jurisprudence

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\textsuperscript{49} Neusner, \textit{Politics to Piety}, 97-100, here 97.

\textsuperscript{50} Shaye J. D. Cohen, “The Significance of Yavneh: Pharisees, Rabbis, and the End of Jewish Sectarianism,” in \textit{The Significance of Yavneh and Other Essays in Jewish Hellenism} (TSAJ 136; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 44-70, here 58. See also Peter Schäfer, “Der vorrabbinische Pharisäismus,” in \textit{Paulus und das antike Judentum} (WUNT 58; ed. Martin Hengel and Ulrich Heckel; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991), 125-75, esp. 127 and 173. On why the Pharisees may have ceased to apply this designation to themselves, see Flusser: “as the Pharisaic movement crystallized, its conservative opponents saw it as a threat to the unity of Israel, as a group that separated itself from the community, as ‘perushim.’ This epithet undoubtedly offended the Pharisees, and while there were sporadic attempts to re-semanticize the term—proposing a positive sense, especially in the area of purity—they generally rejected the term” (\textit{Judaism}, 1:97-103, here 98-99).

\textsuperscript{51} Mason, “Josephus’s Pharisees: The Narratives,” 21, 31. He states: “If Josephus wishes to leave any image of the Pharisees with his audience, it is that they have popular access, support, and influence” (ibid., 19).
under Alexandra as a necessary condition of governance, which has persevered until his own
time."\(^{52}\)

Furthermore, when Josephus says that he “began to live out his citizenship
[πολιτεύεσθαι] by following the sect of the Pharisees” (\(Vita\) 12), we know that πολιτεύεσθαι can
have either a political or a religious nuance.\(^{53}\) His likening of the Pharisees to the Stoics in the
same sentence is not particularly helpful, since traditionally the Stoics are deeply pious while
maintaining an active role in politics.

We shall evaluate more fully in chapter seven the scene in which the Paul of Acts says to
the Sanhedrin, “I have lived out my citizenship in God” (πεπολίτευμαι τῷ θεῷ, 23.1), and
moments later, “I am a Pharisee” (ἐγὼ Φαρισαῖός εἰμι, 23.6). While the expression
πεπολιτεύσαται τῷ θεῷ is clearly religious, even here the author appears to be playing upon the
previously mentioned detail that the tribune had purchased his Roman πολιτεία, when Paul had
obtained his at birth (22.28). We can be confident that the Pharisees were a religious sect as the
author presents them; for he has Paul later say to Agrippa, “according to the strictest sect of our
religion [θρησκεία] I lived as a Pharisee” (26.5). Yet even in this speech we see that Paul
conducted himself as a Pharisee under the ἐξουσία, “authority,” of the high priests (26.10, 12; cf.
9.1-2; 22.5). Can Paul appeal to this authority because it also has some political import for his
defense before Agrippa? Moreover, does his former subservience to the ἐξουσία of the high
priests also assume that he was a loyal subject within the Roman empire? It may be telling that
when the author prefaces the ministry of John the Baptist with what we could call a hierarchy of
imperial power, that hierarchy includes not only the emperor, prefect of Judea, and the tetrarchs


\(^{53}\) Cf. Mason’s argument that Josephus was actually not a Pharisee, despite what this
statement would suggest. See his \textit{Flavius Josephus on the Pharisees: A Composition-Critical

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of the surroundings areas; he includes also the high priests, Annas and Caiaphas (Luke 3.1-2a). While the religious role of the Pharisees in Luke-Acts is clear enough, the extent to which their authority may also be political will require further investigation.

2. The Pharisees in the Roman Empire

In an evaluation of the Pharisees in Josephus, Morton Smith observes two distinct treatments of the sect in the *Bellum judaicum*, on the one hand, and the *Antiquitates judaicae*, on the other. Where Josephus had devoted “most space to the Essenes” in the *Bellum*, some twenty years later in the *Antiquitates*, “the Pharisees take first place, and every time he mentions them he emphasizes their popularity, which is so great, he says, that they can maintain opposition against any government.” Smith proposes that “in such a rewriting of history,” Josephus is offering “a bid to the Roman government. That government must have been faced with the problem: Which group of Jews shall we support?” Smith reasons that “Josephus is volunteering an answer: The Pharisees, he says again and again, have by far the greatest influence with the people. Any government which secures their support is accepted; any government which alienates them has trouble.” Even though at an earlier point in life Josephus had his personal differences with certain Pharisees, “meanwhile the Pharisees had become the leading candidates for Roman support in Palestine and were already negotiating for it.”

Smith’s reading of Josephus has gained wide acceptance as a hypothesis on the Pharisees in the late first century CE. It is important to point out, however, that one of the main proofs for

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54 Smith, “Palestinian Judaism in the First Century,” 75-77.
Smith’s argument is the passage from the *Antiquitates* in which Alexander, on his deathbed, advises Alexandra to concede power to the Pharisees (*Ant*. 13.401-02). As we have seen already, a number of scholars assume that there is at least some historical credibility within this account, as they attempt to identify the Seekers after Smooth Things. If this account is “a rewriting of history,” as Smith suggests, can that history maintain some veracity? Even if we entertain Smith’s thesis, we are not required to regard the account as wholly fictitious; for the larger issue is about what Josephus chose to emphasize in his later composition.

Accordingly, to “discount” the “references to the influence and power of the Pharisees,” as Neusner does, may be too extreme. In support of Smith’s proposal, Neusner adds that these later references to the Pharisees in Josephus “constitute part of his highly tendentious case in behalf of the rabbis of Yavneh, the Pharisees’ heirs, and not objective data about the pre-70 party.” It is noteworthy that Neusner fully endorses Smith’s hypothesis while maintaining his own thesis that the Pharisees were no longer a political party. He thus seems to assume that Rome would benefit through the support of the Pharisees not because they were authoritative as “politicians” in Palestine, but rather because they were philosophically and religiously influential among Jews. While this reading of Josephus does cast doubt on the view that the Pharisees before 70 were a highly influential sect, it does not lessen the possibility that they held significant authority during the period Josephus composed his *Antiquitates*. That Josephus seems to make such a bid would rather attest to an influential role played by the Pharisees after 70.

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56 Neusner, *Politics to Piety*, 65.
David Goodblatt also argues in support of Smith’s thesis and affirms the point that “only after 70 did the Pharisees come to power.”\textsuperscript{57} The portrait of the Pharisees in the \textit{Antiquitates}, he explains, “did not create a trend, but rather reflects one which already existed. In modern terms, Josephus was climbing aboard a bandwagon, something he had done previously when he surrendered to the Romans during the Jewish revolt.”\textsuperscript{58} If Josephus was following a trend in giving preference to the Pharisees, would this help explain why he somewhat vaguely identifies as a Pharisee in his \textit{Vita}? The question of whether he truly was a Pharisee is still on the table; and Steve Mason has problematized this question to a significant degree.\textsuperscript{59} Even though Mason argues forcefully that Josephus was not a Pharisee, it remains clear that Josephus aimed to present himself at least outwardly as a Pharisee and that he aligns himself with that sect on political grounds. Shaye Cohen observes “a pro-Pharisaic bias” in the later writings of Josephus (i.e., \textit{Antiquitates} and \textit{Vita}), which, echoing Smith, leads him to suggest:

The war had destroyed the religious establishments of the country, and, we may conjecture, many groups were attempting to fill the vacuum. Josephus allied himself with the Rabbis, the heirs of the Pharisees, who were becoming influential and may have already attained some measure of official recognition for their academy at Yavneh. Perhaps they were becoming important in the Jewish community of Rome too. We may conjecture that Josephus realized that they would emerge as the leaders of the Jewish scene and imagined himself as their representative in Rome who would intercede on their behalf with emperors and empresses. In any event, Josephus contends in \textit{[Antiquitates]} that the Pharisees had always been prominent and therefore deserve Roman support.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} Goodblatt, “Pharisees in First Century Judaism,” 18. 
\textsuperscript{58} Goodblatt, “Pharisees in First Century Judaism,” 18, note 22. 
\textsuperscript{59} Mason holds that Josephus has a thoroughly negative view of the Pharisees and that he “casts them as a constantly destructive force in the saga of Jewish history. Out of envy, they consistently opposed their rulers; they contributed much to the downfall of the Hasmoneans; they plotted against Herod; and, not least, they sought to oust Josephus from his command” (\textit{Flavius Josephus on the Pharisees}, 375). Mason maintains the same position in his recent article, “Josephus’s Pharisees: The Narratives,” 3-40. 
\textsuperscript{60} Cohen, \textit{Josephus in Galilee and Rome}, 237-38.
It is important to acknowledge, however, that already in the *Bellum* we see what Cohen calls a “Roman-Jewish symbiosis.” Does Josephus in any way align himself with the Pharisees in this earlier work? It appears that he does invoke them in order to justify his own opposition toward the revolutionary elements of the War and his acceptance of Rome’s dominion over Judea. Josephus can state with (and perhaps through) “the notables of the Pharisees” (οἱ τῶν Φαρισαίων γνώριμοι, 2.411) that he, as well as they, “expressed great anger” toward the revolutionaries for their “audacity in causing a revolt, and for bringing so great a war upon their country” (*B.J.* 2.411-12). In light of this piece of evidence, the disparity between the earlier and later writings of Josephus (i.e., particularly in his depictions of the Pharisees) may not be as great as Smith’s thesis would suggest, which Mason has also shown. Yet Smith’s point that the Pharisees in Josephus reflect the post-70 Pharisees more than the Pharisees of the Hasmonean period is still compelling. We should note, however, that already in the *Bellum* we see certain themes, which may simply become more emphatic in the later writings of Josephus.

As we shall discuss more fully in chapter sixteen, it is significant that we find Josephus, in the *Bellum*, predicting the emperorship of Vespasian, supporting his rule, and using the prophet Jeremiah as a scriptural precedent for surrendering—just as the later legends purport the leading rabbi, Yohanan ben Zakkai, had done when he predicted the emperorship of Vespasian.

What may not be immediately evident is that just before Josephus surrendered to Vespasian, he dons the mantle of a Stoic philosopher in the speech he claims to have delivered to his compatriots (*B.J.* 3.361-82). There Josephus purports that “he began to philosophize to them” (*B.J.* 3.361). And while he does not invoke the Stoics by name, we can identify certain elements

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of Stoicism in his argument. Perhaps most prominent is the doctrine of οἰκείωσις, “self-preservation,” even though he does not use the term (B.J. 3.370, 380).\textsuperscript{63} We notice also that he addresses the tension between οἰκείωσις and suicide, arguing that suicide is a last resort (B.J. 3.364).\textsuperscript{64} When Josephus claims that he and his hearers have received their “being” (τὸ εἶναι) from God (B.J. 3.371), the idea has much resemblance to what the stoicizing Lukan Paul expresses—ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν, “for in him we live and move and exist” (Acts 17.28)—which Paul states immediately before quoting the Stoic Aratus: “For we are indeed his offspring [γένος]” (Phaen. 5).\textsuperscript{65} And finally, in the speech Josephus claims that the soul is an immortal “part of God” (θεοῦ μοῖρα) inhabiting the body (B.J. 3.372).\textsuperscript{66}

This depiction of himself as a Stoic may correspond to his much more explicit statement that the Pharisees resemble the Stoics, which he couples with the claim that he began to live as a Pharisee at an earlier point in life (Vita 12). Does Josephus align himself and the Pharisees with the Stoics in order to curry favor with his Roman readers, whom he might rightly expect to be more disposed toward the Stoics than any of the other philosophical schools? If he does, then we

\textsuperscript{63} See D.L. 7.85; and Plutarch, Mor. 1038b-c.


\textsuperscript{65} Cf. Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus 4 (ed. Thom).

may see yet another element of this “bid” recommending the Pharisees as the supporters of Roman rule.

We do see Josephus maintaining the position that God had placed the world’s governance in the hands of the Romans (Ant. 10.276-81), which may partly serve to validate his relationship with the Flavians as an expression of fidelity to a divine purpose rather than disloyalty to his fellow Jews. In his affiliation with the empire, he identifies with the biblical figure Daniel and claims that that prophet “wrote about the rule of the Romans and that Jerusalem would be taken by them and the temple laid waste” (Ant. 10.276). The point that Josephus goes on to make about how these events occurred in accordance with divine providence affirms his approving perspective on the Roman rule over Judea (Ant. 10.277-81)—a stance that, at least insofar as the notion of providence is concerned, resembles his description of Pharisaic beliefs elsewhere (B.J. 2.162-64; Ant. 13.172; 18.13-15).

Is there any proof that the Romans ever came to recognize the Pharisees as their allies in Judea? Goodblatt hypothesizes that toward the end of the first century the dynasty of Gamaliel II

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68 On the Pharisaic understanding of divine providence and fate according to Josephus, as compared to Stoic teachings, see Flusser, Judaism, 2:221-231; and Steve Mason, “Josephus’s Pharisees: The Philosophy,” in In Quest of the Historical Pharisees (ed. Jacob Neusner and Bruce D. Chilton; Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2007), 41-66, esp. 55-59, 62.
rose to power through Roman sponsorship.” As he interprets it, the evidence “suggests not only that Gamaliel II was the first patriarch to obtain Roman recognition, but also that the office and the dynasty which filled it were created by the Roman authorities.”

There is no reason to doubt, as Goodblatt claims elsewhere, “that the Romans paid special attention to the province and its Jewish population after 70.” Chilton and Neusner point out that even before 70, Rome “had an interest in when great feasts were held and arrangements for security during those feasts. Festal celebrations could and sometimes did tip into riot or revolt.” As they explain, this may be the reason why in the Mishnah we see that Gamaliel (i.e., Gamaliel I, as they interpret it) traveled to Syria “to ask for permission from the government” (m. Eduyyot 7:7). The government over Syria-Palestine during this period was of course centralized in Syria. Neusner and Chilton suggest that the governor in Syria and “the prefect in Judea jealously guarded the emperor’s arrangement to have the sacrifices he provided offered by Israelite priests in the Temple. This vignette reflects a time when Gamaliel was a go-between who negotiated the interests of the Temple with the government, demonstrating his role in international Judaism as well as in Jerusalem proper.”

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71 Cf. b. Sanh. 11a. Cecil Roth (“Gamaliel, Rabban,” EncJud 7:365) and Stemberger (“Birkat ha-minim,” 82) associate this tradition with Gamaliel II.

72 Bruce Chilton and Jacob Neusner, “Paul and Gamaliel,” in In Quest of the Historical Pharisees (ed. Jacob Neusner and Bruce D. Chilton; Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2007), 175-223, here 211.
Later Talmudic tradition also reflects the view that Gamaliel I had political ties with Rome. Addressing the question of whether it is permitted to learn or teach Hellenistic philosophy, *b. B. Qam 83a* states:

> It may, however, be said that the family of R. Gamaliel was an exception, as they had associations with the Government, as indeed taught: “He who trims the front of his hair in Roman fashion is acting in the ways of the Amorites.” Abtolmus b. Reuben however was permitted to cut his hair in the Gentile fashion as he was in close contact with the Government. So also the members of the family of Rabban Gamaliel were permitted to discuss Grecian Wisdom on account of their having had associations with the Government.  

It seems that the tradition about Gamaliel’s “associations with the Government” was already well enough established that it could serve as a proof for an argument that was mostly unrelated.

On the question of whether the Pharisees were supportive of Roman rule, their role in the Gospel of John may offer further insight. Written from a post-70 perspective, it is not insignificant that the “the chief priests and the Pharisees” in that Gospel hold council about what to do with Jesus, fearing that “the Romans will come and destroy both our place and our nation” (John 11.48). While there is nothing in this statement to indicate that the chief priests and the Pharisees were submissive to Roman rule, when Jesus is before Pilate the position of the chief priests is clear: “We do not have a king, except Caesar” (19.15). These two passages together seem to imply that the chief priests came to recognize Caesar as their emperor at least partly because they did not want to bring destruction upon their holy city and people—which, when read after 70, means further destruction.

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We notice, however, that “the Pharisees” so designated are not present in the scene where the chief priests profess their loyalty to the emperor. This absence is curious, for when “the chief priests” appear throughout this Gospel, “the Pharisees” often accompany them (7.32, 45; 11.47, 57). The only times “the Pharisees” do not appear with “the chief priests” is when the latter are overtly seeking someone’s death—that is, Lazarus (12.10) and Jesus (19.6, 15, 21). Even though Judas procures the “officers from the chief priests and from the Pharisees” in order to take Jesus into custody (18.3), it is “your own nation and the chief priests” who hand over Jesus to Pilate (18.35).

It is questionable that the historical Pilate consulted with the Jewish religious authorities of his day about whether to execute Jesus. Accordingly, the role of “the chief priests” in putting Jesus to death is perhaps a literary element that we should seek to explain within a post-70 historical context. One possibility is that there would be less at stake in pinning these charges upon “the chief priests,” since their function and likely their power ceased to exist after 70. By contrast, the authors of this Gospel may have needed to exercise more caution in depicting the Pharisees. Granting that the historical Pharisees do not seem to have had any part in the execution of Jesus, to what degree does the Fourth Gospel eliminate a Pharisaic presence from its passion narrative? Are the Pharisees assumed to be among those who belong to “your own nation,” as well as among “the Jews” who cry out to Pilate, “If you release this man, you are not a friend of Caesar; for everyone who makes himself a king opposes Caesar” (19.12)?

Some scholars have noticed that, as designations in John, “the Pharisees” and “the Jews” are sometimes used interchangeably. Moreover, according to Urban von Wahlde, when we evaluate the redaction history of the Fourth Gospel, οἱ Φαρισαῖοι, οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς, and οἱ ἄρχοντες

74 See e.g., John 1.19, 24; 8.13, 22; 9.13, 18; and the discussion by Hakola and Reinhartz, “John’s Pharisees,” 137.
are the terms used for the religious authorities in an earlier stratum of the text, and οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι, “the Jews” (not to be confused with those usages designating “the Judeans”) in a later stratum. As von Wahlde shows, these two sets of terms refer not to two distinct sets of characters in the Gospel; but rather where the author of the earlier stratum mentions “the Pharisees” (sometimes with “the chief priests” and “the rulers”) the author of the second stratum instead uses “the Jews.” We can see these two strata most clearly in reading John 18.12-14, which refers back to 18.3 and 11.45-50. Those who are called “officers from the chief priests and from Pharisees” in 18.3 are called “officers of the Jews” in 18.12. While Caiaphas advises “the chief priests and the Pharisees” in 11.49-50, he is said to have advised “the Jews” in 18.14.⁷⁵

These two sets of terms, however, become more difficult to separate as we read throughout the passion narrative. Not only are the “the Pharisees” not paired with “the chief priests,” there we encounter for the first and only time in this Gospel the expression οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς τῶν Ἰουδαίων, “the chief priests of the Jews” (19.19). These peculiarities may reflect more attentiveness to these sections of the Gospel during the final stages of its editing. While there is reason to think that the editors were more careful in not placing “the Pharisees” among those characters who were calling for the death of Jesus, there is no sign that the editors were attempting to distance “the Pharisees” from the perspective that Caesar is king. On this particular issue, the question is also still open as to whether there may be some ideological or political continuity between the religious authorities envisioned in the earlier stratum, on the one hand, and those envisioned in the later one, on the other.

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In coming to Luke-Acts, it may be coincidental that some scholars have seen ambiguity in the Pharisees of the narrative, while others scholars have noticed ambiguity in various aspects of Roman imperialism throughout the two books. On the other hand, is it possible that this pair of ambiguities reflects some correspondence in their portrayals and perhaps even some veiled political collusion between these characters? Answering this question most fully would of course require a second study, which investigates also those Roman characters and the empire more broadly in Luke-Acts. In the present study, however, we can at least provide the impetus for answering this question by evaluating whether and if so how the Pharisees are in any way aligned with Roman political power, as the author presents them.


A study of the Lukan Pharisees also requires that we attempt to contextualize the Gospel and Acts more broadly within an ancient geographical setting. Even though the Lukan writings contain no clear statement about places from which they may have been written or to which they may have first been sent, are there clues that may help us locate a provenance? And if we can at least hypothesize a provenance for Luke-Acts, what evidence is available for locating Pharisees within that geographical setting?

1. Judea

A number of scholars immediately rule out Judea and its immediate environs as a potential provenance for Luke-Acts. This view is based on the assumption that the author does not have sufficient knowledge of the geography of Judea and the neighboring regions, which may mean that the author had never even visited these areas. Martin Hengel has blunted this view to some degree—proposing that the author likely had at least visited these regions, even though he probably was not a native resident.¹ The author does, for instance, revise ἡ θάλασσα τῆς Γαλιλαίας (Mark 1.16) to ἡ λίμνη Γεννησαρέτ (Luke 5.1), reserving the term θάλασσα for the Mediterranean (Acts 10.6, 32; 17.14; 27.30, 38, 40; 28.4). He also knows that Tyre and Sidon are on the “seacoast” of the Mediterranean, as he improves upon περὶ Τύρον καὶ Σιδῶνα (Mark 3.8) with the more specific statement, ἀπὸ τῆς παραλίου Τύρου καὶ Σιδῶνος (Luke 6.17).² He can estimate that Emmaus is “sixty stadia from Jerusalem” (24.13); that “the mount called Olivet is


near Jerusalem, a Sabbath day’s journey away” (Acts 1.12); and that the road going down from Jerusalem to Gaza is “a desert road” (8.26).

Perhaps the most frequently cited example of the author’s supposed ignorance of the geography of these regions is the statement, “while going toward Jerusalem he was also passing through the midst [διήρχετο διὰ μέσον] of Samaria and Galilee” (Luke 17.11). Hans Conzelmann views this as “the most remarkable” of those references showing that the author was allegedly unfamiliar with the region.³ As Richard Pervo recently notes, however, the geography in this statement “is theological, not topographical.”⁴ In chapter twelve of this dissertation we shall evaluate more fully whether the author, immediately after this statement, goes on to compare the ten lepers (17.12-19) with the Pharisees (17.20-21), and how this comparison may be relevant spatially (i.e., διὰ μέσον and ἐντὸς ὑμῶν, 17.11, 21). The most we should say at this point is that the order in which Jesus passes through Samaria first and Galilee second corresponds to the order in his encounters with the lepers first and the Pharisees second. Perhaps answers to these questions will become clearer in the longer and requisite treatment below.

In terms of our question here, can we use the topographical details in Luke-Acts as criteria for reaching conclusions about the author’s knowledge of Mediterranean geography? Maybe in some cases we still can, such as in his preference for λίμνη over θάλασσα when referring to a smaller body of water. But any points of significance that can be explained on rhetorical or theological grounds must also not escape our notice. Accordingly, it is unsafe to

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⁴ Richard I. Pervo, The Gospel of Luke (The Scholars Bible; Salem, Oreg.: Polebridge Press, 2014), 153. Pervo is not, however, claiming that the Lukan narrator might otherwise have been topographically informed. As he reads Acts: “The narrator exhibits limited knowledge about the geography of Palestine and the interior of Asia Minor” (Acts, 5-6).
assume too quickly that the author was ignorant of a particular region within the Mediterranean basin simply because his topography of a given region does not entirely cohere with our own.

Given the fact that much of the Lukan narrative takes place in urban settings, perhaps the best approach is to ask what cities are most important to the author. Although not making an argument for the provenance of Luke-Acts, scholars have observed that Jerusalem indisputably plays a central role throughout much of the narrative.\(^5\) The Gospel begins and ends in Jerusalem, with characters performing acts of religious service in the temple (1.9; 2.27; 24.52-53). Jesus twice laments the fate of Jerusalem (13.33-35; 19.41-44), which most assuredly shows that the author knows about its destruction in 70 CE (21.20-24). For the apostles in Acts, Jerusalem is the point of departure for carrying out the instructions that Jesus related to them (Acts 1.8). We may approximate that the first quarter of the author’s second book takes place in Jerusalem (Acts 1-7). And even when missionary efforts extend outside and away from Jerusalem, certain characters return to and depart from that city repeatedly (12.25; 15.2; 19.21; 20.16; 21.13; 25.1).\(^6\) If we were to locate the provenance of Luke-Acts on the basis of which city receives the most attention, we would need to locate it in or around Jerusalem.

Yet there is other evidence suggesting that the author is not writing from the perspective of one located in Jerusalem, nor that he is writing to readers in that city. For instance, when he


\(^6\) As Johnson observes, “In spatial terms, therefore, Jerusalem is the center of Luke’s narrative. The middle twelve chapters of the two-volume work narrate events exclusively in that place. Why does Luke make Jerusalem so central? The city and its Temple (which Luke treats as virtually identical) were of obvious historical importance both for Judaism and the nascent Christian movement. But more than historical recollection is involved. For Luke, city and Temple stand as symbols of the people Israel. The death of Jesus and the beginning of the Church in Jerusalem provide the paradigmatic expression of the Jewish people’s acceptance or rejection of God’s visitation. Jerusalem, in short, is the place of pivot in Luke’s story of the Prophet and the people” (*Luke*, 15).
explains that the field Judas purchased was called Akeldama, he notes that this name is in “their
dialect,” that is, the dialect of “the ones who inhabit Jerusalem” (Acts 1.19). Such a statement
would appear to serve as a kind of commentary for readers living somewhere other than
Jerusalem—that is, explaining what might be foreign to those readers. It is more likely that the
author’s attention toward Jerusalem reflects an interest in the holy city of Judaism, as well as a
destination to which pilgrims living throughout the Diaspora would travel for worship (8.27;
and Rome as the main centers of the world. Both in the Gospel and in Acts Luke is very
occupied with Jerusalem. Both Luke and Philo tell about people coming to worship in the
Temple of Jerusalem. Philo shows how Jews from all the world meet and enjoy fellowship in
Jerusalem, and Luke informs us that Jews from all nations live in Jerusalem. Travel to and from
Jerusalem in Acts moreover serves the aims and needs of the emerging Christians movement.
The central and universal role played by Jerusalem in Luke and Philo is due, of course, to the
fact that both represent the geographical outlook of Diaspora Judaism” (\textit{Philo, John and Paul},
279-80).}  

2. Ephesus

In analyzing the book of Acts, some scholars hold that the author has a special interest in
Ephesus and thereby propose that he may have written from there or its environs. This view is
based partly upon the author’s supposed knowledge of details such as the “Hall of Tyrannus”
(19.9), and that Ephesus was “the temple keeper \[νεωκόρος\] of the Great Artemis” (19.35).\footnote{Borgen, \textit{Philo, John and Paul}, 281-82; and Pervo, \textit{Acts}, 5-7. Although not arguing that
show such detailed knowledge of any other city as of Ephesus” (\textit{Roman Society and Roman Law
evidence is inconclusive, however; for the author is quite specific on details from other places as
well.\textsuperscript{9} He purports to know the name of a street in Damascus, for example (9.11). And in Athens he quotes the words of an inscription from an altar (17.23).

Furthermore, the argument based on how detailed the author is about a particular place could also work in the opposite direction. That is to say, it is conceivable that he could be less detailed on the landscape when narrating events that purportedly happened in places already familiar to his readers and more generous with details when it comes to describing places those readers may not have ever visited. While Luke-Acts is not the same kind of project as the writings of Pliny the Elder (\textit{Naturalis historia}) and Pausanius (\textit{Graeciae descriptio}), for example, there may nonetheless be at least some attempt to capture the local flavor of certain cities for his readers.

Perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence for the Ephesian provenance of Acts appears in the speech Paul delivers to the elders of the Ephesian church (20.17-38).\textsuperscript{10} We notice that this speech contains a number of verbal echoes from the Pauline letters, as well as some points of comparison to the Pastorals. To give only one example, where the Paul of Acts expresses his resolve “to finish my course” (τελειῶσαι τὸν δρόμον μου, 20.24), the Pastor claims, “I have finished the course” (τὸν δρόμον τετέλεκα, 2 Tim 4.7). Most relevant for our

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\textsuperscript{9} According to Paul Trebilco, the evidence for the Ephesian provenance of Luke-Acts “is very tenuous and it remains unlikely” (\textit{The Early Christians in Ephesus from Paul to Ignatius} [WUNT 166; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004], 7).

\textsuperscript{10} Edgar J. Goodspeed writes: “Paul’s only extended farewell to any of his churches is the one to the elders of Ephesus” (\textit{New Chapters in New Testament Study} [New York: Macmillan, 1937], 27). Borgen states: “Most important, Paul’s farewell discourse, Acts 20:17-38, was addressed to the elders of the Ephesian church. At the close of his churchfounding activity and missionary travel, Paul gives his ‘testament’ and his legacy to the church at Ephesus. This testament had paradigmatic character, and the Ephesian congregation thereby became the bearers of Paul’s legacy” (\textit{Philo, John and Paul}, 281-82). And Pervo claims: “The speech in 20:17-35 indicates that Ephesus was also the primary, but not exclusive, destination of this book” (\textit{Acts}, 6).
purposes here is the fact that, as the Pastor writes to Timothy, he locates him in Ephesus (1 Tim 1.3; 2 Tim 1.18; 4.12).

In reading Paul’s speech to the Ephesian elders and its resonances with the Pastorals, is it possible to conjecture that Acts was written from or else sent to Ephesus on the basis that 1 and 2 Timothy may also have been? Or, to ask a methodological question, to what extent can we use the speeches and other media (e.g., embedded letters) in Acts to speculate on where the author or his readers may have been located? If we evaluate the speech to the Ephesian elders on its own, apart from 1 and 2 Timothy, there is nothing to suggest that Acts was written to or from Ephesus. But even if we do use 1 and 2 Timothy as external evidence for locating the provenance of Acts, these two letters would still not outweigh the internal evidence we have from the embedded letter in Acts 15.23-29, which purportedly was sent “to the brothers and sisters from the Gentiles in Antioch and Syria and Cilicia” (15.23). While the latter proof is somewhat stronger than the former, in either case the question remains unanswered based on this type of evidence alone.

Moreover, the hypothesis that Acts has an Ephesian provenance does not display any evidence from the Third Gospel that would lead us to think that the author was writing from or to readers in that city. Is there more consistent evidence across the Gospel and Acts that would allow us locate a provenance?

3. Antioch in Syria

Some scholars have proposed that we should place the author of Luke-Acts in Antioch in Syria, a view that is also well-attested in the early reception of Luke and Acts.11 Before reviewing the

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external evidence supporting this theory, perhaps it is best to evaluate whether there are any internal evidences suggesting that the author has a special interest in Syria and the city of Antioch in particular.

We see mention of Syria as early as the infancy narrative, when the author claims, “this first census happened when Quirinius was governing over Syria” (Luke 2.2; cf. Josephus, Ant. 17.355; 18.1-2). The fact that the author dates the census by pointing to a Syrian governor suggests that his readers would know who Quirinius is. What is curious is that the author does not mention Coponius, the first Roman prefect of Judea commissioned to “rule over the Jews with authority in all matters” (B.J. 2.117; Ant. 18.2, here quoted). Granted, according to Josephus, it was Quirinius in particular who was responsible for administering the census (Ant. 18.2). So the reference to Quirinius could simply point to this politically transitional time in Syria and Judea, when these provinces became subject to taxation under direct Roman rule. The naming of Quirinius may also reflect the fact that the imperial power of the region was centralized in Syria, with Judea as its satellite. For placing Luke-Acts within a Syrian provenance, the evidence in Luke 2.2 alone is suggestive at best.

The next clue showing that the author might be especially interested in Syria appears in the scene where Jesus goes into the synagogue of Nazareth and there inaugurates his ministry (4.16-30). It is notable that Ναμάν ὁ Σύρος, “Naaman the Syrian,” are the closing words of the speech that angers Jesus’ audience in the synagogue (4.27). And among the Synoptics, this reference to Ναμάν ὁ Σύρος is unique to the Third Gospel. As far as we know, there is no other Naaman attested in Greek literature; so for this author the designation “the Syrian” would probably not serve to distinguish Naaman from another literary character with that name. It is


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granted though that this qualification does not necessarily mean that the author wishes to highlight Naaman’s provincial locale. For when we read the account about Naaman in 4 Kgdms 5.1-27, he is clearly identified as a Syrian, particularly “the commander of the military of Syria” (5.1).

The closest parallel to Luke 4.27 appears in 4 Kgdms 5.20, where Gehazi calls him ὁ Ναμαν ὁ Σύρος οὗτος, “Naaman, this Syrian.” As we observed in Demetrius’ discussion on figured speech, such a use of the near demonstrative pronoun may allude to (ἐμφαίνειν) some reproachful characteristic in a person, such as the arrogance of Κρατερὸς οὗτος, “this Craterus” (Eloc. 289). We will evaluate below in greater detail whether the Lukan Jesus uses this figure when he calls Herod ἡ ἀλώπηξ αὐτῆς, “this fox” (Luke 13.32). From the perspective of the character Gehazi in 4 Kgdms 5.20, the statement would appear to be pejorative, particularly because Naaman is a non-Israelite.

What is also striking when we compare 4 Kgdms 5.1-27 to Luke 4.27-28 is that, where Naaman in 4 Kgdms “became angry [θυμοῦσθαι] and went away” (5.11) and then “went away in anger [θυμός]” (5.12), in Luke “all in the synagogue were filled with anger [θυμός]” (4.28) when Jesus concludes his speech with this example about Naaman. In this first instance of Jewish opposition toward Jesus in the Gospel, the author appears to have transferred any negative qualities about Naaman onto those in the synagogue.

Is the reference to “Naaman the Syrian” significant in our attempt to identify a provenance for Luke-Acts? If the author’s initial audience of readers was located in Syria, would this scene suggest that Syrian Gentiles (cf. the non-Israelite Naaman) were not as welcome in synagogues as they might have been? It would be difficult to answer that question at this point. We can at least say that the author does not preserve any negative qualities that are applied to
Naaman in the 4 Kgdms 5.20, and that a reference to a Syrian character in this inaugural moment of Jesus’ public ministry might interest Syrian readers.

Antioch in Syria plays a prominent role particularly in Acts. From among the seven who are chosen to serve tables (Acts 6.1-6), only one is associated with any city, namely, “Nicolaus, a proselyte of Antioch” (6.5). This qualification could simply imply that the other six men were Jerusalemites and hence that only Nicolaus was not a native or resident of the city. It is still curious, however, why this piece of information would be relevant for a character whom the author does not develop beyond this scene. It is possible that this detail would serve to place a fellow Antiochene among those seven who were “full of the spirit and wisdom” (6.3).

Following the conversion of Cornelius and his household (Acts 10.1-11.18), it is perhaps not insignificant that the first steps toward a Gentile mission more broadly are taken in Antioch (11.20). And because Barnabas regards these advances as legitimate, the author dubs him “a good man and full of the Holy Spirit and faith” (11.24). It is also at this point that the author informs his readers that “in Antioch the disciples were first called Christians” (11.26), which may reflect an attempt to champion the Christian community in that city.

Antioch then becomes a kind of headquarters for some of the missionary endeavors in neighboring regions. When prophets go to Antioch from Jerusalem and one Agabus predicts an imminent famine, the Antiochene disciples send relief to Judea through Barnabas and Saul (11.27-30). It is the “prophets and teachers” from within the church at Antioch who then commission Barnabas and Saul as they journey to Seleucia, Cyprus, Salamis, Paphos, Perga in

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Pamphylia, Antioch in Pisidia, Iconium, Lystra, Derbe, Attalia, and then back to Antioch in Syria (13.1-6, 13-14, 51; 14.1, 6, 8, 20-21, 25-26).

When Paul and company travel to Antioch in Pisidia, the author does indeed specify that it is to Ἀντιόχεια ἡ Πισιδία that they go (Acts 13.14). And the other references to this Antioch in the immediately subsequent narrative (14.19, 21) are dependent upon this qualification, ἡ Πισιδία, before their return to Antioch in Syria (14.26). Moreover, at the first mention of Christ followers going to Antioch in Syria, it is simply Ἀντιόχεια (11.19-20, 22, 26; cf. 11.27; 13.1). And when he mentions “Nicolaus, a proselyte of Antioch” (6.5), he does not indicate which Antioch he means.

Could the initial readers of Acts assume that any reference to Antioch in Syria was their own, but that when the author referred to Antioch in Pisidia he would need to specify? Readers who knew their geography could probably surmise that when Paul and company go to Perga in Pamphylia and then on to an “Antioch” that the city in question was the one most proximate, that is, located immediately north of Pamphylia in Pisidia. Perhaps the author does specify ἡ Πισιδία for the sake of readers in Syrian Antioch.

When Paul and company return to Antioch in Syria, “whence they had been commended to the grace of God for the work that they had fulfilled” (14.26; cf. 15.40), there they “spent no short time with the disciples” (14.28; cf. 15.35). It is also notable that on their arrival, they gathered the church together and informed them of “the things God had done with them and that he had opened a door of faith for the Gentiles” (14.27). This particular advance of the Gentile mission—made possible in part through the support of the Antiochene church (13.1-3)—then

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contrasts with the potential challenge to that mission, as related in the immediately subsequent scene when some persons go from Judea to Antioch demanding that Christians become circumcised (15.1).

The Antiochene church then sends Paul, Barnabas, and others to Jerusalem in order to settle the matter, and on their way there they report the progress in “the conversion of the Gentiles” (15.2-3). The meeting in Jerusalem results in the letter addressed “to the brothers and sisters from the Gentiles in Antioch and Syria and Cilicia” (15.23), a letter that is well-received by the church in Antioch (15.30-31). This evidence indicates that the Antiochene Christians in Acts both support and benefit from the Gentile mission. Could we say also that this ministry to Gentiles by and among Antiochene Christians in the narrative is a reflection of the author’s promotion of the Gentile mission among readers in Antioch? The evidence does not allow us to draw any conclusions. The most we can say is that the support shown for the Gentile mission by the church in Antioch in some ways mirrors that displayed more broadly by the author of Luke-Acts.

There is yet a second time in the narrative of Acts when Antioch in Syria serves as a home base, as it were, for Paul and his missionary efforts. After Paul and Barnabas deliver the letter to Antioch (15.30-31), they spend time there “teaching and announcing the good news” (15.35) and eventually go their separate ways, departing from Antioch on different missions (15.36-40). Paul later comes back to Antioch (18.22), stays there for “some time,” and departs yet again on another mission (18.23). That Antioch is a place of departure and point of return for Paul multiple times in Acts is indeed curious. We do have indications that the historical Paul spent at least some time in “the regions of Syria and Cilicia” (Gal 1.21) and even in Antioch.
(2.11), but the evidence is otherwise lacking.\textsuperscript{14} To what extent the author of Acts is accurate on Paul’s travel history and to what extent he may be embellishing the facts, and if so why, is impossible to determine. What we can suggest is that Antioch in Acts serves as a center for Christian mission; and that fact might betray an Antiochene bias.

We have a variant reading in Acts that might serve as an early witness to the view that the author was from Antioch. Here the D text (Codex Bezae) introduces the first so-called We-passage at Acts 11.28 (συνεστραμμένων δὲ ἡμῶν, “and when we had gathered together”), which appears within a scene occurring in Antioch.\textsuperscript{15} It is of course less likely that the D text preserves the earlier reading. If anything, it may show that a scribe regarded the author as being from Antioch and thus supposed he was an eyewitness to the events in Acts 11.27-30.\textsuperscript{16}

Another early piece of external evidence associating the author of Luke and Acts with Antioch appears in the so-called Anti-Marcionite Prologues to the Gospels. The Prologue to Luke states that this Gospel was written by “Luke” (ὁ Λουκᾶς) and that this evangelist was “an Antiochene Syrian” (Ἀντιοχεύς Σύρος). He adds that “afterwards the same Luke wrote the Acts of the Apostles.”\textsuperscript{17} Eusebius similarly claims that Luke was “by race of those from Antioch”

\textsuperscript{14} As Meier observes, the reference to Antioch in Gal 2.11 “is the only time Antioch in Syria is mentioned in the whole body of Paul’s writings” (“Antiochene Church,” 28). The Antioch envisioned in 2 Tim 3.11 is surely Antioch in Pisidia, since it appears alongside references to the neighboring towns Iconium and Lystra. Cf. Acts 13.14, 50; 14.1, 5, 8, 19, 21.

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. Strobel, “Lukas der Antiochener,” 131-34.

\textsuperscript{16} Cadbury remarks that the reading is found “also in Augustine and several other Latin authorities.” While it may be true that the reading is “as early as the tradition of Luke’s Antiochian provenance,” less certain is Cadbury’s claim that “it is more likely to be the cause than the effect of that tradition. Readers of such a text could naturally infer from this, the first occurrence of the ‘we,’ that the writer must himself have been an Antiochian, just as readers of the other text have assumed from the first occurrence of the ‘we’ in their text at xvi. 10, and its disappearance and reappearance at Philippi, that the writer was ‘a man of Macedonia’” (Beginnings, 2:248-49).

\textsuperscript{17} The Greek text appears in Kurt Aland, ed., \textit{Synopsis Quattuor Evangeliorum} (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1996), 549.
And Jerome follows this tradition as well, stating in one context that Luke was “an Antiochene” (*Antiochensis, Vir. Ill. 7*), and in another that he was “by race a Syrian of Antioch” (*natione Syrus Antiochensis*, in *Comm. Matt.* Preface 2). So also the Monarchian Prologue to Luke, attributed to Priscillian, calls him “a Syrian of Antioch by race” (*Syrus natione Antiochensis*).\(^{18}\)

We must, however, read the Gospel Prologues and the Church Fathers with caution when trying to identify a provenance for Luke-Acts. Even though they state that Luke was an Antiochene, they at the same time place Luke in Greece at a later period of his life. The Anti-Marcionite Prologue to the Third Gospel claims that Luke wrote down his Gospel “in parts around Achaia” and that he died “in Boetia” (*Evv. Prologi*; Aland, 549). Jerome assumes that Luke was not only “the most educated in the Greek language among all the evangelists,” but also that he “wrote his Gospel among the Greeks” (*Ep. 20.4*) and “in the parts of Achaia and Boetia” (*Comm. Matt.* Preface 2). Jerome’s view about the authorship of Luke and Acts is generally problematic in light of what modern scholarship has shown, for he holds that Luke’s Gospel had been written already during Paul’s lifetime and that Paul even refers to Luke and his “Gospel” in 2 Cor 8.18.\(^{19}\) Accordingly, Jerome also supposes that Luke accompanied Paul during his last days in Rome and that “in the same city” he wrote the book of Acts (*Vir. Ill. 7*).

The early tradition that places the author in Greece appears to be more theologically than historically motivated. Granting that theological and historical motivations may coexist and in some cases not conflict, this tradition may stem from an attempt to place the evangelists at

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\(^{18}\) See the full text in Aland, *Synopsis*, 555; also in *Beginnings*, 2:242-45.

\(^{19}\) *Misimus etiam cum illo fratrem, cuius laus est in evangelio per omnes ecclesias* (2 Cor 8.18). See Jerome, *Vir. Ill. 7*; and *Comm. Matt.* Preface 2. This interpretation of 2 Cor 8.18 appears as early as Origen: τὸ κατὰ Λουκᾶν, τὸ ὑπὸ Παύλου ἐπαινούμενον εὐαγγέλιον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔθνων πεποιηκότα (Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 6.25.5).
different posts throughout the Mediterranean basin—that is, “Matthew in Judea,” “Mark in Italy,” Luke “in parts around Achaia,” and John’s Gospel “in Asia” (*Evv. Prologi*; Aland, 549).\(^{20}\) Theologically, this claim universalizes the fourfold Gospel, which would perhaps be more difficult if two, three, or four of the canonical Gospels were thought to have been written from within the same geographical region. This kind of motivation we see embedded also in Irenaeus’ argument for why there should be no more or no less than four Gospels, that is, “since there are four zones of the world in which we live, and four principal winds, while the Church is scattered throughout all the world” (*Adv. Haer.* 3.11.8).\(^{21}\)

When such a motivation already exists, placing the author in Greece would indeed be a natural move, since his style is arguably the most Hellenistic among the four Gospels, as Jerome rightly points out. Yet there are other Mediterranean authors from this period (e.g., Philo, Paul, and Josephus) who also display styles that are much more Hellenistic than what we encounter in Matthew, Mark, and John; and we would not assume that they were writing from within Greece simply on the basis of their respective styles.

We can explain some of the autobiographical details about “Luke” in the early traditions on the basis of parallels from within the New Testament. For instance, the claim that the author of the Third Gospel “died at the age of eighty-four, full of the Holy Spirit” combines statements about Anna and Jesus from within that Gospel (2.37; 4.1), and also from Acts (6.5; 7.55; 11.24). Yet it is difficult to explain how the tradition about the author’s Antiochene origins emerged, unless early readers of Luke and Acts inferred that the author was from Antioch on the basis of

\(^{20}\) The placement of John’s Gospel *in Asia* appears only in the Latin version of the prologue. As noted in the apparatus of the Greek text: *In fine lege ev τη Ασια sec. Lat. versionem* (Aland, *Synopsis*, 549).

the internal evidence discussed above, or perhaps from the variant reading in Acts 11.28. “The mention of Luke’s Syrian and Antiochene connections,” Fitzmyer observes, “has in se no apologetic or theological value,” such as we see in his association with Greece.\(^{22}\) It is uncertain how such details about the author of Luke and Acts came together during the period of their earliest reception, or perhaps whether the writings were originally associated with an author living in Antioch. In the end, the evidence for placing the author geographically is not as strong as we would like it to be. All we can conclude is that the author lived and wrote somewhere within the Mediterranean basin, possibly Antioch.

4. The Question about Diaspora Pharisees

If Antioch is a possible provenance for Luke-Acts, the question about the author’s knowledge of Pharisaism is directly related to the ongoing puzzle of whether there were Pharisees living throughout the Diaspora.\(^ {23}\) That is to say, how much could an author living outside Judea have known about the Pharisees, apart from source material that may have been available to him?

When the Pharisees first appear within the Lukan narrative, the author assumes that the group was very well represented throughout Galilee and Judea. “Pharisees and teachers of the law,” he claims, “had come from every village of Galilee and Judea and Jerusalem” (Luke 5.17). And throughout the Gospel, Jesus has most of his encounters with Pharisees in and around Galilee (e.g., 6.1-11; 7.36-50; 11.37-44, 53-44; 13.31-35; 14.1-24; 15.1-32; 16.14-31; 17.20-21), and then one encounter in Jerusalem (19.39). Moreover, in Acts Pharisaism is a phenomenon that is associated with Jerusalem exclusively. Gamaliel advises the council in Jerusalem (Acts 5.33-


\(^ {23}\) On whether Pharisees might have lived and even received an education in the Diaspora, see e.g., Johann Maier, *Geschichte der jüdischen Religion: Von der Zeit Alexander des Grossen bis zur Aufklärung mit einem Ausblick auf das 19./20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), 76-77, 80-82.
40. It is in Jerusalem that Paul, Barnabas, and others are opposed by “some who had come to believe from the sect of the Pharisees” (15.5). Paul later addresses the council consisting of Pharisees and Sadducees in Jerusalem (23.1-10). And as Luke presents it, Paul was trained as a Pharisee, “at the feet of Gamaliel,” in Jerusalem (22.3; 26.4-5).

It is thus important to observe that throughout Acts no Pharisees appear in those settings that take place in and around Greece and Rome. Yet we should not assume too quickly that—simply because Jerusalem is a center for Pharisaism in Acts—the historical Pharisees never traveled to other places within the Mediterranean basin. For we also see in Acts that even before his extensive travels as a Christian missionary, Paul, as a Pharisee, could travel as far north as Damascus (9.1-3; 22.3-4; 26.4-12). Furthermore, the proximity of Antioch to Judea made travel back and forth quite possible, as we also see in Acts. Most notable are “some who went down from Judea” (τινες κατελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰουδαίας, 15.1) to Antioch, who hold the same position about circumcision as “some who had come to believe from the sect of the Pharisees” (τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν Φαρισαίων πεπιστευκότες, 15.5).

Is there evidence outside of Luke-Acts suggesting that Pharisees could live and move beyond Judea and Galilee? We have already seen that Josephus could at least give the impression that he was a Pharisee while living in Rome, even if he really was not. Our only other example of a possible Diaspora Pharisee is Paul. As Saldarini observes, “Since Paul lived and worked in greater Syria as a Pharisee, it is possible that Pharisaism had some influence there and that some Pharisees lived outside Jerusalem and Judea.” 24

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24 Saldarini, “Pharisees,” ABD 5:294. Cf. Günter Stemberger: “We cannot reject the idea that Paul might have been a Pharisee with a passing reference to the idea that there were no Pharisees in Asia Minor. We have no evidence for Pharisees in the Diaspora; nevertheless, a conclusion based on the incidental silence of the sources here is not reliable, even if the observance of various religious laws, especially those of ritual purity, must have been extremely
There are of course questions about where Paul lived out his Pharisaism. Our earliest occurrence of the term Φαρισαῖος appears in Paul’s letter to Philippians, where he claims to have been “in respect to the law a Pharisee, in respect to zeal a persecutor of the church” (3.5b-6a). This biographical statement would appear to correspond to the reference in Galatians to his “former way of life in Judaism, how I violently persecuted the church of God” (Gal 1.13). But there is no clear statement in either of these letters about where he led this “former way of life.” One possibility is in or around Damascus, since it is to that city he claims to have returned again (πάλιν ὑποστρέφειν) after having gone away into Arabia (Gal 1.17). Supporting this hypothesis is the detail that he then goes to “the regions of Syria and Cilicia” after his visit to Jerusalem (Gal 1.18-21).

The question becomes more complicated when we ask whether there was any “church” in Syria and Cilicia for Paul to have persecuted during this period of his “former way of life.” One indication that there might have been appears in Acts when Saul asks for permission to go from Jerusalem to Damascus with the prospect of finding “some who belonged to the way” (Acts 9.2). And indeed, in Damascus there is a “disciple” named Ananias (9.10), as well as other “disciples” (9.19). Yet, as we know, the author would have us to believe also that Paul was educated as a Pharisee in Jerusalem (22.3); and even though this author assumes that Paul was from Tarsus in Cilicia (Acts 9.11; 21.39; 22.3), it is in Jerusalem that the Lukan Paul claims to have been from the days of his “youth” and seemingly throughout the period when he “lived as a Pharisee” (26.4-5).25

difficult in the Diaspora” (Jewish Contemporaries of Jesus: Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes [trans. Allan W. Mahnke; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995], 120-21).

25 The complications that arise between ἐγὼ Φαρισαῖός εἰμι (Acts 23.6) and ἔζησα Φαρισαῖος (26.5) are addressed more fully in another chapter.
Although Paul shows in his letters that he maintained a relationship with the church in Jerusalem throughout his ministry (Gal 1.18; 2.1; Rom 15.19), there is nothing in the letters to suggest that he had ever been based there. His efforts to have churches make financial contributions to the saints in Jerusalem (1 Cor 16.3; 2 Cor 9.1-15; Rom 15.25-26, 31) remind us of that larger phenomenon in which supporters of the Judaic religion throughout the Mediterranean would send their gifts to the city; it does not necessary imply that Jerusalem was his base of operations during the period of his “former way of life” or after. While it remains possible that Paul spent some time in Jerusalem as a Pharisee, we should give more weight to the evidence from Galatians, which places him in Syria and Cilicia.

Furthermore, if we can accept that the Pharisees actually did “cross over sea and land” in order to proselytize (Matt 23.15), then there may have been a Pharisaic presence in parts of the Diaspora. Yet we must proceed with caution when interpreting the invectives in Matt 23.13-36, since it can be difficult to separate the rhetoric from the reality. The notion that persons would cross sea and land for only one proselyte may be hyperbolic.

When we analyze all the woes against the scribes and the Pharisees in Matt 23.13-36, the initial statement about what they purportedly do is not always negative or unrealistic (cf. however 23.16-22 with 5.33-37); the problem, according to the Matthean Jesus, often comes when they then contradict their beliefs and practices. It seems that Matthew can take for granted that the Pharisees are to some extent religious exclusivists (23.13), that they travel as missionaries (23.15), swear by oaths (23.16), tithe (23.23), wash their dishes ritually (23.25), and

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26 See Albert I. Baumgarten on the possibility of a Pharisaic mission to the Diaspora (“Marcel Simon’s Verus Israel as a Contribution to Jewish History,” HTR 92 [1999]: 465-478), as well as on the particular approach that may have been taken in such “outreach” work (“The ‘Outreach’ Campaign of the Ancient Pharisees: There is no such thing as a Free Lunch,” in Judaea-Palaestina, Babylon and Rome: Jews in Antiquity [TSAJ 147; ed. Benjamin Isaac and Yuval Shahar; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012], 11-28).
build memorials for persons they respect (23.29). On moral grounds, Jesus could not fault the scribes and Pharisees for shutting the kingdom of heaven before certain humans (23.13); for he earlier claims that he will do the same (7.21-23). Jesus would himself be the hypocrite if he were to oppose proselytizing per se (13.15); for in his final words to the disciples, he instructs them to go and make disciples of all the Gentiles (28.19). Yet there may be one important distinction to make between the proselytizing efforts of the Pharisees and those of Christians. Martin Goodman has argued that the proselytizing work of the Pharisees was for the purpose of recruiting Diaspora Jews to the movement, not Gentiles. In the end, the invective in Matt 23.15 seems to be more about how the scribes and Pharisees allegedly make their single proselyte into a “son of Gehenna” and less about their efforts to cross sea and land in order to proselytize. Accordingly, it remains possible that the Pharisees did travel throughout the Diaspora as missionaries, although not necessarily for the sake of a single convert, nor toward the moral demise of that convert.

On this question of a Jewish mission to the Diaspora, the Gospel of John provides another important piece of evidence. When “the chief priests and the Pharisees” send officers to arrest Jesus, he predicts his departure and says, “you will seek me and you will not find me, and where I am you cannot come” (7.34). Then “the Jews said to one another, ‘Where is this man about to go that we shall not find him? He is not about to go into the Diaspora of the Greeks and to teach the Greeks, is he?’” (7.35). This passage of course makes best sense not within the context of the historical Jesus, but during the period of John’s composition—that is, when the Christian

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27 The woe in Matt 23.27 is less directed against a particular practice than it is a comparison to what they allegedly resemble.

message had gone to the Diaspora and was there being taught. Yet based on how “the Jews” understand the statement, “where I am you cannot come,” is the implication that they were for some reason prohibited from traveling to the Diaspora?

It is sometimes supposed that Pharisees could not have lived outside of Palestine because constant contact with Gentiles would make adherence to Halakah almost impossible. Yet the evidence that leads to this supposition is too tenuous to make a convincing case; and one could just as easily attempt an argument in the other direction by proposing that if Pharisaic Halakah was meaningful anywhere, it would have been so within the Diaspora where the threat of compromising or losing one’s Jewish identity would have been greater. Saldarini makes this point about Josephus and Paul, as Diaspora Pharisees: “Perhaps they found the Pharisaic view of how to live Judaism as a viable response to the intellectual and spiritual challenge of Hellenism. Pharisaism probably brought Jewish practices into daily life and created a conscious way of life which answered the questions and crises felt by some Jews when confronted with the Greco-

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29 Cf. Brown: “Their sneering suggestion that Jesus might go off to teach the Gentile world had become a reality by the time the Fourth Gospel was written” (John I-XII, 318).
Roman culture.” Or as Daniel Schwartz remarks, “when territory is no longer available to impart identity, observance of law is—alongside of pedigree—an obvious alternative.”

As we observed in the previous chapter, the rabbis who composed the Mishnah do not object to the tradition that Gamaliel journeyed to Syria in order to receive authority from the government (m. Eduyyot 7:7). What is especially remarkable about this passage is that they claim “he was long in returning,” presumably meaning that he stayed in Syria for an extended period of time (unless he was held up elsewhere). There is nothing to indicate that the length of Gamaliel’s sojourn was controversial or unusual. They mention it only to explain that on the occasion of his prolonged absence, a leap-year was declared on the condition that he would approve of this declaration upon his return.

We see also a tradition in the Jerusalem Talmud that “Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Gamaliel traveled to Rome” (y. Sanh. 7:19). Rabbi Efes is said to have preached in Antioch (Gen. Rab. 10.4). Purportedly, a question about Gen 3.5 was posed to Rabbi Tanḥuma while he was in Antioch (Gen. Rab. 19.4). And the Babylonian Talmud relates an incident that came before Rabbi Yitzḥak in Antioch (b. Ketub. 88a). Acknowledging the often legendary element in rabbinic accounts, what is insightful about these in particular is that the later rabbis appear to take for granted that earlier rabbis conducted religious affairs throughout the Diaspora.

In the end, the fact that we have limited evidence showing the presence of Pharisees throughout the Diaspora does not necessarily rule out the possibility that there were Pharisees

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living in places other than Judea. We are reminded that we have limited first-hand evidence about the Pharisees living even in Judea. Furthermore, if we can believe that both Paul and Josephus were able to live as Pharisees in the Diaspora (at least at some point in their respective lives), then we have available to us more writings that were composed by a former Pharisee and an alleged Pharisee, both in the Diaspora, than writings by Pharisees in Judea. If the provenance of Luke-Acts is Antioch in Syria, then the likelihood of the author and his readers knowing (about) actual living Pharisees is probable (even if such “Pharisees” no longer wished to apply this name to themselves); if the provenance is elsewhere with the Diaspora, the chances are perhaps not as great, but it does remain possible.
Chapter Five: Luke and His Readers

Do we know who wrote Luke-Acts and who may have been the initial readers? Also, when were these texts written? While we may not be able to identify the author and his audience of readers with full certainty, can we hypothesize what particular ethnic perspective the author seems to display? And then what may have been the ethnic makeup of his readers? These questions are important for evaluating how the author may situate himself in relation to Judaism and to Pharisaism in particular. If the author is a Jewish Christian, then any possible criticisms he insinuates against the Pharisees might point to a conflict within Judaism. If he is a Gentile Christian, however, we would then need to account for why he seems so invested in religious matters that are inherently Jewish. Finally, in light of the complex portraits of the Pharisees in Luke-Acts, did the author take into account that his writings might have had an audience with actual Pharisees?

1. Authorship and Date

Among our earliest evidence for the Lukan authorship of the Third Gospel is the attribution εὐαγγέλιον κατὰ Λουκᾶν, “Gospel according to Luke,” which appears at the end of that Gospel in \( \text{𝔓}^{75} \) (c. 175-225 CE).\(^1\) The Muratorian Canon is of questionable date (late second century CE, at the earliest), but it too identifies Luke as the author of the Third Gospel, as well as of Acts: “the third book of the gospel, according to Luke, Luke that physician, who after the ascension of Christ, when Paul had associated him with himself as one keen in judgment, composed in his own name on the basis of report” (II. 2-6); and then, “But the Acts of all the apostles were

written in one book. Luke compiled for most excellent Theophilus what things were done individually in his presence” (ll. 34-37). And finally, Irenaeus writes, “And Luke also, the follower of Paul, recorded in a book the Gospel that was preached by him” (Adv. Haer. 3.1.1).

As Cadbury points out, we can see in Irenaeus (Adv. Haer. 3.14.1) how early interpreters came to attribute the Third Gospel and Acts to Luke. Their first step might have been to ask who the companion of Paul was—assumed from the We-passages, which Irenaeus does indeed discuss. Out of other companions of Paul, perhaps Luke was chosen “due to a process of elimination.” These interpreters would know that the unnamed person in the We-passages accompanies Paul all the way to Rome (Acts 28.14-16), and then that “Paul” would eventually write from Rome saying, “Only Luke is with me” (2 Tim 4.11; as Irenaeus quotes in Adv. Haer. 3.14.1). Moreover, this Luke must be the same person whom Paul, in another letter, calls “Luke the beloved physician” (Col 4.14; also in Adv. Haer. 3.14.1). And finally, the interpreters could conclude that if Luke wrote Acts, which is addressed to Theophilus (Acts 1.1), he must have also written the Gospel addressed to Theophilus (Luke 1.3).

These connections are fairly easy to make, assuming that the early interpreters knew these texts well (as Irenaeus and others certainly did). Yet these connections are not without problems, especially in light of what many scholars now hypothesize regarding the relationships among the texts in question and their dating. Richard Pervo argues convincingly that some of the Pauline letters served as sources for the composition of Acts; he suggests further that these letters

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2 The late second century is the traditional date of the fragment; yet some date it as late the fourth century. See Gregory, Reception, 40-43. The text of the fragment is also extremely problematic. See selections of the text, as well as an emended text, in Cadbury, Beginnings, 2:210.

3 Cadbury, Beginnings, 2:261.

4 Cf. Gregory, Reception, 39, 41.
probably would not have been available to an author prior to c. 95-100 CE and in the end estimates that Acts was written sometime between 110 and 120.

On the question of whether the author of Acts knew 2 Timothy, or whether the author of 2 Timothy knew Acts, Pervo remains uncertain.⁵ We do nevertheless see one point of contact in 2 Tim 3.11, where the Pastor refers to “my persecutions, my sufferings, what happened to me at Antioch, at Iconium, and at Lystra, what persecutions I endured.” This statement does have some correspondence with the narrative in Acts 13.13-14.23 (esp. 13.14, 50; 14.1, 5, 8, 19, 21). It is possible that the author of 2 Timothy shows his hand in offering a mild apology for “the sharp disagreement” between Paul and Barnabas in Acts 15.36-41. That is to say, the Paul in Acts 15.38 who sees Mark as unfit for ministry, in 2 Tim 4.11 becomes a Paul who relates that Mark is “useful for ministry” after all.⁶ If the author of 2 Timothy knew Acts, then the statement “Only Luke is with me” (2 Tim 4.11) might then serve as an early piece of evidence for the Lukan authorship of Acts. Yet it is more likely that the author of 2 Timothy derived this information about “Luke” from Col 4.14, “Luke the beloved physician and Demas greet you,” and from Phlm 24, “Demas, and Luke, my coworkers.” In Col 4.14 and Phlm 24 Luke and Demas are with Paul, but in 2 Tim 4.10 Demas has deserted him.

While the question of whether Acts or 2 Timothy is the earlier text (and whether the author of the one text knew the other) is important in itself, solving it in the end may not significantly inform our efforts to date Luke-Acts. If Pervo is correct about a collection of Pauline letters becoming available around 95-100, then the author of 2 Timothy may not have

⁵ Richard I. Pervo, Dating Acts: Between the Evangelists and the Apologists (Santa Rosa, Calif.: Polebridge Press, 2006), 299-301.
had access to them prior to that time either. So also, when we compare our earliest external evidence for each text, we are still unable to draw any conclusions.  

Our next question to ask then is whether the author of Luke–Acts displays any knowledge about key historical events. There is strong evidence in the Gospel of Luke showing that the author knows about the Roman siege and destruction of Jerusalem and its temple (19.41-44; 21.5-6, 20-24). And he of course has the Gospel of Mark as a source, which itself reflects knowledge about the destruction of the temple (Mark 13.1-2). Accordingly, 70 CE is our most certain terminus a quo (earliest possible date) for the Gospel of Luke. And we may also apply this terminus a quo to Acts, since its preface refers back to the Gospel and thus assumes its prior composition (Acts 1.1-2).

This preface in Acts raises the question of whether the author disseminated his two volumes together or separately, and if the later, how much time may have elapsed between the writing and distributions of each. If Josephus is of any help on book “publication” in antiquity, we do have some indication that his seven-volume Bellum judaicum was published in installments. In one of the letters that he claims Agrippa wrote to him, Agrippa expresses how he is pleased with “the book” and asks Josephus to send “the remaining ones” (Vita 365). And when we read throughout those books, we can gather that their Greek versions may have been

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completed over a span of time from as early as the reign of Titus (79-81 CE) until as late as the reign of Domitian (81-96 CE).  

While this insight into the publication of the Bellum shows how it is conceivable that the author of Luke-Acts may have “published” his volumes separately, there is no reason to suspect that this author took as long to produce his two books as it took Josephus to complete his seven. As Pervo has shown, we can see traces of the Pauline letters also in the Third Gospel, which suggests that we would need to date its composition after 95-100, as well.  

Moreover, if the author of Luke-Acts wrote his Gospel already with plans to compose Acts, there may not have been much time that passed between the writing of each. We shall discuss more fully in chapter six whether the author has framed his two-volume work with details from the preface of the Gospel (1.1-4) and the ending of Acts (28.30-31). Such a framing may have implications not only for ongoing questions of whether there is narrative unity between

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9 On the translation of the Bellum judaicum into Greek see B.J. 1.3; and C. Ap. 1.50. Because we do not have access to the original version, which Josephus claims to have written in his “ancestral tongue” (B.J. 1.3), it is impossible to know how much he revised and updated the content of the work while “translating” (μεταβάλλειν) it. See Rajak, Josephus, 174-84. In terms of dating the Greek translation of all seven books, the work could have been fully complete as early as 81 CE, the year Domitian became emperor. The task of translating was most likely underway both during the reign of Titus and in the early part of Domitian’s reign. On the one hand, Josephus can relate how Titus is a “witness” of the war (1.10), which suggests that he is still living; and his reign is also current or recent enough for Josephus still to apply the designation Τίτος Καίσαρ (e.g., 7.21). He also claims in his Vita that Titus signed off on the books and gave orders for their publication (363). But in the Bellum judaicum itself, Josephus can refer also to Δομετιανός Καίσαρ (7.85; cf. Ant. 20.267) and even begins to flatter Domitian in some respect (7.152). It is notable that when Josephus refers to Vespasian throughout the Bellum judaicum, he never uses the title Ὀυεσπασιανός Καίσαρ (cf. Vit. 5). The closest Josephus comes to using this designation in the Bellum judaicum is in the story about how he predicts the emperorship of Vespasian, when he claims to have said, σὺ Καίσαρ, Ὀυεσπασιανέ, καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ, σὺ καὶ παῖς ὁ σὸς οὗτος, “You will be Caesar, Vespasian, and emperor, you and this son of yours” (3.401). Even though Josephus claims to have submitted “the books” first to Vespasian and Titus prior to their publication (Vit. 359, 361; C. Ap. 1.50-51), he does not indicate how many books each emperor saw. See also Cohen, Josephus in Galilee and Rome, 84-90.  

10 Pervo, Dating Acts, 51-147.
the two books, it may imply also how the social context of the author and his readers has in some ways remained unchanged from the time he composed Luke 1.1-4 until the composition of Acts 28.30-31.

If we are able to date Luke-Acts after 95-100, is there any indication that the author knows about the Diaspora revolts of 115-117? Pervo has drawn our attention to a number of terms in Acts, which may show some sensitivity toward these revolts.11 While the evidence is suggestive, it would be problematic to limit the usage of such terms, not to mention revolutionary activity, to these years. Perhaps more significantly, the author shows no signs of knowledge about the Bar Kokhba revolt in 132-35, which suggests that we may place our terminus ante quem (latest possible date) at 132. We can thus estimate that both volumes were written c. 105-120.

Finally, supposing that Acts was written around 120 at the latest, this dating would pose a challenge to the view that the author was a companion of Paul. Even if we limit his companionship with Paul to the final years of Paul in the 60s, and then suppose that the author was between 10 and 20 years of age at that time, he would have been somewhere between 60 and 80 years of age when he wrote Acts. This scenario is still possible, but it does leave us with a very young “Luke the beloved physician” in Col 4.14, if we are to attribute that letter to Paul.

On the whole, the evidence suggests that the author of Acts more likely knew Paul from some of his letters (and perhaps other traditions), and that he was less likely a companion of the Paul in the flesh. If one of his reasons for including the We-passages in his second book was to pass off himself as an “eyewitness” among others (cf. Luke 1.2), then the history of reception shows that he succeeded. This evaluation of the evidence of course means that we actually do not

know the name of the author of the Third Gospel and Acts. But for the sake of convenience and clarity, throughout this dissertation we shall refer to the author as “Luke.”

2. Luke and Ethnic Perspective

Some scholars use Col 4.10-14 as evidence that the author of Luke-Acts was a Gentile. The argument is based upon the claim that Paul distinguishes Aristarchus, Mark, and Jesus who is called Justus, as Jews (i.e., οἱ ὄντες ἐκ περιτομῆς, 4.11), from Epaphras, Luke, and Demas (4.12, 14), who presumably are Gentiles. While we can be confident that the former three persons are Jews (although some would not include Aristarchus), it is not entirely clear that Paul sets apart these latter three as Gentiles. Of course the larger problem is that the attempt to answer questions about the author of Luke-Acts on the basis of Col 4.10-14 assumes that the author was indeed the companion of Paul who is there called Luke. Even if we were able to prove that the author of Luke-Acts was the Luke of Col 4.14, we are still confronted with the uncertainty regarding the ethnic identity of this Luke.

As we saw from the Gospel Prologues and the Church Fathers, an early tradition places Luke in Greece during the time he composed his Gospel (prior to his travels with Paul) and in Rome for the composition of Acts (with Paul during his final days). Yet the Prologues and the passages we cited from the Fathers do not display an interest in whether Luke was a Gentile or Jew. The closest they come to this question is the statement that Luke was a Σύρος, “Syrian.”

If we were to accept that the author of Luke-Acts was a Syrian, a further question would then be whether we can assume an ethnic distinction between Σύρος and Ἰουδαῖος. The fact that Jesus invokes Naaman the Syrian as an ethnic contrast to the Jews of Nazareth would suggest that we can (4.27). Yet, even within Luke 4.16-30, it is difficult to determine whether the

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12 See the discussion in Fitzmyer, Luke I-IX, 43-44.
emphasis is placed upon geography or ethnicity; for there is a geographical element within this scene, that is, “in Nazareth, where he had been reared” (4.16). Then there is the statement about Capernaum, as opposed to Jesus’ “own country” (4.23-24). Elijah goes to the widow Zarephath, in the land of Sidon, even when there were already many widows in Israel (4.25-26). And even though there were many lepers in Israel during the days of Elisha, it was only Naaman the Syrian who was cleansed (4.27). It is notable that in this last example, Jesus says nothing about Elisha going to Syria, which does indeed correspond to the account in the LXX where Naaman is healed of his leprosy in Israel (4 Kgdms 5.8-14). It therefore appears that the geographical contrasts in Luke 4.16-30 point also to ethnic distinctions between Jews and non-Jews.

When non-Jewish authors use the terms Σύροι and Ιουδαίοι, the usages often refer to persons from Syria and Judea, respectively, and not necessarily persons who identify with a particular race (Strabo, Geogr. 16.1.1; Plutarch, Mor. 1051e; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.11.12; 2.9.20; Dio Cassius 71.25.1). Even Jewish authors, such as Josephus, can use the terms to designate Syrians and Judeans (B.J. 3.57; C. Ap. 1.179). Josephus does, however, indicate that Ιουδαίοι can inhabit Syria (B.J. 2.461-65); but those Ιουδαίοι would seemingly not then be regarded as Σύροι, even if they are τῇ Συρίᾳ, “in Syria” (B.J. 7.43). It appears also that to call persons Σύροι is not merely to designate their provincial locale, but also to identify their γένος, “race” (Josephus, Ant. 6.244); and the same can be said about those who belong to the “race” of Ιουδαίοι (B.J. 7.43; Ant. 20.173-178, esp. 173; cf. ἔθνος in Ant. 18.371-79, here 378). Even though a Jew may be called an Antiochene, according to Josephus (C. Ap. 2.39; cf. Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 3.4.6, Λουκᾶς δὲ τὸ μὲν γένος ὄν τόν ἀπ’ Ἀντιοχείας), the evidence does not show

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that an Ἰουδαῖος would also be called a Σύρος. Accordingly, if the tradition that Luke was a Σύρος is of any value, this designation would most likely disqualify him as a Jew.¹⁴

Such a disqualification would support the common presumption that the author of Luke-Acts was a Gentile—as we see reflected throughout the scholarship of Ernst Haenchen and Hans Conzelmann, for instance.¹⁵ Since the publication of their important contributions on the Lukan writings, it is nearly impossible for interpreters not to see their impact throughout the secondary literature. Both were themselves drawing upon and influenced by earlier understandings of Luke and his writings; but if we begin with their works, the perception of Luke vis-à-vis his relationship to Judaism is clear. According to Haenchen, Luke is a Gentile Christian for whom “the Jews are ‘written off.’”¹⁶ Similarly, Conzelmann holds that within Acts we can see “reference to the cutting off of the Jews from redemptive history.”¹⁷ In their view, Luke is not only a Gentile himself, it would seem that he also writes exclusively to Gentiles.

Yet this view about Luke’s stance toward and relationship to Judaism has been challenged in recent decades of scholarship. Jacob Jervell in particular has observed that throughout Acts and even at its conclusion the Jewish people have not been wholly rejected; they

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¹⁵ See, e.g., the recent commentaries by Pervo and Carroll, who both hypothesize that the author was a Gentile. Pervo remarks: “Limited understanding of Judaism and strong familiarity with the LXX suggest a gentile who had thoroughly immersed himself in Greek Scripture, perhaps even a believer of long or even lifelong standing” (Acts, 7). And Carroll “considers it probable, though not certain, that the author was a Gentile, but if so the story he tells reveals him to be deeply committed to the God, Scriptures, and community of the Jewish people—perhaps a ‘God-fearer’ much like the devout Gentiles drawn to the worship of the synagogue in Acts” (Luke, 2).


have rather become divided over the Christian gospel. When Paul preaches in Rome, “some were convinced by what was said, and others disbelieved” (Acts 28.24). The quotation of Isaiah 6.9-10 does imply that some have failed to understand; but we could hardly maintain that this prophetic statement applies also to those Jews who were just convinced.\textsuperscript{18}

Although it would be difficult to support Jervell’s view that Luke was the companion of Paul whom we know from the letters (Phlm 24; Col 4.14; 2 Tim 4.11), the more important aspect of his scholarship on Luke-Acts is that he works with the hypothesis that the author “was a Jewish Christian. Maybe he was born a Gentile, but then he came from God-fearers, having his roots in Hellenistic-Jewish Christianity.”\textsuperscript{19} As Joseph Tyson evaluates Jervell’s contribution to the study of Luke-Acts, if we cannot call it “a revolution in understanding the ways in which this ancient author assessed the significance of Judaism for the early Christians,” we can at least say that it constitutes “an important redirection in Lukan studies.”\textsuperscript{20}

When we revisit our Patristic evidence about Luke in light of Jervell’s work, there we see the claims that he was “the most educated in the Greek language” (Jerome, \textit{Ep.} 20.4) and that he wrote his Gospel “for those from the Gentiles” (Origen, \textit{apud} Eusebius, \textit{Hist. eccl.} 6.25). These

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statements do not necessarily imply that Luke was himself a Greek or a Gentile; for they could simply mean that he, like Paul, received a Hellenistic education and supported a mission to the Gentiles. It would be problematic also to assume that Luke must have been a Gentile because his two books reflect a deeper knowledge of Hellenism than some works that are differently Jewish and more deplete of Hellenistic traits. The phenomenon we now call “Hellenistic Judaism” might account for Luke’s ability to draw upon both Hellenistic and Jewish traditions at the same time—an ability we see displayed also, for example, by the Jew and former Pharisee Paul, in his letters and in Luke’s later portrait of him.

David Moessner and David Tiede have recently affirmed the view “that Hellenistic Diaspora Judaism is the primary soil which has nourished the Hellenistic author Luke, and that in a variety of ways Luke ‘remints’ the coin of Hellenistic Jewish narrative.” Moessner and Tiede are here responding in particular to the work of William Kurz, Carl Holladay, and Gregory Sterling. That a growing number of scholars are now regarding Luke-Acts as a product of Hellenistic Judaism is evident in Sterling’s remark that “there is an opinio communis that the author of Acts was either a Hellenistic Jew or a God-fearer who had been attached to a Jewish synagogue.” Accordingly, Moessner and Tiede propose that interpreters must “drop the


23 Sterling, “Opening the Scriptures,” 201. Sterling concludes, “The Stephen speech permits us an opportunity to peer behind the Christianity of the author of Acts into the world of Judaism which nourished him. Probably a Diaspora Jew, the author learned to understand the LXX through earlier retellings—whether histories or homilies—which created a perspective by

While the tradition associating Luke with the Gentiles should not be ignored, evidence from within Luke-Acts must have the final word. Throughout Luke-Acts, do the references to “Jews” (Ἰουδαίοι), on the one hand, and to “Gentiles” (ἔθνη), on the other, in either case imply that the group is ethnically different from the perspective of the author? Throughout the Third Gospel, the term Ἰουδαίοι is used once to designate “elders of the Jews” (7.3), three times during the trial and crucifixion of Jesus in the statement “the king of the Jews” (23.3, 37-38), and once in reference to Arimathea as “a city of the Jews” (23.51). This latter example in particular could serve as a kind of commentary for Gentile readers. Such a qualification is comparable to what we see in Josephus, when he explains for his Roman readers that a certain πόλις is “a city of the Jews” (e.g., Ant. 11.285; 19.329; Vita 349). Accordingly, such a reference might say more about the readers of Luke-Acts than about the author himself.


24 Moessner and Tiede, “Conclusion,” 363. Luke is of course especially interested to show how both Jews and Gentiles join the Christian movement, and he also underscores those moments when Jews reject and antagonize the movement. Yet, as Joseph B. Tyson rightly observes, “In this respect Luke-Acts displays a remarkable imbalance, for there is no comparable interest in Gentiles who rejected Jesus and his followers” (Images of Judaism in Luke-Acts [Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1992], 8). According to Tyson, “The interest in Jewish religious life is remarkable, especially in Acts, and, despite the author’s sympathy with the mission to the Gentiles, there is no corresponding interest in Gentile religious life” (ibid., 3). For the author of Luke-Acts, there does appear to be more at stake in the fact that some Jews rejected Jesus as the messiah than that some Gentiles surely did the same.

25 Cf. Gay L. Byron’s insightful study, which asks this question vis-à-vis “color differences” (Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature [London and New York: Routledge, 2002]).


114
When we come to Acts, the designation Ἰουδαῖοι is much more frequent. Yet the usages are complicated, for we see Ἰουδαῖοι coming from the mouths of both Jewish (e.g., 20.19; 21.11; 22.12) and Gentile characters (e.g., 16.20; 18.14; 24.5; 25.15). Thus it would be problematic to claim that when the narrator refers to Ἰουδαῖοι, he or she is speaking as an outsider. It is notable that in Peter’s speech at Pentecost, he addresses his audience as Ἅνδρες Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ οἱ κατοικοῦντες Ἰερουσαλήμ πάντες, “Jewish men and all who inhabit Jerusalem” (2.14). We might be inclined to understand Ἰουδαῖοι in this address as a geographical designator (i.e., “Judeans”), since it is coupled with οἱ κατοικοῦντες Ἰερουσαλήμ πάντες. Yet in the pericope that immediately precedes this speech, we read: Ἦσαν δὲ ἐν Ἰερουσαλήμ κατοικοῦντες Ἰουδαῖοι, ἄνδρες εὐλαβεῖς ἀπὸ παντός ἔθνους τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανόν, “Now there were Jews living in Jerusalem, devout men from every nation under heaven” (2.5). The subsequent list of regions that these Ἰουδαῖοι come from then makes clear that Peter is addressing diaspora Jews (2.9-11), as well as Judeans (2.9). And also within this pericope, the reference to Ἰουδαῖοι τὲ καὶ προσήλυτοι, “Jews and proselytes” (2.11), is an indication of their ethnicity. Peter’s opening address in 2.14 would therefore appear to be a hendiadys, referring to Jews living in Jerusalem during Pentecost.

It is of course not so surprising to see Jews referring to themselves or other Jews as Ἰουδαῖοι in Luke-Acts. Throughout the LXX, the term occurs frequently as a self-designation for “Judeans” (e.g., 1 Esd 6.1; 2 Esd 15.17; esp. 2 Macc 1.1, 7). And we know that eventually Ἰουδαῖοι was the term “Jews” used for themselves, even when living outside of Judea—as in Alexandria (Philo, Legat. 194) and Rome (Josephus, Ant. 18.80-84). The author of Luke-Acts uses the term in this way when referring to Diaspora Jews in places such as Thessalonica (17.1),

The next question then is how the author of Luke-Acts uses the term ἔθνη in order to designate non-Jews. In the Third Gospel, references to ἔθνη, “Gentiles,” are made only by Jewish characters—Simeon (2.32) and Jesus (12.30; 18.32; 21.24; 22.25; 24.47). So also in Acts, where the designation ἔθνη appears much more often, only Jewish characters apply this term (4.27; 9.15; 11.18; 13.46-47; 15.7; 15.14, 19; 15.23; 18.6; 21.11, 21, 25; 22.21; 26.17, 20, 23; 28.28). The narrator in Acts also uses the term frequently (10.45; 11.1; 13.48; 14.2, 5, 27; 15.3, 12; 21.19). Is it significant that no Gentile character within Luke-Acts uses the term ἔθνη? Of course we would not expect to see non-Jews refer to themselves as ἔθνη, since this designation usually assumes a Jewish perspective and serves to distinguish Jews, as insiders, from the other “nations” (cf. ἀλλόφυλος, 10.28). In attempting to identify the ethnic perspective of the author and his intended readers, it may be telling that the narrator of Acts refers to non-Jews as ἔθνη.

We should nevertheless be cautious in distinguishing so sharply between “Jews” and “Gentiles” when addressing the question about Luke and his initial readers. Even though there is often an assumed distinction between the two throughout the narrative of Luke-Acts, the author also shows how certain characters may identify with each group at one and the same time. Timothy is the son of a “Jewish woman of faith” and a Greek father (16.1). Cornelius is a Gentile who worships the God of Israel (10.1-11.18). It is this very line of distinction of course that the

author blurs to a significant degree when Peter learns and declares in the home of Cornelius that “God is no respecter of persons” (10.34).

Nonetheless, this same promotion of the Gentile mission would seemingly make most sense when directed toward an audience of Jewish readers who may not have fully come to terms with it in the way that even Peter (the apostle to the circumcised, Gal 2.7-8) does when he visits Cornelius. We see that there will be a Jewish mission to the Gentiles as early as the infancy narrative when Simeon declares that Jesus is “a light for revelation unto the Gentiles, and for glory unto your people Israel” (Luke 2.32). So too, Paul is to carry the name of Jesus “before Gentiles and kings and the sons of Israel” (Acts 9.15). The persistent, deliberative attempt to support and advance the Gentile mission throughout Luke-Acts seems to indicate that the author expected his writings to be read among Jewish Christians. It is less likely that he would need to persuade Gentile readers that they were legitimate members of the Christian movement.

At the same time, the Gentile mission that Luke promotes throughout his two books—showing his own acceptance of Gentile Christians within the movement—would suggest that he expected those Christians not only to profit from his writings (i.e., to gain acceptance among Jewish Christians without the requirement of circumcision); the fact that he legitimizes Gentiles as Christians shows that he expects them to obtain membership among Christian communities, perhaps even the communities in which the Lukan writings were read. It is safest therefore to view Luke-Acts as aimed toward a mixed readership that included both Jewish and Gentile Christians.


The author of Luke-Acts lays the groundwork for the Gentile mission largely through characters who are proselytes to Judaism, as well as Gentile sympathizers or “God-fearers” who had not
become proselytes through the rite of circumcision.\textsuperscript{28} As for the former, we have seen already that among the seven in Acts, Luke calls attention to Nicolaus by qualifying him as “a proselyte of Antioch” (6.5). After Paul speaks in the synagogue of Pisidian Antioch, “many of the Jews and devout proselytes” follow him and Barnabas (13.43). And although Peter addresses “Jews and proselytes” in his speech at Pentecost (2.11), he would not come to accept Gentile sympathizers—such as Cornelius (10.2) and his Gospel counterpart, the centurion of Capernaum (Luke 7.4-5)—until later in the narrative (Acts 10.14-15, 28, 34-35). Whether we are dealing with proselytes or uncircumcised persons devoted to the God of Israel, each would assume some close relationship to Judaism.

It is undisputed among scholars that during the period of Roman domination there were Gentiles who were attracted to various aspects of Judaism. In a satire on parenting, Juvenal famously writes about the bad example a father sets when he reveres (\textit{metuens}) the Sabbath—leading his children to worship “nothing except the clouds and the spirit of the sky” and to observe and study teachings from the Mosaic Law. As part of this religious practice, he explains, they follow dietary restrictions “and afterwards take off their foreskins” (\textit{Sat.} 14.96-106). And Tacitus is aware that some Gentiles would renounce their “ancestral religions” and increase the resources of Jerusalem through their financial contributions, and also that converts to Judaism would become circumcised (\textit{Hist.} 5.5). According to Josephus, the temple in Jerusalem enjoyed great wealth because “all the Jews throughout the inhabited world, and the ones who worshiped God [\πάντων \τῶν \κατὰ \τὴν \οἴκουμένην \Ἰουδαίων \καὶ \σεβόμενων \τῶν \θεῶν], even those from Asia and Europe, had been contributing to it for a very long time” (\textit{Ant.} 14.110).

\textsuperscript{28} On the question of conversion to Judaism in antiquity, see Shaye J. D. Cohen, “Crossing the Boundary and Becoming a Jew,” \textit{HTR} 82 (1989): 13-33.
There has been much scholarly attention devoted to the group we conventionally call “God-fearers,” that is, uncircumcised Gentiles who worshiped the God of Israel and supported the Jewish religion, sometimes through material contributions. Those characters in Acts who are identified as fearing God (φοβούμενοι τὸν θεόν, 13.16, 26) or worshiping God (σεβόμενοι τὸν θεόν, 16.14; 18.7; cf. 17.5) have often been understood as belonging to this group. Yet there have been some dissenting voices, since the expressions φοβεῖσθαι τὸν θεόν and σέβεσθαι τὸν θεόν may apply also to pious Jewish persons in other ancient texts. Those scholars who hold that Luke does refer to God-fearers usually point to Cornelius as the most prominent example, since he is described as “devout and fearing God” (εὐσεβὴς καὶ φοβούμενος τὸν θεόν, 10.2; cf. ἐμφοβος, 10.4; and εὐσεβὴς, 10.7), “just and fearing God” (δίκαιος καὶ φοβούμενος τὸν θεόν, 10.22), one who “gave much alms to the people and prayed to God always” (10.2; cf. 10.31), and who was “well-spoken of by the whole nation of the Jews” 10.22). Peter also legitimates Cornelius as one who fears God (ὁ φοβούμενος αὐτόν, 10.34). And while the terms φοβεῖσθαι or σέβεσθαι are not used for the Centurion of Capernaum, the details that he loves the


nation of the Jews, financed the building of a synagogue (Luke 7.5), and has faith surpassing others “in Israel” (7.9) are all suggestive.

In his chapter on Gentile “converts” to Judaism, G. F. Moore compares Naaman to those persons “who occupied a place of prominence in the community, or held office in the city or state,” that is, those who would have had to compromise “their belief and the duties of their station.” Similarly, Louis Feldman invokes Naaman as a biblical precedent for a convert, that is, “one who comes to the realization that there is no G-d but in Israel and who yet continues to bow down in the house of Rimmon, the Syrian storm god, with his master, the King of Syria.”

Although neither Moore nor Feldman is particularly interested in comparing “Naaman the Syrian,” as he appears in Luke, to those Lukan characters who “fear” or “worship” God, the example is nonetheless compelling for the question at hand. Within Luke’s Gospel, Naaman the Syrian and the centurion of Capernaum are the most prominent examples of Gentiles who sympathize with Israelite religion and Judaism, respectively. Yet we may see reference to this phenomenon as early as the Magnificat, where Mary mentions οἱ φοβούμενοι αὐτόν (Luke 1.50).

A. T. Kraabel sparked much discussion when he challenged the widely held view that “God-fearers” were a socially identifiable group in antiquity. He argued that this class of persons was a literary construct invented by the author of Acts. Kraabel made this proposal, even though scholars had long known of an inscription (circa first century CE) from a series of

33 Feldman, Jew and Gentile, 343.
Panticapaeum manumissions, which refers to η συναγωγή τῶν Ἰουδαίων καὶ θεῶν σέβων. It was agreed that the grammatically puzzling καὶ θεῶν σέβων should probably be emended to καὶ θεοσεβῶν. Yet without corroborating evidence, it was still unclear whether this was “the synagogue of the Jews and the worshipers of God” or “the synagogue of the Jews, who also worship God.”

After the discovery of a stele in Aphrodisias—which contains clear references to θεοσεβεῖς on two of its sides—many of the doubts about whether God-fearers existed were laid to rest. Joyce Reynolds and Robert Tannenbaum edited the Greek inscriptions on the stele and dated them to the early third century CE, explaining that “the distinction implied on face a between Jews, proselytes and theosebeis, and on face b between Jews and theosebeis, is new evidence which, for the first time, offers clear light on the meaning of the term theosebeis.”

These three groups would seem to have some scriptural precedent in LXX 2 Chr 5.6, which

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36 See the discussion in Levinskaya, Diaspora Setting, 74-75; and Stanton, “‘God-Fearers’: Neglected Evidence,” 352.

37 Joyce Reynolds and Robert Tannenbaum, Jews and Godfearers at Aphrodisias: Greek Inscriptions with Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 1987), v. Cf. also John G. Gager: “It is no exaggeration to propose that these inscriptions represent the most important epigraphic evidence from the world of Greco-Roman Judaism. They will be the center of debate for years to come. Yet even at this point, certain results seem assured. θεοσεβής designates a separate category of persons associated with the synagogue; it is used in a technical fashion as a title; the category itself is distinct from both proselytes and other Jews; it appears to cover Gentiles, whether exclusively or not” (“Jews, Gentiles, and Synagogues in the Book of Acts,” HTR 79 [1986]: 91-99, here 98); Schürer (ed. Vermes, Millar, and Goodman): “It would be difficult to imagine clearer evidence that theosebeis could be categorized as a formal group attached to a Jewish community, and distinguished both from Jews and from full proselytes” (History of the Jewish People, 3.1:166); and Feldman: “the most important conclusion of the Aphrodisias inscriptions is, I believe, that it establishes once and for all that there was a special class, at least at the time of the inscriptions, known as θεοσεβεῖς, because this group is clearly identified as such, in contrast to proselytes and to those presumed to be born Jews” (Jew and Gentile, 367).
makes reference to πᾶσα συναγωγή Ισραήλ καὶ οἱ φοβούμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐπισυνηγμένοι αὐτῶν, “all the gathering of Israel and the fearers and their gathered persons.”

If Luke knew about a clearly demarcated group that we now call “God-fearers,” he was not so explicit himself in identifying those characters who may have belonged to such a social category. He nowhere uses the term θεοσεβής; and some of the statements about characters who “fear” and “worship” God can (like the inscription from the Panticapaeum manumissions) be understood as hendiadys (e.g., Acts 13.16, 26; 17.17).

The evidence from within Luke-Acts does not allow us to maintain that the author himself was a former God-fearer. Yet if we can assume that Cornelius and others point to the social phenomenon of the God-fearers, it is clear that Luke strongly advocates for them as legitimate members of the Christian movement. He may appeal to God-fearers on the basis of the prophetic tradition that, through a mission to the Gentiles, God would fulfill the promises to Israel. We get some indication that the Gentiles are a part of that divine plan when the author has James quote from the prophet Amos: “After this I will return, and I will rebuild the tent of David, which has fallen, and its ruins I will rebuild, and I will restore it, so that the rest of humanity may seek the Lord, even all the Gentiles to whom my name has been announced” (Acts 15.16-17; cf. Amos 9.11-12). In light of this prophetic statement, a ministry to God-fearers in particular would make sense, since they were the Gentiles already interested and even invested in the traditions of Israel.

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38 As Reynolds and Tannenbaum observe, a Hebrew equivalent for καὶ οἱ φοβούμενοι is absent in the MT (Jews and Godfearers, 65).
39 Martin Hengel, however, claims that he was (Acts and the History of Earliest Christianity [trans. John Bowden; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980], 107). He appears to hold this position because he assumes that Luke is not a Jew: “This is the only explanation of his knowledge of the Septuagint, of the apocryphal and Hellenistic Jewish literature which went with it, and of the institutions of the synagogue, which would be unique for a non-Jew in antiquity” (ibid.).
John Nolland even thinks “that the ideal first-century reader for much of the Gospel of Luke (and of Acts) is a God-fearer.”\(^{40}\) In attempting to identify Luke’s addressee, Θεόφιλος (Luke 1.3; Acts 1.1), Nolland also proposes that “we cannot rule out the possibility that the real recipient is here being addressed under a pseudonym. If this were to be the case, then the etymology of the name, ‘friend of God,’ would suit very well a God-fearer audience.” This proposal is attractive, especially in light of a passage from the Martyrdom of Polycarp, where θεοφιλές and θεοσεβές are near equivalent adjectives qualifying “the race of Christians” (3.2).\(^{41}\) One obvious question, however, is why Luke has not then addressed his two books to Θεοσεβής rather than Θεόφιλος. And one answer would be that Θεόφιλος is actually a personal name (e.g., Dio Chrysostom, Or. 32.97-98; Plutarch, Alex. 32.9; D.L. 5.9), whereas Θεοσεβής is not. The fact that Θεόφιλος is an attested name, of course, leaves open the possibility that this was the actual name of Luke’s addressee. Yet even though it is a Greek name, we could not then presume that the addressee identified as Greek; for Josephus knows of a certain “Matthias, the son of Theophilus, a native Jerusalemite” (Ant. 17.78; 20.223). The name Θεόφιλος also appears in the list of Jewish persons identified on face b of the stele from Aphrodisias; and it seems to be more widely attested among Jews.\(^{42}\)

\(^{40}\) As Nolland further explains, a God-fearer is “one whose birth is not Jewish and whose background culture is Hellenistic, but who had been attracted to Judaism, drawn to the God of Israel and the worship of the synagogue; one who had taken on from his Jewish mentors many of the ethical and religious values of the faith on whose threshold he stood; but one who had not yet taken the final step of circumcision and full incorporation into the national and cultural life of the Jews” (Luke 1:9:20, xxxii). So also Tyson’s “implied reader” is a God-fearer (Images of Judaism, 19-41, esp. 35-39).


If we are to understand Ὁθεόφιλος as a pseudonym, this interpretation comes close to what Origen proposed: “Someone might suppose that he wrote the Gospel to a specific Theophilus. But all of you who hear us speaking, if you are such as to be loved by God, then you too are Theophiluses, and the Gospel is written to you.”43 Is there rhetorical precedent that Luke might have intended to convey such a meaning through this name? Aelius Theon explains in his instruction on ἐγκώμιον that it is sometimes clever to offer praise “from names, as in the name Demosthenes [Δημοσθένης], since he was the strength of the people [τὸ τοῦ δήμου σθένος].”44

The next question then is whether Luke ever commends God as a “friend” to his readers. Perhaps the best indication that he does is the so-called Parable of the Friend at Midnight (Luke 11.5-8), which makes an argument from the lesser friend (i.e., the one in bed, 11.7) to the presumably greater friend (i.e., God). On this question we must also not overlook the accusation that Jesus is a “friend of tax collectors and sinners” (7.34), which appears to come from Pharisees and associates (7.30, 36-50; as well as 5.30; 15.1-2). In opposing Jesus’ table fellowship with certain persons, are the Pharisees proving themselves to be his φίλοι; or are they closer to becoming the kind of θεομάχοι, “God-fighters,” the Pharisee Gamaliel cautions against in his advice to the Sanhedrin (5.39)? Understood within the context of such disputes, it does remain possible that Ὁθεόφιλος was a pseudonym for a Jewish reader.

Conversely, taking Ὁθεόφιλος as a pseudonym for a God-fearer would mean that among Luke’s initial readers there was at least one Gentile and possibly more. But in this case we could not claim that his readers were exclusively Gentiles; for the social phenomenon of the God-fearers, as attested in the ancient sources, is almost always closely tied to a Jewish community. In such a scenario, Ὁθεόφιλος could be the literary patron who sponsored the writing of Luke and

43 Hom. Luc. 1 (GCS 49:10).
44 Prog. 9 (Spengel, 111 = Patillon 76).

The hypothesis that Θεόφιλος is a pseudonym raises the question why Luke would not disclose the real name of his addressee. Is he being discreet for the sake of his readers? And if so, what are the circumstances that would require such caution? In attempting to answer these questions, we may have a clue in the scene where Paul goes “into the house of one named Titius Justus, a worshiper of God [σεβόμενος τὸν θεόν], whose house was next door [συνομορεῖν] to the synagogue” (18.7). On the question of the God-fearers and their relationship with Judaism, this passage is interesting in a number of ways. Does συνομορεῖν convey the idea that the house was adjoined to the synagogue (i.e., sharing a wall with) or simply next to it (i.e., bordering the property)? Does the proximity of the house to the synagogue imply that Titius Justus was the chief benefactor of this religious community? Luke does not answer these questions to the extent that we would like. What he does show in the immediately subsequent scene, however, is that “the Jews” take Paul before Gallio and accuse of him of persuading people “to worship God [σέβεσθαι τὸν θεόν] contrary to the law” (18.13).

It is possible that in this context Luke is making a subtle appeal to God-fearers, implying that they have more in common with the Christian movement than with the Judaism of the synagogue. Even though Paul argues in the synagogue every Sabbath and persuades both Jews and Greeks (18.4), in time he meets opposition and resolves to go “to the Gentiles” (18.6). It is then that he enters the house of Titius Justus (18.7). That Paul is welcomed by one identified as “a worshiper of God” (18.7) would seemingly distance Titius Justus from those Jews who then

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45 On Acts 18.7, as evaluated with respect to the phenomenon of the house church, see Hans-Josef Klauck, Hausgemeinde und Hauskirche im frühen Christentum (SBS 103; Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1981), 31-32.
accuse Paul of persuading people “to worship God contrary to the law” (18.13). In this sense, the house of Titius Justus could have a meaning that verges on the allegorical—that is, Paul and his message are not welcome in the synagogue; but they are in “the house” of those Gentiles who are otherwise sympathetic with the traditions of Israel.

As for why Luke would be discreet in making this point, the fact that Paul’s Jewish opponents take him before Gallio, proconsul of Achaia, points to one possible answer. It is clear from within Luke-Acts that the author conceives of some Jews who oppose the Christian movement and attempt to hand over to the political authorities their fellow Jews who believed that Jesus was the messiah (e.g., Luke 21.12-17). The need to make speech “discreet” and “secure” under such conditions is a question we shall address more fully in chapter six. Alongside this question, is it plausible that God-fearers who held a similar belief would also meet with such opposition? If the narrative of Luke-Acts does point to such a social climate (occupied by the author and his initial readers), the implication is that fellow Jews should not take their inter-religious disputes to the Romans. Luke has Gallio himself say to “the Jews” that he does not wish to get involved in questions about their own law and that they should see to it themselves (Acts 18.14-15). It is questionable, however, that Roman authorities would turn their backs on persons who were accused of acting “against the decrees of Caesar, saying that there is another king, Jesus” (17.7). And notably, this accusation is made after Paul preaches in the synagogue of Thessalonica and persuades a number of Jews (17.1) and “worshiping Greeks” (σεβόμενοι Ἕλληνες, 17.4) of his message (cf. 25.8).

Furthermore, even though Luke may be appealing in part to readers “whose house was next door to the synagogue,” as it were, we could not conclude that he himself lacks an insider’s knowledge of the synagogue and other aspects of Jewish religious practice. Luke appears to have
had at least a basic familiarity with the synagogue and its liturgical order (i.e., a reading from the law, a reading from the prophets, and a sermon). In the scene where Paul and Barnabas go to the synagogue of Pisidian Antioch, “after the reading of the law and the prophets” (13.15; cf. 15.21), the rulers of the synagogue invite Paul and Barnabas to give “a word of exhortation to the people” (13.15), an invitation which Paul accepts (13.16-41). Part of this liturgical order is reflected also when Jesus goes to the synagogue in Nazareth and there reads from “the book of the prophet Isaiah” (Luke 4.16-20) and follows it with a sermon (4.21-27).

Based on the limited evidence we have, it would be impossible to prove that Luke and his initial readers were (former) members of a synagogue. All we can suggest is that the narrative points to a time (whether the immediate past or present) when the Christian message was controversial in synagogues (e.g., Luke 4.28-29; Acts 13.45-46; 14.1-2; 18.4-6). Is there something at stake in the fact that certain Jews throughout the narrative of Luke-Acts resist this message, often within a synagogue? If so, the perspective of the author and his initial readers would appear to come from within Judaism, which would include those closely associated with it.

4. The Question about Pharisaic Readers

So far we have hypothesized that Luke expected the majority of his initial readers to include Jewish Christians and God-fearers. Of course the readership of any text cannot be limited to an author’s target audience—especially after it has been dispatched from the author, whether to an individual or a group of readers. Is there any indication that Luke might have anticipated his

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writings falling into the hands of religious rivals who were opposed to his message—such as members of the Pharisees? If Luke is using figured speech in his depictions of the Pharisees, this might then assume that he is securing his writings in order to protect himself and his readers against the charge of writing or owning subversive literature, in the event that Pharisees obtain and read them. Yet we must not fall into the trap of circular reasoning at this point. We would need to ask whether the Pharisees might have been interested in reading the Lukan writings in the first place, independent of our larger question about his use of figured speech.

Within one of the initial scenes involving Pharisees in Luke-Acts, it is notable that “the Pharisees and their scribes were grumbling” not against Jesus but rather against “his disciples” (5.30). Does this detail point to a debate between the group Luke then calls “the disciples of the Pharisees” (5.33) and Christian disciples—that is, controversy during the period of the author and his first readers? That Jesus refers to a time “when the bridegroom is taken away from them” (5.34) may be one clue that it does. Yet there is no sign within this context that the Pharisees are making accusations against Christian disciples on the basis of their writings; the issues at stake pertain to table fellowship (5.30) and fasting (5.33-35).

Nevertheless, we do see that after Jesus delivers some openly critical sayings against the Pharisees and layers (11.37-52), the scribes and Pharisees begin to “interrogate” (ἀποστοματίζειν, 11.53) him with the intent “to catch something from his mouth [στόμα]” (11.54). Even though initially there is nothing here about the speech of the “disciples” themselves, Jesus does immediately thereafter speak “to his disciples first” (12.1) about “whatever you have said in the dark” and “what you have spoken into ears within private rooms,” which will be disclosed at some point in the future (12.3).
It is only when Jesus enters Jerusalem that some Pharisees show an explicit interest in the words of his disciples. In this scene, after Jesus is acclaimed as “the king who comes in the name of the Lord” (19.38), these Pharisees say to Jesus, “Teacher, rebuke your disciples” (19.39). It is possible that this scene points to a social context occupied by the author and his readers—that is, one in which the Pharisees opposed the Christian proclamation that Jesus was “king.” But even if we were to accept this proposal, there is nothing to indicate that the Pharisees were necessarily reading Christian texts.

When we ask this question more broadly about early Christian literature, we know that Justin attributes to Trypho the claim to have carefully read “the instructions in the so-called Gospel” (Dial. 10.2; 18.1). This evidence shows us that it was conceivable that non-Christian Jews in the late second century could have and perhaps even did read the Gospels. But did the evangelists themselves have such readers within their purview?

The Gospel of John provides some indication that an evangelist might have accounted for the possibility of Pharisaic readers. In the scene where Jesus converses with the Pharisee Nicodemus, the evangelist at first has Jesus address Nicodemus in the singular (λέγει σοι, 3.11); and then without any warning, he shifts the address to the plural (εἰπεῖν ὑμῖν, 3.12). What is remarkable about this shift of course is that Jesus and Nicodemus were presumably having a private conversation (3.2). Does this transition suggest that readers who would identify with Nicodemus should hear the address as directed toward them as well? We cannot tell who may have been the initial readers of the Fourth Gospel either; but if there were at least some Pharisaic readers, then this shift from the singular to the plural would make more sense.

We see a similar grammatical shift in Luke 13.34-35 when Jesus laments over Jerusalem, which occurs immediately after the Pharisees compel him, “go out and depart from here”
(13.31). In the first part of the lament, Jesus addresses Jerusalem in the singular, specifically with two participles in the singular form (ἡ ἀποκτείνουσα and λιθοβολοῦσα) and two singular pronouns (αὐτή and σύ, 13.34). In the latter part of the lament, however, he transitions to the plural, which includes three finite verbs in the second-person plural (ἠθελήσατε, ἴδητε, and εἴπητε, 1.34c-35) and three occurrences of the second-person plural personal pronoun (ὑμεῖς, 13.35). The earlier reference to τὰ τέκνα σου, “your children” (13.34) may explain this sudden change to the plural. Yet the question then is who these children are. Are they the Pharisees he was earlier addressing in the plural (πορευθέντες εἴπατε, 13.32)?

The Matthean parallel of the lament over Jerusalem (Matt 23.37-39) also contains this grammatical shift from the singular to the plural; and there the connection between the “children” of Jerusalem and the Pharisees is more explicit. The lament is appended to the woes against the scribes and the Pharisees (23.13-26), most noticeably in the parallel charges that the scribes and the Pharisees (23.34) and Jerusalem (23.37) kill the prophets.

For Luke, the most conspicuous parallel is that between ὁ οἶκος ὑμῶν (i.e., Jerusalem) in 13.35 and the οἶκος τῶν ἀρχόντων Φαρισαίων, which Jesus enters in 14.1. We shall analyze the role of the Pharisees vis-à-vis this motif of the οἶκος in chapter fourteen. For now, we can at least suggest that the grammatical shift from the singular to the plural in Luke 13.34-35 appears to indicate that those Pharisees whom Jesus addresses in 13.32-33 are still present in 13.34-35. Yet this shift still does not necessarily translate over into historical Pharisees being among the evangelist’s readers; it could mean simply that the Pharisees, as characters, are among Jesus’ hearers in the narrative. The evidence that Luke wrote with the prospect of having Pharisaic readers is somewhat suggestive, but inconclusive. We shall test this hypothesis again in
chapter eight when we analyze Gamaliel, as depicted in Acts 5.34-40. Perhaps that discussion will offer further insight into what should perhaps remain an open question.
PART TWO: THE PHARISEES AND THE SUPPRESSION OF FREE SPEECH

Chapter Six: From Figured to Free Speech

As we observed already, the rhetoricians of antiquity teach that figured speech is useful in settings where παρρησία, “freedom of speech,” is not possible—that is, situations that would place the speaker in danger if he or she were to speak openly. Accordingly, the rhetoricians prescribe figured speech as a means to provide ἀσφάλεια, “security,” for the speaker against hearers who might find the speech offensive and retaliate with some form of punishment. We saw also that characters who are criticized through figured speech can appear ambiguous to hearers; and thus we asked whether the ambiguous depiction of the Pharisees in Luke-Acts might stem from the author’s use of figured speech against these characters. As we attempt to answer this larger question, perhaps it is best to start by asking whether there is evidence in Luke-Acts that the author’s παρρησία was suppressed and that he secures his writings against certain hearers, Pharisees in particular.

1. Framing the Narrative of Luke-Acts

We encounter the term ἀσφάλεια as early as the preface to the Third Gospel (1.4); and scholars have noticed that Luke appears to place emphasis upon this term, since it serves as the concluding point of a formal literary period. What is not immediately evident, however, is what ἀσφάλεια may mean within the preface and thus the noun’s relevance and importance to the book it introduces and, through the connecting link Luke provides (Acts 1.1), to that of the book

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1 On the period generally, see Aristotle, Rhet. 3.9.3-7=1409a-1410a; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Comp. 2, 9; Demetrius, Eloc. 10-24; Hermogenes, Inv. 4.3; BDF §464; and, with regard to Luke 1.1-4, Cadbury, Beginnings, 2:490; Plummer, Luke, 5; Marshall, Luke, 40-41; Fitzmyer, Luke I-IX, 287-90, 300-01; Tannehill, Narrative Unity, 1:10; Nolland, Luke 1-9:20, 4; Alexander, Preface, 103-05; Culpepper, Luke, 39; and Green, Luke, 36, 45.
In light of what we have observed from the instruction on figured speech, we may have a clue when reading the culminating point of the Lukan preface, ἀσφάλεια (Luke 1.4), with the culminating point of the narrative as a whole, μετὰ πάσης παρρησίας ἀκωλύτως, “with full freedom of speech without hindrance” (Acts 28.31).

Some scholars have offered proposals for reading the beginning of Luke’s Gospel and the conclusion of Acts as a narrative frame; and we may affirm many of their observations. But what they have not accounted for is how the narrative, which Luke prefaces with ἀσφάλεια, may anticipate a state of continual, unhindered παρρησία. Some have also convincingly argued for


5 Cf. Lucian, Peregr. 18. Although Peregrinus is able to speak ἀσφαλῶς, “with security,” against the emperor, he is not ignored by the city prefect, who banishes him for his παρρησία. While the emperor in this scene is dismissive of Peregrinus as one who had made an art out of reproaching (λοιδορεῖσθαι), in Lucian’s view the prefect is the true ἀνήρ σοφὸς for finally banishing the imposter (cf. Ind. 22).
reading ἀκωλύτως as a focal word of Luke–Acts—even though they arrive at different conclusions about what exactly is “without hindrance” as the narrative ends and precisely what force Luke implies is no longer threatening the Christian mission. Yet perhaps far too little attention has been given to the penultimate word of the narrative, παρρησία, in previous attempts to decipher the meaning of ἀκωλύτως.7

The adverb ἀκωλύτως of course has the same root as κωλύειν, which is the term Apsines and Hermogenes use when explaining that ἐμφασις is the rhetorical figure applied “whenever we are unable to speak because we are hindered [κωλύειν] and do not have freedom of speech [παρρησία].”8 Accordingly, in reading the Lukan preface with the end of Acts, the terms...

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7 D. L. Mealand, e.g., claims that “the primary and strongest element in the force of ἀκωλύτως is that of the unhindered exercise of religious liberty by one who had been accused of a criminal offence, had made some kind of appeal, and who was now being permitted to proclaim his message openly with hindrance” (“The Close of Acts and its Hellenistic Greek Vocabulary,” NTS 36 [1990]: 583-97, here 590). Yet curiously he does not evaluate ἀκωλύτως and its cognates in relation to παρρησία and seems to overlook the primary significance of the latter term, since he discusses it only in an appended “Supplementary Note” (ibid., 596-97).

8 Apsines (Spengel and Hammer, 330 = Patillon, 112); and Hermogenes (Inv. 4.13 [Rabe, 206 = Kennedy, 188]). In his encomium upon the city of Antioch, Libanius commends the council for not hindering freedom of speech among its members: εἰπέν δὲ οὐ τοῖς μὲν ἔξεστιν, οἱ δὲ κεκώλυνται, ἀλλὰ κοινὴ μὲν παρρησία, “And in speaking, it is not the case that some are permitted and others have been hindered, but rather there is common freedom of speech” (Or. 11.145). Cf. Aphthonius, Prog. 9 (Rabe ed.): Ὥσπερ δὲ οἱ δεσμῷ κατειλημμένοι δεινῷ τὸν δεσμὸν ἔχουσι τοῦ ποιεῖν κάλυμα, τὸν αὐτῶν τρόπον οἱ πενία συζόντες τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς παρρησίας ἐμποδών ἀπελήρασι. “Just as those who are held by a forceful bond are hindered from acting, in the same way those who live in a state of poverty are hindered because they lack freedom of speech.” George A. Kennedy provides a full English translation of Aphthonius in Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric (WGRW 10; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 89-127. Cf. Hans-Josef Klauck’s contextualization of Paul’s παρρησία in Acts 28.31: “Free and courageous speech, refusing to bow to any intimidation, was defended in the Athenian democracy as an ideal against all tyrants” (Magic and Paganism in Early Christianity: The World of the Acts of the Apostles [trans. Brian McNeil; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000], 118).
ἀσφάλεια (Luke 1.4), παρρησία, and ἀκωλύτως (Acts 28.31) may become more sensible in light of each other.

One potential problem with this interpretation, however, is that in addition to “security,” ἀσφάλεια can also convey meanings such as “certainty” and “truth.” Yet the only other time Luke uses the noun ἀσφάλεια in his two books is when the apostles escaped from a prison that is shortly thereafter found κεκλεισμένος ἐν πάσῃ ἀσφαλείᾳ, “locked in full security” (Acts 5.23; cf. 5.20, 28).9 While this episode may at first seem to be irrelevant for the question at hand, it is important to notice that, in addition to the signs and wonders the apostles had previously performed (3.1-26; 4.16; 5.12-16), it is largely their παρρησία (2.29; 4.13, 29, 31) and teaching more generally (4.1-2) that leads up to their imprisonment. Furthermore, within the context of this prison escape, emphasis is placed upon their speech acts in particular. When the angel opens the doors of the prison and leads the apostles out, they are told: “Go, stand in the temple and speak [λαλεῖν] to the people all the words of this life” (5.20). And at daybreak they entered the temple and taught (διδάσκειν, 5.21). Then when the officers bring the apostles back before the council, the high priest tells them: “We strictly ordered you not to teach [διδάσκειν] in this name” (5.28; cf. 4.17-18).

Is it possible that the “security” of the prison conveys a meaning beyond the obvious, and that Luke has perhaps even figured this scene with an allegory he wants his readers to understand? If we can entertain such a reading, then it is perhaps conceivable to interpret the

9 Cf. Chrysostom’s remarks on this pericope, where he observes how, despite the attempts of the high priest and his associates to suppress the speech of the apostles, οὐκ ἐμποδιζομένην αὐτῶν τὴν παρρήσιαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον αὐξόμενον τὸ κήρυγμα, “their freedom of speech was not hindered, but rather their preaching increased even more.” Chrysostom then calls his audience to imitate the apostles’ courage and persistence in using παρρησία through an inferred contrast between the ἀσφάλεια of the prison and the ἀσφάλεια of the soul, as supplied by Christ, which he claims is also far more secure than a well-fortified city with abundant resources (Hom. in Acta 13.3 [PG 60:109]).
prison in this scene as an analog for the confinement of the Lukan λόγοι. Even though some may have suppressed Luke’s own παρρησία and thus have forced ἀσφάλεια upon him, also because of this same ἀσφάλεια his oppressors would then be unable to detect his subversive content. The servants of the oppressors who would open the doors (cf. ἀνοίξαντες, 5.23) of his narrative in the attempt to detect his seditious viewpoints would only become frustrated when they found nothing inside (cf. ἔσω οὐδένα εὗρομεν, 5.23). And the oppressors themselves, when they heard these λόγοι (cf. ὡς δὲ ἤκουσαν τοὺς λόγους τούτους, 5.24), would be left perplexed about their meaning (cf. διηπόρουν περὶ αὕτων τί ἂν γένοιτο τοῦτο, 5.24).

Considering Paul’s παρρησία at the end of Acts, if Luke’s readers knew the Pauline and perhaps even Deutero-Pauline letters, they would likely also know that in Rome Paul spent his final days imprisoned (Phil 1.7, 12-26; Phlm 1, 9-13; cf. Col 4.18; Eph 3.1; 2 Tim 1.8; 2.9), which is then comparable to the confinement of these apostles in the “security” of a Jerusalem prison. Yet like those apostles whose speech was not bound despite the initial attempts to silence them, Paul’s verbal acts in Rome go unhindered (28.31), even though he may remain under house arrest (28.30).

While in the literal sense, the “security” of locked doors in the scene from Acts 5.17-26 would function to prohibit the apostles from getting out, understood allegorically ἀσφάλεια conveys the idea of “safety” or “assurance from personal danger,” that is, a state of having barred some external threat from getting inside. Perhaps it is through this latter use of ἀσφάλεια that Luke assures Theophilus of the safety in his composition and that he, as the recipient of the text, can possess it and, if he wishes to share the work with others, maintain perpetual association with
its contents without any consequences.\footnote{On the question of whether Theophilus was a “literary patron” and how he might have distributed the work he received, see esp. Alexander, \textit{Preface}, 187-200; and also Cadbury, \textit{Beginnings}, 2:490; Marshall, \textit{Luke}, 39-40; Fitzmyer, \textit{Luke I-IX}, 299-300; Nolland, \textit{Luke 1-9:20}, 5; Green, \textit{Luke}, 44-45; Bovon, \textit{Luke 1}, 17; and Carroll, \textit{Luke}, 21.} That the work may be safe to own and use, however, would not necessarily mean that it is also without subversive ideas that seek to challenge or even undercut the authority of those who might get inside. The composition would be secure rather because its author had carefully nuanced the material with an eye toward subtlety in making his points of critique.

We must acknowledge, however, that Luke does not apply the sense of ἀσφάλεια directly to his narrative, but rather to the mind of Theophilus. Accordingly, it is grammatically possible to take the accusative, τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, as cognate in meaning to ἐπιγνῶναι and thus to translate the final clause of the preface, ἵνα ἐπιγνῶς περὶ ὧν κατηχήθης λόγων τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, “so that you may have, with regard to the words in which you were instructed, assurance from personal danger” (1.4). It is worth noting that Euthymius appears to understand τὴν ἀσφάλειαν as an accusative that is cognate in meaning to ἐπιγνῶναι, as he paraphrases: Ἵνα ἐπιγνῶς, ἵνα πλέον κατάσχῃς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τῶν λόγων τῆς πίστεως, “So that you may know, so that you may better have security in the words of faith.”\footnote{Com. Luc. ad 1.4 (PG 129:860b). On the accusative cognate in meaning, see Smyth §1567. Cf. Alexander’s translation of the final clause: “so that you may have assured knowledge about the things in which you have been instructed” (\textit{Preface}, 136). Calvin does not comment upon ἀσφάλεια in particular, but he does reason that Luke addressed the Gospel to Theophilus rather than to a large body because an individual could serve as a guardian of the work in a time when: Undique instabant tyranni, qui metu et terroribus impedirent sanae doctrinae cursum, “Tyrants were threatening from all sides, who with fear and terrors were hindering the course of sound teaching” (\textit{Harm. ad Luke 1.1-4} [CO 45:5]). The usage of ἀσφάλεια as “assurance from personal danger” (cf. LSJ, s.v. 2, “assurance from danger, personal safety”) contributes to the road or journey motif—conveyed in the preface by διήγησις, “leading through,” and παρακολουθεῖν, “to follow,” and καθεξῆς, “from one place to another” (e.g., Luke 8.1; Acts 18.23; cf. Acts 3.24; 11.4). On this notion that the reader travels through the narrative, guided by the author (since he has himself already followed all things carefully), see Moessner, “Appeal}
Another possibility is that—in addition to the material in which Theophilus has already been instructed (ὧν κατηχήθης λόγον)—Luke wishes through the composition of his narrative to teach him the rhetorical art of ἀσφάλεια, that is, “so that you may learn, with regard to the words in which you were instructed, circumspection.” Yet both of these interpretations presuppose that the narrative Theophilus has received—about which he may have peace of mind or through which he may learn or both—is also characterized by ἀσφάλεια.

One argument against these renderings of the clause of course is that it would prove counterproductive to compose a narrative filled with covert criticisms and then to announce openly at the beginning that its contents are presented covertly. Yet is it possible that Luke is capitalizing on the polysemous capacity of ἀσφάλεια, as the rhetoricians taught in the use of figured speech? Luke surely knew that in addition to “security” and “circumspection,” ἀσφάλεια may also convey the idea of “certainty” or “truth” (the most common rendering of the noun in English translations of Luke 1.4), which usage is also intelligible in the final clause: “so that you may know, concerning the words in which you were instructed, the truth” (1.4). Yet if Luke had wished to communicate only the idea of knowing “the truth,” he seemingly would have used the adjectival cognate ἀσφαλής in its articular and substantival form, τὸ ἀσφαλὲς, as he

12 Cf. Moles’ observation about the preface of Luke’s Gospel and other pieces of compressed and dense writing: “The language of great writers can be very polysemous. The fact that a word, phrase or image can be explained on one level does not exclude its operating on other levels; and in some contexts, the more levels the better, provided that each separate level retains sufficient definition, and the whole does not collapse into a mess” (“Luke’s Preface,” 464-65).

13 We would perhaps even expect to see in the prologue a claim about the truthfulness of the work. See the discussion in Clare K. Rothschild, Luke-Acts and the Rhetoric of History: An Investigation of Early Christian Historiography (WUNT 2.175; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 67-71.
does in Acts 21.34; 22.30; and 25.26. In the former two examples, τὸ ἀσφαλές is the object of γνῶναι, whereas ἡ ἀσφάλεια is the object of ἐπιγνῶναι in the preface. And not insignificantly, ἀσφαλές in Acts 25.26 appears within a clause that serves as the subject of γράψαι. 

Accordingly, Luke seems to inform Theophilus that the narrative he has received was composed with circumspection and is thus safe; but if he is indeed making the point that his criticisms are veiled, the way he makes that point is itself veiled. Therefore, it appears that Luke writes so that Theophilus may know “the truth” about which he was instructed; yet ultimately, he may arrive at such certainty in “the security” of knowing that the text he has received is composed with enough subtlety to escape detection as subversive literature.

If Luke is assuring Theophilus about the security of his narrative, could we then assume that the kind of unhindered freedom of speech Paul enjoys at the end of the narrative is not yet possible in the real world of author and recipient? At the closing of Acts, the phrase μετὰ πάσης παρρησίας functions adverbially, qualifying Paul’s acts of “preaching [κηρύσσων] the kingdom of God” and his “teaching [διδάσκων] about the Lord Jesus Christ” (28.31). The adverb ἀκωλύτως modifies the participles κηρύσσων and διδάσκων, as well as the adverbial phrase μετὰ

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14 The view of both Cadbury (Beginnings, 2:509) and Alexander (Preface, 138, 140) that ἡ ἀσφάλεια and τὸ ἀσφαλές are equivalent does not account for Luke’s usage of the former in Acts 5.23 and thereby restricts the polysemous capacity of the noun. Cadbury’s further claim that Luke uses the noun rather than the adjective because of the word’s emphatic position at the end of the period is questionable. Cf. also the adverbial cognate ἀσφαλῶς, which Luke uses for both knowing “truthfully” or “certainly” (Acts 2.36) and for keeping prisoners “securely” (Acts 16.23).

This cluster of terms referring to speak acts appears to carry some significance, especially because of the concentration of the terms in the last sentence of the narrative. Our next question to address then is whether the characters in Luke-Acts express a need to guard their speech in order to avoid danger from powerful individuals. If Jesus and Paul and other protagonists must use their λόγοι with caution until they achieve their respective missions, then perhaps the implication is that Luke and his readers must also secure theirs until full freedom of speech is realized.

2. The Lukan Pharisees as Spies

After the Lukan Jesus delivers a series of woes against the Pharisees and lawyers (11.37-52), the narrator relates that they then “began to hold a strong grudge and to interrogate him about many things, lying in wait for him in order to catch something from his mouth [στόμα]” (11.53-54).
Does this passage necessarily indicate that Luke would need to characterize his Pharisees figuratively in order to avoid repercussions from members within that sect (or perhaps those who carried on the Pharisaic tradition)? We could not build a case on this piece of evidence alone. But what is clear at this point is that Luke depicts the Pharisees as themselves adopting a strategy of covertness, specifically a clandestine attempt to indict Jesus based upon his λόγος.20

If Luke is using figured speech against the Pharisees, however, there would be a seeming contradiction or at least a tension between the Lukian Jesus, on the one hand, openly critiquing the Pharisees through woes (11.37-44), and on the other, his veiled speech against their antagonism. Yet perhaps the point is that direct and free speech (11.37-52) does have consequences (11.53-54), and that Christ followers should therefore use their words carefully. As we see in Acts, Peter and John and Paul and Barnabas all learn the hard way that the resistance they meet by speaking freely (παρρησιάζεσθαι) sometimes calls for a more circumspect mode of speech (Acts 2.29; 4.13, 29, 31; 9.27-29; 13.46; 14.3; 19.8; 26.26), at least until Paul reaches Rome (28.31). In the cases of Jesus and Paul, both seem to maintain the proper balance between direct and indirect forms of speech in order to arrive at the destinations where each fulfills his necessary mission.21 Perhaps Luke is performing a similar balancing act in composing his narrative.
That the narrator describes the Pharisees as hunters who lie hidden in order to prey upon Jesus’ speech (11.54) shows the need for him, and possibly Luke and his readers, to be all the more circumspect with their words. This metaphorical description of the Pharisees serves as the grounds upon which the Lukan Jesus in the next sentence offers a warning about “the leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy” (12.1). Here Luke supplements the notion that hunters are invisible to their quarry with the idea that leaven is similarly unseen yet effective and with the pretense of ὑπόκρισις, literally “acting,” which involves the concealment of one’s true visage behind a mask.22 “Yet,” Jesus assures his hearers, “there is nothing that has been covered that will not be revealed and nothing hidden that will not be made known” (12.2).23

Such unveilings may include not only the disguises that the Pharisees use in their attempt to catch Jesus say something disapproving, but perhaps also the figured criticisms uttered against them by Jesus within the narrative and thus by Luke, its creator. Although Luke may not offer a fully open critique, he appears to anticipate complete disclosure at some point in the future, as he has Jesus say, “whatever you have said in the dark will be heard in the light, and what you have spoken into ears within private rooms will be proclaimed upon housetops” (12.3).

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22 On the invisibility of leaven, see, e.g., Carroll, Luke, 263. On the actor’s mask as a metaphor for dissemblance and insincerity, see e.g., Cicero, Tusc. 5.73; Seneca, Ben. 2.13.2; Martial, Epig. 3.43; Lucian, Nigr. 11; Merc. cond. 30; Gall. 26; Icar. 29; and Justin R. Howell, “Actor,” in EBR, 1:291-93. Cf. also Tacitus, Ann. 1.10; 6.51; and Suetonius, Tib. 33.1.

23 Darr observes, “the Pharisees’ hypocrisy consists of a certain external piety which masks internal wickedness. That this is what Jesus means by this enigmatic epithet is further supported by the following verses (2-3), which refer to the inevitability of ‘hidden things’ being revealed” (Character Building, 105). Conversely, Levine interprets the metaphor of the leaven and the following statement in 12.2 as indications “that nothing in the Pharisees’ action would lead anyone to think ill of them” (“Luke’s Pharisees,” 123).
That the Pharisees wear a mask (as ὑπόκρισις implies) in their attempt to accuse Jesus on the basis of his speech is a point Luke seems to make also in the scene where the scribes and the chief priests send “spies,” whom the narrator describes as ones “disguising [ὑποκρίνεσθαι] themselves as just [δίκαιοι], so that they might seize him on the basis of his speech [λόγος]” (20.20). It is striking that instead of “spies,” the Markan parallel has “Pharisees” and “Herodians” conspiring together in the attempted trap of this episode (Mark 12.13; cf. Matt 22.15-16).²⁴ That Luke has removed or rather disguised the presence of the Pharisees in this scene is not necessarily to exculpate them from assisting in the arrest of Jesus.²⁵ It is possible that Luke chooses not to disclose their identity because he aims to write circumspectly in order to secure his own λόγος.²⁶ Yet if readers were to understand these spies as Pharisees, this covering would not diminish the antagonism of the Pharisees but would rather heighten the depiction of their stealth. Does Luke provide his readers with enough clues to realize that the behavior of those behind the mask is consistent with that of the Pharisees in the previous narrative? By covering them has he also exposed them?

The act of putting on a disguise—conveyed here by the participial form of ὑποκρίνεσθαι—has resonance with the earlier denunciation Jesus gives against the ὑπόκρισις of the Pharisees (12.1), as well as to his rebuttal to the ἀρχισυνάγωγος, “ruler of the synagogue” (13.15; cf. 12.56). Luke of course does not describe the spies in 20.20 with a literal mask; he rather uses ὑποκρίνεσθαι in its metaphorical sense in order to designate that their outer covering

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²⁴ Mark has “chief priests, scribes, and elders” (11.27) send “some of the Pharisees and some of the Herodians” (12.13); and in Matthew “the Pharisees” send “their disciples” and “the Herodians” (22.15-16). Cf. Amy-Jill Levine, “Luke’s Pharisees,” 114.

²⁵ David P. Moessner argues that the Lukian Pharisees have a consistent influence in the events leading up to the death of Jesus, even though their role in the passion narrative is not immediately obvious (“The ‘Leaven of the Pharisees’ and ‘This Generation’: Israel’s Rejection of Jesus according to Luke,” JST 34 [1988]: 21-46).

was one of being δίκαιοι, “just.” Yet even this part of the sketch corresponds with the characterizations of Pharisees in the earlier narrative. In his invective against the Pharisees in 16.14-18, the Lukan Jesus here also points to their outer appearance as δίκαιοι and distinguishes it from their inner true selves when he states, “you are the ones who justify yourselves [ὑμεῖς ἐστε οἱ δικαιοῦντες ἑαυτοὺς] before people, but God knows your hearts” (16.15)—which is reminiscent of the lawyer who, “wishing to justify himself [δικαιοῦν ἑαυτὸν]” (10.29), provoked the parable of the Good Samaritan.

Luke’s pairing of his Pharisees and lawyers in order to show their similarity (e.g., 11.37-52)—probably on the grounds that the Pharisees were known for their acumen in interpreting the law (e.g., Josephus, B.J. 1.110; 2.162)—is nearly as prominent in the narrative as his coupling of the Pharisees and the tax collectors. In the so-called parable of the Pharisee and Tax Collector, Luke provides another clue indicating that the feigned appearance of being δίκαιοι is characteristic of the Pharisees. In this context, Jesus uses the Pharisee of the parable as a reproof to those “who trusted in themselves that they were just” (τοὺς πεποιθότας ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς ὅτι εἰσὶν δίκαιοι).

In contrast to the Pharisees and lawyers, Luke states earlier, the tax collectors justify (δικαιοῦν) God rather than themselves (7.29). Here he pairs the tax collectors with the woman of 7.36-50, who from the perspective of Simon the Pharisee is “a sinner” (7.39). Yet from Luke’s point of view the tax collectors and the woman, despite their past sins, are the true children of God, because through them σοφία is justified (δικαιοσύνη, 7.29, 35). Simon the Pharisee, on the

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other hand, fails to justify God largely because he does not acknowledge Jesus as God’s prophet, which Luke indicates through Simon’s interior monologue (7.39).  

That the Pharisees in particular have already been spying on or at least monitoring Jesus’ behavior is evident—even in places one might least expect them to appear, such as a grain field (6.1-5). In addition to the imagery where they “lie in wait for” (ἐνεδρεύειν) and “hunt” (θηρεύειν) after his speech (11.54), Luke implies the furtive watchfulness that is characteristic of spies by employing for their activities the terms εὑρίσκειν, “to find” (6.7) and παρατηρεῖν, “to watch closely” (6.7; 14.1). And, similarly, the Pharisees have observed that Jesus dines with tax collectors (5.30), which also raises the question of why the Pharisees themselves dine with Jesus on three occasions (7.36-50; 11.37-52; 14.1-24).

Some scholars argue that such table fellowship serves as evidence that Luke depicts certain Pharisees as having amicable relations with Jesus. Yet the motive behind these

28 Sanders argues that while the Lukan Pharisees are “friendly” toward Jesus, the latter, he implies, does not reciprocate with such friendliness toward the Pharisees (Jews in Luke-Acts, 86-87). He states, “every time a Pharisee invites Jesus to dinner Jesus accepts and then takes the opportunity to scold the Pharisees for their incorrect life-styles.” In 7.36-50, for instance, “the sinful woman who anoints Jesus’ feet becomes the foil for Jesus’ critical dialogue with the Pharisee” (ibid., 105-06). Yet it is highly questionable that Luke would portray his protagonist with such a character flaw if indeed the Pharisees are sincere and are being truly “friendly” in extending such dinner invitations.


30 Cf. Darr, who highlights how the Pharisees are “the great observers of the story; since their first appearance they have been vigilant and curious, scrutinizing and critiquing all that Jesus and his disciples do and say” (Character Building, 98).

31 According to Steele, the fact that some Lukan Pharisees invite Jesus to share meals with them (e.g., 7.36; 11.37; 14.1) is an indication that they are “friendly” toward him (“Table-fellowship with Pharisees,” 167). Sanders states, “of the six meals that Jesus takes in others’ homes in Luke, half are in the homes of Pharisees! Frequent invitations to dinner are not a sign of hostility” (Jews in Luke-Acts, 86-87). “Based on these invitations,” Stemberger claims, “one must conclude that Jesus’ relations with the Pharisees could not have been as bad as they are portrayed in the other Gospels” (Jewish Contemporaries, 30). Mason asserts, “Jesus will criticize the Pharisees at every opportunity, but they nonetheless continue to treat him as a respected colleague” (“Chief Priests, Sadducees, Pharisees,” 135). Carroll, however, observes that “in each
invitations to dine appears to be consistent with their persistent desire to be in his presence for the purpose of monitoring his teaching and conduct with the ultimate aim to turn him over to the authorities, which becomes most clear in the final meal scene with a Pharisee, when those present “were watching [παρατηρεῖσθαι] him closely” (14.1). Notably, παρατηρεῖν is sometimes used in Greek literature for the act of maliciously observing another. Furthermore, Luke’s use of the indirect middle here—as well as in 6.7 with the scribes and Pharisees as the subject—presupposes some purpose (for themselves) behind the Pharisees’ scrutiny. And indeed, Luke gives this reason in 6.7, namely, “so that they might find a way to accuse him.”

The spies whom the scribes and chief priests dispatch in 20.20 correspondingly search for a reason to accuse Jesus, specifically, Luke now qualifies, “for the purpose of handing him over to the authority and jurisdiction of the governor.” The trap they set for Jesus over the issue of whether it is lawful (ἔξεστιν, 20.22) to pay tribute to Caesar recalls those earlier moments when the Pharisees and lawyers question and observe and test him on matters pertaining to the law (6.2, 9; 10.25; 11.16; 14.3). Whereas in these previous attempts his accusers limit their questions to matters pertaining to Jewish law, the issue in this episode is seemingly whether and to what extent Jewish and Roman law are compatible. Their hope of course is that Jesus will openly forbid paying taxes to Caesar, which will provide a reason for delivering him to the governor. The synkrisis between the Pharisees and tax collectors, which Luke by this point has firmly established, reverberates in this scene when the spies seem to support the system of Roman taxation, if not in principle at least for achieving their goal. And even though Jesus does not

\[\text{32}\] See, e.g., Xenophon, Mem. 3.14.4; and Aristotle, Rhet. 2.6.20=1384b.
explicitly teach against paying taxes to Caesar, the members of the Sanhedrin later make this very charge when they bring Jesus before Pilate (23.2).

A number of scholars claim that the Pharisees are conspicuously absent in Luke’s passion narrative and on these and other grounds argue that Luke wishes to exclude this group from the larger Jewish body he holds at least partly responsible for the death of Jesus (cf. Acts 4.26-27). While it is certainly the case that Luke does not use the designation Φαρισαῖοι or identify any particular Φαρισαῖος after 19.39, their ongoing antagonism in the events leading up to the passion may be assumed in their membership among the Sanhedrin (cf. Acts 5.34; 23.6), whom Luke clearly depicts as those who brought Jesus before Pilate (22.66-23.5). That there are Pharisaic representatives among the Sanhedrin (e.g., Acts 5.34; 23.1-9) far from diminishes their role at this point in the narrative; this fact simply shows them combining their force with the high priests and the Sadducees, who set a corresponding albeit unsuccessful trap in 20.27-33 immediately after the spies had failed in 20.20-26. Furthermore, that the Sanhedrin included Pharisees intimates the presence of the latter on the scene where Jesus is questioned about his position on Roman taxation (20.20-26; 23.2), which in turn serves as yet another indication that the spies there are Pharisees. If Jesus is accused of forbidding the payment of taxes to Caesar

33 Sanders, e.g., claims that “Luke has scrupulously kept the Pharisees out of the Passion Narrative” (Jews in Luke-Acts, 87). Carroll asserts that the Pharisees are absent in Luke’s passion because they, in the narrative of Acts, serve as “legitimators” of the Gentile mission. “For Luke to depict the Pharisees as direct participants in the proceedings against Jesus, the apostles, Stephen, or Paul, would undermine their positive legitimating function in the narrative” (“Luke’s Portrayal of the Pharisees,” 620). According to Gowler, it is possible that the Pharisees “sympathize—but do not join—with the Jewish leaders who bring about Jesus’ death. They are completely absent from the narrative once Jesus enters Jerusalem” (Host, 299). Kayama claims, “Luke did not have the Pharisees participate in the killing of Jesus; in this the Pharisees distinguished themselves from the political powers centering around the temple authorities” (“Believers Who Belonged,” 108-09). Even though Ziesler argues that Luke paints a favorable portrait of the Pharisees, he explains that the “absence” of the Pharisees in Luke’s passion narrative is not so special, as they also are not directly named in those of Mark or Matthew either (“Luke and the Pharisees,” 148).
(23.2) even when his response to the spies is not a direct statement against rendering such tribute (20.25), then how much more would they charge him for issuing a more overtly treasonous statement?

A similar instance where the Pharisees set a trap for Jesus in the attempt to make him utter subversive speech against the ruling powers appears earlier in the narrative when the Pharisees ask him “when the kingdom of God was coming” (17.20). According to Jesus, the kingdom of God is not coming, μετὰ παρατηρήσεως. This expression can have two meanings, which are not mutually exclusive within this context of the narrative. In one sense, the noun παρατήρησις conveys that the kingdom is not coming with the observance of astrological signs—even though the Lukan Jesus himself does earlier use lightning as a metaphor for the fall of Satan (10.18) and in the present episode for the appearance of the son of man (17.24). Taken in this sense, “the kingdom of God is not coming with the observance of signs.” Yet in another sense, παρατήρησις has the meaning that its verbal cognate παρατηρεῖν does in 6.7 and 14.1 and

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34 Cf. the interpretive tradition that views the Pharisees’ question in 17.20 as sarcasm and thus mockery of Jesus. Cyril of Alexandria states: Ἀλλ’ οὐ πεπίστευκας εἰς αὐτὸν, ἀσύνετε Φαρισαίε, οὐ παραδέξω τὴν παρ’ αὐτοῦ δικαίωσιν. Εἶτα πῶς ἐρωτᾷς πότε ἔρχεται ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ; Διαγελᾷ τοιαύτα τὸ σεπτὸν οὕτω καὶ ἀξιάγαστον ἀληθῶς μυστήριον. “But you have not come to believe in him, O foolish Pharisee. You have not accepted the justification that is from him. How do you then ask when the kingdom is coming? Accordingly, you mock the mystery that is thus sacred and truly marvelous” (Luc. ad 17.20 [PG 72:840c]). Theophylact claims that when the Pharisees heard Jesus teach about the kingdom of God, they would address him with sarcasm (κατειρωνεύεσθαι); and thus in 17.20 they were mocking (διαγελᾶν) him and asking their question ἐν μυκτηρισμῷ καὶ εἰρωνείᾳ, “in derision and irony” (Luc. ad 17.20-25 [PG 123:992b-c]). So also Calvin explains that the Pharisees ask this question per ludibrium, “through mockery,” and mordaciter, “bitingly,” and furthermore that when Jesus answers, oblique perstringit pharisaeorum socordiam, “he indirectly reproves the stupidity of the Pharisees” (Harm. ad Luke 17.20 [CO 45:424]). Conversely, Fitzmyer states: “Nothing in the text suggests that they ask in contempt or by way of testing him” (Luke X-XXIV, 1160).

20.20 when the spying Pharisees attempt to turn Jesus over to the political authorities on the basis of his speech. Thus, “the kingdom of God is not coming with malicious observation.” The clandestine maneuvering implied in μετὰ παρατήρησεως (17.20) strongly differs from the cured Samaritan leper’s act of glorifying God μετὰ φωνῆς μεγάλης (17.15). That Luke in every other instance expresses the idea, “with a great voice,” through a construct in the dative (e.g., φωνῇ μεγάλῃ) rather than with the preposition μετὰ may indicate that here he deliberately contrasts the unhidden praise from the Samaritan with the concealed and antagonistic efforts of these Pharisees.  

When we notice the double meaning conveyed by παρατήρησις, we can then proceed to the questions the rhetoricians prompt us to ask about figured speech. With the Rhetorica ad Herennium, we can certainly say that this term “can be taken in two or more senses.” But is this a case in which we are to understand the word exclusively “in the way that he who spoke intends” (Rhet. Her. 4.67), despite its ambiguity? We have noticed that παρατήρησις as both “observance of signs” and “malicious observation” makes sense within this context. Perhaps the double meaning in this instance is more aligned with the instruction that Apsines and Hermogenes offer on indirect speech, that is, when a statement intending to convey one thing “accomplishes something else as well.” Or to recall indirect speech in the way that Pseudo-

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38 Apsines (Spengel and Hammer, 330 = Patillon, 112); and Hermogenes (Inv. 4.13 [Rabe, 205 = Kennedy, 188]).
Dionysius explains it, there is both a “private” and “public” argument appearing in one and the same expression (*Ars Rhet. 8.16*). The Lukan Jesus can openly say that the kingdom of God is not coming “with the observance of signs” (17.20), as he proceeds to explain (17.24, 29, 37). But his point that the “malicious observation” of the Pharisees will not bring this kingdom he seems to allow his hearers to figure out based on other contextual clues. Accordingly, this later meaning of παρατήρησις, as it may presuppose the disguises used by the Lukan Pharisees, is itself partly disguised. Indeed, as Pseudo-Dionysius prescribes, indirect speech is one way to employ “the art of escaping notice” (*Ars Rhet. 8.16*).

3. Conclusions

We can conclude more broadly that certain characters in Luke-Acts do suffer consequences for their παρρησία about matters deemed subversive or at least controversial. And we have noticed especially in Acts that there are ongoing efforts by the religious officials to suppress the παρρησία of the Apostles, and that Luke ends his narrative with Paul preaching and teaching in Rome “with full freedom of speech [παρρησία] without hindrance” (Acts 28.31). We have suggested also that this culminating point of the Lukan narrative might best be understood in light of the culminating point of the Lukan preface, ἀσφάλεια, “security” (Luke 1.4); for the ancient rhetoricians recommend the use of figured speech in order to achieve ἀσφάλεια in settings where παρρησία is hindered. To read Luke 1.4 and Acts 28.31 together then suggests that there is some correspondence between the story world within the Lukan narrative and the actual world of Luke’s readers—as we have proposed that Paul’s unhindered παρρησία is a luxury that perhaps Luke and Theophilus do not share, but through Paul as a character they anticipate such a state. This correspondence we have observed also when, in the story world of the Third Gospel, Jesus figures his speech as he addresses Pharisees, which appears to parallel
Luke’s authorial voice as he disguises the Pharisees as spies. The narrative frame we have proposed in Luke 1.4 and Acts 28.31, however, is not proven with this evidence alone. Because it is Paul who ultimately enjoys παρρησία in the end, we must also closely analyze his speech, particularly the statements about his Pharisaism and the way he speaks in the presence of Pharisees.
Chapter Seven: Paul and Other Former Pharisees

We saw in the previous chapter how Luke depicts the scribes and Pharisees of his Gospel as “lying in wait for” Jesus in order “to catch something from his mouth [τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ]” (Luke 11.54). In asking whether the Pharisees of Acts are correspondingly at pains to oppose Paul on the basis of his speech, it is perhaps appropriate to begin this part of our investigation with the scene about Paul before the Sanhedrin (Acts 22.30-23.11). When Paul makes his initial statement to this council, the high priest orders “the bystanders” to strike Paul on “the mouth” (τὸ στόμα, 23.2). While these bystanders are not identified, Luke does inform his readers that in addition to the high priest, Pharisees and Sadducees make up the council members (23.6-9). It is within this scene that Paul—observing that one part of the council consists of Sadducees and the other Pharisees—cries out, “Brothers, I am [εἰμι] a Pharisee, a son of Pharisees; concerning the hope and resurrection of the dead I am being judged” (23.6).

One of the greatest ambiguities about the alleged Pharisaism of the Lukan Paul is that, despite this claim to be a Pharisee in the present tense, later in the narrative he states before Agrippa, ἔζησα Φαρισαῖος, “I lived as a Pharisee” (26.5).¹ Both of these statements of course

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¹ A number of scholars hold that Luke portrays Paul as maintaining a Pharisaic and Christian identity at one and the same time; and on this basis some blur the lines between the two sects. Lake and Cadbury note: “That Paul the Christian could speak of himself as a Pharisee ought not to be doubted” (Beginnings, 4:288). The Lukan Paul, Ziesler states, is “still a Pharisee” (“Luke and the Pharisees,” 146). The view that “Paul, even as a Christian, was still in many respects a Pharisee,” according to Marshall, “is historically preferable” (Acts, 385). According to Steele, in Acts 23.6-9, “Paul is presented as both Pharisee and Christian” (“Table-fellowship with Pharisees,” 170). Schmithals assumes that the Lukan Paul is still a Pharisee in his comment: “Zu dieser ‘orthodoxen’ Richtung des Judentums bekennt sich Paulus mit Nachdruck (V. 6); wie nah und wie fern Lukas damit Paulus selbst ist, zeigt ein Vergleich mit Phil. 3,5-9” (Apostelgeschichte, 207). Schneider claims: “Paulus behauptet denn auch, daß er Pharisäer sei (nicht: gewesen sei)! Dies ist mit Phil 3,5-11 kaum vereinbar, entspricht aber dem lukanischen Paulusbild (siehe 22,3)” (Apostelgeschichte, 2:332). In Jervell’s view, “Luke presents him as the Pharisee Paul who remains a Pharisee after his conversion and never becomes an ex-Pharisee”
occur well after the time within the narrative when Paul had joined the Christian movement. Has Luke figured his portrait of Paul vis-à-vis his identity as a Pharisee? In order to answer this question, we must look closely at each of these statements within its respective context, and also attempt to reconcile them within the larger narrative. Yet we shall first seek to answer whether there are any signs of figured speech in Paul’s initial statements to the council, especially those to the high priest and the bystanders in 23.1-5, as his rhetorical style here may partly determine how he addresses the council in 23.6-10.

1. Paul’s Feigned Ignorance about the High Priest (Acts 23.5)

When the bystanders accuse Paul of reproaching (λοιδορεῖν) the high priest (23.4), Paul claims that he was unaware whom he was addressing: “I did not know, brothers, that he was the high priest; for it is written, ‘You shall not speak badly of the ruler of your people’” (23.5). It is initially uncertain whether Paul is truly ignorant that Ananias is the high priest. It is also unclear

(We refer to Rapske’s essay in *The Unknown Paul: Essays on Luke-Acts and Early Christian History* [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984], 71; see also his comments in *Apostelgeschichte*, 555-56), which position Rapske supports. Krodel states: “Not only was the Paul of Acts a Pharisee in the past, but he remained one also as a Christian (contrary to Phil. 3:5-8)” (Acts, 424-25). Even though Sanders sees Paul as “playing a trick on his audience” when he appeals to his Pharisaism in 23.6, he still claims that “Paul is a Pharisee mutatis mutandis—that is, he is a Christianized Pharisee, not a Pharisaic Christian” (*Jews in Luke-Acts*, 100). Brawley holds: “In Acts, Pharisees and Christians are kindred spirits. Paul confesses his fidelity to Pharisaism (Acts 23:6, 26:5)” (*Luke-Acts and the Jews*, 84). In his comment on Acts 23.6, Bruce claims that “a Pharisee could become a Christian and remain a Pharisee” (*Acts* [1988], 428; echoed in *Acts* [1990], 465). According to Tannehill, “Paul is a faithful Pharisee, affirming his family heritage” (*Narrative Unity*, 2:291). As Gowler reads the evidence, “Paul is a Pharisee” (*Host*, 292) and furthermore “the consummate Pharisee, the paradigm of the true Pharisee as seen through the perspective of the narrator” (ibid., 300). Based on Paul’s statements about his Pharisaism in Acts 23.6 and 26.5, Stemberger posits: “If we can take historically this information from Acts, it means that the early community in Jerusalem could hope for prospects of goodwill from the leaders of the Pharisees” (*Jewish Contemporaries*, 32-33). Marshall claims: “Luke consigns Paul’s role as persecutor and indeed his original name to life prior to his conversion but does not consider Pharisaism to be at odds with Paul’s new life in Christ” (*Portrayals of the Pharisees*, 146).
to readers at first glance whether Paul sincerely and not ironically applies the appellation “ruler of the people” to Ananias. Yet we can assert that Luke—as the one in control of the characters within the narrative—is able to use Paul’s declared ignorance that Ananias is the high priest in order to offer judgment against this ruler: “God is about to strike you, you white-washed wall!” (23.3).²

The way Luke incorporates this statement into his narrative has resonance with one of the examples Hermogenes offers on “the figure by allusion [ἐμφασις],” that is, when “someone speaking openly about the matter does not seem to speak it.”³ When the son wishes to reproach his father for having sex with his wife, although he cannot actually say, “he is committing adultery with my wife,” he finds a way to say it openly (as we have just done here) as though he had not said it all.⁴

Yet is it also possible that Luke’s character Paul is using figures in this episode? On the previous day, Paul refers to the high priest and the council of elders who authorized his journey

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² Cf. the account in Josephus where Ananias meets his end at the hands of sicarii who had joined the insurgent forces (B.J. 2.425, 441). See, e.g., Loisy, Acts, 828; Lake and Cadbury, Beginnings, 4:287; Haenchen, Acts, 642; Schmithals, Apostelgeschichte, 207; and Pesch, Apostelgeschichte, 2:243. On the question of whether Luke knew Josephus, see especially Pervo, Dating Acts, 149-99. To the contrary, Hemer dismisses the possibility that Luke knew the works of Josephus and used them as a source (Book of Acts in the Setting of Hellenistic History, 94-99, esp. 95). If Luke knows this tradition about Ananias (perhaps from Josephus) and interprets his death as a divine judgment, Paul may here either predict prophetically or utter a curse that only later finds fulfillment. Pseudo-Oecumenius compares this scene to Paul’s words in 1 Cor 4.12 and claims that here in Acts he not only reproaches (λοιδορεῖν) the high priest but also curses (ἐπαρᾶσθαι) him (Com. in Acta ad 22.30; 23.1-5 [PG 118:273d-276a]). Yet on the basis of this same parallel, Chrysostom holds that Paul does not utter a curse (Hom. in Acta 48.2 [PG 60:334]). Cf. Margaret M. Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art of Pauline Interpretation (Louisville and London: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 171, 296, 479. See also Bede, Act. ad 23.3 (CCSL 121:89); Conzelmann, Acts, 192; Richard J. Cassidy, Society and Politics in the Acts of the Apostles (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987), 64; Barrett, Acts, 2:1059, 1061; and Johnson, Acts, 396.

³ Inv. 4.13 (Rabe, 208 = Kennedy, 192).

⁴ Inv. 4.13 (Rabe, 209 = Kennedy, 194).
to Damascus and who can now corroborate such authorization (22.5; cf. 9.1). Luke seems to imply that it is the same high priest who continues to hold power.\(^5\) Furthermore, because Paul describes Ananias as one sitting in judgment “according the law” (κατὰ τὸν νόμον), as well as one issuing orders (23.3), it is perhaps unrealistic that Paul does not recognize this person of authority as the high priest.\(^6\) The appeal that Paul had poor eyesight—which is attested in the history of interpretation—is of course irrelevant for the narrative of Acts, especially since Paul has just “fixed his eyes upon” the Sanhedrin (23.1) and, on the day before, explained how another Ananias, a devout man “according to the law” (κατὰ τὸν νόμον), restored his sight (22.12-13; cf. 9.18).\(^7\)

The contrast between these two characters both bearing the name Ananias—vis-à-vis their standing in respect to the law—may be significant, because Paul accuses Ananias the high priest of judging him “according to the law,” yet simultaneously “breaking the law” (παρανομεῖν) when he orders the bystanders to strike him (23.3).\(^8\) This high priest of course is

\(^{5}\) 614 pc sy\(^h\) read ὁ ἀρχιερεὺς Ἁνανίας at 22.5a. That the same high priesthood and Sanhedrin is assumed in 9.1-2 and in 22.4-5, even though a number of years seem to have transpired between the events, is apparently not a concern for Luke. Cf. the comments by Haenchen, *Acts*, 625; Conzelmann, *Acts*, 187; and Pervo, *Acts*, 563-64.


\(^{8}\) These two characters appear to form a synkrisis constituting encomium in the case of the first character and invective in the second (Hermogenes, *Prog*. 19 [Rabe ed.]). Cf. Parsons’ comments on Acts 3.12-16; 4.32-5.11 (*Acts*, 60, 72-73). On the lawlessness of Ananias, the high priest, see Lev 19.15; Deut 25.1-2; and Tajra’s comments: “Jewish law considered a defendant innocent until he had been proved guilty. The High Priest ought to have been impartial in this affair. Instead he had violated Jewish law by ordering the prisoner struck before he had been
not the only character Luke portrays as painstakingly upholding the law and violating it at the same time. Those lawyers whom Luke pairs with the Pharisees (Luke 11.45-46) and the believers who were formerly Pharisees (Acts 15.10) receive corresponding incriminations from Jesus and Peter, respectively. And just as the Lukan Jesus inveighs against the Pharisees for cleaning the outside of the cup to the neglect of the inside (Luke 11.39), likens them to unmarked graves that are outwardly harmless but inwardly defiling (11.44), and then warns his disciples about the various disguises the Pharisees hide behind (11.53-12.3), here Paul’s insulting statement that the high priest is a “white-washed wall” suggests that this official has an unblemished exterior that conceals his inner lawlessness.9

Perhaps Paul does respond to the covering of the high priest with his own method of concealment, irony in particular. We know from Quintilian that when irony takes the form of a figure (schema), “the speaker disguises his entire meaning” (Inst. 9.2.46). One example of such dissimulation (dissimulatio), he states, is the feigned ignorance of Socrates, “who went about as an ignorant man marveling at the wisdom of others” (Inst. 9.2.44-46). That most regard Socrates as far from foolish of course reflects the fact that in using irony one pretends to hold a position that is the opposite of what is generally perceived as or in reality is true.10

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9 Cf. Ezek 13.10-15; and Matt 23.27. Augustine here qualifies the “white-washed wall” as “the hypocrisy of the Jewish priesthood” (Ep. 138.13 [CSEL 44:139]). Isho‘dad says the comparison is to call Ananias “a weak and whitened wall, which deceives many by its appearance; for thou also, possessing a corrupted soul, art invested with the form of a judge by the commandment of the Law” (Com. Acts 21; trans. Gibson, 4:32). See also the comments by Lake and Cadbury, Beginnings, 4:287; Bruce, Acts (1988), 426; Fitzmyer, Acts, 717; and Pervo, Acts, 573.

10 See, e.g., Rhet. ad Alex. 21; Rhet. Her. 4.34.46; Quintilian, Inst. 8.6.56; and especially Lucian, Dial. mort. 6.5, where he parodies the long-standing tradition of Socratic irony, specifically this philosopher’s claim to have known nothing. Here Socrates encounters the newly arrived Menippus in Hades and asks about the affairs in Athens. When Menippus reports that the
We have seen already that irony plays a key role in ancient discussions on figured speech. Pseudo-Dionysius claims that “every figure of irony is a sign of figured speech” (Ars Rhet. 9.1). Yet Demetrius specifies that while irony and figured speech are not the same, figured speech “nevertheless has some hint [ἐμφάσις] of irony” (Eloc. 291). So also Quintilian recognizes a similarity between the two; but he defines εἰρωνεία as a sense that is “the opposite” (contrarium) of what is stated and schema as “something else that is hidden also for the hearer to discover, as it were” (Inst. 9.2.65). This distinction is relevant for the episode where Paul appears before the Sanhedrin insofar as it necessitates differentiating the character Paul, who appears to use irony, from Luke, who seems to figure his narrative in this instance through Paul’s ironic claim not to have known that it was the high priest he was reviling.

To read Paul’s interactions with the high priest Ananias only at face value may give the impression that a rather indignant Paul (23.3) suddenly changes his attitude and wishes to take back his words once the bystanders inform him that it is the high priest he censures (23.4-5). Most would not deny that Paul is indignant toward the high priest—which is evident not only from Paul’s general accusation that Ananias acts contrary to the law but also from the καὶ indignantis of Paul’s question in 23.3b. What is disputed, however, is whether Paul continues to express this indignation even after the bystanders attempt to correct him in 23.4. If we are to understand Paul’s response to the bystanders as ironic, then his scorn for the high priest would

11 Interpreters maintaining this view include: Lüdemann, Early Christianity, 242-43; Tannehill, Narrative Unity, 2:286; Gowler, Host, 286; and Fitzmyer, Acts, 714, 717.

12 Smyth §2872: “In questions, καὶ before an interrogative expression marks an objection occasioned by surprise or indignation.” See also Denniston, Greek Particles, 309-10. This usage of καὶ in 23.3 is noted, e.g., by Hackett, Acts, 371; Barrett, Acts, 2:1060; and Bruce, who translates καὶ σὺ κάθῃ, “do you actually sit?” (Acts [1990], 464). Cf. Luke 10.29.
remain even after they question his rebuke. According to Aristotle, when used in speech against an opponent, “irony displays a contemptuous element” (*Rhet.* 2.2.25). Hermogenes develops this point more fully in his discussion on “indignation” (βαρύτης), wherein he explains that “ironic statements” (αἱ εἰρωνεῖαι) communicate “indignant thoughts.” Through such remarks the speaker, on the surface, “willingly defers or yields to the advantage of the opponent [ἐχθρός],” but in reality he deems this opponent “worthy of titles [.getOutputStream() or deeds that are the opposite of those stated” (*Id.* 2.8.16-24). Josephus also shows that a speaker’s use of irony often assumes her or his ill will toward the person who is subject to the ironic statement. When he attempts to legitimize his historical writings by appealing to Agrippa’s praise for them, Josephus clarifies that Agrippa was not using irony (εἰρωνεύεσθαι), for he was far from resorting to “such malignity [κακοήθεια]” (*Vita* 367).

Accordingly, Augustine may be correct that in Paul’s response to the bystanders, “he wished to admonish them sarcastically in the way he spoke.” Calvin agrees and claims that those who understand Paul’s speech here as devoid of figura are not paying enough attention to the counter arguments. Explaining that he has no doubt that Paul’s excuse is ironic (ironica), Calvin further explicates that there are two kinds of irony: “one that is concealed [tecta] by the...
art of deceiving; and another that, as here, figuratively [figurate] points to that which provokes it so that it may sting more sharply.”

Calvin’s claim that irony, as a figure, has a certain stinging force is especially apposite for the kind of critique we see here in Acts 23.1-5. Yet his distinction between one kind of irony that is concealed and another that is sharply pointed does not allow for those instances where criticisms are forceful and at the same time covert. It is important to remember that Demetrius, in giving one of our clearest explications of figured speech, does so within his larger discussion of δεινότης, “forcefulness” (Eloc. 240-304). And, as Demetrius explains, a figured rebuke or accusation derives its force from the subtly expressed matter under question rather than from the speaker’s explicit statement (Eloc. 288). In this way, when hearers notice what or whom the speaker criticizes through a more nuanced and implicit style, through their discovery and comprehension, they become participants in this rhetorical art and thus appreciate the

15 Calvin further claims that, based on Ananias’ behavior, Paul means that he recognizes “nothing priestly about this man” (Com. in Acta ad 23.5 [OE 12.2:232-33]). See also Cassidy, Society and Politics, 65; Marshall, Acts, 383-84; Johnson, Acts, 397; Mason, “Chief Priests, Sadducees, Pharisees,” 153; and Parsons, who states, “the authorial audience would recognize Paul’s prophetic critique of a corrupt leader and his ironic use of Exod 22:28 to make the point that he did not recognize the high priest because he was not acting like one might expect the leader of the people to act” (Acts, 315). Chrysostom notes that some interpret Paul here as speaking ironically (εἰρωνεύεσθαι) but himself disagrees, holding that Paul literally was unaware whom he was addressing (Hom. in Acta 48.2 [PG 60:334-35]). Theophylact follows Chrysostom and claims that Paul cannot see the high priest on account of the many standing around him—despite his subsequent point that Paul sees the high priest at least well enough to call him a white-washed wall based on his shiny appearance (Exp. in Acta ad 23.5 [PG 125:801c]). Cf. also Lake and Cadbury, Beginnings, 4:288; Haenchen, Acts, 638; Bruce, Acts (1988), 426-27; and Barrett, Acts, 2:1055, 1061-62.

16 Cf. Fronto’s letter to Marcus Aurelius where he explains that irony (εἰρωνεία) is an important figure to use in order to persuade and at the same time remain forceful when issuing a critique. Socrates, he explains, “certainly had as much cruelty and force as the Cynic Diogenes displayed in his ravings. But he surely saw that it is easier to appease the dispositions of people in part, and of youth in particular, by friendly and affable speech than to conquer them by a sharp and vehement tone” (Ad M. Caes. et invicem 3.16.2; LCL 1:102).

17 Cf. Quintilian, Res ipsae perducant iudicem ad suspiccionem. “The facts themselves should arouse the suspicions of the judge” (Inst. 9.2.71).
reproach on a higher level. By this method of critique, Demetrius explains, the speaker is still able to reproach (λοιδορεῖν; cf. Acts 23.4); yet in doing so figuratively (ἐν σχήματι), the speech is without danger (ἀκίνδυνος, Eloc. 288; cf. Quintilian, Inst. 9.2.67-68).

Erasmus also makes the point that Paul—after openly reproaching (λοιδορεῖν, Acts 23.4) the high priest—proceeds to issue critique through a more artful style in order to secure his own safety. “It is permissible,” he expounds, “to avoid danger [periculum] by rhetorical artistry [ars] when no benefit appears on the horizon.” Without a doubt, Erasmus explains, Paul “had fallen into a tumultuous situation and declares himself to have been ignorant about the high priest, who was making clear that he was not a high priest, but actually a tyrant [tyrannus].” Erasmus claims that the tyranny (tyrannis) of the high priest here restrained Paul’s freedom of speech

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18 As Quintilian remarks, auditor gaudet intelligere, et favet ingenio suo et alio dicente se laudat, “the hearer enjoys comprehending and applauds his own genius and praises himself for someone else’s speech” (Inst. 9.2.78). In his comments upon the enigmatic ending of Acts, Chrysostom highlights the importance of the audience’s participation in concluding the arguments an author sets up. He states: Μέχρι τούτων τὸν λόγον ἵστησιν ὁ συγγραφεὺς, καὶ ἀφίησι διψῶντα τὸν ἀκροατὴν, ὥστε τὸ λοιπὸν ἁρματείς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι. Τούτο καὶ οἱ άξον Ποιούσι· τὸ γάρ πάντα εἰδέναι, νοθή ποιεῖ καὶ ἐκλελυμένον. Τούτο δὲ ποιεῖ, καὶ οἷα τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα, οὐ λέγει, παρετέλοι βοῦς τοὺς ἐντυπωσάντος τοῖς συγγραφεῖσιν ἡρωομένοις, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων μανθάνοντας τὸ προστιθέναι τῷ λόγῳ· πάντως γὰρ εἰς τὰ πρότερα, τοιαῦτα ἐσχε καὶ τὰ μετὰ τοῦτο. “At this point the author brings the narrative to a halt, and he leaves the reader thirsting for more, so that the reader may draw a conclusion based upon his or her own inference. Even non-Christian authors do this; for to know everything makes the reader sluggish and relaxed. And our author does this, and he does not say what happens next, since he deems it superfluous to convey such to his readers in written form; and as result, they learn how to add to the narrative. He no doubt maintained his earlier points for filling in the blank” (Hom. in Acta 55.2 [PG 60:382]). Ahl also shows that generally ancient writers emphasize their points not through proclamation but rather by insinuating them. This communicatory style in composition, Ahl explains, relies much upon the participation of the reader, who “must find the points for himself and suppose the judgment he passes is his own, not one suggested by the writer” (“Art of Safe Criticism,” 179). On the “openness in the ending of Acts,” see Troftgruben, Conclusion Unhindered, 144-78.

19 Erasmus, Para. in Acta 23.6 (LB 7:755b).

20 Nimirum cessit tumultui et se ignorasse pontificem dicit qui se non pontificem, sed tyrannum re declarabat (Ann. in Acta ad 23.3 [ASD VI, 6:318.209-10]).
(liber lingua), which of course reminds us that the suppression of παρρησία is what often leads one to use figured speech in the first place.\textsuperscript{21}

Under such oppressive conditions, what ultimately makes figured speech a safer alternative to bold criticism is that, if detected, its ambiguity enables the speaker to deny any charges of treason or insubordination and thus to escape possible repercussions (Quintilian, Inst. 9.2.67). One potential problem with such interpretive flexibility, however, is that the hearers (whether they are opponents or allies) may not understand the true intent of the speaker (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ars Rhet. 8.4, 16).\textsuperscript{22} As Pseudo-Oecumenius remarks in his comments upon Paul’s speech before the Sanhedrin, the timing of covert and ironic critique is therefore crucial. “For often,” this author states, “ill-timed freedom of speech [παρρησία] harms the truth, but a well-timed modification successfully exposes the meaning.”\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} Erasmus, Para. in Acta 23.4 (LB 7:755a). Erasmus notes that the bystanders understand Paul’s speech in 23.3 as a convicium, “violent reproach,” when it is actually a libera objurgatio, “open rebuke” (Ann. in Acta ad 23.3 [ASD VI, 6:318.212-14]).

\textsuperscript{22} As D. A. Russell states: “The rhetores’ problem was, naturally, that it is not always easy to recognize ἐσχηματισμένα, and one always needs a context. It was natural, therefore, that they should look out for clues, indications that the author wanted us to see what his σχῆμα was” (“Figured Speeches: ‘Dionysius,’ Art of Rhetoric VIII-IX,” in The Orator in Action and Theory in Greece and Rome: Essays in Honor of George A. Kennedy [MnemosyneSup 225; ed. Cecil W. Wooten; Leiden, Boston, and Köln: Brill, 2001], 156-68, here 164). Cf. Thomas Cole: “Saying something other than what one means is not rhetorical when it merely seeks to conceal meaning from one possible audience (the uneducated, for example, or the uninitiated, or the wielders of political censorship) without any corresponding enhancement in the way meaning is received by the audience for whom it is intended. Nor is the simple conveying of a message known to be false (lying) or an argument known to be fallacious (sophistry) rhetorical per se, however often rhetoric may be used to make lies seem like truth or introduce sophistry in such a way that its fallaciousness passes unnoticed. For pure lies and sophistry to succeed, the audience must remain completely unaware of what is going on. Successful rhetoric, on the other hand, presupposes a certain level of audience sophistication” (The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece [Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991], 14).

\textsuperscript{23} Πολλάκις γὰρ παρρησία μὲν ἀκαίρος ἔβλαψε τὴν ἀλήθειαν, μεταχειρισμὸς δὲ εὐκαίρος κατώρθωσε τὸ προκείμενον (Com. in Acta ad 22.30; 23.1-5 [PG 118:276a-b]). This interpreter’s observation stems from his assumption that, as he remarks in another context, οἱ ἀπόστολοι εἰς παρρησίαν ἀλείφονται, “the apostles were trained in freedom of speech” (Com. in Acta ad 5.29-
feigned ignorance (προσποιεῖν ἄγνοιαν) before the high priest is not harmful, but rather sustaining.24 “For because he knew that he had to cover his just anger and to conceal his just indignation, as though changing his mind he says, ‘I did not know he was the high priest,’ although he knew.”25

In the worlds of both the narrative of Acts and its readers, Luke appears to have Paul offer an ironic response to the bystanders in order to undercut the authority of the high priest. Yet this ironic albeit forcefully aimed rebuke, because it is also rhetorically figured, leaves open the possibility for Luke (and his character Paul) to deny any attempt to subordinate this so-called ἀρχοντα τοῦ λαοῦ, “ruler of the people” (23.5).

2. Ananias as Ruler of the People

Is it also ironic that Paul applies the designation ἀρχων τοῦ λαοῦ to the high priest?26 It is important to notice that in his quotation of LXX Exod 22.27 the Lukan Paul has changed the plural ἀρχοντας to the singular ἀρχοντα.27 It appears that from Luke’s perspective there is only one ruler to whom Christians must submit and abstain from defaming, and it is not the high

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31 [PG 118:117b]). And as he indicates in his comments upon 23.1-5, he regards at least Paul to have been trained also in figured speech.

24 Ἀλλὰ προσποιεῖται ἄγνοιαν οὐ βλάπτουσαν, ἀλλ' οἰκονομοῦσαν (Com. in Acta ad 22.30; 23.1-5 [PG 118:276a]). Cf. Quintilian, Inst. 9.2.61.

25 Εἰδὼς γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ καὶ θυμὸν δίκαιον περιστέλλειν, καὶ ἀγανάκτησιν δικαίαν καλύπτειν, ὥσπερ μεταμελήθεις λέγει: Ὑπὲρ μεταμελήθεις λέγει. Οὕτως ἕκε σὺ ἐστὶν ἀρχιερεύς, καίτοι εἰδὼς (Com. in Acta ad 22.30; 23.1-5 [PG 118:276a]).

26 Cf. Chrysostom (Hom. in Acta 48.2 [PG 60:336]), Haenchen (Acts, 638), and Gaventa (Acts, 314) hold that by quoting Exod 22.27 Paul is showing that he is not speaking ironically.

27 Note, however, that LXX A does have the singular ἀρχοντα. Yet this reading was probably influenced by the text of Acts rather than vice versa. Cf. Barrett, Acts, 2.1062. See also Eccl 10.20: καὶ γε ἐν συνειδήσει σου βασιλέα μὴ καταράσῃ, καὶ ἐν ταμιείσῃ κοιτῶν σου μὴ καταράσῃ πλούσιον· διτ πετεινόν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀποίσει σὺν τὴν φωνῆν, καὶ ὁ ἐχον τὰς πτέρυγας ἀπαγγελεῖ λόγον. Luke of course has no qualms about cursing the rich (e.g., Luke 6.24). And the prominent motif of Jesus’ kingship (e.g., 19.38), together with the implicit notion that one can serve only one (e.g., 16.13; 19.31-34), essentially subverts the authority of any rival ruler.
priest. While Ananias presumes to sit in judgment (κρίνειν, 23.3), he is obviously not privy to Peter’s claim before Cornelius that God had ordained Christ as “judge [κριτής] of the living and the dead” (10.42).²⁸

Paul himself identifies the system of divine justice that overrides the office of the high priest when, in response to that character’s order to strike (τύπτειν, 23.2) him, he foretells the ensuing judgment Ananias is to receive, “God is about to strike [τύπτειν] you” (23.3). That the high priest is to undergo such a punishment is evidence that he cannot justifiably claim what Paul does in the same statement that moved Ananias to order the blow upon him—namely, to have lived out his citizenship in God (πεπολιτεύεσθαι τῷ θεῷ, 23.1). We know that the common usage of πολιτεύεσθαι conveys the notion of living as a citizen within the state. And scholars have pointed out that Luke here uses πολιτεύεσθαι in a religious sense, as he qualifies it with τῷ θεῷ. Yet is this description of Paul’s religious life also politically charged? We may see the political connotations not only within the verb itself, but also in the fact that Luke has the tribune in the previous scene relate to Paul that he purchased his Roman πολιτεία.²⁹

That Ananias responds so vehemently to an otherwise innocuous opening statement is perhaps indicative of the political gravity in Paul’s words. The solution Erasmus offers for the high priest’s anger is that Paul neglects to open his defense with the customary praise of the judge (e.g., Quintilian, Inst. 4.1.5-16) and instead speaks instantly about his own innocence, which condemns the judicial position of the high priest and implies that God alone judges rightly.³⁰ Consistent with this courtroom imagery, Ananias might also understand Paul’s usage of

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²⁹ Cf. 2 Macc 6.1; and the comments by Haenchen, Acts, 637; and Johnson, Acts, 396.
³⁰ Erasmus, Para. in Acta 23.1-2 (LB 7:754e). Cf. Quintilian, Inst. 4.1.11; and the notes by Robert D. Sider in Paraphrase on the Acts of the Apostles (CWE 50; Toronto: University of
συνείδησις in this opening of his defense as a reference to the judge within his soul—a personification of the “conscience” that appears among other ancient authors. If we can apply such a nuance here, then Paul’s mention of his πᾶσα συνείδησις ἀγαθή, “fully good conscience,” would imply that he has already been examined and found innocent, and that before a “good” and hence better judge than the high priest.


See, e.g., conscientia in Rhet. Her. 2.5.8; Quintilian, Inst. 5.11.41; ἐλεγχος and συνειδος in Philo, Decal. 82-91; Fug. 118 (where ἐλεγχος is the personified ἄρχησεις and βασιλευς acting as judge over the soul), 131, 211; and further examples discussed by Hans-Josef Klauck, “Ein Richter im eigenen Innern: Das Gewissen bei Philo von Alexandrien,” in Alte Welt und neuer Glaube: Beiträge zur Religionsgeschichte, Forschungsgeschichte und Theologie des Neuen Testaments (NTOA 29; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), 33-58. That Luke has Paul utter the term συνείδησις in this scene may also reflect his attempt to use language characteristic of the Pauline (Rom 2.15; 9.1; 13.5; 1 Cor 8.7, 10, 12; 10.25, 27-29; 2 Cor 1.12; 4.2; 5.11) and possibly the Deutero-Pauline (1 Tim 1.5, 19; 3.9; 2 Tim 1.3; and Tit 1.15) letters. See also Pervo, Dating Acts, 240-41.

There is a question about the period during which the Lukan Paul claims to have lived out his citizenship in God. Johnson claims that Paul “nowhere suggests (notwithstanding 1 Tim 1:13-15) that his behavior on either side of his conversion was ever motivated by anything other than ‘zeal for God’” (Acts, 396). While the epistolary Paul certainly does recollect his drive to persecute in terms of religious zeal (Gal 1.13-14; Phil 3.6), it is difficult to rectify that former zeal with his present convictions; like the Lukan Paul (Acts 22.6-16; 26.12-18), he regards those past motives as erroneous in light of his current position (Phil 3.7-9). That these Pauls were zealous both before and after their conversions is clear. Yet they do not recollect and describe their past conduct as having continuity with that of the present. The continuous state from the past “until this day” (ἄχρι ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας), which is conveyed also by the perfect πεπολίτευμαι (Acts 23.1), begins post-conversion (cf. 1 Tim 1.12-17). Cf. Denis the Carthusian, who assumes that Paul’s claim to have a clear conscience is a tempore quo ad Christum conversus est, “from the time that he was converted to Christ” (Enarrat. Act. ad 23.1 [Opera 14.1:203]). On ζηλωτης της θεος (Acts 22.3), cf. Musonius Rufus 37 (Lutz, 134); and Epictetus, Diatr. 2.14.13. See also Lake and Cadbury, Beginnings, 4:279; Conzelmann, Acts, 186; Fitzmyer, Acts, 705; and Pervo, Acts, 563, note 39.

164
Is it also possible that Paul’s claim to citizenship τῷ θεῷ implicitly indicts the high priest for situating himself within and expressing his loyalty to a different πολιτεία, that is, Rome? We do know from Josephus that, in the first Jewish revolt against Rome, Ananias maintained a pro-Roman policy even unto the point of death at the hands of Jewish insurgents. The strongest indication within Acts that Ananias may submit to Roman authority appears when he later has a Roman rhetor, Tertullus, make a case against Paul before the governor Felix (24.1-9)—a speech that opens with praise and gratitude for the pax Romana (πολλὴ εἰρήνη) and for the governor’s foresight (πρόνοια) in implementing reforms (διορθώματα) for the nation (24.2-3).

Yet even within the context of Paul’s appearance before the Sanhedrin, Luke shows that just as Ananias has the authority to give orders (ἐπιτάσσειν and κελεύειν, 23.2-3) to the bystanders, he and the other ἀρχιερεῖς are also under the authority of the Roman tribune, from whom they receive orders (κελεύειν, 22.30) to convene for Paul’s examination. The possibility that Luke views the high priests and the Sanhedrin as politically loyal to Rome is seen also in his depiction of their unlawful tendencies as mirroring those of their Roman overlords. The tribune—who orders (κελεύειν, 22.24) Paul to undergo examination by scourging—directly parallels the high priest who orders Paul to receive a blow to the mouth. This rhetorical juxtaposition—showing the parallel opposition from both the Roman and the Jewish authorities—is perhaps one way Luke conveys this political alliance without overtly stating it.

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33 Josephus, B.J. 2.426, 429, 441-42. See also Bruce, Acts (1988), 425.
34 On the notion πολλὴ εἰρήνη or magna pax within a nation or state, see, e.g., Xenophon, Cyr. 6.1.18; Cicero, Phil. 7.23; Diodorus Siculus 11.38.1; and Plutarch, Mor. 408b. Cf. LXX Isa 54.13; and esp. Ps 118.161-65, where the poet declares that even though ἄρχοντες pursue her or him without cause (118.161), there is εἰρήνη πολλὴ τοῖς ἀγαπώσιν τὸν νόμον σου, “great peace for those who love your law” (118.165). See also 2 Macc 4.6.
3. Paul’s Appeals to his Pharisaism (Acts 23.6; 26.5)

If the Lukan Paul is figuring his speech when addressing the high priest and the bystanders in 23.1-5, does he continue to do so in the second part of this defense, and particularly in the claim, “I am a Pharisee” (23.6)? We have reason to suspect that he might, since he later states before Agrippa, “I lived as a Pharisee” (26.5).

Paul’s defense before Agrippa is largely presented as autobiographical, and within it he makes a sharp distinction between his pre-conversion (26.2-11) and post-conversion life (26.12-23), explaining that the experience on the way to Damascus was the turning point. About his pre-conversion life, he claims more fully that “according to the strictest sect of our religion, I lived as a Pharisee [ἔζησα Φαρισαῖος]” (26.5). Because Paul here speaks about his past life, there is no reason to understand the aorist verb ἔζησα as anything other than a simple past. Would this use of the verb then mean that Paul is no longer a Pharisee? It is granted that such a use of the simple past would not necessarily exclude the possibility of his living as a Pharisee in the present. One may after all refer to an identity assumed in the past and simply not mention that he or she still lives accordingly in the present. Yet Paul’s former religious life, as he describes it, included locking up many Christians in prisons (φυλακαί), supporting the decision to execute them, torturing them in synagogues (συναγωγαί) in the attempt to make them blaspheme, and pursuing (διώκειν) them even unto remote cities (26.10-11).

36 Cf. Schmithals: “Er ist—nicht er war (so Paulus selbst Phil. 3,5ff.)—Pharisäer; sein christlicher Glaube ist die folgerichtige Konsequenz seines fortdauernden Judentums” (Apostelgeschichte, 225); Gowler, who holds that the aorist ἔζησα in 26.5 “is used in a gnomic, culminative, or dramatic sense” and that “Paul is still very much a Pharisee” (Host, 295); and Jervell: “Nicht nur, dass er Pharisäer war, sondern dass er einer ist, 23, 6” (Apostelgeschichte, 591).

37 See also Acts 9.1: Ὁ δὲ Σαῦλος ἔτι ἐμπνέων ἀπειλῆς καὶ φόνου εἰς τούς μαθητὰς τοῦ κυρίου, “But Saul, still breathing threat and murder against the disciples of the Lord.”
Correspondingly, when Paul defends himself to the crowd in Jerusalem (22.1-21), the statement about his education “at the feet of Gamaliel” (22.3) provides the basis for why he “pursued [διώκειν] the way to the point of death, binding and handing over [παραδιδόναι] men and women to prisons [φυλακαί]” (22.4). And in this speech as well, the account about his journey to Damascus serves as the turning point from the period when he “imprisoned [φυλακίζειν] and beat the believers [πιστεύοντες] throughout the synagogues [συναγωγαί]” (22.19). This evidence strongly suggests that, while Paul remains Jewish in both ethnicity and practice after his encounter on the road to Damascus (e.g., 18.18; 21.39; 22.3; 24.11, 14-15, 17), he now belongs to a movement that is also thoroughly Jewish yet distinct from the sect of the Pharisees. 38 On the day after his defense in Jerusalem (22.30), why then does Paul say to the Sanhedrin, “I am a Pharisee” (23.6)?

As we saw in chapter one, figured speech can sometimes offer “a secure [ἀσφαλής] display of what will be said before the free speech [παρρησία] that is later to be said, forestalling the distress of its hearing” (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ars Rhet. 2.9.7). Might this rhetorical instruction

38 If Luke had access to the letters of Paul, he probably knew that Paul never abandoned his Jewish identity (e.g., Rom 11.1; 2 Cor 11.22). The epistolary Paul does, however, describe his Pharisaism as conjoined with his active role in persecuting the church and thus most likely a former identity: κατὰ νόμον Φαρισαίος, κατὰ ζήλος διώκων τὴν ἐκκλησίαν (Phil 3.5-6). Saldarini observes that “Luke’s idea that Paul could be a Pharisee and a Christian and that there were Christians who remained Pharisees is very unlikely, especially granted all the conflicts with Jewish authorities and teaching recounted in Acts and alluded to in Paul’s letters. The Pharisees were a political interest group with a program for living Judaism and any interpretation of Christianity, no matter how Jewish, would have found itself in conflict with them” (Pharisees, Scribes and Sadducees, 186). As Luke presents it, according to Alan F. Segal, “Paul’s conversion is best defined in terms of the Pharisaic Jewish community he left behind and the gentile Christian community he joined” (Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990], 11). Even though Martin Hengel dates Luke and Acts earlier than what many scholars now hold, he does nevertheless seem to be correct that Christianity, at least for the first hundred years of its existence, was a movement within Judaism (“Early Christianity as a Jewish-Messianic, Universalistic Movement,” in Conflicts and Challenges in Early Christianity [ed. Donald A. Hagner; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1999], 1-41).
explain why in one instance Paul claims that he is a Pharisee in the present and then in another that he lived as a Pharisee in the past? It is striking that in the same speech before Agrippa, where he says, “I lived as a Pharisee” (26.5), he can also claim to be speaking freely (παρρησιαζόμενος λαλῶ, 26.26). Is Paul therefore lying when he earlier says to the council, “I am a Pharisee” (23.6)? Or to speak in rhetorical terms, is he saying the opposite of what is true, that is, using irony? If he had used ἤμην instead of εἰμί, we would not be asking this question. But if he had used ἤμην, the outcome of his examination would likely not have been the same.39

It appears that there is no indication that anyone among the Sanhedrin will support Paul and that he thus appeals to his Pharisaism as a way out. If we can believe Josephus that the Sadducees would often submit to the tenets of the Pharisees in order to appease the masses (Ant. 18.17), then perhaps Paul assumes that the latter party will win the debate and therefore chooses to side with them over a shared theological belief, namely, the “resurrection of the dead.”40 His

39 We must distinguish our question here from Hyam Maccoby’s view that in Acts 23.1-10 Paul’s “claim to be still a Pharisee was simply a lie, and if his real views had been known, the Pharisees would certainly not have supported him” (Mythmaker, 166). Maccoby holds that the historical Paul never was a Pharisee (Mythmaker, 50-61, 156-71; and Paul and Hellenism [London: SCM Press / Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991], 129-54), while we are asking whether Paul, as Luke depicts him, was a Pharisee only until his conversion to the Christian sect.

40 As Chrysostom explains, Paul says he is a Pharisee, ὡστε αὐτοῦς ἐπισπάσασθαι “so as to draw them in” (Hom. in Acta 49.2 [PG 60:341]). Cf. Josephus, B.J. 2.166; Ant. 13.288, 297-98, 401-02. Even though the Sanhedrin in Acts 22.30-23.10 most resembles what scholars call “the political Sanhedrin,” Luke might also be taking into account that the Sanhedrin of his day, the so-called “religious Sanhedrin,” was predominantly Pharisaic (cf. Gamaliel’s influence in 5.33-40). Smallwood summarizes the differences between the two councils: “the Sanhedrin to which Josephus frequently refers was a political council with judicial functions, meeting under the presidency of the Hasmonaean Priest-kings and later of the High Priests; the Great Sanhedrin of seventy or seventy-one members to which the Mishnah and Talmud frequently refer was a separate body with primarily religious and legislative functions, though it had some rarely used judicial powers also, and, unlike the other, survived the fall of the Temple in A.D. 70. The political Sanhedrin tended to be Sadducaean, while the religious Sanhedrin, after some vicissitudes, had developed into a predominantly Pharisaean body under Pharisaean presidency before the end of the Hasmonaean period and was later the preserve of the rabbis” (The Jews
appeal to this controversial theological issue thus divides the council and seems to distract them from the prior accusation (23.6-8). Accordingly, the Pharisees appear to have forgotten why Paul was under examination in the first place and may wish to acquit him simply to spite the Sadducees—as the Pharisees assert, “we find nothing wrong in this fellow” (23.9; cf. Luke 23.4, 14-15, 22; Acts 26.31). Yet while Paul is successful in turning the conflict away from himself and in winning the support of the Pharisees, he escapes not because the members of that sect rescue him, but rather when the tribune and his soldiers deliver him from the crossfire between the two factions of the council (23.10).

From an ethical point of view, however, would Luke endorse lying as a means to escape a potentially dangerous situation? While Luke clearly shows in the episode about Ananias and Sapphira that the act of lying (ψεύδεσθαι) to the Holy Spirit or to God is a serious and even satanic transgression (Acts 5.3-4), he here makes a distinction between lying ἀνθρώπως, “to humans,” and τῷ θεῷ, “to God” (5.4; cf. 5.29). There is nothing here or elsewhere in Luke-Acts

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42 Despite the fact that Paul instigates this στάσις (23.10), the scene ultimately validates what the Lukan Jesus claims in the Beelzebul controversy—namely, that a house divided against itself will not stand (Luke 11.17). Cf. Pervo, *Acts*, 575. Having previously learned that Paul was a Roman (22.25-29), the tribune fears (ὁρεῖσθαι, 22.29; 23.10) that Paul will suffer harm under his custody and thus that he will be responsible for Paul’s unjust treatment. Cf. Theophylact, *Exp. in Acta ad* 23.10 (PG 125:804c).
that would lead us to rule out the possibility that Luke’s protagonists might use deception as a means to ensure the fulfillment of the divine plan, when facing opponents of that plan.\footnote{Bengel famously claims that Paul’s stratagem here is \textit{divide et impera} (\textit{Gnomon [ad Acta 23.6]}). Alongside what Gaventa also views as “a ‘divide and conquer’ technique that is highly manipulative” in Acts 23.6, she calls our attention to “Luke’s praise of the dishonest manager who acts shrewdly in a context of crisis (see Luke 16:1-9)” (\textit{Acts}, 315).}

Plato argues that while “falsehood in words” (τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος) is of no use to God (\textit{Resp}. 382d-383c), it can be useful to humans who attend to the welfare of others. Physicians, for instance, may justifiably lie to their patients in order to promote and ensure their health. And likewise it is appropriate (προσήκειν) for rulers at times to lie to their citizens for the benefit of the city (\textit{Resp}. 389b).\footnote{Nietzsche affirms Plato’s point in his “Description of Ancient Rhetoric,” in \textit{Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language} [edited and translated by Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and David J. Parent; New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989], 9). He expounds upon this idea more fully in his essay, “On Truth and Lying,” in ibid., 246-57. There he argues that humans are by nature not averse to being deceived, as long as such deception is free of harmful consequences (ibid., 248, 255). “Everything that sets man off from the animal,” he states, “depends upon this capacity to dilute the concrete metaphors into a schema; for in the realm of such schemata, something is possible that might never succeed under the intuited first impressions” (ibid., 250). Cf. Plato, \textit{Soph.} 236e-241e: 260c-266e. See also Machiavelli’s argument that a prince must know well how “to be a great pretender and dissembler” (\textit{The Prince} [trans. Harvey C. Mansfield; 2nd ed.; Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998], 70).} The noble lie is justified in both of these examples because the patients and citizens would otherwise, in response to hearing the truth, choose or continue along a course of action that would bring harm to themselves.\footnote{Cf. Mark D. Given’s study where he demonstrates that the epistolary Paul “had even more incentive than Socrates to deceive the deceived in order to lead them to the Truth” (\textit{Paul’s True Rhetoric: Ambiguity, Cunning, and Deception in Greece and Rome} [Emory Studies in Early Christianity 7; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 2001], 34).}

Lucian echoes Plato’s point at the beginning of his \textit{Lover of Lies}, where the character Tychiades differentiates those who “lie for the sake of advantage” (τῆς χρείας ἑνεκα ψεύδεσθαι) from those who lie “without any advantage” (ἄνευ τῆς χρείας) or toward no practical end. The former, Tychiades says, are even “worthy of praise” for their advantageous falsehood (\textit{Philops.})
The author of the treatise *On Forceful Speaking*, which appears within the Hermogenic Corpus, affirms this point by explaining that an orator will lie to his hearers, even when they know he is lying, under the following condition: “Whenever the falsehood is beneficial to the hearers; for they will not refute the rhetor because of what is to their own advantage.”\(^{47}\)

While Luke does not imply that the Pharisees recognize Paul as lying for their own benefit, he does indicate immediately after the skirmish with the Sanhedrin (23.11) and in the larger context (19.21; 25.10; 27.24) that Paul must make it to Rome alive—a mission that will prove beneficial and even salvific for both Jews and Gentiles (9.15; 26.17-18, 23; 28.20, 28).

We also notice a close parallel between Stephen’s *exordium* before the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem (Ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί καὶ πατέρες, ἀκούσατε, 7.2) and Paul’s in his own defense in Jerusalem (Ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί καὶ πατέρες, ἀκούσατε μου τής πρὸς ὑμᾶς νυνὶ ἀπολογίας, 22.1), as well as that now in his own appearance before the Sanhedrin (ἀνδρεῖς ἀδελφοί, 23.1). Perhaps these parallels show Luke’s readers that Paul must tread these waters carefully. Because Paul was present at the death of Stephen (7.58; 8.1; 22.20), he would surely know that there may be consequences for speaking too freely and truthfully to this council. And on the day after his...
appearance before the Sanhedrin, the fact that Paul’s Jewish opponents bind themselves by an oath to kill him (23.12) underscores the danger he faces. Thus, on a narrative level, Paul’s act of lying to the Sanhedrin appears to buy him some time and to support the divine plan that he seeks to fulfill.

Furthermore, that Luke would portray Paul as resorting to falsehood in order to make visible the divine purpose is a notion he may learn, at least in part, from the epistolary Paul himself in Rom 3.1-8. There Paul explains that some make a slanderous charge against him and his coworkers—namely, that they profess, “let us do evil so that good may come” (Rom 3.8). Despite this charge, Paul explains, human falsehood nonetheless makes manifest the truthfulness of God (3.4, 7). In this diatribe between Paul and an imaginary Jewish interlocutor, the three conditional clauses Paul introduces with εἰ are in this context all considered factual (3.3, 5, 7), just as the three questions that follow them, which he introduces with μή, anticipate negative answers (3.3, 5, 8). It is true, according to the argument, that “some were unfaithful” (3.3) and that “our injustice displays the justice of God” (3.5) and that “by my lie [ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ψεύσματι] the truth of God abounds for his glory” (3.7). While the epistolary Paul does not use these principles as a license to sin (3.8), in Acts 23.6 the Lukan Paul perhaps paradoxically embodies the words of the Jewish interlocutor (just as he identifies with the Pharisees among the Sanhedrin) of Rom 3.4a: “Let God become truthful, and every human a liar [ψεύστης].” The interlocutor supports this declaration by quoting LXX Ps 50.6: “so that you may be justified by

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48 Pervo remarks: “If Luke knew of any Pauline letters, Romans and 1 Corinthians would be leading candidates, for these enjoyed the widest early currency.” Romans in particular, he adds, “offered a picture of a Paul in pursuit of peace and eager to place himself in a good light with believers who were more observant of Torah” (Dating Acts, 55).

49 We may see here an instance in which Paul becomes an interpreter of himself, a phenomenon that Mitchell sees in the Corinthian correspondence (Paul, the Corinthians, passim).
your words [ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σου] and prevail when you are judged [κρίνεσθαι]” (3.4b). The interlocutor’s point that one is justified by words spoken, even though they are false, Paul affirms in 3.7; but there he also uses this point to refute the grounds upon which, he states, “I am being judged [κρίνομαι] as a sinner.”

This prominent theme of judgment in Rom 3.1-8—which Paul conveys through κρίνεσθαι (3.4; Ps 50.6) and then κρίνομαι (3.7) and κρίμα (3.8)—is also especially noticeable in the scene from Acts, where the high priest sits κρίνων, “judging,” Paul (23.3; cf. 24.21; 25.9-10, 20; 25.25; 26.6). Just as the Lukan Paul appeals to the Pharisaic segment of his audience, “concerning the hope and resurrection of the dead I am being judged [κρίνομαι]” (23.6), so the epistolary Paul questions the reasons for his condemnation, “why am I still being judged as a sinner [κρίνομαι]?” (3.7). These correspondences between the narrative in Acts and Paul’s argument in Romans (which may be a source for Luke) suggest that the Lukan Paul, in his trial before the Sanhedrin, could ask with the epistolary Paul: “And if by my lie the truth of God abounds for his glory, why am I still being judged as a sinner [κρίνομαι]?” (3.7). In this sense, if Paul is lying when he says “I am a Pharisee,” the lie would abound for the glory of God (Rom 3.7; cf. Acts 22.11; 26.18, 23)—specifically because this falsehood allows him to avoid the type of execution he saw Stephen suffer and thus to continue his divinely appointed journey to Rome, as the Lord, on the night after Paul escaped, assures him that he will do (23.11).50

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50 Τῇ δὲ ἐπιούσῃ νυκτὶ ἐπιστὰς αὐτῷ ὁ κύριος εἶπεν· θάρσει· ὡς γὰρ διεμαρτύρω τὰ περὶ ἑμοῦ εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, οὕτω σε δεῖ καὶ εἰς Ῥώμην μαρτυρῆσαι, “Now on the following night the Lord stood by him and said: ‘Do not fear! For as you have borne testimony about me in Jerusalem, so must you testify in Rome’” (Acts 23.11). Cf. Josephus, Vita 189-209, where Josephus’ conflict with the political leadership of his fellow Jews from Jerusalem, including the Pharisees (190-197), culminates in the following dream: “Now during that night [Διὰ δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς ἐκείνης] I had a marvelous sort of dream. For when I went to bed, grieved and shaken up because of the letter, I supposed that someone was standing beside me saying [τίνα λέγειν ἐπιστάντα μοι]: ‘Cease from this anguish in your soul, O man, and let go of all fear [παντὸς δ’]...
It is notable that Chrysostom and Theophylact, in their comments upon Acts 23.6, both claim that Paul is not lying in the assertion “I am a Pharisee.” According to them, Paul can appeal to his Pharisaic identity because of his “parents” (πρόγονοι), pointing out the qualification that he is “a son of Pharisees.” One potential problem in this interpretation, however, is that one does not necessarily remain a member of a sect simply because he or she was born into it or even otherwise was nurtured within it at an early period of life.

Calvin appears somewhat hesitant, although he is at least willing to grant that in Paul’s defense before the Sanhedrin he displays “artifice” (stratagema) and “craftiness” (astutia), which Calvin explains, “was closely related to deceit [simulatio], which was not very far from a lie [mendacium].” Yet in the end, he claims that Paul “nevertheless did not lie [mentior].” Calvin does, however, assume that when Paul addresses the Sanhedrin he was not still a member of the sect of the Pharisees. As he explains, Paul declares that he is a Pharisee only insofar as the teaching about the resurrection of the dead (23.6) and angels and spirits are concerned (23.8).

This point is important, for it shows that Paul’s speech in this scene may be only a partial lie, or in other words an attempt to display only some of the truth in order to manipulate his audience. It is noticeable that Paul says nothing about “the resurrection” of Christ in particular,

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51 Chrysostom, Hom. in Acta 49.1 (PG 60:337); and Theophylact, Exp. in Acta ad 23.8 (PG 125:804a). On Chrysostom’s exegesis here, see Mitchell, Heavenly Trumpet, 236.
52 Calvin, Com. in Acta ad 23.6 (OE 12.2:234). Calvin explains that Paul is actually being examined for much more than the matter of resurrection of the dead—that is, he is also charged with abrogating the ceremonies and for admitting the Gentiles to the covenant of salvation.
53 Calvin, Com. in Acta ad 23.8 (OE 12.2:237-38). Although Kingsbury accounts for Paul’s claim to be a Pharisee only as an aspect of his “clever ability” rather than his willingness to lie in particular, he does nevertheless observe: “Paul, in calling himself a Pharisee, does not confess the resurrection from the dead of Jesus Christ but simply affirms a general, end-time resurrection of the dead (Acts 23,6)” (“The Pharisees in Luke-Acts,” 1507-08).
which indeed would not win him favor with his Pharisaic hearers. In his later free speech before Agrippa, however, he can speak about Christ as “the first from the resurrection of the dead” (26.23; cf. 17.18; 24.21). Accordingly, Paul’s claim, “I am a Pharisee,” may not be a full irony (i.e., the complete opposite would be οὐκ εἰμί; the full truth ἦμην); but it is also not fully candid.

Interpreters from Chrysostom to Calvin do not otherwise indicate why they defend Paul against lying in his statement, “I am a Pharisee.” Yet one clue surfaces among some of the same interpreters, as well as others, when they defend Paul also against the charge of lying about his Roman citizenship, since in one instance Paul claims to have been born (γεγεννήσθαι) in Tarsus of Cilicia (22.3) and then shortly after this statement to have been born (γεγεννήσθαι) a Roman citizen (22.28).54 The fact that Porphyry dubs Paul a liar on these grounds may be indicative of why such defenses exist.55 It is therefore possible that some readers of Acts, in their attempts to

54 Cf. Cicero, Leg. 2.5; and Josephus, C. Ap. 2.38-42. According to Chrysostom (Hom. in Acta 47.1; 48.1 [PG 60:326, 333-34]), Paul could legitimately call himself “Roman,” even though some say that citizens within the provinces were not called “Romans” until the reign of Hadrian. Cf. Sherwin-White, “Roman Citizenship,” ANRW I.2:44-45. Ammonius (Frag. in Acta ad 22.28 [PG 85:1588d-1589a]), Pseudo-Oecumenius (Com. in Acta ad 21.39, 40; 22.1-29 [PG 118:269d-273b]), and Theophylact (Exp. in Acta ad 22.29 [PG 125:800c-d]) develop this point and explain that Paul’s Roman citizenship does not require his birth to have taken place in the city of Rome and thus account for his Roman citizenship on the grounds that Cilicia was under Roman rule at the time of his birth. So also, Isho’dad states, “for Tarsus was a city of the Romans” (Com. Acts 20; trans. Gibson, 4:32). Calvin explains: “certain people in the provinces were granted citizenship, if they were in good merit with the State, either in war or in other important affairs, and requested this reward for themselves from the proconsuls. So there is nothing absurd about one, being a Roman citizen by birth, who was nevertheless born in a remote province and may have never set foot in Italy” (Com. in Acta ad 22.28 [OE 12.2:227-28]). On the motif of Paul as a Roman citizen in Acts, see also 16.37-39; 22.25-29; 23.27; 25.1-12; 26.30-32; 28.17-19; and the discussion in Sherwin-White, Roman Society and Roman Law, 144-62; Rapske, Paul in Roman Custody, 83-90; as well as the proposals by Wolfgang Stegemann, “War der Apostel Paulus ein römischer Bürger?” ZNW 78 (1987): 200-29; and Peter van Minnen, “Paul the Roman Citizen,” JSNT 56 (1994): 43-52.

55 Porphyry, Contra Chr. 28 (Makar. III.31). He concludes: ψεύστης οὖν καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ σύντροφος, καὶ περιττὸν τὸ λέγειν· Ἀλήθειαν λέγω ἐν Χριστῷ, οὐ ψεύδομαι. “Therefore he is a liar and a foster-brother of the conspicuous lie, and it is superfluous to say: ‘I am speaking the truth in Christ, I am not lying’ [Rom 9.1].” Yet to accuse an opponent of lying is
refute Christianity, noted the discrepancy between Paul’s use of the present tense in Acts 23.6 and that of the aorist (as a simple past) in 26.5 and on that basis sought to invalidate Paul’s influence. From Luke’s perspective, however, it appears that such a difference would not delegitimize the authority of Paul; it would rather display the rhetorical prowess that serves to accomplish the mission to which he was called. Only as he moves closer to Rome can he declare freely and with full honesty that he lived as a Pharisee (26.5).

4. The Lukan Paul and his Alleged Roman Citizenship

The question of whether the Lukan Paul was lying also about his Roman citizenship is itself a puzzle, although it would be quite difficult if not impossible to prove in either direction. What we can suggest is that Paul’s appeal to his Pharisaism and to his Roman citizenship serve as a pair not only in the history of interpretation, but also in the narrative itself. First of all, these appeals work concurrently in order to ensure Paul’s arrival in Rome. His statement that he is a Pharisee protects him from meeting his death at the hands of fellow Jews before his mission to Rome is realized (23.10-15). And his appeal to Roman citizenship is itself a ticket he uses in order to achieve a safer passage to that city (25.11-12, 21; 26.32-27.1).

Moreover, by successfully defending himself as a “Roman” to the Roman centurion and tribune in the first instance (22.25-29) and as a “Pharisee” before Pharisees in the second (23.6-10), the Lukan Paul rings true the claim of the epistolary Paul in his capacity to become “all a charge that emerges even within Christian circles. See, e.g., the argument Eustathius makes against Origen, as analyzed by Margaret M. Mitchell, “Patristic Rhetoric on Allegory: Origen and Eustathius Put I K in the Early Church (translated with an introduction and notes by Rowan A. Greer and Mitchell; WGRW 16; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007), lxxv-cxxiii. 56 On how Chrysostom responds to a comparable issue in Galatians, see Margaret M. Mitchell. “Peter’s ‘Hypocrisy’ and Paul’s: Two ‘Hypocrites’ at the Foundation of Earliest Christianity?” NTS 58 (2012): 213-234.
things to all people,” that is, to those “under the law” and those “outside the law” (1 Cor 9.19-23).\footnote{57} As interpreters have observed, Luke portrays Paul as more “Roman” than the tribune—since the tribune had to buy the citizenship Paul was born into—just as Paul in the next scene proves himself more devoted to Jewish law than the high priest.\footnote{58}

Just as Paul demonstrates his knowledge of Roman law by claiming that he was born a Roman citizen in order to escape the whipping (22.24-29), so before the Sanhedrin he appeals to his former training as a Pharisee (23.6), which education provided him with expertise in Jewish law. The expression υἱὸς Φαρισαίων, “son of Pharisees,” in 23.6 appears to be metaphorical for Paul’s training among that sect rather than a description of his biological parents’ religious affiliation.\footnote{59} For instance, when on the previous day Paul says that he is a Jew, born at Tarsus of


\footnote{58} According to Bede, Paul’s claim to have been born a Roman citizen is to say to the tribune, “I am more Roman than you” \textit{(Act. ad 22.28 [CCSL 121:88])}. That the tribune obtained his citizenship with much money, Isho’dad explains, “is to say that he was a Barbarian; and afterwards by a large bribe and with great trouble he was received into the Roman citizenship, because this was for great glory at that time, that a man should be called by the citizenship of Rome” \textit{(Com. Acts 20; trans. Gibson, 4:32)}. Similarly, Erasmus paraphrases Paul’s response to the tribune: “Indeed, in this respect my position is better. I was born a Roman citizen and the right of citizenship was passed on to me from my parents” \textit{(Para. in Acta ad 22.28 [LB 7:754d])}. On the buying and selling of Roman citizenship, see Cassius Dio 60.17.3-8; and the comments by Haenchen, \textit{Acts}, 632-35; Conzelmann, \textit{Acts}, 189-90; and Pervo, \textit{Acts}, 569, note 10. Cf. Cicero, \textit{Phil.} 5.11-12; and Tacitus, \textit{Ann.} 14.50.

\footnote{59} Cf. Luke 5.33; 11.19; Acts 9.15. Alternatively, Chrysostom \textit{(Hom. in Acta 49.1 [PG 60:337])} and Theophylact \textit{(Exp. in Acta ad 23.8 [PG 125:804a])} explain that Paul is not lying in the assertion “I am a Pharisee” but is rather claiming Pharisaic identity because of his “parents” \textit{(πρόγονοι)}—he is, as he qualifies, “a son of Pharisees.” Others also understand “a son of Pharisees” in the literal sense, including: Bruce, \textit{Acts} (1990), 465; and Johnson, \textit{Acts}, 397.
Cilicia, he addresses this Jewish audience as “siblings and fathers” (22.1). Among the autobiographical details Paul gives in this *exordium* of his speech (22.1-3), what is notably absent is the often prescribed naming of one’s parents. He does, however, mention that he was “brought up [ἀνατεθραμμένος] in this city” (i.e., Jerusalem rather than Tarsus) and that he was “educated [πεπαιδευμένος] at the feet of Gamaliel with precision in the ancestral [πατρῷος] law” (22.3).

The metaphor of teachers as parents is important both in 22.1-3 and 23.6 because it ties the idea of Paul’s educational engenderment, as it were, to his claim to have been born a Roman citizen. Paul was thus born into and nurtured within the realms of both Pharisaism and Roman imperialism. Could we then claim that, from Luke’s perspective, to be trained as a Pharisee is

60 Hermogenes (*Prog.* 15-16), Aphthonius (*Prog.* 22), and Nicolaus (*Prog.* 50-52) discuss the mention of one’s parents as a feature of encomium. Cf. Mitchell, *Heavenly Trumpet*, 240. Yet this detail of one’s γένος may appear within other genres of speech as well. With regard to Paul’s defense in Acts 22.1-21, see the comments by Parsons, *Acts*, 308-09. Yet we might restrict the *exordium* to 22.1 and thus identify the *narratio* in 22.3-21. As Nicolaus explains, the details of one’s γένος come μετὰ τὰ προοίμια, “after the parts of the *exordium*” (*Prog.* 50). Cf. Plutarch, *Alex.* 2.1. Luke himself indicates that the *exordium* is the sentence of 22.1 when he gives a brief commentary in 22.2 about the effectiveness of this opening—that is, Paul successfully gains the attention of his audience (cf. *Rhet. Her.* 1.7; Cicero, *Inv.* 1.20; and Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.5, as Parsons cites).

61 That the Lukan Paul was reared in Jerusalem may be a further indication as to why he persecuted Christians, as he then relates in Acts 22.3-4 (cf. 9.1-9; 26.9-18)—that is, he had learned the ways of the city that kills the prophets (e.g., Luke 13.34-35; 23.1-49; Acts 7.54-8.1). Because Jerusalem in Luke-Acts is a dangerous city for prophets and because Paul must go to Rome, after his conversion he claims to have heard in a vision, σπεύδον καὶ ἔξελθε ἐν τάχει ἐξ Ἰερουσαλήμ, διότι οὐ παραδέχονται σοῦ μαρτυρίαν περί ἐμοῦ (Acts 22.18). It is also important that Paul relates this vision within his speech delivered on the steps of the temple in Jerusalem (22.1-21). Cf. Acts 28.18. Commenting upon this resistance to Paul’s message in Jerusalem, Chrysostom remarks, ἐν τῇ Ἰουδαίᾳ, ἔνθα ὡς ἐν τυραννίδι ἦσαν, “in Judea it was as though they were in a tyranny” (*Hom. in Acta* 55.2 [PG 60:381]). So also Theophylact, *Exp. in Acta ad* 28.26 (PG 125:845c).

62 W. C. van Unnik convincingly demonstrates that γεγεννημένος and ἀνατεθραμμένος and πεπαιδευμένος in 22.3 constitute a triad that “forms a fixed literary unit,” which ancient authors use to describe the period of a person’s youth (*Tarsus or Jerusalem: The City of Paul’s Youth* [London: Epworth, 1962], 17-45, here 19). As van Unnik observes, Luke uses the same
also to learn political allegiance to Rome? Is the Lukan Paul a character who in his earlier years represented a union between “common Judaism” and Rome? The evidence is suggestive but inconclusive. At the very least, Paul can now exploit his former Pharisaism and Roman citizenship in order to reach his final destination (23.11).  

5. The Other Former Pharisees (Acts 15.5)

If the Lukan Paul was actually not a Pharisee and a Christian at the same time, then what might these results suggest more broadly about persons possibly having dual allegiances to each sect? Perhaps the most important pericope informing this question is that about the group in Acts 15.5, whom many scholars call “Christian Pharisees,” even though this designation does not appear in the text.  

One common rendering of the clause, τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν Φαρισαίων, is "some Pharisees, according to Acts 15:5, were even members of the Christian community” ("Jewish Contemporaries, 33). Carroll dubs them “believing Pharisees,” and “Christian Pharisees,” i.e., Pharisees “within the Christian movement (15:5), although they, more than the non-Christian Pharisees, pose an obstacle for the movement” ("Luke’s Portrayal of the Pharisees,” 606, 618-19). Moessner calls them “Pharisaic believers” ("Leaven of the Pharisees,” 42). Accordingly to Saldarini, “Acts especially treats Pharisees well,” partly because there is “one reference to Christian Pharisees” ("Pharisees, Scribes and Sadducees, 175"). Gowler assumes these Christians are still Pharisees at the moment they attempt to enforce circumcision and the Law of Moses in 15.5 and thus calls them “Pharisaic Christians” ("Host, 280-85"). Darr calls them “Pharisaic believers” as well as “believing Pharisees” ("Character Building, 120-22"). Kingsbury refers to them as “Christian Pharisees” ("The Pharisees in Luke-
πεπιστευκότες (Acts 15.5), could imply that these characters are simultaneously members of both sects—that is, “some believers who belonged to the sect of the Pharisees.” An alternative translation, however, might mean that these Pharisees had departed from their sect in order to join the other: “some who had come to believe from the sect of the Pharisees.” Is Luke intentionally ambiguous in referring to the religious identity of these characters?

To render the perfect participle πεπιστευκότες in 15.5 as “believers” may be misleading. We would of course apply this translation to the present participle πιστεύοντες, as in Acts 2.44; 5.14; and 22.19. Yet the perfect participle, when used in a sentence whose main verb already relates past action, functions as a pluperfect and thus relates action that occurred in the more

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66 Fitzmyer offers the same literal translation. He qualifies these characters as “Jewish Christians of Pharisaic background” (Acts, 545). Although he dubs these characters “converted Pharisees” and “former Pharisees,” he also curiously calls them “Christian Pharisees” (Ibid., 545-46).
Accordingly, πεπιστευκότες in 15.5 seems to convey the notion that this group had come to believe in the more distant past when they were among the Pharisees and continued to believe up until the more immediate past, that is, the time Luke relates in this scene of the narrative when they “rose up.” Is Luke’s point then that these characters belong to the sect of Christ followers and no longer to the sect of the Pharisees?

The preposition ἀπό may also be significant. When we compare Luke’s use of ἀπό to his use of ἐκ, it appears that he favors ἀπό when placing more emphasis upon departure, whereas he prefers ἐκ to highlight source. If this distinction applies in 15.5, then ἀπό might convey the idea of distancing “from” or even “away from” (i.e., disassociation) rather than the notion of “belonging to” or being “from” (i.e., association). When “one” and “some” are said to belong to a larger group in Luke-Acts, we typically see either the preposition ἐκ with a noun identifying the source “out of” which the smaller entity has emerged, yet to which it may still belong (e.g., τινὲς τῶν ἐκ τῆς συναγωγῆς, Acts 6.9); or we see a corresponding grammatical expression with

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67 Cf. other instances of the perfect as a pluperfect: ἠγαλλιάσατο πανοικεὶ πεπιστευκὼς τῷ θεῷ (Acts 16.34); συνεβάλετο πολύ τοῖς πεπιστευκόσιν διὰ τῆς χάριτος (18.27); πολλοὶ τε τῶν πεπιστευκότων ἤρχοντο (19.18); with Winer, Grammar, 430; and Burton, §156. When the main verb of the sentence or the narration is in the present tense, the perfect participle is translated as a perfect—e.g., θεωρεῖς, ἀδελφέ, πόσαι μυριάδες εἰσίν ἐν τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις τῶν πεπιστευκότων (21.20; to whom they refer back in 21.25).

68 Wikenhauser (Apostelgeschichte, 169-71) and Haenchen hold that these characters are former Pharisees and, as Haenchen further qualifies, “Pharisee converts” and “Pharisees turned Christian” (Acts, 444, 458, 463). Meeks and Wilken call them “former Pharisees” (Jews and Christians in Antioch, 17). Marshall similarly calls them “Christians who had been Pharisees in their pre-conversion days.” He adds: “There is nothing surprising about former Pharisees being converted—Paul was one himself—nor about their old attitudes carrying over” (Acts, 263). Contrast Bruce, who claims: “A Pharisee could add acceptance of Jesus as Messiah to his existing beliefs without ceasing to be a Pharisee” (Acts [1990], 334).

69 See this distinction, e.g., in the statements ἐὰν τις ἀπὸ νεκρῶν πορευθῇ πρὸς αὐτοῦ (Luke 16.30) and ἐὰν τις ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναστῇ (16.31).

70 See, e.g.: σώθητε ἀπὸ τῆς γενεᾶς τῆς σκολιᾶς ταύτης (Acts 2.40); τὸν ἀποστάντα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀπὸ Παμφυλίας (15.38). Cf. ἀπό in Luke 6.13, where its usage distinguishes the twelve from the general body of disciples, and in Acts 27.44, where it denotes dismembered pieces of the ship.
the source noun in the genitive and without a preposition (e.g., τινὲς δὲ τῶν Φαρισαίων, Luke 6.2) and sometimes with a participle of εἶναι (e.g., ὅπως ἐάν τινας εὑρή τῆς ὁδοῦ ὄντας, Acts 9.2).  

Luke frequently uses ἀπό, however, when an individual or group has literally departed (i.e., traveled) from one place to another, thus denoting distance, as in the expression τινὲς κατελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰουδαίας (15.1). From a syntactical point of view, an example that more closely parallels the phrase in 15.5 appears in Acts 25.7: οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰεροσολύμων καταβεβηκότες Ἰουδαῖοι, “the Jews who had gone down from Jerusalem.” Here Luke also combines the perfect participle (functioning as a pluperfect) with the preposition ἀπό. Yet in 15.5, rather than a participle conveying that this group had literally traveled from the sect of the Pharisees,

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71 See also: τινὲς δὲ ἔξω αὐτῶν (Luke 11.15); εἶς τις ἔξω αὐτῶν (22.50); γυναῖκες τινες ἔξω ἡμῶν (24.22); οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς πιστοὶ (Acts 10.45; 11.2); τινας ἄλλους ἔξω αὐτῶν (15.2); ἄνδρας ἔξω αὐτῶν (15.22); ἀδελφοῖς τις ἔξω ἡμῶν (15.23); τινες ἔξω ἡμῶν (15.24); τινος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τῶν Φαρισαίων (Luke 14.1); τινες τῶν Σαδδουκαίων (20.27); τινες τῶν γραμματέων (20.39); τινες τῶν γραμματέων τοῦ μέρους τῶν Φαρισαίων (Acts 23.9); and further examples with ἐκ (Luke 1.5; 8.27; 12.13; Acts 11.20; 17.4) and without (Luke 7.36; 11.45; 14.15; Acts 17.18; 19.13, 31; 23.23; 28.21).  

72 See also: ἄνδρες εὐλαβεῖς ἀπὸ παντὸς ἔθνους τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν οὐρανῶν (Acts 2.5); τινες τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῶν ἀπὸ Ἰόππης (Acts 10.23); κατήλθεν τις ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰουδαίας προφήτης (21.10); οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἁσιὰς Ἰουδαίοι (21.27); τινες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἁσιὰς Ἰουδαίοι (24.19). One exception to an otherwise fairly consistent distinction between ἀπὸ and ἐκ appears in Acts 12.1: ἐπέβαλεν Ἀρώδης ὁ βασιλεὺς τὰς χείρας κακὸποῦ τις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἕκκλησιας. It is possible that here Luke has adopted the informal use of ἀπὸ for ἐκ (cf. Zerwick, Biblical Greek, §87) in order to add a secondary nuance that shows the severity of Herod’s intentions to harm those from the church—i.e., to the point of driving them “away from the church.” The phrase ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκκλησίας to describe Herod’s opposition toward the church in Jerusalem may further contrast with the instrumental use of ἀπὸ in 15.4 when Paul, Barnabas, and others were welcomed ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκκλησίας, “by the church” in Jerusalem (cf. ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκκλησίας at 12.5; 15.3; and as a v.l. at 15.4 in Ψ 33. 1739. For the instrumental ἀπὸ, see also Luke 7.35; Acts 2.22; 4.36.
πεπιστευκότες in conjunction with ἀπό seems to relate how the group had converted from the sect of the Pharisees to that of the Christians.\(^73\)

Does their conversion then compare to “the conversion of the Gentiles” (15.3), about which they are now disputing (15.1-35)? It seems presupposed that their having believed (πιστεύειν, 15.5) was all that was required for their salvation, just as believing (πιστεύειν, 15.7; cf. 15.9, 11) is all that is required for Gentiles to receive salvation. Luke may also insinuate a comparison between these two conversions when James mentions οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἐπιστρέφοντες ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν, “the ones who are turning to God from the Gentiles” (15.19).

Furthermore, when Peter addresses these former Pharisees, he informs them that God is a καρδιογνώστης, “knower of hearts,” meaning perhaps that he knows whether persons show inner fidelity, regardless of outer religious expression—in this case, the circumcision of the foreskin (15.8-9; cf. 1.24). As Luke shows in his Gospel, Jesus had peered into the hearts of Pharisees (Luke 5.22; cf. 7.39-40) and in another context informed them, “God knows [γινώσκειν] your hearts [καρδίαι]” (16.15). Peter may be implying that God observes in these former Pharisees, as Stephen declared to the Sanhedrin, hearts that are uncircumcised (Acts 7.51)—while God has cleansed the hearts of Gentile converts (15.9).\(^74\)

\(^73\) Cf. the scene of the triumphal entry, where the preposition in the statement τινες τῶν Φαρισαίων ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου (Luke 19.39) might designate how those Pharisees departed from the crowd in opposition to the kingship of Jesus, which would thus distinguish them from “the whole multitude of the disciples” (19.37) who acclaim his kingship (19.38).

\(^74\) According to Calvin, there is here “an underlying tacit contrast [antity thesis], that humans are more devoted to external purity, because they make judgments based on their dull and earthly understanding. God, however, looks into hearts” (Com. in Acta ad 15.8 [OE 12.2:36]). In the statement that God has cleansed their hearts, Gaventa observes, “there is a wonderful irony with the Cornelius account, in which Peter claims not to eat anything that is common or unclean (10:9-16)” (Acts, 216).
Scholars have shown that Luke may have known about the controversy over whether to require the circumcision of Gentile converts at least in part from Paul’s argument in Galatians.\(^{75}\) If he was using Galatians as a source, to what extent does he rescript that controversy to suit his own purposes? And does he conflate the Judaizers of Galatians with these former Pharisees? Where Paul somewhat vaguely calls the Judaizing Christians \(ψευδάδελφοι\) and \(οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς\) (Gal 2.4, 12; cf. Rom 4.12; Col 4.11), Luke also calls them \(οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς\) (10.45; 11.2); but he may further elaborate upon their antagonism by asserting that they once belonged to the sect of the Pharisees.\(^{76}\)

Even though the former Pharisees do not deny that Gentiles can receive salvation, their attempt to require the circumcision of Gentile converts would impede the mission and thus the divine plan of salvation.\(^{77}\) While their opposition is here not as strong to deserve the designation

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\(^{77}\) Cf. Acts 11.17: \(εἰ οὖν τὴν ἴσην δωρεὰν ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν χριστόν, ἐγὼ τίς ἢμην δυνατὸς κωλύσαι τὸν θεόν;\) Tannehill (*Narrative Unity*, 2:185) remarks: “Putting God to the test by demanding that Gentiles obey the law is roughly equivalent to trying to ‘hinder’ God’s clear purpose, something that Peter recognized he could not do (11.17).”
“God-fighters” (cf. 15.10), there is at least an element of that former resistance that now becomes manifest in their unwillingness to accept God’s impartiality toward human persons.

The idea that God makes no distinction (οὐθὲν διακρίνειν) between Jews and Gentiles (15.9), as Peter informs them, is a lesson Peter had learned for himself and then related to others in the events surrounding the conversion of Cornelius (10.1-11.18, esp. 10.20, 34; 11.12). On the one hand, this opposition points forward to that which Peter faces at the Jerusalem council with the former Pharisees. And on the other, the charge that Peter entered the home of Cornelius and his household (εἰσελθεῖν, 11.3; cf. 10.25, 27; 11.12) and had table fellowship with them (συνεσθίειν, 11.3) echoes the criticisms Jesus received from Pharisees about entering the homes of tax collectors and sinners and eating with them (Luke 5.29-30; 7.34; 15.1-2; 19.5-7; cf. Gal 2.12).

The expression τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν Φαρισαίων πεπιστευκότες (Acts 15.5) does not appear to be ambiguous. Based on syntax and Lukan style, it seems that this statement refers simply to “some who had come to believe” and thus had departed “from the sect of the Pharisees.” There may, however, be a paradox in the idea that these characters who had previously believed and converted from Pharisaism are now troubling those who believe and are converting from the Gentiles (15.7, 19). If Luke is drawing upon Paul’s letter to the Galatians at this point, he seems to qualify the position of the circumcision party as characteristic of former

78 Luke absolves Peter of the charge the epistolary Paul made against him (Gal 2.11-14). Rather than fearing οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς (Gal 2.12; cf. Acts 10.45; 11.2), the Lukan Peter, Barnabas, and James (cf. στῦλοι, Gal 2.9) stand in agreement with both the Lukan Paul (Acts 15.12) and the epistolary Paul in waging arguments against Judaizing Christians.
Pharisees. The characters in Acts 15.5 do not serve as sufficient evidence that Luke knew about persons who identified simultaneously as both Christian and Pharisee.

6. Conclusions

The ambiguity that we have noticed appears in Luke’s portrait of Paul—specifically in Paul’s statement before the Sanhedrin, “I am a Pharisee” (23.6), with his later statement before Agrippa, “I lived as a Pharisee” (26.5). As we saw in this earlier context, despite the high priest’s order to strike Paul on “the mouth” (Acts 23.2), Paul’s rhetorical savvy remains unchecked. To be more precise, Paul appears to use irony as a cover in his remarks to the bystanders about Ananias the high priest (23.5), and also when he applies the title “ruler of the people” to Ananias. Luke may at the same time use ἐμφασις, when Paul’s alleged ignorance that Ananias was the high priest allows him to say: “God is about to strike you, you white-washed wall!” (23.3). In answering whether figured speech may help us understand Luke’s complex portraits of the Pharisees, this part of Paul’s examination (23.1-5) is important because Pharisees partly make up this council; and it also sets the tone for the latter half of this scene (23.6-10), where the Pharisees come to the foreground and Paul claims “I am a Pharisee, a son of Pharisees” (23.6).

As we have seen, Paul’s appeal to his Pharisaism in 23.6 may be an aspect of his artful dissemblance to ensure his own safety before the Sanhedrin. Accordingly, he appears to secure his speech before he can speak freely (26.26). Thus while Paul seems no longer to be a Pharisee, he does have the advantage of knowing how to wear the kinds of masks the Pharisees themselves use against their opponents; and in this case he uses one against the Pharisees. It is perhaps then paradoxical that when Paul creates division among the Sanhedrin by claiming that he is a Pharisee, the Pharisees do not recognize that he speaks a patent falsehood that in the end may result in the salvation of Jews and Gentiles more broadly. Luke furthermore pairs Paul’s appeal
to his Pharisaism with the appeal to his Roman citizenship and thereby shows how he exploits these two alleged identities in order to propel himself toward Rome, where he will fulfill his mission. It is there that he will finally obtain “full freedom of speech without hindrance” (28.31).80

80 As Chrysostom comments upon the closing words of Acts, ἐνι γὰρ μετὰ παρρησίας λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κεκωλυμένως, “for it is possible to use freedom of speech but still be hindered.” And the episodes in Acts where the apostles and missionaries speak freely but then meet with much opposition are clear examples. But in Rome, Chrysostom remarks, Τὴν οὖν παρρησίαν Παύλου οὐδὲν ἐνέκοψεν, ἀλλὰ και ἀκωλύτως ἔλεγεν, “Nothing checked Paul’s freedom speech, but he was actually speaking without hindrance” (Hom. in Acta 55.2 [PG 60:382]).
Chapter Eight: Gamaliel and the God-fighters (Acts 5.33-40)

Perhaps unsurprisingly, a number of scholars maintain that Luke depicts the Pharisee Gamaliel in a highly positive way.¹ Some regard him as one of the so-called “friendly” Pharisees in Luke-Acts.² And others, while granting that the Pharisees of Luke’s Gospel are often antagonistic,


claim that Luke becomes more favorable toward the Pharisees in his portrayal of Gamaliel.\textsuperscript{3}

There is no question that, when the members of the Sanhedrin want to kill the apostles for refusing “to teach in this name” (Acts 5.28, 33), Gamaliel intervenes and counsels the Sanhedrin against this particular course of action (5.34-39). Immediately after Gamaliel’s speech to the council, Luke writes: “And they obeyed him; and after summoning the apostles, they beat them and ordered them not to speak in the name of Jesus and released them” (5.39c-40).

While Gamaliel would not go so far as to kill the apostles, there is a question of whether he approves of their beating and the charge “not to speak in the name of Jesus.” Do they proceed with this form of punishment also out of obedience to Gamaliel? When Gamaliel says “withdraw from these fellows and leave them alone” (5.38), is he advising not only against killing the apostles, but also against attempting to control their speech? If he is advising them against the latter as well, it is then curious why the Lukan narrator can say in the same breath that they obeyed Gamaliel and punished the apostles, ordering them to speak in this name no more.

Scholars have also puzzled over the question why Saul, as a student of Gamaliel, does not follow his teacher’s advice to refrain from persecuting the Christians. One solution has been to discredit Paul’s claim to have ever been trained by Gamaliel in the first place. Yet there is no dispute that the Lukan Paul is a student of Gamaliel. What complicates this problem further is that in two of the three instances where the later-designated Paul refers to his Pharisaic identity (22.3; 26.5), he does so within contexts where he relates how as a Pharisee he forcefully persecuted Christians (22.4-5; 26.9-11). And in the other instance (as we saw in the previous chapter), he, now as a convert to the Christian movement, is himself under interrogation by the Sanhedrin (22.30; 23.6).

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5 See, e.g., Nodet, “Paul, Pharisien,” 423-28. Chilton and Neusner, however, make the case that the logic of the epistolary Paul has certain resemblances to that of Gamaliel (“Paul and Gamaliel,” 329-73). Nevertheless, such arguments are almost entirely concerned about whether the historical Paul was a student of Gamaliel, which is not fully relevant for analyzing the Lukan Paul.


The scene involving Gamaliel marks the first instance in the narrative where the Christ followers are beaten (δέρειν, 5.40) for their speech. Is it significant that only moments before the Lukan Paul later claims to have beaten (δέρειν, 22.19) Christians he also says he was educated “at the feet of Gamaliel” (22.3)?

These questions should prompt us to analyze carefully Gamaliel’s speech to the Sanhedrin, as well as its narrative context. Does Luke provide any clues that readers might discover and then realize that there is another side to Gamaliel’s portrait, in addition to the positive side? To begin answering this question, perhaps a fresh translation of Acts 5.33-42 is in order:

33 And when they heard this, they became furious and wanted to kill them. 34 But there arose [ἀναστάς] in the Sanhedrin a certain Pharisee whose name was Gamaliel, a teacher of the law who was held in honor [τίμιος] by all the people, and he ordered the men to be put outside for a moment 35 and said to them: “Men of Israel, be careful in what you are about to do to these fellows [τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τούτοις]. 36 For before these days, Theudas arose [ἀνέστη] and claimed that he was somebody, and a number of men, about four hundred, joined him. And he was killed, and all who obeyed him [ἐπείθοντο αὐτῷ] were dispersed and came to nothing. 37 And after him, Judas the Galilean arose [ἀνέστη] in the days of the census and withdrew [ἀπέστησεν] the people after him. And he too perished and all who obeyed him [ἐπείθοντο αὐτῷ] were scattered. 38 And now I say to you, withdraw [ἀπόστητε] from these fellows [τῶν ἀνθρώπων τούτων] and leave them alone; because if this plan [βουλή] or this work is from humans, it will be disbanded. 39 But if it is from God, you will not be able to disband them, lest you too are found to be God-fighters. And they obeyed him [ἐπείθησαν δὲ ἀπόστησαν] and 40 after summoning the apostles, they beat them and ordered them not to speak in the name of Jesus and released them. 41 Then they left the presence of the Sanhedrin rejoicing that they were deemed worthy to suffer dishonor [ἀτιμασθῆναι] on behalf of the name. 42 And every day in the temple and at home they did not cease teaching and proclaiming the good news that the Christ is Jesus.

One of the first things we notice about this pericope is that Luke uses the same term for Gamaliel’s rising up in the council that Gamaliel himself will use for the actions of Theudas and

Judas the Galilean (ἀναστήναι, 5.34, 36-37). While we might regard this verbal correspondence as a coincidence, we are led to think otherwise when noticing an additional correspondence in how Theudas, Judas, and Gamaliel are all obeyed (πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ, 5.36-37, 39). Is Luke inviting his readers to draw comparisons among these persons, as well as their followers? Furthermore, as the rhetorical instruction on indirect speech would lead us to ask, has Luke attributed speech to Gamaliel that in the end allows Luke as an author to accomplish something extra?

From the outset we can see that there appear to be two sets of comparisons made within this pericope, one by Gamaliel and one by Luke. Gamaliel compares Jesus and his followers to

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8 The ἀναστὰς δέ in 5.34 places Gamaliel in continuity with the high priest, whose opposition the narrator introduces with the identical expression in 5.17, as well as with the Sanhedrin that “arose” (ἀνιστάναι) in order to take Jesus before Pilate in Luke 23.1. As Chrysostom (Hom. in Acta 13.1 [PG 60:105]) explains at 5.17, to say that the high priest rose up is to say that “he was aroused” (Διηγέρθη) and that he was “agitated because of what happened” (κινηθεὶς ἐπὶ τοῖς γενομένοις), or as Theophylact (Exp. in Acta ad 5.17 [PG 125:592b]) modifies, “because of what was said” (ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις). Similarly, Hackett notes, “rising up, not from his seat in the council (for the council is not said to have been in session), but as it were mentally, becoming excited, proceeding to act” (Acts, 104). Cf. Brawley, who reads ἀναστὰς δέ in 5.17, 34 as “a contrasting parallel” (Luke-Acts, 97); Gowler, who sees Gamaliel as one rising up “in contrast to the high priest and Sadducees” (Host, 278); and Hakola, who claims that by this introduction, “Luke clearly separates Gamaliel from his associates in the council and presents his action as a counterforce to their openly murderous intentions” (“‘Friendly’ Pharisees,” 189).

9 The two occurrences of ἐπείθοντο in 5.36-37 are in the middle voice, that is, in the sense of “obey” rather than in the passive voice, “be persuaded” (cf. Smyth §1734.15; and BDAG s.v. πείθω 3a-c). That πείθεσθαι as a middle takes its direct object in the dative (e.g., Acts 23.21; 27.11; 28.24; Heb 13.17; Jas 3.3) is evidence that each instance of ἐπείθοντο here is in the middle, since the dative αὐτῷ appears with each. If the verbs were passive, Luke would have conveyed agency not with αὐτῷ but with the preposition ὑπὸ plus the agent in the genitive (e.g., Acts 27.11). And correspondingly, ἐπείσθησαν in 5.40, which also appears with αὐτῷ, is a so-called “middle passive,” that is, a verb that is aorist passive in form yet one that functions as an active verb in a middle sense (cf. Acts 23.21). See Smyth §§814-15. This grammatical construal furthermore fits the context where Luke contrasts those who obey God (Acts 5.29, 32) with those who obey humans (5.36-37, 39). Cf. Bengel, Gnomon (ad Acta 5.32); and Johnson, Acts, 100-03. The fact that Gamaliel convinces the Sanhedrin (5.35-39) when Peter and the apostles could not (5.29-32) suggests that the Pharisees held a prominent position among the Jewish leadership.
Theudas and Judas and their followers. But based on the verbal correspondences we have noted, Luke seems to turn the table on Gamaliel by comparing him to the very persons Gamaliel compares to Jesus. Perhaps these matters will become clearer when we observe how the Sanhedrin heeds Gamaliel’s advice to stay away from the Christ followers, as well as the position Gamaliel appears to take in offering this advice.

1. Theudas, Judas, Gamaliel, and Their Respective Followers

While at first glance Gamaliel appears to be neutral in his attitude toward the Christian movement, his use of a future-more-vivid condition may provide nuance to his position: “if [ἐάν] this plan or this work is [ἦ] from humans, it will be disbanded [καταλυθήσεται]” (5.38b). The future-more-vivid condition of course is one that generally anticipates probable fulfillment of something specific in the future.\(^1\) Gamaliel thus seems to regard the plan and work carried on by the Christian apostles as likely of human origin and that—as with the followers of Theudas and Judas the Galilean—they too will become “dispersed” and “scattered” with no power or influence (5.36-37).\(^1\)

The second condition Gamaliel gives, “if [εἰ] it is [ἐστιν] from God, you will not be able [δυνήσεσθε] to overthrow them,” is a simple present condition and thus reflects no position on the reality or probability of the outcome.\(^1\) Yet if the first condition has set the tone for the second, it seems that Gamaliel regards the plan and work of the apostles as probably not “from

\(^1\) See Smyth §2322.

\(^1\) Kingsbury observes the significance of the condition in 5.38, as well as the comparison Gamaliel draws among Jesus and the two messianic pretenders (“The Pharisees in Luke-Acts,” 1505-06). Contrast Rick Strelan, who claims that “Gamaliel had a hunch that the followers of Jesus might be doing ‘the will and work of God’” (“Gamaliel’s Hunch,” Australian Biblical Review 47 [1999]: 53-69, here 53).

\(^1\) See Smyth §§2298-2301, 2321-28.
God.” And if it is not from God, perhaps the members of the council will then “be able to overthrow them.”

When Stephen later addresses that presumably same Sanhedrin (6.12-7.53), Gamaliel does not intervene to prevent his lynching (7.54-8.1). Granted, there is no indication that Gamaliel in particular changes his mind, approves of, or even participates in the stoning, even though it is at this moment that we receive a first glimpse of Gamaliel’s student, Saul, who watches over the garments of the executioners and is clearly “consenting to his death” (7.58-8.1; 22.20). All we can claim from the text is that, as in the cases of Theudas and Judas and their respective followers, those who initially obeyed Gamaliel have now abandoned his leadership. Gamaliel therefore becomes a proof of his own counsel when the people he initially persuades ignore his advice and stone Stephen.

Furthermore, the “dispersal” (διαλύειν, 5.36) and “scattering” (διασκορπίζειν, 5.37) of the Christ followers that Gamaliel initially thought would most likely occur on its own accord finds fulfillment only through “a great persecution against the church in Jerusalem,” when its members, apostles excepted, “were scattered” (διασπείρειν, 8.1, 4) throughout Judea and Samaria. And it is Saul who is at least partly responsible for this persecution (8.3).

What causes the Sanhedrin to change their minds from their initial decision not to kill the apostles (5.33-40) to their lynching of Stephen appears to be their inability “to oppose [ἀντιστῆναι] the wisdom [σοφία] and spirit” with which Stephen characteristically speaks (6.10; 7.54). This detail is reminiscent of the scene in the Gospel where Jesus assures his disciples that he will give them “a mouth and wisdom [σοφία]” their adversaries cannot “oppose [ἀντιστῆναι] or dispute” (Luke 21.15). As Jesus predicts, even though the opponents will fail to withstand

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13 Cf. Sanders, who holds that the Pharisees have nothing to do with the martyrdom of Stephen (Jews in Luke-Acts, 87).
such speech, they will still proceed in killing some from among the disciples (21.16). And just as he states that “they will lay their hands upon and persecute [διώκειν] you and hand you over [παραδιδόναι] to synagogues and prisons [φυλακαί]” (21.12), in his description of the persecution (διωγμός, Acts 8.1) initiated by Stephen’s speech, Luke portrays Saul as “dragging off men and women and handing them over [παραδιδόναι] to prison [φυλακή] (8.3). It appears therefore that the Sanhedrin has forgotten Gamaliel’s caution about being found θεομάχοι, “God-fighters” (5.39). As Stephen tells them, “you are constantly opposing [ἀντιπίπτειν] the Holy Spirit” (7.51).

If we are to understand the verbs διελύθησαν (5.36) and διεσκορπίσθησαν (5.37) as divine passives, then Gamaliel assumes that God was responsible for the scattering of the two failed movements of Theudas and Judas. Yet when the members of the Sanhedrin presumably see that the Christians, rather than dispersing, are actually increasing in number (6.1, 7a), that many of the priests in Jerusalem were joining the movement (6.7b), and that Stephen would not cease speaking (λαλεῖν, 6.10, 13) his message, the Sanhedrin seems to think it is their responsibility to take action in the “scattering” of the church. If the narrator is using διεσπάρησαν (8.1) and διασπαρέντες (8.4) also as divine passives, then the opponents are paradoxically acting as agents of the divine will when they carry out the persecution that causes the scattering.

While the Sanhedrin and Saul are fighting God, their opposition actually becomes instrumental in the larger divine plan—which ultimately shows how that plan engulfs this opposing plan and uses it to further its own purposes. The dispersal of the Christians does not

\[14\] As Eckey (Apostelgeschichte, 1:145) and Osvaldo Padilla (The Speeches of Outsiders in Acts: Poetics, Theology and Historiography [SNTSMS 144; Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008], 124) also observe.
result in the dissolution of the movement—contrary to Gamaliel’s expectations—but rather in its propagation “throughout the regions of Judea and Samaria” (8.1; cf. 1.8; 11.19). Even though from Gamaliel’s perspective this scattering would place the Christian movement within the same category as the uprisings of Theudas and Judas the Galilean, the readers observe that the dispersal of the Christians actually promotes their “proclaiming the word” (8.4) and that Gamaliel’s argument was flawed from the very beginning; for the scattering of a movement after the death of its leader does not necessarily lead to its extinction, nor presuppose that it is of human origin.\footnote{Cf. Darr’s observation that “the audience will perceive in Gamaliel’s speech an unwitting, ironic, and paradoxical oracle of church growth: a leader was killed, and followers were scattered, but instead of dissipating, the movement expanded dramatically” (Character Building, 120). Furthermore, as Haenchen remarks, “Theudas’ movement did not dissolve of its own accord after his death; his followers had to be put down by the cavalry of Fadus, some of them being taken prisoner and others killed. Nor, likewise, did the Zealot movement unleashed by Judas merely fade away; it survived and steadily grew right up to the desperate last struggle of the Jewish War” (Acts, 257).}

It is within this framework that we can perhaps better appreciate Gamaliel’s initial conditional statement and how it may function as an example of figured speech: “if this plan [βουλή] or this work is from humans, it will be disbanded” (5.38). Here the figure would depend upon three usages of the term βουλή, “plan,” “counsel,” and “council meeting.”\footnote{See Rhet. Her. 4.67: “Just as ambiguities that leave the speech obscure ought to be avoided, so must those that accomplish an innuendo of this sort be pursued. They will be found easily if we know and pay attention to the double or multiple meanings of words.”} As Gamaliel uses the term for his audience, βουλή refers to the “plan” of the Christian apostles that is under examination.\footnote{Cf. the apostles’ mention of the preordained divine plan (βουλή) in Jesus’ death (4.28).} Yet from the perspective of Luke’s readers, βουλή may also refer to the “counsel” Gamaliel offers the Sanhedrin and even the “council meeting” that they are holding about how to punish the apostles. In each of these usages, the conditional statement becomes sensible within its immediate and larger contexts. As Gamaliel views the “plan” of the apostles, it is likely of...
human origin (ἐξ ἀνθρώπων) and will probably fail. From the perspective of Luke’s readers, both Gamaliel’s “counsel” and the “council meeting” itself are likely “from humans” and thus probably short-lived, as becomes confirmed in the subsequent narrative with the revived persecutions.

Could we then understand Gamaliel’s prior statement in a double-sense as well? That is, when βούλη ἡ refers to the Sanhedrin and Luke has Gamaliel say “withdraw from these fellows and leave them alone” (5.38), Luke may be informing his readers to stay away from the members of the Sanhedrin; even though they deliberate and plan to leave Christians alone, their harassment continues nonetheless. We shall revisit this question toward the end of this chapter.

2. Obedience to God versus Obedience to Gamaliel

If Gamaliel’s counsel is “from humans” how would we then reconcile this understanding with the fact that he cautions the Sanhedrin about being found “God-fighters” (5.39)? And besides the subsequent persecutions in the narrative, are there indications that they are already rivaling and perhaps even fighting God prior to and at the moment of Gamaliel’s speech?

We may have an initial clue when Gamaliel emerges from the Sanhedrin and orders (κελεύειν) the Christians outside (5.34). Peter and the apostles had only moments before declared to the Sanhedrin, πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις, “one must obey God rather

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18 Once the apostles are ordered outside, they then cannot hear Gamaliel’s true thoughts about their movement. This privilege is granted only to the readers. Luke takes a similar approach in his scene about Simon the Pharisee in Luke 7.36-50. Yet here Simon only attempts to conceal from Jesus his opinion about whether he is prophet, for Jesus can apparently read Simon’s mind (cf. 5.22; 9.47), since Jesus replies to his interior thoughts with a parable (7.40-42). Thus both Jesus and the readers observe that in Simon’s view Jesus is no prophet (7.39).
than humans” (5.29; cf. 4.19; 5.4c). And they reiterate this point when they declare that God has given the Holy Spirit to οἱ πειθαρχοῦντες αὐτῷ, “the ones who obey him” (5.32).

Within the context of Acts, is it significant that whereas Luke has Peter and the apostles use πειθαρχεῖν to describe their obedience to God (5.29, 32) he employs πείθεσθαι for those who obey Theudas, Judas, and Gamaliel (5.36-37, 39)? In the later episode about Paul’s sea voyage to Rome, we read that the “the centurion obeyed [πείθεσθαι] the pilot and the owner of the ship rather than the words spoken by Paul” (27.11). And after suffering the consequences for heeding

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19 Cf. Plato, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ υμῖν (Apology 29d); and the comments by Talbert, Reading Acts, 69; and Keener, Acts, 2:1218. Chrysostom remarks upon the philosophical weight of this statement as well as the implication in the present context that there is rivalry between the commands of God and those of the Sanhedrin (cf. θεομάχοι, 5.39): Πολλὴ ἡ φιλοσοφία καὶ τοιαύτη, ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν δεικνύουσι καὶ αὐτοὺς μαχομένους τῷ Θεῷ. “Great philosophy and of such a kind that from this the apostles show the Sanhedrin also to be rivaling God” (Hom. in Acta 13.1 [PG 60:106]). Similarly, Calvin states, “there is no place for a comparison [comparatio] between God and humans except where there is some kind of antithesis [contrarium]” (Com. in Acta ad 5.30 [OE 12.1:153]). Cf. Krodel, Acts, 127. Note also a more implicit principle reflected in this context, that is, that one must fear God rather than humans (e.g., Luke 12.4-7; 18.2, 4; 22.2; 23.40; Acts 9.26). That the captain and the servants are afraid of being stoned by the people (5.26; cf. Luke 20.19) starkly contrasts with the boldness that led to Stephen’s stoning (6.8-7.60). Cf. Gaventa, Acts, 107. Chrysostom also recognizes this principle, but he appears to read the subject of ἐφοβοῦντο in 5.26 as the apostles rather than the captain and the servants: Ὡ τῆς ἀνοίας! Ἐφοβοῦντο, φησὶ, τὸν ὄχλον. Τί γὰρ αὐτοὺς ὁ ὄχλος ὠφέλει; Δέον τὸν Θεὸν φοβηθῆναι τὸν καθάπερ πτηνός ἀεὶ τῶν χειρῶν αὐτοὺς ἐξαρπάζοντα τῶν ἐκείνων· οἱ δὲ μᾶλλον τὸν ὄχλον φοβοῦνται. “O the folly! For he says they were afraid of the crowd. For how could the crowd benefit them? They ought to have feared the God who as winged creatures always rescues them from hands of those people. But rather they were afraid of the crowd” (Hom. in Acta 13.1 [PG 60:106]). Cf. Keener: “That the apostles were preaching in the temple instead of escaping indicated that they were not even afraid of the Sanhedrin—which could appear to the leaders as at once a mark of their confidence in their dangerous popularity and an act of defiance that further shamed the leaders” (Acts, 2:1215).

20 Cf. Padilla: “The syllogism, then, follows along these lines: ‘God gives the Spirit to those who obey him; we obey him (since we proclaim Jesus); therefore we have the Spirit.’ The embarrassing insinuation is that the Jerusalem authorities are devoid of the Spirit precisely because they refuse to proclaim Jesus and, in fact, are even violently attempting to mute any testimony about him” (Speeches of Outsiders, 119).

21 It is notable that when Josephus describes how Alexandra granted political power to the Pharisees, he says that Queen “ordered” (κελεύειν) the multitude “to obey” (πειθαρχεῖν) the Pharisees (Ant. 13.408).
the wrong advice, Paul tells them, “Men, you should have obeyed [πειθαρχεῖν] me” (27.21). It appears that Luke does use the two terms with nuance, specifically in order to distinguish between a greater and lesser authority, or even between a legitimate and illegitimate authority. Hence, πειθαρχεῖν conveys not merely the act of obedience, but “to obey an authority” (pointing to ἀρχή within the compound). Is Luke thus insinuating that in the cases of Theudas, Judas, and Gamaliel, the people recognize and obey the wrong authorities? If he is, then we see a paradox in the fact that Gamaliel, as a leader of the Pharisees, is from Luke’s perspective as equally devoid of authority as the two persons Gamaliel invokes in his speech.  

Another indication that the Sanhedrin may already be rivaling God appears immediately after Gamaliel’s speech, when the Sanhedrin “ordered [παραγγέλλειν] them not to speak [λαλεῖν] in the name of Jesus” (5.40). This command of course hearkens back to the Sanhedrin’s initial decision, “let us threaten them to speak [λαλεῖν] no longer in this name” (4.17), as well as to their reminder to the apostles, “we strongly ordered [παραγγελίᾳ παραγγέλλειν] you not to teach in this name” (5.28). Yet because “a messenger of the Lord” opened the doors of the prison and instructed them, “speak [λαλεῖν] in the temple to the people all the words of this life” (5.20), the orders of the Sanhedrin appear to be already conflicting with divine instructions.

22 Schmithals (Apostelgeschichte, 61) holds that Gamaliel represents the general Pharisaic opposition toward Jewish insurgents such as Theudas and Judas. As he explains, the Pharisees were largely uninvolved in the Jewish revolt of 66-70 CE. Yet his view that Luke wishes to apply Gamaliel’s perspective to the Christians is problematic. Similarly, Brawley claims that “Luke not only allies Gamaliel with Christianity, but also dissociates him from the company of inauthentic leaders of Judaism” (Luke-Acts and the Jews, 97).

23 Cf. Chrysostom’s comments about how the Sanhedrin are θεομάχοι in having the apostles locked in prison: Ὅρα, πῶς ἦσαν θεομάχοι. Ταῦτα ἀνθρώπινα, εἰπέ μοι, τὰ ἐπὶ αὐτῶν γενόμενα; Τίς αὐτοὺς ἐξήγαγε τῶν θυρῶν κεκλεισμένων; πῶς ἐξῆλθον τῶν φυλάκων πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν ἐστῶτων; “Notice how they were rivaling God. Tell me, were these things that happened to them of human origin? Who led them out from doors that were locked? How did they escape the guards who were standing before the doors?” (Hom. in Acta 13.1 [PG 60:106]). See also Jervell, Apostelgeschichte, 211.
3. The Sanhedrin among Other God-fighters

We have suggested that the role of the Sanhedrin as God-fighters may become realized most at the martyrdom of Stephen. And when we analyze other ancient narratives about God-fighters, we see that martyrdom is tied to this motif also in 2 Maccabees, where one of the seven brothers, before suffering death, declares to Antiochus, “do not think that you will go unpunished for your attempt to fight God [θεομαχεῖν]” (2 Macc 7.19). One corresponding motif that we observe also in 2 Maccabees is the death of the θεομάχος himself, for only a few scenes later Antiochus does receive the punishment the brother foretold when the former becomes gruesomely ill and dies (9.5-29). While Luke does not narrate that the members of the Sanhedrin suffer a judgment of death (cf. Acts 23.3), the motif that God-fighters always die in the fight does help explain why

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24 Rulers, especially tyrants, constitute most θεομάχοι in ancient texts, which is reflected in variant readings of Acts 5.39 from E gig: εἰ δὲ ἐκ θεοῦ ἔστιν, οὐ δυνήσεσθε καταλῦσαι αὐτούς, οὔτε ὡμές οὔτε οἱ ἄρχοντες ὑμῶν, μήποτε καὶ θεομάχοι εὑρέθητε; as well as from D h syhm: εἰ δὲ ἐκ θεοῦ ἔστιν, οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεομάχος εὑρεθῇ· ἀπέχεσθε οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μήποτε καὶ θεομάχοι εὑρέθητε. See also John B. Weaver, who affirms that “ancient θεομάχοι most often took the form of kings (e.g., Pentheus, Lycurgus, Salmoneus, Cambyses), who were known as ‘tyrants’ due, at least in part, to their inordinate violence” (Plots of Epiphany: Prison-Escape in Acts of the Apostles [BZNW 131; Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004], 143). Our earliest usage of the term θεομαχεῖν appears in Euripides’ Bacchae, where the tyrant Pentheus fights against the divine power of Dionysus (45; cf. 325, 1255). Cf. Diodorus Siculus, who relates a speech in which Theodorus compels the Syracusans not to submit to the orders of their current leader, Dionysius (14.67.2), and instead choose another general who will not lead them in “fighting God [θεομαχεῖν]. For it is clear that the divine opposes those who have selected the most impious person for the office of ruling” (14.69.2-3; cf. 14.74.4). Cf. θεομαχεῖν in Xenophon, Oec. 16.3; Plutarch, Mor. 168c; 225c; Marc. 16.3; Epictetus, Diatr. 3.24.21, 24; 4.1.101; and θεομάχος in Lucian, Salt. 24; Jupp. trag. 45; and the analyses by Nestle, “Legenden vom Tod,” 246-69; Kamerbeek, “On the Conception of ΘΕΟΜΑΧΟΣ,” 271-83. For the motif among early Christian authors subsequent to Luke, see Eberhard Heck, MH ΘΕΟΜΑΧΕΙΝ oder: Die Bestrafung des Gottesverächters. Untersuchungen zu Bekämpfung und Aneignung römischer religio bei Tertullian, Cyprian und Lactanz (Studien zur klassischen Philologie 24; Frankfurt am Main, Bern, New York: Peter Lang, 1987); and in relation to prison-escape in Acts, see Weaver, Plots, 132-44.

25 For many examples of this motif, see Nestle, “Legenden vom Tod,” 246-69; and Weaver, Plots, 132-44.
Gamaliel cautions (προσέχειν, 5.35) them, μήποτε καὶ θεομάχοι εὑρεθῆτε, “lest you be found God-fighters as well” (5.39).

The adverbial καί in this final clause of the speech is important because it assumes that Gamaliel has already mentioned other God-fighters who suffered defeat and death in opposing God. And from his perspective, he has explicitly named two and inferred another. His reasoning runs accordingly: Theudas was a God-fighter, which is why “he was slain” (5.36). Judas was a God-fighter, which is why “he also perished” (5.37). And the inference is that Jesus was also a God-fighter, which is why he was crucified. Accordingly, Gamaliel’s caution is against becoming yet a fourth statistic among a larger group of God-fighters.

The notion that the members of the Sanhedrin are already the God-fighters Gamaliel cautions them from becoming may be illuminated further by parallels of the θεομάχος from the ancient sources. Usually when a character expresses concern about fighting God, this fear is not necessarily a proof of piety but rather an acknowledgement that he or she will lose the fight and thus a confirmation of that person’s adversarial role. To recognize the prospect of being a θεομάχος is thus to recognize the likelihood of imminent doom. Josephus relates how when Amenophus, “the king of Egypt,” went out with his army to engage his enemy in battle, he believed that he was about “to fight God” (θεομαχεῖν) and as a result withdrew his forces in order to avoid annihilation (Apion 1.243-46).26

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26 See also Josephus, Ant. 14.310; B.J. 2.582; and 5.378: ἀκούετε δ’ ὅμως, ἵνα γνῶτε μὴ μόνον Ῥωμαίοις πολεμοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ θεῷ, “Yet hear me, so that you may know that you are waging war not only against the Romans, but also against God.” Cf. Plautus: Quid ego faciam? disne advorser? quasi Titani cum eis belligerem quibus sat esse non queam? “What should I do? Should I oppose the gods? Like the Titans, should I wage war against those whose equal I could not be?” (Pers. 1.1.26-27); and Cicero: nam et necessitas ferendae condicionis humanae quasi cum deo pugnare prohibet admonetque esse hominem, “For indeed the necessity of enduring the human condition restrains us from, as it were, fighting against God and also warns us that we are mortal” (Tusc. 3.60).
Philostratus provides further supporting evidence when he narrates the controversy between the holy man Apollonius and Tigellinus, the infamously cruel prefect of Nero’s Praetorian Guard (Vit. Apoll. 4.42.2-44.4). Even though the spies of Tigellinus detect that Apollonius had uttered a treasonous statement against Nero (4.42.2-44.1), Tigellinus fails to indict Apollonius when he stands trial (4.44.2-3)—even when Apollonius frankly admits his negative attitude toward Nero (4.44.4). Concluding that Apollonius had powers that were beyond human, Tigellinus “cautions himself [φυλάττεσθαι] against rivaling God [θεομαχεῖν]” and bids Apollonius to depart, saying, “for you are too powerful to be ruled by me” (4.44.4).

One important distinction between Gamaliel’s mention of θεομάχοι and these parallels from Josephus and Philostratus, however, is that Gamaliel does not include himself as a prospective θεομάχος. In his warnings to the Sanhedrin, he uses only the second-person plural (5.35, 38-39) rather than the first-person plural. Does this fact imply that Luke wishes to exclude Gamaliel from among the God-fighting Sanhedrin? And would Luke perhaps even consider Gamaliel to be “secretly our brother in the faith,” as we see him depicted later in the Pseudo-Clementine literature (Rec. 1.65.2)?

4. Distinguishing Gamaliel from the Apostles

There are other clues in the text that seem to distance Gamaliel from the apostles. Perhaps most significant is that where, on the one hand, the narrator describes Gamaliel as “a teacher of the

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27 Cf. Vit. Apoll. 5.35,5; 7.4.1; Josephus, B.J. 4.493; and Tacitus, Hist. 1.72.
28 Cf. φυλάττεσθαι, “to caution oneself” (Vit. Apoll. 4.44.4) with προσέχειν, “to be careful” (Acts 5.35).
29 See Bernhard Rehm and Georg Strecker, eds., Die Pseudoklementinen II. Rekognitionen in Rufins Übersetzung (GCS; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), 45. The Syriac version adds that he was a brother to the Christians “because it was advantageous” (trans. F. Stanley Jones, An Ancient Jewish Christian Source on the History of Christianity: Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions 1.27-71 [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995], 100).
law held in honor [τίμιος] among all the people [λαός]” (5.34), on the other, the apostles are said to rejoice “because they were deemed worthy to suffer dishonor [ἀτιμάζεσθαι] on behalf of the name” (5.41). That Gamaliel has received such honor reminds readers of those Pharisees whom Jesus criticizes because they love “the best seat in the synagogues and greetings in the marketplaces” (Luke 11.43) and of the ruler of the Pharisees who hosted a dinner where the attendees were choosing “the best seats” and as a result become audience to the parable that teaches against striving for such honorable positions (14.7-11). Even though the disciples themselves are occasionally wrong to have concern about who is the greatest (Luke 9.46-48; 22.24-27), the apostles here in this scene embody what may be Luke’s ideal—that is, to choose suffering over against honor. Luke later has Paul uphold this position when he claims to know that “bonds and afflictions” await him, yet he does not regard his life as τίμια, “valuable” (Acts 20.23-24; cf. 28.10).

As Luke presents it, however, the apostles do in fact obtain honor from among the populace, even if they do not acquire it by the same means as their rivals. As we see in this section of the narrative, the reason the religious authorities attempt to silence the speech of the apostles and to subdue their activity (4.1-4; 5.17-18, 28) is their growing popularity among the people (3.9-11; 4.16-17, 21; 5.12-16, 26). The narrator is quite clear that the Sadducees are “filled with jealousy” at the apostles’ success (5.17), which seems to be why the Sadducees are eager to kill them immediately before Gamaliel’s intervention (5.33).30

30 Johnson (Acts, 96) comments upon ζῆλος: “Luke’s attribution of this vice to the leaders taps into a Hellenistic topos on envy, which consistently connects envy with the urge to kill (Plato, Laws 869e-870a; Plutarch, On Brotherly Love 17 [Mor. 487f]). This commonplace is taken over in Hellenistic Jewish literature (Wis 2:24; Philo, On Joseph 12; Testament of Simeon 2:7, 11). Luke will later apply it as well to the brothers of Joseph (Acts 7:9) and to the Jews who oppose Paul (Acts 17:5).” Cf. Rackham, who reads ζῆλος here as a “jealousy of the influence of
Yet is there any indication that Gamaliel is also jealous? We do notice that in each of the two examples Gamaliel invokes for his argument, he indicates that the leader of the movement attracted a noteworthy following from among the populace—in the case of Theudas, “four hundred men” (5.36), and Judas, he says, “withdrew people after him [ἀπέστησεν λαὸν ὀπίσω αὐτοῦ]” (5.37). As for Judas, Gamaliel’s use of ἀφιστάναι may be significant, for he uses the same word in the next sentence when he advises his hearers, “withdraw from these fellows [ἀπόστητε ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων]” (5.38). Perhaps the point Gamaliel makes by using the same verb for the actions of both Judas’ followers and his hearers is that in each case, the Jewish people (λαός) should not follow such leaders—neither Judas the Galilean nor, it may be implied, the apostles of Jesus.

Based on Gamaliel’s usage of ἀφιστάναι in the previous sentence, is the statement to withdraw from the Christian apostles also a call to withdraw from and avoid the apostles’ brand of Judaism? Certainly Gamaliel’s hearers within the narrative show no signs of joining the Christian movement. Aside from the unlikelihood that Gamaliel would need to dissuade the Sanhedrin from following the apostles, might Luke attribute to Gamaliel the kind of statement a Pharisaic leader, from his perspective, might utter—which for his initial readers would perhaps point to the rivalry between Pharisees and Christians among their present-day λαός? This interpretation would perhaps be a stretch, but a hint of this nuance is present nonetheless.

Furthermore, that the narrator mentions Gamaliel as one “held in honor among all the people [λαός]” appears to reinforce his categorization with Theudas and Judas the Galilean. The statements that Theudas “asserted himself to be somebody” (5.36; cf. 8.9) and that Judas “withdrew people [λαός] after him” in a revolution (5.37) readers could equally apply to rival teachers” and furthermore claims that “the Sadducean party were apprehensive of a popular movement which would endanger their own political position” (Acts, 71).
Gamaliel—as he presumes to be “somebody” who can give orders to the apostles (5.34), and he is a leader of a sect that throughout Luke-Acts revolts not against Rome but perhaps rather against the kingdom of God.

Some might oppose this distancing of Gamaliel from the apostles on the basis of how he signals the culminating point of his speech—that is, with the expression καὶ τὰ νῦν λέγω υἱῶν (5.38).31 Readers of the Lukan narrative are already accustomed to hearing λέγω υἱῶν introduce authoritative teachings, yet almost exclusively those delivered by Jesus.32 Would this affinity in style show mutuality between these two teachers? There is nothing to suggest that Luke would give Gamaliel, as a teacher, equal status to Jesus, or that Christian readers should regard their teachings as equally authoritative. If anything, λέγω υἱῶν might show that, as a Jewish teacher, Jesus has Gamaliel as a foremost rival, and maybe even point to a rivalry between the sects that recognize these two teachers.33

5. Theudas, Judas, and Jesus

Thus far we have focused our attention upon how Luke appears to categorize and compare Gamaliel with Theudas and Judas the Galilean. Our analysis would be incomplete if we did not

31 Here these words indicate a deliberative speech. See Padilla, *Speeches of Outsiders*, 120-27, esp. 125; Pervo, *Acts*, 146.
32 See, e.g., λέγω υἱῶν (Luke 4.24-25; 7.9, 26, 28; 9.27; 10.12, 24; 11.8, 51; 12.4-5, 8, 22, 27, 37, 44, 51; 13.3, 5, 24, 35; 14.24; 15.7, 10; 17.34; 18.8, 14, 17, 29; 19.26, 40; 20.8; 21.3, 32; 22.16, 18, 37), υἱῶν λέγω (6.27; 11.9; 16.9), λέγω σοι (7.47; 12.59; 22.34), and σοι λέγω (23.43). Besides Jesus and Gamaliel, John the Baptist is the only other character within the narrative who uses such a statement to introduce the key points of his teaching (λέγω γὰρ υἱῶν, Luke 3.8). While there is certainly evidence within Luke-Acts suggesting that John the Baptist continued to have a following (e.g., Acts 18.25; 19.3-4), the Pharisaic tradition appears to exert more influence. Cf. Gowler, *Host*, 278.
33 Also problematic is Gamaliel’s membership among the same Sanhedrin that earlier pushed for the execution of Jesus (Luke 22.66-23.25; Acts 4.25-27). The Lukan narrator remarks that “the entire multitude of them arose and brought him before Pilate” (Luke 23.1), excepting only Joseph of Arimathea (23.50-51). See Gos. Nic. 1.1, where the author names Gamaliel as a member of the Sanhedrin that questioned Jesus. Cf. Padilla, *Speeches of Outsiders*, 111.
also look closely at the comparison Gamaliel himself draws among Jesus and these two rebels. Does this latter comparison imply anything about Gamaliel’s political perspective? And are there other signs of figured speech in these aspects of the pericope?

At first glance, it may seem that comparing Jesus to Theudas and Judas the Galilean would be apt for the Lukan narrative. As Josephus describes them, Theudas is a false prophet, and Judas a false king—both of which we may contrast with the Lukan motifs that Jesus is the true prophet and king. Yet Gamaliel seems to invoke Theudas and Judas based on their supposed similarly to Jesus rather than to indicate points of contrast. We are therefore led to ask what Luke and his readers may have known more specifically about Theudas and Judas.

Josephus (Ant. 20.97-99) states that Theudas was an “imposter” (γόης) and that he “persuaded” (πείθειν, cf. Acts 5.36, 37, 39) a great multitude to follow him on the grounds that he was a “prophet” (προφήτης), claiming that he would divide the Jordan and provide his followers easy passage. This prophetic act mostly clearly resembles that of Joshua (Josh 3.7-5.1) and Elijah and Elisha (4 Kgdms 2.8, 13-15), but it also recalls that of Moses (Exod 14.21-31) and thus may have political resonances, since he was the prophet who liberated the Israelites from Egyptian rule. More explicitly political in Josephus is that Theudas was active during the Roman procuratorship of Fadus, whose cavalry beheaded Theudas and also killed many of his supporters. That Gamaliel likens Jesus to an aspiring yet unsuccessful prophet thus appears to complement the opinion of Simon the Pharisee, who also does not accept that Jesus is a legitimate prophet (Luke 7.39; cf. 7.26, 30).

As for Judas the Galilean, he sought to established himself as king, and his uprising challenged the provincial rule of the Herodian dynasty (B.J. 2.56; Ant. 17.271-72, 285)—which we may compare to the theme that the kingship of Jesus trumps that of Herod (e.g., Luke 13.31-
Furthermore, Josephus describes Judas as a “sophist” who, as a leader of his own αἵρεσις, reproached the Jews for submitting to the Romans when they already had God as master (B.J. 2.118, 433). And not insignificantly, Josephus later claims that this sect, the so-called “fourth philosophy,” agrees with the Pharisees in all matters except one: the fourth philosophy refuses to acknowledge the authority of any human (ἄνθρωπος) because they recognize “God alone as leader and master” (μόνος ἡγεμὼν καὶ δεσπότης ὁ θεός, Ant. 18.23; cf. Acts 5.29), which would assume that the Pharisees do submit to human rulers.

Furthermore, we see that here even Josephus appears to use figured speech against Judas. In the same sentence where he notes that Judas was the ἡγεμών, “leader,” of the fourth philosophy, he goes on to say that this sect recognized God alone as their ἡγεμών (Ant. 18.23)—which points not only to a contradiction in this “philosophy” but also to the divine and presumptuous position that Judas occupied in the sect.

Does Gamaliel invoke Judas as an example because he disapproves of leaders who resist Roman rule? Scholars have noticed that the closest correspondence between Gamaliel’s speech and Josephus appears where each describes Judas drawing away the people in revolt. Where the Lukan Gamaliel says, ἀπέστησεν λαὸν ὀπίσω αὐτοῦ, “he drew away the people after him” (5.37), Josephus states, τοῦ τὸν λαὸν ἀπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἀποστήσαντος, “when he drew away the people from the Romans” (Ant. 20.102). Conspicuously absent from Gamaliel’s description is

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34 Judas, according to Josephus, had ζήλωσις βασιλείου τιμῆς, “a zealous pursuit for kingly honor” (Ant. 17.272). Cf. the comments by Pseudo-Oecumenius, Com. in Acta ad 5.37-38 (PG 118:121a-b); and Theophylact, Exp. in Acta ad 5.37-42 (PG 125:597b).

35 See, e.g., Loisy: “Seul trait original et qui se trouve correspondre mot pour mot à ce que Josèphe” (Actes, 288); and Haenchen (Acts, 252-53).

36 Cf. εἰς ἀπόστασιν ἐνῆγε τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους, “he led his countrymen in revolt” (B.J. 2.118); and ἥπειγετо ἑπὶ ἀποστάσει, “he urged on toward revolt” (Ant. 18.4).
an explicit statement that Judas led the Jewish people ἀπὸ Ῥωμαίων, that is, away from supporting the decrees of the Romans.

Yet does the absence of ἀπὸ Ῥωμαίων necessarily mean that Luke is uninterested in this detail, or that he wishes to make Gamaliel’s speech apolitical? Luke does after all have Gamaliel say that Judas appeared ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις τῆς ἀπογραφῆς, “during the days of the census” (5.37); and this of course is the same census Luke earlier indicates happened “when Quirinius was governing over Syria” (Luke 2.2). Josephus is clear that Caesar had commissioned Quirinius to carry out this census in Judea and to install Coponius with ruling authority over the region (Ant. 17.355; 18.1-3). Accordingly, Judas led his movement of resistance because of what the census implied—namely, submission to mortal masters, in this case Romans, and the burden of paying taxes to them (B.J. 2.118; Ant. 18.4-10; 20.102). As Josephus relates, Judas had as his chief ally a certain Pharisee named Saddok, and together they urged their compatriots not to submit to what in their minds was a form of slavery (Ant. 18.4, 9).37

It is not entirely clear to what extent the Pharisees during this earlier period may have opposed Roman authority. Saddok could have simply been an exception among the sect. On the other hand, Gedalyah Allon argues that only during the reign of Agrippa I and especially after 70 CE did the Pharisees become more compliant toward the governmental powers of Rome.38 If he is right, then Saddok may have been more representative of the Pharisees, at least from his day.

37 Bede, following Josephus and Jerome, claims that Judas, “when he joined the undertaking with the help of Sadducus, a certain Pharisee, he urged the people not to pay tribute to the Romans and thereby lose their freedom, making known from the law that they were to serve the Lord alone and that they who were bringing tithes to the temple should not pay tribute to Caesar. This sect became so distinguished that it even led into confusion a great number of the Pharisees and the people, so that they believed that the Lord Christ should be asked: ‘Is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar or not?’” (Exp. Act. ad 5.37 [CCSL 121:31-32]).
As Luke writes from a post-70 perspective, does he perhaps provide any indication in this pericope that the Pharisees had come to align themselves with Roman power? There are some clues pointing in this direction, which in the end may not lead to an answer; they may nonetheless offer further insight into the θεομάχοι of Acts.

It has long been recognized, for instance, that the scene where the apostles escape from prison in 5.17-42 resembles that scene in 12.1-25 where Peter escapes from prison. But does this correspondence show complicity between the Sanhedrin and Herod Agrippa? It could simply indicate that together they are the captors and thus the θεομάχοι in these episodes. Nevertheless, Luke does have the narrator relate how Herod imprisoned Peter once he saw that the death of James “was pleasing to the Jews” (12.3). And Peter aligns their intentions at the very least when he remarks upon his rescue “from the hand of Herod and from what the people of the Jews fully expect” (12.11). Furthermore, just as the high priest and the Sadducees “threw their hands upon the apostles” and arrested them (5.18), so Herod “threw hands upon some from the church in order to harm them” (12.1), which subsequently leads to Peter’s imprisonment (12.3-5). And just as “an angel of the Lord” frees the apostles in the earlier episode (5.19-18), so “an angel of the Lord” in the latter scene “strikes” (πατάσσειν) Peter on the side in order to wake and free him (12.7) and shortly thereafter “strikes” (πατάσσειν) Herod in order to kill him (12.23).

Furthermore, that Herod imprisons Peter because he believes his captivity will be “pleasing to the Jews” (12.3) suggests that the honor Herod receives from the people is what primarily

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39 See, e.g., Loisy, Actes, 277.
motivates his actions. And when he relishes in “glory” (δόξα) befitting only to God these suspicions are confirmed (12.22-23).  

The acclamation that Herod has “the voice of a God and not of a man” (θεοῦ φωνῆ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου, 12.22) is of course from Luke’s perspective an egregious misplacement of divine glory. In the earlier scene, only the apostles make the correct distinction between θεός and ἄνθρωποι (5.29). Even though Gamaliel points to the distinction between the human and the divine in his statement about the plan and work that is ἐξ ἀνθρώπων or ἐκ θεοῦ (5.38-39), we have seen that the plan of the Sanhedrin proves to be of human origin rather than divine.

But does Luke show any correspondence between the political authorities and Gamaliel in particular? The fact that Gamaliel categorizes Jesus with leaders of movements that resisted Roman rule has at least some resemblance to the later scene where the tribune mistakenly takes Paul for the Egyptian insurrectionist (21.37-38). When Gamaliel invokes Theudas as an exemplum in his speech, he begins with the statement πρὸ γὰρ τούτων τῶν ἡμερῶν, “For before these days” (5.36). Likewise, when the tribune recalls the activity of the Egyptian, he refers to his movement as having occurred πρὸ τούτων τῶν ἡμερῶν, “before these days” (21.38). And whereas Gamaliel says that both Theudas and Judas “rose up” (ἀνέστη, 5.36-37), the tribune

41 That a θεομάχος would assume his own divinity is also visible in the character Antiochus of 2 Maccabees. When Antiochus realizes that he is suffering defeat and dying as a result of his opposition toward God (2 Macc 7.19), he acknowledges his fault and states, “a mortal should not have thoughts befitting only to God” (9.12).

42 On the implications behind the people’s acclamation that Herod has a θεοῦ φωνῆ, with regard to Luke’s critique against the imperial cult in particular, see Klauck, Magic and Paganism, 43-44; Klauck, “Des Kaisers schöne Stimme,” 251-67. Cf. also Cornelius (Acts 10.25-26), the Lycaonian crowds and the priest of Zeus, who think Barnabas and Paul are Zeus and Hermes, respectively (Acts 14.11-15), as well as the barbarians who conclude that Paul is a god when he is unharmed by the bite of the viper (28.6).

43 Tannehill also observes “this contrast between divine and human authority,” yet he does not differentiate the perspective of Gamaliel from that of the apostles (Narrative Unity, 2:62).
characterizes the Egyptian’s action with the cognate ἀναστατοῦν, “to rise in revolt” (21.38; cf. 17.6). This linkage between Gamaliel and the tribune, via their perspectives on Theudas and the Egyptian, is one Luke may have learned from Josephus; for Josephus describes the Egyptian insurrectionist with the same terms he uses for Theudas, namely, a γόης, “imposter,” and a presumed προφήτης, “prophet” (B.J. 2.261-3; Ant. 20.97-99, 169-72).44

We also see a parallel between Gamaliel and Pilate particularly in how they refer to Jesus and the apostles. Three times Pilate refers to Jesus with the designation ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος, “this fellow” (Luke 23.4, 14), just as the high priest moments before Gamaliel’s intervention calls Jesus ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος (5.28).45 And correspondingly, two times Gamaliel refers to the apostles (i.e., those who in Acts embody Jesus, 9.4) as οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὗτοι, “these fellows” (Acts 5.35, 38).

When the demonstrative οὗτος qualifies ἄνθρωπος in Luke-Acts, the designation seems to imply contempt, as it does among other ancient authors.46 This expression is not exactly the

45 Some have suggested, although without sufficient evidence, that this designation used by the high priest in Acts 5.28 shows a hesitancy to utter the name Jesus (e.g., Bengel, Gnomon [ad Acta 5.28]; and Bruce, Acts [1988], 112). The evidence required appears, e.g., in Acts 2.21; 9.14, 21; 22.16. The implication is that the high priest and other characters who refuse “to call upon the name of the Lord” resist the salvation that this invocation brings.
46 See, e.g., Luke 14.30; 23.4, 14; 23.47; Acts 4.16; 5.28, 35, 38; 6.13; 22.26; 23.9; 26.31; 28.4. Cf. LXX Isa 39.3; Mark 14.71; Matt 22.2; John 9.16, 24; 11.47; 18.17, 29; Philo, Gig. 5; Epictetus, Diatr. 4.13.21; Plutarch, Caes. 4.9; Lucian, Hist. 38; and Acts Paul Thec. 9, 16. In order to convey respect, Luke uses ἀνήρ with οὗτος (Acts 9.13; 19.37; 23.27; 24.5) or, in one instance, γυνή with αὕτη (Luke 7.44). Cf. Philo, Contempl. 78; Josephus, Ant. 19.182; Plutarch, Alex. 22.10; Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 2.40.2. This distinction corresponds to that when ἄνθρωπος, on the one hand, and ἄνηρ and γυνη, on the other, are used as attributives of substantives (see Smyth §986b; Winer, Grammar, 657; and BDF §242). That is, ἄνθρωπος as an attributive often shows contempt (e.g., ἄνθρωπος φάγος καὶ οἰνοπότης, Luke 7.34; ἄνθρωποι Ῥωμαίοι, Acts 16.37; 22.25; cf. ἄνθρωπος βασιλεύς, Matt 18.23; 22.2; ἄνθρωπος οἰκοδεσπότης, Matt 21.33; ἄνθρωποι ἄγριοι, Lucian, Ver. hist. 2.44; ἰδιῶται ἄνθρωποι, Lucian, Peregr. 13). And conversely, ἄνηρ and γυνη as attributives often convey respect (e.g., γυνὴ χήρα, Luke 4.26; ἄνηρ προφήτης, Luke 24.19; Ἀνδρεὶς ἀδελφοί, Acts 1.16, ἀνδρεῖς Ἰσραήλ, 17.22). See esp. Gamaliel’s address to the members among the Sanhedrin, ἄνδρες Ἱσραήλ, in 5.35. Schneider (Apostelgeschichte 1:399) observes that Gamaliel’s referring to the apostles as οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὗτοι
same as derisively alluding to some negative trait in a person, as we see in Κρατερὸς οὗτος, “this Craterus” (Demetrius, Eloc. 289), ὁ Σύρος οὗτος, “this Syrian” (4 Kgdms 5.20), or ἡ ἀλώπηξ αὕτη, “this fox” (Luke 13.32); but its rhetorical effects appear to be comparable.

That this similarity in speech between Pilate and Gamaliel is not mere coincidence becomes apparent in the later episode in Acts when other Pharisees among the Sanhedrin say about Paul, “we find [εὑρίσκειν] nothing wrong with this fellow [ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος]” (Acts 23.9), which is itself a resounding echo of Pilate’s statements, “I find [εὑρίσκειν] no crime in this fellow [ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος]” (Luke 23.4) and “I found [εὑρίσκειν] no crime in this fellow [ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος]” (23.14; cf. 23.22).⁴⁷

There is a tension in the fact that these characters speak contemptuously about Jesus and the apostles, on the one hand, and that they find them innocent, on the other. Does Luke perhaps cast them as ironic characters?⁴⁸ That is, in declaring their innocence, are they behaving in a

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⁴⁷ The Majority text of Acts 23.9 more explicitly reflects the parallel between Gamaliel and the Pharisees of the Sanhedrin in this later scene by appending μὴ θεομαχῶμεν to their statement εἰ δὲ πνεῦμα ἐλάλησεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἄγγελος. Cf. Chrysostom’s interpretation of this passage, where he states: Οὐκοῦν αὐτοῦ ἀποστῶμεν, μὴ αὐτῷ πολεμοῦντες καὶ θεομάχοι εὑρεθῶμεν. “Therefore let us not withdraw from it [i.e., the πνεῦμα], lest we be at war with it and be found fighting against God” (Hom. in Acta 49.1 [PG 60:338]).

manner that is the opposite of what readers might expect? From Luke’s perspective, did Pilate actually “find” crime in Jesus? He does after all have the Christ followers pin the execution of Jesus upon “not only Herod, but Pontius Pilate as well, with the Gentiles and the peoples [λαοί] of Israel” (Acts 4.27). According to Luke, do the Pharisees also “find” wrong in the Christians? And in turn, do the readers of the narrative “find” (εὑρίσκειν) Pilate and Pharisees complicit θεομάχοι (Acts 5.39)? Although the θεομάχοι cannot “find” the apostles who escape from prison (5.22-23; 12.19), perhaps through these clues from within the narrative, Luke’s readers do “find” those characters who are θεομάχοι (5.39; 12.23).

6. Persecution for (Speech in) the Name

What is certain is that we see some correspondence between the scenes where Pilate does not find Jesus guilty of the alleged crime and where Gamaliel (Acts 5.34-39) and other Pharisees (23.9) make cases for letting off the Christians. Does Luke in any way hint at how Christians


If the Lukan Pilate is ironic, we see it most clearly in his three-fold statement about Jesus’ innocence (Luke 23.4, 14, 22). As Josephus depicts him, Pontius Pilate was notorious for having little tolerance toward Judean uprisings and thus showed almost no reserve in using military force against Jews and Samaritans who were resistant to Roman rule (Ant. 18.58, 62, 85-88). Philo quite scathingly characterizes Pilate’s governorship in terms of “the briberies, the acts of violence, the rapacious deeds, the assaults, the insults, the executions without trial one after another, and the endless and painful cruelty” (Gaium 302). Luke himself highlights the savagery of Pilate’s administration when he mentions some “Galileans whose blood Pilate mixed with their sacrifices” (Luke 13.1)—that is, he invaded their sacred space with militant actions while they were performing sacrifices. And Tacitus states that Pilate sentenced Jesus, or as he calls him, “Christus,” to death (Ann. 15.44). It is therefore not unsurprising to find Pilate playing a key role in the execution of Jesus (Luke 23.1-25; cf. Mark 15.1-15; Matt 27.2-26; John 18.28-19.16), but also highly uncharacteristic that Luke portrays him as hesitant to have Jesus crucified.
may have actually been punished by political and religious authorities? We may have a clue in the fact that Pilate, despite his statements that Jesus has carried out no “crime,” twice declares that he will “punish [παιδεύειν] and release [ἀπολύειν] him” (Luke 23.16, 22; cf. 23.18, 20, 25). And correspondingly, even though Gamaliel argues against killing the apostles, the Sanhedrin nevertheless “beat [δείρειν] them, command [παραγγέλλειν] them not to speak in the name of Jesus [μὴ λαλεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ Ἰησοῦ], and release [ἀπολύειν] them” (Acts 5.40).

While there is attestation that the higher Jewish authorities of antiquity applied punishments as a form of religious and communal discipline, the punishment afflicted upon the apostles in Acts 5.40 has some resemblance to that stemming from Roman policy as well. Their charge “not to speak in the name of Jesus” (5.40) fulfills Jesus’ prediction to his disciples that they will undergo persecutions ἕνεκεν τοῦ ὀνόματός μου, “for the sake of my name” (Luke 21.12), and be hated διὰ τὸ ὄνομά μου, “on account of my name” (21.17). While it is clear in this context of the Gospel that Jewish compatriots are instrumental in carrying out these forecasted persecutions—since the disciples are to be delivered to synagogues in particular (21.12), and that by their relatives (21.16)—the highest authorities the disciples will face are the “kings and governors” (21.12) to whom their compatriots hand them over.

When the apostles in Acts appear before Gamaliel and the rest of the Sanhedrin, the former have not yet been handed over to the highest political authorities, but they are undergoing the type of persecution Jesus predicted, which the narrator here qualifies as “to suffer dishonor for the name [ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματος]” (5.41). This instance where the Sanhedrin punishes and charges the apostles not to speak “in the name of Jesus [ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ Ἰησοῦ]” (5.40)

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50 Physical punishments applied by Jewish authorities are most often described as “forty stripes minus one.” See, e.g., Deut. 25.1-3; 2 Cor 11.24; Josephus, Ant. 4.238; m. Kilaim 8:3; m. Makkoth 1:1; 3:1-16; and comments by Rackham, Acts, 75; Haenchen, Acts, 254; Conzelmann, Acts, 43; Fitzmyer, Acts, 341; and Talbert, Reading Acts, 71; and Keener, Acts, 2:1241-42.
reverberates their earlier threat “to speak no longer in this name [ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ]” (4.17) and their reinforcement of this command “not to teach in this name [ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ]” (5.28).

This particular aspect of the narrative is strikingly similar to the policy concerning Christians about which Pliny and Trajan correspond (Ep. 10.96-97). Most noticeable is that Pliny inquires about “whether it is the name [nomen] itself that is punishable, even if innocent of crimes [flagitia], or whether it is the crimes associated with the name” (Ep. 10.96.2). Although Trajan does not answer whether the name in particular is punishable, he does advise Pliny to punish those charged with being Christians, even if such persons are not to be hunted out (Ep. 10.97.1-2).

We may also compare ἀπολύειν in Luke-Acts to dimittere in Pliny-Trajan. In Luke-Acts, the procedure of punishing (παιδεύειν, Luke 23.16, 22; δείρειν, Acts 5.40) the accused before “releasing” them is clear. While Pliny informs Trajan that he decided to release (dimittere) those persons who proved their loyalty to the emperor and who denied that they were or had ever been Christians (Ep. 10.96.5), whether they were also physically punished is unclear. Yet as Sherwin-White comments, dimittere “commonly has the sense ‘let off’ rather than ‘acquit’, when the judge is not fully satisfied of guilt. The dismissal may then be accompanied by

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51 Pliny does not indicate what exactly might be punishable in the name Christianus. Yet he may raise the question of whether “the name itself” is punishable because the designation Christiani appears to counter groups such as Caesariani and Augustiani, appellations used for devotees of the emperor (Tacitus, Ann. 14.15; Suetonius, Nero 25.1). Cf. Καισαριανοί (Appian, Bell. Civ. 3.13.91; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.19.19; 3.24.117; 4.13.22); Αὐγούστειοι (Dio Cassius 61.20.4); Νερωνιανοί (Plutarch, Galba 17.1); and Ἡρῳδιανοί (Mark 3.6; 12.13); with Josephus, C. Ap. 2.38; Elias J. Bickerman, “The Name of Christians,” HTR 42 (1949): 109-24, esp. 117-19; Harold B. Mattingly, “The Origin of the Name Christiani,” JTS 9 (1958): 26-37; and David G. Horrell, “The Label Χριστιανός: 1 Peter 4:16 and the Formation of Christian Identity,” JBL 126 (2007): 361-381.

52 The Vulgate affirms the correspondence between the terms in Luke 23.16, 18, 20, 23, 25; and Acts 5.40—where dimittere translates ἀπολύειν.
a beating." According to the *Digesta*, when a judge determines that the sentence of capital punishment is too extreme in a given case, one acceptable alternative is to beat and release (*dimittere*) the person(s) under examination (*Dig. 48.19.28.3*)—which closely parallels the scene where Pilate regards crucifixion too severe a punishment for Jesus (Luke 23.18, 21, 23) and the corresponding scene where Gamaliel convinces the Sanhedrin not to kill the apostles (Acts 5.33).

This comparison between Luke-Acts and Pliny-Trajan is not to suggest that Luke necessarily knew about or had even read the Pliny-Trajan correspondence, but rather to show that both Luke-Acts and Pliny-Trajan have some similarity on these points because each is writing about punishments concerning “the name” that most likely were meted out by governing authorities—the former in order to critique such punishments and the latter two about whether to carry them out.

While the Pliny-Trajan correspondence helps to contextualize how Roman authorities may have punished Christians for the “name,” we are still left with the question of what role the Jewish religious authorities may have played in meting out punishments. There is no reason for us to think that the “informer” (*Ep. 10.96.6*) of the Pliny-Trajan correspondence might have come from a Jewish community. Moreover, it may simply be a coincidence that, on the one hand, Roman authorities were questioning whether they ought to punish the name and, on the other, some early Christians regarded themselves as persecuted by Jews also for the name. It is

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54 According to Josephus, when Judea became a Roman province, Caesar granted ἑξουσία to Coponius, even to the extent of inflicting capital punishment (μέχρι τοῦ κτείνειν, *B.J.* 2.117; cf. *Ant.* 18.2).
also possible that Romans found the name suspect for one reason and that non-Christian Jews found it offensive for another.

In his *Dialogue with Trypho*, Justin Martyr claims that Jews placed pressures upon Christians to renounce the name, which he associates with a phenomenon of cursing Christians in synagogues:

> For you curse [καταρᾶσθαι] in your synagogues all those who have become Christians in his name [ἀπ’ ἐκείνου]; and the other nations are even effective in carrying out the curse, killing those who merely confess [ὁμολογεῖν] that they are Christians. To all of whom we say, ‘You are our siblings, instead recognize the truth of God.’ And while neither they nor you listen to us, but rather contend for us to deny the name of Christ [τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Χριστοῦ], we rather choose and submit to be put to death.” (*Dial*. 96.2; cf. 47.4; 108.3)

Later in the dialogue, Justin identifies “the Pharisaic teachers” and “the rulers of the synagogues” as the ones who seem to call for uttering such curses: “do not reproach the son of God, do not ever obey [πείθεσθαι] the Pharisaic teachers and make fun of the King of Israel, as your rulers of the synagogue teach you to do after the prayer” (*Dial*. 137.2).

In interpreting this evidence, we must attend carefully to the distinction Judith Lieu makes between the “Jewish persecution of Christians” and “Christian accusations of Jewish persecution.”\(^{56}\) It is often difficult to draw the line between historical reality and rhetorical polemic in such accusations. It is also important to observe that Justin does not here indict Jews for accomplishing any “killing” of Christians, but only for speaking the curses that lead “other nations” to kill them. We should note also that earlier in the dialogue Justin can refer to former persecutions that have ceased to exist by his day, even though he claims Jews continue to utter the curse: “cursing in your synagogues those who believe on Christ. For you do not have the

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authority to become our murderers, on account of those who now hold power” (Dial. 16.4).

Furthermore, if Jews did persecute Christians prior to Justin’s day, many of those Christians may have been Jews themselves—even if other Jews did regard the Jewish Christians as deviant. And then we would need to ask whether “persecution” consisted of inflicting physical harm, or whether it was merely on the level of verbal harassment. On the latter, Justin purports that Jews had dispatched envoys from Jerusalem to go throughout the Diaspora (εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν) and to report “that the godless sect of the Christians had emerged, distributing the very charges which all who are ignorant about us speak against us” (Dial. 17.1). 57

Some scholars hold that what Justin perceives as the “cursing” of Christians in synagogues is what is otherwise known as the Birkat haMinim, “benediction against the heretics.” 58 Yet our study of how this benediction may have developed and functioned within the context of ancient Jewish liturgies is rife with unanswered questions and irresolvable problems. 59 While some scholars have argued that the Birkat haMinim may be lurking in the background of the Fourth Gospel—as they attempt to illuminate the conflict between the “Pharisees” and

57 Here Justin quotes LXX Isa 52.5: Δι’ ὑμᾶς τὸ ὄνομά μου βλασφημεῖται ἐν τοῖς ἐθνεσι, “because of you my name is slandered among the Gentiles” (Dial 17.2). Cf. Rev 2.9: “the slander [βλασφημία] from those who say that they are Jews and are not, but are rather a synagogue of Satan.”


Christians reflected in that narrative—other scholars have challenged these interpretations.\(^6⁰\)

While we may not be able to confirm whether and much less what Justin knew about the *Birkat haMinim* in particular, he does clearly perceive that some Jews were indirectly involved in persecuting Christians.

Broadly speaking, what also seems certain is that there was at least some conflict among Jews (including Jewish Christians) in antiquity; and that this conflict sometimes revolved around diverging practices and beliefs. From an earlier period, we already observed in Pesher Nahum how the Qumran sect (probably Essenes) viewed the Seekers after Smooth Things (probably

\(^6⁰\) J. Louis Martyn argues that the *Birkat haMinim* served as the grounds for removing Jewish Christians from the synagogue, and even the means by which the synagogue officials excommunicated them. According to Martyn, when we read in John 9.22, “the Jews has already agreed [ἡδὲ συνετέθειντο] that anyone who confessed [ὁμολογεῖν] him to be the Christ would be put out of the synagogue,” the agreement refers to the decision at Yavneh “to reword the *Birkath ha-Minim* so as to make it an effective means for detecting Christian heresy.” And similarly, when many of the rulers “believed in him, but on account of the Pharisees did not confess [ὁμολογεῖν] lest they be put out of the synagogue” (12.42), Martyn sees the Pharisees as referring “either to the messengers (Sheluchim) who delivered the newly formulated Benediction to the Jewish community in John’s city, or to members of the local Gerousia who enforce this formulation” (*History and Theology*, 65). The evangelist of the Fourth Gospel, however, gives no hint of the Benediction as it was supposedly spoken within the liturgy of the synagogue. Teppler explains that even if the author “knew the blessing, or the atmosphere in which it was constructed, his stance did not have to be exactly and definitively against the particular version of the blessing intended by those who constructed it” (*Birkat haMinim*, 354). Marcus defends Martyn’s basic argument yet nuances some of its premises (“*Birkat Ha-Minim*,” 523-551). Langer summarizes the debates on Martyn’s reading and concludes: “That John’s Christian community was being driven out of the synagogue cannot serve as reliable witness to the prayer” (*Cursing the Christians*, 27-29, here 29). Cf. Douglas R. A. Hare’s “survey of the data of Jewish persecution of [early] Christians,” where he concludes that execution, flogging, imprisonment, and formal exclusion from the synagogue all played little to no role in such persecutions. What he views as the social effects of the *Birkat haMinim*, however, stand out as an exception in his analysis: “More common was the exclusion of Christians by the pressure of social ostracism, as indicated by the insertion into the daily prayer of the *Birkath ha-Minim*. Social ostracism was undoubtedly accompanied by economic boycotts, which may have led to financial hardship for some Christians” (*The Theme of Jewish Persecution of Christians in the Gospel according to St Matthew* [SNTSMS 6; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967], 19-79, here 78).
Pharisees) as their antagonists, which may reflect a context of persecution.\textsuperscript{61} And much later, Paul claims to have persecuted the church, which seems to have been concurrent with his life as a Pharisee (Gal 1.13-14; Phil 3.5-6); and thereafter he himself “five times received from Jews forty lashes minus one” (2 Cor 11.24), all the while maintaining his Jewish identity (11.22).\textsuperscript{62}

Luke of course has his own way of showing how Paul, as a former Pharisaic persecutor, was himself persecuted. Up until Saul’s conversion, he forcefully persecuted Christians based on “authority \(\varepsilon \xi \varphi \sigma \alpha\) from the high priests to bind all who call upon the name \(\tau \omicron \delta \omicron \mu \alpha\)” (Acts 9.14; cf. 9.1-2, 21). It is thus paradoxical that while journeying on a mission to persecute “the name” he becomes the missionary who will then carry “the name” before Gentiles, kings, and Jews (9.15; cf. 9.27-28) and must himself suffer \(\upsilon \pi \varepsilon \rho \tau \omicron \omicron \omicron \alpha \tau \omicron \omicron \omicron\), “for the name” (9.16; cf. 5.41; 21.13). And when he later in the narrative stands before King Agrippa, he relates how he once opposed “the name \(\tau \omicron \delta \omicron \mu \alpha\) of Jesus of Nazareth” (26.9).

How might we account for the evidence that there was conflict between Pharisees and Christians in light of the fact that the Lukan Gamaliel counsels his hearers to leave the apostles alone? Understanding Gamaliel and his followers in light of Theudas and Judas and their followers may provide an answer. We have seen above how the Sanhedrin in the narrative do not attend to Gamaliel’s counsel. Yet just as the followers of Theudas and Judas abandoned their respective “plans” after their leader died, it is possible that Luke views the followers of Gamaliel during his day—that is, after Gamaliel had died—as having abandoned the plan of their leader. If

\textsuperscript{61} Flusser, e.g., states: “We now know that the Essenes were persecuted both by the Pharisees and the Sadducees already from the time the Teacher of Righteousness founded the community” (\textit{Judaism}, 1:214-57, here 234). See further John J. Collins, “What Have We Learned from the Dead Sea Scrolls?” \textit{ Biblical Research} 57 (2012): 21-37, esp. 30-33.

so, perhaps Luke is making an appeal, also through figured speech, in the case that “Pharisees” took interest in reading his narrative.

As we observed in Hermogenes, one example of ἔμφασις is when “someone speaking openly about the matter does not seem to speak it.” Even though a particular statement, when uttered on its own, would indict a person, when that statement is couched within a larger context, it may go unnoticed as an indictment and yet still make its point. It is notable that Gamaliel’s speech begins with a warning, “be careful in what you are about to do to these fellows” (5.35); and it ends with the reason for that warning, “lest you be found God-fighters as well” (5.39). Accordingly, Gamaliel’s warning to the Sanhedrin may be directed not only to the characters in the narrative; Luke may also be using Gamaliel as his mouthpiece and thereby cautioning his Pharisaic contemporaries through one of their most revered teachers.

7. Conclusions

Gamaliel’s character is highly complex. On the one hand, his intervention allows the apostles to escape with only a beating and a charge to speak no more in the name of Jesus (Acts 5.40). Yet where Gamaliel likens Jesus to Theudas and Judas the Galilean, Luke in turn shows that Gamaliel, like Theudas and Judas, rises up (5.34, 36-37) and acquires obedient followers among the Sanhedrin (5.36-37, 39). As with the followers of Theudas and Judas, those of Gamaliel follow his leadership only for a time. Within this framework, the clearest sign of figured speech

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63 Inv. 4.13 (Rabe, 208 = Kennedy, 192).
64 Scholars have long observed, as Haenchen notes, “that Gamaliel’s advice to ‘leave the Christians alone’ represents Luke’s own demand” (Acts, 257). As Pervo describes, the scene involving Gamaliel “is designed to showcase Lucan apologetic theology on the lips of an outsider” (Acts, 146). Yet to whom Luke makes this demand has not been fully recognized. Cf. Johnson, Possessions, 197-98; and Padilla, Speeches of Outsiders, 127-34. We may observe a comparable apology in the Lukan Pilate. Thus Pilate, as a provincial governor, may serve as Luke’s own deliberative appeal to provincials—that is, Jesus and his followers are innocent, which the Pharisees among the Sanhedrin echo (23.9).
appears in the term βουλή (5.38), whose usages may convey “plan,” “counsel,” and “council meeting.” In his speech to the Sanhedrin, Gamaliel uses βουλή in reference to the “plan” of the Christ followers, whom he thinks will most likely disperse with time (i.e., based on the future-more-vivid condition). In another sense, however, the martyrdom of Stephen and the persecution against the church (7.54-8.3) show that Gamaliel’s own “counsel,” as well as the obedience of the “council” to him, are temporary.

Luke distinguishes between the obedience given to Theudas, Judas, and Gamaliel (πείθεσθαι, 5.36-37, 39) and the obedience the apostles pay to the authority of God (πειθαρχεῖν, 5.29, 32). Another indication that the Sanhedrin is not submitting to the authority of God appears in Gamaliel’s warning that they not be found θεομάχοι, “God-fighters.” As we see in narratives contemporaneous with Luke-Acts, simply raising the question of whether one might be a God-fighter is often a sign that one soon will be or else already is. It would thus be difficult to maintain that Gamaliel is secretly in league with the apostles. Although he is held in “honor” (τίμιος, 5.34) among the people, he does not “suffer dishonor” (ἀτιμάζεσθαι, 5.41) for the name.

In seeking to answer whether Luke alludes to anything about Gamaliel’s political perspective vis-à-vis Roman rule, our results are inconclusive but suggestive nonetheless. Most significant are the points of contact between Gamaliel’s speech and certain political authorities within the narrative, especially Pilate. Where Pilate conveys some derision toward Jesus when he calls him “this fellow” (Luke 23.4, 14), so does Gamaliel toward the apostles in calling them “these fellows” (5.35, 38)—both of whom the Pharisees in the Sanhedrin echo when they find no wrong in “this fellow,” Paul (23.9). Accordingly, there may be irony in each of these acquittals.

We see a further correspondence in the fact that both Pilate and Gamaliel regard punishment and release (Luke 23.16, 22; Acts 5.40) as the proper way to deal with Jesus and the
apostles. It is uncertain whether this aspect of the narrative reflects the particular policy concerning Christians that we know from the Pliny-Trajan correspondence, or perhaps a more general perspective on Christians who were persecuted for “the name.”

The key differences and the level of conflict between some Jews and (Jewish) Christians in the first and second centuries CE will remain debated. What is certain is that some early Christians perceived that some Jews were either directly or indirectly involved in persecuting them. As we conclude this first part of our investigation into whether and if so how Luke is using figured speech in his depictions of the Pharisees, such a context of perceived persecution might also point to why Luke would figure his speech about these characters. We recall that “figured speeches are invented in dangerous situations” (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ars Rhet. 9.5). If Paul serves as a template for Luke and his readers, perhaps they too can expect eventually to conduct their religious discourse “without hindrance” (Acts 28.31).
PART THREE: LUKE’S MORAL DIAGNOSIS OF THE PHARISEES

Chapter Nine: The Initial Symptoms of Illness

According to a number of scholars, Luke implies that the Pharisees are already “healthy” and “righteous” and thus not the sinners whom Jesus calls to repentance. The pericope receiving most attention on this point appears shortly after the Lukan Pharisees make their first appearance in the narrative (Luke 5.17) and Jesus compares himself to a doctor: “the ones who are healthy have no need of a doctor, but rather the ones who are sick. I have not come to call just persons [δίκαιοι] but rather sinners to repentance” (5.31b-32).

As we read further throughout the Lukan narrative, however, the understanding that the Pharisees are δίκαιοι becomes problematic. For Luke also shows how the Pharisees “justify” themselves (δικαιοῦν, 16.15; cf. 18.9; 20.20), which implies that they are more “unjust” (ἀδικος, 18.11) than the tax collectors who rather justify God (7.29-30, 35) and whom God in turn justifies (18.14). There is thus reason to doubt whether Luke truly wishes to diagnose the Pharisees as healthy. Has Luke in this earlier scene figured his speech against the Pharisees and

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1 Wm. O. Walker, Jr. states, “by implication,” Jesus compares “the scribes and/or Pharisees to ‘those who are well’” (“Jesus and the Tax Collectors,” JBL 97 [1978]: 221-38, here 228). Marshall claims, “The ‘righteous’ here will be the Pharisees, as they thought themselves to be, but the question of whether they were actually righteous or not is not raised; the stress lies on the positive call to the sinners” (Luke, 220). According to Neale, “Most frequently, far from being soft on his Pharisees, Luke portrays them as the very enemies of God’s purpose. At other times, however, he presents them as the ‘righteous’” (None but the Sinners, 103-04). Gowler argues that when the Pharisees initially appear in the narrative (Luke 5.17-26; 27-32) Luke implies that they “are among those who are righteous” and that they “are not yet under attack.” He claims further, “Even though Jesus calls the Pharisees by analogy, ‘well’ and ‘righteous,’ and he calls the toll collectors the ‘sick’ and ‘sinners’ (5:31-32), it is the toll collector who responds correctly to Jesus” (Host, 199). Culpepper qualifies the distinction accordingly: “the righteous (the Pharisees)” and “the sinners (those at table with Jesus)” (Luke, 128). Mason holds that the saying in 5.31-32 “implies that the Pharisees and their associates—the healthy and the righteous—do not need what Jesus has to offer. Jesus does not yet condemn the Pharisees” (“Chief Priests, Sadducees, Pharisees,” 134).
thereby allowed his readers to form a first impression that these characters are healthy? If he has, does he otherwise show that the Pharisees may not be as healthy as some readers have supposed?


As we ask how Luke has diagnosed the Pharisees, it may not be a coincidence that immediately before the meal in the home of Levi (5.27-32) Jesus heals the paralytic (5.17-26). The fact that Pharisees are present in each instance should not escape our notice (5.17, 21, 30). When we analyze these two pericopae together, what appears most prominently are some correspondences between the acts of sitting and standing:

Table 1: Sitting and Standing in Luke 5.17-32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sitting</th>
<th>Standing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“and Pharisees and teachers of the law were sitting [καθήμενοι]” (5.17b)</td>
<td>“and immediately he stood up [ἀναστάς] before them” (5.25a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“and he saw a tax collector named Levi sitting [καθήμενον]” (5.27a)</td>
<td>“and leaving everything behind, he stood up [ἀναστάς] and followed him” (5.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that this paralytic lacks the ability to stand suggests that these parallels between “sitting” and “standing” are deliberate on Luke’s part and may even carry allegorical significance. Through the parallel between καθήμενοι (5.17b) and καθήμενον (5.27a), has Luke invited his readers to compare the Pharisees and teachers of the law to the tax collector Levi? To make a comparison between Pharisees and tax collectors would of course not be so uncharacteristic of Luke, as the subsequent narrative confirms. Furthermore, does the parallel in

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2 When comparing Mark and Luke at this point, as Tannehill remarks, “in Luke the thematic connection is supported by a tighter narrative sequence. The reference to Jesus teaching the crowd by the sea, found between the healing of the paralytic and the call of Levi in Mark 2:13, is not present in Luke” (Narrative Unity, 1:104).
the participle ἀναστάς (5.25a, 28) signal a comparison between the paralytic and Levi? The fact that the synoptic parallels to 5.25a have ἠγέρθη (Mark 2.12) and ἐγερθεὶς (Matt 9.7) suggests that Luke is providing a clearer entrée into this comparison. If he is, then perhaps the implication is that Jesus heals each of these characters—one from a physical malady and the other from a moral one (e.g., extortionary greed, 3.12-13; 18.11; 19.8). When Luke then leaves the Pharisees sitting, we see yet another complication in the view that he casts them as healthy. Are there further clues from the meal scene in Levi’s home that would inform this question?

In that scene we notice two different ways of referring to the guests. The Lukan narrator is unique in identifying “tax collectors and others” (τελῶναι καὶ άλλοι, 5.29) at the meal, whereas the Pharisees and their scribes refer to the guests as “the tax collectors and sinners” (οἱ τελῶναι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοί, 5.30). The synoptic parallels do not distinguish between these two perspectives; their respective narrators and their (scribes of the) Pharisees all use “tax collectors and sinners” (τελῶναι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοί, Mark 2.15, 16; Matt 9.10-11). In Luke, the readers know

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3 Luke uses νομοδιδάσκαλοι and γραμματεῖς interchangeably. For example, the same groups he identifies as Φαρισαῖοι καὶ νομοδιδάσκαλοι in 5.17, he calls οἱ γραμματεῖς καὶ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι in 5.21. There is also interchangeability between νομικοί and γραμματεῖς, as we see in 11.45-46, 52-53. Here it is after Jesus gives a series of woes against Φαρισαῖοι and νομικοί (11.42-52) that οἱ γραμματεῖς καὶ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι become especially more motivated in their attempts to catch him say something unapproving (11.53). Therefore, the transition from Φαρισαῖοι καὶ νομοδιδάσκαλοι in 5.17 to οἱ γραμματεῖς καὶ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι in 5.21 appears to be insignificant for the purposes of understanding the narrative. That Luke uses νομοδιδάσκαλοι and γραμματεῖς and νομικοί to refer to the same characters does, however, offer some historical insight into the relationship between scribism and the study of Jewish law during this period. See further Stephen Westerholm, *Jesus and Scribal Authority* (ConBNT 10; Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1978), 26-39. Even though Luke pairs the Pharisees with νομοδιδάσκαλοι, νομικοί, or γραμματεῖς, it is not safe to assume that all teachers of law, lawyers, and scribes were Pharisees. Scribism was a profession, whereas Pharisaism was a religious sect. See Jacob Neusner, “The Formation of Rabbinic Judaism: Yavneh (Jamnia) from A.D. 70 to 100,” in *ANRW* II.19.2:3-42, esp. 41. Thus, a Pharisee may be a scribe (cf. the Lukan Gamaliel, who is both Φαρισαῖος and νομοδιδάσκαλος [Acts 5.34]), but not all scribes were Pharisees. The fact that Luke qualifies these scribes as those of the Pharisees (i.e., οἱ Φαρισαῖοι καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς αὐτῶν, 5.30; cf. Mark 2.16, οἱ γραμματεῖς τῶν Φαρισαίων) assumes that some but not all scribes were employed by or associated with the Pharisees.
that there are tax collectors, Pharisees, scribes of the Pharisees, and disciples attending this meal. This knowledge corresponds with the fact that the narrator uses ἄλλοι (others of more than two groups) rather than ἕτεροι (others of two groups) to designate those who were present, besides the tax collectors.⁴ That is to say, the “others” consist of the Pharisees, their scribes, and the disciples. The question then remains, whom do the Pharisees and scribes regard as “sinners” when they refer to οἱ τελῶναι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοί (5.30)? That they grumble to the disciples about eating with sinners indicates that the Pharisees and scribes do not include the disciples in this group of sinners. What the readers can then deduce is that the Pharisees and their scribes have paradoxically, and perhaps without realizing it, diagnosed themselves as the sinners with whom Jesus and his disciples eat. That is to say, their question to the disciples, “why are you eating and drinking with tax collectors and sinners?” (5.30), is another way of asking, why are you eating and drinking with tax collectors and us?

The answer to their question is that Jesus and his disciples eat and drink with tax collectors and the Pharisees and their scribes because they are all unhealthy and in need of healing, as the Lukan Jesus then explains: “the ones who are healthy have no need of a doctor, but rather the ones who are sick. I have not come to call just persons but rather sinners to repentance” (5.31b-32). Accordingly, if the Pharisees and their scribes were healthy, Jesus and his disciples would not be eating and drinking with them in this scene, as well as in the subsequent ones.⁵

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Yet there is one important difference between the Pharisees and Levi, as well as other Lukan tax collectors. The Pharisees seem not to recognize their unhealthy condition—that is, they do not acknowledge that they are the “sinners” to whom they have just referred. In this sense, their condition is a double ignorance, which is to say, they are unaware about their ignorance with regard to what constitutes a person who is δίκαιος (e.g., 5.32; 18.11). Would Luke go as far as Epicurus in saying that “knowledge of sin is the beginning of salvation” (apud Seneca, Ep. 28.9)? And does Luke otherwise show that the Pharisees are incapable of formulating proper judgments?

2. The Folly of the Scribes and Pharisees (Luke 6.6-11)

We may find answers to these questions shortly after this meal scene, in the episode about the healing of the man with the withered hand (6.6-11). There Luke ends the episode with the notice that the scribes and Pharisees were filled with ἄνοια, “folly” (6.11). The earlier contrast between “sitting” and “standing” may carry over into this episode—specifically when Jesus commands the man, “get up [ἐγείρειν] and stand [ἱστάναι] in the midst,” to which the narrator adds, “and he stood up [ἀνιστάναι] and stood [ἱστάναι] there” (6.8). The fact that ἀνιστάναι and these two instances of ἱστάναι are absent in the Markan and Matthean parallels (Mark 3.1-6; Matt 12.9-14) further highlights Luke’s emphasis upon these terms. Moreover, Luke retains ἀποκαθιστάναι

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6 Cf. Augustine: “Therefore, when the Pharisees, who regarded themselves as just, reprehended the Lord because he was mingling with the sick as a doctor, and said: behold with whom he eats, with publicans and sinners; the doctor responded to the delirious people: the doctor is not needed for the healthy, but rather for the sick; I have not come to call the just, but rather sinners. This is to say: you are saying that you are just, although you are sinners, you are proclaiming that you are healthy, although you are languishing; you are rejecting a remedy, and you do not have health” (Tract. Ev. Ioh. 7.19).

(6.10; cf. Mark 3.5; Matt 12.13), another compound of ἱστάναι, to describe how the man’s hand was restored. If Luke is inviting his readers to compare the Pharisees to persons who are healed, then in this instance perhaps readers are led to ask whether the thoughts (διαλογισμοί, 6.8) of the Pharisees and the scribes will also be set right—particularly their thoughts about whether it is proper to heal on the Sabbath (6.7) and their opinions about Jesus and his ministry more generally. Yet we cannot establish a comparison between the Pharisees and the man with the withered hand based on this evidence alone.

The most striking piece of evidence that seems to prompt such a comparison appears in the final lines of the pericope: “And he looked around at all of them [αὐτούς] and said to him [αὐτῷ], ‘Stretch out your hand.’ And he did, and his [αὐτοῦ] hand was restored. But they [αὐτοί] were filled with folly and began discussing with one another what they might do to Jesus” (6.10-11). Luke gives four different forms of the pronoun αὐτός in these sentences. Because it is nearly impossible to preserve in an English translation the aesthetic similarity and close succession in these forms of the pronoun, it is important to look closely at the Greek on its own: καὶ περιβλεψάμενος πάντας αὐτούς εἶπεν αὐτῷ, ἔκτεινον τὴν χεῖρα σου. ὁ δὲ ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἀπεκατεστάθη ἡ χεὶρ αὐτοῦ. αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπλήσθησαν ἀνοίας, καὶ διελάλουν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τί ἂν ποιήσαιεν τῷ Ἰησοῦ. Although the phrase πάντας αὐτούς εἶπεν αὐτῷ by itself may not arouse any suspicion, the juxtaposition between αὐτοῦ (referring to the man who was healed) and αὐτοί (pointing to the scribes and Pharisees) is especially suggestive. It is also telling that where Luke has αὐτούς, αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, and αὐτοί, the Markan parallel has αὐτούς, τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ, αὐτοῦ, and oi Φαρισαῖοι (Mark 3.5-6).
Accordingly, is Luke using the rhetorical figure known as πολύπτωτον—that is, the inflection of a word (usually a noun or pronoun) into its various cases? Quintilian illustrates this figure by quoting Rutilius: *Pater hic tuus? Patrem nunc appellas? Patris tui filius es?* (Inst. 9.3.36). Similarly, Aelius Herodianus, quoting Cleochares, relates: Δημοσθένης ὑπέστη Φιλίππῳ. Δημοσθένους πένης μὲν ὁ βίος, μεγάλη δ’ ἡ παρρησία: Δημοσθένει πολλῶν διδομένων οὐδὲν οὐτε πλήθος οὐτε κάλλος ἢξιον ἐφάνη προδοσίας: Δημοσθένην Ἀλέξανδρος εξήτει: τὸ διὰ τί παρ’ αὐτοῖς λογίζεσθε: ἀδίκως τε ἀπέθανες, ὃ Δημοσθένες.

As these examples of πολύπτωτον show, the inflected noun or pronoun typically refers to one and the same party. If Luke is using this figure, or some modification of it, the fact that he has these pronouns refer to two different parties would suggest that there is some correspondence between the two. But we would also notice important distinctions between the two, especially in

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9 *De figuris* (Spengel, ed., *Rhetores Graeci*, 3:97). See also *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, inflecting the name Alexander, Alexander Macedo summo labore animum ad virtute m a pueritia confirmavit. Alexandri virtutes per orbem terrae cum laude et gloria vulgatae sunt. Alexandria omnes maxime metuerunt, idem plurimum dilexerunt. Alexandro si vita data longior esset, trans Oceanum Macedonum transvolassent sarisae (4.31); Hermogenes, quoting Demosthenes, αὕτη τῶν περὶ Θήβας ἐγένετο πραγμάτων ἀρχὴ καὶ κατάστασις πρώτη. τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμα τὸν τότε περιστάντα τῇ πόλει κίνδυνον ἐποίησεν ὅσπερ νέφος (Id. 1.12.258-61); and οὕτω γὰρ ἠγούνται, τούτοις πείθασε, ὅπο τούτων δέος ἐστὶ μὴ παρακρουσθῆτε (Id. 1.12.263-65); Alexander, quoting Xenophon, τίνι μὲν γὰρ φίλοι πλείους ἢ τῷ Περσῶν βασιλεῖ; τίς δὲ κοσμῶν φαίνεται ἕπε τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ βασιλεύς; τίνος δὲ δόρα γινόσκεται μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ βασιλεῖς (De figuris [Spengel, ed., *Rhetores Graeci*, 3:34]); and quoting Demosthenes, οὗτος γὰρ κατέχουσι, τούτοις πείθασε ὑμεῖς, ὅπο τούτων δέος ἐστὶ μὴ παρακρουσθῆτε. κατοὶ τίς θήν ὁ τὸν πόλιν ἐξαπατῶν; οὐχ ὁ μὴ λέγων, ἃ φρονεῖ; τῷ δὲ ὁ κῆρυξ καταρᾶται δικαίως; οὐ τῷ τοιούτῳ (De figuris [ibid., 3:34-35]). For Luke’s use of this rhetorical figure in other contexts, see, e.g., τίς ἐξ ὑμῶν ἕξει φίλον καὶ πορεύσεται πρὸς αὐτὸν μεσονυκτίου καὶ εἴπῃ αὐτῷ· φίλε, χρῆσον μοι τρεῖς ἄρτους, ἐπειδή φίλος μου παρεγένετο εξ ὀδοῦ πρὸς με καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὁ παραθῆσαι αὐτῷ (Luke 11.5-6); and the inflection of πατήρ in 15.11-32, esp. 15.12: καὶ ἐπένε ὁ νεώτερος αὐτῶν τὸ πατρί· πάτερ, δός μοι τὸ ἐπιβάλλον μέρος τῆς οὐσίας. On these two examples of inflection in Luke, see the analyses by Mikeal C. Parsons, *Luke: Storyteller, Interpreter, Evangelist* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2007), 29-30, 56-57.
the following: καὶ ἀπεκατεστάθη ἡ χεὶρ αὐτοῦ. αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπλήσθησαν ἀνοίας. Here αὐτοῦ and αὐτοί are in juxtaposition at the end and beginning of clauses, which then serve as a description of the man’s restoration, in the first, and a statement about the worsening of the scribes and Pharisees’ condition, in the second.\(^\text{10}\) The passive verb in each clause underscores this contrast between a healing of the body (ἀπεκατεστάθη) and a debilitating malady of the mind (ἐπλήσθησαν). That is, “and his hand was restored” (6.10c), “but they were filled with folly” (6.11a).

We might reason that these four pronouns do not actually constitute a figure, on the grounds that Luke is simply being economical in expression. There is, after all, no danger of confusing the referent of the singular pronouns with that of the plural. Yet in Acts 4.9-11 we see another possible usage of this figure, this time with the near demonstrative: ὁ ἄχος (i.e., the lame man, 4.9); τὸ ἄχος (Jesus, 4.10); ὁ ἄχος (the lame man, 4.10); and ὁ ἄχος (Jesus, 4.11). And in this passage there is a slight possibility that readers would confuse the referents, which becomes evident when Pseudo-Oecumenius points out that ὁ ἄχος ἐστὶν ὁ λίθος in 4.11 “refers not to the lame man, but rather to Jesus Christ.”\(^\text{11}\) But the possibility that readers might at least elide the two—Jesus and the lame man (τὸ ἄχος ὁ ἄχος, 4.10)—may actually be the point of such a figure in Acts 4.9-11. What Jesus and the lame man have in common is that they were both raised, as it were: Jesus, “whom God raised from the dead” (4.10); and the lame man, he says, “is standing before you healthy” (4.10). The lame man would thus appear to be a type of Jesus—that is, Jesus also had stood before them healthy, but they did not recognize it (cf. 3.6-7, 15, 22, 26; 4.2).

\(^{10}\) Note also αὐτοῦ and αὐτός at the end and beginning of clauses shortly before in 6.7-8, in this instance both referring to Jesus.

\(^{11}\) *Com. in Acta ad* 4.8-14 (PG 118:97b).
If the purpose of such a figure is not necessarily to confuse and conflate the two parties, but at least to compare them, then how could we possibly compare the man with the withered hand, in the one case, and scribes and Pharisees, in the other? The similarity between them might surface in that a “filling” has taken place in each. That the scribes and Pharisees have minds that are filled with ἄνοια serves as a counterpoint to the notion that in order to restore a body part that is ἔξηρά, literally “dry,” it must be refilled with the proper amount of fluid.  

Galen, for instance, refers to bodies (τὰ σώματα) that become withered (αὐαίνειν) as a result of being dried up (ξηραίνειν). Such a condition may occur, he explains, when water that should normally flow through the cavities of the body is blocked (i.e., ὅδωρ ἀναστομωτικόν, lit., “water that will not pass through an opening”). Another cause he gives is the imbalance of fluid in the organs of the body—that is, too much fluid in one area and thus not enough in another (i.e., πλάδος τις ἀμέτρος αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀργάνοις ἐγγενόμενος, lit., “some disproportionate abundance of fluid that happens in the organs themselves”).

That the man’s hand becomes filled with water, while the scribes and Pharisees become filled with folly, is evident also when we read this story as a typology of the crossing of the Red Sea. As with its Markan parallel, the Lukan account about the man with the withered hand—whom Jesus commands, ἔκτεινον τὴν χεῖρα σου, “stretch out your hand” (Luke 6.10)—is based upon the story in which God orders Moses, ἔκτεινον τὴν χεῖρα σου (Exod 14.16, 26; cf. ἐξέτεινεν δὲ Μωυσῆς τὴν χεῖρα, 14.21, 27), so that the sea would become ἔξηρά, “dry,” (14.21, 29; cf. τὸ

12 Cf. Lucian, where he has the character Mnesippus describe the wife of Zenothemis as one with the right half of her body dried up (ξηρά τὸ ἡμίσυ τὸ δεξιόν, Tox. 24); as well as Acts Thom., where the young man who is guilty of a lawless deed attempts to partake of the Eucharist and consequently has his hands dried up (αἱ δὲ δύο χεῖρες αὐτοῦ ἐξηράνθησαν, 51). Yet after he follows the apostle’s instructions and washes his hands in special waters, they were restored (κατεστάθησαν, 52). See also Acts Phil. 17, 73-74.


 Particularly important is the parallel between ἀπεκατέστη τὸ ὕδωρ (Exod 14.27; cf. ἀποκαταστήτω τὸ ὕδωρ, Exod 14.26) and ἀπεκατεστάθη ἡ χεὶρ αὐτοῦ (Luke 6.10). As Luke presents it, when “the water was restored” to the man’s hand, “his hand was restored” to health. Granted, it is not uncommon to see Luke use verbs of “filling” to describe mental states. Yet the proximity of ἀπεκατεστάθη to ἐπλήσθησαν within these two parallel clauses suggests that Luke wishes to convey the point that, whereas the man became able in his body, the scribes and Pharisees became disabled in their minds.

 A further point of contrast appears in the parallel between the two instances of ποιεῖν in this passage—that is, between what the man with the withered hand did (ἐποίησεν) and then the fact that the scribes and Pharisees conspire about what they might do (ποιήσαιεν) to Jesus. The man with the withered hand was obedient to Jesus’ command (6.10). The scribes and Pharisees, however, advance their discussion about making an accusation against Jesus (6.7). In this sense, the two occurrences of ποιεῖν in 6.10b-11 correspond with the two compounds of ποιεῖν in 6.9, ἄγαθοποιήσαι ἢ κακοποιήσαι, “to do good or to do bad.” Jesus and the man with the withered hand have done good on the Sabbath by saving life (ψυχὴν σῶσαι). Have the scribes and the Pharisees done bad by destroying it (ἀπολέσαι, 6.9)?

 There is no indication that the scribes and the Pharisees were attempting to destroy the ψυχή of the man with the withered hand. They seem to reason that the man’s disability is not

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14 See also the parallels between ἵσταναι in Moses’ statement to the people, στῆτε καὶ ὄρθε τὴν σωτηρίαν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἂν ποιήσει ἡμῖν σήμερον (Exod 14.13), and in the narrator’s description of the pillar, ἔστη ἐκ τῶν ὀπίσω αὐτῶν (Exod 14.19, as well as 14.20), and then in Jesus’ command to the man, ἔγειρε καὶ στῆθι εἰς τὸ μέσον· καὶ ἀναστὰς ἔστη (Luke 6.8); between εἰς τὸ μέσον τῆς θαλάσσης (Exod 14.16, 22-23; cf. μέσον τῆς θαλάσσης, 14.27; ἐν μέσῳ τῆς θαλάσσης, 14.29; ἄνα μέσον τῆς παρεμβολῆς, 14.20) and εἰς τὸ μέσον (Luke 6.8); and between ἡ δεξιά σου χείρ (Exod 15.6) and ἡ χείρ αὐτοῦ ἡ δεξιά (Luke 6.6).

15 See, e.g., Luke 2.40; 4.28; 5.26; Acts 3.10; 5.17; 13.45, 52.
life-threatening and that the healing can therefore wait until another day.\(^{16}\) Yet we may see a
double meaning in the term ψυχή, “soul” and “life.” Could we say that the scribes and Pharisees
have destroyed their own “soul” through their opposition toward Jesus in this scene, which
would perhaps be coterminous to the fact that they were filled with ἄνοια? It is clear that they are
“doing bad” on the Sabbath by watching Jesus closely (παρατηρεῖν, 6.7; cf. 14.1; 20.20) in order
to find a reason to accuse him (κατηγορεῖν, 6.7; cf. 23.2, 10, 14) and by discussing with another
what they might do to him (6.11).\(^{17}\) Accordingly, are they seeking to destroy the “life” of Jesus
by plotting early on how they might hand him over to the political authorities (cf. 20.20)?\(^{18}\)

On this question, we could possibly compare the ἄνοια of the scribes and Pharisees with
the ἄγνοια, “ignorance,” of those who conspired with their rulers (οἱ ἄρχοντες) in executing
Jesus (Acts 3.17; cf. 4.25-28; 13.27).\(^{19}\) Yet this political collusion is highly suppressed in Luke
6.6-11, if it is present at all. In the Markan parallel about the man with the withered hand there is
a clearer indication that the Pharisees are colluding with the political authorities, since there “the
Pharisees went out and immediately held counsel with the Herodians against him, how they
might destroy him” (Mark 3.6).

\(^{16}\) See, e.g., m. Yoma 8.6; and the comments by Str-B 1:622-29; Marshall, Luke, 235;
Fitzmyer, Luke I-IX, 607; Lachs, Rabbinic Commentary, 199-200; Culpepper, Luke, 134; and
Green, Luke, 255.

\(^{17}\) As Bovon (Luke 1, 203) notes, παρατηρεῖν in the LXX “describes the evil people who
lie in wait for a righteous individual to stumble.” See, e.g., παρατηρήσεται ὁ ἁμαρτωλὸς τὸν
dίκαιον (Ps 36.12). Cf. Plummer’s (Luke, 169) comment upon 6.7 (παρετηροῦντο δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ
γραμματεῖς καὶ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι): “Lk. alone tells us who the spies were.” He adds, “The verb
signifies ‘watch narrowly,’ esp. with sinister intent, perhaps from looking sideways out of the
corner of one’s eyes, ex obliquo et occulto.”

\(^{18}\) That Luke does not retain ὅπως αὐτὸν ἀπολέσωσιν (Mark 3.6b; Matt 12.14b) at 6.11b
may not necessarily reflect an effort to acquit the Pharisees of conspiring in the death of Jesus. It
may rather show the discretion in his rhetorical style. As Plummer (Luke, 170) remarks, the
scribes and Pharisees “did not consider that they were breaking the sabbath in plotting to destroy
Jesus on this day (ver. 7). Were they to be allowed to destroy, while He was forbidden to save?”

\(^{19}\) On ἄνοια and ἄγνοια in these passages, cf. the comments by Tannehill, Narrative
What we can claim is that the scribes and Pharisees in Luke’s version of the story are not morally healthy, which confirms the suspicions that were raised earlier from the pericopae about the paralytic and the meal in Levi’s home. Yet before leaving this context of the narrative in our attempts to answer how Luke may have used figured speech in diagnosing the Pharisees morally, there is one additional piece of evidence that deserves our attention.

3. The Textual Variant at Luke 5.17c

In the sentence where the Pharisees are first introduced into the Lukan narrative there is a textual variant that may shed some light on whether these characters require healing. At Luke 5.17c, where some manuscripts read καὶ δύναμις κυρίου ἦν εἰς τὸ ἱάσθαι αὐτόν (κ α B L W Ξ 579. 2542 pc sy² sa; Did), others, instead of αὐτόν, conclude the sentence with αὐτούς (A C D Θ Ψ f ¹.¹³ 33 Ψ latt sy²h bo). Part of the question of whether αὐτόν or αὐτούς is the best reading is how each reading functions syntactically. It is not simply a matter of reading αὐτόν as the subject of τὸ ἱάσθαι in the one instance, or reading αὐτούς as the object of τὸ ἱάσθαι in the other, as some scholars have suggested.

It is clear enough that the preposition εἰς, when used with an articular infinitive, commonly conveys a sense of purpose in the action performed—as we see in Luke-Acts and in

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²¹ Plummer (Luke, 152), e.g., states, “The failure to see that αὐτόν is the subject, not the object, of ἱάσθαι produced the corrupt reading αὐτούς (A C D and versions).” Closely following Plummer, Metzger (Textual Commentary, 115) remarks, “The failure to see that αὐτόν is the subject, not the object, of τὸ ἱάσθαι led copyists to replace it with a plural form, as αὐτούς (A C D al), πάντας (K Cyril), αὐτούς πάντας (syr²¹al), or τοὺς ἰσθενοῦντας (l¹¹).” Similarly, Fitzmyer (Luke I-IX, 582) notes, “some others (C D Θ, and the Koine text-tradition) read autous, ‘was for healing them’ (obj. of the infin.).”
the Koine dialect more broadly. It is also granted that when Luke uses a preposition + an articular infinitive + an accusative (as in 5.17c, εἰς τὸ ἰᾶσθαι [αὐτόν or αὐτούς]), that accusative usually does serve as the subject of the infinitive and not the object. Thus it is indeed less probable that Luke would intend for αὐτούς to serve as the object of the infinitive here in this clause. That is to say, even if we were to accept αὐτούς as the best reading, based on the more widely attested Lukan style, the following sense is unlikely: “And the power of the Lord was for the purpose of healing them.”

Nevertheless, the reading αὐτούς in 5.17c need not function as the object of the infinitive construction. It might also be the subject of τὸ ἰᾶσθαι, if we take ἰᾶσθαι as a passive. That is, “And the power of the Lord was, so that they might be healed.” Such a passive-infinitive construction, also following εἶναι (yet without a preposition), occurs in another passage unique

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22 See, e.g., μετανοήσατε οὖν καὶ ἐπιστρέψατε εἰς τὸ ἐξαλειφθῆναι ὑμῶν τὰς ἁμαρτίας (Acts 3.19); οὗτος κατασφορισάμενος τὸ γένος ἡμῶν ἐκάκωσεν τοὺς πατέρας τοῦ πουειν τὰ βρέφη ἐκθέται αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ μή ζωογονεῖσθα (7.19); ἔπεμψα εἰς τὸ γνῶναι τὴν πίστιν ύμων (1 Thess 3.5); Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ εὐδοκομίποτος ἐστίν, ἐάνπερ χάριτος ἐπιτόχῳ εἰς τὸ τὸν κληρόν μου ἀνεμποδίστως ἀπολαβεῖν (Ign. Rom. 1.2); and Burton §§406-07, 409.

23 See, e.g., καὶ ἐν τῷ εἰσαγαγεῖν τοὺς γονεῖς (Luke 2.27); Ἐγένετο δὲ ἐν τῷ βαπτίσθηναι ἄπαντα τὸν λαὸν (3.21); καὶ ἐν τῷ συμπληροῦσθαι τῶν ἡμερῶν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τῶν ποιεῖσθαι (9.29); Ἐγένετο δὲ ἐν τῷ ὁμιλεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ συζητεῖν (24.15); καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ λέγειν αὐτόν (11.27); καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ ὁμιλεῖν αὐτοὺς (24.15); καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ ἀναστῆναι αὐτούς (24.51); καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ Πέτρου ἐρωταῖον (24.51); καὶ ἐν τῷ διδάσκειν αὐτοὺς (4.2); καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ συμπληροῦσθαι τὴν ἡμέραν τῆς πεντηκοστῆς (Acts 2.1); καὶ ἐν τῷ διδάσκειν αὐτοὺς (4.2); καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ συμπληροῦσθαι τὸν παλαιὸν χθόνιον (8.6); καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ συμπληροῦσθαι τὴν ἡμέραν τῆς πεντηκοστῆς (Acts 3.26). Rarely does an accusative in such a construction serve as the object of the infinitive. See, e.g., ὑμῖν πρῶτον ἀναστῆσας ὁ θεὸς τοῦ παῖδα αὐτοῦ ἀναστῆσας αὐτὸν εὐλογοῦντα ὑμᾶς ἐν τῷ ἀπεστημὸν ἑκάστον ἀπὸ τῶν πονηρῶν υμῶν (Acts 3.26). But even here, it is possible to read ἑκάστον as the subject of the infinitive. When in Luke-Acts two accusatives appear with an articular infinitive, a subject and an object, the first accusative is the subject and the second the object (e.g., Luke 2.27; 11.27; 24.51; Acts 4.2; 18.2).

24 For passive usages of ἰᾶσθαι, see e.g., Galen, De metodo medendi (Kühn 10:212, 308). Cf. ἰᾶται, as present passive, in LXX Lev 14.3. While taking αὐτόν as the subject of τὸ ἰᾶσθαι, it is not possible to read the infinitive as a passive and thereby suppose that Jesus was healed. Because Luke would hardly convey the idea that Jesus is the recipient of a healing, nor can we accept αὐτόν as the object of the infinitive. It is also highly unlikely, if not impossible, that the paralytic is the referent of αὐτόν, since he has not yet been introduced into the narrative.
to Luke, at 21.22: ὅτι ἡμέραι ἐκδικήσεως αὕται εἰσίν τοῦ πλησθῆναι πάντα τὰ γεγραμμένα, “for these are days of vengeance, so that all that has been written might be fulfilled.” Therefore, to take ἰάσθαι as a passive and αὐτοὺς as the subject of this infinitive would remain possible.

A further question that arises, in testing the reading αὐτοὺς, is to whom would this pronoun refer? The most proximate antecedent is clearly Φαρισαίοι καὶ νομοδιδάσκαλοι (5.17b), since readers have not encountered the ἄνδρες carrying the paralytic until the next sentence (5.18).25 Even though Fitzmyer concedes that αὐτοὺς may be the lectio difficilior, he claims that this pronoun “must refer to unnamed people; it cannot mean the Pharisees and teachers.”26 Yet as we have seen within the subsequent scene in the home of Levi (5.27-33), Luke does insinuate that the Pharisees are in need of healing. Is it therefore plausible that when Luke introduces the Pharisees into his narrative he indicates that Jesus had the power to heal them, and then proceeds in the subsequent narrative to show how they resisted that power?

The notion that Jesus can heal the Pharisees may not only be plausible within the Lukan narrative; we have seen some initial signs that it may be a central idea within it. It is clear that later interpreters applied allegorical significance to the stories about Jesus healing physical maladies—viewing those maladies as vices. What is not yet fully confirmed is whether Luke also presents his stories with such allegorical significance, that is, whether he draws upon and develops these traditions in order to convey meaning within the realm of philosophical ethics.

25 Even if we were to leap over the Φαρισαίοι καὶ νομοδιδάσκαλοι of 5.17 and understand αὐτοὺς as a reference to the ὄχλοι of 5.15, it is still the case that the only members of the crowd specified up until 5.17c are the Φαρισαίοι καὶ νομοδιδάσκαλοι. Cf. Euthymius, whose text has αὐτοὺς, which he interprets as the ὄχλοι. He comments: Δύναμις Ὁκεῦ ἦν παρ’ αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ ἰᾶσθαι τοὺς ὄχλους (Luc. ad 5.17 [PG 129:920]).
26 Luke I-IX, 582. See also Bonaventure, whose text of the Vulgate reads eos, whom he qualifies as “the infirm” (Luc. 5.43 [Opera 7:124]).
Our analysis of course does not require that we accept αὐτούς as the best reading in 5.17c. Nor do we have enough evidence even to propose that it is the best reading. After all, the manuscripts supporting αὐτόν are to some degree weightier than those reading αὐτούς. Furthermore, based on evidence we have seen so far from Luke 5.17-32 and 6.6-11, the notion that power of the Lord was present so that “they” (i.e., the Pharisees and teachers of the law) might be healed does not make for such a difficult reading—which is to say, it is hard to maintain that αὐτούς is the lectio difficilior. While we must not rule out entirely the possibility that αὐτούς is original to Luke, it is also quite likely that this reading came from the hand of a scribe who observed that within the Third Gospel Jesus has the power to heal the Pharisees. In the case of this latter scenario, the scribe would have made more explicit what Luke only implies.

4. The Lukan Jesus as a Doctor of the Soul (Luke 4.23; 5.31-32)

There is no question that Luke casts Jesus as a “doctor” in the metaphorical sense when he has him explain that only the sick (i.e., the unrighteous and sinful) have need of a ἰατρός (5.31-32).

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28 Cf. the pseudepigraphical Cynic epistles, where Diogenes remarks: “I did not dine with everyone, but only with those in need of therapy (Ep. Diog. 38.4; in Abraham J. Malherbe, ed., The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition [SBLSBS 12; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1977], 162). We see Diogenes playing the role of a doctor also where he writes to the tyrant Dionysius and there describes tyranny as a “sacred sickness” (Ep. Diog. 29.4; Malherbe, 128). Here Diogenes offers both a diagnosis and a general prescription: “But you have reached an advanced stage in corruption. Therefore cutting, cautery, and medication must be used” (Ep. Diog. 29.5; Malherbe, 128). See also Dio Chrysostom, who says that Diogenes went to Corinth, because “just as the good physician must go where the sick are most numerous and there render aid, so must the wise man reside especially where fools are most numerous in order to convict and reprove their folly [ἄνοια]” (Or. 8.5). He then explains that Diogenes compared himself to a physician, claiming that if he were treating teeth, eyes, diseases of the spleen, gout, or runny
Luke had already introduced this idea when Jesus says in the synagogue of Nazareth: “Doubtless you will say to me this proverb: ‘Doctor [ἰατρός], heal yourself’” (4.23). Yet if the Lukan Jesus is a doctor who is capable of curing souls in addition to bodies, how would he perform such a cure?

There may be an initial clue immediately before Luke introduces the Pharisees and teachers of the law and has his narrator state: “The crowds came to hear him [ἀκούειν] and to be healed [θεραπεύομαι] of their infirmities” (5.15). That Luke pairs the acts of teaching and healing in such close succession raises the question about the relationship between them. Are these two distinct acts, or can one receive healing simply through hearing? And then does the Lukan Jesus literally heal people from their physical maladies while also healing their souls through his teaching? Certainly we arrive at this latter meaning in the case of the paralytic, since he is healed both spiritually and physically when Jesus declares that his sins are forgiven and he walks (5.20-25).

When we compare Luke to the synoptic parallels, it becomes clear that this pairing between “hearing” and “healing” is no random occurrence. The terms ἀκούειν and θεραπεύομαι

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noses, then multitudes would flock to him (8.7). But because he was attempting to cure ignorance [ἀγνωσία], evil [πονηρία], and intemperance [ἀκολασία],” no one consulted with him (Or. 8.8). Correspondingly, Diogenes is a “doctor of the passions” in Lucian, Vit. auct. 8. On the commonplace that likens the moral philosopher to a doctor, see also Seneca, Ep. 22.1; 27.1; 40.4-5; 50.4-5; 109.17; 117.33; 123.17; Ira 1.6.2-4; 1.15.1; 1.16.4; 2.10.7; 3.39.1-4; Const. Sap. 13.2; Cons. Helv. 2.2-3; Musonius Rufus 1 (Lutz, 32); 2 (36); 3 (42); 5 (50); 6 (52); Epictetus, Diatr. 2.13.12-13; 3.21.20-21; and especially the following two treatises by Galen: De propriiorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curacione (Kühn 5:1-57); and De animi cuiuslibet peccatorum dignotione et curatione (Kühn 5:58-103), which are both translated in Galen on the Passions and Errors of the Soul (trans. Paul W. Harkins, with an introduction and interpretation by Walther Riese; Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963). See also Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Klauck, “Heil ohne Heilung?” 85-89.

29 As Bonaventure explains, “Christ simultaneously cures the body and soul of the sick person: the soul from sin and the body from sickness” (Luc. 5.47 [Opera 7:125]).
at Luke 5.15 are unique to this evangelist (cf. Mark 1.45). At another point of comparison, where the Markan Jesus only teaches (Mark 6.34) and the Matthean Jesus only heals (Matt 14.14), the Lukan Jesus both heals and teaches (Luke 9.11). So also, in another instance, where in Mark a great multitude comes to Jesus because of his power to heal (3.8), in Luke a great multitude comes ἄκοισαι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἰαθῆναι ἀπὸ τῶν νόσων αὐτῶν, “to hear him and to be healed from their diseases” (6.18). 30

This latter statement is part of the introduction to the so-called sermon on the plain (6.20-49), which then raises the question of whether that sermon will have a therapeutic effect upon its hearers. Before Jesus begins to speak, the narrator also states: “And all the crowd was attempting to grasp [ἀπεσθαί] him, because power was coming forth from him and he was healing them all” (6.19). The usage of ἀπεσθαί in this context may convey a double meaning, “to touch” and “to understand.” 31 In one sense, it is conceivable that they are trying “to touch” Jesus and thereby be healed from their physical diseases. The hemorrhaging woman clearly receives physical healing in this way; and in that scene, “power” (δύναμις, 8.46) goes out from Jesus when the woman touches him (ἀπεσθαί, 8.44-47), just as “power [δύναμις] was coming forth from him” before the sermon (6.19). Yet because readers also know that some had come ἀκοῦσαι αὐτοῦ, “to hear him” (6.18), it is sensible that some were trying ἀπεσθαί αὐτοῦ, “to understand him” (6.19), as well.

We may compare how ἀπεσθαί seems to function in this scene to an occurrence of this verb from Plutarch’s treatise, Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat (Mor. 75a-86a). There he explains that beginning students of philosophy initially crowd together with much excitement

31 On these usages of ἀπεσθαί, see LSJ, s.v. ἀπω II and III.4.
and shouting, but after encountering philosophy they become attentive and silent, attending to reason (ὁ λόγος) as if to a god (θεός, 81d-e). He invokes Menedemus as having said that “the multitudes who sailed out for school in Athens were wise at first; then they became philosophers, then rhetors, and as time went on, common persons. The more they laid hold of reason [ἀπτεσθαι τοῦ λόγου], the more they laid aside self-conceit and affectation” (81f).

Plutarch then uses the common analogy that likens philosophical study to receiving medical treatment—showing how some will stubbornly resist moral admonition, just as some refuse treatment that would bring bodily healing:

Therefore in the case of those who want medical treatment [ἰατρεία], the ones who have pain in a tooth or a finger immediately go to those who provide healing [ὁι θεραπεύοντες]; and the ones who have fever call them to their house and want their help. But the ones who have reached a state of melancholy or inflammation of the brain or frenzy sometimes cannot even tolerate those who would come to see about them, but rather drive them away or flee their presence—not even realizing that they are sick because they are so sick. Thus also in the case of those who sin [ὁι ἁμαρτάνοντες], the incurable are the ones who behave antagonistically and savagely and express anger toward those who correct and admonish. But the ones who bear and accept it have a milder condition. And if a person who sins submits himself to those who correct, acknowledges his condition, discloses his depravity and does not rejoice in hiding it nor takes pleasure in being ignored, but rather confesses and wants a person to lay hold of [ὁ ἅπτόμενος] and admonish him, there is no small indication of progress. (Mor. 81f-82a)

Plutarch twice uses ἅπτεσθαι in this context of the treatise, once to show that students “lay hold” of reason as they come to understand it, and again to indicate that those students must recognize the need for someone to “lay hold” of them in order to make moral progress. When we compare Plutarch to Luke and ask how each uses the commonplace that likens a philosophical teacher to a doctor, we see some striking similarities but also some important

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32 We see ἅπτεσθαι used for the act of “laying hold of” or “comprehending” λόγος or λόγοι, e.g., in Aristophanes, Ran. 894; Plato, Resp. 538c; 539a; Strabo, Geogr. 4.4.2; Sextus Empiricus, Math. 10.319 (LCL 3:366); Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 4.7.1; 4.30.1. And for how λόγος or λόγοι may “lay hold of” persons, see Plutarch, Alc. 6.1; Oth. 3.4. Cf. Plato, Resp. 511b.
differences. In the Third Gospel the Pharisees are most conspicuously resisting Jesus because he heals others rather than because he attempts to heal them. Yet we have also seen some subtle indications that the Lukan Pharisees are morally unwell, even when they oppose Jesus in his work as a healer of others. And perhaps here we see another key difference between the example from Plutarch and this theme in Luke. The sick persons in Plutarch do not doubt whether the doctor is qualified to heal, but only deny that they in particular are in need of treatment. The Pharisees in Luke, however, do question whether Jesus can accomplish the forgiveness of sins (5.21) and also his particular approach at moral rectification (5.30-32), even though they may take for granted that he is a healer of physical infirmities (6.7).

5. Conclusions

It would be difficult to maintain the view that Luke regards the Pharisees as morally healthy. At that point in the narrative where the Pharisees make their first appearance, Luke seems to draw a subtle comparison between the paralytic, who stood up (Luke 5.25a), and the Pharisees and Levi, who are all sitting (5.17b, 27a). And then there is a further comparison within a comparison, as Levi also stands (5.28), while the Pharisees presumably remain seated. These comparisons imply that, just as the paralytic received the forgiveness of sins and healing, so is Levi morally healed when he stands within his tax office, leaves everything behind, and follows Jesus. Accordingly, the Pharisees then unknowingly diagnose themselves when they ask why the disciples eat and drink with “tax collectors and sinners” (5.30), including themselves among the latter.

The theme that the paralytic and Levi stand is subsequently echoed through multiple verbs of standing when Jesus heals the man with the withered hand (6.6-11, esp. 6.8). Luke

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33 Cf. Seneca, Tranq. 1.16: “I think that many people could have arrived at wisdom if they had not thought they had arrived, if they had not pretended about certain traits in themselves, and passed by other traits with their eyes shut.”
signals a comparison between the man with the withered hand and the Pharisees through the rhetorical figure known as πολύπτωτον, the inflection of a noun or pronoun into various cases (αὐτοῦς, αὕτῳ, αὐτοῦ, and αὐτοῖ, 6.10-11). When drawing such a comparison, we notice that a “filling” has occurred in each. The man’s “dry” hand was filled with water and thus restored (6.10), which Luke conveys through a typology based upon the crossing of the Red Sea. The scribes and Pharisees, however, “were filled with folly” (6.11).

The textual variant at Luke 5.17c raises the question of whether Luke had there already implied that the Pharisees and teachers of the law were in need of healing. After testing the reading αὐτοῦς, we have seen that one syntactical possibility is to understand αὐτοῦς as the subject of τὸ ἱᾶσθαι, taking the infinitive as a passive—that is, “so that they might be healed.” While αὐτόν is most likely the earlier reading, the variant αὐτοῦς may at the very least reflect an early interpretation that these characters are morally unwell.

There is no doubt that Luke casts Jesus as both a healer of bodies and a doctor of souls (4.23; 5.31-32). When we evaluate how souls in particular may receive healing in this Gospel, the evidence suggests that hearing and understanding the teachings of Jesus play a key role. While the Pharisees at this early point in the Gospel have failed even to acknowledge that they are sick, we have so far seen only a few symptoms that would lead readers to diagnosis them as “sinners.” If they are not counted among those whom Luke regards as “just persons” (δίκαιοι), does he otherwise characterize them as unjust? And if so, how?
Chapter Ten: The Passions of Injustice

In the previous chapter, we evaluated the passage in which the Lukan Jesus speaks figuratively about “just persons” (δίκαιοι) as having moral health and those who are “sinners” as being morally sick (Luke 5.31-32). We also observed some indications that Luke has figured his speech in diagnosing the Pharisees as morally unwell. If Luke does not include the Pharisees among the just, does he also cast them as unjust? We may find an answer to this question from within that context where the narrator identifies the Pharisees as φιλάργυροι, “lovers of money” (16.14); for here the theme of justice plays an important role. The reason the narrator calls the Pharisees φιλάργυροι is seemingly to provide some commentary on why they were scoffing at Jesus’ teachings about how to use “the mammon of injustice” (ὁ μαμωνᾶς τῆς ἀδικίας, 16.9) or “unjust mammon” (ὁ ἄδικος μαμωνᾶς, 16.11), and that “he who is unjust [ἄδικος] in the least is unjust also in much” (16.10)—all of which stems from what ἀδικία, “injustice” (16.8), means within the parable in 16.1-8.¹ It is also immediately after the Pharisees are said to be φιλάργυροι that the Lukan Jesus tells them: “you are the ones who justify yourselves [οἱ δικαιοῦντες ἑαυτοὺς] before people, but God knows your hearts” (16.15).

We have seen from earlier parts of the narrative that one way Luke insinuates the moral sickness of the Pharisees is to juxtapose them with characters who have physical maladies. Does he make a similar rhetorical move in this context of the Gospel? Furthermore, if the love of money has some relationship to injustice from Luke’s perspective, how would his readers possibly understand this point about the Pharisees in particular? We shall attempt to answer each

¹ See, e.g., Tannehill: “‘Dishonest’ is probably too narrow a translation for adikia. When applied to the manager in verse 8, it refers to his dishonesty, but when applied to the disciples and others in verse 9, it means more than wealth gained by specific acts of dishonesty. It indicates that wealth in this present world is part of an unjust system that oppresses the poor. Therefore, giving it to the poor is the proper antidote” (Luke, 248-49).
of these questions in turn, first by analyzing the term φιλάργυροι within this context of the Gospel, and second its use within moral philosophical discourse pertaining to justice in particular.

1. The Passion for Money

When the narrator says that the Pharisees are “lovers of money” (16.14), this accusation at first seems devoid of any figure. Within the history of interpretation, however, some have linked these “lovers of money” to the earlier episode about the healing of the man with dropsy (14.1-6), which occurs in a “house of one of the rulers of the Pharisees” (14.1). As Augustine explains, “we rightly compare the dropsical man to an avaricious rich man, for the more the former overflows with inordinate fluid, the more he is thirsty; so the more that one is abounding in riches that he does not use well, the more ardently he longs for such.” Gregory the Great states this point more fully:

And hence our redeemer cures the dropsical man in front of the Pharisee’s house, and when he was arguing against avarice, it is written: “and the Pharisees, who were avaricious, heard all these things and derided him.” Therefore, why is it that the dropsical man is cured in front of the Pharisee’s house, except that through the bodily illness of the one, the illness of heart in the other is expressed. Since the more a dropsical person drinks, the more he thirsts; so also every avaricious person increases his thirst from drink, in that when he has acquired the things that he longs for, he pants

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2 Hydropem autem recte conparamus diuiti auaro, sicut enim ille quanto magis abundat humore inordinato, tanto amplius sitit, sic iste quanto est copiosior diuitiis quibus non bene utitur, tanto ardentius talia concupiscit (Quaest. ev. 2.29; Almut Mutzenbecher, ed., Quaestiones evangeliorum [CCSL 44B; Turnholti: Brepols, 1980], 70). Immediately before, Augustine explains: “He fittingly compared a dropsical man to an animal that fell into a well, for he was troubled by fluid, just as he compared that woman—whom he had said was bound for eighteen years, and from the same bondage he released—to a beast of burden that is released so that it may be led to water” (ibid., 69-70). See also Bede, Luc. ad 14.1-2 (CCSL 120:275); Albert the Great, Luc. ad 14.2 (Opera 23:328-29); Bonaventure, Luc. 14.11 (Opera 7:361); and Maldonado, Luc. ad 14.5 (Martin 2:250).
the more in longing for others. For he who by acquiring longs for more is he whose thirst increases from drink.  

More recently, Willi Braun has argued (seemingly independent of Augustine and Gregory) that the healing of the man with dropsy serves as a contrast to the potential, albeit unrealized, healing of the “craving desire” that the Lukan Pharisees manifest. Partly because Luke places this healing in the home of the Pharisee and at this point in the narrative, readers can infer that the Pharisee “still suffers from ‘dropsy,’” Braun states. Braun takes his cue from Cynic traditions that use dropsy as a “metaphor for consuming passion.” For example, Stobaeus preserves the following tradition about Diogenes of Sinope: “Diogenes used to compare the lovers of money [οἱ φιλάργυροι] to dropsical persons. For the latter, though being full of fluid, desire drink; and the lovers of money, though being full of money, desire more—but both for their harm. For the more the things desired are obtained, the more the passions are increased.”

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3 Vnde et Redemptor noster ante pharisaei domum hydropicum curat, et cum contra avaritiam disputaret, scriptum est: Audiebant autem omnia haec pharisaei, qui erant auri et deridebant illum. Quid est ergo quod ante pharisaei domum hydropicum curatur, nisi quod per aliiis aegritudinem corporis, in alio exprimitur aegritudo cordis? Hydropicus quippe quo amplius biberit, amplius sitit, quia et omnis avarus ex potu sitim multiplicat, qui cum ea quae appetit adeptus fuerit, ad appetenda alia amplius anhelat. Qui enim adipiscendo plus appetit, huius sitis ex potu crescit (Moralia in Iob 14.12; Marci Adriaen, ed., S. Gregorii Magni Moralia in Job Libri XI-XXII [CCSL 143A; Turnholt: Brepols, 1979], 705-06).


5 Braun, Feasting, 30-38. Less certain is Braun’s claim that there is “little ground for believing that Luke had anything more than a vague, second-hand knowledge of Pharisees” (Ibid., 28).

6 Διογένης ὁμοίου τοῦ φιλαργύρου τοῦ ὑδρωπικοῦ, ἀκείνους μὲν γὰρ πλήρεις ὄντας ὑγρῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν ποτοῦ τοῦς τε φιλαργύρους πλήρεις ὄντας ὄργανοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖν πλεῖονος, ὁμοφόρους δὲ πρὸς κακοῦ. ἐπιτείνεσθαι γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ πάθη, ὅσοι τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα πορίζονται (Stobaeus, Anthologium 3.10.45). See also Polybius, Hist. 13.2.2; Horace, Odes 2.2.9-16; Ovid, Fast. 1.215-16; Plutarch, Mor. 524a-d; and Braun, Feasting, 30-38.
2. The Passion for Glory

This evidence leading us to compare the dropsical man to the Pharisees is especially compelling. Yet it would be problematic to limit the metaphor of dropsy exclusively to φιλαργυρία, “love of money,” since the parable that Jesus tells immediately after healing the dropsical man is chiefly concerned about those who were choosing “the first seats at the table” (14.7). The topic addressed in this parable therefore raises the question of whether dropsy may also signify the passion that moral philosophers call φιλοδοξία, “love of glory,” or φιλοτιμία, “love of honor.” And when we look further into this history of interpretation, Cyril of Alexandria for one does apply both of these terms in his interpretation of the parable. While Luke himself does not use these terms, the Lukan Jesus does refer to the ἐντιμότερος, “more honorable person,” who might supplant the one who vies to have the first seat (14.8). He also explains that one will receive “glory [δόξα] before all who recline with you” not by choosing the first seat, but rather by being promoted to a higher seat when he has first chosen the lowest.

As Erasmus expounds upon this section of the Gospel in his paraphrase, the Pharisees “were pursuing their own glory [gloria],” which “was the true dropsy of the heart.” He continues: “So great was their thirst for the most foolish glory, so great was their swelling;

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7 Cyril of Alexandria, Luc. ad 14.7-11 [PG 72:785c-d]). Theophylact identifies the passion as κενοδοξία, “vainglory,” and remarks: “For behold, when he healed the man with dropsy he taught the Pharisees that it is good to benefit on the Sabbath. And when he saw them also clamoring about the first seat, he heals this passion as well” (Luc. ad 14.7-11 [PG 123:929d]).

8 Erasmus, Para. Luc. 14.7 (LB 7:400e). See also Tannehill: “Jesus cures this man with dropsy, and then turns to the Pharisees and lawyers, who are driven by their own insatiable desire for places of honor. Can he cure them by his teaching?” (Luke, 228). Parsons likewise observes that the parable in 14.7-14 is well understood “against the backdrop of dropsy as a metaphor for the insatiable desire for status and honor” (Luke, 226). He further comments: “The man with the dropsy represents the unquenchable desires of the dinner guests; his healing represents the possibility for the transformation of their desires from seeking self-exaltation to a life of humility” (ibid., 227).
the inside nothing was sound. Yet he who was suffering from water within the skin was easily healed, because he acknowledged his sickness and desired to be healed."

Although dropsy appears to serve as an analogy more often for greed, Teles (invoking Bion of Borythenes) purportedly likened the “dropsical person” (ὄδρωπικός) to one who is “insatiable [ὑπληστος] and thirsty for glory [δοξοκόπος] and superstitious.” The term ὑπληστος here may have the nuance “greedy,” since in this context Teles is explaining how “money” (χρήματα) must not be sought for the person who would be freed from “lack” (ἔνδεια) and “scarcity” (σπάνις). If so, then we see how the analogy may apply to multiple passions at one and the same time.

We should also not assume that dropsy, as an analogy for the passions, was original and unique to the Cynic tradition. For without invoking the Cynics, Seneca uses the symptoms of dropsy to typify persons who swell with anger (Ira 1.20.1); and elsewhere he associates these symptoms with those who become bloated with excessive and luxurious dining habits (Ep. 95.15-16; 122.3-4). In yet another context, Seneca explains that cravings for money or food are characteristic of the inexplebilis animus, “insatiable soul,” which he compares to an unquenchable thirst caused by a morbus, “sickness” (Helv. 11.3-4). Similarly, in explaining the condition of a certain young man who was suffering from dropsy, Philostratus remarks that “he took his pleasure in drunkenness and neglected a dry diet” (Vit. Apoll. 1.9). And Lucian includes

9 Erasmus, Para. Luc. 14.7 (LB 7:400f).
10 Stobaeus, Anthologium 4.33.31.
11 Clement of Alexandria also remarks how “desire” (ἐπιθυμία) can manifest itself outwardly, just as dropsy has symptoms that become externally visible (Paed. 3.5.33). See also John Chrysostom, De Lazaro 3.5 (PG 48:998); and on Chrysostom’s moral perspective regarding these passions, see further Margaret M. Mitchell, “Silver Chamber Pots and Other Goods Which Are Not Good,” in Having: Property and Possession in Religious and Social Life (ed. William Schweiker and Charles Mathewes; Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2004), 88-121.
dropsy among a host of other ills that are “born from those expensive dinners” (*Gall.* 23). In comparing the dropsical man and the Pharisees, what other passions might Luke attribute to the Pharisees?

3. The Passion for Luxury

The fact that some authors from antiquity associate dropsy with gourmands might lead us to suspect that the rich man of Luke 16.19-31 is also within the evangelist’s purview. In addition to being a “rich man,” the first thing we learn about him is that he “would dress himself in purple and fine linen and celebrate splendidly every day” (16.19). The most obvious marks of similarity between the Pharisees and the rich man are the designations that they are φιλάργυροι (16.14) and πλοῦσιος (16.19), respectively—even though we must grant that loving money and actually having money are not the same.

When we look at the history of interpretation, Bede draws the comparison between dropsy and avarice, and he also remarks that the dropsical man “is compared to him whom an overflowing stream of carnal pleasures weighs down.” But he is not necessarily referring to the rich man of 16.19-31 in particular. Theophylact also comments that “a dropsical person [ὑδρωπικός] is everyone who through a relaxed and luxurious [ὑγρός] way of life is terribly sick in his soul.” While the adjective ὑγρός in its most literal sense means “wet” or “moist,” Theophylact appears to expound upon the analogy of dropsy through this term—as ὑγρός can also convey that a person’s lifestyle is “soft” or “luxurious.” Yet he does not invoke the rich man of 16.19-31 in his interpretation.

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12 Here the speaker in the dialogue is Pythagoras, reincarnated as a rooster (*Gall.* 3-4).
15 See, e.g., Plutarch, *Sol.* 3.1; and LSJ, s.v. ὑγρός, II.7.b.
If Luke expected his readers to understand the dropsical man as symptomatic of the rich man in 16.19-31, are there also other earlier themes that become further developed in that parable? There is some correspondence between the theme of injustice in 16.1-15 and 16.19-31. While it may be implied that the pursuit for money leads to injustice in 16.1-15, we see that the rich man of 16.19-31 is unjust most notably in the contrast between his lavish and daily celebrations while Lazarus was “longing to be fed from what fell from the rich man’s table” (16.21). And it is only after the rich man and Lazarus die that justice is served to each (16.25).16

The fact that Lazarus was longing to be fed (ἐπιθυμεῖν χορτασθῆναι, 16.21) echoes a statement about the younger son from 15.11-32, who was longing to be fed (ἐπιθυμεῖν χορτασθῆναι, 15.16) from what the pigs were eating. Does the longing desire in each of these characters serve to contrast with the passions of those who could have fed them but did not? In the case of the younger son, we do not know what kind of resources his employer may have had. Yet the parable does indicate that “no one was providing for him” (15.16), which may imply that his employer had not invited him to his table. There seems to be more of a contrast between, on the one hand, the younger son and Lazarus, and, on the other, the elder son and the rich man; about the latter two we could say that both had “more than enough bread” (Luke 15.17; cf. 16.19, 21).

Furthermore, the Lukan Jesus had earlier instructed the ruling Pharisee that when he hosts a meal he should invite “the poor, crippled, lame, and blind” instead of his friends and kindred and rich neighbors (14.12-13). And this instruction reverberates within the parables of 15.11-32 and 16.19-31. The elder son of 15.11-32 complains about the party thrown for the younger son

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(15.25-30)—indicating that the elder son typifies those Pharisees and scribes who were grumbling about Jesus welcoming (προσδέχεσθαι) and eating with tax collectors and sinners (15.1-2). Luke then draws a further distinction between the table fellows of Jesus and those of the Pharisees when the elder son complains that the father had never given him any meat so that he could “celebrate” with his friends. The elder son’s desire for celebrating (ἐυφραίνεσθαι, 15.29) and the rich man’s practice of celebrating daily (ἐυφραίνεσθαι, 16.19) both contrast with the necessity of celebrating and rejoicing (ἐυφρανθῆναι δὲ καὶ χαρῆναι ἔδει, 15.32) in the case of the younger son.

We may draw further distinctions in the elder son’s use of the term κατεσθίειν (15.30), which seems to comprise a figure based upon the multiple meanings of the word. In the most obvious sense of the term, the elder son accuses the younger of “using up” or “devouring” the father’s living with prostitutes. Yet in another sense the complaint echoes the earlier accusations that Jesus and his disciples were eating and drinking with tax collectors and sinners (ἐσθίειν, 5.30; 7.34; συνεσθίειν, 15.2)—now expressed indirectly through the slightly modified charge that he is “eating up” with them. Conversely, the Lukan Jesus will later refer to the scribes as ones who “devour” (κατεσθίειν, 20.47) widows’ houses.

Yet in the more immediate context, do the elder son and the rich man also display desires for “eating up” at table, pointing to yet another application in this figure? In the case of the elder son, he is clearly angry (ὀργίζεσθαι, 15.28) over the fact that his father has killed the grain-fed calf for the younger son, when the elder has never received so much as a kid (15.27, 29). Notably, the three mentioned “grain-fed calf” in this parable culminates in the elder son’s

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17 Cf. Seneca: “Many men devour [comedere] their goods, and many have mistresses” (Ep. 122.14).
18 The disparity between ὁ μόσχος ὁ σιτευτός and ἔριφος is increased in Β75 B pc, which read ἔριφον, “little kid.”
complaint (15.23, 27, 30). As for the rich man in 16.19-31, the details that he celebrated “daily” (16.19) with food falling from his table (16.21) are the most prominent signs of his passion for “eating up.”

4. Passions of Injustice in Moral Philosophical Traditions

As we have seen, there are compelling reasons to think that the dropsical man of 14.1-6 serves as a character with whom to compare those who are displaying passions for glory, money, and luxury within this context of the Gospel. Besides using dropsy as an analogy for immorality, is Luke drawing even further upon the Greek and Roman philosophical traditions at this point his narrative? Perhaps the best approach at answering this question is to analyze some of the authors who discuss these and related passions, and then to evaluate whether they too place these passions in relation to injustice.

As early as Plato, we see how his ideal philosopher is set over against those who have passions for honor and money. When he lays out his notion of the tripartite soul, he explains that each part has a pleasure that is peculiar to each. The first part is that with which a person learns and naturally takes its pleasure in learning; the second part is that with which a person feels anger; and the third “we call the appetitive part because of the intensity of its appetites for food, drink, sex, and the things that are associated with them. We call it also the money-loving part, because such appetites are especially satisfied by money” (Resp. 580d-e).

Earlier in the dialogue, the passions for honor and money and certain pleasures serve to characterize an unjust and inferior constitution of the state. After establishing that aristocracy is the preeminent constitution and the philosopher an ideal ruler, Plato shows how his utopian city-state may begin to disintegrate and ultimately result in tyranny. Yet before a tyrant begins to rule, other inferior rulers (545a)—which correspondingly have inferior constitutions—pave the way
toward this corrupt city-state. The first of these inferior constitutions is a timocracy, which emerges from the aristocracy as a result of faction within the city-state (Resp. 545b-547a). The ruling philosophers of the aristocracy become compromised, and the people seek rulers from among the unphilosophical and warmongering elements (547e-549a). From an early age, the would-be timocratic ruler develops the nature for being a φιλοχρήματος, “lover of money” (549b). During adulthood, these rulers will long for money and enjoy pleasures in secret (548a-b).

Because timocracy transforms into oligarchy (the second inferior constitution), many of the negative aspects of the former are maintained once the latter takes shape. Thus oligarchy reflects an even greater stage of degeneration than timocracy. For instance, oligarchy creates a sharper divide between the rich and poor—since in this constitution only the rich assess property and rule (550c-d). Although φιλοτιμία (i.e., the type satisfied by victory in warfare) is abandoned when the young and future oligarch sees his timocratic father lose his wealth (553a-b), the older oligarch repossesses this trait—yet for different reasons—once he amasses property. He loves being honored (φιλοτιμεῖσθαι) for nothing except “the possession of wealth and whatever else leads to that” (553d).19

19 Unlike the timocrat, the oligarch refuses to use his many resources for waging war and thus is usually defeated but remains wealthy (555a). The third constitution, democracy, arises from a society where these wealthy, intemperate oligarchs are eventually overthrown by their impoverished subjects. It is inevitable that the poor will become dissatisfied and restless in a city-state whose leaders foster the idea that the accumulation of wealth is the greatest honor. Because the oligarchs have become “fond of luxury, free of both physical and mental toil, too soft to endure pleasures or pains, and lazy” (556b-c), the poor are able to kill or expel them easily and give the rest of the population an equal share in ruling the city-state (557a). Such a constitution promotes the freedom for a diversity of people to exist as equals (557c, 558c). The fourth inferior constitution, tyranny, evolves from democracy when freedom (i.e., the most treasured good of the latter constitution) results in disorder, anarchy, and eventually, slavery. The permissiveness that freedom has created leads to a confusion of roles (563e-564a). For example, parents behave like children and children like parents (562e-563a). Rulers are treated like
This idea that such passions may increase as a person becomes older appears also in a fragment from Cleinias of Tarentum—a Pythagorean contemporary of Plato. He includes these passions in a discussion about how to nurture the young toward a life of piety and reverence. According to Cleinias, “the causes” (αἱ αἰτίαι) that lead a person “to act unjustly” (ἀδικεῖν) once he or she has matured beyond the years of childhood are “these three” (αὗται τρεῖς): “a love of pleasure [φιλαδονία], pursued in the enjoyments derived through the body, greed [πλεονεξία], in the act of gaining, and a love of glory [φιλοδοξία], in being superior and ruling over equals and peers.”

In order to counteract these three, Cleinias explains, one must equip the young from the very beginning with “a respect for the laws, a sense of shame before the gods, and a passion for letters.” Perhaps we can infer that the latter three will cause a person to grow into the kind of adult who embodies justice.

Cleanthes, in his Hymn to Zeus, praises the kingship of Zeus and the universality of his law and then maligns those mortals who would disobey that law. To defy the law of God in this subjects and subjects like rulers (562c-d). The excessive license fostered among the people and their desire to avoid having any master at all cause them to ignore their laws (563d-e). Eventually, the demos establishes one person as their sole leader, who in due course becomes a tyrant (565c-d). See also Robert Joly, who summarizes Plato’s argument accordingly: the φιλόσοφος rules the ideal city-state; the φιλότιμος the timocracy; the φιλοχρήματος the oligarchy; the φιλήδονος the democracy; and the φιλήδονος also the tyranny. He further qualifies, “Les deux types de φιλήδονοι sont philosophiquement distingués par le fait que l’homme démocratique se limite aux plaisirs superflus, alors que l’homme tyrannique y joint les plaisirs déréglés” (Le Thème Philosophique des Genres de Vie dans l’Antiquité Classique [Académie Royale de Belgique, Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques, Mémoires 50.3; Bruxelles, 1956], 83).

While the passions widely associated with youth (e.g., sexual desire) may wane as a person ages, other passions (e.g., greed) may actually increase. See, e.g., Plutarch, Mor. 786a-b. This fragment of Cleinias is preserved in the anthology of Stobaeus 3.1.76. The text followed here appears in the collection and edition by Holger Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period (Acta Academiae Aboensis, Ser. A, 30.1; Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1965), 108.

See further Elizabeth Asmis, who points out that the part of the hymn extending from line 9 to 14 “ends climactically by bestowing on Zeus the title of supreme king everywhere” (“Myth and Philosophy in Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus,” BRBS 47 [2007]: 413-29, here 415).
context is to have a contentious eagerness for “glory” (δόξα, 27), to turn one’s attention toward “profits acquired through cunning” (κερδοσύναι, 28), and to seek after occasions for “indulgence and pleasurable acts of the body” (ἄνεσις καὶ σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα, 29). The Hymn then appeals for Zeus to rescue humans from their “destructive ignorance” (33), to “disperse it from the soul” (34), and to grant them the kind of knowledge Zeus relies upon in “governing all things with justice” (δίκης μέτα πάντα κυβερνᾶν, 34-35). What this appeal may reflect is that human rulers are liable to come under the control of their passions (or perhaps already have) and thus need divine guidance in keeping those passions at bay and in knowing how to uphold justice.

Cicero also invokes these passions as he discusses the topic of justice—or more specifically, as he explains the nature of unjust acts committed against an individual or a group, as opposed to injustice wrought through negligence (Off. 1.23-27). The passions (cupiditates) for money (pecunia), pleasure (voluptas), and honor (honor) or glory (gloria), he explains, are interrelated “motives” that may perpetuate one another and eventually lead a person to act unjustly (1.25-26). He holds that the passions for honor and glory and power (potentia) appear often “in the greatest souls and in the most brilliant geniuses.” On this point, he uses Julius Caesar as an example of one who became corrupt in his pursuits for power (1.26; cf. 2.23).

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23 See also Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Sappho und Simonides: Untersuchungen über griechische Lyriker (Berlin: Weidmann, 1913), 188-91; M. Marcovich, “Zum Zeushymnus des Kleanthes,” Hermes 94 (1966): 245-50, esp. 249-50. As Johan C. Thom comments, “Kleanthes gives three examples of wrong life-goals, namely, to receive honor (v. 27), to make money (v. 28), and to have pleasure (v. 29). These goals can clearly be identified with the conventional ways of life (βίοι) often criticized by ancient philosophers, that is, the φιλότιμος (honor-loving), φιλοχρήματος (wealth-loving), and φιλήδονος (pleasure-loving) life (Kleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus: Text, Translation, and Commentary [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005], 24, 128-42, here 130). So also Asmis explains that, according to the poet, “Bad humans rush toward a variety of things—honor, wealth, pleasure—pursuing different goals at different times. Their chaotic haste reflects the excess of the passions that motivate these pursuits” (“Myth and Philosophy,” 424).

24 See also Cicero, Off. 1.68-70.
Philo of Alexandria appeals to “the most sacred Plato” in his *Quod Omnis Probus Liber* 

Sit (13) and there contends that “the bad person” has “many hindrances,” namely, φιλαργυρία, φιλοδοξία, and φιληδονία, which he personifies as οἱ ψυχῆς παρανομώτατοι ἄρχοντες, “the most lawless rulers of the soul” (*Prob.* 21-22). Philo also reckons the passions for money and elaborate meals as typical of human kings (*Prob.* 31), a lifestyle we may contrast with that of the Essenes (*Prob.* 75-91). This utopian community he holds starkly different from the many rulers (δυνάσται) who have risen to power and subsequently slaughtered their subjects and, like hounds, have invaded cities only to leave behind “the unforgettable misfortunes of the suffering as monuments of their impiety and hatred of humanity” (*Prob.* 89-90). Conversely, the Essenes show their love of virtue (φιλάρετος) through their freedom from such passions, which he expresses as τὸ ἀφιλοχρήματον, τὸ ἀφιλόδοξον, τὸ ἀφιλήδονον (*Prob.* 84).

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25 Cf. *Prob.* 64-65, where Philo sets in opposition two possible pursuits—one, the need to track down the “holes” (καταδύσεις) of those teachers who are capable of taming a bestial way of life and, another, the attempt to seek out all the “nooks” (μυχοί) of the earth in order to mine its precious metals, all “for the sake of money.” He shows the contrast between these two objectives, on the one hand, by the adversative δέ in the phrase νυνὶ δὲ χρημάτων μὲν ἕνεκα, and the other, by the parallel between the “holes” where these philosophers may be found and the “nooks” from which precious metals are mined. That he employs surgical terminology and imagery when describing how “we open up [ἀναστέλλειν] the rough and hard veins [φλέβες] of the earth” in order to acquire gold and silver and other metals also suggests a contrast with the commonplace in which the philosopher is described as a physician. That is to say, while those with a passion for increasing wealth cut open the earth for its resources, those who aim for virtue seek out a surgeon who might extirpate pursuits of “war and slavery and unspeakable evils” from their souls.

26 On the μισανθρωπία of these rulers (*Prob.* 90), cf. Epictetus, *Gnom.* 46: Οὐδεὶς φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλήδονος καὶ φιλόδοξος φιλάνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μόνος ὁ φιλόκαλος. We see a contrast between king and philosopher also in Philo’s example about Alexander of Macedon’s exchange with Calanus the Gymnosophist. The latter demonstrates his freedom from such passions, especially φιλοδοξία, when he declines Alexander’s request to travel with him and thereby achieve μέγιστον κλέος, “greatest fame,” throughout all Asia and Europe (*Prob.* 94).

Seneca also addresses these passions, yet from his perspective, a moderate attempt to acquire riches and honors and pleasures is not in itself unvirtuous. An obsessive pursuit of such, however, is excessive and uncharacteristic of the philosophical life. In his consolation to Marcia, Seneca praises the virtue of Marcia’s deceased son by observing that he had the wisdom of an old man even in his youth and that he sought “riches [divitiae] without avarice [avaritia], honors [honores] without ambition [ambitio], and pleasures [voluptates] without luxury [luxuria]” (Marc. 23.3). Correspondingly, in one of his moral epistles, Seneca identifies these passions as characteristic of “an unstable soul” (Ep. 69.1). He writes: “There is no evil without an enticement. Avarice promises money; luxury, many and various pleasures; ambition, a purple garment and applause, and the power that comes from applause, as well as whatever power can do. Vices tempt you by means of payment, but this life I am describing to you must be lived without compensation” (69.4-5).

Plutarch, in his De Stoicorum repugnantii, identifies the desires for money and pleasure and glory as “vices and diseases” (αι κακίαι και τα νοσήματα, Mor. 1050d). According to Chrysippus, he relates, Zeus was responsible for bringing all into the world, including φιλαργυρίαι, φιληδονίαι, and φιλοδοξίαι, which he groups along with δειλίαι, “cowardices,” and ἀδικίαι, “injustices.” Here Plutarch argues that the Stoics contradict themselves by presuming, on the one hand, that Zeus created all parts of the cosmos, including vice, and, on the other, that Zeus chastises for vice (Mor. 1049d-1051a).

28 Cf. Seneca, Vit. beat. 23.3; with the comments by Elizabeth Asmis: “Although Seneca makes clear that wealth is not a good, he associates it closely with virtue. It was basic Stoic doctrine that the wise person prefers wealth to poverty, but is also indifferent to it; wealth provides greater scope for virtue, but the virtue practiced in wealth is equal to that practiced in poverty. Seneca abides rigorously by this doctrine, but by emphasizing preference above indifference, he creates a new link between wealth and wisdom” (“Seneca’s On the Happy Life and Stoic Individualism,” Apeiron 23 [1990]: 219-55, here 249).
Dio Chrysostom discourses rather extensively upon these three passions in his *Fourth Oration on Kingship*. After first depicting the encounter and dialogue between Alexander of Macedon and Diogenes of Sinope on the matter of how one might “rule as king in the best way” (Or. 4.1-80, here 4.24), in the second part of the oration Dio has Diogenes deliver a speech to Alexander on “the most common and noticeable spirits [δαίμονες]” driving all persons, “tyrants and commoners, rich and poor, entire nations and cities” (4.81-139, here 4.81). He explains that under the influence of these “spirits,” humans lead “three domineering [ἐπικρατεῖν] lives” (4.83), namely, “the pleasure-seeking and luxurious” (ὁ ἡδυπαθὴς καὶ τρυφερός), “the money-loving and wealth-loving” (ὁ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλόπλουτος), and “the honor-loving and glory-loving” (ὁ φιλότιμος καὶ φιλόδοξος, 4.84). When these passions of the soul are manifest in the same person, Diogenes explains, they conflict with one another just as “diseases” (νοσήματα) of body do, making them difficult to cure (4.138). It has long been held that Diogenes and Alexander in this oration serve as stand-ins for Dio and Trajan, respectively. That Diogenes can help Alexander learn about matters pertaining to justice and kingship (τὰ δίκαια καὶ βασιλικά, 4.40)—using these three lives as the framework for his speech—is to say that Dio can instruct and advise Trajan on the same topics.

In Lucian’s dialogue *Hermotimus*, Lycinus challenges the Stoic Hermotimus on the question why he had chosen to follow the teachings of the Stoics. In addition to learning “justice” (τὸ δίκαιον, *Hermot.* 7; cf. 75, 79) and other virtues, Hermotimus claims that his

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29 Dio’s point is that these δαίμονες have mastery over the souls of humans, as he indicates also in Or. 4.99-100. Cf. 4.133-38.

training enables him to strip off and forget about “riches and glories and pleasures” (πλοῦτοι καὶ δόξαι καὶ ἡδοναί, 7-9) as he makes his ascent toward happiness. When Lycinus urges Hermotimus to explain how one can choose the philosophy that is best and true, to the exclusion of other philosophies, Hermotimus uses the three passions as a proof for why he prefers Stoicism over the other schools. The Epicureans, he had heard, were “sweet of mood and lovers of pleasure [φιλήδονοι],” the Peripatetics “lovers of riches [φιλόπλουτοι] and argumentative,” and the Platonists “arrogant and lovers of glory [φιλόδοξοι].” By contrast, Hermotimus relates, many told him that the Stoic philosopher was capable of becoming “the only king, the only rich man, the only wise man, and everything in one” (16).

That Hermotimus brands his philosophical rivals with these three passions is comparable to how Justin Martyr uses them in invective against so-called “false teachers” (ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι, Dial. 82.1), whose teachings he regards as “atheistic and blasphemous and unjust [ἄδικα].” He claims that they use the name of Christ (i.e., ἐν ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ παραχαράσσοντες, “defacing in his name,” 82.3; cf. 82.2) in order to teach “what has been impressed upon their minds by the unclean spirit of the devil” (82.3). When Justin then claims that he and his compatriots teach “on account of fear” and “not on account of the love of money or the love of glory or the love of pleasure” (οῦ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν ἢ φιλοδοξίαν ἢ φιληδονίαν), is he implying that his opponents

31 Hermotimus compares the metaphorical mountain climb toward virtue to the ascent of Heracles, whose divine part stripped off mortality and flew up to the gods (Hermot. 7). Similarly, in a pseudonymous epistle of Heraclitus, the author draws a comparison between Heracles and his labors to those of “Heraclitus,” who states, καὶ ἔμοι γε πολλοὶ καὶ δυσχερέστατοι ἰῆλοι κατώρθωνται. νενίκηκα ἡδονάς, νενίκηκα χρήματα, νενίκηκα φιλοτιμίαν, “Indeed, I have successfully accomplished many of even the most difficult labors. I have conquered pleasures, I have conquered money, I have conquered the love of honor” (Pseudo-Heraclitus, Ep. 4.3; in Malherbe, Cynic Epistles, 190-93).

are driven by these latter motives? In this way, the “false teachers” may manifest passions resembling those of their rulers, which he shows by quoting Isa 1.23: “Your rulers [Οἱ ἄρχοντες] are the companions of thieves, loving gifts [φιλοδόντες δόρα], running after a reward.” By contrast, Justin states, “we do not wish to live like the rulers of your people” (82.4).  

Origen applies these passions in his interpretation of the three-fold temptation of Jesus. In his second homily on the Lukan temptation narrative, he explains that there are “two kings” who are eager to reign over humans, “the devil, the king of sin over sinners, and Christ, the king of justice [iustitia] over the just [iusti].” Here Origen conflates Luke’s βασιλείας τῆς οἰκουμένης (Luke 4.5) with Matthew’s βασιλείας τοῦ κόσμου (Matt 4.8) and qualifies these kingdoms as those of “worldly humans” (κοσμικοὶ ἄνθρωποι). Some of these humans, he states, are themselves “ruled by fornication [βασιλεύεσθαι ὑπὸ πορνείας], others are ruled by a love of money [φιλαργυρία], and others by vainglory [κενοδοξία] and other passions.” Those whom Origen describes as subject to fornication in particular would perhaps fall within the broader category of persons he earlier identifies as “lovers of pleasure” (amatores voluptatis), whom he contrasts with “lovers of God” (amatores Dei). According to Origen, only the latter have Christ, “who is word, wisdom, justice [iustitia], and truth,” reigning over them. Christ does, however, “wish to reign and to subject all nations, so that they might become servants of justice

33 What Justin means by “the rulers of your people” becomes clear in Dial. 85.1, where he quotes Ps 23.7: Ἀρατε πύλας, οἱ ἄρχοντες ὑμῶν, καὶ ἐπάρθητε, πύλαι αἰώνιοι, ἵνα εἰσέλθῃ ὁ βασιλεὺς τῆς δόξης. Here he distinguishes υμῶν βασιλεὺς from οὗτος ὁ ἡμέτερος Χριστός and explains that while some interpret the words of this psalm to be a reference to Hezekiah, and others to Solomon, he can prove that ὁ βασιλεὺς τῆς δόξης points to Christ.

34 Origen clarifies that τὰς βασιλείας τοῦ κόσμου does not refer to “the kingdom [οἰκονομία] of the Persians or the one of the Indians.” He goes on to explain that the devil holds “countless multitudes of people” under his imperium and that he is “king of almost the entire world” (Hom. Luc. 30 [GCS 49:172-73]).

35 Origen, Hom. Luc. 30 (GCS 49:172).
In his *Vita Antonii*, Athanasius appears to use the temptation narratives from the Gospels as a model for conveying how the devil (διάβολος, cf. Matt 4.1; Luke 4.2) attempted (πειράζειν, cf. Mark 1.13; Matt 4.1; Luke 4.2) to lead (κατάγειν, cf. Matt 4.1; Luke 4.1, 5, 9) the young Antony away from his ascetic discipline (Vit. Ant. 5.1-2). The devil reminds Antony of “his possessions, the care of his sister, familial ties, the love of money [φιλαργυρία], the love of glory [φιλοδοξία], the manifold pleasure of food [τροφῆς ἡ ποικίλη ἡδονή], and the other relaxations of life, and finally the roughness of virtue and how great is its toil” (5.2). Antony, however, remains unmoved in “purpose” (πρόθεσις, 5.1, 3), and the devil fails to detach him from his “upright choice” (ἡ ὀρθὴ προαίρεσις, 5.3).

5. The Rulers of the Pharisees and the Question of Justice

This brief analytical survey of ancient authors helps to contextualize one moral philosophical framework within which Luke seems to diagnosis the Pharisees. We have seen that a number of these authors apply the passions for glory, money, and (certain) pleasures to persons whom they also regard as unjust. Another recurring theme that perhaps should not go unnoticed is that these particular passions often serve to define immoral kings. Yet such passions are attributed to non-ruling persons, as well (e.g., Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.81).

The theme of kingship, however, may offer insight into why Luke treats these passions after the healing of the man with dropsy; for the healing occurs when Jesus goes “to a house of a certain one of the rulers [ἄρχοντες] of the Pharisees” (14.1). We must concede, however, that not all rulers would fall within the category of “kings,” and nor does Luke otherwise make explicit

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reference to this Pharisee as a ruler. We could nonetheless make an argument on intertextual grounds that Luke is drawing upon commonplaces (and perhaps even sources) that address the topic of kingship, and in doing so he addresses not only the Pharisee as host but also the guests who may be within the sphere of this Pharisee’s ruling authority.

For example, in comparing the parable in 14.15-24 to its Matthean parallel (Matt 22.1-10), one of the first differences we notice is that between ἄνθρωπος τις (Luke 14.16) and ἄνθρωπος βασιλεύς (Matt 22.2). In one sense, the “kingly fellow” in the Matthean version appears to represent the emperor Titus, since the king “sent his troops” and “burned their city” (22.7)—that is, blaming the destruction of Jerusalem upon “those murderers” who killed the king’s servants. Yet in another sense, the king and his son (22.2) represent God and Jesus, respectively, as do the householder (οἰκοδεσπότης) and his son from the earlier parable in Matt 21.33-41.

It is unclear whether Luke or Matthew has made the more extensive revision of this Q parable. What we can assert is that the kingly role of the “certain man” in the Lukan version is not expressly stated, but perhaps implied. In one sense, the “certain man” who “made a great dinner [ποιεῖν δείπνον] and invited [καλεῖν] many” (14.16) alludes to the fact that Jesus tells this parable on the occasion when a ruler of the Pharisees had “made” (ποιεῖν, 14.12-13) a meal and invited Jesus and others (καλεῖν, 14.7, 12). There is, however, a sudden turn in the parable when the man gives the command to go out and bring in “the poor and maimed and blind and lame” (14.21), pointing back to the fact that Jesus had just commanded the Pharisee to invite these very

persons to his meals (14.13). Accordingly, we see how the householder (οἰκοδεσπότης, 14.21; cf. 13.25) in this Lukan parable may refer to the ruler of the Pharisees, as well as to Jesus. Perhaps the question this double application raises is, which one of these two will be host to the dinner “in the kingdom of God” (14.15, 24)?

It is also possible that the theme of kingship serves as a backdrop for the earlier parable in 14.7-11, especially if we read the parable with LXX Prov 25.6-7: “Do not boast in front of the king [βασιλέως]; and do not linger in the places of rulers [δυνάσται], for it is better that it be said to you: ‘Come up [ἀναβαίνειν] to me’ than to humiliate [ταπεινοῦν] you in the presence of a ruler.”

While the parable in 14.7-11 is aimed primarily at the guests who wanted the more honorable seats, we should not overlook the authority of the host in telling a guest to move up higher (προσαναβαίνειν ἀνώτερον, 14.10). We see that Luke also turns the spotlight upon the host in 14.12-14 when he has Jesus offer instruction “to the one who had invited him.” Here Jesus compels the host not to invite his friends, siblings, kindred, and rich neighbors, lest they invite him in return and he be repaid (14.2). He should rather invite those who do not have the means to reciprocate, that is, “the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind” (14.14).

Is the Lukan Jesus instructing his host to reconsider whom he counts among his “friends” (14.10, 12; 15.29), on the basis of what he expects to receive in return for hosting a dinner?38 On this question we may compare a passage from Seneca, where he explains that one’s true friends are not found among those who stand in line to offer salutations to some powerful individual:

It is an old custom among kings and those who imitate kings to divide the company of their friends, and a mark of arrogance to hold entering and even touching their threshold at high value, and to give you the honor of sitting nearer the door, to be first

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in setting foot inside the house, in which there is door after door shutting out even those who are admitted. Among us, Gaius Gracchus and afterwards Livius Drusus were the first to regulate dividing their throng and to receive some in private, some as a group, and some all together. Those men accordingly had first-rank friends and second-rank friends, but never true friends. (Ben. 6.34.1-2)

The kind of social ranking Seneca refers to here is not directly parallel to the phenomenon of giving someone a more honorable seat at a meal; but the role of persons in conferring more honorable positions is nonetheless comparable in each. Seneca explains in this context that having a true friend in itself is a much greater benefit than what these other “friends” could offer (6.33.3; 6.34.3-5). He furthermore makes the point throughout this work that when a person does not have the physical resources to return a benefit, the simple acknowledgement of having received a benefit or the desire to pay it back should suffice as a return (1.1.3; cf. 1.7.1-3). Accordingly, when kings or rich persons bestow benefits, they should not always expect to receive back on equal terms (4.40.1-5; cf. 5.4.1-4).

For Luke, the repayment for inviting those without the means to reciprocate comes “at the resurrection of the just [δίκαιοι]” (14.14). Is the Lukan Jesus implying that this host is not already among these just persons? Is the host perhaps rather among those who will be deemed “workers of injustice [ἀδικία]” (13.27), even though previously they had eaten and drank in Jesus’ presence (13.26)? The use of the present imperative μὴ φώνει in 14.12 may imply that the host was currently in the habit of including the wrong persons on his lists of guests, and thus that Jesus means he should “stop inviting” such guests to his dinners.39 The prospect of being counted among the “just” appears to depend upon whether he will instead invite the marginalized to his dinners.

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There is, however, one piece of evidence within this context that would problematize the notion that the Pharisees are unjust. In the parable of the lost sheep, the Lukan Jesus says, “there will be more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine just persons [δίκαιοι] who have no need of repentance” (15.7). What seems clear in this parable is that Jesus defends himself by illustrating why he eats with tax collectors (i.e., the one lost sheep) rather than the δίκαιοι (i.e., the ninety-nine sheep). Does this parable lead us to associate the ninety-nine δίκαιοι with the Pharisees and scribes?

We may find clues for answering this question by looking closely at the controversy that prompted this and the other two parables about what had become “lost” (15.3-32). The controversy itself appears in 15.1-2:

'Ἡσαν δὲ αὐτῷ ἐγγίζοντες πάντες οἱ τελῶναι καὶ οἱ ἁμαρτωλοί ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ. καὶ διεγόγγυζον οἵ τε Φαρισαίοι καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς λέγοντες ὅτι οὗτος ἁμαρτωλοὺς προσδέχεται καὶ συνεσθίει αὐτοῖς.

Now all the tax collectors and sinners were drawing near to hear him. And the Pharisees and scribes were grumbling saying, “this man welcomes sinners and eats with them.”

What is not immediately clear in this passage is who οἱ ἁμαρτωλοί are, according to the narrator in this first sentence, and who the ἁμαρτωλοί are, as the Pharisees and scribes perceive them in the second. It is possible to understand οἱ τελῶναι καὶ οἱ ἁμαρτωλοί as a hendiadys, which would then contrast with οἱ τε Φαρισαίοι καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς, also as a hendiadys. Another possibility, however, is that when the narrator relates that πάντες were drawing near to hear him,
the “all” refers to tax collectors, on the one hand, and the Pharisees and scribes, as οἱ ἁμαρτωλοί, on the other. Are there other indications that would support this interpretation?

It seems that in order for the Pharisees and scribes to wage a complaint, they would need to be present as well, or at least to receive word about what was taking place (cf. 15.26). Are the Pharisees and scribes also among those drawing near (ἐγγίζειν) to hear (ἀκούειν) Jesus (15.1)? Luke may insinuate that they are when the elder brother also drew near (ἐγγίζειν) and heard (ἀκούειν) the music and singers (15.25). This correspondence suggests that the tax collectors, Pharisees, and scribes are all, as “sinners,” going to hear Jesus. The question then is how each will respond to what they hear. Although the younger son twice professes that he had sinned (15.18, 21), his being found (15.24, 32; cf. 15.4-6, 8-9) is a clear proof that he is the kind of “sinner who repents” (15.7, 10). Do the Pharisees and scribes, by contrast, remain unrepentant and unjust sinners?

Regarding the Pharisees in particular, we may find evidence in the parable of the Pharisee and the tax collector (18.9-14). The Lukan Jesus addresses the parable “to some who trusted in themselves that they were just (δίκαιοι) and held the others (λοιποί) in contempt” (18.9). The Pharisee of the parable distinguishes himself from the tax collector in claiming that he is “not like other (λοιποί) people, rapacious, unjust (ἀδικοί), adulterers, or even as this tax collector” (18.11). His self-justification, in assuming that he is not ἀδικος (18.11), seems to be why he did not leave the temple δεδικαιωμένος, “justified,” as the tax collector did (18.14).

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41 On τοὺς πεποιθότας ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς (18.9), cf. μὴ πεποίθατε ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς (Jer 7.4); ἐν τῷ εἶπαί με τῷ δικαίῳ ὁ ὦτος πέποιθεν ἐπὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ποιήσῃ ἀνομίαν, πάσαι αἱ δικαιοσύναι αὐτοῦ οὐ μὴ ἀναμνησθῶσιν· ἐν τῇ ἀδικίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἐποίησεν, ἢ αὕτη ἀποθανεῖται (Ezek 33.13); and the comments by Bengel, *Gnomon* (ad Luc. 18.9); and Fitzmyer, *Luke X-XXIV*, 1185.

42 In the mere naming of the two characters in this parable (18.10), readers might assume that the Pharisee is just and the tax collector unjust. Yet in making these assumptions about both
this parable thus has continuity with those Pharisees to whom Jesus earlier said, “you are the ones who justify yourselves [οἱ δικαιοῦντες ἑαυτοὺς] before people, but God knows your hearts” (16.15). The tax collector, on the other hand, is in the company of those Lukan tax collectors who justify (δικαιοῦν) God and Wisdom (7.29-30, 34-35)—which is concomitant with the fact that the tax collector of the parable humbles himself (ἔαυτόν, 18.14).

Luke may show how the Pharisee of the parable justifies himself in the statement: ὁ Φαρισαῖος σταθεὶς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ταῦτα προσηύχετο (18.11a). The placement of πρὸς ἑαυτόν within this statement is ambiguous and appears to be the kind of figured speech that is constructed through word-arrangement (Quintilian, Inst. 9.2.70). In one sense, “The Pharisee stood by himself and prayed this.” In another sense, “The Pharisee stood and prayed this to himself.” In the latter sense, his praying to himself (πρὸς ἑαυτόν) is an indication that he is among those “who trusted in themselves [ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς] that they were just” (18.9).

While the tax collector in the parable calls himself a “sinner” (18.13), the parable is really spoken against the sinfulness of the Pharisee. When reading this parable in our attempts to understand characters, readers may themselves be indicted (along with the Pharisee) for justifying the Pharisee and for condemning the tax collector. As John Bunyan states, “The Publicane was a notorious sinner: The Pharisee was a notorious righteous man” (Seasonable Counsel: A Discourse upon the Pharisee and the Publicane [ed. Owen C. Watkins; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988], 122). Similarly, Bernard Brandon Scott observes, “The Pharisee’s prayer marks him as the ideal of the pious, and the tax collector’s acknowledgment that he is a sinner acknowledges what all know to be true” (Hear Then the Parable: A Commentary on the Parables of Jesus [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989], 97). As Bovon comments at Luke 18.14a: “The demonstrative pronoun οὗτος (“this man”) makes clear that, contrary to all expectations, it is this man, and not the other, who was to go back down to his home “justified” (Luke 2, 550).


Cf. Bunyan, who makes the point that the Pharisee prayed “with himself” and not to God by comparing him to the unjust judge in the previous parable, who speaks “within himself” (Discourse upon the Pharisee and the Publicane, 130-31). When Bunyan explains that the Pharisee “prayed with himself to himself” (ibid., 131), he appears also to observe the ambiguity in this sentence.
identify who are the “just persons who have no need of repentance” (15.7), we might ask also whether Luke regards any as being exempt from needing repentance. According to the preaching of John the Baptist, his hearers could not simply appeal to their Abrahamic ancestry; the “fruits worthy of repentance” were required (3.8; cf. 16.24, 27, 30-31). Jesus also teaches on one occasion that hearers should not assume that some were worse sinners than others and that unless they repented, they would all perish (13.1-5). So also in Acts, God is said to have given repentance to both Israel and the Gentiles (5.31; 11.18; cf. Luke 24.47; Acts 2.38; 3.19; 13.24; 20.21; 26.20). And Paul declares in Athens that God “commands all people everywhere to repent” (Acts 17.30).

In light of this evidence, the notion that some would not need to repent may be understood as a figure of irony. Accordingly, the statement in 15.7 may still refer to the Pharisees; but it appears to be an indication of their self-justification, implying further that they do not acknowledge their need to repent. That is to say, we may call the Lukan Pharisees δίκαιοι, as long as we also accept that this designation is fitting because they have justified themselves.

This understanding of the statement would cohere with what we have seen so far on the question of whether Luke casts his Pharisees as just. The Pharisees and scribes in the home of Levi (5.27-32) unknowingly diagnosis themselves among the sinners who are in need of a doctor and thus not among the δίκαιοι (5.31-32). And the unidentified spies (who appear to be Pharisees) were “disguising themselves as just [δίκαιοι]” (20.20).

45 Cf. Tannehill: “if the Pharisees claim to be among the righteous, the term ‘righteous’ becomes ironic, for the Pharisees’ claim will soon be challenged. Jesus will accuse the Pharisees of falsely justifying themselves before others (i.e., claiming to be righteous to attract human honor; cf. 16:15; 18:9-14)” (Luke, 238).

46 Cf. Wellhausen: “Die Charakteristik in 18, 9, wie die in 20, 20, geht auf die Pharisäer” (Das Evangelium Lucae, 99).
6. Conclusions

More broadly speaking on the question about justice in this context of the narrative, we have seen how Luke insinuates that the Pharisees have a passion for glory and excessive dining; and the Lukan narrator states outright that they have a passion for money. The story about the healing of the man with dropsy appears to serve as an analog for how these passions can be destructive, unless they are cured. That is to say, just as persons with actual dropsy have an insatiable thirst that can eventually lead them to drown in the very water that will not satisfy them, so persons who crave glory and luxury and money cannot find contentment in these things and thus run the risk of pursuing their desires to the point of moral demise.

While Luke does not explicitly compare the dropsical man to the Pharisees, he has created a context in which his readers may draw such a comparison—as the history of interpretation affirms. We recall from the Rhetorica ad Herennium that “Innuendo [significatio] is that which leaves more in suspicion than was put down in the speech” (4.67). And one of the ways this figure may be constructed is “through analogy,” that is, “when we speak by some analog that conveys nothing more, but from it we insinuate what we might be thinking.” To paraphrase how that rhetorician concludes his teaching on innuendo, Luke seems to have allowed his readers to suspect something while he has held it back.47 Or to restate Quintilian’s instruction on allusion (emphasis), this figure leaves something hidden also for the hearer to discover (Inst. 9.2.65).

The possibility that Luke’s readers would have compared the dropsical man to the Pharisees seems likely in light of the fact that some ancient moral philosophers use dropsy as an analogy for certain passions. We have also observed that the particular passions Luke

47 Rhet. Her. 4.67: “This figure sometimes has much in terms of the pleasant and the grandeur; for it allows the hearer to suspect something when the orator has held it back.”

269
incorporates in this part of his narrative frequently appear together among some Greco-Roman authors, and they can serve to characterize unjust kings. Accordingly, what Luke’s readers might conclude further is that “the rulers of the Pharisees” (14.1) are also unjust—a conclusion that the broader narrative would support.

That Luke seems to apply these passions to the Pharisees, however, does not necessarily mean that his Pharisaic contemporaries actually did have such immoral desires. As we have seen in the examples from Justin Martyr and Lucian in particular, these passions may also serve as topics for making accusations against competing teachers and philosophers. Understood in this sense, Luke may have viewed the Pharisees as the rivals of the Christians and thereby sought to invalidate their authority by insinuating that they were unjust.
Chapter Eleven: The Evil Eye and its Cure

In the previous two chapters, we observed examples of figured speech from two separate scenes in which Jesus dines with Pharisees (5.27-32; 14.1-24). In each case, that which could be understood as positive conviviality in one sense proves to be implicitly critical regarding the moral health of the Pharisees in another sense. We see an additional scene in which the Lukan Jesus dines with the Pharisees at 11.37-52; and here the critical remarks spoken against the Pharisees and lawyers appear to be much more frank.¹ We are reminded that, immediately after these criticisms against the Pharisees and lawyers in 11.37-52, Luke seems to show the consequences of speaking too freely when he remarks how the scribes and Pharisees then “began to hold a strong grudge and to interrogate him about many things, lying in wait for him in order to catch something from his mouth” (11.53-54). If this scene provides a rare glimpse into what the Lukan Jesus would openly say against the Pharisees, then the content of those criticisms may inform our investigation into what he might in other instances only insinuate through figured speech. Furthermore, if the remarks against the Pharisees and lawyers in 11.37-52 are examples of free speech, could we also say that they are devoid of any figure? Or to ask this question in light of the instruction from Pseudo-Dionysius (Ars Rhet. 9.11), are the remarks in 11.37-52 also figured yet significantly “dissolved” to the point that they are not fully secure? Do these censorious remarks point to instances of figured speech within this immediate context of the narrative? And finally, how do these critical statements further diagnose the moral health of the Lukan Pharisees?

¹ Erasmus regards Jesus’ denunciations against the Pharisees and lawyers in 11.37-52 as “free speech” (liber sermo), as opposed to “flattering” (assentari) them (Para. Luc. 11.45-46 [LB 7:386c-d], which he further describes as “medicine” (Para. Luc. 11.53 [LB 7:387d] that Jesus prescribed “for no other purpose except to heal evils [mala]” (Para. Luc. 11.46 [LB 7:386d]).
1. The Pharisees and the Evil Eye of Predatory Greed

As with the other meal-scenes with Pharisees in the Third Gospel (5.27-39; 7.36-50; 14.1-6), the one in 11.37-52 results in conflict. When the Pharisee who had invited Jesus to dine sees that he did not wash before the meal, Jesus says to him: “Now you Pharisees cleanse the outside of the cup and the dish, but the inside of you is full of predatory greed and evil. Fools, did not he who made the outside also make the inside? Give as alms those things that are within, and behold all will be clean for you” (11.39-41).

This controversy over what is clean on the outside and the inside appears to have some correspondence with the previous pericope about whether the body is “full of light” (φωτεινόν) or “full of darkness” (σκοτεινόν, 11.34, 36); for this question is also about what is within the human individual, specifically whether “the light that is inside you [τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν σοί]” is darkness (11.35). The reference to “the light that is inside you” seems to be another way of speaking about “the lamp of the body,” which the Lukan Jesus also equates with “your eye” (11.34). Within this more general correspondence between 11.34-36 and 11.37-41 (pertaining to what is inside a person), the most specific verbal connection appears in the statement about the eye that is “evil” (πονηρός, 11.34), coupled with the accusation that the Pharisees are “full of predatory greed and evil [πονηρία]” (11.39).

Yet is it possible to qualify this interior evil further within this context? In order to answer this question perhaps we should attend to what it means when the eye is πονηρός, and then what it means when it is ἀπλοῦς (11.34). Both of these terms can convey multiple senses within this context and thus appear to constitute an instance of figured speech. In a physiological sense, to say that an eye is πονηρός means that it is “unhealthy.” And accordingly, an eye that is ἀπλοῦς is one that is “healthy,” which more specifically means that it has “single” (as opposed to
διπλόος, “double”) vision. Is this example of physical health also serving as an analogy for moral health; and if so what does it mean when an eye is “evil” and not “single” in a moral philosophical sense?

The coupling of ἁρπαγή with πονηρία in 11.39 may inform this question; for it is possible that Luke uses the two terms as a hendiadys, perhaps with the implication that an eye that is “evil” is one that has its sight set on rapacious activity. What supports this understanding of ἁρπαγή καὶ πονηρία (11.39) is Cadbury’s observation that “the single eye” in antiquity often indicates generosity and conversely “the evil eye” miserliness. One piece of compelling evidence appears in Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs 5.4.2: “The single-purposed man [ὁ ἕπλοῦς] does not desire gold.” Such a person, the author furthermore claims, “sees [ὁρᾶν] all things in singleness of purpose [ἁπλότης] and does not welcome into his eyes [ὀφθαλμοί] what is evil [πονηρίαι] from the error of the world” (5.4.6). Similarly, we read in LXX Sirach 14.9-10: “The eye of the greedy [πλεονέκτου ὁφθαλμός] is not filled with a portion, and evil injustice

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2 Tannehill rightly translates ἁρπαγή as “predatory greed” (Luke, 198)—that is, a term somewhat stronger than πλεονεξία (cf. 12.15) or φιλαργυρία (cf. 16.14), since the nuance of “grasping” suggests that the desire has already led one to act or that it is at least anticipated.

3 Henry J. Cadbury, “The Single Eye,” HTR 47 (1954): 69-74. Cf. Dale C. Allison, Jr., “The Eye is the Lamp of the Body (Matthew 6.22-23=Luke 11.34-36),” NTS 33 (1987): 61-83, esp. 76-78, 82 n. 31. Cadbury’s observations may also inform our understanding of the Matthean version of this logion (Matt 6.22-23). For instance, Candida R. Moss (“Blurred Vision and Ethical Confusion: The Rhetorical Function of Matthew 6:22-23,” CBQ 73 [2011]: 757-76) argues that “a healthy eye” for Matthew is one that is capable of seeing righteousness (as we can also deduce from the Lukan context, 11.42). We could also then ask what kind of ethical behavior makes one righteous within the Matthean context. The author seems to infer this point by starting with what righteousness (or “light”) is not—that is, unrighteousness (or “darkness”), which manifests itself in “storing up treasure on earth” (Matt 6.19) and in the attempt to serve both “God and mammon” (Matt 6.24). See also Matt 20.15, where the householder asks his workers, who are disgruntled over their payment, whether they have an “evil eye.”
ἀδικία πονηρά dries up the soul. An evil eye ὀφθαλμὸς πονηρός is envious φθονερός over bread, and it is lacking on his table” (cf. Sir 31.13).

The example from Sirach illustrates the common coupling of greed and envy, the latter of which is also frequently conveyed by the “evil eye.” This pairing demonstrates how envy and greed are quite often inseparable passions, since one’s rapaciousness can lead to jealousy over owning another’s possessions and vice versa. While Luke does attribute the passion of envy to the Jewish opponents of Jesus and his followers throughout his narrative (Acts 5.17; 7.9; 13.45; 17.5; cf. Luke 15.25-32), the more immediate context concerning the Pharisees calls for an emphasis upon the nuance of greed over envy.

4 πλεονέκτου ὀφθαλμὸς σώκ ἐμπίπλαται μερίδι, καὶ ἀδικία πονηρά ἀναξηραίνει ψυχήν. ὀφθαλμὸς πονηρός φθονερός ἀπ' ἄρτῳ καὶ ἐλλιπής ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης αὐτοῦ. Cf. Bonaventure, who also notes these parallels in Sirach (Luc. 11.74 [Opera 7:301]).

5 For the “evil eye” in early Christian sources and its close correspondence with both greed and envy, see e.g., Gal 3.1; Mark 7.22; Matt 20.15; John Chrysostom, Hom. Matt. 64.3 (PG 58:612-13); and Hom. 1 Cor. 12.7 (PG 61:106).


7 Theophylact interprets the darkened eye as both envious and greedy when he states, “if the eye and light that the soul has received from God is found darkened by either jealously [βασκανία], or love of money [φιλοχρηματία], or generally speaking by love of material, then the soul itself is also darkened” (Luc. ad 11.33-36 [PG 123:868b]). He also reads the accusation about being “full of predatory greed and wickedness” in 11.39 as a reference to these two passions: “greed [πλεονεξία] and envy [φθονός] and the effects of envy.” Jesus, he claims, “heals their two passions of greed and envy by prescribing almsgiving. For he who truly shows mercy and gives alms will neither extort from, nor envy him to whom he has given alms” (Luc. ad 11.37-41 [PG 123:868d-869a]). See also Tob 4.10, 16, where the idea of almsgiving as a prophylactic for avoiding the darkness appears with the exhortation, “let not your eye begrudge [φθονείν] you in the giving of alms” (cf. 14.11). While there is nothing in Jesus’ statements
Immediately after the charge that the Pharisees are “full of predatory greed and evil” (11.39), the fact that Jesus calls them “fools” (ἀφρόνες, i.e., “without” φρήν, “mind,” 11.40) may be another indication that Luke diagnoses them with the “evil eye.” Interpreters from as early as Origen have observed that the eye sometimes serves as an analog for the mind: “The mind [νοῦς] is the organ for clear sight within the whole soul and the whole human.” 8 In his comments on the Matthean parallel (6.22-23), John Chrysostom also claims that the concept of an injured eye represents the mind in an unhealthy state: “For just as the eye is to the body, so the mind is to the soul.” 9 Chrysostom further qualifies the significance of this analogy: “For just as when the eyes are blinded, most of the capacity within the other members goes away—since the light within them is put out—so also when the mind is depraved, your life will be filled with countless evils; therefore just as we aim for this within the body—namely, to keep the eye healthy—so also do we the mind within the soul.” 10

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Luke does seem to presuppose in some instances throughout his narrative that sight represents insight.\textsuperscript{11} Through the teaching about an eye that is “single,” does he wish to insinuate that the Pharisees are double-minded?\textsuperscript{12} If we can apply this nuance here, the diagnosis is perhaps expounded upon in the later accusation that the Pharisees have dual allegiances to God and money: “No servant is able to serve two lords [δύο κύριοι]” (16.13).\textsuperscript{13} Thus the warning may be to ensure that the eye (i.e., the mind) is healthy (i.e., singly devoted) and therefore emanating light representative of overall moral health.\textsuperscript{14}

2. Curing the Evil Eye

The Lukan Jesus does not offer his hearers a clear remedy for treating the evil eye in 11.33-36; yet he may provide a subtle one in 11.41: “But give those things that lie within [τὰ ἐνόντα] as alms, and behold all things will be clean for you.” This injunction itself is not entirely direct and may be a further example of figured speech, as conveyed through ambiguity in particular. In its most obvious sense, the act of giving alms seems to counter the “predatory greed” of the Pharisees (11.39).\textsuperscript{15} Some interpreters, however, have raised the question of how to understand

\textsuperscript{12} In his comments, Cyril of Alexandria (Luc. ad 11.39 [PG 72:713a]) invokes James 4.8: “Cleanse your hands, you sinners, and purify your hearts, you double-minded folk.” Similarly, Bonaventure states: “After the rebuke against duplicity [in 11.39-41] a threat of demise is added here [in 11.42-54] against the duplicitous and the hypocrites” (Luc. 11.85 [Opera 7:304]).
\textsuperscript{13} Cf. especially the Matthean parallels of Luke 11.34-36 and 16.13, which appear without interruption in Matt 6.22-24. This Matthean arrangement of the material shows the contrast between “the single eye” (Matt 6.22) and service to “two lords” (Matt 6.24) more explicitly. Cf. Cadbury, “Single Eye,” 71-72.
\textsuperscript{14} Cf. Lucian, Nigr. 4, where the chief speaker of the dialogue describes his conversion to the philosophy of Nigrinus as a healing of his eye ailment—that is, as he learned to renounce “wealth and kingly dominion and reputation and honor,” he “became sharper-sighted in the soul [ψυχή].” See also Betz, “Matthew vi.22f,” 54-56; Johnson, Luke, 186; Nolland, Luke 9:21-18:34, 655-59; Culpepper, Luke, 244; and Moss, “Blurred Vision,” 761.
\textsuperscript{15} Cf. Euthymius, Luc. ad 11.41 (PG 129:977); and Maldonado, Luc. ad 11.41 (Martin 2:212-13).
τὰ ἐνόντα (11.41a). Are these “the things that are inside” the Pharisees (i.e., predatory greed and evil, 11.39), or “the things that are inside” the cup and plate (i.e., food given as alms, 11.41a)?

If we were forced to choose one sense over the other, the latter sense would perhaps be the best option—since the term ἐλεημοσύνη, “alms” or “mercy giving,” appears within the command. Yet as we have seen in other examples of figured speech, the two or more senses that comprise a figure are not mutually exclusive and may rather complement and inform one another. Within the present context, it is conceivable that if the Pharisees did give away their “predatory greed and evil,” it would perhaps count as a form of “mercy giving.” That is to say, those persons who might have been the victims of the predators would now find relief.

If we can understand τὰ ἐνόντα in both of these senses, it is possible that the second clause of the sentence also conveys a double meaning: καὶ Ἰδοὺ πάντα καθαρὰ υμῖν ἐστίν, “and behold all things will be clean for you” (11.41b). If one is concerned about the cleanliness of “the cup and the plate” (11.39), then giving away the food and drink in those dishes would be one way of making the insides καθαρά, that is, “free” or “clear” of their contents. Accordingly, this measure would ensure that “all” (πάντα) would be clean, not only the outside but also the inside (11.39). Yet by performing such an act of mercy, the inner being of the Pharisees would

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16 Theophylact reads τὰ ἐνόντα as the wealth that inhabits the heart of the greedy: “For the money of the lover of money [φιλοχρήματος] enters into his heart and resides there fixed” (Luc. ad 11.37-41 [PG 123:869a]). Alternatively, Plummer comments: “The contents of your cup and platter give ye in alms, and, lo, all things are clean to you,’ i.e., benevolence is a better way of keeping meals free from defilement than scrupulous cleansing of vessels” (Luke, 311). And Culpepper similarly concludes that it is “probably best to read Jesus’ solution as a continuation of the metaphor: Give away the contents of the cup, and it will all be clean. Almsgiving (see 12:33) is the most effective antidote to greed (v. 39)” (Luke, 247).

17 For this usage of καθαρός, see LSJ, s.v. 1.3.
also be clean, and not only the external. This latter sense becomes evident when we recall that
the controversy arose because Jesus did not wash before the meal (11.38).\(^{18}\)

We may understand another aspect of this figure in the pronoun ὑμῖν (11.41b). When it is
“the cup and the plate” that the Pharisees wish to clean, ὑμῖν perhaps functions best as a dative of
advantage—that is, all things will be “clean for you.” Yet because the statement seems also to
address the interior lives of the Pharisees, ὑμῖν may also function as a dative of place: “clean
within you” (cf. τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν σοί, 11.35).\(^{19}\) And in this instance also, the two senses appear to
complement each other—since when both the outsides and the insides of the dishes are clean
“for you,” all that is “within you” is clean, as well.\(^{20}\)

In this particular figure, there may also be a paradox in the term γέμειν. In one sense, an
empty cup and plate would suggest that persons at the table had finished their meals and were
thus “full.” Yet if those persons at table instead give the contents of their dishes as alms, their
stomachs may be empty (cf. πάντα καθαρὰ ὑμῖν ἐστιν, 11.41) but at least they will not be full of
vice.

If Jesus compels the Pharisees to give away the contents of their dishes in 11.41, does he
otherwise in this context accuse them of not giving away food as alms? He does not make such
an explicit accusation; yet we may see an implicit contrast in the statement that immediately
follows: “But woe to you Pharisees, because you tithe mint and rue and every herb, and you pass
by [παρέρχεσθαι] the judgment and love of God.” When we read this woe in light of the
injunction from 11.41, his point appears to be that they give a tenth of what Erasmus calls the

\(^{18}\) Therefore, “the one who made” both the outside and the inside (11.40) is not only the
person who makes dishes, but also God.
\(^{19}\) See Smyth §§1481, 1531.
\(^{20}\) On this implied analogy between the cup and the body, cf. Ambrose, *Luc.* 7.100-02
(CCSL 14:248-49).
“cheapest greens,” but they do not otherwise attend to what God judges to be right (κρίσις), and then how the love (ἀγάπη) of God is expressed through merciful acts of giving. As he goes on to explain, “It was necessary to perform the latter [i.e., the judgment and love of God] and not to pass by [παράνωται] the former [i.e., the tithing of greens]” (11.42). The statement that they have passed by “the love [ἀγάπη] of God” in the first woe may also be read with the accusation in the second woe: “you love [ἀγαπᾶν] the first seat in the synagogues and greetings in the marketplaces” (11.43).

While the first woe seems to be thus tied to the second, the third appears to make yet another reference to the interior lives of the Pharisees and thereby links it back to the τὰ ἐνόντα of 11.39. In the third woe, we read: “you are like unseen graves, and people walk over them and do not know” (11.44). The final clause of this statement may serve as an example of the kind of figured speech that is “either entirely suppressed or even cut off” (Quintilian, Inst. 8.3.85; cf. abscissio in Rhet. Her. 4.67). That is to say, the consequences of walking over the graves are not spelled out for the hearer; and the significance of the analogy in the first clause remains unstated. But the woe still assumes the notion that contact with graves would render a person unclean (e.g., Num 19.11-22; Lev 21.1-4, 11). The Matthean parallel shows how frankly the Lukan Jesus might have spoken if perhaps he had not figured his speech: “Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites; for you are like whitewashed tombs, which on the outside appear

21 Erasmus, Para. Luc ad 11.42 (LB 7:386a). Similarly, Theophylact states: “The Pharisees would tithe even the smallest items, supposedly so they would not transgress the law” (Luc. ad 11.42-51 [PG 123:869c]). That the Pharisees, rather than giving alms, “give tithes of mint and rue and every herb” (11.42) is, according to Nolland, “a little comic.” He explains: “The picture here is of Pharisees who tithe simply everything, with no regard for what were the normal practical exemptions for minor quantities of non-commercially produced edible plants. Excessive scrupulosity on this one side in matters of tiny detail is matched by a curious comparative laxity in the areas of huge significance: social justice and love of God” (Luke 9:21-18:34, 670).

beautiful, but on the inside are full of the bones of the dead and all uncleanness. So also you on
the outside appear just to humans, but on the inside you are full of hypocrisy and lawlessness”
(Matt 23.27-28). As in the analogy from Luke 11.39-41 that likens the Pharisees to cups and
plates, in 11.44 the Lukan Jesus appears only to insinuate that the Pharisees are externally clean
but inwardly unclean.  

3. The “Some” and “Others” in the Beelzebul Controversy

We have seen so far that Luke does appear to figure the statements against the Pharisees in
11.37-44, even if those statements are not as fully secure as the other instances of figured speech
that we have observed throughout his two books. At the beginning of this meal-scene, Luke
informs his readers: “While he was speaking, a Pharisee invited him to dine with him” (11.34).
This statement suggests that the Pharisee was among those who heard the teachings about the
evil eye in 11.33-36—which, as we have also noticed, are closely tied to the subsequent remarks
Jesus makes to the Pharisee. If there was at least one Pharisee who hears Jesus teach prior to the
meal-scene in 11.37-52, does Luke otherwise indicate a Pharisaic presence in this earlier part of
the narrative? And if so, are any of these earlier teachings also directed toward or against the
Pharisees?

When reading immediately prior to the scene in which the Pharisee invites Jesus to dine,
this material seems to have been prompted largely by the so-called Beelzebul controversy in
11.14-23. Yet Luke does not explicitly identify any Pharisees as being involved in this

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23 On these analogies pertaining to what is inside and outside, see also the various images
in this context about things that are able to house or contain other things—that is, the body
containing a demon (11.14, 24-26), the house riches (11.21-23), a lamp light (11.33), the eye
controversy. He rather refers to Jesus’ interlocutors only as τινὲς, “some,” and ἕτεροι, “others.” It is, however, important to note that ἕτεροι (as opposed to ὀλλοι) typically refers to “others” of two groups.24 The question then is whether these two groups in 11.14-23 might be the Pharisees and lawyers who are clearly present in 11.37-52.

In comparing Luke’s version of the Beelzebul controversy to the parallel synoptic material, it is curious that Pharisees appear in both Mark and Matthew. Where Luke relates that “some” from the crowds accused Jesus of casting out demons by Beelzebul (11.15), Mark identifies “the scribes from Jerusalem” (Mark 3.22) and Matthew “the Pharisees” (Matt 12.24) as the ones bringing this charge.25 And where Luke states that “others” from the crowds “were testing [πειράζειν] him and seeking from him a sign from heaven” (11.16), Mark specifies “the Pharisees” (Mark 8.11) and Matthew “the Pharisees and the Sadducees” (Matt 16.1) as those making such a demand.

Moreover, Tannehill observes that Jesus responds to the “some” in 11:17-26 and then to the “others” in 11.29-36, so that “11:14-36 forms a single section of controversy with segments of the crowd.”26 If he is right about Jesus responding to the “some” and “others” even beyond the Beelzebul controversy, is it furthermore possible to extend the response to these two groups also in 11.37-52, and thus to demarcate this section of controversy as 11.14-52? If so, there may be a connection between the two groups in 11.14-23 and the Pharisees and lawyers in 11.37-52. Yet

24 See Smyth §1271; and the discussion above in chapter nine.
25 Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, who conflates Mark’s “scribes” and Matthew’s “Pharisees” and thus qualifies Luke’s “some” as “scribes and Pharisees” (Luc. ad 11.14 [PG 72:700c]).
26 Tannehill, Narrative Unity, 1:149. The most obvious correlation, for instance, between the “others” and the response to them in 11.29-36 is that they seek a “sign.” On this structure within the narrative, see also Bonaventure (Luc. 11.36 [Opera 7:288]); and Fitzmyer, Luke X-XXIV, 930.
to answer this question, we would need to evaluate any possible relationship between these two pericopae.

At the beginning of the Beelzebul controversy, the “crowds” from which the “some” and “others” presumably emerge “were amazed” (θαυμάζειν, 11.14) when Jesus expelled the demon from the deaf-mute man. And comparably, the Pharisee in 11.37-41 “was amazed” (θαυμάζειν, 11.38) that Jesus did not wash before the meal. Yet this verbal parallel may be a mere coincidence and thus does not by itself establish a relationship between the two scenes.

Much earlier in the narrative, Luke shows a joint opposition against Jesus coming from the Pharisees and lawyers when he describes them as having “rejected the plan of God for themselves” (7.30). Notably these Pharisees and lawyers are also from among the “crowds” (7.24); and their refusal to accept John’s baptism leads Jesus to compare them, “people of this generation” (7.31; cf. 11.29-32, 50-51), to spoiled children who complain whether one upholds ascetic abstinence or attends symposiastic affairs (7.32-34). Especially important in this context, though, is the particular accusation they mount against John because of his asceticism, namely that “he has a demon” (7.33)—which closely relates to the charge made by the “some” in 11.15, stating that Jesus operates under the authority of the “ruler of demons.”

We might also suppose that a dispute over demonological matters would most likely occur with the Pharisees, since Luke regards them as particularly invested in matters pertaining to πνεῦμα (Acts 23.8). And as Luke shows even in the immediate context, a demon is nothing other than ἀκάθαρτον πνεῦμα, “an unclean spirit” (11.24-26; cf. 11.13). Yet it is still curious why Luke would refrain from naming the Pharisees in this particular controversy.

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27 See also Luke 4.33, 36; 6.18; 8.29; 9.42; Acts 5.16; 8.7; and the discussion by Clinton Wahlen, Jesus and the Impurity of Spirits in the Synoptic Gospels (WUNT 2.185; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 140-69, esp. 148-52, 165-66.
Perhaps more significant is that Jesus casts out demons “by the finger of God” (ἐν δακτύλῳ θεοῦ, 11.20), which may contrast with his first woe against the lawyers: “you load people with burdens hard to bear, and you yourselves do not touch the burdens with one of your fingers [ἐν τῶν δακτύλων ὑμῶν]” (11.46).

Among the Synoptics, only Luke uses the expression ἐν δακτύλῳ θεοῦ to refer to Jesus’ activity as an exorcist, and he uses it only here within his corpus. A further significance of the phrase within the present context may become apparent when we observe the two almost identical expressions in the LXX where “the finger of God” refers to the divine composition of the law through the agency of Moses. In Exod 31.18 the stone tablets containing the law “have been inscribed by the finger of God [τῷ δακτύλῳ τοῦ θεοῦ].” And similarly in Deut 9.10, Moses recounts the reception of “the two stone tablets that have been inscribed by the finger of God [ἐν τῶν δακτύλων τοῦ θεοῦ].” Thus in addition to the contrast between Jesus carrying out God’s work (11.20) and the lawyers’ negligence in keeping his law (11.46), this biblical echo shows a disparity between Jesus and his opponents. The agency (i.e., “the finger of God”) traditionally associated with the delivery of the law and expectedly assumed by lawyers has instead fallen within the domain of Jesus.

Yet that Jesus casts out demons “by the finger of God” has another point of reference in the LXX that may be equally relevant. The magicians of Pharaoh’s court in Exod 8.15 recognize the “signs and wonders” (Exod 7.3) performed through the agency of Moses and Aaron as δάκτυλος θεοῦ, “a finger of God.” When reading this biblical tradition alongside the Lukan account of the Beelzebul controversy, we see a possible correlation between Pharaoh’s magicians and Jesus’ interlocutors, specifically their work as exorcists (11.19). In the attempt to explain what the “finger of God” might mean in Luke 11.20, Pieter W. van der Horst explains
that Jannes and Jambres (i.e., two of Pharaoh’s magicians) “were often regarded in haggadic sources as persons who had made a pact with the devil and his demons.” Such traditions may lead Luke’s readers to suspect that the “some” and “others” in 11.14-23 are playing a similar adversarial role.

The fact that the “others” are “testing” (πειράζειν) Jesus is one possible clue that their activity is in line with the work of devil. The detail about their testing is unique to the Lukan account of the Beelzebul controversy (11.16; cf. 11.29); the other Synoptics place it in entirely different contexts (cf. Mark 8.11-13; Matt 16.1-4). Has Luke included the “testing” within this pericope in order to evoke the earlier account about the devil “testing” (πειράζειν and ἐκπειράζειν, 4.2, 12) Jesus, as well as the more immediate scene where the lawyer “tests” (ἐκπειράζειν) Jesus in similar fashion (10.25-37)?

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29 See, e.g., the comments by Plummer, Luke, 301; and Green, Luke, 453. Cf. also the immediately preceding episode about prayer (11.1-13), where Jesus teaches his disciples to ask for the coming of God’s “kingdom” (11.2) and that they not enter into a “test” (πειράσματα) themselves (11.4). As Johnson summarizes, the discourse in 11.14-26, “provides a polemical contrast to the previous passage in which Jesus taught his disciples to pray (11.1-13). Now, rather [than] asking and receiving the ‘Holy Spirit from heaven’ (11:13), these opponents seek a ‘sign from out of heaven’ (11:16). Rather than praying to God to deliver them from testing (11:4), they deliberately put Jesus to the test (11:16). Rather than ask for forgiveness of sins they in effect accuse Jesus of the sin of collusion with Satan (11:4, 15). Rather than recognize in Jesus the one who proclaims the kingdom of the Father (11:2), they accuse him of being a minion of Satan’s rule (11:15)” (Luke, 183). See also Luke 22.24-34, where in 22.28 Jesus commends his disciples for their endurance with him in his “trials” (πειράσματα), part of which is resisting the type of kingdom the devil had earlier proposed (4.1-13) and which Jesus reminds the disciples about (22.25-27). The kingdom God had assigned to him he in turn disposes to them (22.29-30).
The lawyer who appears in 10.25 is not only reminiscent of the devil in 4.1-13, he also appears to set the stage for the “others” in 11.16 and the attendant responses to them in 11.29-36, as well as the culminating woes against them in 11.45-52. It is clear that the lawyer (νομικός), in keeping with his expertise, examines Jesus over matters pertaining to the law (νόμος), as the quotations from Deut 6.5 and Lev 19.18 augment (10.25-27). Although Luke depicts the lawyer with at least some knowledge of the law (cf. 11.52), he also portrays him making the same error as the scripture-quoting devil in 4.1-13—that is, putting “the Lord God” to the test (ἐκπειράζειν) and thus contradicting the law (4.12; cf. Deut 6.16).30

Yet if the lawyers are present within the Beelzebul controversy, Luke seems not only to underscore their similar behavior to and association with the devil, he further builds upon a reversal between them and the Samaritans. The name Βεελζεβούλ, “Beelzebul,” evokes the scene in 4 Kingdoms 1.1-17 where Ahaziah, the injured and ailing king of Samaria, sends his messengers to find out from “Baal, fly god of Ekron,” whether he is to recover.31 Luke has already alluded to this tradition in his previous narrative when Elijah appears on the mountain (9.28-30)—as that prophet also does in 4 Kingdoms 1.9 (cf. 3 Kgdms 19.11)—and almost

and subsequently warns Peter that Satan has asked for the disciples (22.31), which is perhaps a request to occupy his (i.e., Satan’s) kingdom after Jesus departs. Jesus’ assuring Peter that he has prayed that his faith not fail is reminiscent of his own steadfastness under a period of testing (4.1-13) and his instruction to the disciples about praying that they might not enter into such a test (11.4). Cf. Acts 20.11.

Cf. Acts 15.5-10, where Peter responds to “some who had come to believe from the sect of the Pharisees” (15.5) by reminding them how God granted the holy spirit (15.8; cf. Luke 11.13) to Gentiles and then proceeds to ask them: “why do you test God [πειράζειν τὸν θεόν] by placing a yoke upon the neck of the disciples that neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?” (15.10).

The name itself is an approximate transliteration of the deity’s title as it appears in the MT, בֶּלֶל צֶבֶב אַלֹּהי זֶבַע (2 Kgs 1.2), which the LXX simply translates Βααλ μυῖαν θεὸν Ακκαρων, “Baal, fly-god of Akkron” (4 Kgdms 1.2). Cf. Wolter, Lukasevangelium, 416-17. That Luke and the other Synoptics have Βεελζεβούλ may reflect an attempt to modify the title to זבל באל, “lord of the exalted place,” which would convey the notion of a (false) deity who assumed a prominent position.
immediately after this scene of transfiguration when James and John inquire about whether they should call down fire from heaven (πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ) to destroy the Samaritans (9.54), which is a clear reference to the two consecutive instances in 4 Kingdoms 1.10, 12 where fire from heaven (πῦρ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ) consumes a Samaritan officer and his fifty servants.

That the Beelzebul controversy follows the transfiguration on the mountain and the request about destroying the Samaritan village may allow Luke to insinuate who the real adversaries are for his prophet—that is, not the Samaritans, but rather those who test him by demanding “a sign from heaven” (σημεῖον ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, 11.16), which is a reversal of the tradition where Elijah must demonstrate to the Samaritans that he is “a man of God” (ἄνθρωπος τοῦ θεοῦ) by performing such a sign (4 Kgdsms 1.10, 12). Luke initially shows that his prophet does not need to exhibit this sign to the Samaritans, but rather to the lawyers, in his telling of the so-called parable of the Good Samaritan; for here a Samaritan is more obedient to the law than the priest, the Levite, and more importantly the lawyer, whose testing of Jesus prompted the parable (10.25-37; cf. 17.16).

In addition to the fact that the lawyer and the “others,” like the devil (4.1-13), put Jesus to the test (10.25; 11.16) and violate their own law (Deut 6.16), their desire to receive “a sign from heaven” is often necessary demonstrations of divine power not for the prophet’s supporters or associates, but for his opponents and for outsiders generally (cf. 21.11, 25; Acts 2.19). In addition to the fire that consumes his Samaritan opponents, for instance, Elijah had also earlier defeated the prophets of Baal when “fire from the Lord fell from heaven” (3 Kgdsms 18.38) and with the darkening of the sky with clouds to signal the coming rain (3 Kgdsms 18.45). That such signs are required by those not within the prophet’s circle is corroborated in LXX Jer 10.2-3, which states: “do not learn according to the ways of the nations [τὰ ἔθνη], and do not fear signs from heaven [σημεῖα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ]; for they fear them whenever they appear. For the customs of the nations are futile.”

Sharon H. Ringe (Luke [Louisville, Westminster John Knox, 1995], 156) observes: “One might surmise from the question that the lawyer is a Pharisee whose theology included belief in the resurrection of the dead. The test may have been to see whether Jesus shared that perspective, or rather was a Sadducee (the aristocratic party connected to the temple, which did not believe in the resurrection).” Cf. Levine, “Luke’s Pharisees,” 121.
heaven” (11.16) marks them out as members of “an evil [πονηρός] generation” (11.29; cf. 11.34, 39, 50-51). The Lukan Jesus highlights their wickedness by comparing them to some representative Gentiles, that is, “the queen of the South” (11.31) and the “Ninevites” (11.30, 32)—a comparison implying that the “others” are worse, since the queen and the Ninevites will arise and condemn the people of this generation (11.31-32).\footnote{Cf. the comments by Bede and Bonaventure (\textit{Luc.} 11.66-69 [Opera 7:298-300]), who both explain how in this instance a rhetorical comparison becomes the means by which the Queen of the South condemns the evil generation. Bede, e.g., claims: “She will in no way condemn by the power of judgment, but rather by a comparison [\textit{comparatio}] with someone who has acted better” (\textit{Luc.} 4.286-87 [CCSL 120:238]).}

Although the queen of the South initially showed skepticism to Solomon’s wisdom and put him to the test (πειράζειν) through riddles (3 Kgdms 10.1, 3) in similar fashion to the Lukan devil (4.1-13), the lawyer (10.25), and the “others” (11.16), she in the end blessed the God of Israel for establishing Solomon upon the throne (3 Kgdms 10.6-9). Correspondingly, the Ninevites and their king repented at the preaching of Jonah (Jon 3.5-10). Accordingly, the queen of the South and the Ninevites will condemn (κατακρίνειν) the members of the evil generation at the judgment, because as a pair they repented and acknowledged the authority of God’s true king. The implication seems to be that the “others” have done neither, even though a σημεῖον, “sign,” (i.e., Jesus) “greater than” Solomon and Jonah is among them (11.31-32).\footnote{The text literally states that “something greater” (πλεῖον) than Solomon (11.31) and Jonah (11.32) is here. Yet πλεῖον most certainly refers to the σημεῖον, which Jesus will become to “this generation,” just as Jonah became a σημεῖον to “the men of Nineveh” (11.30). That Jesus is greater than Solomon and Jonah, a king and prophet, fits within Luke’s larger portrayal of Jesus as playing both of those roles (cf. 10.24). See, e.g., Fitzmyer, \textit{Luke X-XXIV}, 934.}

The detail about the Queen of the south coming “to hear” (ἀκούειν, 11.31) the wisdom of Solomon is comparable to the macarism that Jesus speaks to the woman in the previous pericope:
“Blessed rather are the ones who hear [οἱ ἀκούοντες] the word of God and keep it” (11.28).

Similar to the deaf-mute man who speaks to the marvel of the crowds (11.14), “the woman from the crowd” has a voice (φωνή, 11.27) that rises above it, even if Jesus modifies her own macarism.

Do the speech acts of the deaf-mute man and the woman from the crowd imply anything about their own moral health? We could not make a case based upon the content of their speech; but if demons sometimes prohibit auditory and vocal abilities (δαιμόνιον [καὶ αὐτὸ ἦν] κωφόν, 11.14), then both of these persons appear (now) to be free of any demons that would hinder them from hearing and speaking “the word of God.” Perhaps the question then is whether the “some” and “others” of crowd have demons that need expelling. And if Luke diagnoses the Pharisees with eye problems in 11.33-36, how might the inability to see properly relate to the condition of

36 Cf. Luke 1.38; and 8.21. Erasmus understands the act of giving birth to (by a mother) and then breastfeeding a child (by a wet-nurse) as metaphors for one’s hearing and doing the word of God (Para. Luc. 11.27-28 [LB 7:383e-f]). This interpretation necessitates the usage of μενοῦν (cf. quinimo in the Vulgate, which Erasmus paraphrases sane, “truly”) in 11.28 as an affirmative rather than a corrective particle—that is, “blessed indeed” and not “blessed rather.” For Erasmus, and Bede before him (Luc. 4.241-44 [CCSL 120:237]), the woman represents the church, whose position Jesus both affirms and qualifies.

37 Theophylact comments on the condition of deaf-mutism: “Deaf-mute [κωφός] usually means someone who cannot speak; but it might also designate a person who cannot hear, and essentially one who can neither hear nor speak. And indeed, those unable to hear from birth are also unable to speak. For this unavoidably happens to them. For we speak those things that we learn through hearing of course. Whenever someone cannot hear, he or she naturally cannot speak, unless perhaps by some misfortune one suffers loss of hearing later in life, in which case nothing prevents the person from speaking. Therefore the man was brought to the Lord with both conditions, disabled in both the tongue and the ears. He is a symbol [σύμβολον] of human nature, which was possessed by demons and could not bear to hear the words of God and was thus much less able to speak them” (Luc. ad 11.14-20 [PG 123:860b-c]). Theophylact goes on to identify the “demons” as “passionate [ἐμπαθεῖς] and demonic deeds” (Luc. ad 11.14-20 [PG 123:860c]).

38 Cf. also Zechariah’s becoming mute (κωφός) upon hearing and resisting Gabriel’s message (Luke 1.18-22), as contrasted with Mary’s obedient reception of that messenger’s statement to her (1.38). According to Origen, Zechariah becomes κωφός because he is a type for those who lack λόγος (Hom. Luc. 5 [GCS 49:29-31]). Ambrose makes a similar point, yet he also explains that the voice is the instrument of verbum, and John is that voice (i.e., “the voice of one crying in the desert” [Luke 3.4]) as Christ is verbum (Luc. 1.40-41 [CCSL 14:26-27]).
deaf-mutism within the context of the Third Gospel, as well as within broader prophetic and philosophical contexts of antiquity?

Luke sometimes pairs the inabilities to hear and see throughout his narrative in order to represent his antagonists’ failure to understand or assimilate to the kingdom of God. For example, when Jesus instructs the seventy-two about those who will either receive or resist their deeds and announcements pertaining to “the kingdom of God” (10.9, 11), the rejection of that message is the opposite of hearing it (10.16). The verb used for such an act of rejection (ἀθετεῖν) Luke employs only in one other instance in his corpus—when the Pharisees and lawyers are said to have “rejected the plan of God for themselves” (7.30). As becomes clearer after the seventy-two return, the reason some do not hear the message about the kingdom of God is not only that they have refused it; this teaching has ultimately been hidden from them (10.21), perhaps because they have resisted and opposed it (10.6-12). Accordingly, these foes are not only incapable of hearing the message about the kingdom of God, their eyes cannot see what the disciples of Jesus have witnessed (10.23)—namely, that the demons are subject to (ὑποτάσσειν) them because of their place within that kingdom (10.17). Jesus tells them: “many prophets and kings wished to see what you see, and did not see it, and to hear what you hear, and did not hear it” (10.24).

When reading the Matthean account of the Beelzebul controversy, we encounter a more explicit pairing between the lack of sight and hearing; for there the demon-possessed man is said to be τυφλὸς καὶ κωφός, “blind and deaf-mute” (Matt 12.22). If Luke knew about a tradition that ascribed both of these disabilities to the demon-possessed man, perhaps he preferred to delay the

diagnosis of eye problems until 11.33-36, 39 and there addressed not blindness but double vision.

Furthermore, we notice the pairing between deafness and blindness in the Israelite prophetic tradition, as well. Isaiah projects a situation in which the “lawless” (ἀνομος) and “arrogant” (ὑπερήφανος) one who held the power, as well as his attendant “lawless ones” (οἱ ἄνομοι), have all come to naught, and as a result “the deaf [κωφοί] shall hear” and the “eyes of the blind shall see” (Isa 29.18), which Luke also incorporates into his earlier narrative (Luke 7.22). For Isaiah, among those who are blind and deaf are God’s “servants” (παῖδες), his “slaves” (δοῦλοι), and also “the ones who lord it over” (οἱ κυριεύοντες) them (Isa 42.18; 43.8; cf. Luke 22.25).

From the Greek philosophical tradition, deafness and blindness sometimes serve as metaphors for the ignorance resulting in moral impairment (i.e., the inability to hear instruction and develop insight toward correction and improvement). Diogenes, for instance, was said to have applied the term ἀνάπηροι, “disabled,” not to those who were κωφοί and τυφλοί, but rather to those without a knapsack (D.L. 6.33)—perhaps referring to those who are unable to subsist only on what would fit in a knapsack.41 Epictetus similarly uses the conditions of deafness and blindness in a figurative sense to depict the misfortune of those who have lost the use of choice (προαίρεσις), which when healthy enables them to distinguish between good and evil (Diatr. 1.18.5-8; 2.23.16-22).42 In his comments on Luke 11.14, Titus of Bostra provides a philosophical interpretation of deafness reminiscent of Epictetus: “Deaf means the condition of deafness when

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42 See also Epictetus, Diatr. 2.24.19; 4.8.20-21; Philo, Fug. 123; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 30.42; and Lucian, Vit. auct. 27.
the word of God is not heard. For the most oppressive demons have surrounded the hearing of human choice [προαίρεσις] and have destroyed the soul’s sense of hearing.”

4. Conclusions

In the end, we cannot be fully certain that Luke wanted his readers to understand the “some” and “others” of 11.14-23 as Pharisees and lawyers, respectively. And even if we could be certain, we could not then confirm why he does not name them at this point. As we have seen, however, there are reasons at least to suspect that the “some” and “others” are Pharisees; and these suspicions would not rule out the possibility that Luke is applying figured speech in his version of the Beelzebul controversy. If we were to accept that Luke only alludes to the Pharisees in 11.14-23, we would nevertheless need to explain why he suppresses their presence in this earlier scene and then does not when Jesus dines with the Pharisee in 11.37-52. Perhaps the most we can do in answering this question is to propose that the earlier scene in 11.14-23 allows readers to suspect that Jesus is disputing with Pharisees and lawyers; and the later scene in 11.37-52 provides further clues to confirm those suspicions. This gradual escalation from (partial) concealment to revelation appears to test the limits on how much one can criticize the Pharisees and their associates before they begin “to hold a strong grudge” (11.53).

The more apparent examples of figured speech within this context of the narrative appear, strangely enough, to be tied to statements that would otherwise qualify as free speech. As we

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43 Κοφὸν λέγει τὸ κωφότητα ἐμποιοῦν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀκουσθῆναι λόγον Θεοῦ. δαίμονες γάρ πονηρότατοι περιελόντες τὸ εὐήκοον τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων προαιρέσεως, ἐπήρωσαν ἡμῶν τὴν ἀκοὴν τῆς ψυχῆς (Luc. ad 11.14 [TU 21.1: Sickenberger, 202]). Cf. 3 Enoch 15b, a much later text (fifth-sixth century CE), yet one that similarly describes the activity of a demonic ruler (cf. ὁ ἄρχων τῶν δαίμονων, Luke 11.15) who causes deafness: “Metatron is Prince over all princes, and stands before him who is exalted above all gods. He goes beneath the throne of glory, where he has a great heavenly tabernacle of light, and brings out the deafening fire, and puts it in the ears of the holy creatures, so that they should not hear the sound of the utterance that issues from the mouth of the Almighty” (trans. Alexander in OTP, 1:303).
have seen, the frank and direct criticism that the insides of the Pharisees are “full of predatory
greed and evil” (11.39) helps to confirm an earlier ambiguous statement about whether the eye is ἁπλὸς or πονηρός (11.34). When an eye is ἁπλὸς, it is “single” (i.e., generous and singly
minded in purpose) and thus “healthy.” On the other hand, an eye that is πονηρός is “evil” (i.e.,
greedy and double-minded) and thus “unhealthy.” The antidote for the evil eye, therefore, is to
“give those things that lie within [τὰ ἐνόντα] as alms” (11.41). In one sense, to give away the
“predatory greed and evil” within (or the evil eye inside, 11.35) allows one to achieve
cleanliness. In a more practical sense, to give away the sustenance inside “the cup and the plate”
would be a sign that one is not greedy but generous. Then both the dishes and the persons will be
pure, not only on the outside but on the inside as well.

More broadly speaking, we have seen in this chapter and in the previous two that the
Lukan Jesus diagnoses the Pharisees as morally unwell. While it is clear that Luke casts Jesus as
a “doctor” in the metaphorical and philosophical sense of the term, the nuances in his diagnoses
of the Pharisees are largely concealed through figured speech. If Luke also plays the role of a
doctor and provided “examples of the work in healing souls” throughout his two books, as
Eusebius claims (Hist. eccl. 3.4.6), his readers would most likely need to attend carefully to his
rhetorical style in order to understand fully what he prescribes.44

44 Euthymius echoes the point that Luke, having first learned the art of healing bodies,
later conducted work in the healing of souls (Luc. preface [PG 129:857b]). Cf. Seneca, who
views his writings as prescription drugs for later generations—explaining that the “wholesome
suggestions” he offers therein have even been helpful in administering to his own “sores, which
even if they have not been completely cured, they have ceased to spread” (Ep. 8.2). In another
epistle, Seneca uses the metaphor of the philosopher as physician in order to explain that in other
situations written correspondence may not be the best remedy. Certain diagnoses are most
accurate only when the patient is present (Ep. 22.1-3). On this topic in Seneca’s epistles, see the
essays by Hildegard Cancik-Lindemaier (“Seneca’s Collection of Epistles: A Medium of
Philosophical Communication,” 88-109) and Margaret M. Mitchell (“Reading to Virtue,” 110-
PART FOUR: THE PHARISEES AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

Chapter Twelve: The Kingdom within Reach

In chapter six we evaluated part of the episode in which the Pharisees asked Jesus when the kingdom of God was coming (17.20-21). As we observed there, Jesus responds that the kingdom of God is not coming μετὰ παρατηρήσεως (17.20)—a statement that serves as an example of figured speech through the double meaning of the term παρατήρησις. Accordingly, in one sense, the kingdom of God is not coming “with the observance of signs,” and in another, not “with malicious observation.” What we did not discuss in that earlier chapter, however, is the second part of Jesus’ response: “they will not say: ‘look, here it is, or there it is,’ for look, the kingdom of God,” he says, is ἐντὸς υμῶν (17.21).

If we see what Pseudo-Dionysius calls a public and a private argument (Ars Rhet. 8.16) in μετὰ παρατηρήσεως, perhaps the more obvious or public sense would be “with the observance of signs,” since the later clause (ιδοὺ γὰρ ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐντὸς υμῶν ἐστι) appears to affect the meaning of this earlier one (οὐκ ἔρχεται ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ μετὰ παρατηρήσεως). That is to say, Jesus’ hearers should not be waiting or looking for the kingdom of God, “for look,” he explains, the kingdom of God is actually already present. Yet interpreters and scholars have long puzzled over the phrase ἐντὸς υμῶν, debating over how precisely the kingdom of God is present. Does the Lukan Jesus mean that the kingdom of God is “in your midst,” “among you,” or “within you”? Is this statement to the Pharisees a further example of figured speech through ambiguity? And if so, is it the kind of figure from which hearers ought to accept one meaning to the exclusion of others; or does the context allow for taking the statement in multiple senses?

Because the scholarship on ἐντὸς υμῶν is so extensive, it may prove fruitful to begin answering
such questions by attempting to learn from what interpreters have already observed and proposed about this statement.

1. Previous Interpretations of ἐντὸς ὑμῶν (Luke 17.21)

A number of modern scholars argue against understanding ἐντὸς ὑμῶν as “within you,” claiming that nowhere else in his Gospel and Acts does Luke refer to the kingdom residing inside the human soul or heart. Accordingly, they propose that “among you” makes best sense.\(^1\) Conversely, other scholars argue that ἐντὸς ὑμῶν means “within you” or “inside you” to the exclusion of “among you.”\(^2\)

Earlier interpreters also understand ἐντὸς ὑμῶν as “among you” or “in your midst,” but they are generally less intent on limiting its usage to one of these meanings. Ephrem the Syrian, for example, allows for a double meaning: “Where the king is, there too is the kingdom. This is why he said, The kingdom of God is in your heart.”\(^3\) He goes on to say: “The scribes and pharisees did not want to enter through this door of life, in keeping with what he had said, See,


\(^3\) Ephrem the Syrian, Comm. Diat. 18.5; trans. McCarthy, 272.
the kingdom is in your heart. [He was referring to] himself, for he was standing in their midst.\textsuperscript{4}

Similarly, Euthymius comments: “And he was among them [Ἐντὸς αὐτῶν], as one conducting himself in their midst [ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν].” It appears also that a scholiast has provided additional options to Euthymius’ interpretation, including: “The success of the kingdom of God lies within you [ἐν ύμίν κεῖται], in your will [ἐν τῇ προωφέσει ύμῶν].”\textsuperscript{5} Theophylact also explains that τὸ πιστεοῦσα, “to have faith,” is ἐντὸς ἡμῶν; but Jesus here shows that the Pharisees “are ignorant of the entity that is within them [ἐντὸς αὐτῶν], and that it is very easy for those who desire [βούλεσθαι] to take hold of this entity. For while I am now among you [μέσον ὑμῶν], you are entirely capable [δύνασθαι] to receive the kingdom of God, if you have faith in me and if you choose to live according to my commandments.”\textsuperscript{6} Maldonado interprets the statement, regnum Dei intra vos est, to mean “the Messiah, whom you expect, is in your midst [in medio vestrum].”\textsuperscript{7} But he claims also that the kingdom of God was “within them” (intra illos), “because they were able, if willing, to receive Christ.”\textsuperscript{8} And Bengel remarks: “for the kingdom is within you [intra vos]; even as the King Messiah is in the midst of you [in medio vestri].\textsuperscript{9}

Other earlier interpreters emphasize the sense “within,” further explaining that the kingdom of God lies within one’s own power or choice. Tertullian asks: “Who will not interpret in this way: It is within you, that is, in your hand, in your power [Intra vos est, id est in manu, in potestate vestra], if you hear, if you do the commandment of God?”\textsuperscript{10} Origen also understands ἐντὸς ύμῶν as “within you” and on three separate occasions combines the statement with a

\textsuperscript{4} Ephrem the Syrian, Comm. Diat. 18.8; trans. McCarthy, 274.
\textsuperscript{5} Euthymius, Luc. ad 17.21 (PG 129:1048a-b).
\textsuperscript{6} Theophylact, Luc. ad 17.20-25 (PG 123:993a).
\textsuperscript{7} Maldonado, Luc. ad 17.20 (Martin 2:310).
\textsuperscript{8} Maldonado, Luc. ad 17.21 (Martin 2:311).
\textsuperscript{9} Bengel, Gnomon (Luc. ad 17.21).
\textsuperscript{10} Tertullian, Marc. 4.35.12.
quotation from Deut 30.14: “The word is very near you, in your mouth and in your heart” (cf. Rom 10.8).\textsuperscript{11} As he interprets elsewhere, the kingdom is “potentially ‘within us.’”\textsuperscript{12} Cyril of Alexandria similarly explains, “for it is within you [ἐντὸς γὰρ ὑμῶν ἐστι]; that is, to seize it lies within your wills [ἐν ταῖς ὑμετέραις προαιρέσεσι] and your authority [ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ].”\textsuperscript{13}

Well over half a century ago, Colin Roberts showed examples of this usage of ἐντὸς from the papyri and furthermore cautioned against ignoring “the Fathers and the whole exegetical tradition” on this point, which Cadbury echoed in support.\textsuperscript{14} More recently, J. C. O’Neill suggests that when Jesus responds to the Pharisees in Luke 17.21, he means “that the responsibility for doing what God required actually lay within their own grasp.”\textsuperscript{15} And J. Ramsey Michaels argues that ἐντὸς ὑμῶν has the sense of “in your hand” or “in your power.” He points to Jesus’ statement to the Pharisees in 11.41 (τὰ ἐνόντα δότε ἐλεημοσύνην) and proposes more specifically that it is the giving of alms that lies within the power of the Pharisees.\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{12} Origen states: οὗ ἡ βασιλεία δυνάμει μὲν «ἐντὸς ὑμῶν» ἐστιν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ καὶ (ὡς όνόμασεν ὁ Μᾶρκος) ἐν δυνάμει καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ, «ἐντὸς» τῶν τελείων μόνων, “whose kingdom is potentially ‘within us,’ and actually also in power (as Mark identifies) and not at all in weakness, ‘within’ those who are perfect alone” (Comm. ser. Matt. 12.32; ed. Erich Klostermann, Origenes Werke 10 [GCS 40; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1935], 142). See also Comm. ser. Matt. 10.14; and 12.14. In his homily on Luke 17.21, Origen remarks, “either the kingdom of God rules in our hearts, or the kingdom of sin” (Hom. Luc. 36 [GCS 49:207]).
\textsuperscript{13} Cyril of Alexandria, Luc. ad 17.20 (PG 72:841a).
\end{footnotes}
By analyzing the usages of ἐντός in Greek literature prior to and up until Luke’s period, Ilaria Ramelli has demonstrated that ἐντός more often than not means “inside” or “within,” whether referring to space or time. But do any of the authors from this period use the preposition to convey the idea that it is from “within” that one has power, as some interpreters have suggested?

2. The Kingdom “within you”

A passage from Plutarch may illustrate how ἐντός is used for the sense “inside” while also verging on the meaning “within the power of.” Plutarch relates that Pelopidas had instructed the wife of Alexander “not to fear the external splendor and armament [μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὴν ἕξω λαμπρότητα καὶ παρασκευήν] of the tyrant, which lay within his weapons and guards [ἐντὸς τῶν ὀπλῶν καὶ τῶν φυλακῶν οὖσαν]” (Pel. 35.3). While Plutarch shows a clear contrast between what is outside (ἐξω) and inside (ἐντός), we also see that the tyrant derives his power or armament (παρασκευή) from his location within the group of guards. But this particular usage of ἐντός does not serve as a close parallel to ἐντός ὑμῶν in Luke 17.21, since the genitive pronoun ὑμῶν is not the same as τῶν ὀπλῶν καὶ τῶν φυλακῶν.

Perhaps closer is Plato’s use of the preposition when referring to “the pure fire within us [ἐντὸς ἡμῶν]” (Tim. 45b) and when otherwise designating what is ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς, “within the soul” (Soph. 263e; and Resp. 401d). But these instances alone do not sufficiently show any particular capacities coming from the soul. A passage from Philo, however, may illustrate this usage of ἐντός. In his interpretation of Genesis 39.11, he explains that when Joseph goes “into the house,” the house is an allegory for the soul and thus that Joseph goes “within himself” (ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ, Leg. 3.238-39). For Philo, by entering into his soul, Joseph is capable of exercising

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“self-control” (ἐγκρατής) and thus to flee Potiphar’s wife, whom he identifies allegorically as “pleasure” (Leg. 3.237-241). Accordingly, Joseph abandons τὰ ἐκτός, “the things outside,” and inside his soul is able “to perform his works” (ποιεῖν τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, Gen 39.11). “The works of the man of self-control,” Philo explains, “are perhaps performed by the will of God” (Leg. 3.239).18

When we evaluate how Luke refers to human interiority throughout his two books, we find that he uses the term καρδία, “heart,” more than ψυχή, “soul.” Yet in Acts 4.32, the Lukan narrator explains that there was “one heart and soul” (καρδία καὶ ψυχὴ μία) belonging to the multitude of those who believed. This statement may form a hendiadys, as we see also in Luke 10.27 when the lawyer quotes from Deut 6.5: “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart [καρδία], and with all your soul [ψυχὴ].” Luke does not elsewhere use ἐντός to designate what is “within” a human, as we see in the LXX (e.g., ἡ καρδία μου ἐντός μου, Ps 38.4).19 Yet he does quite commonly use the preposition ἐν to designate what is in the human heart: ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου, “in your heart” (Acts 5.4), ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν, “in your heart” (Luke 24.38), ἐν ταῖς καρδιαῖς ὑμῶν, “in your hearts” (Luke 5.22; 21.14), ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτῆς, “in her heart” (Luke 18.


19 See also πάντα τὰ ἐντός μου, “all that is within me” (Ps 102.1); ἡ καρδία μου τετάρακται ἐντός μου, “my heart is troubled within me” (Ps 108.22); τὰ ἐντός μου, “the parts within me” (Isa 16.11); καὶ τὰ ἐντός αὐτοῦ πλήρη δόλου, “and what is inside him is full of deceit” (Sir 19.26); συνεστέλλετο δὲ ἡ καρδία μου, καὶ ἐντός γεφράνου μου διελεγόμην ἀντιλέγων, “and my heart was subdued, and within my kidneys I was arguing and disputing” (Symmachus’ version of Ps 72.21; see the edition by Frederick Field, Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt; Veterum interpretum graecorum in totum Vetus Testamentum fragmenta [Oxford: Clarendon, 1875], 2:215).
A closer analysis of Luke’s use of the term καρδία reveals also that, for him, it is in the human heart that a person formulates thoughts, comes to understanding, and makes decisions. More specifically, it is also from within the heart that a person has the capacity to express faith or loyalty: as the Lukan Jesus responds to the two persons on the way to Emmaus, “O foolish ones and slow in heart to believe [ὦ ἀνόητοι καὶ βραδεῖς τῇ καρδίᾳ τοῦ πιστεύειν] all that the prophets have spoken” (24.25; cf. 8.12, 15); and as Stephen says about the Israelites in the time of Moses, “they turned in their hearts [ἐστράφησαν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν] toward Egypt” (Acts 7.39; cf. 13.22).

Is it significant that, immediately before Jesus encounters the Pharisees in 17.20-21, he tells the Samaritan leper, “Your faith has saved you” (17.19)? We have already observed that when the Samaritan leper glorifies God μετὰ φωνῆς μεγάλης, “with a great voice” (17.15), this phrase may contrast with the notion that the Lukan Pharisees were operating μετὰ παρατηρήσεως, “with malicious observation” (17.20). We have also noticed multiple instances in which Luke juxtaposes his Pharisees with characters who receive physical healing, which may lead readers to ask whether the Pharisees will also be cured. Has Luke placed the episode about the ten lepers (17.11-19) alongside this encounter with the Pharisees (17.20-21) toward a similar rhetorical end?

When Jesus cleanses (καθαρίζειν, 17.14) the ten lepers, it is only the one Samaritan leper who returns and expresses gratitude for the healing (17.15-16), and thus only this leper who is

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20 For thoughts (Luke 1.17; 2.19, 35, 51; 3.15; 5.22; 9.47; 21.14; 24.38; Acts 5.4; 8.20-22; 28.27) and decisions made (Luke 1.17; 12.45; Acts 7.23, 51; 11.23, 16.14) within the heart. The emotions, both the positive (24.32; Acts 2.26, 37, 46; 14.17) and negative (Acts 5.3; 7.54; 21.13), also reside in the heart.
commended for his faith (17.19). To what extent can we claim that the one leper is healed, or literally “saved” (σώζειν), both externally and internally? While he expresses his faith outwardly when “he returned glorifying God with a great voice” (17.15) and when he “fell on his face at his feet” (17.16), to what degree does Luke show throughout his narrative that faith is also internal and that having it is within one’s own power or domain?

On the matter of whether a person can be internally unclean, when addressing the ones “who had come to believe from the sect of the Pharisees” (15.5), Peter says about the Gentiles that God had “cleansed [καθαρίζειν] their hearts by faith” (15.9). The instrumental dative τῇ πίστει in this statement might suggest that God is solely in control of operating this faith; but Peter had also just used τὰ ἔθνη, “the Gentiles,” as the subject of the infinitive πιστεύσαι (15.7; cf. 15.5, 11). According to Luke then, although God does the cleansing, it seems that the act of having faith is within the power of humans.

This understanding of how the heart may be cleansed appears to be in the background also when the Lukian Jesus performs his first healing of leprosy (5.12-16). The leper in that scene recognizes that Jesus has the power to cleanse (δύνασθαι καθαρίζειν, 5.12); but in the immediately subsequent pericope of 5.17-26, Luke may imply that the scribes and the Pharisees are internally unclean, because they dispute in their hearts (διαλογίζεσθαι ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις, 5.22) about whether Jesus has the power to forgive sins (δύνασθαι ἁμαρτίας ἀφεῖναι, 5.21), that is, the power to provide inner cleansing.21

If Luke has similarly contrasted the Samaritan leper with the Pharisees who ask him about the kingdom of God, his response that the kingdom is ἐν τῷ ὃμοιον may insinuate that they

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21 As Brown observes, all uses of διαλογισμός in the NT are pejorative (Birth of the Messiah, 441). See especially Luke 5.22; 6.8; 9.46, 47; 24.38, as well as the comments by Fitzmyer, Luke I-IX, 430.
do not understand what the leper already has. The Lukan Jesus utters the statement ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέν σε (17.19) three other times with the Gospel (7.50; 8.48; 18.42); and in each of these instances the person who expresses faith is juxtaposed with another character or group of characters who similarly does or contrastingly does not show evidence of faith. The faith of the anointing woman (7.50) contrasts with the fact that Simon the Pharisee does not acknowledge Jesus as a prophet (7.39, 44-46). Jarius’ fear initially inhibits the faith that is required for his daughter to receive healing (8.50), when the “daughter” with the issue of blood, despite her trembling, owns up to her touching Jesus (8.47). The faith of the blind man who received his sight (18.42) sets the stage for Zacchaeus, who was doubly hindered, by his short stature and thus the crowd, in his attempts “to see” Jesus (19.3).

3. The Governing Part of the Soul

To say that “the kingdom of God is within you” is perhaps to say that its coming is within the power of those who have faith. But can we go as far as Origen does, when he expounds upon Luke 17.21 and asserts, “And I think that the kingdom of God is understood to be the blessed state of the governing part of the soul [ἡγεμονικόν] and the ordering of wise thoughts” (Or. 25.1)? In Stoic philosophy, the term ἡγεμονικόν is used for Zeus as the “governing faculty” of the world, as well as for that part of the soul that governs an individual. This twofold usage is based upon the conception that the human being is a microcosm of the world—that is, the mind

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22 For Bede, the kingdom of God “is in their hearts,” because that is where belief occurs (Luc. ad 17.21 [CCSL 120:315]). In his paraphrase, Erasmus qualifies that the kingdom of God “is not a kingdom of bodies but of souls [animi]; and it does not consist of visible but invisible guards” (Para. Luc. ad 17.20 [LB 7:419f]). Wellhausen states: “Das ἐντός bedeutet mehr als ἐν μέσῳ. Vielmehr ist das Reich Gottes hier, ähnlich wie im Gleichnis vom Sauerteig, als ein Prinzip gedacht, das unsichtbar in den Herzen der Einzeln wirkt” (Evangelium Lucae, 95). Cf. also Richard Sneed’s attempt to recover the Sitz im Leben Jesu (“The Kingdom of God is Within You’ (Lk 17,21),” CBQ 24 [1962]: 363-82).
is to the body as Zeus is to cosmos. Luke does not elsewhere provide any indication that the soul’s governing capacity is conceived of as an interior kingdom, but the idea should perhaps not be overlooked; for in Seneca, we do see an analogy drawn between a political kingdom and the rule each person has over her or himself (Ben. 7.3.2-3). As Elizabeth Asmis observes:

Although Seneca pictures the regnum of god in the first place as a cosmic kingdom, by analogy with a political monarchy, he also shows this rule as something that is interiorized within each individual as self-rule. Humans are, at one and the same time, members of god’s kingdom, viewed as coextensive with the world, and rulers of a kingdom within themselves. This internal kingdom is their mind, which is itself a kind of god as well as part of the cosmic god.

According to the Stoics, the ἡγεμονικόν in particular is located in the heart and is furthermore what rules an individual’s thoughts and actions. As Porphyry describes:

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25 The Stoics considered the ἡγεμονικόν the control center for impressions (φαντασίαι) and impulses (ὄρμαι), rational speech (D.L. 7.159), and bodily movement, such as walking (SVF 2.836). Most Stoics located the ἡγεμονικόν in the heart (e.g., Plutarch, Mor. 1084b; D.L. 7.159; SVF 2.885, 886, 911). Some, however, placed it in the head (e.g., SVF 2.908, 910). On the ἡγεμονικόν as it rules subservient elements within the psyche, see also SVF 2.831; Seneca, Ep.
Now the Stoics divide the soul into eight parts: five of these parts correspond to the senses, the sixth to the faculty of speech, the seventh to the reproductive faculty. And the other part, the ἡγεμονικόν, they explain as though it had the realm of a ruler [ἄρχον], and the other parts show deference in the manner of a servant, so that the same entity consists of a ruler and ones who are ruled.\(^{26}\)

The ἡγεμονικόν was also thought to be the governing capacity that enables the rational being to master the passions. For instance, Clement of Alexandria expands the octopartite soul of traditional Stoicism to ten parts by adding “the spiritual principle at creation” and “the distinctive character of the holy spirit” (Strom. 6.16.134.2).\(^{27}\) In this context he claims that whenever the spirit “masters desires [ἐπιθυμίαι], the ἡγεμονικόν reigns as king [βασιλεύω]” (Strom. 6.16.136.1). Clement also considers the one who strengthens the ἡγεμονικόν a “kindly

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\(^{26}\) SVF 2.830. On the eight-part soul, see also SVF 2.827, 828, 836; Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 180; Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 29; and Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 61.

\(^{27}\) For Clement, this number corresponds to the Decalogue (Strom. 6.16.134-36).
Similarly, Julian would later comment, in his exposition on noble kingship, that the good king is one who “hands over his governance [ἡγεμονία] to the part of the soul that is naturally kingly [βασιλικός] and fit for governing [ἡγεμονικός], and not to the passionate and undisciplined part” (2.87d). Thus the ἡγεμονικόν is the centralizing part that governs a person’s senses and other functions—just as the head of an octopus is the control center of its tentacles. Correspondingly, Calcidius compares the ἡγεμονικόν to a tree trunk with emanating branches, which in turn he likens to a monarch who dispatches delegates throughout his realm.

Galen and Clement of Alexandria shed further light on the relationship between the ἡγεμονικόν and the προαίρεσις—the latter of which we often designate the human “will” or “sphere of choice.” Both of these authors place the προαίρεσις within the domain of the ἡγεμονικόν. Clement states: “But the governing part of the soul [ἡγεμονικόν] contains the power of choice [ἡ προαίρετική δύναμις], which enables investigation, learning, and the acquisition of knowledge. But all the powers are arranged under the command of one—the governing part. And through it a person lives and lives in a certain way” (Strom. 6.16.135.4). Making claims based on both philosophy and medicine, Galen places the “voluntary” (κατὰ προαίρεσιν) and “conative” (καθ’ ὀρμήν) in one category and explains that “the source of sense-perception and voluntary movement belongs to the governing part [ἡγεμονικόν] of the soul” (Hipp. et Plat. 8.1.1-3).

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28 See also Strom. 6.15.115.2.
30 SVF 2.879. See also SVF 2.826; and Dio Chrysostom Or. 4.75, 80. Cf. Philo of Alexandria, who likens the mind to “a great king” and the senses to “bodyguards” (Spec. 4.123; Somn. 1.32; cf. Spec. 3.111, 184; 4.92, 123; All. 3.115; Sacr. 49; Det. 23; and Prob. 146).
While most Stoics emphasize the supremacy of the ἡγεμονικὸν, Epictetus centralizes the soul’s power within the realm of the προαιρέσις in particular.\textsuperscript{31} For him there is nothing more sovereign (κυριώτερον), nothing stronger (ἰσχυρότερον), and nothing that exercises more authority within a person than her or his προαιρέσις (\textit{Diatr.} 2.10.1; 2.23.18, 20).\textsuperscript{32} In evaluating how Epictetus distinguishes between the προαιρέσις and the ἡγεμονικὸν, A. A. Long observes that ἡγεμονικὸν “is a term that applies to the souls of animals who lack rationality as well as to human beings. Epictetus confines \textit{prohairesis} to humans and God; it is God’s special gift of a rational, self-scrutinizing, and motivating faculty.”\textsuperscript{33} Long further explains that the term προαιρέσις refers “to the human mind in just those capacities or dispositions that Epictetus constantly maintains to be completely ‘up to us’ and free from external constraint.”\textsuperscript{34}

When Luke uses the expression ἐντὸς ὑμῶν, does he wish to convey an idea similar to what Epictetus means in his teaching that the προαιρέσις and its functions are the only things

\textsuperscript{31} As A. A. Long observes: “Epictetus is the only Stoic according to our record who made \textit{prohairesis} a key term. Earlier Stoics did have a use for the word (see p. 220), but they almost certainly did not employ it extensively or with the broad scope that Epictetus adopts. They typically referred to rationality via their standard term for the human mind, \textit{hégemonikon}, which literally means ‘governing faculty’” (\textit{Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life} [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002], 211). Rather than a key Stoic term, προαιρέσις was more Aristotelian (e.g., \textit{Eth. eud.} 1225b; \textit{Eth. nic.} 1163a, 1178a). On the προαιρέσις in Epictetus, see recent contributions by Jackson Hershbell, “The Stoicism of Epictetus,” \textit{ANRW} II.36.3:2159-60; Robert Dobbin, “Προαιρέσις in Epictetus,” \textit{AncPhil} 11 (1991): 111-35; Asmis, “Choice in Epictetus’ Philosophy,” 387-88; and Richard Sorabji, “Epictetus on \textit{proairesis} and Self,” in \textit{The Philosophy of Epictetus} (eds. Theodore Scaltsas and Andrew S. Mason; Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 87-98.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Diatr.} 2.10.1-3: “Consider who you are. First of all, a human being—that is, one who has nothing more sovereign [κυριώτερον] than the faculty of choice [προαιρέσις]. But rather the other faculties are made subject to this one, and it is free from slavery and subjection. Consider then what you are separated from by reason. You are separated from wild animals. You are separated from sheep. Furthermore, you a citizen of the world and a part of it. You are not one of its subordinates, but rather one of its leading parts [προηγούμενοι].” See also \textit{Diatr.} 2.23.47.


under our control or ἑφ’ ἡμῖν, “up to us”? We have seen that Cyril of Alexandria and Euthymius (or a scholiast) do apply the term προαίρεσις in their comments on the meaning of ἐντὸς ὑμῶν, which further suggests that we should leave open this possibility. Yet if the Lukan Jesus were speaking solely about human interiority, we would expect from him a statement such as ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν. Is ἐντὸς ὑμῶν the kind of figured speech that enables Luke to convey multiple senses through a single expression?

4. The Kingdom “among you”

Previous interpretations of Luke 17.21 lead us to reevaluate whether ἐντὸς ὑμῶν can also mean “among you” or “in your midst.” We have observed an example in Plutarch where it is said that the power of Alexander lay “within his weapons [ἐντὸς τῶν ὀπλῶν] and guards” (Pel. 35.3). Plutarch elsewhere uses the expression ἐντὸς τῶν ὀπλῶν to designate persons located inside a military encampment (Ages. 19.1) or inside the ranks (Pyrrh. 28.4). Also, Xenophon explains how a cavalry commander may trick an enemy into thinking that his cavalry is weaker than it appears. He reasons that members of the cavalry, seated on their horses, will be much higher than the infantry, who are on foot. Accordingly, “the infantry may be concealed not only among [ἐντὸς], but also behind the cavalry [ὀπισθεν ἵππεων]” (Hip. 5.13).

Yet we could not go so far in proving that ἐντὸς always has the nuance that power is attained from being among a group; sometimes the preposition appears to mean simply that one is or some are physically located ἐντὸς τῶν ὄρων, “inside the boundaries” (Lucian, Philops. 12; Alex. 30). And this usage seems to affirm the idea that when a person is said to be located “among” other persons, he or she is physically “inside” the bounds that designates a group.

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35 See, e.g., Diatr. 1.1.7, 23; 1.22.10-11; 2.19.32-33; 3.26.24, 34; 4.1.65, 83-84.
36 See also ἐντὸς αὐτῶν in Xenophon, Anab. 1.10.3.
As some scholars have noticed, this usage of ἐντὸς appears also in another passage from Xenophon.  
37 When Critias enrolls a body of three thousand supporters who were to share in the government, Theramenes objects that one could limit the number to three thousand: “as if this number necessarily consisted of fine and good persons, and that there could be no excellent persons outside ἐξο τούτων of them nor any bad persons among them ἐντὸς τούτων” (Hell. 2.3.19).

Scholars have pointed to further examples in the Greek translations of the Hebrew Bible.  
38 Where the Israelites ask, “Is Yahweh among us [ברוך] or not?” (Exod 17.7), Aquila translates with ἐντὸς ἡμῶν; and he translates in the same way where Moses says, “let the Lord go among us [ברוך]” (Exod 34.9).  
39 Also, where the psalmist likens himself to one “forsaken among the dead [במתים]” (Heb Ps 88.6 = Grk 87.5), Symmachus translates with ἐντὸς νεκρῶν.  
40 And where the poet says about Judah, “all her pursuers have overtaken her between the straits [בין המצריים]” (Lam 1.3), the LXX and Symmachus personify הָמֵצִיר as τῶν θλιβόντων; and Symmachus in particular translates ἐντὸς τῶν θλιβόντων αὐτῆν, “among the ones who oppress her.”

The preposition ἐντὸς, however, is not always used in exactly the same way as ἐν μέσῳ. In evaluating how authors use the two expressions together, it appears that ἐν μέσῳ refers more

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39 Cf. at Exod 17.7 LXX ἐν ἡμῖν; Theodotion ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν; and at 34.9 LXX μεθ’ ἡμῶν; Theodotion ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν. See Field, Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt, 1:111, 144.
40 Cf. at Ps 87.5 LXX ἐν νεκροῖς. See Field, Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt, 2:239.
41 Cf. LXX Lam 1.3 ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν θλιβόντων. See Field, Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt, 2:747.
specifically to what is “in the middle.” Philo, for instance, discusses reasons why the tree of life occupies a central place “in the middle [ἐν μέσῳ] of the garden” (Leg. 1.59-60); but then he speaks more generally about the tree of knowing good and evil, unsure even as to whether it is “inside [ἐντός] or outside [ἐκτός] the garden” (1.60). So also, when Arrian describes the tomb of Cyrus, he remarks that the sarcophagus was “between [ἐν μέσῳ] the table and the couch” (Anab. 6.29.6), and then he refers to a small room that was also “within [ἐντός] the enclosure” of the tomb (6.29.7). According to these examples, while objects that are ἐντός must be located inside, they are not necessarily in the center.

This shade of difference between ἐντός and ἐν μέσῳ, however, may be harder to observe within Luke-Acts; for that which is ἐν μέσῳ does seem to refer generally to what is “among,” almost interchangeably with the sense of ἐντός that we see in other ancient authors. Yet if we observe the small distinction that Philo, Arrian, and others appear to assume, perhaps “among you” rather than “in your midst” is the better translation of ἐντός ὑμῶν in 17.21. The former sense of the statement would suggest that Jesus is a synecdoche for the kingdom of God—that is, he is a part of the kingdom that is present among these Pharisees, but he is not necessarily in the middle of the group. While interpreters would hardly doubt that Luke casts Jesus as a representative of the kingdom of God, it is important to ask how he might represent that kingdom here in this context.

5. The Lukan Jesus as Kingly Benefactor

Within the history of interpretation, we see a recurring claim that Jesus is a benefactor when he heals the lepers in 17.11-19. Titus of Bostra comments that it is significant that Jesus “was

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42 See further examples in Xenophon, Anab. 2.1.11; Plato, Critias 116a; Pseudo-Aristotle, Mech. 4; Strabo, Geogr. 9.3.6; and Dio Cassius, 55.20.8.
passing through between [διὰ μέσον] Samaria and Galilee” in 17.11, since this detail shows that
“the Samaritans are grateful, but the Jews are unthankful, even though they are also benefacted
[kαὶ εὐεργετούμενοι].”
Euthymius similarly notes that the nine had “a forgetfulness of the
benefaction [εὐεργεσία]” bestowed to them and were thus ἀχάριστοι, “ungrateful.”
And Bonaventure explains that the one leper responds “through the glorification of his benefactor”
and proceeds to cite a number of scriptural proofs showing other persons who gave thanks for
“the reception of benefactions.”

In modern scholarship, Frederick Danker has called our attention to some of the terms in
17.11-19 that evoke the theme of benefaction in antiquity. When the ten lepers meet (ἀπαντᾷν,
17.12) Jesus and address him as master (ἐπιστάτης, 17.13), Luke shows “the arrival of inferiors
in the presence of a superior.” And in the statement “have mercy on us” (ἐλέειν ἰμάς, 17.13), we
see a “plea for the conferment of a benefit.”

Only the Samaritan leper, however, shows
gratitude to his benefactor—since he returns and gives glory (δοξάζειν and δοῦναι δόξαν, 17.15,
18) to God, pays obeisance (πίπτειν ἐπὶ πρόσωπον παρὰ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ, 17.16) to Jesus,
offers thanksgiving (εὐχαριστεῖν, 17.16), and expresses faith (πίστις, 17.19).

Furthermore, the fact that Luke has Jesus “passing through [διέρχεσθαι] between Samaria
and Galilee” (17.11) we may also compare to the speech Peter gives in the home of Cornelius,
where he describes Jesus as one who “passed through benefacting and healing [διέρχεσθαι
eὐεργετῶν καὶ ἰόμενος] all who were oppressed by the devil” (Acts 10.38). This more explicit

44 cf. ἀνὰ μέσον in Titus of Bostra, Luc. ad 17.11 (TU 21.1: Sickenberger, 224). Cyril of
Alexandria repeats this point (Luc. ad 17.14 [PG 72:840b]).
45 Euthymius, Luc. ad 17.16 (PG 129:1045d).
46 Bonaventure, Luc. 17.30-31 (Opera 7:435-36). So also Maldonado reiterates this point
that “the others were ungrateful for the benefaction” (Luc. ad 17.15 [Martin 2:307]).
47 Frederick W. Danker, Benefactor: Epigraphic Study of a Graeco-Roman and New
Testament Semantic Field (St. Louis, Mo.: Clayton Publishing House, Inc., 1982), 406-07, 441,
here 406. See also the comments by Fitzmyer, Luke X-XXIV, 1151; and Green, Luke, 623.
statement about Jesus’ role as a benefactor appears within an epitome, which summarizes and highlights parts of the Third Gospel (10.36-41). If Luke conceives of and casts Jesus as a benefactor, does he insinuate that “the kingdom of God is among” others whom Jesus encounters in the Gospel?

The lepers’ initial plea for mercy (ἐλεεῖν ἡμᾶς, 17.13) reminds us of the blind man in a later scene who twice cries out to Jesus, “son of David, have mercy on me [ἐλεεῖν με]” (18.38-39). In a manner befitting a king, “Jesus ordered [κελεύειν] him to be brought to him” (18.40) and then poses a characteristic question of a benefactor: “What do you wish that I do for you?” (18.41). Comparably, the Markan Herod presumes his role as benefactor when he says to the daughter of Herodias: “Ask me whatever you wish, and I will give it to you” (6.22). As Plutarch relates it, Alexander the Great was speaking as a potential benefactor when he approached Diogenes of Sinope and asked whether he needed anything (τίνος δεῖσθαι, Alex. 14.2; Mor. 605d). That Jesus has the capacity to grant the blind man’s request assumes that he has the kingly authority that the blind man had acknowledged when he hailed him as “son of David.” As Euthymius observes, when the blind man then follows Jesus, he is “returning gratitude and is thus repaying him for the benefaction.”

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49 On Alexander as a benefactor, see also Plutarch, Alex. 39.1-7.
50 Ἡκολούθει δὲ αὐτῷ εὐγνωμονήν καὶ οὕτω τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀμειβόμενος (Luc. ad 18.42 [PG 129:1056c]). The episodes about the healing of the blind man and the salvation of Zacchaeus, juxtaposed with each other, show Jesus as the proverbial εὐεργέτης καὶ σωτήρ, “benefactor and savior.” On this designation, see, e.g., Philo, Legat. 22; Josephus, B.J. 1.530; Vita 244, 259; Plutarch, Thes. 33.1; and Lucian, Tim. 5.
If we can accept both senses of ἐντὸς ὑμῶν as here proposed, the question that perhaps remains is whether the Pharisees will acknowledge Jesus as their benefactor. The Samaritan leper appears to serve as an unexpected and paradoxical example of one who realizes his inner potential of having faith (i.e., within) and who at the same time acknowledges that the kingdom of God is present in Jesus (i.e., among). The fact that Jesus addresses the Pharisees in 17.20-21 shows that they too have this potential, even though they may not have come to terms with it.

Luke furthermore distinguishes between what Jesus says when addressing the Pharisees in 17.20-21 (ἀπεκρίθη αὐτοῖς καὶ εἶπεν, 17.20) and what he says to the disciples in 17.22-37 (Εἶπεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς μαθητάς, 17.22). The difference between these two audiences may explain why Jesus says to the Pharisees, οὐδὲ ἐροῦσιν· ἰδοὺ ὅδε ἢ· ἐκεῖ, “they will not say, ‘look, here it is or there it is’” (17.21); and then to his disciples, ἐροῦσιν ὑμῖν· ἰδοὺ ἐκεῖ, [η·] ἰδοὺ ὅδε, “they will say to you, ‘look, there it is, [or] look, here it is’” (17.23). The most important difference is that between οὐδὲ ἐροῦσιν in the statement to the Pharisees and ἐροῦσιν to the disciples. It appears that the Lukan Jesus approves of the implied subject of οὐδὲ ἐροῦσιν (17.21) and that he disapproves of the implied subject of ἐροῦσιν (17.23). Is it understood that Christian disciples are the subject of οὐδὲ ἐροῦσιν (17.21) and that the Pharisees are the subject of ἐροῦσιν (17.23)? The fact that Jesus refuses to point out any visible signs when the Pharisees seem to expect signs would suggest so. What makes this distinction between the two implied subjects even sharper is that Jesus bids his disciples to avoid those who would look to such signs: “do not follow, and do not run after them” (17.23).

Simeon had earlier recognized that the sign was Jesus himself (2.34), which is further implied in 11.29-30. Accordingly, the kingdom of God appears to be present already: “If I am casting out demons by the finger of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you [ἐφ’}
ὑμᾶς] (11.20); and “the kingdom of God is proclaimed as good news, and everyone is forced into it” (16.16).\footnote{Ilaria L. E. Ramelli has made a strong case that βιάζεται should be read in the passive voice (“Luke 16:16: The Good News of God’s Kingdom Is Proclaimed and Everyone Is Forced into It,” JBL 127 [2008]: 737-58). Luke may uphold the kind of universalism we see in Paul, “all Israel will be saved” (Rom 11.26; cf. Mishna, Sanh. 10.1), while also accounting for the salvation of all non-Jews. Cf. Hengel, “Early Christianity,” 1-41, esp. 27-28.}

6. Conclusions

When Jesus tells the Pharisees that the kingdom of God is ἐντὸς ὑμῶν (17.21), Luke appears to create a figure through the ambiguity of the preposition ἐντὸς. The most common use of ἐντὸς conveys the notion “inside” or “within,” which may designate in particular the capacities that come from within the human soul or heart. In this sense, there may be an implicit contrast between the Pharisees and the Samaritan leper; for the latter is cleansed not only externally, but also shows evidence of internal cleansing when Jesus tells him, “Your faith has saved you” (17.19). It may be impossible to prove that Luke is alluding to the kingly realm of that part of the soul (located in the heart) that governs a person’s thoughts and decisions, which the Stoics identify as the ἡγεμονικόν or the προαίρεσις. While some interpreters have applied these terms in their exegesis of 17.21, Luke nowhere refers to human interiority in this particular way. The closest parallel to this sense of ἐντὸς ὑμῶν from elsewhere in Luke-Acts is ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν, “in your hearts.” Nevertheless, it does seem possible that Luke is reflecting, at the very least, a more general idea that each person has an internal kingdom within her or himself.

There is also significant evidence that would allow us to understand ἐντὸς ὑμῶν as “among you.” In this sense, Jesus may be a synecdoche for the kingdom of God, which is present within the bounds demarcating the group of Pharisees he addresses in 17.20-21. The Samaritan
leper may have recognized what the Pharisees did not: that Jesus is a kingly benefactor to whom gratitude is due for his power to heal.

These two senses of ἐντὸς ὑμῶν thus seem to complement one another. The kingdom of God is “among” them, but it is also “within” their domain to recognize it. We may conclude therefore that this example of figured speech, through ambiguity, is not one that calls for ruling out one sense in favor of another. The difficulty then is to translate ἐντὸς ὑμῶν in a way that would preserve the ambiguity. A correspondingly polysemous preposition may be unavailable in English. Perhaps the following comes close: “the kingdom of God is within your reach.”
Chapter Thirteen: Simon the Pharisee and the Feet

As we saw in the previous chapter, Luke casts Jesus as a benefactor whose kingdom is already “among” those who would acknowledge it from “within” themselves (17.21). In that context of the Gospel, Luke furthermore appears to present a rhetorical comparison between the Samaritan leper and the Pharisees: the leper acknowledges Jesus as his benefactor, while the Pharisees seemingly do not. Jesus tells the leper immediately before his encounter with the Pharisees, “Rise and go; your faith has saved you” (17.19). We also noted briefly how this statement reverberates what Jesus earlier says to the anointing woman in the house of Simon the Pharisee: “Your faith has saved you; go in peace” (7.50). Does Luke make a rhetorical comparison also between the anointing woman and Simon? And are there other signs of figured speech pointing to the Pharisees in this earlier scene?

1. The Repetition of πόδας

When we read Luke 7.36-50, the references to Jesus’ feet appear to constitute the most prominent theme. The narrator repeats the phrase τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ three times in a single sentence: “and standing behind at his feet [τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ], weeping, she began to wet his feet [τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ] with tears, and was wiping them with the hair of her head, and was kissing his feet [τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ] and anointing them with ointment” (7.38). Then Jesus refers to his own feet four times when addressing Simon: ὕδωρ μοι ἐπὶ πόδας (7.44b); μου τοὺς πόδας (7.44c); μου τοὺς πόδας (7.45); and τοὺς πόδας μου (7.46). And the fact that this detail is absent
in the Synoptic parallels to the story (Mark 14.3-9; Matt 26.6-13) further shows its importance in the Lukan account.¹

In attempting to identify the significance of this theme, it is possible that Luke draws a contrast between the woman, who honors the feet of a prophet, and Simon, who says, “If this man were a prophet, he would have known who and what sort of woman it is who touches him” (7.36). In this sense, the woman would perhaps recognize what Paul says when he quotes from Isa 52.7: “How beautiful are the feet of those who preach good news” (Rom 10.15).² Yet it would be misleading to suggest that Luke intended to invoke one or both of these texts, as references to the feet of prophets are not uncommon in antiquity.

Another possibility is that the woman is paying homage to Jesus as a king. J. Duncan M. Derrett has pointed to examples in which rulers have their feet kissed.³ In Xenophon, Gadatas and Gobryas are said to have kissed (καταφιλεῖν) the hands and feet of Cyrus, while also weeping (δακρύειν) with joy (Cyr. 7.5.32). According to Seneca, when Pompey offered his gratitude to Caesar for granting him his life, Caesar responded by extending his left foot to be kissed (Ben. 2.12.1). And Epictetus assumes that it is tyrannical to be forced into kissing the feet (τοὺς πόδας καταφιλεῖν) of Caesar (Diatr. 4.1.17).⁴

The question of whether Jesus is a king, however, is not expressly stated in 7.36-50, but rather the question of whether he is a prophet (7.39). The Synoptic parallels seem to place some emphasis upon the kingly role of Jesus—since the woman in each of the two accounts anoints his

¹ Cf. τὸ σῶμά μου (Mark 14.8) and ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματός μου (Matt 26.12). See, however, the Johannine account: τοὺς πόδας τοῦ Ἰησοῦ and τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ (John 12.3).
⁴ Cf. Polybius, Hist. 15.1.7.
head (Mark 14.3; Matt 26.7) rather than his feet, perhaps echoing the tradition that kings of Israel had their heads anointed with oil (1 Kgdms 10.1). Yet we see that prophets were anointed, as well (3 Kgdms 19.15-16; Isa 61.1; and Luke 4.18). Furthermore, while the Lukan Jesus does remark that Simon failed to anoint his head with oil (7.46), such references may indicate simply that one is an inhospitable host rather than point out a failure to acknowledge Jesus as the Christ.

Nevertheless, the fact that Simon does not kiss Jesus, in addition to not anointing his head with oil, may be significant; for in the scene where Samuel anoints Saul, we read: “And Samuel took the flask of oil and poured it on his head [ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ] and kissed him [φιλεῖν αὐτόν] and said to him, ‘Has the Lord not anointed you ruler over his people, over Israel?’” (1 Kgdms 10.1). Contrastingly, Jesus tells Simon, “You did not give me a kiss [φίλημά]” (7.45), and also, “You did not anoint my head [τὴν κεφαλὴν μου] with oil” (7.46).

If Luke is alluding to the practice of anointing the king of Israel, we might explain the innuendo as the kind of figured speech in which the consequence is stated, but the premise is left unstated: “when the things that might follow from some other thing are mentioned, from which the entire matter is left in suspicion” (Rhet. Her. 4.67). The fact that Jesus remarks upon Simon not giving him a kiss or anointing his head with oil might lead us to suspect that Simon dismisses Jesus as king over Israel (7.45-46), just as he previously dismissed him as a prophet (7.39). But this possible point of contact between 1 Kgdms 10.1 and Luke 7.36-50 would still not explain why Luke repeatedly refers to Jesus’ feet.

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5 See also 1 Kgdms 16.6; 24.7.
6 In recounting how Philippus showed hospitality to Julius Caesar and his entourage, Cicero says about Caesar: *unctus est, accubuit*, “he was oiled up, and he reclined for dinner” (Att. 13.52). See also Eccl 9.7-8.
While the repetition of a word or phrase would not necessarily qualify as figured speech, Quintilian explains that there is a “class of figures that revolves around the ears and appeals to their sensibilities, by some resemblance, equality, or contrast of sounds” (Inst. 9.3.66). He then gives an example in which “the same word is repeated while carrying a greater meaning,” describing it as a kind of union between ἐμφάσις, “allusion,” and geminatio, “reiteration” (9.3.67). Does the repetition of πόδας in Luke 7.36-50 convey some greater meaning? Certainly the phrase τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ on its own is too commonplace to specify any particular point of reference from within the biblical tradition or elsewhere. Some corresponding verb in connection with τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ might bring us closer; but even then we would need additional clues from the broader context to help substantiate any possible allusion.

2. Psalms of Solomon 8 and Luke 7

In Psalms of Solomon 8.18, it is said about Pompey that “he set down his feet [ἔστησεν τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ] with great security” when he entered Jerusalem, which we may compare to Luke 7.38: στᾶσα ὀπίσω παρὰ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ, “standing behind at his feet.” Although a form of ἵστάναι does occur with τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ in each text, the subject of ἔστησεν in Ps. Sol. 8.18 (i.e., Pompey) and that of στᾶσα in Luke 7.38 (i.e., the anointing woman) are not fully comparable. Yet if we account for the fact that τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ designates the feet of one who entered Jerusalem in the one text (Pss. Sol. 8.18), and one who will enter Jerusalem in the other (Luke 9.51-53; 13.31-35; 19.28-46), the correspondence may carry some significance. And when we examine the broader context of each, we find other points of comparison, which we may tabulate more fully:

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7 See also Quintilian, Inst. 9.1.33, 38; 9.2.63; 9.3.29, 35-36.
Table 2: Comparing Psalms of Solomon 8 and Luke 7

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<td>ἐδικαίωσαν τὸν θεὸν (7.29)</td>
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<td>ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία (7.35)</td>
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</tbody>
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Where the psalmist says, “I justified God” (Pss. Sol. 8.7), the Lukan narrator states about all the people and the tax collectors, “they justified God” (Luke 7.29). For the psalmist “God was justified” among the nations of the earth (Pss. Sol. 8.23), just as in Luke “wisdom was justified by all her children” (7.35).\(^8\) We know that Matthew’s Gospel contains a parallel to the saying in Luke: where we read καὶ ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν τέκνων αὐτῆς (Luke 7.35), Matthew has καὶ ἐδικαίωθη ἡ σοφία ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς (Matt 11.19).\(^9\) Yet Matthew does not otherwise show any evidence of having alluded to Pss. Sol. 8 in the way that Luke has. To what extent Q may have also drawn from Pss. Sol. 8 is impossible to know. If Q had only some version of this parallel saying, it is possible that Luke conflated the saying with the statement in Pss. Sol. 8.23 and at the same time incorporated other allusions to that psalm within his narrative.

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\(^8\) Cf. Προσέκοψεν ὁ δίκαιος καὶ ἐδικαίωσεν τὸν κύριον (Pss. Sol. 3.5).

John Calvin knows of interpreters who understand the Lukan version of the saying in various ways. As he points out, the question depends largely upon how to read the preposition ἀπό. Does ἀπό with a passive verb convey agency, as ὑπό does more frequently (i.e., wisdom has been justified by all her children)? Or does ἀπό indicate absolution or separation between the two (i.e., wisdom has been freed from all her children), as Simon Gathercole proposes? On this later sense, Calvin claims that “especially the scribes praised themselves as the nurselings of God’s wisdom.” Does Luke insinuate that wisdom has been freed from the Pharisees and lawyers (7.30), who may have claimed that they were her descendants? And is this statement an instance of figured speech through ambiguity?

As Calvin remarks, we do find that Luke uses ἀπό to convey agency in Luke 17.25: ἀποδοκιμασθῆναι ἀπὸ τῆς γενεᾶς ταύτης, “to be rejected by this generation.” And an example of ἀπό with a passive form of δικαιοῦν appears in LXX Isa 45.25: ἀπὸ κυρίου δικαιωθῆσονται, “by the Lord they will be justified.” As for using ἀπό to convey the notion of absolution, we read in Acts 13.38-39: γνωστὸν οὖν ὑμῖν ὡς ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί, ὅτι διὰ τούτου ὑμῖν ἄφεσιν ἐκβαλλόντων καταγγέλλεται, [καὶ] ἀπὸ πάντων ὧν οὐκ ἠδυνήθητε ἐν νόμῳ Μωϋσέως δικαιωθῆναι, ἐν τούτῳ πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων δικαιοῦται, “Therefore let it be known to you, brothers, that through him forgiveness of sins is proclaimed to you, and by him everyone who believes is freed from all that you could not be freed by the law of Moses.” Similarly, Paul states in Rom 6.7: ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, “For he who has died has been freed from sin” (cf. 6.18). And the expression δικαιοῦσθαι ἀπό to convey the notion of being freed from sin or evil has further

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11 Calvin, *Harm. ad Luc.* 7.35 (CO 45:308).
Yet an example in which δικαιοῦσθαι ἀπὸ means “to be freed from” a person or persons is difficult to locate among the ancient sources. Therefore, it is perhaps best not to take the saying in Luke 7.35 as an instance of figured speech through ambiguity. The saying appears rather to function concurrently with the narrator’s remark in 7.29, just as the two statements in Pss. Sol. 8.7, 23 seem to complement one another.

The possibility that Luke has appropriated and modified these statements from Pss. Sol. 8.7, 23 further suggests a relationship between θεός and σοφία in his narrative. Are the two equivalent, or is wisdom simply an attribute of God? Even though the parallel between θεός and σοφία in Luke 7.29, 35 might suggest that they are synonymous and equivalent, the fact that Luke later refers to ή σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ (11.49) suggests that σοφία is one quality of θεός and not simply an alternative designation for the deity. In this sense, the relationship between θεός and σοφία may be like that between θεός and βουλή in 7.30, where the narrator states, “the Pharisees and lawyers rejected the plan of God [ἡ βουλή τοῦ θεοῦ] for themselves.” While σοφία and βουλή may go hand in hand, so also in Pss. Sol. 8.20 Pompey is said to have killed πᾶς σοφὸς ἐν βουλῇ, “everyone wise in counsel.” The Lukan Pharisees and lawyers, in addition to rejecting the plan of God, rejected also the wisdom of God, in contrast to those children of wisdom. Just as

12 See, e.g., ὅπως δικαιοῦσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς άμαρτίας τῶν ψυχῶν ύμῶν (T. Sim. 2.6.1); and ἵνα δικαιωθῆτε καὶ ἀγιοθῆτε ἀπὸ πάσης πονηρίας καὶ ἀπὸ πάσης σκολιότητος (Herm. Vis. 17.1 [III.9]).
13 See, e.g., Prov 8.1-9.18; Sir 24.1-2; and Wis 6.12-11.1. Cf. John 1.1. Scholars have previously claimed that σοφία in Luke 7.35 is “a periphrasis for God or for the boulê tou theou” (Talbert, Reading Luke, 87); and “a personified attribute of God” (Bovon, Luke 1, 287). Bonaventure (Luc. 7.61, 63 [Opera 7:182]) and Bengel (Gnomon [ad Luc. 7.35]) understand “wisdom” as a designation for Jesus.
15 Cf. Bonaventure: “Such were the Pharisees, so that the Wisdom of God could reproach them: ‘You despised our every plan’” (Luc. 7.55 [Opera 7:180]). Here Bonaventure quotes Prov 1.25, where in the LXX Σοφία (1.20) says: “but you would make my plans [βουλαί] invalid, and you disobeyed my reproofs.”
σοφία is one part of θεός, so the tax collectors represent one part of a larger group referred to as “her children” (7.35).

Is there significance in the parallel between Pompey entering “into the house of his sons” (Pss. Sol. 8.18) and Jesus entering “into the house of the Pharisee” (Luke 7.36; cf. 7.44)? If there is, does Luke then insinuate that the “sons” of Pompey were the Pharisees? What is clear is that οἶκος in Pss. Sol. 8.18 serves as a metaphor for Jerusalem. And although it is impossible to prove, we observed in chapter three that there are reasons to suppose that the “sons” designates Pharisees who gave Pompey entrance into the city.

In the next chapter we shall analyze more thoroughly the statement in Luke 13.35 where Jesus likens Jerusalem to an οἶκος that has been abandoned. Is it a mere coincidence that, immediately following this statement in 13.35, Jesus again enters “a house [οἶκος] of a certain one of the rulers [ἄρχοντες] of the Pharisees” (14.1)? Moreover, in the detail that both Pompey and Jesus enter into an οἶκος, readers of the Lukan narrative may be prompted to ask which of these persons was received more hospitably into Jerusalem. In Pss. Sol. 8, οἱ ἄρχοντες τῆς γῆς, “the rulers of the earth,” are said not only to have opened the gates to Jerusalem, but also to have met Pompey μετὰ χαρᾶς, “with joy” (8.16a). According to this author, “they said to him, ‘Welcome is your way [ἡ ὁδός]. Come, enter in peace [εἰσελθεῖν μετ’ εἰρήνης].’ They leveled the rough ways [αἱ ὁδοί] for his entrance [εἴσοδος)” (8.16b-17a). Conversely, if the Lukan Pharisees and lawyers refused the baptism of John, who is preparing ἡ ὁδός for Jesus (Luke 7.27, 30), they will likely respond negatively to Jesus also as he makes his journey toward Jerusalem. At this point in our analysis, perhaps all we can suggest is that Simon’s house may serve as an analog for Jerusalem; for in this scene, as well as in the later one when Jesus reaches Jerusalem,
there is a Pharisaic element that is not fully accommodating when Jesus enters (19.39), especially when compared to how the anointing woman and the disciples receive him (19.37-38).

The question about inhospitality is partially answered in Luke 7.36-50, where we find some telling signs of synkrisis between the woman and Simon, showing that she was more hospitable.\(^\text{16}\)

And turning to the woman, he said to Simon: “Do you see this woman? I entered your house, and you did not give water for my feet. But she wet my feet with tears and wiped them with her hair. You did not give me a kiss. But she, from the moment I entered, has not ceased kissing my feet. You did not anoint my head with oil. But she has anointed my feet with ointment. (7.44-46)

Although Luke does not attribute to the woman any words that might display her perspective, her actions (as affirmed by Jesus) display her superiority in the comparison.

3. The Pharisees in Luke 7.24-50

Fitzmyer asks why Luke has placed the story about Simon the Pharisee and the anointing woman (7.36-50) at this point in his Gospel, claiming that it “is unrelated to the three preceding passages.”\(^\text{17}\) Yet as we have seen, Luke appears to weave material from Pss. Sol. 8 into this story, as well as into the foregoing material. Fitzmyer’s question nonetheless remains important, even if we come to accept that there is at least some cohesion within this broader context.

If Luke is alluding to a tradition that the Pharisees had admitted Pompey into Jerusalem, does he also insinuate that they are the ones “in kingly courts” (ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις, 7.25)? What is clear is that Jesus contrasts the glorious clothing and luxurious lifestyle of these unidentified

\(^{16}\) Cf. Calvin: “The antitheses, in which the woman is preferred to Simon, must be noted.” He adds that “not even with a hospitable kiss” did Simon think it fitting to receive Christ (Harm. ad Luc. 7.44 [CO 45:379]). On the washing of feet, Bonaventure invokes Abraham in Gen 18.4 (Luc. 7.75 [Opera 7:186]). Johnson also observes, “the Pharisee invites Jesus to table, but violates all the rules of hospitality, and thereby shows (as he does also by this thoughts) that he does not accept Jesus as God’s prophet” (Luke, 129).

\(^{17}\) Fitzmyer, Luke I-IX, 684.
persons with the rugged asceticism of John the Baptist (7.24-25). The fact that the narrator makes a second point of contrast between John and the Pharisees and lawyers in this same context (i.e., they rejected John’s baptism, 7.30) suggests that Jesus does refer to them.

Furthermore, in his questions to the crowds, Jesus places emphasis upon what they were aiming to perceive in John: “What did you go out into the wilderness to observe [θεᾶσθαι]? A reed shaken by the wind” (7.24); “But what did you go out to see [ἰδεῖν]? A man dressed in soft clothes” (7.25); “But what did you go out to see [ἰδεῖν]? A prophet?” (7.26). 18 Perhaps comparable to these questions is the one Jesus poses to Simon: “Do you see [βλέπειν] this woman?” (7.44). 19

In addition to these questions pertaining to sight, there is also repetition in the particle ἰδοῦ, referring respectively to the ones in kingly courts (7.25), John the Baptist (7.27), Jesus (7.34), and the anointing woman (7.37). If Luke is inviting his readers to “look” at those introduced by this particle, then the arrangement would form a chiasm:

18 The contrasting responses to John’s baptism from the tax collectors, on the one hand, and the Pharisees and lawyers, on the other, suggest different motives for going out into the desert “to see” (θεᾶσθαι) John in the first place. The tax collectors, Luke shows previously, go “to be baptized” and sincerely inquire of John what they should do in order to repent (3.12-13). The Pharisees and lawyers perhaps go for the same reason they often observe the teaching and conduct of Jesus (cf. Acts 21.27).

Table 3: Chiasm signaled by ἰδού

A  “Look, those who are in glorious clothing and luxury are in kingly courts.” (7.25)

B  “Look, I am sending my messenger before your face, who will prepare your way before you.” (7.27; cf. Exod 23.20; Mal 3.1)

B’ “Look, a gluttonous fellow and a drunkard, a friend of tax collectors and sinners.” (7.34)

A’ “Look, a woman who was a sinner in the city.” (7.37)

This arrangement may then call for a comparison between its parts. For instance, that Jesus (B’) is a friend of “sinners” is subsequently confirmed when the woman (A’), “a sinner,” comes to him. While each statement after ἰδού does not prompt other obvious points for comparison, the persons to whom the statements refer could possibly serve as a pair for comparison based upon other details in the text. The differences between John (B) and Jesus (B’) are clear: “John the Baptist has come neither eating bread nor drinking wine” (7.33), whereas “the son of man has come eating and drinking” (7.34).

There is also a clear assumption that John the Baptist (B) does not wear “soft clothing” (μαλακὰ ἱμάτια, 7.25), while those in kingly courts (A) do dress in “glorious clothing” (ἱματισμὸς ἔνδοξος, 7.25). That John does not live in “kingly courts” (τὰ βασίλεια) may also be expressed through the statement that he is not “a reed shaken by the wind” (κάλαμον ὑπὸ ἀνέμου σαλευόμενον, 7.24). Two other attestations of this metaphor occur within contexts characterizing opposing rulers. The poet in LXX Psalm 82.12-14 expresses disdain toward those rulers who aimed to take possession of the sanctuary and thus calls upon God to make them “like a reed in the wind” (ὡς καλάμην κατὰ πρόσωπον ἀνέμου). The author of 3 Maccabees similarly describes...
how Ptolemy was punished, claiming that God “swung him from side to side like a reed by the wind [ὡς κάλαμον ὑπὸ ἀνέμου]” (2.22).20

Are we to see a contrast between the ones in kingly courts (A) and the anointing woman (A′), just as we observe one between the Simon and the woman? We should not speculate on what “sinner in the city” (7.37) means and posit that she was a courtesan.21 More compelling is to understand the woman as one of wisdom’s “children” (τέκνα, 7.35), who are distinct from the “the people of this generation,” whom Jesus likens to “children [παιδία] sitting in the marketplace” (7.31). The difference between τέκνα and παιδία in this context seems to be that the τέκνα are the offspring of wisdom, whereas the parents of the παιδία are unspecified. Then to each of these two groups of children we may compare John the Baptist: “Among those who are born of women [ἐν γεννητοῖς γυναικῶν] none is greater than John; but he who is least in the kingdom of God is greater than he” (7.28).

It remains unclear whether Luke conceives of the Pharisees and lawyers in 7.30 as the gloriously appareled persons in 7.25, even though Luke does differentiate John from each group. If we are to understand the ones “in kingly courts” (7.25), “the Pharisees and lawyers” (7.30), and “the people of this generation” (7.31) as the same persons, then perhaps they went into the desert to see John (7.24-26), refused his baptism (7.30), and concluded that he was demon-possessed (7.33; cf. 11.15).22

20 See also Lucian, Hermot. 68; and Howell, “Lucian’s Hermotimus,” 275-76.
21 On γυνή ἤτις ἦν ἐν τῇ πόλις ἁμαρτωλή (7.37), see e.g., Plummer, Luke, 210; and Kilgallen, “Forgiveness of Sins,” 106. Although some interpreters have seen the woman’s unbound hair as being sexually suggestive, it may also be a sign of her mourning. See especially Reid, “Do You See This Woman?” 45-46; Charles H. Cosgrove, “A Woman’s Unbound Hair in the Greco-Roman World, with Special Reference to the Story of the ‘Sinful Woman’ in Luke 7:36-50,” JBL 124 (2005): 675-92; and Parsons, Luke, 128-30.
22 Cf. Mason: “The last we hear of him is that Simon addresses Jesus respectfully and seems willing to take correction from him (7:40)” (“Chief Priests, Sadducees, Pharisees,” 136).
What seems more probable is that the Pharisees and lawyers rejected that John was “a prophet” and “more than a prophet” (7.26), just as Simon disregards Jesus as a prophet when he utters a contrary-to-fact condition: “he spoke to himself saying, ‘if this man were a prophet, he would have known who and what sort of woman it is who touches him, that she is a sinner’” (7.39). In displaying Simon’s inner thoughts, Luke is using the figure known as προσωποποιία, “personification.” Quintilian explains that through such a figure “we disclose the thoughts of adversaries as though they were speaking to themselves (but they are credible only if we make them say what is not absurd for them to have thought)” (Inst. 9.2.30).

A further indication that Simon denies Jesus this special role is that he addresses him with the mere title, διδάσκαλε, “teacher” (7.40)—a seemingly honorable form of address, but in Luke one used by such characters as: the lawyer who tests Jesus (10.25); one of the lawyers whom Jesus rebukes with woes (11.45); the greedy member of the crowd who prompted the parable of the rich fool (12.13); the ruler who did not wish to part with his wealth (18.18); the Pharisees who want the disciples to stop acclaiming Jesus’ kingship (19.39); and the spies (20.21) Sadducees (20.28) and scribes (20.39) who set traps in the attempt to take Jesus into custody. The characters who are true disciples or otherwise acknowledge Jesus’ divinely sanctioned role, almost always address him with ἐπιστάτα, “master,” or κύριος, “Lord.”

“In Simon the Pharisee,” Darr rather explains, “the reader sees a representative of all the Pharisees who (the narrator told us) rejected God’s will for themselves by not experiencing John’s baptism (7:30). The sinful woman stands for their opposites, the sinners who did undergo the baptism of repentance (7:29)” (Character Building, 101).


24 For ἐπιστάτης, see Luke 5.5; 8.24, 45; 9.33, 49; 17.13; and for κύριος, see e.g., Luke 5.8, 12; 7.6; 9.54, 59, 61; 10.17, 40; 11.1; 12.41; 13.23; 17.37; 18.41; 19.8; 22.33, 38, 49; Acts 1.6; 7.59, 60; 9.5; 22.8, 10, 19; 26.15. See, however, Luke 21.7, where an unidentified group
The centurion of Capernaum, for instance, had earlier sent his friends with a message for Jesus, which includes such an address: “Lord [κύριε], do not trouble yourself, for I am not sufficiently equipped [ἰκανός] to have you enter [eiσέρχεσθαι] under may roof” (7.6). The centurion then explains that he is “a man set under authority [ἐξουσία]” (7.8)—by which he most likely means that he is subordinate to Caesar, just as he has soldiers and slaves subordinate to himself. The centurion will not have Jesus enter his house because he recognizes that he is no match for his authority; and hence Jesus responds, “not even in Israel have I found such faith” (7.9). By contrast, Simon does invite Jesus into his house (7.36, 44), but then he does not welcome him as one to whose authority he had become subordinate.

4. Conclusions

In the attempt to explain why there is repeated reference to Jesus’ “feet” in Luke 7.36-50 (a total of seven occurrences), we have identified one possible point of contact in Pss. Sol. 8.18, which includes a reference to Pompey’s “feet” as he entered Jerusalem. As Quintilian explains, sometimes a word that is repeated can have some greater meaning, as conveyed through ἔμφασις, “allusion” (Inst. 9.3.67). Other parallels between Pss. Sol. 8 and Luke 7 increase the possibility that Luke alludes to this particular psalm in his account about Simon the Pharisee and the anointing woman. There may be significance especially in the parallel between Pompey having entered “into the house of his sons” (Pss. Sol. 8.18) and Jesus “into the house of the Pharisee” addresses Jesus as διδάσκαλος. Among his audience in this context are both disciples and non-disciples (20.25), the latter of which may include scribes (20.46), the rich (21.1), and “some who spoke about the temple” (21.5). Even though Jesus is clearly addressing the persecutions his disciples must endure in 21.10-19, the question in 21.7 about a σημεῖον appears to come from the mouths of non-disciples or at least some akin to those Jesus earlier describes as members of an “evil generation” (11.29-30), because they seek such a σημεῖον. While divine signs certainly occur from Luke’s perspective (e.g., 21.11, 25), it is characteristic of non-disciples to ask for or about them (Luke 11.16; 23.8).
(Luke 7.36). This correspondence suggests, although does not confirm, that Luke views the Pharisees as having admitted Pompey into the city. Yet two key differences between these texts are the presence and acts of the anointing woman in the Lukan story; she proves to be more hospitable toward Jesus than does the Pharisee, which Luke shows through a rhetorical comparison.

Reading Luke 7.36-50 within the broader context of the narrative may lead us to conclude that Simon is a representative of those “in kingly courts” (7.25), “the Pharisees and lawyers” (7.30), and “the people of this generation” (7.31). These groups (which are possibly one and the same) appear to have denied the prophetic role of John the Baptist (7.26, 30, 33); and comparably, Luke has Simon disregard Jesus as a prophet when Simon speaks to himself a contrary-to-fact condition, an example of attributed speech called προσωποποιία, “personification” (e.g., Quintilian, Inst. 9.2.30). Luke possibly indicates also that Simon fails to acknowledge Jesus as the Christ, since Simon does not anoint his head with oil or give him a kiss (Luke 7.45-46; cf. 1 Kgdms 10.1)—that is, an innuendo made through stating the consequence of an unstated premise (Rhet. Her. 4.67). Luke appears to set Simon and these former groups over against “all the people and the tax collectors,” who “justified God” (Luke 7.29; cf. Pss. Sol. 8.7), as well as the anointing woman, by whom “wisdom was justified” (Luke 7.35; cf. Pss. Sol. 8.23).
Chapter Fourteen: The Pharisees and the Abandoned House

As we observed from our comparison between *Pss. Sol.* 8 and Luke 7 in the previous chapter, the reference to Jerusalem as an οἶκος, “house,” in *Pss. Sol.* 8.18 may serve as a backdrop for understanding why Simon is not hospitable toward Jesus when he enters his οἶκος in Luke 7.36 (cf. 7.44). In Luke 13.35, we see an example in which οἶκος may refer to Jerusalem, as Jesus laments over the city and speaks about the abandonment of the “house.” This first lament over Jerusalem could be important for our analysis of the Lukan Pharisees, since Jesus exchanges words with some Pharisees (13.31-33) immediately before the lament and then once again goes into the οἶκος of a Pharisee (14.1) immediately after. Is there significance in this broader theme pertaining to the house, as it relates to the Pharisees of 13.31-33 in particular?

1. Inside and Outside the House (Luke 13.22-14.24)

It is not immediately clear to what οἶκος in Luke 13.35 refers. We might suppose that the οἶκος is the temple in Jerusalem, especially when reading the Matthean parallel (23.38) to this saying.1 Alternatively, some scholars have pointed to possible echoes from Jer 22.1-9 and have suggested that οἶκος may refer to the royal palace located in Jerusalem, in a literal sense, or perhaps to the political authority of Judea that is centralized in Jerusalem, more metaphorically.2 Still another option is to understand οἶκος as Jerusalem, the city whose destruction the Lukan Jesus predicts.3

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1 See, e.g., Theophylact, *Luc. ad* 13.34-35 (PG 123:928a-b).
2 See especially Francis D. Weinert: “οἰκός in Luke 13:35a does not refer primarily to the Temple. Rather, it designates Israel’s Judean leadership, and those who fall under their authority. As Luke presents it, this is the ‘house’ which presently, but only for the time being, will remain undisturbed by the direct challenge of Jesus personal presence” (“Luke, the Temple and Jesus’ Saying about Jerusalem’s Abandoned House (Luke 13:34-35),” *CBQ* 44 [1982]: 68-76, here 76); and the comments by Fitzmyer, “The words are probably an allusion to Jer 22:5” (*Luke X-XXIV*, 1036); and Nolland, “‘Your house’ is best not taken narrowly of the temple. Jer 22:1-8 provides

330
While the Matthean parallel to Luke 13.34-45 does have a setting in the temple (Matt 21.12; 23.37-39; 24.1), there is nothing in Luke’s redaction to suggest that the οἶκος is the temple.\(^4\) Even though the Lukan Jesus does go to the temple after he enters Jerusalem, the quotation from Ps 117.26, which concludes the first lament in Luke 13.35, later recurs as he approaches the city (19.38, 41), not as he enters the temple. When Jesus eventually enters the temple—there quoting from Isa 56.7 in response to those who were selling—this quotation granted identifies the temple as ὁ οἶκος μου, “my house,” and οἶκος προσευχῆς, “a house of prayer” (Luke 19.46). Yet here we should perhaps note that “my house” is not necessarily the same as ὁ οἶκος ὑμῶν, “your house” (13.35).

Moreover, if the Lukan Jesus had said ὁ οἶκος σου in 13.35 (with σου referring to Jerusalem, cf. 13.34), then an argument for understanding the “house” as the temple might be possible. Yet in evaluating the expression ὁ οἶκος ὑμῶν in 13.35, the closest possible referents to the plural personal pronoun are the “children” of Jerusalem in 13.34. In referring to the temple, it seems again that the Lukan Jesus would rather use an expression such ὁ οἶκος τοῦ θεοῦ (6.4), rather than one that would disassociate or distance him from the house.

When we read Luke 13.35 within its broader context, there are several terms that appear to complement the theme about the οἶκος. After the narrator remarks that Jesus was “making his way toward Jerusalem” (13.22), an unnamed person questions him, which prompts the following teaching: “strive to enter [εἰσελθεῖν] through the narrow door [θύρα], for many, I say to you, will

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3 See Tiede, Prophecy and History, 65-96, esp. 70-78. Cf. Carroll: “The oikos is probably not the temple, which Luke terms the house of God, but Jerusalem (e.g., 6:4; 19:46). Nevertheless, the impending disaster for the city is inseparably bound to the temple’s destruction (21:5-6, 20-24)” (Luke, 294, note 44).

seek to enter [εἰσέλθειν] and will not be able. Once the master of the house [οἰκοδεσπότης] has risen and shut the door [θύρα], and you begin to stand outside [ἐξω] and knock at the door [θύρα], saying, ‘Lord, open for us,’ then he will answer and say to you, ‘I do not know where you are from’ (13.24-25). This theme continues when he says, “In that place there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth, whenever you see Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the prophets in the kingdom of God, but you yourselves cast outside [ἐξω]” (13.28).

Some of these terms occur also in the parable at 14.16-24. Perhaps most notable is “the master of the house” (οἰκοδεσπότης, 14.21; cf. κύριος, 14.23) who commands his servant, “Go out [ἐξέλθει] quickly to the streets and lanes of the city and bring in here [εἰσάγαγε ὧδε] the poor and maimed and blind and lame” (14.21). Then when the servant responds that he has already done this and with room to spare (14.22), the master tells him, “Go out [ἐξέλθε] into the highways and hedges and compel people to enter [εἰσέλθειν], so that my house [μου ὁ οἶκος] may be filled” (14.23).

Does this οἶκος in 14.23 refer to the same one in 13.35? The fact that one “is being left” (ἀφίεσθαι, 13.35) when the οἰκοδεσπότης aims that the other be “filled” (γεμίζεσθαι, 14.23) suggests not. It is nonetheless possible that because the one is abandoned (13.35) the οἰκοδεσπότης would attempt to restore it (14.23). Yet here too we may see a clear distinction between ὁ οἶκος ὑμῶν (13.35) and μου ὁ οἶκος (14.23). Furthermore, the house in which the οἰκοδεσπότης resides seems to be another designation for “the kingdom of God” (13.28-29, 14.15), which we would not necessarily equate with or locate within the house associated with Jerusalem (13.35).

Another aspect of this larger theme emerges through multiple forms of καλεῖν in 14.7-24. In order to see the full range and number of these occurrences, we may list them accordingly:
τοὺς κεκλημένους (14.7); κληθῆς; κεκλημένος (14.8); καλέσας (14.9); κληθῆς; ὁ κεκληκώς (14.10); τῷ κεκληκτί (14.12); κάλει (14.13); ἐκάλεσεν (14.16); τοῖς κεκλημένοις (14.17); and τῶν κεκλημένων (14.24). Does the emphasis upon these terms fall within the class of figures that Quintilian says “revolves around the ears and appeals to their sensibilities, by some resemblance, equality, or contrast of sounds” (Inst. 9.3.66)? Quintilian does not here provide an example of this kind of verbal inflection; but the concentration of these forms of καλεῖν especially in 14.7-10 is difficult to overlook. Although the Pharisee did “invite” Jesus into his house (14.12) for the meal in this scene, perhaps the remaining question is whether Jesus will receive a welcome invitation into Jerusalem.

From within this context, the most telling indication that Jerusalem will not willingly receive Jesus appears in 13.34: “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the one who kills the prophets and stones those sent to her. How often I wanted [ἠθέλησα] to gather your children in the way that a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you did not want [ἠθελήσατε] it.” We have already discussed in chapter five the curious shift from the singular (e.g., αὐτή and σύ, 13.34) to the plural (e.g., ὑμεῖς, 13.35) as Jesus is addressing Jerusalem. One clue that the plural pronouns and the implied subject of the plural verbs in 13.34-35 may refer to the Pharisees is the fact that Jesus remarks about “how often” (ποσάκις) he wanted to gather the “children” of Jerusalem even before he had been to the city since inaugurating his ministry. Had the Lukan Jesus previously desired to gather the Pharisees under his protection, but they resisted him? If Jesus is still

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5 Ἰερουσαλήμ Ἰερουσαλήμ at the beginning of the sentence in 13.34 is an example of the figure called anadiplosis (Smyth §3009). Yet this instance of anadiplosis immediately follows a sentence ending with the word Ἰερουσαλήμ in 13.33, thus also forming the figure known as anastrophe (Smyth §3011).

speaking to the Pharisees of 13.31-33 when he addresses Jerusalem in 13.34-35, then we may be led to ask whether there are any other clues that point to such resistance from Pharisees.

Scholars have given much attention to what motives these Pharisees may have had when they come to Jesus and tell him: “go out \(\varepsilon\xi\varepsilon\lambda\theta\varepsilon\) and depart from here, for Herod wants to kill you” (13.31). Some suppose that they are serving as Herod’s emissaries, which may or may not mean that they all want him gone.\(^7\) And others regard them as giving Jesus the friendly and sincere advice to flee, which suggests that they intend to protect him from Herod.\(^8\)

\(^7\) Bengel claims that Herod thought Jesus “should be removed as far as possible: and the Pharisees intended the same. Hence both conspired against Jesus” (\textit{Gnomon [ad Luc. 13.31]}). In commenting upon Luke 13.31-33, Loisy suggests that the narrative assumes “les pharisiens en connivence avec Hérode.” He adds, “Les pharisiens n’agissent pas dans l’intérêt de Jésus, mais dans celui d’Hérode” (\textit{Les évangiles synoptiques}, 2:125-26). F. A. Farley states, “We know of the later alliance between the Pharisees and the Herodians. They were probably already acting in concert” (“\textit{A Text (Luke xiii.33),}” \textit{ExpT} 34 [1923]: 429-30, here 430). T. W. Manson explains, the “stiff and uncompromising reply” that Jesus gives in 13.32-33 “may incline us to think that Jesus regarded these Pharisees as semi-official emissaries of the Tetrarch” (\textit{The Sayings of Jesus} [London: SCM Press, 1949], 276). Affirming Manson, Harold W. Hoechner notes that the Pharisees may not be “the sympathizers they pretended but the semi-official agents of Antipas” (\textit{Herod Antipas} [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972], 220). According to Caird, “The Pharisees who came to warn Jesus of Herod’s intentions posed as friends, but they might have guessed that he would be suspicious of their unwonted solicitude for his safety and would recognize that they were actually in collusion with Herod. Herod earned himself the title of fox because, not daring to take direct action against Jesus at the height of his Galilean popularity, he tried to drive him from his tetrarchy by this devious intimidation, subtly disguised as friendship” (\textit{Luke}, 173). Marshall states, “Jesus take the Pharisees at their face value as agents of Herod and gives them a message for that ‘fox’ (9:58)” (\textit{Luke}, 571). Conversely, Bovon observes, “Although Jesus’ answers were addressed to the tetrarch Herod through the Pharisees (v. 32a), nothing allows us to say that the first summons was dictated by Herod (v. 31). So the Pharisees cannot be considered to have been delegates sent to Jesus; their status remains ambiguous” (\textit{Luke 2}, 321). In the end, all we can claim is that the Lukan Jesus seems to assume that these Pharisees can have an audience with Herod. The question of whether they were “in kingly courts” (7.25) is impossible to answer for certain.

\(^8\) As Culpepper observes, “The role of the Pharisees in these verses has served as the linchpin for arguments that Luke presents the Pharisees in a more positive light than do the other Gospels” (\textit{Luke}, 280). Tyson, e.g., takes it for granted “that Pharisees appear here, not as antagonists of Jesus, but as friends. It is surprising to meet friendly Pharisees in the anti-Pharisaic gospels. This passage may indicate that some of the Pharisees, at least, were more friendly to Jesus than we are elsewhere given to understand” (“\textit{Jesus and Herod Antipas},” 245).
We could not conclude that Luke is using figured speech in this instance simply because scholars have formed different impressions about these Pharisees. Yet in attending to the initial word that Luke attributes to them, ἔξέλθε, we may ask whether it can convey multiple senses within this context. If we were to read their statement to Jesus outside of its context, there would be no reason to suspect that they were anything but sincere. Yet when read in light of this broader theme concerning the οἶκος, the imperative ἔξελθε may have another nuance. Perhaps most striking is that the statement occurs immediately after Jesus teaches his hearers, “strive to enter [εἰσελθεῖν] through the narrow door” (13.24), lest they be “cast outside [ἔξω]” (13.28).

The phrase ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ὥρᾳ seems to join the scene in 13.31-35 to the foregoing narrative, perhaps implying a sense of immediacy—that is, “at that very hour.”9 In his comments on Luke 13.31, Euthymius observes how the previously spoken judgments may be significant for understanding the motives of these Pharisees:

When they heard that they would be cast outside [ἔξω] and that they would be last, they were inflamed with anger, and feigning [ὑποκρινάμενοι] goodwill, advised him to go out [ἔξελθε] and leave—on the one hand, under false pretext, lest he be executed by Herod; on the other hand, and in reality, lest being in their presence and performing wonders he be glorified and attract the crowd.10

The possibility that these Pharisees were “feigning goodwill” may remind us that Jesus earlier warns his disciples to beware the “hypocrisy” (ὑπόκρισις) of the Pharisees (12.1); and because

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Steele assumes amicable relations between the Lukan Pharisees and Jesus in his claim that the Pharisees in 13.31 “warn him to flee from Herod” (“Table-fellowship with Pharisees,” 156). Fitzmyer explains that the Pharisees in 13.31 “are depicted giving Jesus sage advice; these at least are well disposed toward him” (Luke X-XXIV, 1030). According to Ringe, the Pharisees in 13.31 “have come as Jesus’ friends, identifying with him against a common opponent, Herod” (Luke, 191). And Green states, “Luke’s mural of the Pharisees is neither finished nor painted with one color. He does not lump all Pharisees together in one composite group character, but, as here, he can speak not of ‘the Pharisees’ but of ‘some Pharisees.’ In this case, faced with the option of siding with Herod over against Jesus, some Pharisees actually align themselves with Jesus” (Luke, 537).

10 Euthymius, Luc. ad 13.31 (PG 129:1008b).
there are “hypocrites” (ὑποκριταί, 13.15) in the narrative leading up to this scene, perhaps Jesus should indeed be on his guard at this point.

In a classic article on 13.31-33, Adelbert Denaux expounds more fully on “hypocrisy” in this context and further suggests that these Pharisees are attempting to prevent Jesus from accomplishing his mission. If the Pharisees are trying to divert him from his course toward Jerusalem, Jesus makes clear that they will not succeed when he remarks how it is impossible that a prophet perish ἐξω Ἰερουσαλήμ, “outside Jerusalem” (13.33). Does this use of ἐξω indicate that the Pharisees are aiming to cast Jesus out of the “house” by compelling him leave? The previous instance of ἐξω, as Jesus explains how “the workers of injustice” will be “cast outside” (13.28), seems to serve as a point for contrast not only between the two houses but also between those who would be thrown out of each.

Should we understand this sense of ἐξελθεῖν as almost synonymous to ἐκβάλλειν? It is notable that in this context Jesus uses the latter term both for those who will be cast outside (ἐκβάλλεσθαι ἐξω, 13.28) the kingdom of God and for the work of casting out demons (ἐκβάλλειν δαιμόνια, 13.32). While it would perhaps not be a stretch to understand a correlation between “the workers of injustice” (13.27) and “demons” (13.32), any possible allusion that the Pharisees were demonic would be difficult to support from within this context of the narrative. On this particular point, perhaps all we can suggest is that Jesus, the οἰκοδεσπότης, will cast out certain persons from the kingdom of God, just as he is casting out demons while en route to

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11 Denaux states: “Il est possible que dans l’intention de Lc, la conduite des Pharisiens en Lc., XIII, 31 est une illustration concrète de l’hypocrisie, dont ils sont accusés en XII, 1. En apparence, ils avertissent Jésus contre les intentions meurtrières d’Hérode. En réalité, ils veulent empêcher Jésus d’accomplir sa mission. Il nous semble donc que, pour Luc, c’est là l’intention propre qui se cache derrière l’advertissement «Pars et va-t-en d’ici». En tout cas, selon Luc, c’est ainsi que Jésus interprète leur intervention (voir le v. 32). En outre, d’une manière hypocrite, ils prétendent à Hérode une intention qu’il n’a pas” (“L’hypocrisie des Pharisiens,” 197).
Jerusalem. It seems furthermore to be a paradox that he cannot die “outside” Jerusalem, even though there may be an attempt to keep him out of or expel him from the city.

This notion that there is a mutual casting out, either envisioned (13.38) or attempted (13.31), may be supplemented also in the fact that when the Pharisees tell Jesus to go (πορεύομαι, 13.31), he responds by telling them to go (πορευθέντες, 13.32); for he must go (πορεύεσθαι, 13.33) to Jerusalem.\(^\text{12}\) The ὅτι clause that states the alleged reason why they command Jesus to go also seems to have a counter-point in the ὅτι clause that Jesus gives for why he is going to Jerusalem. That is, they tell him to leave, ὅτι Ἡρῴδης θέλει σε ἀποκτεῖναι, “because Herod wants to kill you” (13.31b). His response shows that he will not leave his course, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται προφήτην ἀπολέσθαι ἐξώ Ιερουσαλήμ, “because it is not possible that a prophet perish outside Jerusalem” (13.33b).

2. The Function of υμῖν (Luke 13.35a)

Another puzzling aspect about the οἶκος in 13.35 is the syntax of υμῖν, which occurs in the sentence: ἴδον ἂριστα ὑμῖν ὁ οἶκος υμῶν (13.35a). Because these pronouns seem to refer back to the “children” of Jerusalem—and possibly the Pharisees whom Jesus addresses—it is important to ask how or why these hearers were affected by this abandonment of the “house.” When we take into account the various functions of the dative, the so-called dative of feeling (ethical dative) seems possible, especially if Jesus is aiming to communicate to his hearers some emotion or gravitas concerning the abandonment.\(^\text{13}\) Although in 13.31-35 we are not told, as we later are,

\(^{12}\) On these instances of πορεύεσθαι, see also the comments by Bengel (Gnomon [ad Luc. 13.33]) and Tannehill (Luke, 223).

\(^{13}\) In this use of the dative, the first or second person pronoun denotes the interest of the speaker or the person(s) addressed. See Smyth §1486; BDF §192; Turner, Grammar, 239; and, e.g., ἐμοὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῆν Χριστὸς καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν κέρδος, “as I see it, living is Christ and dying is gain” (Phil 1.21).
that Jesus “wept over” the city (19.41), other similarities between 13.31-35 and 19.28-46 might suggest some intense emotion also in this earlier scene. If we were to settle upon this function of the dative, however, it would be difficult to preserve the ὑμῖν of 13.35a in an English translation; but perhaps the following would come close: “Look, your house, you will be interested to know, is being left.”

At the same time, there may be some detriment conveyed in the verb ἀφίεται, thus making it possible to read ὑμῖν as a dative of disadvantage: “Look, to your detriment your house is being left.”14 This function of the dative would seem to complement the idea that some Pharisees compel Jesus to go out (ἐξελθεῖν, 13.31). Also, as a possible intertextual point of contact with Luke 13.35, some scholars cite the prophet’s words in Jer 12.7: Ἐγκαταλέλοιπα τὸν ὁἶκόν μου, ἀφῆκα τὴν κληρονομίαν μου, “I have forsaken my house, I have left my inheritance.”15 If Jesus is the prophet who leaves the “house” from Luke’s perspective, then this abandonment might explain what led to the city’s destruction in 70 CE.

Reading this sentence in the wake of the destruction might also allow us to understand ὑμῖν as a dative of military accompaniment.16 That is, some of the city’s leadership may have left the city, along with its “children,” when the Romans placed it under siege. The image of Jesus as a hen, who fails in the attempt to gather (ἐπισυνάγειν) her brood, may further suggest that the chicks fled out from under her protection (13.34).

14 See Smyth §§1481-85; and BDF §188. Cf. μαρτυρεῖτε ἑαυτοῖς ὅτι υἱοί ἐστε τῶν φονευσάντων τούς προφήτας, “you testify against yourselves that you are sons of the ones who murdered the prophets” (Matt 23.31); and the dative of advantage: πάντες ἐμαρτύρουν αὐτῷ, “all were speaking well of him” (Luke 4.22); Καίσαρ μοι κωδίκελλον ἔγραψεν, “Caesar wrote credentials for me” (Epictetus, Diatr. 3.7.30).
16 See Smyth §1526.
Yet in the detail that the “children” are unwilling to be gathered by Jesus, is it furthermore possible to understand ὑμῖν as a dative of cause? That is, “Look, your house is being left because of you.” It is notable that the sentence in 13.35a occurs immediately after the statement καὶ οὐκ ἠθελήσατε, “and you were unwilling” (13.34). In this sense, because of their unwillingness, their house was being abandoned; and this divine abandonment perhaps resulted in destruction. Although we would expect to see the dative of cause with a verb of emotion in more belletristic Greek, this nuance in usage is often ignored in the koinē dialect. Nevertheless, we may be hard pressed to locate an example of the personal pronoun as a dative of cause. Accordingly, the other functions of the dative already noted seem more likely candidates for understanding ὑμῖν.

If ὑμῖν in 13.35a is an instance of figured speech, we of course could not attribute it to Luke; for Matthew shares an almost verbatim version of the sentence (with the addition of ἔρημος at the end, Matt 23.38). We can, however, suggest that Luke appropriated the sentence from a source and placed it within a context leading us to suspect that the antecedent of ὑμῖν includes the “certain Pharisees” of 13.31 and that he views them as having played a role in the abandonment of Jerusalem.18

3. “This Fox” and the Pharisees

The question of whether and to what extent Luke views the Pharisees as responsible for the destruction of Jerusalem we shall take up again in the next chapter. Yet before leaving our analysis of 13.31-35, the statement in which Jesus responds to these select Pharisees and calls

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17 See Smyth §§1517-20; BDF §196; Winer, Grammar, 270; Turner, Grammar, 242; and, e.g., Rom 4.20; 11.20; 2 Cor 1.15; 1 Pet 4.12 (with a verb of emotion); Josephus, Ant. 17.146; D.L. 2.57.
18 Cf. Tiede, Prophecy and History, 77.
Herod a fox demands our attention; for in commenting upon these words, “Go and say to this fox [εἴπατε τῇ ἀλώπεκι ταύτῃ]” (13.32), some interpreters claim that Jesus refers not to Herod, but rather to the Pharisees themselves. Cyril of Alexandria, for example, explains:

he counters them in a meek and obscure fashion [ἐπεσκιασμένως], as was his custom. For he said, “say to this fox.” Attend carefully [ἀκριβῶς] to the force of the statement. For indeed what is said seems in a way to be directed toward and to refer to the person of Herod, as some have supposed. But it is rather aimed at the insensibility of the Pharisee. For although he could have perhaps said, “say to that fox,” he avoids this. But in the most clever way, by using an expression whose meaning lies somewhere in the middle, he makes known also what is near the Pharisee, saying, “to this fox.” And he likens the man to the fox. For the animal is constantly crafty and peevish. Such also are the Pharisees.  

Theophylact develops this same interpretation but uses additional terms that may be particularly relevant for understanding the statement as a possible example of figured speech. He writes:

they are using Herod as their excuse and are pretending [σχηματίζεσθαι] to be concerned about the savior. But he knew their hearts and answered them in a meek and covert fashion [συνεσκιασμένως], as was his custom, and said, “say to this fox.” And he seems indeed to refer to Herod as a fox; but if one would examine closely, he rather refers to the Pharisees. For he did not say, “to that fox,” but “to this,” an expression whose meaning cleverly lies somewhere in the middle. For by saying “fox” in the singular, he led them to think it was Herod; but by using the near demonstrative “this,” he insinuated [αἰνίσσεσθαι] that they themselves were deceitful. For indeed, the Pharisees were displaying the craftiness and peevishness of the fox.

Euthymius also follows this interpretive tradition; yet rather than likening the fox to an individual Pharisee, as Cyril does, he more clearly identifies the fox as an immoral quality within the Pharisees: “Because he knew their craftiness, he answers patiently and cleverly, saying, ‘go and say to this fox,’ that is, to the deceit, to the peevishness that is in you all. For such is the fox.

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20 Theophylact, *Luc. ad* 13.31-33 (PG 123:924c-d).
For even though the statement seems to make an allusion [ἀποτείνειν] against Herod, it rather referred to them.\(^\text{21}\)

If we were to accept some version of this interpretation of ἡ ἀλώπηξ αὐτῆ, “this fox,” we could then suggest that Luke is using figured speech—through indirect statement in particular—in order to conceal his critique of the Pharisees. What might complicate this interpretation, however, is that when Demetrius cites the comparable expression (Κρατερὸν τοῦτον, “this Craterus,” *Eloc.* 289) as an example of figured speech, the speaker is making an allusion against Craterus himself and not against another party. Yet perhaps we should allow for some variety in the application of figured speech.

Additionally, what does seem to correspond between these interpretations of ἡ ἀλώπηξ αὐτῆ and Κρατερὸν τοῦτον is that a negative character trait is identified in each. Where the interpreters of Luke explain that Jesus insinuates against the craftiness, peevishness, and deceit of the Pharisees, Demetrius claims that “in using the demonstrative ‘this’ [τοῦτον], all the arrogance [ὑπερηφανία] of Craterus is alluded to [ἐμφαίνειν] and reproached by a figure [ἐν σχήματι]” (*Eloc.* 289).

We might also suppose that the Pharisees are more opposed to Jesus’ work in casting out demons and performing cures (13.32) than is Herod and thus that the statement does refer to them. But when Jesus earlier gives to the twelve “power and authority over all demons and to cure diseases” (9.1), Herod does attempt “to see” Jesus after hearing about their wonder-working acts (9.7-9).

We have also pointed out some reasons for understanding the Pharisees as the metaphorical brood that the hen attempts to gather under her wings. If the Pharisees are both the fox and the chicks, then the analogy would seemingly contradict itself and break down. Interpreters have long commented upon the pairing between the fox and the hen. This pairing further supports understanding the fox as Herod and his aims to prey upon Jesus, the hen. As Bede interprets:

The city itself, which he had referred to as his nest, he now calls the house of the Judeans. Having been exposed with the Lord’s assistance, not undeservingly, it is abandoned, because not only did it despise to be protected by the wings of this omnipotent bird, which Matthew calls a hen, but also the same bird, wishing to protect itself, must be devoured by foxes—that is, the city handed over Christ to be crucified by Herod and Pilate. Meanwhile the city of the same foxes, namely of earthly rulers, is itself given over to rapine. For after the Lord was killed, the Romans came and, plundering it as an empty nest, took away their place, nation, and kingdom.

If we follow Bede, we would not explain “this fox” as an example of figured speech that is accomplished through indirect statement. We could, however, suggest that it is an instance of ἐμφασις or significatio: on the one hand, the near demonstrative pronoun makes the remark disparaging toward Herod (Demetrius, Eloc. 289); and on the other, the designation “fox” gives rise to a similitudo, “analogy,” in particular (Rhet. Her. 4.67). As Luke further applies the analogy, he seems to regard Jesus as the one who would shield the children of Jerusalem from

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22 Bede states: “And fittingly he who had called Herod a fox, who was plotting his death, compares himself to a bird. For the deceitfulness of the fox does not ever cease to lie in wait for birds” (Luc. ad 13.34 [CCSL 120:274]). See also A. W. Verrall, “Christ before Herod,” JTS 10 (1909): 321-53, esp. 352-53; John A. Darr, Herod the Fox: Audience Criticism and Lukan Characterization (JSNTSup 163; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 179-83; Bovon, Luke 2, 332; and Carroll, Luke, 294. Ambrose also comments upon the foxes who have holes (Luke 9.58) and claims that Jesus “compares foxes to heretics.” He then introduces a citation of Matt 23.37-38 (cf. Luke 13.34-35) by saying: “the heretic is in a hole, as the deceitfulness of the fox is always intent upon evil against that hen in the Gospel” (Luc. 7.31 [CCSL 14:225]).

23 Bede, Luc. ad 13.35 (CCSL 120:274).
predators. But because they “did not want it” (13.35)—and perhaps because they told him to “go out” (13.31)—their “house” is left vulnerable to attack.

4. Conclusions

Regarding the Pharisees of 13.31-33, the most noticeable sign that Luke applies figured speech in his depiction of them appears in the imperative ἔξελθε, “go out” (13.31). In one sense, their statement suggests that they are warning Jesus to escape the murderous aims of Herod. Yet when Jesus responds, he refers to Jerusalem as an abandoned “house” (13.35), which in another sense suggests that these Pharisees do not want him there and are commanding him to leave. Although Jesus is clearly not yet in Jerusalem at this point in the narrative, this scene assumes what both he and Luke’s readers know about a later time—a period after Jesus had been crucified in Jerusalem, when the house had been abandoned, left vulnerable, and destroyed. For both the Lukan Jesus, looking forward, and for Luke’s readers, looking back, the events of this period call for lamentation. While Jesus may eventually leave the house, he makes clear that he must still go to Jerusalem, because it is impossible that a prophet die ἔξω, “outside,” that city (13.33). Set over against this abandoned city is another house, the kingdom of God, whence the master of the house will cast “outside” the workers of injustice (13.28) but fill with people nonetheless (14.23). In the attempt to ground these two senses of ἔξελθε in ancient rhetorical instruction, the first sense appears to function in a way that is “public,” and the second “private” (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ars Rhet. 8.16). The broader theme about the “house” seems to serve as the key for understanding Luke’s “art” in this context and what he may want readers “to figure out” (Ars Rhet. 8.4).

Complementing this theme concerning the abandoned house is the analogy depicting Herod as a fox (13.32) and Jesus a hen (13.34). The fact that the brood is unwilling to be
gathered by the hen may support the notion that these Pharisees compel him to leave. While the “children” of Jerusalem (13.34) is the nearest possible antecedent of the plural pronouns and subject of the plural verbs in 13.34-35, it is conceivable that Jesus is still addressing the Pharisees of 13.31-33 and thus identifies them as these children. Are there any indications that Pharisees resist the Lukan Jesus when he does eventually enter the city?
Chapter Fifteen: The Pharisees and the Kingly Entrance

The Lukan Jesus concludes his first lament over Jerusalem and its children by telling them that they will not see him until they say, “Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord” (13.35), which is a direct quotation from LXX Ps 117.26. We encounter a slightly expanded version of this quotation as Jesus approaches the city and his disciples cry out, “Blessed is the king [ὁ βασιλεύς] who comes in the name of the Lord” (19.38). We might suppose that the persons whom Jesus addresses in 13.35 are the same ones who later acclaim his entry into Jerusalem. While the quotation from Ps 117.26 does link the two scenes together, there are perhaps reasons to distinguish between the children of Jerusalem in 13.34-35 and the disciples in 19.37-38. First of all, we know that the people of Jerusalem seem to have recited this line from Ps 117.26 to pilgrims as they came to the city for Passover, as well as other feasts. And in light of this tradition, the “children” of 13.34-35 would not necessarily reserve this recitation exclusively for Jesus and his coming. Thus, in one sense when Jesus says they will not see him until they speak these words, he is simply marking the occasion of his entry into the city. Secondly, the fact that Jesus subsequently offers another lament over the city (19.41-44) suggests that its citizens are not unanimous with the disciples in welcoming him. It may not be a coincidence that this second lament (19.41-44) also immediately follows an exchange with Pharisees (19.39-40). It is notable that the title ὁ βασιλεύς in the version of the acclamation that Luke attributes to the disciples is absent both in Ps 117.26 and in the synoptic parallels. Is it the addition of this title that leads some of the Pharisees from the crowd to tell Jesus, “teacher, rebuke your disciples” (19.39)?

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1 See Str-B 1:850; and Fitzmyer, Luke X-XXIV, 1037.

Within this context of the Gospel, the Pharisees who want to have Jesus rebuke (ἐπιτιμᾶν, 19.39) and silence (σιωπᾶν, 19.40) his disciples appear to mirror those unnamed characters in front of the blind man, since they similarly rebuke (ἐπιτιμᾶν) the blind man in their attempts to silence (σιγᾶν, 18.39) his cries that Jesus is the “son of David” (18.38-39). We know that the title “son of David” is politically charged in the Lukan narrative, specifically because the angel Gabriel says about Jesus that “God will give to him the throne of his father David; and he will reign over the house of Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there will be no end” (1.32-33; cf. 1.27, 69; 2.11; 20.31; 20.41-44). The parallel between those who repute the blind man and the Pharisees of 19.39 suggests that it is the acclamation of Jesus’ kingship that these Pharisees are opposing. When Jesus responds, “if they become silent, the stones will cry out” (19.40), does he mean that there are consequences for suppressing the proclamation of his kingship?

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2 See R. Alan Culpepper, “Seeing the Kingdom of God: The Metaphor of Sight in the Gospel of Luke,” Currents in Theology and Mission 21 (1994): 434-443, esp. 438-39; Tannehill, Luke, 274; and Brent Kinman, “Parousia, Jesus’ ‘A-Triumphal’ Entry, and the Fate of Jerusalem,” JBL 118 (1999): 279-94, esp. 285. We may compare Jesus’ role as “son of David” to that as the shepherd of Israel who seeks after the lost (19.10; cf. 15.3-7), as presented in Ezek 34.15-16, 23-24 (Bovon, Luke 2, 600). The encounter with the blind man “when he was drawing near to Jericho” (18.35) is not insignificant. As Ringe (Luke, 230) explains, “Jericho is the last place for the travelers to regroup and ready themselves to retrace the route of Israel’s kings at the annual enthronement festival. At the festival, the king would leave Jerusalem and descend the mountain, and wearing clothes of ordinary people, the king would make his way back to the place of power chanting the Songs of Ascent (Psalms 120-134).”

3 Cf. Cyril of Alexandria’s commentary in its Syriac version. When Jesus enters Jerusalem on the colt, Cyril explains, despite the rebuke from the Pharisees, the people “praise him not secretly, and in concealment; not in a hidden manner, and, so to speak, silently, but with freedom of speech, and loud voice” (Hom. Luc. 130; trans. Smith). According to the Greek version of Cyril, the statement from the Pharisees in 19.39 is characteristic of χριστομάχοι (Luc. ad 19.39 [PG 72:877c]). Cf. Acts 5.39.

4 The condition in 19.40 (ἐὰν οὗτοι σιωπήσουσιν, οἱ λίθοι κράξουσιν) appears to be a so-called “emotional future condition.” According to Smyth (§2328), “When the protasis expresses strong feeling, the future indicative with εἰ is commonly used instead of ἐὰν with the
In one sense, that “the stones will cry out” may indicate simply that inanimate and lifeless objects will sing the praises of the messiah if humans do not.  

John the Baptist earlier states, “God is able from these stones to raise up children to Abraham” (3.8). And Jesus may attest to John’s statement when Zacchaeus vows to make amends for his unjust accumulation of wealth and Jesus declares him “a son of Abraham” (19.9).

Yet that “the stones will cry out” may also mean that a particular consequence for silencing these disciples is the demolition of buildings. For in the lament that immediately follows, Jesus says to Jerusalem, “they will not leave a stone upon a stone in you” (19.44). A similar statement appears in the subsequent narrative where Jesus explains that the “beautiful subjunctive.” Although Luke substitutes the future indicative for the subjunctive, he has not fully completed the construction by using εἰ instead of ἐάν as one would expect.

Cf. the concluding exhortation from the speech Josephus delivers to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, in which he remarks how those who fail to see “a way of salvation” (B.J. 5.415) are ἄτεγκτοι καὶ λίθων ἀπαθέστεροι, “impervious and more insensible than stones” (5.417).

Origen makes this connection (Hom. Luc. 37 [GCS 49:212]); as well as Titus of Bostra: “But who are the stones? The ones who worship stones, the nations who have gone astray—concerning which it was said, ‘God is able from these stones to raise up children to Abraham’” (Luc. ad 19.40 [TU 21.1: Sickenberger, 233]).

Contrast Plummer, who states, “It is not likely that there is any reference to the crashing of the stones at the downfall of Jerusalem” (Luke, 449).

The previous statement in 19.44a (καὶ ἐδαφιοῦσίν σε καὶ τὰ τέκνα σου ἐν σοί) complements this graphic description of Jerusalem’s fall. The imagery recalls Psalm 136, which is a lament over the destruction of the city in 587 BCE at the hands of the Babylonians and their Edomite supporters. Yet the forecast given by the Lukan Jesus in 19.41-44 is the opposite of that which is recollected in Psalm 136. Whereas Jerusalem is a cherished memory in the latter context (136.4-7), the Lukan Jesus speaks about the judgment against this city in the same terms the psalmist uses against Babylon. The indictment in 19.44a that Jerusalem and the children within it will be dashed to the ground (ἐδαφίζεται) echoes Ps 136.9 where the psalmist pleads for vengeance against the Babylonian enemy, whose repayment is expressed in having its infants dashed against the rock. Cf. the indictment against Nineveh in Nah 3.1-19, which city is accused of conspiring with other nations and whose infants their enemies will dash upon the ground (ἐδαφίζεται, 3.10); that against Samaria in Hos 14.1, whose sucklings also will be dashed upon the ground (ἐδαφίζεται); and Josephus’ description of the harsh conditions of the famine when Jerusalem was under siege and children were dashed to the ground (ἐδαφος, B.J. 5.433). Cf. Isa 13.16; 4 Kgdms 8.11-12; Hos 10.14; and the comments by Johnson, Luke, 299; and Culpepper, Luke, 372-73.
stones” (21.5) making up the temple will fall: “not one stone will be left upon a stone that will not be thrown down” (21.6). The idea that emerges from these passages seems to be that from the fall of stones comes a great noise—a sound of such magnitude and consequence that the stones are personified with human voices. We find a comparable personification of stone in Hab 2.11a, where it is said that λίθος ἐκ τοίχου βοήσεται, “a stone will shout out from a wall.” Here the stone becomes vocal because of the destruction of a “house” that had become lofty through πλεονεξία κακή, “evil greed” (2.9-10). Not only will the stone making up the wall roar when the building falls, a beetle will speak out from the wood (2.11b).

While the “stones” in this context may provide a link between Jesus’ reply to the Pharisees (19.40) and the subsequent lament (19.41-44), this detail does not in itself associate these Pharisees with Jerusalem. In our analysis of 13.31-35, we noticed some clues suggesting that the Pharisees there and the “children” of Jerusalem are one and the same. This association might carry over into the present context; for here too the Lukan Jesus refers to the “children” of Jerusalem (19.44). Yet in 13.31-35, the transition from Jesus’ exchange with the Pharisees to the lament over Jerusalem is more seamless—joined particularly by repeated reference to the city:

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9 Does Luke, in echoing Hab 2.11, imply that greed was a consequence for the destruction of the temple? Although he does not use the term πλεονεξία in this context, this passion may have motivated the abuses of ὁι πωλοῦντες, “the ones who sold,” whom Jesus drives out from the temple (19.45). The accusation that these merchants had made the οἶκος προσευχῆς, “house of prayer,” into σπήλαιον λῃστῶν, “a den of bandits,” would support this interpretation (19.46). And the Lukan Jesus does assume that greed has consequences, as he makes clear in his earlier warning to a man from the crowd, “Watch out, and beware of all greed [πλεονεξία]” (12.15). Michael Farris points out that worshipers in the temple were required to pay a double tax, to the Romans and to the Temple (“A Tale of Two Taxations (Luke 18:10-14b): The Parable of the Pharisee and the Toll Collector,” in Jesus and His Parables: Interpreting the Parables of Jesus Today [ed. V. George Shillington; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997], 23-33).

10 Hab 2.11b: καὶ κάνθαρος ἐκ ξύλου φθέγξεται αὐτά, lit., “and a beetle will utter them from wood.” The antecedent of αὐτά appears to be the ἕθη πολλά of 2.8. If so, the meaning is perhaps that a beetle “will call them by name,” that is, identify the nations (or Gentiles; cf. Luke 21.24) that bring destruction upon the house.
Ἰερουσαλήμ. Ἰερουσαλήμ Ἰερουσαλήμ (13.33b-34a). After Jesus responds to the Pharisees in 19.40, however, there is at least some movement indicated in the words, “And as he drew near and saw the city, he wept over it” (19.41); and then he offers the lament.

Nevertheless, the καὶ σύ in the opening clause of the lament may provide a clue: “if only you too [καὶ σύ] had recognized on this day the terms of peace [τὰ πρὸς εἰρήνην]” (19.42). While σύ clearly refers to Jerusalem, does the adverbial καὶ implicate these Pharisees along with the city? In other words, does καὶ imply that, with the Pharisees, the city “too” had failed to acknowledge what would bring peace in their wishes to have the disciples silenced? If they

11 We see the expression τὰ πρὸς εἰρήνην also in the parabolic vignette from Luke 14.31-32—where the king with an army of ten thousand, if he is not able to meet a king with twenty thousand, sends an embassy asking for τὰ πρὸς εἰρήνην. And a similar phrase appears in the LXX where Toi, the king of Hamath, upon hearing that David had defeated Hadadezer, chooses to form an alliance with “king David” and thus sends a messenger “to ask him for terms of peace [τὰ εἰς εἰρήνην]” (2 Kgdms 8.10). Cf. 2 Kgdms 11.7 (καὶ ἐπηρώτησεν Δαυιδ εἰς εἰρήνην Ιωαβ καὶ εἰς εἰρήνην τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ εἰς εἰρήνην τοῦ πολέμου); T. Jud. 9. 7 (τότε αἰτοῦσιν ἡμᾶς τὰ πρὸς εἰρήνην); and esp. Ps 121.6, which celebrates Jerusalem and its temple and implores the reader or hearer, ἐρωτήσατε δὴ τὰ εἰς εἰρήνην τὴν Ἰερουσαλημ. Also, as Fitzmyer notes, there is here “a play on the name Jerusalem.” The etymology of the name had long served as grounds for an identity as a city of peace (e.g., Ps 121.6; Philo, De somn. 2.250; Heb 7.2). “The city, whose very name is associated with peace, fails to recognize what makes for its own peace—fails to recognize the bearer of heaven’s peace, fails to recognize its ‘king’ of peace” (Luke X-XXIV, 1256).

12 The questions of who wanted peace and how it might be achieved are answered in different ways in the early accounts of the Jewish War. Josephus describes a disagreement between the insurgents, led by Eleazar, and the ones whom he at first identifies only as the chief priests and γνώριμοι, “notables” (B.J. 2.410). He qualifies these γνώριμοι, some lines latter, as “the notables of the Pharisees” (οἱ τῶν Φαρισαίων γνώριμοι, 2.411) in particular—remarking how they banded together with the leading citizens of Jerusalem and the chief priests in favor of εἰρήνη, “peace” (2.422). The major point of contention between the two sides, as Josephus tells it, emerged when Eleazar and the revolutionaries persuaded the temple ministers “to accept no gift or sacrifice from a foreigner.” What this prohibition implied was that now sacrifices would not be offered “on behalf of the Romans and Caesar” (2.409). While the leading citizens, the notables of the Pharisees, and the chief priests made arguments in favor of accepting such gifts and sacrifices, the position of the revolutionaries won the day (2.410-418). According to Josephus, it was this act of prohibition that marked “the beginning of the war with the Romans” (2.409). It becomes clear throughout the Bellum judaicum that Josephus places himself also among those contending for peace and surrender and thus sharply distinguishes his position from...
disagree with the acclamation about “peace in heaven” (ἐν οὐρανῷ εἰρήνη, 19.38), then it would seem so. When Jesus replies to the Pharisees in 19.40, Erasmus claims that he “indirectly [oblique] criticized the blindness of the Pharisees.” This point possibly takes into account the remark spoken against Jerusalem in 19.42, that “the terms of peace” are “hidden from your [σου] eyes.” While Luke does not directly diagnose the Pharisees with blindness in this context,

that of the revolutionaries and their allies (e.g., 5.362-419; 6.215-16). Cf. Travers: “There was a large and influential party of what we should call ‘pacifists,’ who if they could have had their way would have endured the full weight of Roman oppression, rather than go to war. These pacifists probably included the majority of the Pharisees. Certainly the leading Pharisees of the time belonged to the peace party. But the war party while more varied in its composition, must have included some Pharisees—some who took the line which, sixty years later, Aqiba took in the war of Barcochba” (“The Effect of the Fall of Jerusalem upon the Character of the Pharisees,” 10). According to some rabbinic accounts, the act of surrendering to Rome would result in peace. In b. Git. 56a, e.g., the rabbis and the biryoni (ברויוני, the derogatory term for the revolutionaries) disagree about how to respond to the Roman forces. While the rabbis say, “let us go out and make peace with them,” the biryoni reply, “let us go out and fight them.” In the two recensions of Abot R. Nat. it is Yohanan ben Zakkai who serves as the spokesperson for peace. In the one account, Vespasian bids the citizens of Jerusalem to send out “one bow and arrow” (Abot R. Nat. B 6), and in the other “one bow or one arrow” (Abot R. Nat. A 4), as a sign of their surrender and submission to the Romans. If they send out such a sign, according to the account in Abot R. Nat. B 6, Vespasian promises to leave them “in peace” (בשלום). While both recensions portray Yohanan as one who willfully submits to Vespasian and his forces, the account in Abot R. Nat. A 4 highlights even more how Yohanan aligns himself on the side of Vespasian. The speech that Vespasian gives to the citizens of Jerusalem Yohanan repeats almost verbatim when he addresses the men of that city, including the request to send out “one bow or one arrow” (Abot R. Nat. A 4). The most notable difference between the two speeches is where Vespasian addresses them as “fools,” Yohanan calls them “my children” (Abot R. Nat. A 4). The edition of the two versions of Abot de Rabbi Nathan here cited is that by Solomon Schechter, Avoth de-Rabbi Nathan (1887; repr., New York and Jerusalem: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1997). See also the edition by Hans-Jürgen Becker, Avot de-Rabbi Natan: Synoptische Edition beider Versionen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006). For full English translations of Abot de Rabbi Nathan A, see Judah Goldin, The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan (YJS 10; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955); and Jacob Neusner, The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan: An Analytical Translation and Explanation (BJS 114; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986); and for Abot de Rabbi Nathan B, Anthony J. Saldarini, The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan (SJLA; Leiden: Brill, 1975). For b. Gittin, see the text and interfacing translation by Maurice Simon, Hebrew-English Edition of the Babylonian Talmud (ed. I. Epstein; London: The Soncino Press, 1977).

Jerusalem’s inability to see might point back to the episode about the blind man, who paradoxically can “see” better than those who attempt to silence his cries.

2. The “Citizens” and the Nobleman

If the characters who attempt to silence the blind man (18.39) and the disciples (19.39) do so because they oppose the kingship of Jesus, then we may see a further clue about this opposition in the so-called parable of the pounds (19.11-27). There the “citizens” are said to have hated the nobleman and to have sent an embassy after him saying, “We do not want this man to reign over us” (19.14; cf. 19.27). In comparing this parable to its Matthean parallel (Matt 25.14-30), we notice that the detail about the “citizens” is unique to Luke. Yet this possible correlation between the citizens and the Pharisees would require also a correlation between parable’s “nobleman” and Jesus.

Perhaps the most common interpretation of the parable is that the “nobleman,” the ten “servants,” and the “citizens” represent Jesus, Christian disciples, and Jewish detractors, respectively. According to this view, the parable presents a scenario in which Jesus distributes funds to his servants with which to trade until his return; and upon his second coming, he allocates awards and punishments based upon how they used what they had received and then subsequently orders his opponents who had resisted his rule to suffer damnation.

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14 As Calvin comments upon this detail in the parable of the pounds, “the abused subjects of the ruler [princeps] stirred into revolt during his absence so that they might throw off his yoke” (Harm. ad Luc. 19.12 [CO 45:567]).

15 Cf. Bonaventure, who explains at 19.28 that what was previously said “about the Jerusalemites” is relevant because they “were going to deny that he was their king” (Luc. 19.42 [Opera 7:486]); as well as Bengel’s comment upon the πολίται of the parable, “as the people of Jerusalem were” (Gnomon ad Luc. 19.14).

16 See, e.g., Eusebius, Luc. ad 19.12-27 (PG 24:588d-93c); Augustine, Quaest. ev. 2.46 (CSSL 44B:109-10); Cyril of Alexandria, Luc. ad 19.11-27 (PG 72:868d-76c); Theophylact, Luc. ad 19.11-28 (PG 123:1024c-29b); Euthymius, Luc. ad 19.11-28 (PG 129:1060a-64b);
This understanding of the parable does seem to correspond to certain aspects of the narrative within its immediate context. We know that the Lukan Jesus tells this parable in order to correct the misunderstanding that “immediately the kingdom of God was about to appear” (19.11). Is one point of the parable then that the second coming would not occur until after


17 Luke intercalates the parable with statements about Jesus’ journey to Jerusalem. As the narrator introduces the parable, “he added and spoke a parable because he was near Jerusalem” (19.11). And then immediately after the parable the narrator explains, “and after saying these things he went ahead going up toward Jerusalem” (19.28). The journey the Lukan Jesus makes to receive his kingdom is the one he began when αὐτὸς τὸ πρόσωπον ἐστήρισεν τοῦ πορεύεσθαι εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, “he set his face to go toward Jerusalem” (9.51; cf. 9.53). Scholars have observed the close similarity between this expression and one that occurs in Jeremiah and Ezekiel for the act of delivering prophetic oracles against a nation, city, or person—which oracles anticipate the divine punishments meted out upon them. See, e.g., διότι ἐστήρικα τὸ πρόσωπόν μου ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ταύτην εἰς κακά καὶ οὐκ εἰς ἀγαθά· εἰς χεῖρας βασιλέως Βαβυλῶνος παραδοθήσεται, καὶ κατακαύσει αὐτὴν ἐν πυρί (Jer 21.10); and Διὰ τοῦτο προφήτευσον, υἱὲ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ στήριζον τὸ πρόσωπόν σου ἐπὶ Ιερουσαλήμ (Ezek 21.7). See also Isa 50.7; Jer 3.12 (cf. οἱ θέντες τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτῶν, Jer 49.17); Ezek 6.2; 13.17; 14.8; 15.6-8; 21.2; 25.2; 28.21; 29.2; 38.2. See Craig A. Evans, “‘He Set His Face’: A Note on Luke 9.51,” *Bib* 63 (1982): 545-48; and Evans, “‘He Set His Face’: Luke 9.51 Once Again,” *Bib* 68 (1987): 80-84. In the later article, Evans draws our attention to how the statement portends the judgment and fall of Jerusalem (cf. Charles Homer Giblin, *The Destruction of Jerusalem according to Luke’s Gospel: A Historical-Typological Moral* [AnBib 107; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1985], 31-32). Yet Luke’s use of πορεύεσθαι and εἰς are the most noticeable differences between the phrase in his narrative and the parallels that appear in Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Thus what is στηρίζειν τὸ πρόσωπον ἐπὶ in those prophetic books Luke modifies to στηρίζειν τὸ πρόσωπον εἰς and combines this expression with πορεύεσθαι. While it is certainly possible to render εἰς as “against,” in corresponding fashion to ἐπὶ in the parallels from Jeremiah and Ezekiel, Luke’s use of πορεύεσθαι conveys how Jesus advances εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, simply “toward Jerusalem.” Yet his going “toward Jerusalem” need not rule out the nuance that his entry into that city (19.28-40) will eventually result in a
Jerusalem fell into the hands of the Romans? The Lukan Jesus does explain in the subsequent narrative that first “the times of the Gentiles” must be fulfilled (21.24) and other signs will occur (21.25-26), and “then they will see the Son of man coming on a cloud with power and great glory” (21.27). In this sense, perhaps the kingdom of God would not appear immediately because Jesus would be rejected as king, and the punishment for that rejection would not become fully realized until some forty later when the city was laid waste. In other words, the slaughter of the citizens (19.27), which happens because they reject the nobleman (19.14), is possibly a

judgment “against Jerusalem” as well (19.41-44). In addition to evoking prophetic language in 9.51-53, Luke appears to be drawing upon depictions of rulers who set out on expeditions toward fulfilling their respective purposes. One such depiction is that of Hazael, the king of Syria, who ἔταξεν τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ ἀναβῆναι ἐπὶ Ιερουσαλήμ, “set his face to go up against Jerusalem” (4 Kgdms 12.18). Similarly, in the Theodotion version of Daniel 11.17, it is said about Antiochus III, in reference to his military campaign that placed Judea under Seleucid control, τάξει τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ εἰσελθεῖν ἐν ἰσχύι πάσης τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ, “he will set his face to enter with the strength of his whole kingdom” (cf. 11.18-19). Most important in these examples are the terms denoting travel (ἀναβῆναι, 4 Kgdms 12.18; and εἰσελθεῖν, Theod. Dan 11.17). Such language may illuminate why Luke twice uses πορεύεσθαι in this pericope (9.51, 53). Moreover, when the narrator in 9.53 relates that τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ ἦν πορευόμενον εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, “his face was going toward Jerusalem,” we may hear an echo of 2 Kgdms 17.11, τὸ πρόσωπον σου πορευόμενον ἐν μέσῳ αὐτοῦ, “your face going in their midst” (cf. Bengel, *Gnomon [ad Luc. 9.53]*). Here the face belongs to Absalom, and the statement occurs within the counsel Hushai gives to Absalom about his rebellious attempt to take the throne of his father David and hence the prospect that “all Israel will be gathered [συνάγειν]” to Absalom (2 Kgdms 17.11).

18 Cf. Luke 21.20-21: “But when you see Jerusalem surrounded by armies, then know that its desolation has come near. Then let the ones who are in Judea flee to the mountains, and let the ones who are inside the city depart, and let not the ones who are out in the country enter it.” The consequences of remaining in Judean cities such as Jericho, as well as in Jerusalem, are spelled out in Josephus: “Then most of the population, anticipating their approach, had fled from Jericho to the hill country opposite Jerusalem, but not a small number was left behind and killed” (B.J. 4.451).

harbinger of the destruction of Jerusalem (19.41-44; 21.20-24), which occurs perhaps because Jesus was rejected and executed in that city (13.34; 19.39; 23.1-49). 20

Most scholars agree that the nobleman of the parable ultimately signifies Jesus. And many have also recognized that the nobleman is cast in terms that evoke the reign of Archelaus. 21

That the nobleman goes “to receive for himself a kingdom [λαμβάνειν ἑαυτῷ βασιλείαν] and return” (19.12; cf. λαμβάνειν τὴν βασιλείαν, 19.15) is a depiction that bears strikingly similarities to how Josephus describes the Herodian vassals as having traveled to Rome in order

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20 While the slaughter of the citizens in 19.27 may not refer directly to the siege of Jerusalem, it appears to foreshadow Jesus’ lament over the destruction (19.41-44). Some earlier interpreters recognize that the slaughter points to the destruction of Jerusalem, yet they unfortunately maintain a staunch anti-Jewish perspective in this interpretation. Theophylact, e.g., claims, “He means the Jews whom he will hand over to destruction, consigning them to the outer fire. Even though these wretched persons were slaughtered by the Roman armies here—I mean in this world—they are being kept and guarded for slaughter also in the world to come” (Luc. ad 19.15-28 [PG 123:1029b]). Similarly, Euthymius states, “This slaughter indicates either the punishment of the Jews in the age to come or their utter destruction during the time of Vespasian and Titus” (Luc. ad 19.27 [PG 129:1064b]).

21 What seem to be allusions to a Herodian vassal, and Archelaus in particular, some scholars regard as “secondary” or even “embarrassing.” Sanders refers to a “secondary element” that “does not help us to understand the parable” (“Parable of the Pounds,” 666). In explaining the presence of this element, one view is that the parable in its Lukan form is a conflation of two parables, or that material from a second parable was added to a main one, as Nolland claims: “the allusions to Archelaus that are characteristic of these additions and that give a quite negative tone to the royal figure seem more likely to point to the boldness of Jesus than to Luke or the church tradition before him” (Luke 18:35-24:53, 910-11). See also Denaux, “Parable of the King-Judge,” 39-40, 51. More recently, Schultz seeks to make sense of what he regards as an “embarrassing motif” on geographical and historical grounds, arguing: “It is only by associating the Archelaus motif of the Parable of the Pounds to the historical Jesus, precisely in the context suggested by the Gospel of Luke, that we are able to read the parable without contradicting what we know of the historical Jesus himself, or of the early church’s conception of who he was” (“Jesus as Archelaus,” 119). Still another view is that the references to the tyrannical nobleman create a parody of Jesus’ more commendable kingship. See, e.g., Richard B. Vinson, “The Minas Touch: Anti-Kingship Rhetoric in the Gospel of Luke,” PRSt 35 (2008): 69-86; and Green, who claims that the “king serves as an analogy for Jesus primarily in a parodic or ironic way” (Luke, 676).
to acquire from Caesar the authority to rule their respective provinces.\(^{22}\) Herod the Great had acquired authority from Augustus and Antony (\textit{B.J.} 1.282-85; τὴν βασιλείαν παραλαμβάνειν, \textit{Ant.} 14.370-89, here 389).\(^{23}\) And after Herod’s death, multiple potential heirs to the throne had all vied for power by appearing before Augustus—including Archelaus (λαμβάνειν τὴν ἀρχήν παρὰ Καίσαρος, \textit{B.J.} 2.14-19, 26-38, here 2.32; κτῆσις τῆς βασιλείας, \textit{Ant.} 17.219-23; 228-50, here 17.220), Antipas (\textit{B.J.} 2.20; \textit{Ant.} 17.224-27), Philip (\textit{B.J.} 2.83; \textit{Ant.} 17.303), and “the false Alexander” (\textit{B.J.} 2.101-10; \textit{Ant.} 17.324-38).\(^{24}\)

That a body of dissenters would dispatch a πρεσβεία, “embassy,” to contest the unfavorable βασιλεία of a vassal (19.14) parallels the accounts in Josephus where a delegation of fifty ambassadors—whom he calls πρέσβεις and πρεσβευταί and, as a group, πρεσβεία—went to Augustus in order to protest the reign of Archelaus (\textit{B.J.} 2.80-91; \textit{Ant.} 17.299-314).\(^{25}\) It is granted that the sending of such a πρεσβεία is not unique to the circumstances involving Archelaus. For, as Josephus also relates, when his father Herod had defeated Antigonus and was


\(^{23}\) According to Josephus, only Caesar “had the authority [ἐξουσία] to give or to withhold” complete sovereignty (\textit{Ant.} 17.239, 313, here 313). Cf. Luke 10.19.

\(^{24}\) At Herod’s death, Caesar had become the ruler of his estate, “according to the terms of the will” (\textit{B.J.} 2.3); and it was thus within Caesar’s power to appoint an heir. Josephus relates the outcome of their fight for the throne in \textit{B.J.} 2.93-100; and \textit{Ant.} 17.317-20.

\(^{25}\) See also \textit{B.J.} 2.111, where both Jews and Samaritans send ambassadors (πρεσβεύειν) to Caesar, which results in the banishment of Archelaus to Vienna and the confiscation of his property to the imperial treasury.

355
crowned upon his entry into Jerusalem (cf. Luke 19.28-40), “embassies [πρεσβεῖαι] from all parts,” including the Jewish leadership, met Antony in opposition to Herod’s vestment of power (Ant. 14.297-303). Yet there are additional details within the parable that may point specifically to Archelaus.

For instance, the detail that the citizens hated (μισεῖν, 19.14) the nobleman has some correspondence to the theme of hatred (μισος) toward Archelaus that Josephus includes within his narratives (B.J. 2.22, 82; Ant. 17.227, 302). Josephus also makes clear that this hatred was mutual between Archelaus and his adversaries; he hated them because “they were opposed to his rule and were speaking against him” (Ant. 17.313). Of course the animosity between him and his subjects had been expressed earlier (even before Caesar had officially granted him rule) when he brought about “the slaughter of three thousand of his countrymen in the temple precinct” (B.J. 2.30-32, 89; Ant. 17.313, as here quoted). The reason for this slaughter, according to Josephus, is that Archelaus felt threatened by a growing rebellious uprising, which would detain him when he was already in a hurry to depart for Rome; yet he ordered their execution only after previous attempts to suppress their opposition without bloodshed (B.J. 2.1, 8-13; Ant. 17.208-218).

One key difference between the account about Archelaus in Josephus and the parable about the nobleman in Luke is when the massacre occurs. In Josephus, the slaughter (σφαγή, Ant. 17.237, 313, 316) takes place before Archelaus leaves for Rome, whereas in Luke the nobleman calls for the slaughter (κατασφάζειν, 19.27) of his enemies after he returns from the far

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26 Cf. Josephus, B.J. 2.76; and the comments by Fitzmyer, Luke X-XXIV, 1235; Johnson, Luke, 290; Nolland, Luke 18:35-24:53, 914. See also Ant. 17.342-44, where Josephus relates how, during the reign of Archelaus, the leaders among the Jews and Samaritans brought charges to Caesar against the “cruelty and tyranny” of Archelaus.
country. It is possible that Luke changed the order of the events in order to make the basic structure of the parable correspond to what he shows in the subsequent narrative. That is, just as the nobleman goes to receive his kingdom (19.12), faces opposition from rebels (19.14), and then later slaughters those rebels (19.27), so Jesus enters Jerusalem to receive his kingdom (19.28-38), is opposed by the Pharisees (19.39), and the result is the onslaught and destruction of Jerusalem in 66-70 CE (19.43-44). Where the nobleman in 19.27 refers to οἱ ἐχθροί μου, “my enemies” (i.e., the rebellious “citizens”), whom he orders to be slaughtered, Jesus in 19.43 refers to οἱ ἐχθροί σου, “your enemies” (i.e., the Roman forces), who annihilate the city and its inhabitants.

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27 When the nobleman goes “to a far country” (19.12), readers know that the Lukan Jesus’ journey to Jerusalem leads ultimately to his departure to heaven (9.31; 24.51; Acts 1.9), where he has his place at the right hand of God (Acts 7.56). Among those who interpret the “far country” as heaven are: Origen, _Luc. Frag._ 227 (GCS 49:325); Eusebius, _Luc. ad_ 19.12 (PG 24:589c); Cyril of Alexandria, _Luc. ad_ 19.11 (PG 72:869c); Theophylact, _Luc. ad_ 19.11-14 (PG 123:1024d); Euthymius, _Luc. ad_ 19.12 (PG 129:1060b); Bonaventure, _Luc._ 19.18 (Opera 7:478); Erasmus, _Para. Luc._ 19.26 (LB 7:432b); Calvin, _Harm. ad Luc._ 19.12 (CO 45:567-68); and Bovon, _Luke_ 2, 612. Jülicher famously claims that the “far country” is not Italy, but heaven ( _Gleichnisdreden Jesu_ , 2:486). Yet in the sense that εἰς χώραν μακρὰν does signify travel to Rome, we may compare Luke’s use of this expression in the parable of the lost son (15.11-32), where the younger son journeyed εἰς χώραν μακρὰν after receiving his share of the property (15.13). Correspondingly, just as the nobleman “returns” or “comes” (ὑποστρέφειν, 19.12; ἐπανέρχεσθαι, 19.15; ἔρχεσθαι, 19.23) after going εἰς χώραν μακρὰν, so the younger son “goes” or “comes” (πορεύεσθαι, 15.18; ἔρχεσθαι, 15.20, 30; ἥκειν, 15.27) to his father after his journey.

28 Euthymius, e.g., identifies οἱ ἐχθροί as οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι (_Luc. ad_ 19.43 [PG 129:1065b]). Others also observe that the Lukan Jesus predicts the siege of Jerusalem in 19.41-44, including: Origen, _Hom. Luc._ 38 (GCS 49:213-14); Eusebius, _Hist. eccl._ 3.7; Cyril of Alexandria, _Luc. ad_ 19.44 (PG 72:880d); Bede, _Luc. ad_ 19.41-44 (CCSL 120:346-47); Erasmus, _Para. Luc._ 19.43-44 (LB 7:435f-36c); Luther, _Evangelien-Auslegung_, 3:341-42, 348-50; and Bengel, _Gnomon (ad Luc._ 19.41, 43). Alternatively, some scholars claim that one can document all of the vocabulary and possible points of reference within 19.41-44 to various passages in the LXX and thus that the statements need not refer to the siege against Jerusalem in particular (e.g., C. H. Dodd, “The Fall of Jerusalem and the ‘Abomination of Desolation,’” _JRS_ 37 [1947]: 47-54; and Johnson, _Luke_, 299). Yet it is possible that Luke chooses to invoke more contemporary events through the more antiquated language and traditions from the LXX (see, e.g., Fitzmyer, _Luke X-XXIV_, 1343-44).
There is, nevertheless, one seeming contradiction in the notion that the Roman forces destroy Jerusalem as punishment for its rejection of Jesus, a non-Roman ruler. In conveying this idea, however, Luke may be drawing upon the *topos* that the God of Israel uses non-Israelite powers to punish the people for its sins. We see this commonplace, for example, in Lam 1.5 where it is through “its enemies” (οἱ ἐχθροὶ αὐτῆς) that the Lord humbled Jerusalem, “because of the multitude of its impieties.”29 And as the Jeremiah of 4 Baruch prays, “Behold, Lord, now we know that you are delivering your city into the hands of its enemies [οἱ ἐχθροὶ αὐτῆς]” (3.6)—a fate Jerusalem suffers in that narrative as well, “because of the multitude of the sins of those who lived within it” (1.1, 7).30

When Jesus refers to “the time of your visitation” (ὁ καιρὸς τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς σου, 19.44; cf. 1.68), we may see another indication that Luke applies this *topos*. This statement appears to mean that the Lord will “visit” Jerusalem through the military forces of the city’s enemies, as we observe also in Jeremiah (καιρὸς ἐπισκοπῆς, 6.15; cf. 6.19, 23; 10.15) and Lamentations

29 See also Lam 1.2, 18; 2.1-9, 17, 21; Jer 15.4; 39.3-4, 24, 28-36; 41.2-3, 21; 44.17; 45.3, 18; 50.3, which refer to the Babylonian forces that destroyed the first temple. So also Lamentations Rabbah takes what was said about the destruction of the first temple and applies it to the destruction of the second. For Lamentations Rabbah, see the edition by Salomon Buber, *Midrasch Echa Rabbati* (Wilna, 1899; repr., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967); and the translation by A. Cohen, *Midrash Rabbah: Lamentations* (London and New York: The Soncino Press, 1983). See also R. Travers Herford, *The Effect of the Fall of Jerusalem upon the Character of the Pharisees: A Paper read before the Members of the Society for Hebraic Studies* (The Society for Hebraic Studies 2; London, 1917), 16-17; and Shaye J. D. Cohen, “The Destruction: From Scripture to Midrash,” *Prooftexts* 2 (1982): 18-39. Cf. Josephus: “Now it was clearly God who granted to the Romans the sufferings of the Galileans. And then he also shut out the people from the city, every single one of them by their own hands, and delivered them up to their murderous enemies for destruction” (*B.J.* 3.293); and, “Clearly God, God himself is bringing his cleansing fire with the Romans and is taking by storm the city that is filled with such pollutions” (*B.J.* 6.110).

30 See also Jer 20.4-5; 21.10 (cf. Luke 9.51-54); 4 Baruch 1.5, 10; 2.2, 7; 4.6; and 4 Ezra 3.25-27; 4.23; 5.28; 6.58.
In this sense, even though Gentile enemies lay siege to the city (cf. Luke 20.21-24), it is the inhabitants of the city who have themselves become responsible for its destruction.  

Yet we may ask why Luke would allude specifically to Archelaus while also pointing to the siege of Jerusalem, which took place decades after that ethnarch was deposed. As Josephus tells it, the end of Archelaus’ tyrannical reign in 6 CE marks the end of Judea’s autonomy and the beginning of direct Roman rule over the province. At this time, the region Archelaus ruled was annexed to Syria and officially became a Roman province (B.J. 2.117, 167); and Caesar had sent Quirinius to govern Syria and to make an assessment of the property in both Syria and Judea, which meant that its citizens would become subject to Roman taxation (B.J. 2.118; Ant. 18.1-2). Along with Quirinius, Caesar sent Coponius, the first Roman prefect of Judea, “in order to rule over the Jews with authority [ἐξουσία] in all matters” (B.J. 2.117; Ant. 18.2, here quoted). Yet it was Quirinius in particular who was charged with the duty of compiling the census-lists (ἀπογραφαῖ, Ant. 18.2-3). Luke of course also identifies this census (ἀπογραφή, Luke 2.2; cf. Acts 5.37) carried out by Quirinius as a pivotal moment, when he claims that the birth of Jesus occurred on the very trip his parents took to become enrolled as tax-paying subjects (ἀπογράφειν, Luke 2.2, 3-7).  

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31 See also Wis 3.7: καὶ ἐν καιρῷ ἐπισκόπης αὐτῶν ἀναλάμψουσιν καὶ ὡς σπινθῆρες ἐν καλάμῃ διαδραμοῦνται.
32 Cf. the lamentation (ὁλοφυρμός) Josephus utters over Jerusalem (B.J. 5.19-20), in which he claims that it was God who destroyed the city (5.19).
33 As S. G. F. Brandon states, “In that year Judaea and Samaria were placed under direct Roman rule. The emperor Augustus finally made this decision after Archelaus, whom he had appointed ethnarch of these territories in 4 B.C., had convinced him of his inability to rule efficiently” (Jesus and the Zealots: A Study of the Political Factor in Primitive Christianity [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967], 29).
The rhetorical aims of Luke and Josephus, however, appear to differ significantly in their depictions of this politically transitional time in Judea. For Josephus, the rebellious activity characteristic of this earlier period in Judea called for Rome’s intervention, just as he justifies the later Roman military action taken against the insurgents within Jerusalem in 66-70 CE. Yet for Luke, at the moment when Rome assumes complete domination over Judea, a new king, who will redeem Jerusalem (2.38; cf. 2.25), is demanded; and those who would oppose this king are the real insurgents.

Luke may also cast the nobleman as Archelaus because of the significant revolutionary activity that his reign sparked. Josephus opens his second book of the Bellum judaicum by explaining how Archelaus’ journey to Rome gave rise to “new disturbances” (B.J. 2.1). This emerging revolutionary activity that coincided with the beginning of his reign becomes fully developed at the end of his ethnarchy—when Judas the Galilean, rebelling against the demand to pay taxes to Rome, founded a new sect (B.J. 2.117-18). This sect Josephus explains in more detail in his Antiquitates judaicae and there designates it as “a fourth of the philosophies” of Judaism (Ant. 18.23-25), distinguishing it from the three ancient and hence legitimate sects of the Essenes, the Sadducees, and the Pharisees (Ant. 18.11-22; cf. B.J. 2.119-66; Vita 10).

One ongoing historical debate among scholars is whether the founding of the so-called fourth philosophy marks the beginning of an organized Zealot movement in Judea, which then came to full blossom in the revolt against Rome in 66-70 CE.35 Although the historical reality of

35 William Reuben Farmer claims, “Josephus explicitly tells that the Jewish revolt against Rome began de novo after the banishment of Archelaus and during the procuratorship of Coponius (A.D. c.6-9),” but, he states, “Josephus may have obscured the obvious continuity
this question remains unconfirmed, it is nevertheless evident that Josephus wishes to connect the
two. The members of this sect, he explains, laid the foundation (φύειν, Ant. 18.6, 8; φυτεύειν, 18.9) for factions and slaughters that led to “the conquest and destruction of cities, until finally
this faction offered up the very temple of God to the fire of the enemies” (Ant. 18.8). According
to the account in his Bellum judaicum, those persons Josephus holds responsible for the burning
of the temple are none other than the Zealots (B.J. 4.387-88). Through the parable about the
nobleman and the citizens, Luke may also place the beginnings of this revolutionary movement
in Judea during the reign of Archelaus.

between the Jewish nationalism of the second century B.C. and that of the first century A.D.”
(Maccabees, Zealots, and Josephus: An Inquiry into Jewish Nationalism in the Greco-Roman
Period [New York: Columbia University Press, 1956], 11). Farmer ultimately maintains “that
there was a positive connection between the Jewish nationalism” of the earlier and later periods
(ibid., 47). Martin Hengel argues at length that “the activity of the movement initiated by Judas
lasted until the Jewish War” (The Zealots: Investigations into the Jewish Freedom Movement in
the Period from Herod I until 70 A.D. [trans. David Smith; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989], 79).
He further explains that “in the so-called ‘fourth philosophy,’ Judas the Galilean founded a real
party not only with quite definite opinions…but also with a firm organization and a single
leadership. That party also determined the fate of the Jewish people throughout the two
following generations and formed the permanent focal point of the growing Jewish freedom
movement” (ibid., 86). According to Shimon Applebaum, “The formal organized emergence of
the Zealot movement took place in A.D. 6, but it had antecedents” (“The Zealots: The Case for
Revaluation,” JRS 61 [1971]: 155-70, here 159). Similarly, Brandon claims that “the census,
ordered by Augustus in A.D. 6, was the immediate cause of the founding of the Zealot
movement” (Jesus and the Zealots, 47). Morton Smith disagrees with the position that the
Zealots had their origin with Judas the Galilean and holds rather that the Zealots, “as a party, did
not come into existence until the winter of 67-68” (“Zealots and Sicarii, Their Origins and
Relation,” HTR 64 [1971]: 1-19, here 19). David M. Rhoads raises a number of doubts about
whether we can connect Judas’ fourth philosophy with the later Zealots and concludes that the
Zealots “may have shared a heritage of determined resistance reaching back to the time of Judas’
revolt” (Israel in Revolution, 6-74 C.E.: A Political History Based on the Writings of Josephus
[Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976], 47-60, here 60). Richard A. Horsley, with John S. Hanson,
states, “The Zealots proper were a totally separate phenomenon, historically, from the Fourth
Philosophy mentioned by Josephus as active over sixty years earlier” (Bandits, Prophets, and
See also Richard A. Horsley, “The Zealots: Their Origin, Relationships and Importance in the
A further clue from Luke-Acts that the revolutionary movement began during this period appears within the speech Luke attributes to Gamaliel in Acts 5.36-37. There Gamaliel refers to Judas the Galilean as having led a rebellion “in the days of the census” (5.37), which is unquestionably the same movement Josephus claims to have emerged when Quirinius began the census in Judea (B.J. 2.117-18; Ant. 18.1-10). Luke, however, differs from Josephus on when the rebel named Theudas was active. If Luke and Josephus are referring to the same person, one author is surely wrong on the dating. Josephus places Theudas during the procuratorship of Cuspius Fadus (Ant. 20.97-99), circa 44-46 CE; and to the contrary, the Lukan Gamaliel claims that Judas the Galilean became active after Theudas, which would place Theudas’ rebellion before 6 CE.36 Our question here, however, is not whether Luke or Josephus is accurate on the historical dating of Theudas’ activity. The point is rather that Luke places the rebellion of Theudas prior to the deposition of Archelaus in 6 CE and thus likely during the reign of that ethnarch.37

It is questionable, however, whether Luke would date the origins of this revolutionary movement before the dethronement of Archelaus, since Josephus seems to suggest that the revolutionaries became active immediately after Archelaus was deposed. Yet perhaps the more important question is whether Josephus himself also shows the existence of revolutionary activity in the period leading up to and during the ethnarchy of Archelaus, and if so, whether he

36 Yet another problem that arises from Gamaliel’s speech is the supposition that the movements of Theudas and Judas the Galilean petered out after their deaths (Acts 5.36-37). As Brandon observes, despite the defeat of Judas, as mentioned by Gamaliel, “the movement evidently did not break up and disappear. Josephus, as we have seen, traced the Zealots or Sicarii of the period 66-73 back to Judas” (Jesus and the Zealots, 52).

37 It is possible that Luke has confused Theudas with one of the other aspiring kings during the period of 4 BCE-6 CE. Josephus identifies three from this time: Simon (Ant. 17.273-77); Athronges (17.278-84); and the false Alexander (17.324-38). See further discussion in Keener, Acts, 2:1230-33.
draws a connection between that activity and the founding of the fourth philosophy. It is
certainly clear that rebellious uprisings were rife in this earlier period, as Josephus states: “Now
Judea was full of banditries [λῃστήρια]. And as chance would have it, one might win the
support of the seditious and set forth himself as king and press on toward the destruction of the
community. Distress would fall upon few of the Romans and then only mildly, but the murder of
their own people they brought on to the greatest extent” (Ant. 17.285).

Furthermore, Josephus shows at least some linkage between, on the one hand, those who
protested against Archelaus and, on the other, Judas the Galilean and his associates who laid the
foundation for revolution, including the Zealot movement. According to his narrative, the sailing
of Archelaus to Rome and the census of Quirinius each sparked a “revolution” (ἀπόστασις, Ant.
17.250; 18.4) and was the occasion of “faction” (στάσις, 17.212, 214-16; 18.8) and “tumults”
(θόρυβοι, 17.269; 18.9) more broadly among and within the people of Judea. In the earlier
period, the rebels incite Archelaus to apply force that leads to the “slaughter” (σφαγή, 17.218,
237, 239) of three thousand Jews in the temple, which is not unlike the “slaughters” (σφαγαί,
18.8) Judas, Saddok, and their followers also paved the way toward. In each of the two periods
Josephus identifies the motives of the revolutionaries as their “hopes for personal gains” (οἰκείων

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38 Does the term λῃσταί in Luke 19.45 allude to some form of insurgency? The phrase σπῆλαίον λῃστῶν appears in Jeremiah 7.11; and Mark and Matthew also use it in their accounts about the cleaning of the temple (Mark 11.17; Matt 21.13). In Jeremiah, that the first temple had become a σπῆλαίον λῃστῶν was one of the conditions under which it was destroyed. And according to the account Josephus gives, we can say the same about the burning of the second temple—immediately prior to which the Zealots, whom he also calls λῃσταί, had taken over the temple and were using it as their citadel (B.J. 4.135-207; 5.5-7; cf. Ant. 20.123-24). On the use of the term λῃσταί for the Zealots, see, e.g., Hengel, Zealots, 24-46; Brandon, Jesus and the Zealots, 35, 46-47; and Applebaum, “The Zealots,” 163. Cf. also the collusion between the λῃσταί and the Sicarii (e.g., Josephus, B.J. 2.425-26). According to Josephus, the temple had been taken over by Eleazar, one who, as Brandon observes, “evidently had Zealot sentiments and support, and in the struggle that followed his party, consisting of the lower order of the priesthood, was quickly reinforced by the Sicarii” (Jesus and the Zealots, 58).
ἐλπίδες κερδῶν, 17.269; οἰκείων κερδῶν ἐλπίδες, 18.7). And if we can equate Judas, the son of Ezekias (17.271-72), with Judas the Galilean (18.4-10, 23), then we see a further connection between the rebellious movements before and after the deposition of Archelaus.

There is also some philosophical continuity among the revolutionaries from the two periods. Those who rebelled against the rule of Archelaus, Josephus explains, “were altogether submissive to their own will rather than to the authority of their rulers” (17.210). So also, the key difference between the fourth philosophy and the Pharisees, according to Josephus, is that the former sect refuses to recognize any human as their master (18.23). They have, he explains, “a passion for freedom [ἐλεύθερος] that is hard to conquer” (18.23). Similarly, the rebels who protested the reign of Archelaus “desired their freedom [ἐλευθερία] above all” (17.227).

Yet there is one important difference between these protests against Archelaus and the rebellion of the fourth philosophy. Those who spoke against Archelaus wanted “freedom” from under him in particular and were willing instead to be placed under a Roman governor (17.227); and, as we observed, the members of the fourth philosophy wanted no human governors at all. This point of dissimilarity may indicate that those who preferred a Roman governor represent an altogether different group from that of Judas and his followers. Yet this one difference may not be enough to defy the otherwise general and rhetorical continuity between the two groups and may instead indicate that the populace who resisted the reign of Archelaus was at first open to Roman rule but then changed their minds once the Romans made plans to assess their property for taxation. Their change of position, to have no human rulers, could then be explained as a founding principle upon which the sect was established, when Judas and Saddok organized in protest against the census. Whatever the case may be, there is sufficient evidence both within the
Lukan narrative and in Josephus to explain why Luke would identify and then insinuate the reign of Archelaus as a period of significant revolutionary activity.

If Luke and Josephus hold conflicting political perspectives, then we may have a further explanation as to why Luke would emphasize rebellious activity at the beginning of Archelaus’ reign. Where Josephus places the blame upon Judas the Galilean as a founder of a revolutionary sect, brought on in part by the reign of Archelaus, Luke seems to place more emphasis upon the ruler whose actions called for a new form of rule. Yet it is not the rule of a Roman procurator (i.e., Coponius or his associate in Syria, Quirinius) that Luke endorses. He may rather insinuate—through Jesus’ journey toward Jerusalem and his kingly entry into that city—that Jesus would undo the fact that Archelaus had brought Roman supremacy over Judea. But like Archelaus, Jesus is met with some resistance when he goes to receive his kingdom. In this sense, the parable of the pounds likely refers to Jesus receiving his kingdom in tandem with an account about Archelaus going to Rome in order to receive his. From Luke’s perspective, the difference between the two journeys may be that the “citizens” during the period of Archelaus had a legitimate reason to protest the reign of a tyrant; but the Pharisees who speak out against the acclamations of Jesus’ kingship unfortunately brought destruction upon Jerusalem.39

39 On the causes for the destruction of Jerusalem, we may also compare Josephus and later rabbinic accounts. Josephus claims that the flames consuming the temple, “had their origin and cause from its own worshipers” (B.J. 6.251) and not from Titus, who actually attempted to quench the fires (6.254-59; cf. 1.10). According to the account in ‘Abot R. Nat. A, the temple was burned (quoting and expounding upon Zech 11.1) because its high priests had not been “trustworthy custodians.” Yet part of the blame is also that the city had resisted surrender to Rome. Where Vespasian says to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, “Fools, why do you seek to destroy this city, and why do you seek to burn the temple?” (Abot R. Nat. A 4), Yohanan correspondingly asks, “My children, why do you destroy this city, and why do you seek to burn the temple?” (Abot R. Nat. A 4). Similarly, in Abot R. Nat. B 6, Yohanan says to the men of Jerusalem who refuse to surrender, “You will be the cause of this city being destroyed and this temple being burned.” The account in b. Git. 56s names the culprits: “Jerusalem was destroyed because of Qamza and Bar Qamza.” It remains obscure, however, exactly why the exchange
3. Conclusions

Luke does not openly state any specific reason why “some of the Pharisees” tell Jesus to rebuke his disciples (19.39). Yet the addition of the title ὁ βασιλεύς to the quotation from Ps 117.26 suggests that these Pharisees may object to the view that he is “the king” (19.38). We have observed a further clue from the previous episode where some unidentified persons rebuke the blind man in their attempts to silence his cries that Jesus is “son of David” (18.38-39). The protested application of these two titles has then lead us to ask whether the “citizens” who object to the reign of the nobleman (19.14, 27) may correspond to the Pharisees of 19.39.

The parable about the nobleman appears to serve as an example in which an entire story has been figured (cf. Ars Rhet. 8.1), and that through analogy in particular (Rhet. Her. 4.67). In one sense, the nobleman may represent Archelaus, whose disputed reign eventually resulted in direct Roman rule over Judea. In another sense, the nobleman is analogous to Jesus, whose entry into Jerusalem will also lead to controversy both during (Luke 23.1-25) and after his lifetime. We might conclude that the Pharisees of 19.39 are aiming to protect the disciples from the consequences of seditious speech (an interpretation we could then pair with the supposed “friendly” warning to Jesus in 13.31). Yet Jesus clearly holds a different perspective, as we see when he replies, “if they become silent, the stones will cry out” (19.40). If the stones eventually...

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between these two individuals brought on the destruction. The best clue appears in the biblical passage Yohanan ben Zakkai quotes: “Happy is the man who is cautious always, but he who hardens his heart falls into misfortune.” The lesson related in the story, which is prompted by this biblical passage, is that Yohanan, as the ever “cautious,” remains in a state of happiness, while the stubbornness of Qamza and Bar Qamza, whose hearts were hardened, fell into misfortune. See the analysis by Jeffrey L. Rubenstein, Talmudic Stories: Narrative Art, Composition, and Culture (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 139-75. On the reasons for the destruction according to the account in Lam. Rab., see Cohen, “The Destruction,” 26.
did cry out during the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE (19.44; 21.6), we could then assume that for some reason the disciples had become silent.
Chapter Sixteen: Zacchaeus and the Pharisees

In the previous chapter, we analyzed the correspondence between, on the one hand, those who rebuke the blind man in the attempt to silence his cries (18.38-39) and, on the other, “some of the Pharisees” who tell Jesus to rebuke his disciples for acclaiming his kingly entrance into Jerusalem (19.39-40). There we asked also whether the “citizens” from the parable of the pounds (19.11-27) typify these characters who seem to protest the kingship of Jesus. These points of cohesion within this context might lead us to evaluate whether the intervening pericope about Zacchaeus (19.1-10) also has some bearing upon our investigation. Furthermore, some interpreters have observed that the Pharisees are conspicuously absent in this episode. For in two earlier instances of the narrative, those who “grumble” about Jesus dining with tax collectors and sinners Luke identifies as scribes and Pharisees (γογγύζειν, 5.30; διαγογγύζειν, 15.1-2; cf. 7.34, 39); and by contrast, now he remarks that “all were grumbling [διαγογγύζειν]” (19.7).¹ Despite

¹ Maldonado notes the similarity between those who grumble about Jesus staying with Zacchaeus and the earlier accusations from the Pharisees (Luc. ad 19.7 [Martin 2:324]). So also, as Johnson comments on 19.7, “The reaction is so typical of the scribes and Pharisees within Luke’s narrative (5:30; 7:34, 39; 15:2) that the reader is surprised not to find them identified” (Luke, 285). Furthermore, some have questioned the relationship between 19.1-10 and 19.11-27. Marshall, e.g., comments on parable and claims that there is “no real link with the preceding story of Zacchaeus” (Luke, 702). Conversely, Bovon states, “The parabolic narrative is linked to the preceding episode concerning Zacchaeus (19:10) in several ways” (Luke 2, 605). Others have observed also that the initial phrase in 19.11 (Ἀκουόντων δὲ αὐτῶν ταῦτα προσθεὶς) seems to provide a transition from the episode with Zacchaeus to the telling of the parable. This transitional phrase thus may indicate that the grumblers in 19.7 are also among those who hear the parable in 19.11-27. In addition to Jesus’ disciples (19.29, 37, 39), is there a Pharisaic presence from as early as 19.7 until as late as 19.39-40? See, e.g., Plummer, Luke, 438; Nolland, Luke 18:35-24:53, 911-12; Green, Luke, 677; and Denaux, “Parable of the King-Judge,” 49. Johnson interprets a Pharisaic presence even earlier in his comment upon 19.39, wherein he states: “Although no Pharisee has been explicitly mentioned since 18:10-11, we are to assume their continued presence, which has been suggested in places such as 18:18-21, 39; 19:7” (Luke, 297).
this absence of the Pharisees in 19.1-10, are there clues that Luke might allude to them in any way?

1. The Sycamore Tree

Luke calls the unnamed characters who rebuke the blind man οἱ προάγοντες, “the ones going before” (18.39). This detail may correspond to the fact that Zacchaeus runs ahead (προτρέχειν, 19.4) of the crowd in the next scene. That the synoptic parallels identify these characters as πολλοί (Mark 10.48) and ὁ ὄχλος (Matt 20.31) suggests that Luke wishes to insinuate this similarity between οἱ προάγοντες and Zacchaeus. What Zacchaeus is aiming to do by running ahead and climbing the tree, however, is not immediately evident. Is Zacchaeus attempting to spy on Jesus, as some Lukan Pharisees appear to do? Does he intend to identify Jesus (i.e., “who he was,” 19.3) in order to inform the higher authorities who this alleged “son of David” is?

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2 19.4: καὶ προδραμὼν εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν ἀνέβη ἐπὶ συκομορέαν ἵνα ἴδῃ αὐτόν ὅτι ἐκείνης ἥμελλεν διέρχεσθαι. Is συκομορέα the antecedent of ἐκείνη? Some scholars rather supply ὁδός (e.g., Plummer, Luke, 434; Fitzmyer, Luke X-XXIV, 1224; and Bovon, Luke 2, 597, note 51). Yet ἐκείνης might be a genitive of place (Smyth §1448), as the parallelism between ἐπὶ συκομορέαν (19.4) and ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον (19.5) suggests. The difference between διέρχεσθαι ἐκείνης (genitive of place) in 19.4 and διέρχεσθαι τὴν Ἰεριχώ (accusative of space, Smyth §1581) in 19.1 may be to pass by the sycamore tree versus to pass through the city.

3 Timothy A. Brookins provides some insights about οἱ προάγοντες: “In v. 39 Luke adds οἱ προάγοντες (‘those going in front’) as the subject of ἐπετίμων, whereas no subject is specified in Mark (10.48). It is interesting that this rare word is used in Mark 10.32, where Jesus ‘led the way’ (ἦν προάγων), just prior to the parallel healing account (10.46-52). In Luke, however, it is those within the crowd who are said to be ‘in front’. Although on one level this reversal of roles is meant in a spatial sense, it also audibly echoes Jesus’ discussion of who wants to be first in importance. Jesus had warned against this in 13.30: ‘Behold, some are last who will be first, and some are first who will be last’; it is no coincidence that ‘at that very hour’ the Pharisees (i.e., those who are ‘first’ among the people; cf. 19.47) make a threat on his life (13.31). Similarly, in 19.47 it is the ‘first’ among the people—the οἱ πρῶτοι τοῦ λαοῦ—and not the λαός themselves who seek to ‘destroy’ Jesus. Consistently, it is against the religious leaders that Luke inveighs his greatest criticism (cf. 7.45; 19.47; 22.71); and it is on them that he most squarely places the blame for Jesus’ death. All of this points compellingly to a negative judgment on this group here” (“Luke’s Use of Mark as παράφρασις: Its Effects on Characterization in the ‘Healing of Blind Bartimaeus’ Pericope (Mark 10.46-52/Luke 18.35-43),” JSNT 34 [2011]: 70-89, here 82-83).
Should we liken him to hunters who “lie in wait” for Jesus in order “to catch” some piece of evidence (11.54) that will serve as grounds for his arrest (6.7; 14.1; 20.20)? Luke may provide readers with enough information to raise these questions, but clearly not with enough explicit statement that would qualify his narrative as subversive.

Luke may, nonetheless, provide a glimpse of his aim in the detail that Zacchaeus climbs a sycamore tree (συκομορέα, 19.4), coupled with Zacchaeus’ statement that if he has extorted (συκοφαντεῖν, 19.8) anyone, he will restore it fourfold. The identical four-letter sequence in the terms συκομορέα and συκοφαντεῖν appears to signal an instance of the figure known as παρονομασία, “a play upon words that sound alike.” Is Luke insinuating that Zacchaeus, as a ruling tax collector, was a συκοφάντης, “extortioner,” when he climbed the συκομορέα? Earlier

4 Other interpreters have pondered similar questions. Ringe, e.g., claims, “A sycamore tree should provide good cover and let him get away with his covert surveillance without jeopardizing his dignity” (Luke, 232). Similarly, Bovon asks, “Had he taken into consideration the fact that it is not always easy to look through a tree’s foliage? Was he also afraid of being seen—did he wish to see without being seen?” (Luke 2, 597). Cf. Diodorus Siculus 3.25-26, where hunters attack their prey from trees; Lucian’s reference to one “making his view from a high tree in safety [ἀσφαλής]” (Hist. 29); and Pausanias’ description of images in Corinth, about which he explains, “Pentheus was insulting toward Dionysus and furthermore was so daring, they say, that he eventually went to the Cithaeron to spy upon the women, and that he climbed up a tree to see what was being done [ἀναβάντα δὲ ἐς δένδρον θεάσασθαι τὰ ποιούμενα]. But when the women detected him, they immediately dragged Pentheus down and, though still alive, tore his body to pieces” (2.2.7).

5 On why Zacchaeus makes fourfold restitution for his extortion, G. H. R. Horsley notes that “poena quadrupli was a penalty laid down for extortion” (New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity: A Review of the Greek Inscriptions and Papyri published in 1977 [vol. 2; North Ryde, N. S. W.: Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, Macquarie University, 1982], 70-73, here 72). In light of the parallels from documentary texts, he also explains that Zacchaeus is “offering to provide restitution in the same proportion as he would have been liable to under Roman law if he had been brought to court” (ibid., 72-73).

6 This figure can take a variety of forms, as we see especially in Rhet. Her. 4.29. See also Cicero, De or. 2.256; Quintilian, Inst. 9.75-76; and Hermogenes, Id. 2.5.63-98.
in 3.14, Luke does use συκοφάντης when John the Baptist urged the soldiers (whom Luke there couples with tax collectors, 3.12-13) to extort no one.  

Yet the term συκοφάντης in Greek literature is used not merely for an “extortioner” but also for an “informer.” In his Deipnosophists, Athenaeus explains the etymology of the term συκοφάντης (from σῦκον and φαίνειν) and claims that the term was originally used in Athens: “And when many people were found to be evading the law, those who identified them to the jurors were then for the first time called informers [συκοφάνται]” (3.74e). The word σῦκον, “fig,” in particular came to form part of the term, he states, “because at that time the fines and property-taxes [εἰσφορά] were figs, wine, and olive oil, from which they administered public affairs” (3.74f). The συκοφάνται were thus persons who, on the one hand, exacted (εἰσπράττειν) these forms of taxation and, on the other, ones who revealed (φαίνειν) to the jurors those parties obligated to pay fines (3.75a). Is Luke possibly playing upon both of these usages? The fact that Zacchaeus ἀνέβη ἐπὶ συκομορέαν ἵνα ἴδῃ αὐτόν, “went up into a sycamore tree in order to see him,” does seem to point to this latter usage and thus to an additional nuance in his role as a συκοφάντης, namely, as an “informer.”

It is also insightful that prior to his discussion about figs (Deipn. 3.74c-80e), Athenaeus classifies the fruit of the συκομορέα as one type of fig (2.51b). Galen claims that some in his
day understood the word συκόμορον (i.e., the fruit of the sycamore) to mean σῦκα μωρά “tasteless [or foolish] figs.” He regards these persons as “absurd” and explains that the fruit most likely derived its name from the fact that it is a hybrid “between mulberries [μόρα] and figs [σῦκα].” While Galen and Pliny the Elder (Nat. 13.56) claim that sycamore fruit is sweet, Strabo states that it “resembles a fig, but it is not prized for its taste” (Geogr. 17.2.4). And regarding taste, Augustine says only that sycamore fruit differs from that of figs. Based upon how some in antiquity described the fruit of the συκομορέα, it is possible that Luke has Zacchaeus climb a συκομορέα—as opposed to a συκῆ, “fig tree” (cf. 13.6-9)—in order to insinuate his own distaste, as it were, for Roman taxation.

Even though Galen is probably correct about the derivation of the fruit’s name, what is important is that he informs us of this other way of thinking about the sycamore. Some early Christian interpreters also play upon μωρόν, “tasteless, foolish,” rather than μόρον, “mulberry,” in their efforts to explain the significance of the sycamore tree in Luke 19.4. Cyril of Alexandria, for instance, substitutes the omega for the omicron and uses the spelling συκομωραία and thereby points to “a fig tree producing not figs but rather foolish things” (συκῆ μὴ ποιοῦσα σῦκα ἀλλὰ μῶρα). Similarly, Augustine states, “sycamores are translated into Latin as ‘foolish figs’ [Fici fatuae].”

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8 In Deipn. 2.51b, Athenaeus distinguishes between the συκάμινος, “sycamine,” and the συκομορέα, “sycamore” or “mulberry fig.” Luke also assumes this distinction, since he refers to the συκάμινος in 17.6 and the συκομορέα in 19.4.
9 De alimentorum facultatibus 2.35 (Kühn 6:616-17). See also the edition and commentary by Owen Powell (Galen, On the Properties of Foodstuffs [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 96).
10 Augustine, Serm. 174.3 (PL 38:941).
11 Cyril of Alexandria, Luc. ad 19.2 (PG 72:865d). The foolish figs, according to Cyril, are significant for multiple reasons. The climbing of the sycamore tree signifies that Zacchaeus is “rendering foolish [μωραίνειν] the members that are upon the earth, fornication, immorality, and so forth.” Also, Christ, “as he was traveling by the way of life pertaining to the law, which is a
If figs are hanging in the background in this episode, it may also be significant that this fruit is sometimes symbolic for the salvation of the Jewish people. In 4 Baruch, for example, Jeremiah instructs Abimelech to distribute figs among the people as a remedy for their sicknesses (3.15; 5.25; 7.32). This tradition comes down from the book of Jeremiah in the prophetic oracle about the two baskets of figs, one basket containing figs that are “exceedingly good” and the other “exceedingly bad” (24.1-10, here 24.2-3). In Jeremiah the good figs represent the people whom God will preserve and restore to their land, despite their exile among the Chaldeans (24.4-7). Yet the bad figs, which may not be eaten, symbolize those who will fall under a curse and suffer “the famine and the death and the sword” (24.8-10).

While the figs in 4 Baruch are always representative of those within the good basket, Luke might imply that the fruit of the sycamore (i.e., Roman taxation) belongs in the bad basket. Accordingly, Jesus instructs Zacchaeus to come down from the tree (19.5), and salvation comes to his house only after he does so (19.9). Furthermore, by having him climb the tree in the first place Luke seems to intimate that Zacchaeus will inform the higher authorities about a possible rival and thus one who might oppose the payment of taxes to Rome. In this sense, Zacchaeus

12 Serm. 174.3 (PL 38:941). Augustine explains that the sycamore is “a tree of foolish fruit” because it represents “Christ crucified,” that is, “a stumbling block to the Jews” (i.e., the crowd from which Zacchaeus ascends), “but to the Gentiles foolishness [stultitia] (1 Cor 1.23)” (Serm. 174.3 [PL 38:942]). Also on the foolish figs of the sycamore tree, see Ephrem the Syrian, Comm. Diat. 15.21 (McCarthy, 241); with Tjitze Baarda, “The ‘Foolish’ or ‘Deaf’ Fig-Tree: Concerning Luke 19:4 in the Diatessaron,” NovT 43 (2001): 161-77; Bede, Luc. ad 19.1-4 (CCSL 120:334, 1522-35); Theophylact, Luc. ad 19.1-10 (PG 123:1024a); Bonaventure, Luc. 19.7 (Opera 7:474); Erasmus, Para. Luc. 19.4 (LB 7:428a-c); Erasmus, Ann. Luc. ad 19.4 (ASD VI, 5:572-74); and Maldonado, Luc. ad 19.4 (Martin 2:322).

13 Cf. Isa 38.21; 4 Kgdms 20.7; and the comments on 4 Baruch by Herzer, 4 Baruch, 72.

14 Herzer proposes that 4 Baruch has a Judean provenance and was composed within the school or circle of Yohanan ben Zakkai. He dates 4 Baruch to the period 117-132 CE (4 Baruch, xxx-xxxvi, esp. xxxiv).
possibly foreshadows the spies who question Jesus about whether it is lawful to pay taxes to Caesar (20.21-26), a trap they set “for the purpose of handing him over to the authority and jurisdiction of the governor” (20.20).

Besides his status as a ruling tax collector, are there other clues that Luke places Zacchaeus within the political domain of Roman power, along with any clues that Zacchaeus would possibly oppose Jesus? There is at least some correspondence between Zacchaeus and Herod in their mutual attempts “to see” Jesus. When Herod hears news about what had taken place after Jesus gave ἐξουσία to the twelve and sent them out to preach the kingdom of God (9.1-8), the narrator says about Herod, καὶ ἐζήτει ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν, “and he was attempting to see him” (9.9). And comparably, after Jesus had been hailed as the “son of David” while passing through Jericho, the narrator says about Zacchaeus, καὶ ἐζήτει ἰδεῖν τὸν Ἰησοῦν, “and he was attempting to see Jesus” (19.3).¹⁵

This theme pertaining to sight of course is prominent in the episodes about the blind man and Zacchaeus. Luke twice uses ἀναβλέπειν regarding the blind man, once when Jesus commands him to receive his sight (18.42) and again when the narrator reports that he did (18.43). Unlike the blind man and Zacchaeus, who are both initially unable to see, Jesus is not hindered when he comes to the tree and, “looking up” (ἀναβλέπειν, 19.5), sees Zacchaeus.¹⁶ In the most obvious sense, Zacchaeus climbs the tree because he is “small” and thus cannot see. But if he is climbing the tree as an “informer,” then he may be incapable of acknowledging Jesus as

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¹⁵ William P. Loewe (“Towards an Interpretation of Lk 19:1-10,” CBQ 36 [1974]: 321-31, here 324-35) and John O’Hanlon (“The Story of Zacchaeus and the Lukan Ethic,” JSNT 12 [1981]: 2-26, here 13) also notice this correspondence. Contrast Fitzmyer: “There is no need to compare him with Herod (9:9), whose motivation was sign-seeking (23:8); the treatment of Zacchaeus in this episode does not suggest that” (Fitzmyer, Luke X-XXIV, 1223).

¹⁶ Bonaventure, e.g., compares Zacchaeus and the blind man in claiming that the crowd that poses an obstacle to Zacchaeus also “tried to prevent the illumination of the blind man” (Luc. 19.5 [Opera 7:473]).
the “son of David.” Perhaps because Zacchaeus “was seeking [ζητεῖν] to see” (19.3) as Herod previously had (9.9), Zacchaeus is one of the lost whom Jesus came “to seek [ζητεῖν] and to save [σῶσιν]” (19.10).

There is, however, one often overlooked but important qualification the narrator adds about the object of Zacchaeus’ efforts, namely that he was attempting to see τίς ἐστιν, “who he was” (19.3). This statement also reverberates Herod’s question about Jesus, τίς δὲ ἐστιν οὗτος, “but who is this?” (9.9)—which itself recalls the scene where Jesus tells the paralytic that his sins are forgiven and the scribes and Pharisees ask, τίς ἐστιν οὗτος (5.21), as well as that where those dining in the home of Simon the Pharisee ask, τίς οὗτός ἐστιν (7.49). While the parallels between Zacchaeus and Herod and the Pharisees do imply agreement in their outlook on Jesus and his authority (cf. 9.7-9; 13.31-33), that Zacchaeus comes down from the tree at Jesus’ bidding (19.5-6), receives him into his house rejoicing (19.6), and addresses him as κύριος (19.8) are all proofs that he comes to see “who he was” in a different sense.

2. To Climb and Come Down

The earlier parable about the Pharisee and tax collector may set the scene for the character Zacchaeus. For in each pericope we encounter the ideas of ascending (ἀναβαίνειν, 18.10; 19.4) and descending (καταβαίνειν, 18.14; 19.5-6). The statement that concludes the parable,

17 Cf. Bonaventure’s remarks that Zacchaeus “was on a quest to see Jesus, evidently so that he might come to know the true God” (Luc. 19.7 [Opera 7:474]); and Robert Tannehill’s remarks about “the two quests” that are taking place in this scene (“The Story of Zacchaeus as Rhetoric: Luke 19:1-10,” Semeia 64 [1993]: 201-11, esp. 205).

18 It is notable that Luke revises τί οὗτος (Mark 2.7) to τίς ἐστιν οὗτος (Luke 5.21). The Lukan disciples also ask this question about Jesus (τίς ἔστιν οὗτος) because of their lack of faith (ποῦ ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν) in his authority over the wind and water (8.25). Cf. Luke 1.66; 4.34; 9.18.

19 Contrast Plummer, who claims that the parable of the Pharisee and tax collector “has no connexion either with the parable which precedes it or with the narrative which follows it”
“everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and the one humbling himself will be exalted” (18.14), is spoken also at the conclusion of the parable concerning the places of honor (14.7-11). We know that the Lukan Jesus tells that prior parable in the house of a ruling Pharisee in order to address a misconception about what constitutes true honor (δόξα, 14.10). While the act of humbling oneself or being humbled by another is at its core a state of mind or attitude that one is to assume according to Luke, the mental disposition of humility (whether arrived at by oneself or forced upon one by another) is conveyed metaphorically through physical and spatial details in each parable. That is to say, the person who chooses the first seat at a marriage feast is quite literally moved to a lower seat when a more honorable guest is present (14.8-9). Yet the physical transference from a higher to a lower space points to the shame (αἰσχύνη, 14.9) brought upon the guest in both its social and mental dimensions. Correspondingly, in the second parable, while both the Pharisee and the tax collector stand (18.11, 13) praying, only the tax collector physically displays his mental humility in not wishing to raise his eyes toward heaven and striking his chest (18.13). Moreover, even though both the Pharisee and the tax collector literally “go up” (ἀναβαίνειν, 18.10) into the temple to pray, only the tax collector “goes down” (καταβαίνειν,
18.14) to his house justified, which appears to be an additional metaphor of his having lowered himself to a humble frame of mind.\(^{22}\)

Is this movement from a higher to a lower position in its physical and literal dimensions also significant in the fact that Zacchaeus went up (ἀναβαίνειν, 19.4) into the sycamore tree and then subsequently came down (καταβαίνειν, 19.5-6) when Jesus orders him to do so? We do notice that just as Jesus commends the tax collector from the parable for having gone down “to his house justified [δεδικαιωμένος εἰς τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ]” (18.14), so he explains to Zacchaeus why he must come down: “for today I must stay in your house [ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ σου]” (19.5; cf. 19.9)—the result being that salvation comes to that house (19.9). The implication could be that when Zacchaeus heeds the demand to come down from the tree, he is humbling himself from his socially prominent position as a ruling tax collector and a rich man (19.2)—which he then demonstrates when he resolves to give away half of his possessions to the poor and to restore fourfold the amount he gained through extortion (19.8).\(^{23}\)

\(^{22}\) Tertullian reads this parable as one about “two people who worship with the opposite disposition, the Pharisee with pride, and the tax collector with humility” (\textit{Marc.} 4.36.1). Cf. Otto Michel (”τελώνης,” \textit{TDNT} 8:105): “The Berakah of the Pharisee has become praise of self rather than praise of God, whereas the publican can utter only a brief prayer of penitence.”

\(^{23}\) There has been debate about whether Zacchaeus is resolving to give (back) or whether he is defending himself for already being in the habit of giving (back). On reading Zacchaeus’ statement as a “resolve,” see Dennis Hamm, “Luke 19:8 Once Again: Does Zacchaeus Defend or Resolve?” \textit{JBL} 107 (1988): 431-37; and Hamm, “Zacchaeus Revisited Once More: A Story of Vindication or Conversion?” \textit{Bib} 72 (1991): 248-52. Alternatively, Fitzmyer (\textit{Luke X-XXIV}, 1225) and Alan C. Mitchell (“Zacchaeus Revisited: Luke 19,8 as a Defense,” \textit{Bib} 71 [1990]: 153-76; and “The Use of συκοφαντεῖν in Luke 19,8: Further Evidence for Zacchaeus’s Defense,” \textit{Bib} 72 [1991]: 546-47) argue that the verbs δίδωμι and ἀποδίδωμι in 19.8 are iterative and that Zacchaeus is defending himself against the grumblers. These verbs, however, might rather function as futuristic presents (Smyth §1879), implying that Zacchaeus stands and vows to make right any previous injustices. In this sense, we could compare the tax collector Levi, who rose and left the tax office at which he was sitting and followed Jesus (5.27-28). See also Tannehill’s arguments against reading the statement as a resolve (“Story of Zacchaeus,” 203-04).
It may also be significant that Zacchaeus delivers this statement about his plans to make economic reparations after “taking his stance” (σταθείς, 19.8). Luke uses σταθείς also for the Pharisee of the parable, who takes his stance in prayer (18.11), in contrast to the tax collector, who simply “stood” (ἔστως, 18.13) and prayed. While σταθείς is a passive form with an active and intransitive meaning—just as ἔστως is also active and intransitive—Luke appears to use σταθείς for actions in which his characters take firm and confident stances before speaking. Notably, two of the three occurrences of σταθείς in Luke’s Gospel are for the Pharisee of the parable and Zacchaeus; and the other occurs in the intervening scene when Jesus orders the blind man to be brought to him (18.40)—where the synoptic parallels have στάς (Mark 10.49; Matt 20.32; cf. Luke 7.38). The Pharisee seems to take his stance because he is overly confident in

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24 Cf. Chrysostom: Χαρᾶς δὲ ἐμπλησθεὶς, σταθεὶς εἶπεν· οὐ περιπατῶν, οὐ καθήμενος, ἀλλὰ σταθεὶς, ἵνα δείξῃ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ ἀμετάθετον γνώμην (In Zacc. [PG 61:768]).
25 Theophylact remarks that σταθείς in 18.11 is indicative of the Pharisee’s “haughtiness and lack of humility.” He then contrasts this participle with ἑστώς in 18.13 and comments about the tax collector that, although he stood, “his posture was stooped” (Luc. ad 18.9-14 [PG 123:1004d]). See also Bengel, Gnomon (ad Luc. 18.11); Plummer, Luke, 416; and Lachs, Rabbinic Commentary, 116, note 1. In addition to the subtle difference between σταθείς and ἑστώς, there is also the detail that the Pharisee stands πρὸς ἑαυτόν, “by himself,” and the tax collector μακρόθεν, “from far away” (18.13). As Wellhausen comments, “Die Zöllner steht im Hintergrund, der Pharisäer in einsamer Größe vor der Front” (Das Evangelium Lucae, 100). See also Scott, Hear Then the Parable, 94-95. On the posture of the tax collector and the distance between him and the Pharisee, Bunyan imagines the tax collector resembling a filthy, condemned criminal: “Doth the poor Publicane stand to vex thee? doth he touch thee with his dirty Garments; or doth he annoy thee with his stinking Breath? Doth his posture of standing so like a man condemned offend thee? True, he now standeth with his hand held up at Gods Bar, he pleads guilty to all that is laid to his charge” (Discourse upon the Pharisee and the Publicane, 156). Although it is unclear whether Bunyan intends to parody ritual purity here, the halakhic rulings regarding tax collectors as defiling (e.g., m. Ḥag. 3:6; m. Ṭehar. 7:6) should perhaps not go unnoticed for explaining the distance between the two characters.
26 See the occurrences in Acts: Σταθείς δὲ ὁ Πέτρος σὺν τοῖς ἐνδέκα ἔπηρεν τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπερεθέγασαν αὐτοῖς (2.14); πορεύεσθαι καὶ σταθέντες λαλέτε ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τῷ λαῷ πάντα τὰ ἱματα τῆς ζωῆς ταύτης (5.20); εἶδεν [τόν] ἄγγελον ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτοῦ σταθέντα καὶ εἰπόντα (11.13); Σταθείς δὲ [ὁ] Παῦλος ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ Ἀρείου Πάγου ἔφη (17.22); σταθείς οἱ κατήγοροι οὐδεμιᾶν αἰτήσαν ἐφερον (25.18); σταθείς ὁ Παῦλος ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν εἶπεν (27.21); with Smyth §814; BDF §313; and Fitzmyer, Luke X-XXIV, 1186.
justifying himself at the expense of others when he prays.\textsuperscript{27} Perhaps the Pharisee should have
been firm in “having mercy” (ἐλεεῖν, 18.38-39) on others rather than despising them (ἐξουθενεῖν, 18.9; cf. 23.11); and perhaps he should have resolved to give away his possessions (19.8; cf. 18.22) rather than pay a mere tenth (ἀποδεκατοῦν) on what he continues to acquire (κτᾶσθαι, 18.12; cf. 11.39; 16.14).\textsuperscript{28}

3. Zacchaeus and Yohanan ben Zakkai

If σταθείς prompts us to compare Jesus also to the Pharisee and Zacchaeus, are there other elements that might point to such a comparison within this context? It is notable that the title given to Jesus in 18.37, Ναζωραῖος, has an ending that is identical to that in the name Ζακχαῖος. Are these equivalent endings a coincidence, or do we see here another instance of παρονομασία? It may be telling that the Markan parallel has Ναζαρηνός (Mark 10.47) rather than Ναζωραῖος. Furthermore, Ναζωραῖος occurs only here in Luke’s Gospel.\textsuperscript{29} In the earlier and later parts of the Gospel, he retains the Markan Ναζαρηνός (Mark 1.24 // Luke 4.34; 24.19).


\textsuperscript{28} Some interpreters suggest that Zacchaeus resolves to give away all his possessions, that is, he will give half to the poor and use the other half to repay what he had gained through extortion. See, e.g., Titus of Bostra, Luc. ad 19.5, 8 (TU 21.1: Sickenberger, 230-31); Euthymius, Luc. ad 19.8 (PG 129:1057b-c); Plummer, Luke, 435; and Tannehill, Unity, 1:123-24; Tannehill, “Story of Zacchaeus,” 203.

\textsuperscript{29} The designation Ναζωραῖος for Jesus appears in Acts 2.22; 3.6; 4.10; 6.14; 22.8; 24.5; 26.9.
We know that an -ιος suffix is a patronymic in Greek and thus may indicate descent.\textsuperscript{30}

The use of this suffix in the appellation Ναζωραῖος may be significant in showing how he whom the crowd regards as a son of Nazareth the blind man recognizes as “son of David” (18.38-39).

When we compare the Markan parallel about the blind man, there is a notable pairing between Jesus, “son of David” (Mark 10.47, 48), and Bartimaeus, “the son of Timaeus” (10.46). Luke, however, drops the name of the blind man altogether.\textsuperscript{31} Is he more interested in pairing Ναζωραῖος with Ζακχαῖος? There does seem to be a pairing between Jesus as “son of man” (19.10) and Zacchaeus as “son of Abraham” (19.9).\textsuperscript{32}

Jacob Neusner has proposed that the name Ζακχαῖος is the Greek translation of בן זבא, “ben Zakkai.”\textsuperscript{33} On the basis of this clue and the fact that Zacchaeus in the \textit{Infancy Gospel of Thomas} is “a Galilean schoolteacher,” Neusner furthermore suggests that the story told in that Gospel “arose, in its original form, in the Jewish-Christian community in Galilee after 70 C.E., and that it was intended to liberate the community from the authority of R. Yohanan ben Zakkai’s academy at Yavneh. Among the Jewish-Christians, the name of Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai must have been well known after 70 C.E., for he founded at Yavneh a central institution

\textsuperscript{30} Smyth explains: “Patronymics, or denominative proper names denoting descent from a father or ancestor, are formed from proper names of persons by means of” various suffixes (§845), including -ιος (§846f).

\textsuperscript{31} Mark’s use of the name Bartimaeus, “the son of Timaeus” (10.46), is not without complications. On the various proposals, see Collins, \textit{Mark}, 508-09.

\textsuperscript{32} See also the repeated καὶ αὐτός that introduces Zacchaeus: καὶ αὐτός ἦν ἄρχιτελώνης καὶ αὐτός πλούσιος, “and he was a ruling tax collector, and he was rich” (19.2). This dual identity appears to merge into one by the end of the pericope when Jesus declares, καὶ αὐτός ὦν ὦς ἄβραμ οὗτος Αβραάμ ἐστιν, “he too is a son of Abraham” (19.9).

which promulgated laws applying to Palestinian Judaism.”

While Neusner notes that he “cannot explain a connection, if any, to the Zaccheus of Luke,” perhaps we should reevaluate the evidence—even if some of our results remain inconclusive.

Neusner’s proposal raises some questions about the relationship between the Zaccheus of Luke and the Zaccheus of the *Infancy Gospel of Thomas*. Did the Lukan Zaccheus form the basis for the Zaccheus in *Thomas*, or did the author of *Thomas* find material for or otherwise create this character independent of Luke? If the author of *Thomas* was drawing upon the Lukan Zaccheus, did he perhaps see Yohanan ben Zakkai in the Lukan Zaccheus? Because the evidence is limited, this latter question may be impossible to answer fully. We can nonetheless attempt to answer the former.

We know that the concluding story about Jesus’ visit to the temple at the age of twelve in *Infancy Gospel of Thomas* 19.1-12 is most likely drawn from the similar account in Luke 2.40-52. For example, what is Ἰησοῦς προέκοπτεν [ἐν τῇ] σοφίᾳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ χάριτι παρὰ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώποις at the end of the Lukan episode in 2.52 is Ἰησοῦς προέκοπτε σοφίᾳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ χάριτι at the end of the *Infancy Gospel of Thomas* in 19.12.

When we compare the accounts about Zaccheus in each Gospel, there appears to be a common interest also in applying the adjective μικρός either to Zaccheus or Jesus. As for the Lukan Zaccheus, Mikeal Parsons has contextualized the kind of “physiognomic consciousness” that would enable Luke to convey to an audience how one characterized as τῇ ἡλικίᾳ μικρός,

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34 Neusner, “Zaccheus/Zakkai,” 57, 58; and *Life of Yohanan ben Zakkai*, 53, 55.
35 As Hans-Josef Klauck observes, the pericope in Luke 2.41-52 “is the obvious nucleus from which the whole work has grown. New material fills the gap in Luke 1-2 between the birth of Jesus and his public appearance at the age of twelve, and here the New Testament supplies some individual expressions and personal names, patterns of speech and narrative motifs” (*Apocryphal Gospels: An Introduction* [trans. Brian McNeil; London and New York: T&T Clark, 2003], 73).
“short in stature,” could be by implication μικρός in soul or mind as well. Whereas the Lukan Jesus “increased in wisdom and in stature [ἡλικία] and in favor with God and humans” (2.52; cf. 1.80; 2.40), Zacchaeus, Parsons observes, “did not grow in stature, did not become strong in spirit, and certainly did not increase in human favor.”36 As Cyril of Alexandria correspondingly explains, Zacchaeus “was short in stature [μικρός τὴν ἡλικίαν] not only bodily, but spiritually as well.”37

A somewhat more noticeable comparison between Jesus and Zacchaeus appears in the *Infancy Gospel of Thomas*; but there the adjective μικρός points to the physicality of Jesus, on

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36 Mikeal C. Parsons, *Body and Character in Luke and Acts: The Subversion of Physiognomy in Early Christianity* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2006), 101. See also David Rohrbacher, “Physiognomics in Imperial Latin Biography,” *Classical Antiquity* 29 (2010): 92-116, esp. 99; and Bovon, who observes, “When the Gospel writer is interested in someone’s physical appearance, it is to point out some defect or, as here, a limitation” (*Luke* 2, 597). Cf. the brief episode in Josephus about a certain Jonathan (*B.J.* 6.169-76), whom he describes as having had “a small body [σῶμα βραχύς] and a despicable appearance” (6.169). In this scene, Jonathan’s “smallness of body” (ἡ βραχύτης τοῦ σώματος, 6.172) seems to provide a basis for his “behaving foolishly” (ματαΐζειν, 6.175) and ultimately for his antagonism toward the Romans. See also Josephus’ description that Herod had a σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν ἀνάλογος “body proportionate to his soul” (*B.J.* 1.429). In particular, Josephus explains, Herod possessed traits of soul and body that were προτερήματα, “superior,” to others (1.430). Cf. also his description of Julian, the centurion who had “strength [ἀλκή] of body and courage of soul” (6.81). In contrast to this proportion between body and soul, Josephus expresses amazement about a certain Sabinus, that there lived a ἡρωικὴ ψυχή, “heroic soul,” within his λεπτὸν σῶμα, “thin body.” His body, he states, “was much too narrow for the peculiar strength [ἀλκή] he possessed” (6.55).

37 Ἡν δὲ καὶ μικρὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν οὐ μόνον τὴν σωματικήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πνευματικήν (Luc. ad 19.2 [PG 72:865c]). Titus of Bostra makes the same statement, except he uses the adjective βραχύς instead of μικρός (Luc. ad 19.3 [TU 21.1: Sickenberger, 230]). Cf. Ambrose, *Luc.* 8.87 (CCSL 14:330, 1041-45). Isha’dad qualifies, “Zaccheona, that man little in stature, both bodily and spiritual” (*Com. Luke* 18; trans. Gibson, 1:193). Euthymius imagines Zacchaeus saying: εἰμι καί μικρός τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν πνευματικὴν· ἕτε γὰρ χαμαὶ περὶ τὰ γεηρὰ σύρομαι, “I am also small in spiritual stature, for I am still crawling low upon the ground in the case of earthly things” (Luc. ad 19.10 [PG 129:1057d-1060a]). And Theophylact: “For everyone who rules over many in vice [κακία] is small in spiritual stature [μικρός ἐστι τὴν πνευματικὴν ἡλικίαν], for flesh and spirit oppose one another, and on account of this he cannot see Jesus because of the crowd” (Luc. ad 19.1-10 [PG 123:1021d]). Conversely, Chrysostom states: Ζαχαρίας ὁ τὴν ἡλικίαν τοῦ σώματος μικρός, τῇ δὲ φρονήσει τοῦ πνεύματος μέγας, “Zacchaeus was small in bodily stature, but large in spiritual understanding” (*In Zacc.* [PG 61:767]).
the one hand, and the mental capacity of Jesus’ interlocutors, on the other. Rather than the “ruling tax collector” of the Lukan narrative, Zacchaeus in the *Infancy Gospel of Thomas* is a διδάσκαλος and καθηγητής, “school master” (6.1, 4, 6, 13, 15, 16, 19, 21-22; 7.1), who encourages Joseph to hand Jesus over to his tutelage, seeing that Jesus is a φρόνιμον παιδίον, “prudent child,” and has a καλός νοῦς “good mind” (6.2). As Jesus overhears the exchange between Zacchaeus and Joseph—and in keeping with Joseph’s warning that Zacchaeus not consider Jesus to be a μικρός σταυρός “small cross” (6.3)—Jesus appeals to his own superior intellect and bids Zacchaeus to become his student rather than he to learn from Zacchaeus (6.6-7). After some bystanders scoff at such an appeal, Jesus labels them as “ones to marvel in small things [μικροθαύμαστοι] and small in mind [μικροὶ τοῖς φρονήμασιν]” (6.11). Correspondingly, when Jesus later demonstrates his more advanced knowledge of the letters of the alphabet, Zacchaeus admits that his own διάνοια, “intelligence,” was confounded (7.6) and thus that he has been shamed by a παιδίον μικρόν, “small child” (7.10).

In support of Neusner’s proposal, Tony Burke observes that two of the miracles Jesus performs in the *Infancy Gospel of Thomas* bear striking similarities to miracles attributed to Rabbi Hanina ben Dosa, a student of Yohanan ben Zakkai. Moreover, the fact that the Gospel ends with the scribes and Pharisees blessing Jesus may further support the particular rhetorical

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38 Matthew uses καθηγητής when distinguishing Christian leaders from those of the Pharisees: “nor are you to be called school masters, because your school master is one, the Christ” (Matt 23.10). The word ἀρχιτελώνης (Luke 19.2) is not attested in Greek literature prior to Luke’s Gospel. It is not uncommon to see the prefix ἀρχι- in titles designating one’s leading socio-religious and political role (e.g., ἀρχιερεύς and ἀρχισυνάγωγος) in texts earlier than and contemporaneous to Luke’s Gospel (see, e.g., Wolter, *Lukasevangelium*, 611-12). It would be difficult to confirm that Luke coined ἀρχιτελώνης; but there is nothing to rule out this possibility. Cf. Fitzmyer, *Luke X-XXIV*, 1223.

39 Burke (*De Infantia Iesu Evangelium Thomae Graece* [CCSA 17; Turnhout: Brepols, 2010], 208) states, “The Miraculous Stretching of a Beam and the Healing of James’ Snakebite recall similar tales told of Rabbi Hanina ben Dosa (*Babylonian Talmud*, Ta’anit 25a; *Tosefta* Berakhot 3,20; *Babylonian Talmud*, Berakhot 33a).”
thrust that attempts to show the supremacy of the Christian sect over Pharisaism. That they had “never seen nor heard such glory and such virtue and wisdom” (19.10) seems to say that the Pharisees had not produced such remarkable qualities among their own disciples.

The point in the *Infancy Gospel of Thomas* that Zacchaeus and others are μικροὶ τοῖς φρονήμασιν (6.11) in comparison to Jesus may reflect either the author’s sophisticated reading of Luke’s description that Zacchaeus is τῇ ἡλικίᾳ μικρός (19.3) or perhaps a broader tradition (in which Luke also participates) wherein Zacchaeus was cast as intellectually inferior to Jesus. In whatever case, the significance of any possible comparison between Jesus and Zacchaeus in the Lukan account would not be that Luke needs to assert the superiority of Jesus to a ruling tax collector. Given the infamy of tax collectors, few readers would doubt such an insinuation. Moreover, to compare Jesus to a mere tax collector would likely prove disparaging to Jesus himself, as Luke and the majority of his readers would assume that Jesus deserves to stand in comparison to a figure with at least some socio-political influence. Nor does Luke otherwise show any interest in juxtaposing tax collectors alongside Jesus on the basis of their “wisdom” and “favor with God and humans” or the lack thereof.

If the Lukan Zacchaeus does point to Yohanan ben Zakkai, we might then explain the fact that he is a ruling tax collector as an instance of irony. That is to say, Luke may be alluding to this influential person and at the same time applying to him traits that were the opposite of how he would have been perceived within his own circle. This characterization would seemingly support the reversal between tax collectors and Pharisees that Luke presents throughout his

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Gospel. With Zacchaeus, however, there may be yet another twist in this larger rhetorical comparison. Although Luke does insinuate that Zacchaeus is extortionary (cf. 11.39; 18.11), Zacchaeus differs from the larger body of Pharisees because he repents of these unjust practices and becomes a recipient of the salvation that Jesus provides. Would this comparison between Jesus and Zacchaeus ultimately point to that between the Christian sect, on the one hand, and Pharisaism, on the other? A sure answer to this question is impossible; for we are also uncertain about whether the historical Yohanan ben Zakkai was himself a Pharisee.

Scholars have debated the period from which the traditions about Yohanan came. Daniel Boyarin, for example, holds that “the earliest strata of Yavneh legends” are “from the late second to the late third centuries” of the Common Era. Alternatively, Anthony Saldarini claims that the story about Yohanan’s escape from Jerusalem originated during the period that spans from the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE until the Bar Kochba revolt of 132-135 CE. This was the period, Saldarini proposes, when Yohanan’s school at Yavneh flourished; and thus the story emerged “as an explanation of the new center of Judaism necessitated by the loss of the Temple and of the regular functions of priests and courts.”

43 Saldarini, “Johanan ben Zakai’s Escape from Jerusalem: Origin and Development of a Rabbinic Story,” JSJ 6 (1975): 189-204, here 194. Saldarini argues more specifically “that all four versions of the escape story depend upon a Vorlage, a basic, original story which then developed through two traditions into four versions” (ibid., 190). Jacob Neusner holds that the accounts about Yohanan’s escape from Jerusalem “are likely to have been based on historical events, but are neither wholly congruous with the events of that period nor internally consistent. All accounts agree, however, that he escaped from the city when escape was still possible, met Vespasian while the city was under siege, prophesied his imminent rise to imperial power, and was permitted by him to go to Yavneh, there to take refuge from the war” (Life of Yohanan, 152). Neusner is nevertheless “certain that he escaped from the city before it fell in the summer of 70 A.D., probably in the spring of 68, then surrendered to the Romans, and was permitted by them to go to Yavneh (Jamnia), a town in the plain where a number of pro-Roman Jewish loyalists had taken refuge” (ibid., 146). In another context, Neusner identifies the problems and
In testing Saldarini’s hypothesis, we do notice at least one point of contact between the legends about Yohanan’s surrender to Vespasian and how Josephus purports to have also surrendered. The most notable parallels between the respective stories about Yohanan and Josephus are that both predict the emperorship of Vespasian, and both appeal to the prophet Jeremiah in justifying their positions.\textsuperscript{44} The reason Yohanan and Josephus identify with Jeremiah limitations in our knowledge about the historical Yohanan ben Zakkai when he states, “it is quite obvious that two accounts of the same event, the escape of R. Yohanan ben Zakkai from Jerusalem and his encounter with Vespasian, represent extraordinarily different versions of the event; both cannot be right; and since the accounts differ precisely on what happened and why, it is quite evident that neither provides the kind of factual information historians need and do not have for this period. They tell us, rather, what differing schools of thought chose to recall about a controversial event” (“In Quest of the Historical Rabban Yohanan ben Zakka,” \textit{HTR} 59 [1966]: 391-413, here 394). Boyarin similarly interprets one related piece of evidence not “as a record of the real historical situation at the time of Yavneh,” but rather “as a representation of Yavneh as projected in the earlier stage of rabbinic literature” (\textit{Border Lines}, 158). There is at least some agreement that these traditions represent the attempt to make the circumstances of the Jewish War relevant for later generations by reshaping within and augmenting upon the framework of what really took place. See the discussions by Jacob Neusner, “Beyond Historicism, After Structuralism: Story as History in Ancient Judaism,” \textit{Henoch} 3 (1981): 171-99, esp. 186-89; Daniel Boyarin, “Tricksters, Martyrs, and Collaborators: Diaspora and the Gendered Politics of Resistance,” in \textit{Powers of Diaspora: Two Essays on the Relevance of Jewish Culture} (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 37-102, esp. 46-54; and Michael L. Satlow, \textit{Creating Judaism: History, Tradition, Practice} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 115-19. Some scholars of course have attempted to recover what actually happened behind the legends, including those about Yohanan ben Zakkai. See, e.g., Gedalyahu Alon, “Rabban Johanan B. Zakkaï’s Removal to Jabneh,” in \textit{Jews, Judaism and the Classical World} (trans. Israel Abrahams; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1977), 269-313; Cecil Roth, “The Pharisees in the Jewish Revolution of 66-73,” \textit{JSS} 7 (1962): 63-80; J. W. Doeve, “The Flight of Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkaï from Jerusalem, When and Why?” in \textit{Übersetzung und Deutung: Studien zu dem Alten Testament und seiner Umwelt, Alexander Reinhard Hultst gewidmet von Freunden und Kollegen} (Nijkerk: Callenbach, 1977), 50-65; and Peter Schäfer, “Die Flucht Johanan b. Zakkaïs aus Jerusalem und die Gründung des ‘Lehrhauses’ in Jabneh,” \textit{ANRW} II.19.2:43-101.\textsuperscript{44} For Josephus, see \textit{B.J.} 3.400-04; 4.618-29 (cf. Jer MT 40.1-6; LXX 47.1-6); 5.391-93 (cf. Jer MT 27.12-22; LXX 34.10-18); and for Yohanan, the analyses by Neusner, \textit{Life of Yohanan ben Zakkaï}, 159; Neusner, “Beyond Historicism,” 186-89; and Amram Tropper, “Yohanan ben Zakkaï, \textit{Amicus Caesaris}: A Jewish Hero in Rabbinic Eyes,” \textit{JSIJ} 4 (2005): 133-149, esp. 143-49. See also Saldarini, “Johanan ben Zackai’s Escape,” 196-98; and Schäfer, “Die Flucht Johanan b. Zakkaïs aus Jerusalem,” \textit{ANRW} II.19.2:84-88. Both Suetonius (\textit{Vesp.} 5.6) and Dio Cassius (66.1.1-4) know the tradition that Josephus had predicted the reign of Vespasian,
seems to be that this prophet in particular is remembered for proclaiming to his fellow Israelites a message of submission to Nebuchadnezzar.\(^45\)

We cannot be sure that the stories about Yohanan are dependent upon what Josephus writes about his own surrender to Vespasian. Nor do we know whether Josephus bases his own account upon one about Yohanan, or perhaps whether the stories about both Yohanan and Josephus are products of a larger tradition (otherwise unknown) in which certain Jews who escaped are depicted as surrendering to Vespasian and thus receiving benefactions from him.\(^46\)

All we can suggest is that the template for such an escape story existed within the first twelve years after the destruction of Jerusalem—that is, the period in which Josephus composed and translated his *Bellum judaicum*.

When we compare the rabbinic accounts about Yohanan to the episode about Zacchaeus and its broader context in Luke, the most significant point of similarity is perhaps the question Jesus poses to the blind man in 18.41 and the one Vespasian asks Yohanan. Jesus asks the blind man, “What do you wish that I do for you?” (τί σοι θέλεις ποιήσω; 18.41).\(^47\) In *Abot de Rabbi* and they each include it among the various other stories that portended his emperorship. See also Josephus, *B.J.* 6.312-13; Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.13; Suetonius, *Vesp.* 4.5; and Orosius, *Hist.* 7.9.3. On Josephus and the legends about the founding of Yavneh, see Alon, “Rabban Joḥanan B. Zakkai’s Removal to Jabneh,” 269-313.

\(^45\) Cf. the role of Jeremiah in 4 *Baruch*.

\(^46\) As we see in Josephus, Yohanan may have been one among many Jews who surrendered to Vespasian and then ended up in Yavneh (Jamnia): “After occupying the parts around the toparchy of Thamna, he [i.e., Vespasian] advanced upon Lydda and Jamnia; and since both were already subdued, he colonized there a sufficient number of those who had come over to him, and then he arrived at Emmaus” (*B.J.* 4.444). Cf. Catherine Hezser, *The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine* (TSAJ 66; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 171-80; Hezser, “Yavne,” *RPP* 13:646-47.

\(^47\) Although Luke gets this statement from his Markan source (10.51), perhaps we should allow for the possibility that he is appropriating Markan material and at the same time alluding to other, comparable traditions. The four accounts about Yohanan ben Zakkai’s escape from Jerusalem appear in *Abot de Rabbi Nathan A* 4; *Abot de Rabbi Nathan B* 6; *Gitten* 56a-b of the Babylonian Talmud; and *Lamentations Rabbah* 1.5 (§31).
Nathan B 6, Vespasian says to Yohanan, “Ask of me something for yourself” (שאל לך שאלה).

Similarly, in Abot de Rabbi Nathan A 4, Vespasian remarks, “ask of me what I shall give you” (שאל מה אתן לך). In b. Gittin 56b, Vespasian bids Yohanan, “ask me for something that I may grant for you” (בעי מינאי מידי דאתן לך). And in Lamentations Rabbah 1.5 (§31), Vespasian says, “Ask of me something for yourself, and I will grant it” (שאל לך שאלה ואנא עביד). Although Jesus and Vespasian do respectively appear as benefactors in each source, perhaps this piece of evidence would be stronger if the Lukan Jesus had asked Zacchaeus this question.

Nevertheless, is it possible that the question, “What do you wish that I do for you?” (18.41), sets the scene for the meeting between Jesus and Zacchaeus, where σωτηρία, “salvation,” comes to the house of Zacchaeus (19.9)? We observe a detail regarding salvation also in b. Gît. 56a-b. There Yohanan refers to his plan to sneak out of Jerusalem and meet with Vespasian as an opportunity to obtain “a small salvation” (הצלה פורתא, b. Gît. 56a). And once he successfully gets this meeting, it is then that Vespasian offers to benefact Yohanan. According to this version of the tradition, when the question arose as to why Yohanan did not ask Vespasian to

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48 According to Neusner, the request for Yavneh and its sages “represented a statement of the Pharisaic loyalists’ policy. If Rome would grant inner autonomy, the Pharisaic loyalists would willingly counsel political submission to Rome” (Life of Yohanan ben Zakkai, 164). In addition to Yavneh, in b. Gît. 56b Yohanan asks for “the family chain of Rabban Gamaliel.” Simon notes, “R. Joḥanan was particularly solicitous for R. Gamaliel and his family, as they were supposed to be of the house of David” (Hebrew-English Edition of the Babylonian Talmud, note a, 2). Cf. Luke 1.32; 18.38-39.

49 Is Jesus the σωτηρία that comes to Zacchaeus’ house? Cf. Simeon, who says, εἶδον οἱ ὀφθαλμοί μου τὸ σωτήριόν σου (2.30), which harkens back to the previous statement from the narrator, καὶ ἦν αὐτῷ κεχρηματισμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ισχίου μὴ ἰδεῖν θάνατον πρὶν [ἡ] ἄν ἰδῇ τὸν Χριστὸν κυρίου (2.26). On the relationship between the themes of sight and salvation, see also the quotation of Isa 40.5 in Luke 3.6: καὶ ὄψεται πᾶσα σάρξ τὸ σωτήριον τοῦ θεοῦ.
spare Jerusalem, Yohanan is said to have thought Vespasian would not grant this larger request and that “a small salvation” (הצלה פורחתא) was the best option (b. *Git.* 56b).

The tradition that Yohanan predicts the emperorship of Vespasian appears also in all four versions about his escape from Jerusalem. According to *Abot R. Nat.* B 6, once Yohanan gets outside the city he approaches Vespasian and hails him, “*Vive domine Imperator!*” (אי רימוני אימפוטרין). As a prediction of Vespasian’s reign, Yohanan then quotes Isa 10.34, “And Lebanon shall fall by a mighty one.” After three days pass, “letters came to Vespasian from Rome, saying, ‘Nero the emperor [מלך] is dead, and the Romans have made you emperor [המליכוך].’”

The version in *b. Git.* 56a-b shows the same basic structure and motifs as those in *Abot R. Nat.* B 6, yet this former account has some distinctive details within the tradition. According to this telling, once Yohanan safely arrives among the Romans, he hails Vespasian, “Peace to you, O emperor, peace to you, O emperor” (שלום עלך מלכא שלמא עלך מלכא, *b. Git.* 56a). Vespasian objects by explaining that he is not emperor, only to have Yohanan moments later insist that he is emperor on the basis of Isa 10.34. And then Vespasian receives a message “from Rome saying, ‘Rise, for Caesar [קיסר] is dead, and the notables of Rome have decided to make you head!’” (*b. Git.* 56b).

According to the parallel account in *Lam. Rab.* 1.5 (§31), Yohanan asks from among the Roman soldiers, “Where is the emperor [מלך]?” When Vespasian then learns about Yohanan’s

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50 The term הצלחה in *b. Git.* 56a-b is perhaps an echo of Esth 4.14: רוח והצלה יעמדו ליהודיים, “relief and salvation will arise for the Jews from another place.” הצלחה occurs only here in the MT. With the destruction of Jerusalem, the other “place” for Yohanan and his heirs was possibly Yavneh. Cf. Tropper’s suggestion that “a small salvation” may have been inspired by Dan 11.33-34 (“Yohanan ben Zakkai, *Amicus Caesaris*,” 135-36, note 8).
inquiries and allows him access, Yohanan hails Vespasian as “emperor” (מלא). Despite Vespasian’s attempt to resist his kingship and his fear that the currently reigning emperor will put him to death should he hear of a possible usurpation, Yohanan insists that Vespasian will soon begin to reign because Isa 10.34 predicts that a king would destroy the temple. And three days thereafter, Vespasian receives news “that Nero Caesar had died and the Romans had proclaimed him emperor [המלךוהו].”

Where in ‘Abot R. Nat. B 6 and b. Giṭ. 56a-b and Lam. Rab. 1.5 (§31) Yohanan gives the prediction that Vespasian will become emperor before Vespasian offers to benefact Yohanan, in ‘Abot R. Nat. A 4 the prediction comes after Yohanan had already received Yavneh. According to this account, Yohanan says to Vespasian, “you are about to be appointed as emperor [במלכות]” and subsequently quotes Isa 10.34 as proof. And thereafter messengers came to Vespasian and announced “that Caesar was dead and that he had been appointed to become the next emperor [במלכות].”

If Luke had quoted or otherwise alluded to Isa 10.34, then the comparison between his Gospel and these rabbinic narratives would be much more compelling. At the same time, we cannot rule out the possibility that the quotation of Isa 10.34 became part of the tradition well after Luke composed the Gospel. Yet even the acclamations of Vespasian’s reign do not find a strong parallel in the episode about Zacchaeus. Although Zacchaeus does address Jesus as

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51 The Aramaic text gives Yohanan’s greeting in Latin, vivi domine Imperator, perhaps following the tradition in ‘Abot R. Nat. B 6, which gives the Hebrew transliteration of this Latin expression: ארי דומיניא אימפטוריה.
κύριος, “Lord” (19.8; cf. 18.41; 19.31, 33-34), he is not the one to apply the titles υἱὸς Δαυίδ, “son of David” (18.38, 39), or ὁ βασιλεύς (19.38).  

We might also expect to find in Luke a stronger parallel to the tradition that Yohanan was “a friend of the emperor” (Abot R. Nat. B 6) or “a friend of Caesar” (Abot R. Nat. A 4). Even though Luke links this episode to those earlier meal scenes where the Pharisees and scribes “grumble” that Jesus eats and drinks with and is a “friend” (φίλος) of “tax collectors and sinners [ἁμαρτωλοί]” (5.30; 7.34; 15.1-2), the term φίλος is absent in 19.1-10. It is nonetheless conceivable that when Jesus lodges with Zacchaeus, Luke is bringing Jesus’ “friendship” with tax collectors to its culmination. Yet this particular aspect of his narrative does not necessarily show that he is alluding to or is dependent upon traditions about Yohanan.

4. Conclusions

We cannot be confident that Luke is alluding to Yohanan ben Zakkai through the character Zacchaeus. If he does offer a figured portrait of this historical person, then we may see an instance in which the author has left (much) more in suspicion than he has actually put down in speech (Rhet. Her. 4.67).

While the Pharisees are absent in 19.1-10, we may at the very least see their influence upon the “all” who grumble that Jesus lodges with Zacchaeus (19.7). We have also observed that when Zacchaeus goes up (ἀναβαίνειν, 19.4) into the tree and then comes down (καταβαίνειν, 19.10).

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52 At Luke 18.41, the blind man also uses κύριος for Jesus, rather than ραββουνί as we see in Mark 10.51. See also the version in Matt 20.33, in which the two blind men use κύριος as well. Cf. Brookins, “Luke’s Use of Mark,” 80.

53 On this theme in the versions of Abot R. Nat., see Saldarini, “Johanan ben Zakkai’s Escape,” 201; and Tropper, “Yohanan ben Zakkai, Amicus Caesaris,” 133-149.

19.5-6), this physical movement may serve as an analog for one who mentally humbles himself in accordance to earlier teachings spoken to Pharisees (14.11; 18.14).

More certain is the word play between συκομορέα (19.4) and συκοφαντεῖν (19.8). Yet this figure, as Luke applies it, does not necessarily allude to the Pharisees and may point only to Zacchaeus’ role as a chief tax collector and rich man. If Zacchaeus is an “informer,” as well as an “extortioner,” there is possibly a connection between him and the spies who question Jesus about whether it is lawful to pay taxes to Caesar (20.20-26); but we might also expect a tax collector to serve as an informer in such matters. Although no one piece of evidence from within 19.1-10 points directly to the Pharisees, perhaps there are enough reasons to suspect that Luke points to them at least indirectly.
We began this study by asking whether the author of Luke-Acts applies figured speech in his depictions of the Pharisees. And now that we have evaluated the evidence, we may conclude that Luke has partially hidden many of his criticisms against these characters. He furthermore seems to have carefully mediated between full disclosure and complete concealment in making such criticisms, which may account for the “ambiguity” and complexity that many scholars had already observed in the Lukan Pharisees. Moreover, what appears to concretize this broader ambiguous picture are the multiple instances in which Luke uses an ambiguous word (and in one instance an ambiguous arrangement of words) in characterizing the Pharisees and those who speak to them.

Yet we have observed also that Luke’s use of rhetorical figures is not limited to those that are constructed through ambiguity. It appears that he aimed to arouse suspicions about the Pharisees through, for example, allusions, analogies, rhetorical comparisons, personification, the inflection of a given word, and irony. We have seen that such figures enabled him to offer his criticisms in a discreet and secure fashion, albeit with the effect that sometimes the figures and thus the points of critique either go unnoticed or are even understood as laudatory.

We have found that Luke may hint at this rhetorical style through the culminating point of his preface, “security” (ἀσφάλεια, Luke 1.4), which seems to anticipate the culminating point of Luke-Acts, “with full freedom of speech without hindrance” (μετὰ πάσης παρρησίας ἀκωλύτως, Acts 28.31). This narrative framing suggests that readers could not only know the “truth” about which matters they had been taught, but they could also have “security” in using the two books and perhaps even learn the rhetorical art of “circumspection” through reading them—an art that may have been necessary at least until they reached a point where free speech
was possible. Perhaps a greater appreciation and understanding of this style of speech, as Luke applies it to the Pharisees, is the most significant contribution we can offer through this study.

Many of our findings, nevertheless, have generated other questions, which may have implications for further study of Luke-Acts and its broader historical, social, and literary milieu. While we have focused upon the construction of figured speech—as an ancient Greco-Roman rhetorical style—and its possible meanings and effects, perhaps it is warranted to investigate further the social context(s) out of which this speech emerged. Chapters eight and fifteen have already initiated such an investigation, asking whether the historical Pharisees attempted to suppress or silence Christian proclamation even to the point of persecution, whether real or perceived.

This kind of research might then enter into conversation with scholarship that examines how oppressed individuals and groups disguise their writings in order to escape retaliation from their oppressors—the kind of writing Leo Strauss articulates in his Persecution and the Art of Writing. Literature that allows one to engage simultaneously in “public” and “private communication,” which Strauss terms “exoteric,” bears a striking similarity to what we have seen Pseudo-Dionysius call “the public” and “the private argument” (Ars Rhet. 8.16). This similarity perhaps comes as no surprise, since Strauss himself finds such a compositional technique in the writings of ancient rhetoricians.

Comparably, James C. Scott, in his Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, has more recently drawn the distinction between “the public” and “the hidden transcript.” Scholars have already been using Scott’s work as a model for analyzing biblical texts, in many cases leading to fresh and significant insights into the social world of their authors. In using such theoretical models to study Luke-Acts, perhaps a necessary first step
would now be to learn from the ancient instruction on figured speech, since this instruction seems itself to have been the “theory” Luke was following in order to escape notice.

In chapter two we raised the question of how possibly to understand the relationship between the Third Gospel and Marcion’s Gospel. Although we have held back from becoming too distracted by this interesting and important debate throughout this investigation, perhaps now we can synthesize some of our findings that may have implications for further study into this larger question.

We have seen that—as early as Luke 2.2 (absent in Marcion’s Gospel) and throughout Acts—there appears to be a special interest in Syria, and Antioch in particular. Notably, the reference to Naaman the Syrian in Luke 4.27 appears immediately before 17.14 in Marcion’s Gospel. While this reference has narrative coherence in Luke 4.27, it is difficult to determine whether Luke removed it from source material comparable to that appearing in 17.11-19 or whether he drew it directly from 4 Kgdms 5.1-27. We have reason to believe that Luke is working with material from 4 Kgdms 5.1-27, since he seems to play upon the motif of “anger” in 4 Kgdms 5.11-12 (cf. Luke 4.28). Yet it is conceivable that Luke could have derived the reference from an earlier Gospel, recognized its original source in 4 Kgdms 5.1-27, and then developed and expanded upon the reference with additional echoes from 4 Kgdms 5.1-27. On the other hand, if Marcion had transferred the reference from its context in canonical Luke, he probably would have done so in order to conjoin it with other material about “lepers” (i.e., the ten lepers of 17.11-19). What is especially striking is that in Luke’s Gospel, the statement “there were many lepers” (πολλοὶ λεπροὶ ἠσαν, 4.27, attested in Marcion’s Gospel before 17.14) is paired with “there were many widows” (πολλαὶ χήραι ἠσαν, 4.25, unattested in Marcion’s
Gospel). Has Luke drawn the material for this gender pairing from an earlier Gospel? Or has Marcion omitted one of its members?

A similar issue arises in the gender pairing between the bent woman in Luke 13.10-17 and the man with dropsy in 14.1-6. We have noted how Augustine observes that both of these characters suffer from a condition pertaining to water—the woman seems to have not enough water, while the man has too much. Hence, Jesus must lead her to water (13.15, attested in Marcion’s Gospel), just as he must pull the other from a well (14.5, unattested in Marcion’s Gospel). Again, it is plausible that Luke could have discovered one member of such a pairing from an earlier source and then invented the other part in order to complete the pairing. Yet what complicates such a scenario are the gender pairings in Acts, embedded within material that Luke seems to have invented. Perhaps further exploration into whether and how Luke possibly draws from Mark, when creating such pairings for his Gospel, would inform this question.

We have furthermore observed that shortly after the Lukan Jesus teaches concerning an eye that is “evil” (πονηρός, 11.34)—explaining this condition as a body that is full of darkness—he diagnoses the Pharisees as being full of predatory greed and “evil” (πονηρία, 11.39). The linkage between these statements does not appear in Marcion’s Gospel—as the accusation that the Pharisees are full of predatory greed and evil is attested, while the earlier teaching about the “evil” eye is unattested. A comparison to Matthew’s Gospel further complicates the issue, for that Gospel has the teaching on the evil eye (Matt 6.23) but does not link it together with a woe against the Pharisees, nor accuse them of being full of evil (cf. ἄκρασια, “self-indulgence,” Matt 23.25). While this evidence suggests that Luke may have brought together and developed material already available to him, it remains uncertain whether he derived that material from an
early form of Marcion’s Gospel in creating the link, or whether Marcion has broken the link by excising 11.34-36 from an early version of canonical Luke.

In chapter fifteen we demonstrated how the ἔξω of 13.28 leads up to the ἔξω of 13.33—that is, after Jesus teaches that workers of injustice will be cast “outside” (13.28), the Pharisees tell Jesus to “go outside” (ἐξελθεῖν, 13.31), and he responds that it is not fitting that a prophet die “outside” of Jerusalem (13.33). Notably, the ἔξω of 13.28 is attested in Marcion’s Gospel, and the ἔξω of 13.33 is absent. Also significant, where we read ἐκβαλλομένους ἔξω in Luke 13.28, Marcion has κρατούμενος ἔξω. The idea that the workers of injustice will be “kept outside” is consistent with the previous material where they stand “outside” knocking (13.25, partially attested in Marcion’s Gospel)—and even more consistent than “thrown outside,” since they appear to have never entered. Has Marcion improved upon Luke by replacing ἐκβαλλομένους with κρατούμενος (13.28)? The matter is not so simple of course, for Luke might have preferred ἐκβαλλομένους as a complement to ἐκβάλλω δαιμόνια in 13.32, which is absent in Marcion’s Gospel.

In examining the parable of the two sons (Luke 15.11-32) and its immediate context, in chapter eleven, we drew a connection between the younger son, who was longing to be fed (ἐπιθυμεῖν χορτασθῆναι, 15.16) from what the pigs were eating, and Lazarus, who was longing to be fed (ἐπιθυμεῖν χορτασθῆναι, 16.21) from what fell from the rich man’s table. Also, at the end of the earlier parable we see one occasion that calls for celebrating (εὐφραίνεσθαι, 15.29, 32), and at the beginning of the later parable an example of extravagant celebrating (εὐφραίνεσθαι, 16.19). We know that the parable of the two sons is wholly absent in Marcion’s Gospel, whereas the statements about Lazarus longing to be fed and the rich man’s daily celebrations are both attested. Did Luke derive the parable of the rich man and Lazarus from an
earlier source and then set the stage for it (at least in part) through the parable of the two sons? Or has Marcion (again) broken a link?

A closer analysis of the episode with Zacchaeus (Luke 19.1-10) might also inform such questions. Although in Marcion’s Gospel Zacchaeus does remark on the possibility of having previously “extorted” (συκοφαντεῖν, 19.8), the earlier reference to his climbing the “sycamore” (συκομόρεα, 19.4) is unattested. Also unattested is John the Baptist’s injunction that soldiers are to extort (συκοφαντεῖν, 3.14) no one. It is possible that Luke expanded upon the idea of “extortion” that he received from a source, supplementing it with the detail that Zacchaeus climbed the sycamore. Yet συκομόρεα and συκοφαντεῖν, and the word-play between them, could all be original to Luke, in which case a later editor perhaps did not notice the figure and omitted the reference to the tree (assuming that “sycamore” did not appear in Marcion’s Gospel).

Similarly, Marcion’s Gospel appears to have had the statement in 17.11 about Jesus “passing through [διέρχεσθαι] between Samaria and Galilee” in a ministry of benefaction, which we have compared to Peter’s claim in Acts 10.38 that Jesus “passed through [διέρχεσθαι] benefacting and healing.” Did Luke derive the statement in 17.11 from a source and then echo it in Acts? Or are both statements original to Luke?

Questions about the Pharisees in Marcion’s Gospel arise at 20.1 and 20.20-21. If οἱ Φαρισαῖοι did appear in Marcion’s Gospel at 20.1, and that Gospel does show a Proto-Luke, then we would perhaps see an additional example of Luke’s efforts to disguise the antagonism of the Pharisees. Yet it seems clear that Luke refers to “the chief priests and the scribes with the elders,” and not “the Pharisees,” rather because he drew this material from Mark’s “the chief priests and the scribes and the elders” (11.27). On the other hand, if οἱ Φαρισαῖοι appeared in Marcion’s Gospel at 20.1, and that Gospel shows a revision of the Third Gospel, then Marcion
would seem to have heightened the conflict Jesus has the Pharisees. While it is possible that oi Φαρισαῖοι appeared at 20.1 in Marcion’s Gospel, we might rather attribute the reference to how Tertullian (our witness for this possible attestation) interprets the passage (see Marc. 4.38.1 with Bapt. 10.1).

Similarly, at 20.20-21—where Luke has “spies” asking Jesus about paying tribute to Caesar—Tertullian writes, “And there came to him Pharisees, testing him” (Marc. 4.19.7). Yet it appears that Tertullian is not attributing this statement to Marcion’s Gospel, but is rather appealing to his own “scripture” (scriptura). In doing so, he seems to have conflated Luke’s “spies” with “the Pharisees” in the synoptic parallels (Mark 12.13; Matt 22.15). It remains unclear, however, why Tertullian claims that they were “testing him.” Although this detail is unattested in the synoptic accounts, it is actually Tertullian’s main interest in this context of his argument (cf. Luke 10.25, which Tertullian quotes, and 11.16).

If 20.20-21 was absent in Marcion’s Gospel, then the statement about how the scribes and chief priests were watching Jesus closely (παρατηρεῖν, 20.20) through the “spies” is also absent. As we have seen, if we cannot say that παρατηρεῖν and παρατήρησις are programmatic for Luke’s depiction of the Pharisees, we can suggest that these terms are used almost exclusively for the watchful activity of the Pharisees (and scribes) in his Gospel. We know that παρατηρεῖν is attested also in Marcion’s Gospel at 6.7. Yet because the Markan parallel (3.2) also has παρατηρεῖν, we have reason to doubt that Luke learned this term from a Proto-Luke in this instance. And while παρατήρησις is attested in Marcion’s Gospel at 17.20, the occurrence of παρατηρεῖν at 14.1 is unattested.

We know that it is extremely difficult to determine “originality” in studying the Gospels, given the apparent fluidity among them at the earlier stage(s) of composition, as well as in their
later transmission. But redaction critical studies have long shown that we can gain some insight into the distinct literary themes and theological emphases from within a given Gospel. And it has hopefully been demonstrated in this study that, when comparing these texts, we should also ask whether the rhetorical style of each is in some way distinct. In evaluating the relationship between the Third Gospel and Marcion’s Gospel, perhaps it would inform the question to reexamine their parallel passages containing figured speech, asking to what extent this rhetorical style is consistent with the non-parallel passages.

A further question, attendant to the study of the Third Gospel and Marcion’s Gospel, is the relationship each of these texts has with Judaism and Jewish literature. If Marcion did omit certain parts of canonical Luke because they were too Jewish, then what might this imply about the possible early “life” of canonical Luke in Jewish-Christian communities? Even if Luke-Acts was written partly in response to Marcionite Christianity, we would still most likely grant that Luke-Acts reflects more interest in Judaism than does Marcion’s Gospel.

Answers to such questions, however tentative, may have implications also for how to situate Luke-Acts within its broader literary culture, and perhaps to what extent these early Christian texts are outgrowths of earlier Jewish literature. As we saw in chapter three, there is a lingering question of whether the historical Pharisees held, or at least aspired to hold, authority that was religious or political, or perhaps both (as it is often difficult, if not impossible, to separate the two); and this question arises also in Luke-Acts. Based on our analysis in that chapter, it is clear that the Lukan Paul speaks about the Pharisees as a religious sect (Acts 26.5). As we also observed, however, Paul may state this credential because it has some political import for his defense before Agrippa. Moreover, in comparing Psalms of Solomon 8 and Luke 7 in chapter fourteen, Luke appears to participate in an ongoing literary tradition of depicting the
Pharisees as playing a gate-keeping role—that is, as ones who may have had some say in whether certain rulers (Demetrius III, Pompey, and Herod) entered Jerusalem. Perhaps additional research into such a role in the *Psalms of Solomon*, the Dead Sea Scrolls, Josephus, and Luke-Acts would reveal more about their possible involvement in political affairs, and also provide further insight into the relationships among these texts.

It is hoped that the present evaluation of the Lukan Pharisees will contribute to ongoing scholarship that contextualizes Luke-Acts within communities closely connected with Hellenistic Judaism—that is, communities that included Jewish Christians and god-fearing Gentiles. Luke’s figured depictions of the Pharisees may reflect a social context in which the Christian message was a matter of controversy between these communities and (other) Jews. The diagnoses that the Pharisees and their rulers are unjust and display the passions of unjust persons are best explained as stemming from moral philosophical diatribe and as ways for one group of teachers to inveigh against a rivaling group. While Luke assumes that Pharisees could become Christians, the evidence that one could be a Pharisee and Christian simultaneously is tenuous. The two groups appear to be divided over questions concerning what constitutes the kingdom of God, whether its king had arrived, and if so whether they can speak this message openly.


405


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