THE EFFECT OF PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION ON AUTHORITARIANISM AMONG STIGMATIZED RACIAL MINORITIES: A MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I argue that authoritarianism is a natural human response to the perception of threat to one’s group. The construct thus represents a response to a largely non-existent threat among dominant group members (e.g., “reverse racism”) and to a real threat among stigmatized group members (e.g., racism). As a result, the term doesn’t have the same negative or pathological connotations for stigmatized minorities that it has for dominant group members. This forces us to fundamentally reconsider what authoritarianism is. My primary hypothesis is that perceived discrimination — i.e., experiencing the threat of racism — causes higher authoritarianism among stigmatized minorities.

Chapter 1 articulates my theory of racial variation in authoritarianism (RVA) and derives hypotheses from it. RVA has many moving parts, and in this chapter I ground most of them in the extant literature.

Chapter 2 establishes the empirical anomaly that is this dissertation’s jumping-off point, which is that black Americans are by a wide margin the most authoritarian racial group in America. In this chapter I show that every available study reports that members of racial minority groups are more authoritarian on average than their dominant group counterparts. This finding holds across more than five decades of studies and three scales of authoritarianism (Fascism, Right Wing Authoritarianism, and Child Rearing Values).

Chapter 3 uses summary statistics to evaluate several dimensions of the empirical finding of racial variation in authoritarianism. These include this finding’s temporal stability, the shapes of its distributions for numerous racial groups, the temporal stability of these distributions, and the finding’s relationship to the following variables: church attendance, education, need for cognition, ethnocentrism, perceived discrimination, linked fate, and gay rights. In this chapter I show that elevated levels of authoritarianism among stigmatized minorities exist independently of the most intuitive covariates that one might suspect are able to account for the empirical anomaly at the heart of this project.
Chapter 4 reports a series of logistic regressions to show that racial discrimination represents a form of intergroup threat among black Americans. This secures a crucial link in my theory, which is that perceived discrimination among minorities functions as and behaves like normative threats do among the mass public.

Chapter 5 employs multilevel modeling with post-stratification to estimate the effects of perceived racism among black Americans on authoritarianism from nationally representative surveys and census data. In this chapter I provide the most direct and explicit empirical test of my dissertation’s primary hypothesis, which receives clear and strong support.

Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of future research that my project entails.
1.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces my theory of racial variation in authoritarianism, or RVA. Section 1 provides a historical account of the construct’s theoretical development. The concept of authoritarianism has changed considerably over time, and RVA attempts to build on some of the most recent developments in this evolution. Section 2 articulates the general framework of RVA, and Section 3 enumerates several hypotheses derived from RVA. First, though, I will address two basic questions: (i) What is authoritarianism? (ii) Why is it important to study racial variation in authoritarianism?

1.1.1 What is Authoritarianism?

Authoritarianism is a pre-dispositional construct that refers to one side of a values continuum, with social solidarity and conformity at one end and individual autonomy and freedom on the other. Authoritarians reward uniformity with, and punish deviance from, whatever set of norms and conventions they think the authorities of their group maintain. Group identity has grown increasingly central to theories of authoritarianism, and with RVA I attempt to further this trend.

There are both static and dynamic features of authoritarianism. The static features can be thought of as randomly distributed baselines. The idea here is that some people are just born predisposed to value conformity to group norms over individual freedom, and vice versa. The dynamic features can be thought of as the propensity of these baselines to respond to
environmental variables. In other words, some contexts are able to make people more or less authoritarian, whatever their baseline levels.

This definition largely stems from recent scholarship. As I will outline below, it has emerged slowly since the original formulation in the 1950s. The changes over this evolution are pretty profound. What got me interested in this project, however, is what has remained steady since the outset. Mean levels of authoritarianism vary greatly across racial groups. No matter the theory, no matter the measure, marginalized racial groups always have higher average levels than privileged groups.

Largely unnoticed, this is one of the most robust findings in the authoritarianism literature. In the next subsection I will talk about why it matters.

1.1.2 Why Does Variation in Authoritarianism Matter?

The first reason is that it might upend our understanding of authoritarianism. Traditionally, we think of authoritarianism as a pathology that causes members of dominant racial groups to be hostile toward members of marginalized groups. But maybe it is better understood as a coping mechanism of people who think that their group is being marginalized.

To varying degrees, we find such people — “authoritarians” — in every racial group. So maybe there is a difference between dominant group authoritarianism and subordinate group authoritarianism. The former has been studied extensively for decades. Currently, however, most researchers don’t even recognize a distinction between authoritarianism per se and “dominant group authoritarianism”. And subordinate group authoritarianism hasn’t been studied at all. Why?

One reason is that researchers don’t want to further stigmatize groups that are already stigmatized. As William Julius Wilson points out, it is common for progressive researchers to ‘avoid describing any behavior that might be construed as unflattering or stigmatizing to ghetto residents’ (1987: 6). Such avoidance would be a mistake in this case, for several
First, the perception of authoritarianism as pejorative stems from dominant group authoritarianism. It might not fully apply to the subordinate group version. When dominant group authoritarians feel that their group is threatened, they react in part by targeting subordinate group members. Naturally, words that describe this usually acquire pejorative connotations. The situation is different when subordinate group authoritarians respond to perceived group threat. Their perception is more accurate. Their experience is more sympathetic. And there are no groups below them in the racial hierarchy for them to target.

Second, RVA posits that authoritarianism is an effect of stigmatization. If any group is being stigmatized by RVA it is the perpetuators of racial discrimination, not the targets. That said, the full picture is more complicated.

Third, to the extent that subordinate group authoritarianism is unflattering, its victims are members of the stigmatized groups in question. This applies to individuals who are viewed as deviant by other members of their community. These individuals have to endure two layers of discrimination. The first layer is the standard discrimination that all members of their stigmatized group face. For example, the struggles every African American experiences from living within a white supremacist racial order. The second layer comes from other members of their own group. For example, homosexuality is highly stigmatized within the African American community.

An original hope of the first authoritarianism researchers was to explain and prevent ethnocentrism. This project is ongoing, and I would like to expand it. One of my hopes is to explain and prevent the type of hyper discrimination that results from subordinate group authoritarianism. RVA provides an opportunity to understand the dynamics of hyper discrimination. In so doing, it uncovers yet another negative consequence of racism, one that is counterintuitive, little known, and poorly understood. As a well-studied dispositional construct, the study of racial variation in authoritarianism also promises to elucidate con-
nections between concepts and findings that might otherwise remain obscure. Let’s consider an example from the race and politics literature.

There is a tension between the concepts of linked-fate, the belief that individual wellbeing depends on group wellbeing, and secondary marginalization, which is when marginal groups stigmatize their most vulnerable members along cross-cutting issues (Dawson 1994, Cohen 1999: 346). According to Cathy Cohen, processes of secondary marginalization represent a crisis for linked-fate politics. Linked-fate politics are based on solidarity and homogeneity. However, processes of secondary marginalization undermine this basis by introducing an expanding heterogeneity of identities. As a result, Cohen argues, traditional linked-fate black politicians are at risk of becoming out of touch with their increasingly heterogeneous African American constituency (ibid).

The relationship between linked-fate (LF) and secondary marginalization (SM) looks different from the perspective of RVA. Rather than being in tension with one another, RVA suggests that LF and SM are interdependent. To see why, we have to consider how the concepts of LF and SM overlap with concepts that constitute essential components of modern theories of authoritarianism.

Linked-fate is closely associated with both racial-identity salience and perceived discrimination (see, e.g., Hochschild and Weaver 2007: 656). The activation of authoritarianism requires at least three things. One, membership to a group with impermeable boundaries, i.e., a difficult-to-exit group to which members feel linked. Two, a high-intensity commitment to that group, i.e., high-intensity group-identification and thus high group-salience. And three, the perception of intergroup threat, e.g., perceived discrimination from another group.

Together, these three variables — linked-fate, racial-identity salience, and perceived discrimination — function like a recipe for authoritarianism. And all three of them have a strong
presence in the African American community that is well-established empirically.\(^1\) When activated, authoritarianism increases the enforcement of uniformity and social cohesion at the expense of difference and autonomy. This suggests that authoritarianism might drive processes of secondary marginalization within the African American community.

RVA thus suggests that processes of secondary marginalization are a function of linked-fate beliefs. As such, there is a limit to the extent that processes of secondary marginalization (SM) can pose a threat to linked-fate politics, if at all. LF causes SM. That is, increases in the strength of SM occur in response to increases in the strength of LF. This suggests that Cohen’s concerns about the crisis of linked-fate politics are misguided. At the precise moment when processes of secondary marginalization are most acute, we can expect the strength of linked-fate beliefs to also be at their peak. For traditional linked-fate black politicians this would suggest ensconce ment rather than estrangement — the opposite of what Cathy Cohen predicts.

Summing up, racial variation in authoritarianism is an important topic of study for both normative and theoretical reasons. Normatively, RVA provides a tool for explaining and preventing hyper discrimination. Preventing the negative effects of racism is impossible if we don’t even know they exist. RVA attempts to establish the existence of one such negative effect, and to take some first steps toward understanding it.

Theoretically, RVA challenges and expands our fundamental understanding of authoritarianism. In the next section, I track many of the misunderstandings that arise when theories of authoritarianism focus exclusively on how the construct manifests among dominant group members.

\(^1\) See Section 1.3 for supporting citations and discussion.
1.2 Authoritarianism, Then and Now

From the first theory of authoritarianism to the present, this section traces the evolution of our theoretical understanding of authoritarianism. While the earliest theories of authoritarianism are unable to account for racial variation in the construct, subsequent theories become increasingly able do so.

1.2.1 Berkeley Beginnings

According to Adorno et al.’s (1950) original formulation, the authoritarian personality (AP) refers to a set of nine personality traits that explains and predicts susceptibility to fascist, anti-democratic, and ethnocentric values.\(^2\) The Berkeley group’s primary goal was to explain and thus allow others to prevent the types of ethnocentric violence that occurred under fascist rule in WWII (Stellmacher and Petzel 2005). Despite the specificity of their intended target, the Berkeley group’s project ended up having implications and applications of a much more general nature. As Duckitt notes, they discovered that individuals ‘who were generally prejudiced were also characterized by nationalism, ethnocentrism, social and economic conservatism, anti-egalitarianism, and pro-authority attitudes’ (2009: 6).

An avalanche of criticism followed the publication of the Berkeley group’s findings, but for my purposes much of it missed the mark.\(^3\) Within less than a decade, at least four studies found higher mean levels of authoritarianism among marginalized racial groups (African Americans and Latinos) than among members of dominant groups (Whites).\(^4\) To my knowledge, however, theoretical discussions of authoritarianism ignored these findings.

\(^2\) These nine domains are: conventionalism, submission, aggression, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotypy, power and toughness, destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity of a dangerous world, and sexual obsession (Adorno et al 1950: 228).

\(^3\) While the bulk of this criticism was methodological, most of the theoretical criticisms focused on AP’s Freudian framework, which does not directly concern me here. See Kinder and Kam (2011: 18) and Martin (2001) for discussion.

\(^4\) Smith and Prothro (1956), MacKinnon and Centers (1956), Greenberg et al (1957), and Steckler (1957)
The findings of racial variation in authoritarianism raised important questions, but nobody asked them. Consider the most obvious example: If authoritarianism is defined as a susceptibility to antisemitism or ethnocentrism, then how can conspicuous victims of these tendencies such as African Americans and Latinos be more authoritarian than whites? Suppose naively that this definition, and the finding of higher authoritarianism among black Americans, are both simply true. From the perspective of the Berkeley group’s framework, this brings us to the strange-sounding hypothesis that black Americans are more antisemitic than white Americans.5

Alternatively, suppose that members of all racial groups who feel threatened by another racial group — be they white Germans of the 1940s who feel threatened by Jews, Jews of the 1940s who feel threatened by white Nazis, or African Americans during any moment in the history of the United States who feel threatened by white racists — will become more authoritarian. This brings us to the peculiar hypothesis that German Jews of the 1940s are highly authoritarian. Clearly, something is awry with the Berkeley group’s theory of authoritarianism.

In my view, there are many things awry with Adorno et al’s theory, but these problems do not arise from the seemingly strange hypotheses of the preceding two paragraphs. They arise, rather, from the absence of any considerations like them and the loss of theoretical insights that resulted from this absence.6 To begin, as a function of their specific goals, the Berkeley group overemphasized the centrality of both antisemitism7 and ethnocentrism to authoritarianism. This would have been readily apparent if they had grappled with racial variation in the construct.

5. This is actually what research on antisemitism among African Americans typically finds, which means that, even from the perspective of the AP framework, questions that my project raises ought to have been asked since the inception of authoritarianism research (see, e.g., Okami 1992).

6. I am primarily indebted to Duckitt (1989) for many of the criticisms of AP that follow.

7. Despite being somewhat strong in the 1950s, the relationship between authoritarianism (among whites) and antisemitism waned in the following decades (Raden 1999: 337).
More theoretically, the main problem is that the Berkeley group’s theory is not sufficiently
group-oriented. Despite sophisticated discussion of ingroup-outgroup psychology, Adorno et al never reasoned their way to the realization that authoritarianism is indexed by the intensity of one’s group-identification. With this realization in hand, the Berkeley group might have discovered that levels of group-identity tend to be higher among members of subordinate racial groups than among members of dominant groups.

Furthermore, the content of the group that one identifies with is more fungible than Adorno et al realized. It is different for individuals who identify with dominant ‘high-status’ groups, like most of the Berkeley group’s predominantly white subjects, than it is for individuals who identify with marginalized ‘low-status’ groups, like the African American and Latino subjects of the studies listed in Footnote 3. As Adorno et al discuss, the former are likely to index their group-identity at the level of society as a whole, which leads to nationalism, patriotism, and ‘hostility toward minority groups’ or any other seemingly unassimilated or deviant group, ranging from homosexuals to ‘people with bad manners’ (1950: 224, 233).

On the other hand, individuals who strongly identify with marginalized groups are just as likely to be ‘authoritarian,’ but their group-identity is more likely to be indexed at the level of primary groups.\(^8\) Subsequently, their ‘authoritarianism’ manifests as mostly intra-group phenomena\(^9\) and thus does not have the same society-level implications. This suggests that, in addition to overstating the association between ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, the Berkeley group also overstated the association between autocratic or fascist government and authoritarianism. For this reason, the term ‘authoritarianism’ is misleading. I will, however, continue to use it as a matter of convention ( irony not intended).

A second feature that is awry with the Berkeley group’s theory of authoritarianism is that the construct – or, more accurately, the manifestation of the construct – is more dynamic

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9. That is, these phenomena mostly occur between members of the same group – e.g., processes of secondary marginalization.
or situational than they realized. From Adorno et al’s Freudian perspective, authoritarian child-rearing practices are the root of authoritarianism (1950: 6). Socio-economic conditions only matter with regard to their impact on parenting style, which shapes a child’s personality, and thus level of authoritarianism, for the rest of her life (ibid).

The assumptions built into this view undercut everything that we now know about ingroup-outgroup processes. Highly responsive to changes in context, these processes are manipulable to some degree. As I discuss in the next section, the operations of ingroup-outgroup processes differ systematically as a function of variation in several variables. Examples include group-identity, group-salience, the permeability of group boundaries, and the perception of intergroup threat.

Despite making an important and groundbreaking contribution, the Berkeley group did not understand the role that group-identification plays in the manifestation of authoritarianism. This led them to make universal claims about the construct that are, in fact, unique to members of dominant groups. In addition, this prevented them from viewing authoritarianism as a dynamic construct that manifests differentially as a function of contextual variation.

1.2.2 Altemeyer Streamlines AP

Altemeyer (1981) caused a resurgence in authoritarianism research when he introduced the concept of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), which is highly similar to the Berkeley group’s theory. The core difference is that Altemeyer defines authoritarianism as the covariation of three, rather than nine, clusters of attitudes: conventionalism, submission, and aggression.

While the Berkeley group made ethnocentrism part of their definition of authoritarianism, RWA demotes it to being a correlate of the construct. This move was not theoretically motivated, however, as it reflects the outcome of a-theoretical inductive procedures. Altemeyer found that the ethnocentrism items did not load coherently with the three attitudinal
clusters that define RWA. He thus discarded the primary motivation behind the Berkeley group’s original concept of authoritarianism. This represented an opportunity to fundamentally rethink the concept, in retrospect, but the opportunity was missed.

To my knowledge, no studies were published that reported racial variation in RWA until 1995, and there have only been two others since then. All three studies show higher mean levels among members of stigmatized minority groups, which is not surprising in light of similar findings based on the RWA-scale’s predecessor, the F-scale. Similar to the F-scale studies of previous generations, most RWA research was, and continues to be, based on predominantly white subjects. As a consequence, RWA researchers continue to conflate authoritarianism among members of dominant groups with authoritarianism proper.

1.2.3 Duckitt Unifies RWA

Despite the accumulation of a massive authoritarianism literature since 1950, there were no revolutionary conceptual developments until Duckitt’s (1989) theory of group authoritarianism (GA). Unsatisfied with Altemeyer’s definition of authoritarianism as the covariation of three traits, Duckitt sought to uncover the ‘underlying construct [that] pulls these three components together into a single unitary and coherent dimension’ (1989: 70). His theory posits that this underlying construct is the intensity of an individual’s emotional identification with a given social group. This idea has far-reaching theoretical implications, and it is the root of RVA.

GA posits that greater intensity of ingroup-identification will cause three things: (i) greater conformity with ingroup norms, (ii) greater respect for, and obedience toward, ingroup authorities, and (iii) greater intolerance of, and punitiveness toward, violators of ingroup norms (Duckitt 2009: 70ff). If intensity of group-identification is the lynchpin of authoritarianism, then this changes the way that we think about the relationship between au-

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thoritarianism, intensity of group-identification, and every variable that affects the intensity of group-identification. If more intense group-identification causes levels of authoritarianism to increase, then variables related to more intense group-identification ought to play a larger causal role in increasing levels of authoritarianism.

Duckitt’s view thus suggests a simple causal chain: variable → intensity of group-identification → authoritarianism. This chain is probably too simplistic to function as a theoretical model of reality, but it furnishes several paths to authoritarianism that were much less apparent before Duckitt. Any variable that causes more intense group-identification has the potential to serve as a hypothesized cause of authoritarianism. This causal chain is, of course, only a starting point for generating hypotheses from Duckitt’s framework. The model gets more complicated as it incorporates dimensions of group-identity other than intensity, such as degree, salience, content, and likelihood.

There is one variable in Duckitt’s causal story that I have not mentioned yet: perceived intergroup threat. Though intensity of group-identification remains the lynchpin of GA, group-identity has to be paired with perceived intergroup threat in order to cause need for social cohesion (2009: 32). Otherwise put, the combination of high group-identity and high perceived-threat results in need for social cohesion. Purchased at the expense of personal individuality and diversity, the psychological need for social cohesion results in, and in some regards is tantamount to, authoritarian values.

The inclusion of perceived intergroup threat completes Duckitt’s causal story. Compared to its predecessors, this story is well suited to account for racial variation in authoritarianism. As I mentioned in the introduction, members of marginalized racial groups – and black Americans in particular – enjoy high levels of all three of the variables that constitute Duckitt’s theory: group-identity, perceived intergroup threat, and perceived need for social cohesion. Rather than being a coincidence, this provides us with a good theoretical template for explaining why authoritarianism is so high among members of stigmatized racial groups,
relative to members of dominant groups.

There are, however, some theoretical problems with the correspondence between the three core variables of Duckitt’s theory and similar variables that have been measured among minority populations. Like his predecessors, Duckitt did not formulate his theory of authoritarianism with either stigmatized racial groups, or the findings of high authoritarianism among them, in mind. In fact, almost all of the empirical findings that he uses to both support and motivate his theory are from studies based on predominantly white samples.

Duckitt writes that his conceptualization of authoritarianism ‘converges almost exactly with Tajfel’s social identity theory of prejudice’ (1989: 75). Like most theories of prejudice, social identity theory (SIT) is largely based on experimental data from predominantly white subjects. Consequently, GA contains many of its predecessors’ biases, and it provides a similarly misleading account that is partial to the manifestation of authoritarianism among members of dominant groups.

That said, a lot of SIT research focuses on general intergroup behavior, and many of its findings have applications that extend beyond prejudice which flows from dominant to subordinate groups. So, rather than simply introducing dominant-group bias into Duckitt’s theory, SIT studies provide important resources for adapting Duckitt’s theory to account for racial variation in authoritarianism. But this adaptability is not always evident in the details of Duckitt’s account.

One example is Duckitt’s emphasis on the reciprocal causal relationship between (i) ingroup attachment and cohesion and (ii) outgroup hostility, which is caused by threats to social identity (1989: 76). His explanation of this reflects an undue emphasis on, and concern with, the perception of social identity threats among members of dominant groups. Not all threats to social identity result in outgroup hostility. This hinges on the distinction between secure and insecure social identities, which refers to perceptions of relative group status as either stable or vulnerable to change. Threats to social identity only result in hostility
toward outgroups among individuals with insecure social identities (1989: 76f).

However, the distinction between secure and insecure social identities does not mean the same thing for members of dominant and subordinate groups. For members of dominant groups, the prospect of negative change in the relative status of their group is high stakes. Favorable relative group status is their status quo, and changes to it represent potential losses. Since losses are aversive, negative reactions to the threat of them makes sense. This accords with Duckitt’s account.

In contrast, the situation is more complicated with members of subordinate groups, for whom the prospect of negative change in the relative status of their group represents a lower stakes gamble. Unfavorable relative group status is their status quo, and changes to it represent either potential gains or small potential losses. Yet, since gains are attractive and small losses are close to neutral, substantial negative reactions to the threat of either do not make sense. Clearly, then, the situation is different for members of subordinate and dominate groups.

Duckitt notes that ‘increased discrimination is most powerfully and clearly found when differentiations favorable to the ingroup have become insecure and threatened’ (1989: 77). However, he does not discuss what happens in the case of status differentiations that are unfavorable to the ingroup, which means that most of his discussion does not directly apply to marginalized racial groups. I thus have to modify Duckitt’s framework in order to make it applicable to subordinate groups.

Many of these adaptations cluster around respective differences in how members of dominant and subordinate groups experience threat. These differences are a function of the different levels at which they index group-based social-identification. Since members of dominant groups tend to equate — or, rather, conflate — their primary racial group (e.g., white) with their society as a whole (e.g., America), they tend to index their social-identity at the societal
level. In contrast, members of subordinate groups tend to index their social-identity at the primary group level, e.g., African American.

Differences in group-identity indexing force us to reconsider the central posit of GA – i.e., that the anticipation of intergroup competition will increase ingroup-identification and thus cause higher levels of authoritarianism. This causal story plays out differently for members of dominant and subordinate groups. Duckitt observes that traditional measures of authoritarianism correlate strongly with measures of patriotism and nationalism, which he says reflects group-identity being indexed at the national level (ibid). But this only makes sense for dominant group members.

Duckitt does not say if he expects patriotism to correlate with authoritarianism among subordinate group members. It seems possible, though, given his characterization of GA as a ‘common framework for the assessment of authoritarianism both as an individual difference construct and as a group phenomenon, equally applicable to small primary groups as to large secondary societal or cultural groups’ (2009: 71, emphasis mine). Duckitt seems to be aware of GA’s wider applicability, and I maintain that it extends to members of stigmatized racial groups.

This extension is based on two features of stigmatized racial groups – and of black Americans, in particular – that distinguish them from dominant racial groups. The first feature is that members of minority groups experience greater relative levels of racial ingroup-identification (see, e.g., Dawson 1994 and Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). Authoritarian processes, writes Duckitt, ‘should only come into play to influence thought and action within group contexts and when group matters and categorizations become salient and relevant’ (1989: 73). GA posits that stronger ingroup identification causes higher levels of authoritar-
ianism, and, with a few modifications, it follows that members of stigmatized racial groups should have higher relative levels of authoritarianism.

The second feature is that members of minority groups experience higher levels of intergroup threat via higher levels of group-targeted discrimination (e.g., Sigelman and Welch 1991 and Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). GA posits that perceived intergroup threat increases ingroup identification, which in turn increases authoritarianism. Higher levels of authoritarianism among members of minority groups should thus be a function of the degree to which they perceive their group to be under threat. A good example is members of subordinate racial groups who perceive themselves as victims of group-targeted racial discrimination from members of dominant groups.

While discussing the example of Irish Catholicism in Northern Ireland, Duckitt makes the relationship between GA and being a member of a minority group explicit (1989: 80). He notes that it seems feasible that members of minority groups will show higher authoritarianism levels when their primary identification group is salient, but the opposite effect will occur when the societal level is salient (ibid). Duckitt’s comments raise an interesting question: What happens when their primary identification group is chronically made salient? The result might be a chronically elevated level of authoritarianism.

If this is true, then it raises an additional question: If the authoritarianism of stigmatized minorities is high on account of their chronically high identification-group salience, then what happens when their societal-level group-identity is made salient — e.g., after 9/11 — thereby reducing the salience of their primary-level group-identity? We know that events like 9/11 cause spikes in authoritarianism among ‘low-authoritarian’ whites (Hetherington and Suhay 2011), which suggests that many of them switch from low to high group-identity salience. For members of subordinate groups, in contrast, the switch is from one type of high group-identity salience to another type of it. Thus, rather than increase, their levels of authoritarianism are likely to remain unchanged.
With regard to racial variation in authoritarianism, the preceding two paragraphs end with just two of the many hypotheses that one can draw after making small modifications to Duckitt’s framework. I will elaborate on these and many others in the final section of this article.

1.2.4 Feldman Streamlines GA

It took over a decade for the impact of Duckitt’s (1989) theoretical discoveries to appear in the authoritarianism literature. A notable example is Feldman (2003), who hypothesizes (i) that authoritarianism originates in the conflict between the values of social conformity and personal autonomy, and (ii) that individuals who both value social conformity and perceive a threat to social cohesion will exhibit higher levels of prejudice and intolerance.

I refer to Feldman’s framework as the social conformity-autonomy theory of authoritarianism (SCA), and it essentially boils down Duckitt’s wide-ranging ideas to a parsimonious conceptualization that furnishes more actionable hypotheses. Perhaps equally important, Feldman’s conceptualization also produced a methodological breakthrough, providing a novel, easy way to measure authoritarianism. Unlike Duckitt, who sought convergence with social identity theory, Feldman bases his theoretical positions on two large-scale studies of values.

The first study is from sociology, and it investigates ‘societal values from the perspective of the values that people consider most important for raising children’ (Feldman 2003: 47; citing Kohn and Schooler 1983). Kohn and Schooler (1983) find that there is a self-direction—conformity dimension to parental values in every industrialized country for which they have data.

The second study is from psychology, and it reports that in each of the twenty countries analyzed, ‘[sets of either] conformity [or] self-direction values clustered together virtually everywhere’ (Feldman 2003: 47; citing Schwartz 1992). The authors also report that stimu-
lation values cluster with self-direction values, and that security and tradition values cluster with conformity values (ibid).

Reasoning from the findings of these two studies, Feldman arrives at the theoretical conclusion that a relative preference for social conformity should result in a strong desire to limit diversity, which indicates that people who are not conforming to societal norms represent a potential threat to the maintenance of those norms (2003: 48). Unlike Duckitt’s focus on threats to group-identity, Feldman focuses on threats to the maintenance of social norms. This accords more closely to intra-group phenomena, such as processes of secondary marginalization, so long as we allow the relevant norms to be on the level of one’s primary group rather than on the level of society.

The assignment of different levels of group-identification to members of dominant and subordinate groups is empirically motivated, but it is not determinate under all conditions. For members of both groups, authoritarian processes can be indexed at both secondary and primary group levels. The level at which they get indexed is only partly a function of differences between dominant and marginalized groups. It is also a function of contextual differences. In some environments, societal-level threats like terrorist attacks are more salient, while in others more localized threats like racism are more salient.  

Feldman writes that individuals who value autonomy over social conformity lack ‘motivation to react negatively toward groups that do not fit neatly into social conventions’ (2003: 49). The converse, of course, is that social conformists do not lack this motivation. Feldman’s key insight here is that the relationship between ingroup cohesion and outgroup denigration is causally reciprocal.

This insight provides the basis for a methodological breakthrough in the measurement of authoritarianism. In essence, it predicts that we can use values (self-direction versus conformity) to measure authoritarianism (understood as the desire to limit diversity).

13. The expected outcomes of interactions between these two types of differences could be expressed by a simple $2 \times 2$ matrix.
From the first study mentioned above, we know that parental values split along a self-direction/conformity continuum. And from the second study, we know that this taps into a values continuum which appears to be universal. The upshot is that we should be able to use parental values in order to measure authoritarianism.

### 1.2.5 Stenner Expands on SCA

If Feldman (2003) represents the beginning of a project that aims to actualize Duckitt’s theories in an empirical research setting, then Stenner (2005) represents the ambitious and thorough realization of this project. Stenner’s theory of the authoritarian dynamic (AD) ‘posits a dynamic process in which an enduring individual predisposition [authoritarianism] interacts with changing environmental conditions — specifically, conditions of “normative threat” — to produce manifest expressions of intolerance’ (2005: 14).

According to Stenner, authoritarianism manifests as an inclination toward attitudes and behaviors that aim to structure society and social life in a manner that enhances sameness and diminishes difference across people, beliefs, and behavior (2005: 16). The catalysts that activate these manifestations are normative threats, i.e., threats to the normative order, which refers to the system that demarcates people, authorities, values, and norms as constitutive of group identity (ibid: 17). The content of this normative order is flexible in terms of its specification of both right-and-wrong and us-and-them, but it is inflexible with regard to values of individual autonomy and diversity (ibid: 19).

Though I generally agree with Stenner, in many instances she does not sufficiently account for the finding of racial differences in authoritarianism. For example, Stenner claims that authoritarianism manifests as an inclination toward ‘attitudes and behaviors that aim to structure society and social life in ways that enhance sameness and minimize diversity of people, beliefs, and behavior’ (2005: 16, emphasis mine). However, the scope of authoritarianism’s manifestations might not extend to the societal-level for individuals whose
group-identification is indexed at a sub-societal primary group level.

Stenner’s discussion of the relationship between authoritarianism and ‘authoritarian political arrangements’ provides another example (2005: 15). The authoritarian worldview and autocratic political arrangements are in accordance for members of politically dominant groups, but not for members of politically and economically dispossessed groups. Paradoxically, Stenner’s view implies that the most authoritarian groups are also the groups least likely to support authoritarian political arrangements. Rather than accept this paradox, I maintain that the relationship between authoritarianism and authoritarian regimes needs to be reconsidered.

An additional example is the relationship between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, which is weaker than Stenner suggests (e.g., 2009: 250). Kinder and Kam find that even though authoritarianism and ethnocentrism are positively correlated for most racial groups, they are negatively correlated for African Americans (2010: 268[n50]). If ethnocentrism is central to the construct, then this constitutes a second paradoxical finding for the United States’ most authoritarian racial group. The paradox vanishes, however, if we view ethnocentrism as a feature unique to the manifestation of authoritarianism among members of dominant groups.

In other instances, Stenner’s framework is more amenable to accounting for racial variation. As I mentioned above, she defines normative threat as a threat to the normative order, which refers to ‘some system of oneness and sameness that makes “us” an “us”: some demarcation of people, authorities, institutions, values, and norms that for some folks at some point defines who “we” are, and what “we” believe in’ (2005: 17). It is not a coincidence that Stenner puts ‘us’ and ‘we’ in quotation marks. For, as she explicitly claims, the content of group identity is flexible with regard to us-and-them.

Yet, the us-content of dominant group members is probably different than the us-content of subordinate group members. Dominant group members are more likely to conflate their
group identity with the society as a whole, whereas subordinate group members are more likely to define their group identity against, or in opposition to, their society as a whole. This might in part explain why some race and politics scholars view post-racial political discourse as a threat to racial political progress (e.g., Smith and King 2009). Racial injustices are difficult to rectify if one of their central or constitutive features, race, is either excluded from political discourse or low in salience among influential political actors, who might mistakenly believe that what is good for America is good for its stigmatized racial groups.

An upshot of this is that dominant and subordinate group members will be sensitive to different types of normative threat. For dominant group members, societal-level normative threats will have the most impact. For minority group members, in contrast, group-specific normative threats will have the most impact. Further, these different types of threat will result in sets of manifestations that differ in scope. The scope for dominant groups might extend to national boundaries, whereas for subordinate groups it is likely to remain within the bounds set by racial-ingroup concerns. This suggests that stigmatized racial minorities will view national-level concerns through a racialized lens.

One of Stenner’s important contributions is that she clarifies the conceptual differences between authoritarianism and both (i) social or status-quo conservatism and (ii) economic or laissez-faire conservatism (2005: 86ff and 2009). Stenner defines status-quo conservatism as ‘an enduring inclination to favor stability and preservation of the status quo over social change’ (2009: 142). And she defines laissez-faire conservatism as ‘a persistent preference for a free market and limited government intervention in the economy’ (ibid). These two ‘universal personality dimensions’ are distinct from authoritarianism, which she defines as ‘an enduring predisposition, in all matters political and social, to favor obedience and conformity (oneness and sameness) over freedom and difference’ (ibid).

In a comparative analysis of the distinct types of variables that most strongly predict each of these three constructs, Stenner finds that the strongest predictors of authoritarianism are
personality and cognitive capacity variables (Stenner 2009: 145). Personality variables are related to individual needs for oneness and sameness. For example, openness-to-experience is associated with a preference for diverse, complex, and novel stimuli, and it mitigates authoritarianism (Stenner 2009: 145). Cognitive capacity variables are related to the individual ability to handle freedom, complexity, and diversity. For example, verbal ability, which Stenner views as a proxy for innate cognitive capacity, also mitigates authoritarianism (2009: 145). Variables like these play a central role in the theory of authoritarianism that I cover in the next subsection.

1.2.6 Hetherington & Weiler’s Cognitive Turn

Hetherington and Weiler’s theory of authoritarianism places at the center both a need for order and a propensity to rely on established authorities to provide that order (2009: 34). They view cognitive simplicity as the root of authoritarianism. Individuals with fewer cognitive tools are more likely to both (i) rely on emotion and instinct and (ii) feel threatened by a complicated and ambiguous world (ibid). Core features of preceding theories, such as submission to authority, get downgraded in this view to being secondary consequences of the need for concreteness.

According to Hetherington and Weiler, authoritarianism is a product of the breakdown in cognition that results from threat and anxiety. They write, ‘When people feel substantial threat or anxiety (or fatigue), cognition breaks down, causing greater reliance on emotion and instinct to pick up the slack’ (2009: 34). Since feelings of threat and anxiety are associated with the perception of discrimination among marginalized racial groups, Hetherington and Weiler’s theory is well suited to account for racial variation in authoritarianism, at least with regard to these variables.

There is, however, a potential normative downside to Hetherington and Weiler’s focus on cognitive attributes. This emphasis introduces a new set of normative implications that
might, for some, bolster the pejorative connotations of the term ‘authoritarianism.’ The authors note that Stenner ‘associates authoritarianism with a range of personality defects, including lack of intelligence, greed, unwarranted suspiciousness, a generally sour disposition, and a tendency, under threat, to experience significant “cognitive deterioration”’ (Hetherington and Weiler 2009: 37; citing Stenner 2005).

Nobody, presumably, wants to be associated with these defects either personally or by proxy via group membership. As a result, progressive researchers do not typically apply such characterizations to victimized groups with whom they sympathize. For this particular case, however, I maintain that the normative line needs to be redrawn. If the effects of prejudice-induced threat have undesirable qualities, then it is imperative for proponents of racial political progress to study these effects, understand them, and make them known. The alternative is inaction, ignorance, and silence.14

Since stigmatized minority groups have the highest mean authoritarianism scores, it is surprising that the vast majority of studies of authoritarianism exclusively and explicitly focus on white respondents (see Hetherington and Weiler 2009: 22[n2] and Stenner 2005: 38[1] for brief discussion). In the context of Hetherington and Weiler’s project, it might also seem surprising that their explanation hinges on the manifestation of authoritarianism among whites, a racial group that does not have a particularly high mean authoritarianism score.

Despite their many successes, Hetherington and Weiler might not have taken their discovery to its logical conclusion. Issue evolution based on civil rights or racial issues might give rise to the unique significance of ethnocentrism rather than authoritarianism. This is the thesis of Kinder and Kam (2010), who in many ways retell Hetherington and Weiler’s

14. It is important to note, moreover, that Hetherington and Weiler are not simply saying that authoritarians are cognitively defective. Their point is more complex than this. They are saying that people who experience anxiety from perceived threat experience a breakdown in cognition. Calling someone authoritarian is thus not tantamount to calling them dumb. It suggests, rather, that their cognitive functions are under higher load all other things being equal.
story — but with ethnocentrism in the lead role instead of authoritarianism. Using the same data, they run models that are similar to Hetherington and Weiler’s, but with measures of both ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. In almost every case, the effects of ethnocentrism are larger than the effects of authoritarianism.

As I mentioned above, Kinder and Kam report a moderate correlation between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, but there is an important exception: African Americans. This is consistent with studies that compare social-dominance orientation (SDO) with right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). For example, Heaven and Greene (2001) find no correlation between SDO and RWA among blacks, while Whitley (1999) finds that SDO is based in intergroup dominance, whereas RWA is based on submission to the authoritative beliefs of one’s group. Collectively, these findings support my contention that ethnocentrism is less likely to be a manifestation of authoritarianism among members of stigmatized minority groups.

Hetherington and Weiler’s cognitive turn has two especially noteworthy takeaways. First, by sticking to exclusively studying whites, Hetherington and Weiler ended up focusing on a variable with less explanatory power than ethnocentrism. Second, by emphasizing the unflattering cognitive dimensions of authoritarianism, they put themselves in a position that makes it awkward to discuss authoritarianism among stigmatized groups. This may have provided them with motivation to dismiss the very puzzle that I am trying to solve, as I discuss in the next section.

1.2.7 Perez & Hetherington Attempt to Reject the Puzzle

Perez and Hetherington are among the first scholars to directly address the “persistent pattern [of] remarkably higher levels of authoritarianism among African Americans relative to Whites” (2014). They charge that the difference is largely a statistical artifact. This position might seem like a direct challenge to my project; however, many of their arguments and findings are consistent with the framework that I articulate in this chapter.
The main objection of Perez and Hetherington is that child rearing items are not valid indicators of authoritarianism across racial groups. They claim that this is because these items do not enjoy the statistical property of measurement invariance. “[I]ndividuals from low-status groups,” they write, “may not translate their understanding of family order to the political and social world because their group does not occupy the same station that parents do in a family” (ibid: 401).

This interpretation stems from Perez and Hetherington’s focus on the idea that child rearing values are able to measure authoritarianism because they function as a metaphor for attitudes about the political and social world. Their test of this interpretation, a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis, finds a lack of measurement invariance (ibid: 399f). There is a lot that one could say about the validity of this finding, but even if it is valid it does not necessarily undermine my theory.

Whereas Perez and Hetherington test whether or not observed differences in scores depend on group membership, I argue that observed scores are a function of group membership. As I have argued repeatedly, authoritarianism behaves differently among members of dominant and subordinate groups. Thus, rather than being challenged by a lack of measurement invariance, my theory predicts it.

Next, Perez and Hetherington present correlations by race across several of authoritarianism’s traditional correlates (ibid: 403, Figure 1). The authors intend these correlations to test whether the differences they found (i.e., lack of measurement invariance) are substantively meaningful. The correlates they report include core values, symbolic attitudes, affect for religious minorities, and policy preferences items (ibid: 404).

There is, however, an important inconsistency in Perez and Hetherington’s interpretation of these correlations. On the one hand, Perez and Hetherington “expect authoritarianism [to] display either weak or nonexistent associations with Blacks’ political preferences, suggesting that the lack of invariance we have uncovered matters in an applied setting” (ibid: 403).
This predicts that the pairs (Black and White) of correlations will not track one another.

On the other hand, though, Perez and Hetherington acknowledge that “the high mean and low variance of authoritarianism among Blacks might bias correlations downward for this group (ibid: 404). If the correlation pairs do not track one another, then this downward bias will probably not be apparent. If, however, the correlation pairs do track one another, then the associations of authoritarianism with Blacks’ preferences should essentially mimic the associations of Whites’, albeit with a consistent downward bias.\textsuperscript{15}

These pairs of correlations are reported as dot plots, and the plots reveal a consistent and conspicuous pattern (ibid: 405, Figure 1). The pairs consistently track one another, and they do so with a consistent downward bias (toward zero) among Blacks. All of the pairs have the same sign, and almost all of them rise and fall together within relatively narrow bounds. Only including statistically significant pairs of correlations, their differences\textsuperscript{16} range from .8 to .17 with a 12.7 average (Perez and Hetherington 2014, Supplementary Materials, Table B).

Surprisingly, however, Perez and Hetherington conclude that “[t]his general pattern [of correlational gaps] underscores the child rearing scale’s lack of measurement invariance across race (ibid: 406). Their conclusion is unexpected for two reasons. First, at the outset of the section they claimed to be testing wether the measurement variance they found was substantively meaningful. This predicts pairs that track randomly, which is the opposite of what they found.

In other words, what Perez and Hetherington actually found is that their previous finding of measurement invariance is not substantively meaningful. Correlates of authoritarianism among Blacks and Whites follow the same general pattern. This not only undermines the

\textsuperscript{15} This expectation assumes that the downward bias will be uniform across all of the associations.

\textsuperscript{16} Here I used the simple calculation, ([White correlation]-[Black correlation]), which is possible because the absolute value of every White correlation is larger than the absolute value of every Black correlation in each pair. This is consistent with the expectation of a consistent downward bias toward zero among Blacks relative to Whites.
substantive validity of their measurement variance finding, but it suggests that the substan-
tive meaning of authoritarianism among Blacks and Whites is fundamentally the same.\textsuperscript{17}

Second, measurement invariance indicates a difference in kind and not just in degree. A difference in kind predicts randomly situated pairs. A difference in degree predicts cor-
relations among black Americans that are of the same sign but weaker, and this is what they found. Further, since the correlations among black Americans are downward biased, the gaps might be statistical artifacts of this bias. So the truth lies somewhere between a difference in degree and no difference at all.

At best, these data allow Perez and Hetherington to say that the correlates of author-
itarianism are weaker among African Americans. But they go well beyond this in their interpretation. They write, for example, that “the fact that Blacks’ authoritarianism — as measured by the child rearing scale — does not correlate with a range of theoretically relevant variables suggests this scale is not effectively measuring authoritarianism within this group” (ibid: 410). Yet this is the opposite of what they found. In every statistically significant case, the correlates for Blacks and Whites enjoyed the same sign.

Next, Perez and Hetherington present experimental results. Their experiment uses an illegal immigrant cue to manipulate threat to normative order, and the treatment effect is measured via a scale of opposition to illegal immigration (ibid: 407). “If the lack of invariance that we have uncovered in the child rearing scale is trivial,” Perez and Hetherington contend, “then authoritarianism should produce uniform effects across Blacks and Whites” (ibid).

This expectation only makes sense, however, if authoritarianism among Blacks is not chronically elevated due to perceived discrimination. If so, getting its effects to spike experimentally will be difficult. The reason is that additional marginal effects are harder to achieve as baselines rise. There is only so much room to move along any given scale, including our measure of authoritarianism. Thus, when baseline levels are high — as they are with

\textsuperscript{17} To be clear, this is not my position, but it is what Perez and Hetherington’s reported findings suggest.
authoritarianism among African Americans — it ought to be much easier to make its effects decrease experimentally.

It thus makes sense that Perez and Hetherington got null effects among black Americans. They took the wrong approach. The distribution of authoritarianism among black Americans (low variance, high mean, monotonically rising) suggests using a treatment designed to lower its effects. PJ Henry (2011) provides a successful example of this approach. Using a stigma-lowering, self-worth affirmation treatment, he lowered authoritarianism levels among stigmatized minorities alongside null results for white Americans (and thus closed the gap between them).

Finally, Perez and Hetherington address an alternative explanation that has two parts. The first part is their assumption that authoritarianism should uniformly affect the opinions and behaviors of black and white Americans. The second part is that “the child rearing scale does not ‘work’ [...] because its effect is race-specific” (ibid: 408). To do this, Perez and Hetherington say that they scoured the academic literature for alternative measures of authoritarianism. But they chose to exclude the two other most widely used measures, the F-scale and the RWA-scale.

The details behind this choice deserve scrutiny. To my knowledge, the gap in authoritarianism that Perez and Hetherington are attempting to debunk holds across every extant F- and RWA-scale study that reports racial variation. Even if those measures are deeply flawed, this undermines their central claim. According to Perez and Hetherington, the reason that child rearing items do not work is that the metaphor between household and society breaks down for low-status groups. If this is true, then it is hard to explain why other measures of the construct that do not employ this metaphor produce the same results.

In lieu of these scales, Perez and Hetherington use two direct single-item measures of attitudes toward ‘respect for authority’. There are many problems with this approach, though. One major issue is that it does not make sense to choose these single-item measures
over the RWA-scale. The main criticism of the RWA-scale that Perez and Hetherington cite is that its content is tautologous with many of the variables that it ought to be able to predict. This would not be a problem for Perez and Hetherington, however, if they actually believe that traditional correlates of authoritarianism do not hold among African Americans.

Another issue is that these items are problematic in a way that resembles the authors’ main concern with the child rearing items. According to Perez and Hetherington, child rearing items only work if individual dominance at home meshes with group dominance in society (ibid: 398). This is only a problem, though, if dominant and subordinate group members both index group identity at the societal level. However, if subordinate group members index group identity at the group level, then conformity preferences at home might only have to mesh with conformity preferences for the group.

As a result, it is hard to know how subordinate group members will interpret the meaning of the word ‘authority’ in the phrase ‘respect for authority’. If they are thinking on the level of society, then they will likely view authority negatively because it represents oppression. In contrast, if they are thinking on the level of their racial group, then they might view authority positively if they believe that authority within the group represents something positive for the group.

My overarching view of Perez and Hetherington’s position is that they have made an error that is common among authoritarianism researchers. The error is akin to when Whites view the concerns of minorities as partial special interests, but view their own concerns as post-racial, impartial, or simply normal. Similarly, authoritarianism researchers have confused the manifestation of the construct among Whites as indicative of the construct per se. Then, when the manifestation of the construct does not perfectly align with these patterns among low-status group members, the results are dismissed as statistical artifacts — and the acknowledgment of a negative effect of racism and discrimination gets lost along the way. In the next section I outline a theory that I believe allows us to take a more productive
and inclusive path.

1.3 My Theory of Racial Variation in Authoritarianism (RVA)

In this section I outline my theory of racial variation in authoritarianism (RVA). Though extant theories of the construct purport to be about authoritarianism proper, I maintain that they are partial to the manifestation of authoritarianism among members of dominant groups. This exclusive emphasis on dominant groups is odd because, in study after study, members of subordinate, ‘low status,’ marginalized groups exhibit higher mean levels of authoritarianism, compared to members of dominant groups. RVA represents my attempt to modify extant theories and develop an extension of them that is able to account for racial variation in the construct. Though RVA applies generally to all marginalized groups who satisfy the criteria specified, in this section I will focus on black Americans as my test case.

1.3.1 The Template of RVA

RVA’s starting template is primarily derived from Duckitt’s (1989) GA, which posits that a combination of (i) high group-identity, and (ii) high perceived intergroup-threat, causes (iii) high psychological need for social cohesion, which results in authoritarianism.

Differences between GA and RVA hinge more on issues of content and application than on structural issues. More specifically, most of the complexities that ensue result less from structural enhancements to the template, and more from attempts to establish that members of marginalized racial groups satisfy the criteria associated with each variable. I will address this issue of ‘fit’ or correspondence for each of the template’s three variables.
1.3.2 (i) Group Identity

Let’s begin by defining some terms. First, McClain et al define ‘group identification’ as ‘an individual’s awareness of belonging to a certain group and having a psychological attachment to that group based on a perception of shared beliefs, feelings, interests, and ideas with other group members’ (2009: 474). This is different than ‘group consciousness,’ which they define as ingroup-identification politicized by ideological beliefs about the relative status of one’s group (ibid: 476). Lastly, a dimension of ideological beliefs about relative group status is sometimes referred to as low public regard, which refers to the belief that other groups maintain negative opinions of one’s group, and vice-versa with high public regard (Sellers and Shelton 2003: 1081).

Though these variables are closely related, I maintain that both high group-identity, and high group-consciousness that is low on the public regard dimension, represent likely preconditions for authoritarianism among African Americans. Several studies report higher mean levels of both group-identity and group-consciousness among African Americans, compared to whites and other racial groups.

Kinder and Winter, for example, report that black Americans are three times more likely to identify with their racial group than are whites (2001: 443, Table 2). In addition, Citrin et al (2001) report higher levels of group consciousness among racial minorities, and they find that this coincides with a widespread perception of being discriminated against among African Americans and Latinos, but not among Asian Americans. This second finding draws a connection between group-identity and perceived threat, which is the variable discussed in the next subsection (2001: 257[n61]). These are just two examples from a large set of studies that report racial differences in racial ingroup-identification. Many of these studies also provide support for two other contentions that I maintained in the previous section.

The first contention is that subordinate group-identity is indexed at the primary-group level rather than at the societal or national level. In addition to reporting that blacks are
more likely to identify with their racial group compared to Latinos and whites, Phinney et al also find that blacks and Latinos identify as American more weakly than do whites (1997: 175, Table 1). Further, Sidanius et al find that racial ingroup-identification among blacks has a large and significant negative effect on patriotism, whereas the opposite is true for whites, who also report being significantly more patriotic than blacks (1997: 126f, Table 8).

The second contention is that outgroup-denigration is less likely to be a manifestation of authoritarianism among individuals who strongly identify with marginalized racial groups, compared to their dominant group counterparts. This contrasts with social identity theory, which posits that ingroup identification predicts outgroup prejudice or denigration (Tajfel 1981).18 My contention receives support from Herring et al, who find that ingroup favoritism and outgroup dislike are weakly associated among African Americans (Herring et al 1999). Further, in addition to reporting stronger ingroup-identity among blacks than among whites, Kinder and Winter report almost no black-white differences in outgroup-resentment (2001:443, Table 1).

In sum, there is substantial empirical support for the claims that, compared to whites, African Americans are (i) more likely to strongly identify with their racial group, (ii) more likely to index their group-identity at the primary group level rather than at the societal or national level, and (iii) less likely to embrace outgroup denigration as a function of ingroup identification.

1.3.3 (ii) Perceived Intergroup- Threat

In the authoritarianism literature, the relationship between perceived normative threats and the activation of authoritarianism is well established (e.g., Feldman and Stenner 1997 and Hetherington and Suhay 2011). In the race and politics literature, high levels of perceived

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18. This is commonly attributed to social identity theory, but it primarily refers to the original formulation. To his credit, Tajfel (1982) quickly recognized that the causal relationship between ingroup-identity and outgroup denigration is strongest and most consistent among dominant groups.
discrimination among African Americans, both in absolute terms and relative to whites, is also well established (e.g., Kluegel and Bobo 2001: 163 and Sears and Savalei 2006: 907, Table 3). This raises the question: Is perceived discrimination among African Americans an example of the type of perceived normative threat that activates authoritarianism?

I maintain that the answer is Yes, but only after some modifications. In traditional authoritarianism research, normative threats are understood as perceived societal-level threats that register as threats to one’s social identity and way-of-life. Elsewhere in political science, perceived threat is conceptualized in terms of zero-sum political and economic competition between groups (e.g., Bobo and Hutchings 1996).

My perspective differs from both of these. Like the traditional authoritarianism view, RVA conceptualizes perceived threat as the perception of threats to one’s social identity and way-of-life, but indexed at the racial group level. Further, though perceptions of discrimination and competition refer to related intergroup phenomena, RVA emphasizes perceived discrimination, which is consistent with Bobo and Hutchings’ finding that blacks perceive the highest levels of discrimination against their group, followed by Latinos, Asians, and then whites (1996: 966, Table 5).

Rather than explicitly measuring perceived discrimination, Bobo and Hutchings use a related variable that they call ‘racial alienation.’ This refers to a collective memory dimension that reflects one’s historically developed sense of group-position as a function of accumulated experiences with racial inequality and discrimination (1996: 956[n5]). They describe racial alienation as the invasion of the micro-world by the macro-world, and I think this captures the pervasive nature of the threats that many stigmatized minorities, and especially black Americans, experience. My previous question can thus be rephrased: Can the perception of a longterm accumulation of pervasive racialized threats cause a chronic activation of authoritarianism?

Among contemporary authoritarianism scholars, Stenner provides the most thorough
treatment of the hypothesis that normative threats catalyze the manifestation of authoritarianism, and she stipulates that the key difference between normative and other threats is that normative threats are collective rather than personal (2005: 31). Stenner’s examples of normative threats include disobedience to leaders, norm violations, lack of consensus in group values or beliefs, out-of-control diversity, variance in public opinion, high levels of public protest, party turnover in the White House, and perceptions of ideological diversity (ibid: 26, 31, 32). Examples of personal threats, which can actually attenuate the manifestation of authoritarian attitudes, include family financial distress, criminal victimization, and personal trauma (ibid: 32).

The personal threats that Stenner lists do, arguably, apply broadly to many marginalized racial communities, but here it might seem that I ought to be more concerned with the applicability of the collective threat examples. However, compared to whites, the distinction between personal and collective threats is less clear for African Americans. Among all racial groups, blacks exhibit the highest levels of linked-fate, which refers to the belief that individual fates are closely linked to one’s racial group (Dawson 1994). And linked-fate is closely related to perceived anti-black discrimination among African Americans (Hochschild and Weaver 2007).

With regard to RVA, these relationships are interesting because perceived discrimination represents a combination of the first two variables in my theoretical template: group-identity and perceived intergroup-threat. Moreover, Claudine Gay finds that African Americans are significantly more likely to both perceive anti-black discrimination and subscribe to linked-fate beliefs if they live in lower quality neighborhoods (2004: 556, Figure 2). The attributes of low quality neighborhoods might function as a daily reminder of racial inequalities, and residents probably associate them with several environmental threats. Gay’s findings thus suggest that differences in neighborhood quality might impact variation in authoritarianism among blacks.
Turning to Stenner’s list of collective threats, most of the examples represent collective threats on the level of society. As a result, they primarily reflect ingroup-threats for individuals who equate, or conflate, the wellbeing of their society with the wellbeing of their racial group. Since this describes members of dominant groups, these items have to be modified to reflect the expectation that members of subordinate groups will index their group-identity at the level of primary or racial groups. The goal of this modification is to reflect a linkage between individual and subordinate-group social identity, rather than a linkage between individual, dominant-group, and national-level social identity.

This modification is supported by both the findings on linked-fate beliefs among black Americans mentioned above, and with Citrin et al’s (2001) finding that, among black Americans, higher levels of perceived discrimination track with higher levels of ingroup-identification. A recent study by Shaffer and Duckitt provides additional support. They report that, among five first-order threat factors associated with authoritarianism, the only factor that is uniquely associated with the construct is perceived threats to one’s ingroup (2013: 14).\(^{19}\) This helps us home in on ingroup-threat as the unifying theme across Stenner’s diverse list of collective-threat examples, and it provides an empirical basis for extending what we know about the sub-national indexing of ingroup-identity among blacks to the concerns of this subsection: perceived intergroup-threat.

More specifically, Shaffer and Duckitt’s finding suggests that the relevant distinction is not between personal and collective threats, but rather between threats perceived as related to one’s ingroup and threats that are not. Perceived discrimination encompasses perceptions of the most common set of ingroup-threats that African Americans face. The consequences of this are evident in studies on race-related stressors, which find more reported experiences with race-related stressors among African Americans than among any other racial group.

\(^{19}\) The five threat factors are (i) harm to self, child, or country; (ii) environmental/economic concerns; (iii) threats to ingroup; (iv) personal/relationship failures; and (v) political and personal uncertainties (Shaffer and Duckitt 2013: 10, Table 1).
So, even though perceived discrimination does not represent a threat to society or nation, it does represent an ingroup-threat among African Americans. RVA thus conceptualizes perceived threat as perceived discrimination, generally, and as perceived anti-black discrimination among African Americans, specifically. In the next subsection, I discuss additional reasons for conceptualizing perceived discrimination as a species of perceived threat. These additional reasons are a product of the causal relationship between perceived discrimination and the third variable in the RVA template: need for social cohesion.

1.3.4 (iii) Need for Social Cohesion

Numerous studies in black psychology find a positive association between (i) sense of attachment to, and interdependence with, ingroup members and (ii) anticipating the needs of, and seeking social support from, other ingroup members (e.g., Hunter and Joseph 2010: 488 and Constantine et al 2003). Senses of attachment and interdependence resemble variables that I discussed in the Group-Identity subsection, such as group-identity, group-consciousness, and linked-fate. And racial group-related senses of anticipating others’ needs, and seeking social support, both represent behaviors that ought to accompany a psychological need for social cohesion (NSC).

There is thus empirical support for the link between (previously discussed) group-identity variables and NSC variables. But how do we explain this link? The preceding subsection suggests that perceived intergroup-threat plays an important intermediate role. In their review of research on self-identity in group contexts, Ellemers et al (2002) elaborate on this role. According to them, threats to group-value are likely to negatively impact self-esteem, which, as a collective coping response, results in stronger affiliation and loyalty among highly committed members of the devalued group (Ellemers et al 2002: 176). This account helps elucidate causal interactions between group-identity and perceived threats, while linking
both variables to NSC.

One condition of Ellemers et al’s causal account is that highly committed members must perceive the boundaries of their group as impermeable. In other words, these group members do not have the option of disassociating from their group. This situation results, in part, from the ascriptive counterpart of group-identity: group membership, which ‘refers to the assignment of an individual into a particular group based on characteristics that are specific to that group, in accordance with widely held intersubjective definitions’ (McClain et al 2009: 473).

My theoretical template stipulates that the co-occurrence of group-identity and perceived ingroup-threat causes NSC, and I have supported the claim that levels of both variables are high among African Americans. Moreover, both Duckitt (1989) and Ellemers et al (2002) stipulate that high group-identity does not just co-occur with perceived threat, but is caused by perceived threats to both group-cohesion and group-value. Self-esteem is the intermediate variable in the case of threats to group-value. And several studies support the idea that, among African Americans, perceived discrimination represents a threat to group-value that functions via self-esteem.

For example, Phinney et al report that, while racial-identity predicts self-esteem for all racial groups, it only does so uniquely among blacks (1997: 176, Table 2). In addition, Branscombe et al find that ‘prejudice against one’s group [functions as] a threat to the group’s status.’ More specifically, they report that, among African Americans, attributions to prejudice both (i) increase the salience of ingroup membership, and, as a means of maintaining and improving self-concept, (ii) increase racial-group reliance (1999: 138). Further, Sellers and Shelton report that ‘nationalist ideology, which stresses the uniqueness of being of African descent’ buffers black subjects from the negative impact that perceived discrimination has

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20. GPA also predicts self-esteem among African Americans, but GPA is not an independent variable of high interest. In addition to racial identity and GPA, other independent variables included in the models are American identity (which only predicts self-esteem for whites), outgroup attitudes, SES, gender, and age.

PJ Henry’s (2011) experimental investigation of racial variation in authoritarianism provides, in my view, the clearest and most compelling support. According to Henry, ‘being marginalized and socially devalued based on one’s social group membership’ provides a chronic source of threats to stigmatized minorities (2011: 424). Henry hypothesizes that authoritarianism plays a psychologically protective function that helps stigmatized racial minorities manage the psychological threats to identity that accompany the experience of prejudice. Among subjects assigned to the control condition, Henry reports the typical pattern of racial variation. In contrast, among subjects assigned to the treatment condition, who completed a worth-affirming exercise, the pattern of higher authoritarianism among stigmatized racial minorities vanishes (Henry 2011: 431, Figure 1).

I conclude that there is strong empirical support for the claim that high levels of both group-identity and perceived intergroup-threat are causes of NSC. This is especially true for African Americans, but the claim should extend to members of all stigmatized groups who satisfy similar criteria.

1.3.5 Implications for Authoritarianism Among Whites

From the perspective of RVA, high-authoritarian whites might seem like they are responding to the stigmatizing experiences that members of marginalized, low-status racial groups face, even though it is impossible for whites to actually face these experiences. This is actually very close to my view, and several studies support it. For example, Norton and Sommers report that, on average, whites believe that anti-white bias is a bigger societal problem than anti-black bias (2011: 216, Figure 1).

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21. Henry’s (2011) study, Perez and Hetherington (2014), and my project are to my knowledge the only three explicit investigations of racial variation in authoritarianism. 

22. This hypothesis echoes Jost et al’s (2003) findings on conservatism, broadly construed; and it is consistent with Ellemers et al’s (2002) account, which I have discussed throughout this subsection.
In a large meta-analytic review, Jost et al find that ‘motives to overcome fear, threat, and uncertainty may be associated with increased conservatism, and some of these motives should be more pronounced among members of disadvantaged and low-status groups’ (2003: 342). While motives to overcome threat ought to be more pronounced among individuals who face real threats to their social identity, these motives also ought to have similar effects among all individuals who perceive that they face such threats.

There is a high correlation between authoritarianism and perceptions of a dangerous world (e.g., Altemeyer 1996: 40 and Jost et al 2003: 362). This helps explain why researchers have had so much success uncovering the dynamic interactions between manifestations of authoritarianism and perceived threats (e.g., Stenner 2005). As I mentioned at the outset, I view the static component of authoritarianism as a largely inherited baseline that is randomly distributed across all human populations. Baseline authoritarianism will thus be distributed across dominant and subordinate groups alike, and variation that emerges between these distributions is a function of contextual variables that cause group-specific differences in threat perceptions.23 This has at least two important implications for RVA.

First, it entails that authoritarianism will be distributed across all human populations in a roughly similar manner. Populations that experience higher levels of perceived threat will shift toward the authoritarian end of the libertarian-authoritarian spectrum. Though the magnitude of this shift will have significant implications, it will look more like two slightly separated but largely overlapping bell curves, rather than like the DW-NOMINATE score distributions of Democrats and Republicans, which look like two bell curves that barely overlap.

Second, though my articulation of RVA is almost emphatic with its emphasis on the point that members of dominant and subordinate groups tend to index their social-identity

23. Other group-specific differences might also cause variation of this sort, but they are beyond the scope of this project, and my operating assumption is that the magnitude of their effects is not large enough to interfere with my results, which are thus probably even stronger than the findings I report in subsequent chapters suggest.
at the levels of secondary and primary groups, respectively, this does not mean that they do so exclusively. Citrin et al report, for example, that the ‘tendency to choose a national rather than an ethnic self-definition prevailed among a majority of all ethnic groups, though minorities clearly were more favorable to the multiculturalist emphasis on the primacy of ethnicity than were whites’ (2001: 257).

In other words, Citrin et al (2001) found that members of both dominant and subordinate racial groups identify as American first, but racial identification is more pronounced among racial minorities. Even though, on average, racial minorities tend to identify as Americans first, they do so less often than whites. And when this happens, racial minorities report a second racial identity more often than whites.

These findings suggest that many members of both dominant and subordinate racial groups will be responsive to sets of threats that, like their respective distributions of authoritarianism levels, overlap significantly. Simply put, the perception of similar threats results in similar shifts from individual baseline authoritarianism levels, with regard to both direction and magnitude.

If members of subordinate and dominant groups perceive largely overlapping sets of threats, then what, according to RVA, accounts for racial differences in authoritarianism? The short answer is: racial differences. And the more fleshed out answer is: the stigmatizing experiences that members of marginalized, low-status racial groups face, which account for the threats that stigmatized minorities are more likely than whites to perceive (but that some whites perceive anyway even though they have little or no reason to).

1.4 RVA Hypotheses

In the previous section, I articulated the three-variable template that constitutes my theory of racial variation in authoritarianism (RVA): a combination of (i) high group-identity (GI), and (ii) high perceived-threat (PT), causes (iii) high need for social cohesion (NSC), which
results in authoritarianism.

In this section, I enumerate several of the hypotheses that RVA furnishes. As in the previous section, I focus on black Americans as my test case, though my hypotheses should generalize to all members of stigmatized groups who satisfy the criteria specified. To facilitate and elaborate on the generalizability of these hypotheses, I reference between-group comparisons when possible. In each subsection, I briefly summarize the findings associated with each variable of the RVA template, and then enumerate hypotheses derived from them.

1.4.1 (i) Group-Identity Hypotheses

Racial group-identity and racial group-consciousness (GC) are both higher among African Americans than among other racial groups. Both variables are associated with perceived discrimination among marginalized racial groups, such as blacks and Latinos, but not among dominant or non-marginalized racial groups, such as whites and Asian Americans. In addition, racial group-identity among African Americans and Latinos is negatively associated with both American-identity and patriotism, whereas the opposite is true among whites. Lastly, racial group-identity among African Americans is only weakly associated with outgroup-denigration. Thus:

\( H1 \): Levels of both GI and GC will be positively associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans.

\( H2 \): Levels of American-identity and patriotism, or other indicators of social-identity indexed at the societal or national level, will be negatively associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans.

\( H3 \): Though African Americans will exhibit uniquely high mean levels of authoritarianism across all three of the most widely used measures of the construct, their F- and RWA-scale scores will largely be driven by items that do not explicitly refer to, or equate social-identity with, societal or national level concerns.

\( H4 \): Levels of racial outgroup denigration will either not be associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans, or it will be less positively
associated with levels of the construct compared to whites.

\textit{H5}: Levels of intra-group denigration – i.e., hostility toward sub-groups within the African American community, such as homosexuals, atheists, or individuals married to whites – will be positively associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans.

\subsection*{1.4.2 (ii) Perceived-Threat Hypotheses}

Levels of both perceived discrimination (PD) and racial alienation (RA) are highest among black Americans, followed by Latinos, Asian Americans, and whites. Blacks also exhibit the highest levels of linked-fate (LF) beliefs, followed by Latinos and Asian Americans; and LF is closely associated with both PD and GI. High levels of both PD and LF are negatively associated with neighborhood quality, which might result from cues that function as reminders of past and present racial discrimination. Lastly, even among predominantly white subjects, perceived ingroup-threats are the only threat factor directly associated with authoritarianism. Thus:

\textit{H6}: Levels of PD and other related variables, such as RA, will be positively associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans.

\textit{H7}: Levels of LF and other related variables, such as PD and GI, will be positively associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans.

\textit{H8}: Both (i) scales combining items from, or related to, measures of LF, PD, GI, and RA, and (ii) interactions between these measures, will be positively associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans.

\textit{H9}: Threats that African Americans perceive as racial ingroup-threats will be positively positively associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans.

\textit{H10}: Compared to whites, the set of threats that are positively associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans will contain (i) fewer threats related to to the society or nation as a whole, (ii) more threats related to African Americans and associated concerns (e.g., the criminal justice system and the racial injustices that blacks associate with it), and (iii) more threats to personal
wellbeing.

*H11*: Poor neighborhood quality, and other variables that reflect chronic exposure to cues that signal the effects of past and present racial discrimination, will be positively associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans.

### 1.4.3 (iii) Need-for-Social-Cohesion Hypotheses

Threats to group-value negatively impact self-esteem. As a coping response, this results in higher GI, which predicts self-esteem among African Americans. The causal arrow between GI and self-esteem might go both ways. Attributions to prejudice, which are psychologically palliative, increase both GI salience and racial group reliance. Either way, worth-affirming interventions make the relatively higher authoritarianism levels of stigmatized minorities disappear. But these might represent temporary distractions from the effects of perceptions of low public-regard (PR) on self-esteem. Thus:

*H12*: Self-esteem will be positively associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans.

*H13*: Low PR will be positively associated with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans.

*H14*: The interaction of self-esteem and low PR will have a stronger positive association with levels of authoritarianism among African Americans than either of the two variables individually.

### 1.4.4 Contextual Hypotheses

Some whites perceive themselves as subject to the same threats as stigmatized racial minorities. This reflects the randomly distributed, static component of authoritarianism, which is common to all human groups, and which implies a tendency to perceive a dangerous world. Between-group differences in authoritarianism are significant but not drastic, and they reflect group-specific differences in perceptions of threats. Since differences in the levels at
which subordinate and dominant group members tend to index their social identity are not exclusive, most members of both groups will perceive and respond to similar sets of threats.

All threats are contextual, and contextual variation will result in geographic differences across the sets of threats that both types of groups perceive. That is, both groups who reside in one place will share one set, and both groups who reside in another place will share a different set (independent of the group-specific threats that are not shared). So, even though every group’s baseline level of authoritarianism is the same, contextual factors unique to every geographical location will cause it to shift in the same way for everyone who resides in that location, resulting in a new baseline that is specific to both time and place.

This new geographically determined baseline is the baseline from which racial differences emerge, and these differences are a function of the unique experiences that only members of marginalized, low-status racial groups face. This results in a set of threats that stigmatized racial minorities are more likely to perceive than are whites (or members of other non-stigmatized racial groups). In sum, these phenomena — inherited baselines (shared by all), new geographically determined baselines (shared by all in the same location), and racial differences that emerge from these new geographic baselines — will unfold within geographic units of varying sizes, from zip codes to nations. Thus:

*H15*: On the state level, for states in which blacks perceive higher levels of racism and discrimination, relative to blacks in other states, blacks’ authoritarianism levels will be higher, relative to whites in their state.

In other words:

*H16*: Higher levels of perceived racism among blacks — understood as a between-states variable — will correlate positively with the extent to which blacks’ mean authoritarianism scores are higher than whites’ — understood as a within-states variable.
1.4.5 Conclusion

Hypotheses 15 and 16 have geographic or contextual implications that extend to all of the hypotheses before them (1-14), which are really hypotheses about between-group differences that reflect movements away from a shared baseline that is determined by time and place. The hypothesized relationships between variables are specifically hypothesized in this contextually relative manner, though some of them might hold across national-level data. A satisfactory test of them requires techniques, such as multilevel modeling, that are able to control for both time, such as year, and place, such as states, though geographic units smaller than states would be ideal.

Despite being a general theory of racial differences in authoritarianism, then, RVA provides hypotheses that require us to consider local variation in racial experiences and perceptions in order to explain and understand the mean national differences that are emergent from this local variation.
CHAPTER 2
AUTHORITARIANISM AMONG STIGMATIZED MINORITIES: SUMMARY STATISTICS

2.1 Introduction

The root of this project is a puzzling and poorly understood empirical puzzle: why are black Americans the most authoritarian racial group in the United States? In the previous chapter, I formulated a theory of racial variation in authoritarianism (RVA), which I believe both explains the puzzle and generalizes to all stigmatized racial minorities. In this chapter, I use summary statistics to both establish and examine the statistical fact that my leading question assumes – i.e., the empirical claim that levels of authoritarianism are higher among stigmatized racial minorities.

In doing so, I also expand upon my treatment of Perez and Hetherington’s (2014) theory that racial variation in authoritarianism is a statistical artifact. Perez and Hetherington base their argument in part on the claim that these findings lack substantive validity. In other words, they argue that ‘Black and White responses’ do not ‘display similar patterns of association with measures of political preferences’ (ibid: 403). As I showed, however, this interpretation was not consistent with their reported findings.¹

Perez and Hetherington’s findings did not support their argument, but do they support mine? In the previous chapter I concluded that their results indicate the substantive difference between Black and White authoritarianism lies somewhere between a difference in degree and no difference at all. RVA’s answer, in contrast, depends on the content of individual survey items. For example, a question that measures racial resentment against African Americans only makes sense for non-Black respondents. As Perez and Hetherington note, “[i]t is unsurprising that racial resentment toward Blacks would evince different relationships

¹ See Section 1.2.7 in Chapter 1 for further discussion
with authoritarianism depending on race” (ibid: 404).

Their logic here, however, applies to less obvious examples as well. Determining when relationships with authoritarianism will depend on race relies on one’s theory of racial variation in the construct. On this matter, Perez and Hetherington proceed without a theory to guide them.\(^2\) RVA, however, predicts a weaker relationship among African Americans for items with content that involves the indexing of social identity (American Identity) and ethnocentrism (Feeling Thermometers of other groups and Immigration items).

Further, similar logic applies to any item whose content might have different implications for African Americans. Partisanship is a good example. African Americans are considered electorally captured by the Democratic Party, which is the only racially progressive option (Frymer 1999). This entails overwhelming support for the Democratic Party among African Americans, and this in turn should make it difficult to find meaningful correlations between partisanship and other variables.

In this chapter, then, I will use RVA to help me navigate toward variables that ought to enjoy relationships with authoritarianism that are similar for both whites and blacks and away form those that should not. While many of these involve the content of specific items, RVA provides predictions about several other types of variables. Among these are statistical properties of the measure like its shape (distributions of the score across groups) and stability (the consistency of these distributions over time). These provide a good starting point for providing a descriptive statistical portrait of the puzzle that I am trying to solve.

### 2.2 Shape and Stability

Couched in a passing comment with a brief footnote attached, Hetherington and Weiler are among the first scholars to notice the uniquely high authoritarianism of African Americans\(^2\). More specifically, they have a theory for racial variation in child rearing values, but not a theory that attempts to account for the similar patterns of variation observed across all three of the major authoritarianism scales.
Their observation was not only based on a single survey, the 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES), but on a sub-population that only represented about 15% of that year’s sample. If what Hetherington and Weiler observed is nothing more than a one-shot statistical artifact, then RVA is an explanans without an explanandum.

To help establish the basic reality of my explanandum, the following three subsections will look at temporal variation (mean authoritarianism scores across time by racial group), distributions within racial groups (authoritarianism histograms by race), and distributions over time (histograms by race and year).

2.2.1 Temporal Variation Across Racial Groups

RVA furnishes the general hypothesis that the experience of discrimination among members of stigmatized racial groups is responsible for their elevated levels of authoritarianism. It thus predicts that all highly stigmatized racial groups, such as African Americans or Native Americans, will have relatively high authoritarianism scores. And non-stigmatized racial groups, such as whites or Asian Americans, will have relatively low scores. Thus, according to RVA, the uniquely high authoritarianism of African Americans represents just one example of a broader phenomenon.

More specifically, RVA predicts that the effect of stigmatization on authoritarianism (i) will persist as long as stigmatization persists, and (ii) the magnitude of this effect will be a function of the magnitude of stigmatization (or of an individual’s perception of it). We can examine both of these predictions with the 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2010 ANES surveys, which all contain the same three-item authoritarianism battery. Figure 1 presents the mean authoritarianism scores of racial groups across these five waves. Each racial group is represented by a single line, which is drawn by connecting the mean authoritarianism scores of that group for each of the five years in which the surveys were taken.

The first prediction regards stability. Temporal stability is when little to no change occurs
over time, which produces flat horizontal lines. Temporal instability is when a large amount of change occurs over time, which produces jagged lines. If a group experiences low stigma that is stable over time, then it should exhibit low authoritarianism scores that are similarly stable over the same period of time, and vice-versa with high stigma.

The second prediction regards relative levels of authoritarianism (understood as reflections of the effect of stigmatization). The lines that represent the most stigmatized groups should be the highest, while the lines that represent the least stigmatized groups should be the lowest. Regardless of how high or low they are, levels of stigma and authoritarianism should track together.

The lefthand plot in Figure 2.1 includes African-Americans, Latinos, Whites, Native-Americans, and Asian-Americans. The means of Native-Americans and Asian-Americans are unreliable because they are computed from subsets that range from only 10 to 31 observations. Nonetheless, their general trends are consistent with RVA’s predictions. Native-Americans are a highly stigmatized racial group that enjoys higher average authoritarianism scores than Asian-Americans, a relatively unstigmatized racial group. African-Americans have the highest mean score in every year except 1992. Native-Americans take this prize, which might reflect either that (i) they experience high levels of stigmatization, or (ii) that the size of their 1992 sample is too small to be reliable.

The righthand plot of Figure 2.1 excludes Native-Americans and Asian-Americans because of how poorly sampled they are. This plot presents the same data for blacks, Latinos, and whites, but with the addition of confidence intervals that represent $+/-$ one standard error from each mean. Consistent with RVA, in every year black Americans have the highest mean authoritarianism score, followed by Latinos and then whites.

The authoritarianism scale ranges from 1 to 9. Across all five waves the mean black scores remain steady around 7, which is just two points shy of the max value. The mean white scores are similarly steady, hovering above 5.5 across all five waves. The stability
Figure 2.1: Line plots of mean authoritarianism scores by race and year. Error bars in righthand plot represent confidence intervals of $\pm$ one standard error. Data: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2010 ANES

of both sets of means might reflect the stability of America’s racial order, which has clear implications for the relative positions of whites and blacks in the racial hierarchy. These implications are less clear for Latinos, however, which might explain the variability of their mean scores across time.

One interesting feature of the plots in Figure 2.1 is that in 2008 there appears to be upward pressure on the mean scores of all groups. There are several plausible explanations. For whites and Latinos, the prospect of the United States’ first black president might signal a threat to white privilege or a threat to Latino ascendence, respectively. For Latinos, the surge might reflect an environment in which immigration issues or the burgeoning electoral significance of Latinos are uniquely salient. Both prospects might register as threats. Immigration changes threaten friends and family, and unmet expectations can register psychologically as losses. The salience of both issues, moreover, is likely to decrease in the following off-election year, and this is consistent with the drop in Latino scores observed between 2008 and 2010.

The upward pressure in 2008 might also reflect the effect of a threat that is widely perceived by members of all racial groups, such as the financial crisis of 2007-2008. If so, the size of each group’s upward shift should be a function of two variables. The first variable
is baseline scores. Upward shifts should be more pronounced for groups with lower baseline scores than for groups with higher baselines. Consistent with this expectation, blacks and Latinos exhibit small and large bumps, respectively. Less consistent with this expectation, though, whites are the group with the lowest baseline but they do not experience the largest bump.

The second variable is the stability of social position, which can be interpreted either generally or vis-a-vis the racial hierarchy. Formed by a long and tragic racial history, the relative social positions of whites and blacks are highly stable. In comparison, Latinos are a fairly recent addition to the American racial landscape. Relative to other groups, the social position of Latinos is less settled and thus less stable. This might make Latinos more sensitive or susceptible to the effects of perceived threats on authoritarianism.

Alternatively, the surges in authoritarianism might simply reflect the fact that ANES oversampled African-Americans and Latinos in 2008. Blacks represent 25% of the 2008 sample, compared to 13%, 11%, 15%, and 10% in 1992, 2000, 2004, and 2010, respectively. Latinos represent about 19% of the 2008 sample, compared to being unmeasured, 4%, 6%, and 8% in 1992, 2000, 2004, and 2010, respectively. If these oversampled data are less biased, then the 2008 surges might simply reflect more accurate estimates made possible by larger samples.

Lastly, let’s examine how Figure 2.1 bears on the contrasting predictions of RVA and Perez and Hetherington’s statistical artifact theory (SAT). The results are consistent with the predictions of RVA but not of SAT. RVA predicts temporal stability of mean group levels that track with the racial hierarchy. And this is what we observed.

SAT, however, is based on the theory that the child-rearing scale ‘draws heavily on a metaphor about hierarchy’ which ‘is effective among members of a majority racial group because individual dominance at home meshes with group dominance in society’ (Perez and Hetherington 2014: 398). RVA and SAT thus furnish the same predictions for whites, but
SAT provides no direct predictions for high-status minority groups, like Asian Americans, or low-status minority groups, like African Americans. Indirectly, SAT should predict randomness rather than consistency for these groups, since it posits the breakdown of a metaphor for these types of groups. As we’ve seen (and will continue to see), though, this is the opposite of what we observe.

Further disagreement between the two theories emerges later in this chapter when we consider with what variables authoritarianism ought to correlate across different racial groups.

2.2.2 Distributions Within Racial Groups

Having looked at the average scores of racial groups over time, I turn now to the distribution of these scores within each group. I will once again use the figures in this section to adjudicate between RVA and SAT. In the presentation of their theory, Perez and Hetherington use correlations to test whether ‘Black and White responses... display similar patterns of association with measures of political preferences’ (2014: 403ff). However, as the authors note, ‘the high mean and low variance of authoritarianism among Blacks might bias correlations downward for this group’ (ibid: 404).

In this section, then, we can look at a graphical representation of these properties (high mean, low variance) that bias correlations downward for African Americans. This has a simple but important upshot. As an alternative to simple correlations, graphs provide a less biased and more informative representation of the simple relationships between authoritarianism and variables of interest.

Figure 2.2 presents a histogram of raw authoritarianism scores by race, which is computed from a dataset that pools the 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2010 ANES surveys. The proportions of each racial group — whites, Latinos, and blacks — are graphed side-by-side to facilitate comparisons between groups at each level of authoritarianism.\(^3\) Bins representing

\(^3\) Native-Americans and Asian-Americans are excluded because they are too poorly sampled, which is
even scores along the 1 to 9 authoritarianism scale are also excluded. The scale’s items offer respondents an ‘authoritarian’ option, a ‘libertarian’ option, and a ‘both’ option, which is the least popular of the three. Even scores result from respondents who choose the infrequent ‘both’ option, and including them in the histogram makes it harder to see the shape of each group’s distribution.

![Proportion of authoritarianism scores by race](image)

**Figure 2.2:** Histogram of raw authoritarianism scores by race. Dark grey bars represent African-Americans, grey bars represent Latinos, and light grey bars represent whites. Even scores are excluded to enhance clarity. *Data: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2010 ANES*

It is clear from Figure 2.2 that the distributions of authoritarianism scores are shaped differently for each group. Whites have a mean score of 5.6 and their distribution is close to normal with a slight left skew. Latinos have a much higher mean score of 6.7 and their distribution exhibits a strong left skew. Blacks have the highest mean score, 7.1, and they have the only distribution that rises monotonically from left to right. A very small proportion of black respondents score on the libertarian side of the scale. In the data that Figure 2 displays, which omits even entries, under 8% of black respondents score in the two odd-numbered ‘libertarian’ bins, 1 and 3. In the full data that includes both odd and even numbers, this proportion falls even further. Only about 1.3% of black respondents score in the ‘libertarian’ bins, 1 through 4.

In Figure 2.3 I provide a similar side-by-side histogram of Native-Americans and Asian-
Figure 2.3: Histogram of raw authoritarianism scores by race. Darker bars represent Native-Americans and lighter bars represent Asian-Americans. Even scores are excluded to enhance clarity. *Data: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2010 ANES*

Americans. Even though both groups are poorly sampled — N=86 and N=62, respectively, despite pooling five surveys — the shapes of their distributions accord with RVA. The stigmatized racial group, Native-Americans, have a mean score (6.5) that is similar to black Americans’ mean score (7.1), and a distribution that rises monotonically from left to right like the distribution of black American scores, albeit less steeply. In contrast, the relatively non-stigmatized racial group, Asian-Americans, have a means score (5.7) that is similar to whites’ mean score (5.6), and a distribution that is similar to the distribution of white scores, albeit less normal, higher peaked at the neutral or central value, and with a greater left skew.

Given these contrasts, reporting comparisons of correlations is unlikely to be informative. Thus, in the following sections I will provide graphical representations of these relationships rather than correlations.

### 2.2.3 Distributions Over Time

We have looked at both (i) changes across time for each racial group, and (ii) the shapes of distributions of authoritarianism scores for each racial group. Now we will combine these and look at changes in the distributions over time. The histogram in Figure 2.2 is derived
from pooling the five available ANES surveys, and Figure 2.4 presents the same histogram under the heading ‘Pooled.’ The first five graphs in Figure 2.4 display the same type of histogram, but unpoled by year. This allows us to examine the temporal stability of the histogram derived from the pooled data, and the result of this examination is at once boring and exciting.

Figure 2.4: Histograms of raw authoritarianism scores by race and year. Dark grey bars represent African-Americans, grey bars represent Latinos, and light grey bars represent whites. Even scores are excluded to enhance clarity. *Data: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2010 ANES*

The boring news first: shapes of distributions are essentially constant for each racial group across all six histograms. Almost nothing changes. The distributions of black scores increase from left to right in every graph. The distributions of white scores are close to normal with a slight left skew in every graph (though one might argue that 2004 represents a slight departure). And the distributions of Latino scores enjoy a heavy left skew in every graph. 1992 does not provide Latino data, but in every other year except 2004 the proportion of Latino scores increases from left to right, peaks at 7, and drops at 9.

Despite the overarching consistency across the graphs in Figure 2.4, I noted that the 2004
histogram differs from the others in two subtle ways. The 2004 sample is the smallest of the set, and it might simply be less representative than the other samples. That said, the 2004 histogram is in most ways highly similar to the other histograms in Figure 2.4.

Recall that Figure 2.1 showed a 2008 surge in the mean scores of every group. This is consistent with the histogram for 2008 in Figure 2.4. The ‘libertarian’ bins 1 and 3 of the 2008 histogram receive the smallest proportions of scores for all three racial groups.

And now the exciting news: lockstep consistency across 18 years of data might seem boring, but it suggests that the empirical anomaly that originally motivated my project points to a phenomenon that is real, robust, durable, and consistent. Though I am focusing on recent ANES data in this chapter, in subsequent chapters I find that these distributions hold across different measures, including the F- and RWA-scales, and different periods of time, dating as far back as 1952.

2.3 Substantive Validity Across Variables of Interest

I will now turn from form (shape and stability) to substance (relationships with variables of interest). This presents us with an important question: which variables of interest? My theory of racial variation in authoritarianism (RVA) and Perez and Hetherington’s statistical artifact theory (SAT) answer this question differently.

For Perez and Hetherington, the variables that matter are the ‘variables the literature suggests authoritarianism should be strongly associated with, including core values, symbolic attitudes, affect for religious minorities, and policy preferences’ (2014: 404). This answer implies that authoritarianism is the same construct across racial groups. It implies, further, that there is not a distinction between dominant and subordinate group authoritarianism.

RVA, in contrast, distinguishes between variables that ought to share similar relationships with authoritarianism across groups and those that should not. Let’s briefly consider some of the variables for which Perez and Hetherington provide comparisons of correlations. Recall
from the previous section that the central difference between dominant and subordinate group authoritarianism is that the two groups index group identity at different levels (society versus ingroup). Thus, what I am looking for when assessing the appropriateness of a variable in this context is content that includes group identity in a way that dominant and subordinate group members will interpret differently. Many of Perez and Hetherington’s variables contain problematic content of this sort.

Moral traditionalism exemplifies this. In theory, moral traditionalism ought to correlate with authoritarianism across groups, as it accords with the expected punishment of deviance (be it societally or within one’s group). However, if we look at the wording in the items that constitute this variable, all of them contain references to potentially problematic levels of identity indexing: ‘breakdown of our society,’ ‘the country,’ and ‘the world’ (Hetherington and Weiler 2009: 28; citing items in 2008 American National Election Studies survey). So, even if we ignore the expected downward bias of the correlation for African Americans, it is not clear that African Americans will interpret these items in the same way as members of other groups.

To resolve this, we have to look at variables that don’t raise these issues, but that are also of interest to both theories. If the relationships between authoritarianism and these variables are weaker for African Americans, it supports Hetherington and Perez’s theory. If, however, the relationships are the same, then it supports my theory. I will begin with religiosity and education, which have the additional benefit of helping me address common objections involving religion and class.

2.3.1 Textbooks and Bibles

The two most common objections to RVA that I hear are from folks who think my findings reflect either (i) socio-economic differences between blacks and whites, or (ii) religious differences between blacks and whites. It is beyond the purview of this chapter to definitively
address these alternative theories. I can, however, see if there are differences between racial groups in the way that authoritarianism interacts with variables long associated with the construct, such as church attendance and education.

Figure 2.5: Line plots of mean authoritarianism scores by race and church attendance. Lines of lefthand plot represent whether R attends church: dark line represents Yes and light line represents No. Lines of righthand plot represent frequency of church attendance among Rs who attend church: dark line represents once a week or more (≥ 1/week) and light line represents less than once a week (< 1/week). Data: 1992, 2000, 2004, and 2008 ANES.

Most of the religion-based objections that I encounter imply that the effect of religiosity on authoritarianism is somehow different among stigmatized racial minorities than it is among members of dominant racial groups. Figure 2.5 presents line plots of mean authoritarianism by race and two church attendance variables. Both plots speak directly to the assumption underlying the religion objection.

In the lefthand plot, the lines represent answers to the question: ‘...do you ever attend religious services, apart from occasional weddings, baptisms or funerals?’ The dark line represents respondents who answered Yes and the light line represents respondents who answered No. The results are discouraging for the religion-objection. It is common for authoritarianism researchers to report higher levels of authoritarianism among religious subjects than among irreligious subjects (e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 2009: 59, Table 3.2). Consistent with this common finding, subjects who attend church have higher mean authoritarianism
scores across all three racial groups.

More surprising, perhaps, is that the gap is essentially the same across all three groups. Subjects who attend church are about .5 points more authoritarian on average than subjects who don’t attend church. This entails that blacks who attend church are more authoritarian than whites who attend church by the same margin that blacks who do not attend church are more authoritarian than whites who do not attend church. In both cases, the gap is about 1.5 points, which is substantial for a 9-point scale.

In the righthand plot of Figure 2.5, the lines represent frequency of church attendance, with the dark line representing once a week or more and the light line representing less than once a week. The results are the same, except that the lines are slightly higher in the righthand plot. This is because non churchgoers are excluded from the righthand plot.

The upshot of the two plots in Figure 2.5 is that religiosity seems to enjoy the same relationship with authoritarianism among members of both stigmatized racial groups and dominant racial groups. It appears, then, that something other than religion must account for elevated mean scores of stigmatized minorities.

Is education this special something? While the line plot in Figure 2.6 does not provide a definitive answer to this question, it is slightly more interesting than the plots in Figure 2.5 because it shows that education affects authoritarianism differently across racial groups. Moving from least to most educated, the change in authoritarianism is larger among whites than among Latinos or blacks.

But there are two problems with reading too much into the differences between races in Figure 2.6. The first is that the general trends are still highly similar. Like with the church attendance variables, the plotted lines ultimately suggest the same story: something else is making the authoritarianism levels of black Americans and Latinos higher, and the effects of education levels look highly similar across all three racial groups. The second problem is that there are not enough observations on the libertarian-oriented end of most variables. In
Figure 2.6: Line plot of mean authoritarianism scores by race and education. Darker lines represent lower levels of education. Lighter lines represent higher levels of education. Data: 1992, 2000, 2004, and 2008 ANES

In this case, out of 685 African-Americans left in the sample (after cleaning the data), there are only 36 observations in the highest education category and 75 in the second highest category, which together comprise just 15% of an already small sample. This compares to 259 and 484 in the white columns, which together comprise 32% of the remaining whites left in the sample.

If we look past the considerable uncertainty in the means of the top two education categories of blacks and Latinos, they are almost an entire point higher than their white counterparts. This gap is consistent with the comparisons of the lowest three education categories, which are computed from larger samples and thus more reliable.

To end I will note the close clustering of these three categories in the African-American column. Squeezed between 7 and 8 along a 9-point scale, these subsets of observations have little wiggle room with which to work. There is no theoretical reason to conceptualize authoritarianism as a construct that can be bound within the range of this scale. In the histograms of authoritarianism among blacks, the highest value seems log jammed, and I suspect that a scale with a larger range would uncover meaningful variation within this category. In other words, I suspect that some individuals who score 9 on this instrument are
far more authoritarian than others who also score 9 on it. Consider that in these data over 46% of black Americans score this scale’s max value of 9.

The key point to note from these two figures is that, for both religiosity and education, the patterns of association are similar across racial groups.

### 2.3.2 Cognitive Simplicity

Cognitive simplicity is a widely reported covariate of authoritarianism. It is of particular interest to the debate between SAT and RVA, however, because of other work by one of SAT’s authors. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) characterize authoritarianism as a product of the breakdown in cognition that results from threat and anxiety. The authors write: ‘When people feel substantial threat or anxiety (or fatigue), cognition breaks down, causing greater reliance on emotion and instinct to pick up the slack’ (Hetherington and Weiler 2009: 34).

Cognitive simplicity provides an especially interesting test, then, because it goes to the heart of the author’s more developed theories of authoritarianism. Either they think that African Americans don’t feel substantial racial threat and anxiety, or that for some reason African Americans respond differently to it than everyone else. RVA, in contrast, posits that African Americans do experience and perceive racial threat, and that they respond to it in the same way that other humans respond to normative threats.

Cognitive simplicity is interesting in other ways as well. Like the child-rearing battery itself, cognitive variables have the advantage of creating distance between the predisposition, which has deep normative implications, and the variables used to measure and test its validity, which are often laden with overlapping normative content. Need for cognition (NFC) is one of the most successful and straightforward measures of cognitive simplicity, and it is often used to test the construct validity of authoritarianism measures. Let’s examine if its relationship with authoritarianism is the same across racial groups.
Figure 2.7: Line plots of mean authoritarianism scores by race and Need for Cognition (NFC). Dark grey lines represent African-Americans, grey lines represent Latinos, and light grey lines represent whites. Data: 2004 and 2008 ANES

Figure 2.7 presents three line plots of mean authoritarianism by race and preferences between complex or simple problems, in the lefthand plot, and attitudes toward thought-intensive responsibilities, in the center plot. The righthand plot shows means along a 7-point NFC scale constructed by simply adding the first two NFC items.4

The pattern across all three plots is by now familiar. For whites, the well-established covariate exhibits a strong positive correlation with authoritarianism that rises steadily in the expected direction. For Blacks and Latinos, the lines connecting their means across the same bins have smaller slopes than the white lines. This reflects a difference in the correlations between authoritarianism and the NFC scale of .08 for blacks and .2 for whites. As before, Latinos, and black Americans especially, begin at a very high position on the authoritarianism scale, and this leaves them less room to move.

Consider that in these data the mean authoritarianism of blacks who score the max value of the NFC scale is about 7/10 of a point higher than the mean authoritarianism of whites who score the minimum value of the NFC scale. When it comes to Latino and Black samples, in a manner of speaking, it seems that all of the well-known drivers and correlates

4. NFC Q1 is coded from -2 to 2 and NFC Q2 is coded as either -1 or 1. These two items are then summed to form a 7-point scale, which is recoded to range from 1 (most NFC) to 7 (least NFC).
of authoritarianism are arriving late to the party. Even at their lowest levels, it appears that something else has already driven up the baseline authoritarianism levels of these groups.

That said, the general trends are the same. For both groups, authoritarianism and cognitive simplicity (need for cognition) move together. The trend lines are steeper for whites, but the nature of the relationship (the direction of the slope) holds. As a test of two theories, these figures provide mixed results. The relative strengths of the relationships (stronger for whites) support SAT, whereas the similarity of the general trends (similar direction of slopes) supports RVA.

2.3.3 Ethnocentrism

Like cognitive simplicity, ethnocentrism is a blue chip correlate of authoritarianism. As I argue in the previous section, RVA predicts that it will correlate with authoritarianism more strongly for whites than for African Americans. I decided to include this section, however, because after producing Figure 2.8 I discovered there was more to the story. The results are more mixed than I anticipated.

As my measure of ethnocentrism I used the stereotype-based measure that Kinder and Kam (2010) use as their primary measure of the construct. This measure is constructed out of rankings of racial groups (blacks, whites, Asians, and Latinos) from least to most hard-working, intelligent, and trustworthy, coded so that higher values indicate positive assessments. For each category, every respondent’s mean rating of outgroups is subtracted from the rating of their racial ingroup, which produces three differences that are then summed and divided by three. Higher scores thus indicate higher levels of ethnocentrism.

The resultant scores are organized into quintiles, which together constitute my 10-point ethnocentrism scale. The fourth bin represents the neutral spot of the scale, which is where the score is equal to zero. Scores to the left of zero represent the opposite of ethnocentrism, xenocentrism, which increases as the scale moves leftward from 3 to 1. Scores to the right
Figure 2.8: Line plot of mean authoritarianism scores by race and ethnocentrism. Tick marks along x-axis represent quintiles (i.e., bins of 10% quantiles) of ethnocentrism scores. Dark grey lines represent African-Americans, grey lines represent Latinos, and light grey lines represent whites. Data: 1992, 2000, 2004 and 2008 ANES

of zero represent ethnocentrism, which increases as the scale moves rightward from 5 to 10.

A line plot of mean authoritarianism scores by race and this 10-point ethnocentrism scale is presented in Figure 2.8. In large part, this plot exhibits the typical patterns that have emerged in every previous line plot. First, Latinos and African-Americans begin at a much higher level of authoritarianism than whites. Second, the means of all groups rise in the expected direction, but the slope is larger for whites. Third, the gap between the means of whites and the means of blacks and Latinos either remains the same or converges some but without undermining the overall trend.

There are exceptions, however. On the lefthand or xenocentric side of the scale, mean authoritarianism scores are almost flat but decrease slightly for all three racial groups. Once the neutral quantile is passed, however, the means for all three groups begin to rise. The means of whites rise almost two points, from 4.9 at their minimum ethnocentrism to 6.8 at their maximum. The means of blacks only rise by about half of a point, from 7.1 at the minimum to 7.6 at the maximum. And the means of Latinos rise about a point, from 6.7 to
7.7. As a result, the gap between the means of whites and the means of blacks and Latinos begins at a distance of about 2 points and converges to a distance of a little less than 1 point.

To summarize, the gist here is that for all groups the most xenocentric members have the lowest authoritarianism scores. Then, once we are on the ethnocentric side of the scale, as ingroup favoritism increases so do mean authoritarianism scores. However, as with cognitive simplicity, the strength of this relationship is strongest among whites.

2.3.4 Perceived Discrimination and Linked Fate

Turning to perceived discrimination and linked fate, the plots presented in this subsection represent puzzling challenges to my theory. In its simplest form, RVA posits that higher perceived discrimination causes higher authoritarianism, and this is why we observe racial variation in the construct. This predicts that perceived discrimination and authoritarianism will correlate strongly among stigmatized minorities — thus steeply increasing slopes in the sorts of graphs we’ve been looking at. Yet, this is not what we observe in graphs of these variables.

Figure 2.9 presents the relationship between perceived discrimination and authoritarianism. Perceived discrimination is measured as a response to the following question: ‘Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.’ And respondents can choose from five options that range from disagree strongly to agree strongly.

The lines that represent blacks and Latinos in Figure 2.9 are the first that we have seen with slopes close to 0. Another first is that black respondents are distributed more evenly across the five bins of the perceived discrimination item. The two least populated bins, which represent ‘Disagree Strongly’ and ‘Disagree Somewhat,’ comprise about 24% of the black sample.

Figure 2.10 presents an index formed from the perceived discrimination item plotted in
Figure 2.9: Line plot of mean authoritarianism scores by race and perceived discrimination. 
Data: 1992, 2000, 2004 and 2008 ANES

Figure 2.10: Line plot of mean authoritarianism scores by race and perceived discrimination index. Data: 2010 ANES.

Figure 2.9 and another that simply asks respondents: ‘How much racial discrimination is there in the United States today?’ Since this question was only available in one of the surveys, the sample is very thin, as the lengths of the error bars indicate. Figure 2.10 provides an additional example of nearly flat lines with a slightly negative slope — if, that is, we take the error bars into account.
Figure 2.11: Line plots of mean authoritarianism scores by race and linked fate, on the left, and perceived discrimination, on the right. *Data: 1992, 2000, 2004 and 2008 ANES; only 2004 and 2008 for lefthand plot.*

Figure 2.11 presents a side-by-side comparison of linked fate, which is only available in two the surveys, and the original perceived discrimination item. A unique feature of the linked fate measure is that black respondents predominantly answer that they either do not believe in linked fate at all, or that they believe in it either ‘some’ or ‘a lot.’ This is why the confidence intervals of the ‘depends’ and ‘barely’ categories are so long. Even though numerous studies report the highest levels of linked fate among African-Americans, the notion appears to be highly divisive. With the perceived discrimination index of Figure 2.10, on the other hand, there are almost no black respondents in the first three categories, which represent the lowest levels of perceived discrimination.

Taken at face value, these plots do not support several of the arguments that I pursued in the previous chapter. RVA characterized both linked fate and perceived discrimination as components of a causal model intended to explain the path from stigmatization to elevated levels of authoritarianism. These plots, in contrast, might suggest that linked fate and perceived discrimination function as responses to the experience of stigmatization that constitute alternatives to, rather than components of, elevated levels of authoritarianism. This
theory is unhelpful, however, because it is not able to explain why authoritarianism levels among Latinos and blacks are, in every graph presented, higher than the authoritarianism levels among whites.

That said, in subsequent chapters I will show that these graphs are actually a sort of red herring. RVA theorizes the relationship between authoritarianism and discrimination as geographically bound, predicting a relationship that moves from a locally established baseline.

### 2.3.5 Gay Rights

In this chapter I have thus far evaluated the empirical finding of racial variation in authoritarianism with regard to its temporal stability, the shapes of its distributions for numerous racial groups, the temporal stability of these distributions, its relationship to church attendance, education, need for cognition, ethnocentrism, perceived discrimination, and linked fate. The only type of variable missing is one that measures issue attitudes.

![Figure 2.12: Line plot of mean authoritarianism scores by race and support for gay rights index. Data: 1992, 2000, 2004 and 2008 ANES](image)

To remedy this I will now turn to attitudes toward gay rights. Figure 2.12 presents mean authoritarianism scores by race and an index of support for gay rights. This index is
constructed from the three items plotted individually in Figure 2.13, which measure attitudes toward the issues of adoption by gays, job discrimination against gays, and gays in the military. Once again, the lines for blacks and Latinos track well above the line for whites, and these converge toward the max value of the gay rights index. The lines that represent whites and blacks converge to a 1-point gap, while the line that represents Latinos crosses the white line as it plunges at the final two values. This is consistent with the histograms discussed at the outset, which showed dips at the max value among Latinos.

![Line plots of mean authoritarianism scores by race and support for gay rights index.](image)

Figure 2.13: Line plots of mean authoritarianism scores by race and support for gay rights index. Data: 1992, 2000, 2004 and 2008 ANES

Both of these figures provide additional examples the pattern we have observed most frequently throughout this chapter. The relationship between authoritarianism and the variable of interest (gay rights attitudes, in this case) move together in the same direction across racial groups. This suggests that a substantial degree of continuity exists across racial groups with regard to the substantive meaning of authoritarianism. And, of course, this supports the central predictions of RVA. However, these relationships are consistently stronger among whites. This suggests that, despite the evident continuity in meaning, there is also something else behind the higher scores of stigmatized groups. And this supports SAT’s contention that higher scores among stigmatized minorities lack substantive validity. The two theories appear to capture different aspects of the relationships presented in this
chapter.

2.4 Conclusion

One of my goals for this chapter was to demonstrate that this dissertation is trying to solve a real puzzle. Rather than simply being a statistical artifact, racial variation in authoritarianism (higher scores among stigmatized minorities) enjoys many of the properties we would expect from a substantively meaningful comparison of groups. The finding persists over time, maintains its form over time, and correlates similarly across groups with numerous variables for which theory predicts a positive relationship. Lastly, these variables of interest range across numerous domains: socio-economic (education), cultural (religiosity, ethnocentrism), cognitive (cognitive simplicity), and issue attitudinal (gay rights).

As mentioned above, the graphs presented in this chapter capture features of both SAT (stronger relationships among whites; steeper slopes) and RVA (similar relationships across groups; directionally similar slopes). In the next chapter, however, I turn to evidence that supports RVA but challenges a central tenet of SAT. The statistical artifact theory claims that racial variation in authoritarianism is due to factors specific to the child rearing scale. In the next chapter, however, I will show that the empirical regularities concerning racial variation span all three of the major measures of authoritarianism, and thus cannot be an artifact of the child rearing scale.
CHAPTER 3
RACIAL VARIATION IN AUTHORITARIANISM:
LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Introduction

Since Adorno et al.’s (1950) pioneering study, the conceptualization and measurement of authoritarianism has experienced numerous refinements and revisions. There have been two especially influential operationalizations of the construct since Adorno et al.’s (1950) fascism or F-scale. The first is the right-wing authoritarianism or RWA-scale (Altemeyer, 1981) and it dominates the literature. The second is the child-rearing values or CRV-scale (Feldman and Stenner 1997) and it is emergent. From the F-scale to the RWA and CRV-scales, however, research on differences in authoritarianism between racial groups has been scant to non-existent.

Only a small handful of studies report differences in levels of authoritarianism between racial groups. A consistent and perhaps surprising finding across these studies is that mean levels of authoritarianism are higher among members of stigmatized minority groups than among non-stigmatized groups. This finding persists across the three aforementioned measurements of authoritarianism, from the F-scale (e.g., Smith and Prothro 1956, MacKinnon and Centers 1956, Greenberg et al 1957, Steckler 1957) to the RWA-scale (e.g., Whitley et al 2011, Quinton et al 1996) and the CRV-scale (e.g., Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Henry 2011). Collectively, these studies suggest that racial differences in authoritarianism are robust across alternative measures of the construct.

This robustness to different measures represents a challenge to Perez and Hetherington’s theory (SAT) that racial variation in authoritarianism is a statistical artifact. According to their account, ‘[t]he child rearing scale now used to measure authoritarianism is cross-racially invalid because it draws heavily on a metaphor about hierarchy’ (Perez and Hetherington...
2014: 398). Their theory implies that the racial gap observed in authoritarianism is unique to studies that use the child-rearing values scale (CRV). This prediction, however, turns out to be false.

Sections 1, 2, and 3 review and discuss studies that report racial differences in authoritarianism based on F-, RWA-, and CRV-scales, respectively. In these sections I attempt to show that almost every study reports that members of racial minority groups, and black Americans especially, are more authoritarian on average than their White (and Asian) counterparts. In other words, this finding holds across studies that use all three scales to measure authoritarianism, even the much maligned F-scale.

### 3.2 F-Scale: Introduction

Adorno et al (1950) designed the F-scale to be a measure of ‘anti-democratic potential’ that succeeds even among individuals who are not willing to express ‘open hostility toward outgroups’ (1950: 224). Items that fall within nine variable domains comprise the scale. These domains represent lower-level (relative to open hostility), predispositional variables that accompany and, Adorno et al maintain, are thus able to predict the potential for hostility toward outgroups (ibid: 228).

Adorno et al isolate nine such variable domains: (i) rigid conventionalism, (ii) submission to ingroup, (iii) aggression toward convention violators, (iv) anti-intraception (the subjective, imaginative, or tender-minded), (v) superstition and stereotypy, (vi) preoccupation with toughness, (vii) destructiveness and cynicism, (viii) projectivity (of a dangerous world), and (ix) sex, or a preoccupation with sexual ‘goings-on’ (1950: 228). 30 items designed to tap these domains constitute the F-scale. To repeat, this scale purports to measure the ‘potentially antidemocratic personality’ – i.e., it purports to measure the susceptibility to, or predisposition toward, fascist or anti-democratic values.

Upon first glance, levels of authoritarianism as measured by the F-scale should be rel-
atively low among racial or ethnic minorities. By definition, racial minority groups are outgroups, which the F-scale is supposed to measure a predispositional hostility toward. Racial minorities are also well-known targets of stereotypes, which is the fourth variable domain. Upon further review, though, the idea that racial minorities should have lower F-scale scores than whites is less obvious than one might think. As emphasized above, Adorno et al want the F-scale to work among individuals who are predisposed to be hostile toward outgroups but unwilling to express this hostility openly (1950: 224). In order to accomplish this goal, there is no explicitly racist or ethnocentric content in the items that comprise the F-scale. The next section continues and develops this line of thought.

3.2.1 F-Scale: Hypothesis

The attempt to avoid items with explicitly fascist or ethnocentric content opens up an interesting theoretical possibility. I will break down the logical structure of this possibility into three parts. The third part formulates a version of this article’s hypothesis, which is the form it takes in the context of F-scale measures of authoritarianism.

First, if pre-dispositional variables that predict a susceptibility to fascism exist, then they might represent a susceptibility that is equally distributed across all human groups. This includes groups demarcated along racial lines.

Second, these variables are supposed to tap a tendency to perceive dangers from outgroups that are to some degree fake or not true. Analogous perceptions among similarly inclined (i.e. authoritarian) members of racial minority groups differ in one important respect: their object of concern – racism or discrimination against them – is to some degree real or true.

Third, responses to real threats might be more pronounced than responses to chimerical threats among individuals with the same personality ‘syndrome.’ So, if white authoritarianism is a response to largely chimerical threats, then minority authoritarianism might be a response to both chimerical threats and real threats. It seems reasonable, then, to expect
the latter response to be larger or more pronounced. This conjecture translates into the following counterintuitive hypothesis.

**F-Scale Hypothesis:** Racial minority groups, and African Americans in particular, will have higher mean F-scale authoritarianism scores than whites.

At the opening of this subsection I noted that this hypothesis is in some sense possible because the authors of the F-scale attempted to keep its items free from explicitly fascist content. This makes sense from the perspective of Kessler and Cohrs (2008), who define authoritarianism as a set of general social psychological processes. By this definition, fascism represents one particular, concrete, and historically contingent manifestation of authoritarianism. It should thus be possible to study authoritarianism without studying fascism.

Even if all fascists are authoritarians, it does not follow logically that all authoritarians are fascists. This is not a trivial point. A susceptibility to fascist values might represent a very small share of the set of possible manifestations of these processes. Further, a content-free measure of these processes might only predict fascist values under certain conditions, and these conditions might only be as rare or as common as fascism itself.

The above hypothesis does not, then, imply that members of racial minority groups are unusually susceptible to embracing fascist values. Rather, the above hypothesis suggests that Adorno et al’s (1950) attempt to find a predispositional measure able to predict fascist values might (i) tap the general processes behind that particular manifestation of them to a degree that (ii) makes the F-scale useful for predicting and investigating other manifestations and effects of the general social psychological processes that comprise authoritarianism.

### 3.2.2 F-Scale: Review

To my knowledge there are no studies that explicitly investigate or test the hypothesis that racial minority groups should have higher mean F-scale scores than whites. Fortunately, however, there are at least four studies that both use the F-scale to measure authoritarianism and
report mean scores of racial groups. These studies have a lot of methodological limitations. Interpreted with caution, their findings are nonetheless consistent and suggestive.

The first is a short paper by Smith and Prothro that investigates variation in authoritarianism among ‘subcultures’ (1956: 335). Their sample consists of white and black students from the south who attend segregated colleges located in the same city. The white and black subsamples are not matched according to socioeconomic status or social class identification, which, Smith and Prothro note, would be nearly impossible due to the degree of racial inequality in the south. Subjects do, however, report father’s occupation, and the results suggest that the authors’ pessimism might be overstated. Showing significant overlap, the most frequent answers among whites are coded as lower-middle to middle class, and among blacks as lower to lower-middle class.¹ This should not be too surprising given that both subsamples are taken from college student populations. The socioeconomic similarity that these two subsamples enjoy is a relatively advantageous characteristic of the sample as a whole.

Smith and Prothro compute the mean F-scale scores of the entire sample and also of subgroups disaggregated by race and gender. They note that the mean score of their entire sample (4.29) is significantly higher than the mean score of the pooled samples (3.78) in Adorno et al (1950: 266). One might think that regional effects associated with the south account for this disparity. However, the mean score of Smith and Prothro’s white subsample (3.86) is only slightly higher than the mean score of Adorno et al’s pooled sample, suggesting that region effects are small to non-existent.

It seems that race effects, rather than region effects, are primarily responsible for the high mean authoritarianism of Smith and Prothro’s pooled sample. The mean score of their black subsample (4.68) is so high that it would have lacked precedent among Adorno et al’s findings had they not included a sample of San Quentin inmates (4.73). Even more

¹ No further information, such as distributions of responses, is provided.
surprising, perhaps, is that the mean score of black women (4.87) is significantly higher than both the mean score of black men (4.51) and the mean score (4.73) of Adorno et al’s inmates (Adorno et al 1950: 266, Table 8; Smith and Prothro 1956: 336, Table 1). These gender differences are unique to black Americans in this sample, which furnishes nearly identical scores for white men and white women (3.87 and 3.86, respectively).

In the second study, MacKinnon and Centers (1956) use a 7-item instrument derived from the F-scale to study the relationship between authoritarianism and ‘urban stratification variables’ such as education and occupation. They use census demographic data to target regions within Los Angeles County expected to yield a socioeconomically diverse sample; but they provide little additional information on sampling procedures. One disadvantage of this sample is that, unlike in the Smith and Prothro sample above, the socioeconomic characteristics of the racial subgroups are highly dissimilar. As a result it is impossible to isolate race-specific effects with these data.

Given the above caveats, MacKinnon and Centers report large differences in authoritarianism between racial groups. A larger proportion of authoritarians comprise minority groups relative to whites. The reported proportion of authoritarians among whites, African Americans, and Mexican Americans is 42%, 77%, and 80%, respectively. Unfortunately, MacKinnon and Centers do not provide their criteria for determining how responses are

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2. This finding of gender differences among blacks (i.e., among the subgroup exhibiting uniquely high authoritarianism levels) might be interesting to critics of the CRV-scale who charge that child-rearing items will introduce gender bias. The finding here appears to validate their fear, but with the F-scale. This could be an anomaly, but it could also have a more interesting explanation. Kessler and Cohrs (2008) suggest that authoritarian processes are deeply bound with variation in learning, and thus child-rearing, styles and values. This suggests that, rather than checking to see if the CRV-scale is able to tap the same dimension as the F-scale or RWA-scale, we should check for the reverse. And, if we take the latter view, this finding of black gender differences is consistent with the notion that even the relatively content-laden and psychometrically faulty items of the F-scale are able to tap into this value-orientation that has child-rearing values at its core. To repeat, it might be a good idea to investigate, in addition to everything else, if the F-scale and RWA-scale behave in a manner that is consistent with Kessler and Cohrs’ (2008) evolutionary account of RWA.

3. It is interesting that, to my knowledge, authoritarianism researchers did not posit or test any explicit hypotheses about gender differences in authoritarianism until Henry and Brandt (2012).

4. At 25% authoritarian, Asian Americans are the exception to this trend.
coded to form an authoritarian-equalitarian binary variable; and they do not include a middle category. Further, they do not provide group means. Despite these unknowns, however, the differences between subordinate and dominant groups are stark.

Third, Greenberg et al (1957) conduct a study of student attitudes toward school integration and the correlation of these attitudes with F-scale scores. They report mean F-scale scores for four subgroups: A (white seniors), B (white sophomores), C (black seniors, juniors, and sophomores), and D (black freshmen). Using a different procedure for scoring the F-scale than the previous two studies, Greenberg et al report that the mean authoritarianism levels of the white subgroups A and B are 130.6 and 134.7, respectively. The mean scores of the black subgroups C and D are 155.7 and 156.5, respectively. T-tests of the differences between groups A and C and B and D are both significant beyond the .01 level (1957: 28, Table 1). The authors do not provide any additional information about the samples that is relevant to my concerns.

Finally, the fourth is a short study by Steckler (1957) that investigates the ideology of black college students. His sample consists of 222 students who were interviewed while attending church groups at predominantly black colleges in Texas. Using a 20-item version of the F-scale, Steckler reports a mean score of 4.66, which is almost identical to the mean black score (4.68) that Smith and Prothro (1956) report.

Interpretations of the above four studies warrant caution. Often, their sampling and coding procedures are obscure, their samples are non-representative, and their analyses are rudimentary by today’s standards. A characteristic problem is that, with the possible exception of Smith and Prothro (1956), their data analyses are not able to isolate race-specific effects on group differences in mean levels of authoritarianism. It is thus difficult to rule out the possibility that the reported variation between groups is a function of differences in their respective demographic characteristics. That said, taken as a group they evidence a broad trend in authoritarianism differences between racial groups, as measured by the
F-scale. Without exception, black Americans and Mexican Americans have higher mean authoritarianism levels than whites.

Throughout this subsection I have emphasized that Adorno et al (1950) purposely constructed the F-scale out of items that do not contain explicit racist or ethnocentric content. Their goal was to predict hostility toward outgroups among individuals unwilling to openly express this hostility. For my purposes, the lack of racist or ethnocentric content raised a counterintuitive possibility. I reasoned that these items might tap a value orientation that is equally distributed across human populations, including groups most likely to be victimized by manifestations of authoritarianism. I reasoned further that this furnishes the hypothesis that minority groups will have higher mean F-scale scores than whites. To investigate this hypothesis I reviewed extant F-scale studies that contain measures of mean racial group scores. Despite the serious limitations of these studies, the broad trend of their findings is consistent with my hypothesis.

3.2.3 F-Scale: Criticisms

The publication of Adorno et al (1950) was followed by a torrent of criticism that mostly targeted the F-scale. It is ironic, in light of these, that the considerations in the previous subsection are premised on Adorno et al’s attempt to construct the F-scale out of items without explicit racist or ethnocentric content. This is ironic because a central criticism of the F-scale is that several of its items contain content that is tautological with the variables that the scale is supposed to predict, such as fascist, anti-democratic values or ethnocentrism (see, e.g., Stenner 2005: 21).

A good example of this tautological content is item number 23 of the F-scale, which is categorized under the domain of authoritarian submission. Respondents are asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can
put their faith’ (Adorno et al 1950: 255, Table 7).

At worst, this statement provides a vivid portrayal of 20th century fascism (this was my original impression of it). A more moderate view is that it provides a thinly veiled description of something akin to the spirit of fascism. A skeptical view, in line with the objectives of Adorno et al, is that this statement does not contain any explicitly fascist content, strictly speaking. This skeptical view is to some extent true. However, it is also true that the statement of item 23 implies that strong leadership should supersede laws (as an express need of this country, no less) which is a distinctly anti-democratic notion.

To summarize, the content of item number 23 risks being fascist in spirit and sound; and it is anti-democratic by entailment. If a respondent agrees with it, then she has done something very close to – or at least too close to – both agreeing generally with fascist values and subscribing to at least one anti-democratic notion. It follows that, due to the specific nature of its content, this item comes too close to directly measuring the endorsement of fascist or anti-democratic values. As a potential direct measure of these values, it is unable to function as an item in a scale that is supposed to predict them.

Another criticism is that the original F-scale suffered from acquiescence response set, a bias that refers to the tendency of respondents to consistently provide affirmative answers to questions without regarding their content (Duckitt 1989: 66, Stenner 2005: 20). This problem is usually fixed by varying the structure of the questions so that the ‘authoritarian’ response is not always affirmative. However, the scope and fixability of this problem for the F-scale became a topic of controversy (see, e.g., Chapman and Campbell 1956).

A perhaps more damaging criticism of the F-scale is that it tapped into a range of attitudes that extended beyond authoritarianism, resulting in an incoherent and inconsistent multi-dimensionality (Hetherington and Weiler 2009: 36, Duckitt 1989: 65, Altemeyer 1981: 18f). Further, the nine variable domains at the heart of this issue are derived from, and thus intertwined with, Adorno et al’s Freudian theoretical framework, which began to fall out of
favor soon after the publication of Adorno et al (1950).

In sum, the F-scale suffered from ongoing concerns about the reliability and validity of its items and their alleged domains; and these were accompanied by doubts about its theoretical motivations and origins. Given these concerns and criticisms it should be surprising that I found any support for my hypothesis among the F-scale studies reviewed in this section. The main reason is that my central hypothesis, which I formulated outside of the context of F-scale research, is based on a much more general, lower level, and more fundamental conceptualization of authoritarianism.

Adorno et al designed their scale to study predispositional propensities toward fascism and antisemitism, in particular, and intolerance and ethnocentrism, in general. As the targets of all three — racism, intolerance, and ethnocentrism — minority groups ought to be the subpopulations least likely to score high on this measure. If, in contrast, members of minority groups tend to score higher than whites, then clearly something is amiss in the fit between Adorno et al’s measure and the construct that it is supposed to tap. I will return to this issue below.

3.2.4 F-Scale: Empirical Analysis

The conceptualizations of authoritarianism that followed and largely replaced the F-scale are more parsimonious in a few ways. Yet they still tap components that were both (i) conceptualized as part of the original construct and (ii) measured by one or more items in the original F-scale. This continuity might explain why my hypothesis — formulated in the context of today’s revised theories and measurements — seems to hold across F-scale studies. But this observation is premature in part because of the relatively weak basis for it provided above, which amounts to a skimming of results from a handful of old studies. To better establish and clarify the meaning of those findings, in this subsection I analyze one of the few nationally representative surveys that includes F-scale items.
Figure 3.1: Densities of raw authoritarianism scores by race, with vertical dotted lines at group means. 10 represents highest possible F-scale score. *Data: 1952 American National Election Studies.*

In 1952 the Survey Research Center, which is now called the American National Election Studies, included a short 10-item version of the F-scale in their post-election survey. Each of the items contains a statement with which respondents either strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree. Responses to the ten items are coded as -1, -.5, .5, or 1, which sums to yield a 37-point scale that ranges from -10 (least authoritarian or most libertarian) to 10 (most authoritarian or least libertarian). Figure 3.1 displays smoothed histograms of F-scale scores for white (N=416) and black (N=45) respondents. Authoritarianism levels were significantly higher for blacks (mean = .89) than for whites (mean = -.74; \( t = -3.07, p = .003 \)). This is consistent with the results that Smith and Prothro (1956) report.

Some folks will find it surprising that mean black F-scale scores are higher than mean white F-scale scores. If I had obtained this finding with the CRV-scale, a skeptic might charge that the general value orientation that the CRV-scale taps is too far removed from the specifically intolerant and ethnocentric predispositional personality variable that both the F-scale and the RWA-scale tap. This explanation, however, does not appear to hold up, at least not with these data. Further, compared to the RWA-scale, the F-scale is generally viewed as too heavy-handed or content-laden. Some folks, then, should find it even more surprising that the mean F-scale scores of blacks are higher than those of whites.
That said, these results are only preliminary. They are consistent with my hypothesis, but it would be overreaching to say that they provide solid support for it. As with the findings that I reviewed above, the differences between white and black mean authoritarianism levels reported in Figure 3.1 could be a reflection of the effect of non-racial demographic variables on authoritarianism. As a simple test of this possibility I ran a regression of F-scale authoritarianism on race, a rough proxy for perceived discrimination, and covariates sex, age, education, and household income.

Table 3.1: Authoritarianism on Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(intercept)</td>
<td>.41 (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>1.47 (.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>-.20 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>.24 (.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.51 (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.34 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.61 (.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 reports the results of this simple model. Controlling for demographic variables, this model estimates that the average effect on authoritarianism of being black compared to being white is substantively large and statistically significant. The model estimates this effect to be an increase of about one and one-half units up the authoritarianism scale, which reflect a change of about 7 percent. From the means of both groups, this estimated effect is large enough to push one across zero to the other side of the authoritarianism-libertarianism, or conformity-autonomy, spectrum.

This is bad news for Perez and Hetherington. They posit that the Black-White gap in
authoritarianism is an artifact of the child rearing values scale. However, only one of the ten items in this F-scale battery includes child rearing. Further, the gap persists across all five F-scale datasets.

3.3 RWA-Scale: Introduction

Criticisms of Adorno et al (1950) and their F-scale resulted in a lull in authoritarianism research that spanned decades. This lull ended with the introduction of Altemeyer’s (1981) right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) project. RWA is atheoretical in at least two senses. First, Altemeyer does not distinguish between the measurement of RWA and its conceptualization. Second, he derives RWA inductively from factor analyses of F-scale items, trimming away the items that do not coherently load under factors. The result is a construct with only three, rather than nine, dimensions.

The three domains (or dimensions, or ‘attitudinal clusters’) of RWA are essentially the first three that Adorno et al (1950) enumerate: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression (Altemeyer 1996: 7). The RWA-scale represents at least three methodological improvements to the F-scale. First, its items are balanced to avoid the response set issue. Second, it enjoys higher levels of reliability. And third, by focusing on its three covarying domains, the RWA-scale avoids the F-scale’s incoherent multidimensionality (ibid: 12f).

As I noted in the previous section, there are not many F-scale studies that either (i) explicitly focus on racial variation in authoritarianism, or (ii) report results relevant to this topic. There are even fewer RWA-scale studies that meet these criteria. One explanation for this gap is that researchers continued to conceptualize authoritarianism as a construct intended to explain the hostility that dominant groups sometimes direct toward minority groups. Consequently, researchers continued to overlook minority groups as candidate populations for the study of authoritarianism.
On theoretical grounds Altemeyer does not specifically rule out the notion of measuring authoritarianism among racial minorities. He even mentions that minorities ‘within North American... have not been studied,’ while making the larger point that extant RWA research encompasses a limited range of samples (1996: 18). Further, when Altemeyer refers to ‘High RWAs’ and their ‘dislike of minorities’ (e.g., 1996: 46), he refers to ‘High RWAs’ rather than to ‘High RWA members of the dominant group,’ though he sometimes seems to imply the latter. Unlike Adorno et al (1950), Altemeyer views prejudice and ethnocentrism as a correlate or likely consequence of authoritarianism, and not as one of its core conceptual domains (1996: 25).

That said, authoritarian aggression, which is one of Altemeyer’s three attitudinal clusters, comes close to implying that prejudice or ethnocentrism is a central component of authoritarianism. This is evident when he writes that ‘[a]nyone could become the target of authoritarian aggression, but unconventional people (including “social deviants”) and conventional victims of aggression (such as certain minority groups) are attacked more readily than others’ (ibid: 10). Prejudice, then, is expected as a correlate of authoritarianism, but only because it provides a ‘conventional outlet of aggressive impulses’; and it would only be deemed ‘authoritarian’ if an authority sanctioned it (ibid).

While discussing the theoretical basis of his construct, Altemeyer is careful not to include the sort of content-laden thoughts and behaviors that he would like his scale to predict. Sometimes, though, this care and precision does not carry over to the individual items that comprise his scale. Unlike Altemeyer’s theoretical discussion, many of his scale’s items mention specific groups, including women, homosexuals, atheists, and feminists (1996: 10f, Exhibit 1.1). This is not necessarily a problem given my specific interest in racial minority groups. However, since I believe that authoritarianism levels will increase among the members of any group that feels threatened, the items that mention specific groups are a problem in the context of analyses that focus on any of the groups that they mention.
There is an additional problem with the content of several of the RWA-scale’s items. This problem relates directly to my interest in studying authoritarianism among black Americans and other marginalized racial groups. As mentioned above, I view authoritarianism as a response of group-members to perceived threats to their group. It can thus be problematic if measures of authoritarianism contain content that group-members perceive as against their self-interest qua members of specific groups. African Americans, for example, experience numerous forms of discrimination from the criminal justice system. This, then, should affect African American opinion on issues that fall within or are related to the domain of criminal justice.\footnote{I discuss this issue in greater detail at the end of the literature review in Subsection 3.2.2 below.}

Several of Altemeyer’s RWA items explicitly mention the criminal justice system in a manner that might sway high-authoritarian black respondents from providing ‘authoritarian’ answers. There are three such examples among the thirty four items. The first is item 1, which states: ‘Life imprisonment is justified for certain crimes.’ The second is item 21, which states: ‘What our country \textit{really} needs, instead of more “civil rights,” is a good stiff dose of law and order’ (emphasis in original). Lastly, item 34 states: ‘The facts on crime... show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order’ (Altemeyer 1996: 13f, Exhibit 1.1).

The content of these statements is likely to induce conflicting opinions among respondents who are both black and predisposed to be high-authoritarian. On the one hand, qua black Americans, these respondents will distrust any enhancement of a racially discriminatory criminal justice system. On the other hand, qua high-authoritarians, these respondents will be predisposed to prefer a robust, well-ordered, strict and punitive criminal justice system.

I refer to it as \textit{crosstalk} when items are likely to induce mixed signals among respondents in this manner. Crosstalk is responsible for at least three undesirable outcomes. First, it makes black or other minority respondents’ responses to these items difficult to interpret.
Second, crosstalk undermines factor analyses with black or other minority samples. And third, it makes it more difficult to administer the scale to black or other minority samples without making adjustments, which in turn undermines between-group comparisons of mean RWA-scale scores. On a more positive note, given these issues, any findings regarding racial variation in RWA-scores are probably stronger than reported.

3.3.1 RWA-Scale: Hypothesis

The concerns of the previous subsection indicate that, like Adorno et al (1950), Altemeyer’s conceptualization and operationalization of authoritarianism might lack sufficient generality. To avoid this shortcoming, measures of authoritarianism must employ items without two types of content. The first is any specific mention of a minority group target. The second is any specific mention of an issue domain that is uniquely salient to a racial group we are interested in. Measures that violate these criteria are problematic for investigating hypotheses about differences in authoritarianism between racial groups. They are thus problematic for testing my hypothesis, which posits higher levels of authoritarianism among racial minority groups than among whites, the majority or dominant group.

In the F-scale section above I maintain that, given numerous caveats, broad and consistent trends in the evidence indicate support for my hypothesis with F-scale measures of authoritarianism. Based on an even smaller but sometimes higher quality body of evidence, this section maintains that RWA-scale measures of authoritarianism will also provide support for my hypothesis. Thus:

RWA-Scale Hypothesis: Racial minority groups, and African Americans in particular, will have higher mean RWA-scale authoritarianism scores than whites.

In fact, there are theoretical reasons to believe that the RWA-scale will provide even stronger support than the F-scale. Altemeyer enumerates at least five ways in which his theory of RWA differs from ‘the Berkeley theory’ of authoritarianism (1996: 46). A theme among these
differences is that the Berkeley theory is less general than RWA in ways that make it unable to account for behaviors that ought to intuitively fall under the umbrella of authoritarianism.

Altemeyer provides three examples. The first is that the Berkeley definition of authoritarian aggression only applies to violators of conventional values, whereas his definition stipulates that the victims can be anyone (ibid). The second example is that the Berkeley definition of conventionalism is limited to middle class values, whereas Altemeyer’s focuses on an individual’s perception of authority-endorsed norms and is thus subject to no theoretically exogenous, content-laden limitations (ibid). Third, Altemeyer notes that many components of the Berkeley definition that Adorno et al (1950) included under their nine domains, such as cognitive rigidity, are now relegated to being potential correlates of authoritarianism.

All of Altemeyer’s moves toward greater generality make the theory of RWA more amenable to being extended and applied to minority groups, relative to the Berkeley theory and its F-scale measure. For example, if the victims of authoritarian aggression can be anyone, then this includes violators of norms endogenous to minority communities. Conventionalism provides a second example. If it is both (i) agnostic to value content and (ii) based on perceptions of authority-endorsed norms, then authoritarian conventionalism can function with regard to values endogenous to a particular community whose members perceive endorsement among their particular authorities.

If my reasoning is sound, then RWA-scale research should be consistent with the F-scale studies that found higher authoritarianism levels among minorities. Further, these differences should be even larger. There is, however, one additional consideration that militates against this expectation. Minorities were probably subject to, and thus perceived, higher levels of racist threat in the 1950s than in the decades that followed. Mindful of this possibility, in the next subsection I review extant RWA-scale research that is germane to the various expectations that I have hypothesized in this subsection.
To my knowledge there are only three RWA-scale studies (Quinton et al 1996, Whitley et al 2011, and Edwards and Leger 1995) that report racial variation in authoritarianism. Part of the reason for this is that, unlike the F and CRV-scales, the RWA-scale does not appear to have made it onto any publicly available nationally representative surveys. RWA-scale studies are thus primarily based on small samples of college students, which are even less likely than nationally representative surveys to provide adequate samples of non-whites.

The first is a study by Quinton et al (1996) on the personality and attitudinal predictors of support for Proposition 187, a 1994 California initiative to make illegal immigrants ineligible for public services. Quinton et al use the 1995 version of Altemeyer’s 30-item RWA-scale to measure authoritarianism among the white (N=79) and Latino (N=92) college students in their small but balanced sample (ibid: 2209). In addition to basic demographic variables, they also include measures of both collective self-esteem and stereotypical beliefs about illegal immigrants.

Perhaps surprisingly, Quinton et al found that Latinos are more likely than whites to oppose Prop 187 (ibid: 2012, Table 1). Consistent with my expectations, mean authoritarianism levels are higher among Latinos (101.35) than among whites (94.88). The difference is not statistically significant, but overall this finding is consistent with my expectations in at least two ways. First, my intuition is that Latinos will experience and perceive less racism-based threat than black Americans. This is consistent with research on levels of linked-fate among racial groups, which reports the highest levels among blacks, lower but substantively significant levels among Latinos, and the lowest levels of linked-fate among whites (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). So the racial differences reported in the Quinton et al (1996) study between whites and Latinos should be smaller than the differences between whites and blacks that I discussed in the previous section.

Second, I also intuitively expect Latinos to experience and perceive more racism-based
threat than whites. This intuition is, again, consistent with the findings that Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) report. The direction of the difference in the two group’s respective mean scores is consistent with this, even though in Quinton et al’s small sample this difference does not attain statistical significance. In correlational analyses run separately on their Latino and white samples, the coefficient of RWA on support for Prop 187 is almost identical (.27 and .28), and statistically significant, for both groups (ibid: 2213, Table 2). Unfortunately, however, Quinton et al do not provide enough information about how they scored the RWA-scale to assess the magnitudes of these coefficients.

The second study is by Whitley et al (2011) on differences in attitudes toward gays between white and black college students. Their sample includes 59 black subjects and 61 white subjects. The authors measure attitudes toward homosexuals via questions that elicit self-reported affect (e.g., warm, relaxed, annoyed, disgusted) felt toward gay men and women. And they measure authoritarianism via Altemeyer’s 20-item short version of the RWA-scale (ibid: 302). Whitley et al scaled both measures to range from -4 (most positive attitudes toward gays, least authoritarian, respectively) to 4 (most negative attitudes toward gays, most authoritarian, respectively).

The authors propose two related hypotheses. The first is that heterosexual black college students will hold more negative attitudes toward gays than will heterosexual white college students. The second is that RWA will mediate this difference between the two racial groups (ibid: 301). More specifically, they hypothesize that a variable like RWA – i.e., one of the five variables that they measure on the basis that they have all been observed to affect anti-gay attitudes in the literature – will mediate the differences in negative attitudes toward gays between white and black college students.

Their first hypothesis receives motivation from ‘a substantial body of anecdotal literature’

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6. I use the terms ‘homosexuals’ and ‘gays’ interchangeably to refer generally to queer males and females. I use the term ‘lesbians’ to specifically refer to queer females. And I use the term ‘gay men’ to specifically refer to queer males. The bases of these choices are a combination of arbitrary convention, desire for clarity, and consistency with the usage of terms by Whitley et al (2011).
which suggests that the straight black community is less accepting of homosexuality than the straight white community (Whitley et al 2011: 299). Further, a meta-analysis of extant studies that report on this difference between the two racial groups supports the anecdotal evidence (ibid; citing Whitley 2008). Whitley et al propose three factors to explain these findings: religiosity, gender-role attitudes, and racial identity. The first two factors are highly correlated with both (i) one another and (ii) authoritarianism. The third factor is also related to authoritarianism, but for now almost uniquely in the context of the overarching hypothesis of my dissertation.\footnote{7}

Whitley et al’s second hypothesis is, to repeat, that RWA will mediate racial differences in negative attitudes toward gays. The authors note a wide body of evidence linking RWA to prejudice, in general, and to prejudice against gays, in particular (Whitley et al 2011; citing Whitley and Lee 2000). Whitley et al note, however, that they ‘were unable to locate any research or theory pertaining to Black-White differences in RWA’ (2011: 301). They thus included RWA in their study in a speculative or exploratory manner.\footnote{8}

Across the board, Whitley et al (2011) report results that are consistent with their hypotheses and thus also consistent with mine. Regarding their first hypothesis, black males and females have more negative attitudes toward homosexuals in general (means = .47 and .28 respectively) than do white males and females (means = 1.52 and 1.41 respectively; \footnote{7. See Henry (2011) and Perez and Hetherington (2014) for the only exceptions of which I am aware.} \footnote{8. Both directly and indirectly, other scholars in addition to Whitley et al (2011) have noted this gap in both research and theory regarding racial differences in authoritarianism. Examples include Henry (2011), Edwards and Leger (1995), Hetherington and Weiler (2009), and Stenner (2005). The most direct example is the study by PJ Henry, which he opens by stating that ‘[e]thnic minorities often have shown higher mean levels of authoritarianism compared to Whites. However, no theoretical mechanism has been directly tested to explain these ethnicity differences’ (2011). The other examples are less direct in the sense that they merely note the uniquely high authoritarianism levels of minority groups, and of blacks especially. None of them, however, attempt to account for this unexpected empirical anomaly by developing explicit theories or hypotheses. Most of them provide speculative discussions of various factors that might account for it. Unfortunately, though, these discussions are both (i) too brief and (ii) formulated in terms that are too general or non-specific to yield testable or falsifiable theories or hypotheses. Nonetheless, I address some of their points in the literature review subsections of their respective sections.}
ibid: 304, Table 1). Interestingly, the differences between whites and blacks are somewhat contingent on whether the target is either a lesbian or a gay man. The correlation between RWA and feelings toward lesbians does not really differ between whites (−.62) and blacks (−.61).

In contrast, the correlation between RWA and feelings toward gay men differs dramatically between whites (−.84) and blacks (−.58; \( z = -2.9 \); ibid: 307, Table 3). Further, mean authoritarianism is higher among black men and women (−.65 and −.76)\(^9\) than among white men and women (−1.24 and −2; ibid: 304, Table 1). A unique feature of these results is that none of the gender or racial group means fall on the positive or ‘authoritarian’ side of the scale, which indicates a subject pool that is more liberal than the samples discussed thus far. Despite this, the differences in white and black means, i.e., the distance between them along the scale, is commensurate with the results from other samples discussed above.

Whitley et al (2011) test path models to assess their second hypothesis, which posits that RWA or other variables that enjoy similar properties will mediate the black-white difference in attitudes toward homosexuals. The authors find that RWA is the only variable (among five hypothesized on the basis of how they affect anti-gay attitudes reported elsewhere in studies of non-minority populations) that mediates the relationship between race and anti-gay affect (ibid: 307). This means that controlling for RWA substantially reduces the white-black difference in attitudes toward homosexuals. In contrast, the other four — social dominance orientation (SDO), male role norms, religious attendance, and racial identification — do not mediate this difference.

\(^9\) Even though this difference is small, it provides another non-CRV example of higher authoritarianism scores among black women compared to black men. Further, in these data the same pattern holds between white women and white men.
3.3.3 Edwards and Leger: Introduction

The third study is by Edwards and Leger (1995) on the psychometric properties of the RWA-scale in black and white students in South Africa. As an investigation of the perils of using authoritarianism measures with black samples, this study has important implications for my project. Consequently, I will provide a lengthier and more detailed review of it. The paper’s thesis is that the RWA-scale, which was developed with data from predominantly white Canadian samples, ‘does not hold together psychometrically or conceptually when used with a black sample’ (Edwards and Leger 1995: 47). The authors use factor and item analysis to show that, unlike for the white sample, for the black sample the RWA-scale amounts to a set of heterogeneous items that lacks structure.

Edwards and Leger maintain that since some of the scale’s items ‘have different connotations for whites and blacks as a result of their different political and cultural histories... a comparison between black and white individuals on the higher order construct of Authoritarianism cannot be made’ (ibid). They conclude that, even though the RWA-scale is able to measure authoritarianism for whites in Canada and South Africa (with minor modifications), it is not suitable to measure the construct for South African blacks because the ‘problems of equivalence are insurmountable’ (ibid: 63).

If similar issues arise with black American samples, Edwards and Leger’s conclusion could have serious implications for my project, as I noted above. Fortunately, there are several reasons to believe that the authors’ conclusions are not as problematic for my project as they might initially seem.

A central problem is that Edwards and Leger adapt the RWA-scale in an asymmetrical manner. The RWA-scale was developed with data from a population that is both Canadian and white. Edwards and Leger seek to examine its psychometric properties for a population that differs both contextually (Canada versus South Africa) and racially (white versus black).  

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10. This subsection is broken into sub-subsections because of its unusual length.
Edwards and Leger, however, only make adjustments to the scale that address the former difference.

For example, the original statement of Item 1 reads: ‘Laws will have to be strictly enforced if the nation’s way of life is going to be preserved.’ According to the authors, the statement is problematic in the South African context because it might tap attitudes toward the enforcement of unjust apartheid laws (ibid: 50). This might introduce the sort of crosstalk discussed above, which occurs when high-authoritarian African Americans encounter, say, statements about how strict or punitive the criminal justice system should be. Such statements will appeal to high-authoritarians but have the opposite effect on members of a group against which this system discriminates. Edwards and Leger thus change Item 1 to instead read: ‘In a post-apartheid non-racial South Africa, laws will have to be strictly enforced if the nation’s way of life is going to be preserved.’

Adjustments like this one make it less surprising that, when applied to South African white samples, the RWA-scale exhibits desirable psychometric properties similar to those that Altemeyer found with Canadian white samples. Adjustments of this sort, however, do not fix the crosstalk issue for black South Africans. In fact, they might enhance the crosstalk problem or at least introduce a new version of it. A post-apartheid, non-racial South Africa represents a utopian state of affairs to black South Africans. This hypothetical racial-political order would be difficult to achieve and maintain; and its maintenance would benefit black South Africans disproportionately. The adjusted version of Item 1 thus puts low-authoritarian black South Africans in a pickle. On one hand, the strict enforcement of laws will repulse them qua low-authoritarians. On the other hand, the maintenance of racial political progress will appeal to them qua black South Africans.

Edwards and Leger’s other adjustments ignore racial differences in a similar manner. As a result, their adjusted RWA-scale is more likely to perform better with white South African samples than with black South African samples. For Item 1 (the example discussed above)
the mean white score is 5.2 and the mean black score is 4.9 (Edward and Leger 1995: 61, Table 6). With a scale that ranges from 1 (strongly disagree or least conservative) to 7 (strongly agree or most conservative), means of 5.2 and 4.9 are both fairly conservative. Due to the crosstalk issue, however, the mean white score has a more straightforward meaning that is easier to interpret relative to the mean black score.

Interpreting the mean scores of Item 1 for both groups is difficult for additional reasons. Item 1 contains numerous ambiguities. One such ambiguity concerns how subjects will interpret the phrase ‘a nation’s way of life.’ The authors’ adjustment — ‘a post-apartheid non-racial South Africa’ — posits a racially progressive state of affairs that is hypothetical. Agreement with the statement might represent nothing more than a subject’s opinion about the desirability of that hypothetical state. Assuming that this racially progressive hypothetical is more desirable to low-authoritarians, both white and black low-authoritarians should experience crosstalk since strict law enforcement will repulse both groups. The primary difference regarding race is that the stakes are much higher and more concrete for black subjects.

Edwards and Leger: Analysis of Whites

Though the white sample exhibits good internal consistency (α = .83), the item-scale correlations of Items 1, 5, and 9 are below .25 (Edwards and Leger 1995: 53, Table 3). The authors provide explanations for all three of these low correlations. All three explanations, however, suggest that Edwards and Leger expect high-authoritarians to think and behave in a manner that is non- or even anti-authoritarian by definition.

Beginning with the example of Item 1, Edwards and Leger write that it ‘may well fail to correlate with Authoritarianism because of a general lack of sympathy for the use of power to uphold particular cultural values rather than because of its reference to law and order in general’ (1995: 54). This explanation entails that high-authoritarians — i.e., subjects who
tended to score high on the other items but not on this item — have, over time, developed a
distaste for the Afrikaaner-dominated national party’s historical use of force to impose and
uphold a cultural order. By definition, however, high-authoritarians ought to prefer this sort
of behavior from their political leaders.

The second example is Item 5, which states: ‘The death sentence as a form of punishment
should be completely abolished’ (Edwards and Leger, 1995: 51, Table 1). The authors claim
that its low item-scale correlation for the white sample is due to a high-profile campaign
against corporal punishment that was salient in the subjects’ environment during the scale’s
administration (1995: 54). This explanation suggests that high-authoritarians will be sus-
ceptible to publicity campaigns against issues that they are, by definition, predisposed to
support. It seems to me, in contrast, that a campaign against such an issue would incite or
activate, rather than circumvent, the authoritarian predisposition of high-authoritarians.

The third example is Item 9, which states: ‘Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals
are unfortunate people who deserve better care instead of so much punishment’ (ibid: 51,
Table 1). The authors explain its low item-scale correlation by, for a third time, attributing
non-authoritarian thoughts and behaviors to otherwise high-authoritarian subjects. ‘It is
probable,’ Edwards and Leger write, ‘that the more conservative students, reasonably well
informed about these abuses [of overcrowding and violence toward prisoners], would have
agreed to this item more than their Canadian counterparts, thus weakening its correlation
with the scale as a whole’ (1995: 54).

Almost by definition, however, one should expect high-authoritarian subjects to support
both (i) aggressive incarceration of criminals and (ii) the use of violent force by sanctioned
authority figures. These two issues clearly fall under the domains of authoritarian aggres-
sion and authoritarian submission, respectively. The authors’ explanation contradicts this
because it entails that support for these issues among high-authoritarians is mediated by a
concern for both (i) the wellbeing of prisoners and (ii) the quality of prison conditions.
Measures of authoritarianism, however, are supposed to predict general proclivities toward both active violence (aggression) and passivity in the face of violence (submission). Authoritarianism would predict the opposite of this if, among high-authoritarians, humane and empathetic concerns reversed these proclivities. It does not make sense, then, for Edwards and Leger to imply that high-authoritarians will develop an aversion to such violence if its salience in their environment persists for a long enough period of time.

The issues with these three particular items are, however, not large enough to compromise Edwards and Leger’s factor analysis of the white group. It obtains a coherent set of the following six factors: (i) law enforcement and conventionalism, (ii) anti-conventionalism, (iii) respect for authority and leader loyalty, (iv) sexual and family values, (v) anti-authoritarian attitudes (toward capital punishment, national anthems, and blind obedience), and (vi) aggression toward criminals (1995: 55). These correspond nicely to Altemeyer’s three-part conceptualization of authoritarianism: conventionalism for factors 1, 2, and 4; submission for factors 3 and 5; and aggression for factors 5 and 6.

In my view, the authors obtain satisfactory results with the white sample in part because the contextual differences between Canada and South Africa are not large enough to undermine the analysis. Nonetheless, contextual differences created problems for some of the items, and these proved to be somewhat difficult to account for conceptually.

Edwards and Leger (iii): Analysis of Blacks

Edwards and Leger do not obtain satisfactory results with the black sample. It exhibits low internal consistency ($\alpha = .43$), and only two of the items enjoy item-scale correlations larger than .2 (1995: 56). While the white sample only has one item with a negative loading for one of the six factors obtained, the black sample has seven items with negative loadings for five of the ten factors obtained (ibid: 57). Unlike with the white sample’s six factors, most of the black sample’s ten factors do not group items into meaningful clusters.
As discussed above, with the white sample three of the scale’s twenty-four items load in an unexpected manner, which Edwards and Leger attribute to contextual factors unique to South Africa. I attempted to show, to the contrary, that all three of their explanations made assumptions that are theoretically or logically incompatible with the concept of authoritarianism. The upshot of my counter-arguments might be that authoritarianism is a conceptually complex construct. Thinking about and applying it in a research context can be difficult and conceptually taxing. By adding race into the equation, their analysis of the black sample compounds these complexities.

As Whitley et al (2011) noted, there is a paucity of theoretical and empirical work on the relationship between race and authoritarianism. Similar to the Whitley et al (2011) study, then, Edwards and Leger’s analysis of a black sample is in some sense an atheoretical pursuit. This is reflected somewhat in their unwillingness to amend the scale to address racial differences, which contrasts with their willingness to do so to address contextual differences.

It is not surprising, then, that Edwards and Leger’s analysis of the black sample indicates that, compared to the white sample, a much larger set of items and factor clusters are faulty or problematic. What is surprising, in contrast, is that Edwards and Leger chose not to make any adjustments to the scale for this analysis. Their exhibited familiarity with South African racial politics suggests that, setting theoretical issues aside, they have the factual knowledge required to make the required adjustments. Not setting theoretical issues aside, on the other hand, the conceptual problems that arose in Edward and Leger’s explanations of negatively loaded items in the white sample apply here as well. Using items that loaded negatively with the black sample, I will provide four examples.

The first example is item 7, which is about cracking down on deviant groups and troublemakers to protect moral standards. Edwards and Leger note that it probably loads neg-

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11. I am specifically referring to authoritarianism in non-white populations. There is, of course, a sizable literature on the relationship between authoritarianism and prejudice. For obvious reasons, though, it is typically based on white subjects and focused on their prejudicial attitudes toward non-whites.
atively because in South Africa conservative white politicians are known to refer to blacks as ‘troublemakers’ (1995: 58). Item 7 should thus produce crosstalk for black subjects.

The second example, item 8, states that a lot of society’s rules about sex are just customs that are not necessarily better than other societies’ customs. It loads negatively for factor 7, whose main item is about the need for firmness with loafers and criminals (ibid). This might reflect crosstalk for high-authoritarian blacks who agree with firmness with criminals qua authoritarians, but who reject the colonial period’s imposition of rigid sex norms qua black South Africans.

The third example is item 10, which is about the importance of children showing respect for authority. The main item for which it loads negatively is about flags, national anthems, and the glorification of one’s country. This produces crosstalk for South African blacks because both youth participation and flags and anthems play a large role in African Nationalism. The latter, however, do so in service to a theme of self-determination that is distinct from, and in conflict with, the general glorification of South Africa (ibid).

The fourth example, item 13, is about the right of youth to refuse to fight a war. This item is problematic in the South African context because, at the time of this study, military conscription was compulsory for whites only. For blacks, then, refusing to fight might represent a gesture of submission (Edwards and Leger 1995: 58).

These four examples suggest that Edwards and Leger could have amended items in order to make them better suited to the South African context for both the white and the black samples. In some sense, however, they did just the opposite. Many of their adjustments that work with the white sample are specifically problematic with the black sample. For example, many of the adjusted items for factor 3 load dissimilarly despite containing similar content. The two markers for factor 3 are items 1 and 15, which refer to law enforcement in ‘a post-apartheid non-racial South Africa’ and in ‘a future democratic South Africa,’ respectively. Item 7, which refers to law enforcement as well, but in ‘a future South Africa,’ fails to load.
on this factor, as does item 21, which is about the firmness of law enforcement.

Upon first glance, it is odd that similar items load dissimilarly with factor 3. From the perspective of my previous arguments, however, it is to be expected. I argued that the notion of a racially progressive future South Africa contains crosstalk-inducing ambiguities. High-authoritarian blacks are amenable to both authoritarian governing styles and racial progress. But these attitudes conflict with another. It is thus difficult to interpret the statements of these items. As a result, responses to these statements are likely to be inconsistent, which explains the odd loading patterns of items with regard to factor 3.

On the whole, Edwards and Leger’s factor analysis of the black sample suggests unstructured heterogeneity. Two exceptions are factors 4 and 6, which contain clusters of items that are thematically related (Edwards and Leger 1995: 14). Factor 4 has items on libertarian or non-authoritarian attitudes toward religion and drug use, and factor 6 has items on obedience to authority and norms. The items of both factors fall under the domain of authoritarian submission, and they represent the only exceptions to an otherwise unstructured set of heterogeneous items.

Edwards and Leger conclude that ‘the RWA items failed to provide a coherent measure of authoritarianism in the black group’ (1995: 60). This conclusion is only true in a technical sense that is not substantively informative. It is, in other words, tantamount to a description of what happens with factor analyses of scales that contain too many faulty items. This leads to at least two issues or problems with Edwards and Leger’s conclusion.

The first problem is that their conclusion marks a stopping point in their analysis that might be premature. On the one hand, it is true that the adjusted scale shows unstructured heterogeneity for the black sample. On the other hand, as the preceding discussion evidences, it is fairly easy to finger the items that are most problematic for this sample. It might be possible to construct a scale that is satisfactory for black South African samples by simply removing the faulty items.
The second issue is that Edwards and Leger’s conclusion can be misleading. That is, it lends itself to interpretations that the data do not warrant. This concern does not apply to the entire article because in most instances Edwards and Leger are careful not to overstate their conclusions. They do not explicitly claim that the scope of their conclusion extends beyond the application of their modified 24-item RWA-scale to black South African samples. They also do not explicitly claim that their findings have general implications which militate against the use of RWA-scales or other measures of authoritarianism with minority samples.

In some instances, however, Edwards and Leger imply that their findings do have general implications of this sort, and they express suspicion over use of RWA-scales to measure authoritarianism with minority samples in general. For example, in their concluding remarks Edwards and Leger claim that ‘basic conceptual work based on the phenomenology of the concept being measured [authoritarianism] needs to precede the psychometric development of scales for use in the black community’ (Edwards and Leger: 1995, 20). This claim extends beyond the implications of their findings if, that is, the authors intend it to suggest that their analysis of the black group shows a deep or basic conceptual incongruity between authoritarianism and non-whites. Edwards and Leger might, on the other hand, intend it as a call for the sorts of critical considerations that I am attempting to provide in this section.

So far I have attempted to show that Edwards and Leger’s study indicates that a small but significant set of RWA items does not transfer to the black South African sample. Further, this issue is not unique to the black group in the sense that there is a similar but smaller set of items for the white group. Importantly, the items in both sets fail to transfer for conceptually similar reasons. Both sets contain items that have different connotations for white Canadians than they have for white, black, or both white and black South Africans. This lack of transference results in ambiguity, crosstalk, or both. Fortunately, however, it is possible to locate these items and remove them from the scale. It should thus be possible to use RWA items to measure authoritarianism among blacks or other minority groups.
Edwards and Leger: Item-by-Item Black-White Comparison

In the final section, Edwards and Leger provide item-by-item comparisons of mean black and white responses. These are based on analyses of variance that control for seven demographic covariates (1995: 60, Table 6). The predominant trend of these comparisons is that blacks have higher mean scores than whites for most of the items.\textsuperscript{12} This trend supports my above claim that Edwards and Leger’s RWA-scale would have probably worked with the black group if they had removed the faulty items from it. Moreover, it is consistent with almost every finding that I have reviewed thus far.

Several details of Edwards and Leger’s item-by-item comparison have interesting implications for my project. Nineteen of the twenty-four comparisons are statistically significant. Mean black scores are higher for twelve out of nineteen, or about 63\%, of these comparisons. While this percentage is probably high enough to interpret it as support for my hypothesis, it actually underestimates the extent to which blacks score more conservatively than whites across these items. Most of the items that whites score higher on have something in common: In the preceding subsections I have argued that they are unsuitable for use with either the white sample, the black sample, or both.

Taking a closer look, whites scored higher on eleven of the twenty-four comparisons (1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, and 19). Three of these are not statistically significant (7, 13, and 15); along with two which whites scored lower on (14 and 21). Six of the comparisons for which whites scored higher are based on law-and-order items (1, 5, 6, 9, 12, and 18) with item 19 being the exception. Removing law and order items and statistically insignificant comparisons leaves us with 12 remaining items, and black respondents score higher on 10/12 or about 83\% of these.

As I discussed above, law-and-order items are especially likely to induce crosstalk among

\textsuperscript{12} Though the scores in Edwards and Leger’s results are not aligned by the meaning of their direction, I have aligned them so that higher scores always indicate higher levels of authoritarianism, and my subsequent writing will reflect this without further comment.
both low-authoritarian whites and, to a greater degree, high-authoritarian blacks. Further, among these six law-and-order items, three have the lowest item-scale correlations for the white sample. The exception, item 19, refers to the past in a manner that should have a similar effect. I will discuss three of these seven comparisons as examples.

The first example is item 6, which states that ‘[t]he death sentence as a form of punishment should be completely abolished’ (Edwards and Leger 1995: 51, Table 1). Even though the authors do not explicitly categorize it as such, this is clearly a law-and-order item. It is thus susceptible to inducing crosstalk among blacks who are less likely to support capital punishment in the context of a criminal justice system that they perceive to be prejudiced against them.

The second example, item 18, states that ‘[r]ules about being “well-mannered” and respectable are chains from the past which we should question very thoroughly before accepting’ (ibid). As the group with a higher or more conservative score, whites agree less with this statement compared to blacks. Three factors inform this item’s crosstalk issue for black South Africans predisposed toward authoritarianism. First, rules about manners and respectability should appeal to them qua authoritarians. Second, however, breaks from the apartheid past should appeal to them qua members of the oppressed group. Lastly, the phrase ‘chains from the past’ invokes slave imagery, which should enhance any confusion or ambiguity created by the first two factors.

The third example is item 19, which states that ‘[t]he courts should be easy on drug offenders. Punishment would not do any good in cases like these’ (ibid). This is also a law-and-order item, though the authors did not categorize it as one. Subject to the same issues and problems of the other law-and-order items, it is no surprise that whites score higher on it in part because crosstalk effects are likely to attenuate the mean black response. In this case, authoritarian black South Africans should support cracking down on deviants but oppose crackdowns expected to target their group.
There is an additional problem that is specific to the adjustments that Edwards and Leger made to some of the items. The differences in means are not statistically significant for five of the twenty-four items (items 7, 13, 14, 15, and 21). Three of these items (7, 13, and 15) reflect Edward and Leger’s adjustments that make reference to either a future, post-racial South Africa or to a nondescript ‘any state.’ As I discuss above, the content of these adjustments suffer from issues of both crosstalk and ambiguity. Item 21 is another law-and-order item (see the previous four paragraphs). And, for what it is worth, I see no issue with item 14.

Summarizing the results of this item-by-item comparison, eleven of the twelve items that are not consistent with my expectations – i.e., seven with more conservative white scores and five with statistically insignificant differences – are faulty. As discussed above, they are faulty due to either ambiguity, crosstalk, or both. Since these issues affect the black subjects disproportionately, it is not surprising that Edwards and Leger’s factor analyses show psychometrically desirable properties for the white sample but not for the black sample.

Edwards and Leger provide an alternative interpretation of the results of their item-by-item comparison. They write: ‘Many of [the differences between the groups] are understandable in the light of known cultural and political factors. In effect, this analysis provides a measure of cultural differences in degree of conservatism regarding the issues which make up the content of the items. However, it is not these values and attitudes that are of central interest here. Since we do not have a measure of the higher order construct of Authoritarianism for the black sample, we cannot strictly speak of differences in authoritarianism’ (1995: 62).

My interpretation diverges with Edwards and Leger’s on at least two issues. First, their conclusion focuses on the modal comparison that shows higher scores for blacks. This contrasts with my analysis which (i) focuses on the exceptions to this trend and (ii) finds that most of these items are problematic or faulty. Consequently, I conclude that the modal
response is even more representative than the raw numbers suggest.

Second, Edwards and Leger do not pursue the anomalous contrast between (i) the results of their factor analysis of the black group, and (ii) the results of their item-by-item comparison. The former shows no evidence of authoritarianism among blacks as a higher-order construct on the scale level, whereas the latter shows evidence for authoritarianism among blacks on the item level. By my interpretation, the item-level findings indicate that the scale-level findings reflect a methodological problem and thus cannot be taken at face value. It would be interesting to see what happens once the faulty items are removed.

In their concluding remarks, Edwards and Leger mention another study (Edwards and Riordan 1994) that also attempts to use a scale with a black sample even though it was developed with largely white samples. The authors of this study improved the alpha of their scale from a .52 to a .62 ‘by omitting a few weak items’ (Edwards and Leger 1995: 65). Edwards co-authored that study; and he and Leger isolate and explicitly discuss a few weak items in their study. It is thus surprising that that they do not pursue the strategy of omitting faulty items in the study under review.

Edwards and Leger’s alternative view is not viable if the only reason that a measure of the higher-order construct is missing for blacks is that all of the faulty items are included in the scale. It might be a coincidence that these faulty items almost exclusively comprise the items for which whites are either more conservative than, or indistinguishable from, blacks. But this is highly unlikely. Once the faulty items are discarded, blacks are more conservative than whites on every remaining item except one. Since all of the RWA-scale’s items are weighted equally, it seems likely that (i) a truncated version will be large enough to be psychometrically sound, and (ii) this truncated scale would show higher mean scores for blacks than for whites.

I will conclude this section by noting that if a future finding ever validates these two expectations, this finding would not be very disruptive. It would show that the authoritar-
ianism scores of these two subpopulations are consistent with almost all of the findings on racial differences in the literature.

3.4 CRV-Scale: Introduction

Altemeyer’s RWA-scale is currently the most widely used measure of authoritarianism (Hetherington and Weiler 2009: 47, Hetherington and Suhay 2011: 550, Brandt and Henry 2012: 3). This has been true for over two decades, and a large body of RWA research has accumulated during this time. In a review of studies intended to exhibit the RWA-scale’s empirical validity, for example, Altemeyer proudly lists over 20 types of behavioral outcome variables that the scale predicts (1996: 19ff). To some extent, however, this impressive accumulation of RWA-scale findings might be illusory.

A common criticism of the RWA-scale is that it is tautological with the outcome variables that it purports to explain or predict.\(^\text{13}\) The RWA-scale is supposed to measure a predispositional trait, or higher-order\(^\text{14}\) dimension, that structures attitudes and values. It should thus predict authoritarian attitudes like, say, support for punitive law enforcement. It should not, however, contain items that either tap this attitude directly or that tap closely related attitudes.

Results obtained when this occurs often take the form of apparent but illusory evidence


\(^{14}\) Scholars refer to the construct as both ‘higher-order’ and ‘low-level’. Though these might appear to be opposites of one another, in context they are actually used either synonymously or to refer to different but complementary features of the construct. For example, Edwards and Lager refer to authoritarianism as a ‘higher-order dimension presumed to underlie particular values and attitudes, so that items which refer to particular values and attitudes can be used to measure it’ (1995: 62). And Stenner writes that authoritarianism refers to a ‘low-level generalized tendency, [i.e.,] a persistent latent predisposition to favor oneness and sameness over freedom and difference’ (2005: 72). In each example authoritarianism is both (i) higher-order, in the sense that it behaves like a general organizing principle or dimension whose logic orders or organizes particular attitudes, and (ii) low-level, in the sense that it represents a deep-seated general propensity, on the individual-level, toward these particular attitudes. These represent complementary features of the construct, as opposed to competing conceptualizations of it.
for relationships between the predictor variable (RWA) and various outcome variables (expected behavioral manifestations of RWA). Unfortunately, these relationships are a function of conflated predictor and outcome variables, which is another way of saying that the content of these variables is tautological or logically equivalent. Relationships between tautological items might sound impressive if their items are assigned different names. However, as logical equivalents of one another, they are literally uninformative.\footnote{Note that to my knowledge there are no critics who charge that RWA items are perfectly tautological with any of the outcome variables that the RWA-scale has been used to predict. Rather, the gist of their criticism is that the degree of tautology is large enough to bring the legitimacy of RWA findings into question.}

A measure of authoritarianism that avoids the tautology problem is thus needed. The CRV-scale provides a solution to this problem, and it appears to be growing in popularity among political psychologists (see, e.g., Feldman and Stenner 1997, Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Hetherington and Suhay 2010, Henry 2011, Brandt and Henry 2012). Comprised of items that elicit preferences for child-rearing values, the CRV-scale contains no direct or explicit political, cultural, or ideological content. Compared to the F and RWA-scales, then, the CRV-scale is almost incapable of encountering the tautology problem. As Hetherington and Suhay write, ‘The broad child-rearing values measured are fairly well divorced from political ideology and attitudes; therefore, the measure is unlikely to be conflated with social conservatism and is easily distinguished from the dependent variables’ (2011: 550).

3.4.1 CRV-Scale: Construct Validity

With regard to my project and its overarching hypothesis, the CRV-scale represents an attractive measure of authoritarianism. In relation to the lengthy discussion above, for example, the CRV-scale avoids almost all of Edwards and Leger’s (1995) issues that stem from item content, e.g., crosstalk, ambiguity, and differences in connotative meaning between populations. Avoiding pitfalls like the tautology problem is a negative reason to embrace
the CRV-scale in the sense that it is premised on what the scale does not do.

There are, however, many positive reasons to embrace it. The first section of this article, for example, provides several (empirically grounded) theoretical reasons for preferring the CRV-scale to its competitors. The primary positive reason for using the CRV-scale, though, is that it enjoys most of the properties that one would both expect and desire from a measure of authoritarianism. Let’s consider some evidence.

To begin, the CRV-scale enjoys a moderate to high correlation with the RWA-scale ($r = .54$; reported in Hetherington and Suhay 2011: 551[n14]). This suggests, at the very least, that some type of relationship exists between child-rearing values and RWA. Feldman and Stenner note that (i) authoritarianism researchers have been aware of this relationship since Adorno et al (1950), and (ii) both Adorno et al (1950) and Altemeyer (1981, 1996) incorporate child-rearing values into their conceptualization and measurement of the construct. To explain this, Feldman and Stenner point to findings in psychology that indicate an unusually deep connection between child-rearing values and authoritarian values like intolerance and conformity (1997: 747, citing Martin 1964 and Kohn 1977[1989 reprint cited]; for a discussion of similar points see Hetherington and Weiler 2009: 49).

Discussing similar issues elsewhere, Stenner concludes that child-rearing values ‘can effectively and unobtrusively reflect one’s fundamental orientations toward authority/uniformity versus autonomy/difference’ (2005: 23f, emphasis in original). Further, in a brief discussion of Stenner’s use of the CRV-scale, Kinder and Kam note that the CRV-scale is reasonably reliable (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .6$) while avoiding both the F-scale’s response set issue and the RWA-scale’s tautology issue (2010: 250[n22]).

While these observations and claims might be suggestive, they do not provide direct evidence of the relationship between child-rearing values and authoritarianism. If this relationship is as strong as Stenner and other proponents of the CRV-scale claim that it is, then

16. To my knowledge, this is the only correlation between RWA and CRV-scales reported in the literature.
the CRV-scale should enjoy high empirical validity as a measure of the construct. In other words, it should both correlate with, and be predictive of, authoritarian attitudes and any other manifestation of the construct. Several studies report evidence that suggests a strong relationship between child-rearing values and authoritarianism. I will discuss two examples that focus on empirical validity.

In the first example, Feldman and Stenner (1997) find that, when respondents perceive higher levels of normative threat, CRV authoritarianism affects attitudes toward at least six issues. These issues include intolerance, militarism, support for the death penalty, support for order over freedom, the derogation of outgroups, and the expression of solidarity with ingroups (Feldman and Stenner 1997; and for additional discussion see Stenner 2005: 32).

In the second example, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) use the CRV-scale to argue that authoritarianism structures ‘preferences about many of the new issues on the American political agenda, such as gay rights, the war in Iraq, the proper response to terrorism, and immigration’ (2009: 5). Hetherington and Weiler argue that each of the CRV-scale’s four items presents choices to respondents that ‘appropriately mirrors choices individuals are forced to make in politics’ (ibid: 48). The items, they continue, prompt respondents to ‘choose between a preference for self-directed decision making and strict adherence to rules which... is critical to distinguishing authoritarians from non-authoritarians’ (ibid).

While their theoretical discussion of the CRV-scale largely mirrors the arguments of Stenner (2005), Hetherington and Weiler also conduct several original tests of the CRV scale’s construct validity. The intention of these tests is to evidence a strong ‘relationship between [the CRV-scale] and a range of different variables that a good measure of authoritarianism should be correlated with’ (Hetherington and Weiler 2009: 52). Examples of these variables include education ($r = -.35$), need for cognition ($r = -.26$), political knowledge ($r = -.3$), need for order ($r = .35$), political tolerance ($r = -.4$), racial resentment ($r = .35$), and being evangelical ($m = .71$; ibid: 52–62).
Hetherington and Weiler report several additional findings on the extent to which the CRV-scale measure of authoritarianism structures specific attitudes. Using logistic regression to estimate the effect of authoritarianism on several gay rights issues, they find on average that ‘the predicted probability moves from well above .5 for non-authoritarians to below .5 for those with the most authoritarian worldview’ (ibid: 95, Table 5.2). Further, Hetherington and Weiler report similar results for attitudes on several civil liberties issues (ibid: 102, Table 5.5), attitudes on the use of force versus diplomacy (ibid: 104, Table 5.6), and even preferences for Hilary Clinton or Barack Obama in the 2008 Democratic primary\textsuperscript{17} (ibid: 187, Table 9.3).

These results suggest that the CRV-scale provides an attractive measure of authoritarianism in regard to construct validity, which is on par with both the F-scale and the RWA-scale. For my purposes, though, this must also be true with racial differences variables. As I attempted to show in the previous two sections, F-scale and RWA-scale studies both find that mean levels of authoritarianism are higher among blacks and other minority groups than among whites. There are no findings in the literature, to my knowledge, that either contradict this finding or are inconsistent with it. For my project, then, it is important for the CRV-scale to exhibit similar results with racial difference variables, and this is the topic of the next subsection.

\subsection*{3.4.2 CRV-Scale: Review}

There appears to be only four CRV-scale studies that report racial variation in authoritarianism. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Henry (2011) provide the only two direct and explicit examples. Barker and Tinnick (2006) provide an indirect example in that they use the CRV-scale as their primary measurement instrument, but they do so in the context of

\footnote{17. The idea of this last example is that with a white or non-black sample high authoritarians are expected to prefer the white candidate because they are either (i) inclined to favor in-group members over out-group members or (ii) that they believe a black candidate will be more likely to support non-authoritarian policies.}
a conceptual framework based on the theories of George Lakoff. Xiao (2000) provides another example that is indirect in the sense that she uses CRV items to construct conformity, autonomy, and care orientation scales.

The first example, Hetherington and Weiler (2009), only contains a brief mention of racial variation in authoritarianism. Discussing why they limit their analysis to non-black respondents, the authors write that African Americans are ‘the most authoritarian racial group in the United States by far’ (2009: 141, emphasis mine). Computed from 2004 ANES data, they report a mean authoritarianism score of .75 for blacks versus .55 for non-blacks (ibid: 141[n5]).

The second example is a paper by Henry (2011) on racial variation in authoritarianism. This study is, perhaps, the only explicit attempt to explain why mean authoritarianism levels are higher among minorities than among whites. Henry hypothesizes that minorities endorse authoritarianism because it serves a self-protective, psychological function. He derives this hypothesis from research on stigma in the psychology literature. According to Henry, this research suggests that the daily experience of racial prejudice creates conditions that (i) ‘lead to a state of psychological self-defensiveness against future threats’ and thus (ii) the adoption of ‘attitudes that provide a psychological sense of security’ (Henry 2011: 421).

As part of his analysis, Henry tests and rejects the ‘working class authoritarianism’ hypothesis, which posits that minorities endorse authoritarianism as a by-product of factors that correlate with low status groups, such as low education and low income (Henry 2011: 421; citing Lipset 1959). This is consistent with the simple analysis I conducted in chapter two, which suggests that the effect of race on F-scale authoritarianism is not simply a function of demographic variables. Henry’s stigma hypothesis is also broadly consistent with Stenner’s theory of the authoritarianism dynamic. According to Stenner (2005), authoritarianism is a predisposition toward intolerance whose expression varies with levels of perceived normative threat (Henry 2011: 423; citing Feldman and Stenner 1997 and Stenner 2005; for similar
Further, Henry’s hypothesis is consistent with Stenner’s findings on the differential effects of normative versus personal threat. Normative threats activate authoritarianism. In contrast, personal threats—e.g., family financial distress, criminal victimization, divorce, serious illness, and the loss of loved ones—attenuate the effects of authoritarianism (Stenner 2005: 32). Stenner’s findings are interesting from the perspective of Henry’s stigma hypothesis because they coincide nicely with Henry’s core distinction between threats that implicate a role for stigmatization and those that do not. Working with seemingly disparate or unrelated theoretical frameworks, the findings of both Stenner (2005) and Henry (2011) indicate that only the former appear to be related to authoritarianism.

For the first half of his analysis, Henry uses 2004 ANES data to conduct preliminary tests of his hypothesis. He reports statistically significant negative correlations between authoritarianism and race (non-white versus white), education, income, and need for cognition (2011: 427, Table 1). Next, Henry runs five simple regressions of authoritarianism on race and combinations of three working class authoritarianism hypothesis variables (education, income, and need for cognition). These models are similar to the simple model I ran in chapter two. Models 1, 2, and 3 each include one of these three variables, model 4 includes all of them, and model 5 includes all of them plus controls. The coefficient of the race variable is statistically and practically significant in all five models; and it is the largest coefficient in models 1, 3, and 5, which is the full model (2011: 428, Table 2).

These findings support both the stigma and the working-class authoritarianism hypotheses, however. So, for the second half of his analysis, Henry conducts an experiment on a student sample comprised of 216 white subjects and 53 black and Latino subjects. His subjects defined neutral words under the control condition, and wrote about a personal experience that made them feel valuable under the anti-stigma treatment condition. In the treatment condition, the difference between white and minority groups is tiny and statis-
tically insignificant, which provides causal support for Henry’s stigma hypothesis. In the control condition, on the other hand, the minority group has higher authoritarianism scores ($m = 4.65$) than the white group ($m = 3.84, p < .05$), which is, of course, consistent with previous findings (Henry 2011: 431, Figure 1). The finding that minorities are more likely to endorse authoritarianism appears to be robust across all three measures of the construct.

The third example is a study by Barker and Tinnick (2006) on the etiology of ideological constraint. This study reports variation in CRV authoritarianism indirectly. That is, the authors use the CRV-scale to operationalize a construct that is distinct from, but shares family resemblances with, authoritarianism. This construct is the distinction between nurturant and disciplinarian visions of parental roles, and George Lakoff claims that this distinction plays a central role in political cognition. Though I am agnostic on the issue of Lakovian political psychology, Barker and Tinnick’s CRV-scale findings are obviously relevant to my project. Following Hetherington and Weiler (2009), I treat Barker and Tinnick’s (2006) paper like a study of authoritarianism.

Barker and Tinnick’s thesis is that high CRV scores will predict political individualism, moral traditionalism, and commitment to punitive justice, whereas low CRV scores will predict egalitarianism, humanitarianism, and political tolerance (2006: 251). The authors use only three of the four CRV items to construct their scale, and they choose an unconventional method of scoring that does not treat low and high CRV scores as a continuum. More specifically, they do not score the libertarian or non-authoritarian answers in a manner that can be reflected additively (e.g., scored as -1, 0, or 1, yielding a 7-point range from -3 to 3). Rather, their zero value pools together what other scoring methods would categorize as neutral (0), weakly libertarian (-1), moderately libertarian (-2), and strongly libertarian (-3, or least authoritarian). Barker and Tinnick’s scale thus yields a 4-point range.

Despite their unconventional coding choices, Barker and Tinnick’s results are highly consistent with previously discussed authoritarianism findings. Based on 2000 ANES data,
the authors report that the CRV-scale correlates (i) significantly and positively with sexism, moral intolerance, Christian fundamentalism, religiosity, racism, and African American identity, and (ii) significantly and negatively with political knowledge, education, and income.

Next, Barker and Tinnick run several generalized linear models that include numerous covariates. They report significant CRV coefficients that are in the expected direction for models regressed on three outcome variables: (i) equal rights, (ii) humanitarianism versus individualism, and (iii) self-reported ideology (2006: 256, Table 2). Further, the authors obtain similar CRV coefficients for similar models regressed on nine issue-based outcome variables. These variables include foreign aid, affirmative action, illegal immigration, gay rights, and abortion (2006: 257, Table 2), as well as welfare, defense, guns/crime, and taxes (2006: 258, Table 3). In sum, Barker and Tinnick’s results are almost uniformly consistent with extant CRV findings.

The fourth example is a study by Xiao (2000) on the intersectional effects of class and gender on parental values in the 1990s. Like the previous study by Barker and Tinnick (2006), Xiao (2000) reports on racial variation in CRV authoritarianism indirectly. Interestingly, Xiao grounds her ideas on the same child-rearing studies that Feldman and Stenner (1997) and Stenner (2005) cite as motivation for their use of the CRV-scale as a measure of authoritarianism. Referring to the work of Kohn (1977) and others, Xiao writes, ‘Empirical research has documented an enduring relationship between social class and parental values: Working-class parents are more concerned with their children’s conformity, while middle-class parents value their children’s autonomy more’ (2000: 786). She interprets these differences as reflecting values adapted to the different types of work that working-class and middle-class people do, but notes that research on gender-based differentiation along these lines produces mixed results.

To explore this issue, Xiao uses CRV items from the 1990-1993 World Values Survey (WVS) to construct three scales meant to capture the value domains of autonomy, confor-
mity, and care orientation. Care orientation loosely captures a continuum with unselfish tolerance on one end, and independent hard work on the other end (Xiao 2000: 789). This domain seems relevant to the economic dimension of ideology but not to authoritarianism specifically. In contrast, the other two clearly overlap with the concept of authoritarian submission, and they include many of the same items that Stenner (2005) uses in her CRV-scale based on WVS data. This, then, is the sense in which Xiao’s study provides indirect CRV authoritarianism findings.

Along with numerous controls, Xiao includes African American and Latino race dummies in her regressions on the autonomy and conformity CRV subscales. The autonomy model’s estimated African American dummy coefficient is statistically insignificant but in the right direction. It is negative, in other words, which might indicate that the endorsement of autonomy child-rearing values is lower among blacks than among whites. The coefficient of the Latino dummy is almost four times larger than the black coefficient, and it is both statistically significant and in the right direction (Xiao 2000: 796, Table 4). That said, the estimated effect, which is about -.07 along a 4-point scale that ranges from 0 to 3, is not practically significant. When Xiao runs the same model on the conformity subscale, the estimated coefficients for the African American and Latino dummies essentially flip, and this holds for their size, statistical significance, direction, and practical significance (Xiao 2000: 797, Table 5). Note that for my purposes this flip in direction is what I would expect, since, unlike autonomy, conformity is an authoritarian value.

Xiao’s results are thus consistent with my expectations, albeit weakly. In all cases the estimated effects are too small to be practically significant, and about half of them are not statistically significant anyway. None of the estimated effects that are germane to my project, however, are estimated to be in a direction contrary to my expectations. Unfortunately, Xiao does not report either the size of her black and Latino subsamples or their mean scores on any of her CRV subscales. Nonetheless the pattern that we’ve observed repeatedly emerges
once again, bringing the tally of this review to a perfect 12/12.

### 3.5 Conclusion

The overarching story of this chapter is that in virtually every known example we observe higher mean authoritarianism scores among stigmatized racial groups. This holds across four F-scale studies in the 1950s, three RWA-scale studies in 1990s and 2000s, and four CRV-scale studies since 2000. Either this is a highly improbable coincidence, or there is a robust relationship between elevated authoritarianism levels and membership in stigmatized racial groups.

This chapter also marks my third and final response to the statistical artifact theory of Perez and Hetherington (2014). In chapter 1 I showed how their findings didn’t evince lack of substantive validity. In chapter 2 I provided my own evidence of substantive validity across racial groups. And in this chapter I showed that the phenomenon isn’t even limited to the child rearing measure. Taken together, it would be pretty hard to make the case that the finding of racial variation is a statistical artifact, either in general across all measures or specifically with regard to the child rearing scale.
CHAPTER 4

AUTHORITARIANISM AMONG STIGMATIZED MINORITIES: INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF THREAT

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I attempt to show that racial discrimination represents a form of intergroup threat among African-Americans. Previous research finds that while perceived threat and authoritarianism are both able to predict support for a similar set of issues, such as gay marriage, their interaction is negative (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). This means that their effects on support mediate one another. More specifically, it means that as levels of authoritarianism (or threat) rise, the effects of variation in threat (or authoritarianism) diminish.

Findings like these provide an indirect way for me to test the claim that perceived discrimination represents a measure of perceived threat. If my claim is true, then I should be able to produce similar findings using perceived discrimination as my perceived threat variable. In other words, if perceived discrimination represents a form of intergroup threat, then it should behave similarly to other validated measures of threat.

In this chapter I use American National Election Studies (ANES) survey data to test this possibility. My analysis unfolds in three steps. First, I replicate a previous study of this relationship. Second, keeping everything else in that model intact, I replace its measure of threat (from new lifestyles) with mine (perceived racial discrimination). Third, I rerun the model and compare the two sets of results.

One problem with this approach is that most extant observational studies of the relationship between threat and authoritarianism focus primarily on non-Hispanic White respondents. This is a problem because my dissertation is primarily about authoritarianism and threat as they manifest among stigmatized minorities. To deal with this issue, I be-
gin by comparing these models with similar models run exclusively on African-American subsamples.

In this chapter, then, I investigate two separate but related questions: (i) Is the relationship between threat and authoritarianism different among African-Americans than it is for the aggregate population? (ii) Among African-Americans, does the nature of this relationship change when standard measures of threat are replaced by my measure of threat, perceived discrimination?

4.2 A Test Case For My ‘Experiment’

One way to frame the analytical strategy of this chapter is to think about it as an experiment. The analysis that I am replicating can be thought of as my baseline for comparison or ‘control group,’ swapping the threat variables is the ‘treatment,’ and differences between the two sets of results constitute the ‘treatment effects.’

For this experiment I have chosen to begin with a replication of Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) analysis of the determinants of support for adoption among gays. They use logistic regression to estimate the effects of threat (agreement that new lifestyles pose a threat to society), authoritarianism (childrearing values), and their interaction (plus several controls), on support for gay adoption (yes or no).

Given my goals, Hetherington and Weiler’s analysis is convenient for at least two reasons. First, gay rights is an appealing issue domain because its relevance to authoritarianism is not limited to the manifestation of authoritarianism among members of privileged racial groups. Civil rights, in contrast, is an example of an issue domain that would not work. The reason is that attitudes among high authoritarian African-Americans on issues in this domain, such as affirmative action, would be difficult to disentangle from the effects of simple self interest.

Second, the threat predictor (new lifestyles) is less domain specific than the issue-position outcome variable (gay adoption), and yet both of them are members of the same domain,
attitudes toward gays. Threat from new lifestyles is very general and open to interpretation, whereas gay adoption is very specific and relatively closed to alternative interpretation. This raises questions about what it would mean to use the new lifestyles variable to predict support for gay adoption. The threat predictor (new lifestyles) and the issue position outcome variables (e.g., gay adoption) might raise endogeneity concerns.

While this might be a problem for Hetherington and Weiler’s original analysis, it represents an opportunity for me. The perceived threat predictor variable, new lifestyles, measures agreement along a five-point scale with the claim that ‘new lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.’ The bivariate outcome variable, gay adoption, measures Yes or No responses to the following question: ‘Do you think gay or lesbian couples, in other words, homosexual couples, should be legally permitted to adopt children?’ Given the similarity of these two variables it is perhaps no surprise that comfort with new lifestyles strongly predicts support for gay adoption.

Perceived discrimination (PD) measures agreement along a five-point scale with the claim that ‘Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.’ Hetherington and Weiler’s endogeneity issue represents an opportunity for me because PD is both (i) less domain specific than new lifestyles and (ii) its content is not logically related to homosexuality. This means that PD represents a perceived threat variable without any endogeneity concerns.

There is no logical reason to expect PD to be able to predict support for gay adoption. Further, if PD is a measure of perceived threat, then it should behave similarly to new lifestyles in the context of a model that uses authoritarianism, perceived threat, and their interaction, to predict support for gay adoption.
4.3 Threat and Authoritarianism: Negative Interaction Versus Additivity

Before comparing how the two threat variables perform, however, I first want to discuss a discovery I made while replicating Hetherington and Weiler’s original analysis. I will begin with a brief description of my replication. The data and the model of my replication are very similar to the original. The data come from the 2004 ANES survey. The model is a logistic regression of support for gay adoption on authoritarianism, perceived threat from new lifestyles, their interaction, race (African-American dummy), moral traditionalism, party identification, ideological self placement, gender (female dummy), income, education, age, church attendance (one week or more dummy), and three religion dummies for Evangelical, Mainland Protestant, and Catholic. All variables except age and dummies are scaled to range from 0 to 1.

There is one difference between the original model and my replication. I did not include the three religion dummies because the criteria for coding them is not clear from either the text or the ANES documentation. Religiosity is accounted for by the church attendance dummy, but the effects of membership to specific religious denominations is not. It would have been possible for me to include a Catholic dummy, but this seemed less interesting than the distinction between Mainland and Evangelical Protestants, which was difficult to determine with sufficient objectivity.

Conceptually, I am comfortable with this omission because the direction of the causal arrow between, (i) levels of authoritarianism, and (ii) membership in more or less authoritarian denominations, is unclear. There would thus be no clear way to interpret the effects of these dummies. In addition to this, and perhaps more importantly, my replication succeeded despite this omission.

The results of my replication are graphically displayed in part (a) on the left side of Figure 4.1, which is highly similar to the original, Figure 6.2 of Hetherington and Weiler.
These figures represent the effect of authoritarianism on support for gay adoption across different levels of perceived threat. Conversely, they also represent the effect of perceived threat on support for gay adoption across different levels of authoritarianism. The $y$-axis shows the predicted probability of support for gay adoption, ranging from 0 (no chance of support) to 1 (no chance of opposition). The $x$-axis shows levels of authoritarianism, ranging from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). The lines show levels of perceived threat from new lifestyles, ranging from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest).

The overall story that the slopes in Figure 4.1 (a) communicate is twofold. First, when threat is at its highest level, authoritarianism has essentially no effect on support for gay adoption. This is represented by the flatness of the bottom-most line. Second, when authoritarianism is at its highest level, threat has a very small effect on support for gay adoption. This is shown by the close clustering of the right-most points, which represent probabilities at various levels of threat for individuals with the highest level of authoritarianism. These features of Figure 4.1 (a) constitute a graphical representation of the significant and substantial coefficient for the negative interaction between threat and authoritarianism found in the model.

![Figure 4.1: The Effect of Authoritarianism on Support for Gay Adoption across Different Levels of Perceived Threat. Data: (a) 2004 ANES; (b) 1992, 2000, 2004 and 2008 ANES](image-url)
Hetherington and Weiler use this finding to support a controversial position in an ongoing debate in the authoritarianism literature. The debate is over competing explanations of frequently observed aggregate-level spikes in authoritarian attitudes following aggregate-level spikes in perceived threat – e.g., in response to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center towers (Peterson et al 1993, Sibley et al 2007; see Duckitt 2013 for an overview). The most common explanation is that these spikes occur among high authoritarians. Stenner (2005, 2009), for example, argues that these spikes in perceived normative threat activate a predisposition that remains latent in the absence of threat.

Stenner’s explanation contrasts sharply with Hetherington and Weiler’s. They claim that it is impossible for authoritarians to become any more authoritarian in their policy attitudes, and that the spike must thus be among low authoritarians rather than among high authoritarians. And part (a) of Figure 4.1 provides clear and strong support for this alternative explanation. The spike cannot occur among high authoritarians if perceived threat has close to no effect on their support for gay adoption, as the close clustering on the righthand side indicates. Further, if authoritarianism is a latent predisposition, then higher perceived threat will have larger effects on support among individuals high in authoritarianism than among those low in it. But the lines of Figure 4.1 suggest just the opposite, with fanning on the left side and close clustering on the right.

Hetherington and Weiler’s alternative explanation, however, runs counter to several previous studies which suggest that individuals who are higher in authoritarianism are more responsive to perceived threats (see, e.g., Duckitt 2001). To test the robustness of Hetherington and Weiler’s findings in light of these studies, I decided to rerun my replication of their model with more data in order to see if their results were unique to, say, the sample or the time period in which it was taken. While Hetherington and Weiler only used the 2004 wave of the ANES survey, I pooled all of the waves of ANES surveys that include the variables in their model. This allowed me to include the 1992, 2000, 2004, and 2008 waves.
The results of my reanalysis are displayed in part (b) of Figure 4.1. The lines of this graph tell a different story than Hetherington and Weiler’s explanation, which is represented in part (a) of Figure 4.1. In the graph based on pooled data, for example, when threat is at its highest level, the effect of authoritarianism on support for gay adoption drops about 10 points as we move from the lowest to the highest level of authoritarianism. This is represented by the downward slope of the bottom-most line. In contrast, the slope of this line is flat in the old graph (on the left side).

Another difference in the new graph is that when authoritarianism is at its highest level threat has a fairly large effect on support for gay adoption. Threat’s effect when authoritarianism is at its lowest level is almost as large as its effect when authoritarianism is at its highest level. This is exhibited graphically by the non-clustering or dispersion of the right-most points, which represent probabilities of support at various levels of threat for individuals with the highest levels of authoritarianism. Note how these points are only slightly less dispersed than the points that represent the lowest levels of authoritarianism on the left-most side. In contrast, the points cluster significantly as authoritarianism increases in the old graph (on the left side).

On the left side of Figure 4.1, the lines graphically represent a negative interaction between threat and authoritarianism. Contrary to this explanation, however, the lines on the right side indicate that the effects of threat and authoritarianism on support for gay adoption are primarily additive. Higher levels of both variables negatively affect support, and this remains true for each variable independent of variation in the other variable. In other words, if the level of one variable is high, rather than mitigating the effects of the other variable, it simply adds to it.

An additive relationship between threat and authoritarianism entails a novel explanation of the spikes in authoritarianism that follow spikes in threat. Recall that Stenner attributes the spike in authoritarianism to high authoritarians, while Hetherington and Weiler attribute
it to low authoritarians. The additive view, in contrast, attributes the spike to individuals on both ends of the authoritarianism spectrum. This is indicated by the dispersion of points at every level of authoritarianism on side (b) of Figure 4.1.

There are some nuances, though. At the lowest value of authoritarianism, a move from the minimum to the maximum value of threat corresponds to about a .5 change in probability of support, which is very large. In contrast, at the lowest value of threat, a move from the minimum to the maximum value of authoritarianism corresponds to a little more than a .25 change, which is still quite large but only half the size of the previous move. At the maximum values of authoritarianism and threat, the analogous changes are about .25 and .10.

At least two aspects of these comparisons are notable. First, threat has a much larger effect than authoritarianism (.5 versus .25, and .25 versus .10). More specifically, the effect of variation in threat on probability of support when authoritarianism is held constant at its highest and lowest levels is larger than the effect of variation in authoritarianism when threat is held constant at its highest and lowest levels.

Second, even though additivity captures the general patterns, as the two comparisons above indicate, the effects of both threat and authoritarianism are truncated when the other variable is at its maximum value. This can be viewed as a significantly weaker version of the Hetherington and Weiler explanation, who argue that threat only affects authoritarian attitudes primarily among low authoritarians. With more data, however, their model instead shows that threat has larger effects among the lowest authoritarians (about a .5 difference between lowest and highest levels of threat) than among the highest (about a .25 difference between lowest and highest levels of threat). Noting that Stenner argues that the effects occur primarily among high authoritarians, we might say that Hetherington and Weiler’s explanation is closer to the truth according to these data.

The additivity view suggests that, relative to perceived threat, the power of authoritar-
ianism is smaller than either Stenner or Hetherington and Weiler appreciated. At the very least, this is true in the case of support for gay adoption. As we have seen, for this issue the effects of perceived threat on authoritarian attitudes are almost twice as large as the effects of authoritarianism.

4.4 Threat and Authoritarianism Among Minorities: Negative Interaction Revisited

Taking a step back, recall that my primary interest here is in racial variation in authoritarianism. My ultimate goal is to explain why stigmatized minorities have such high levels of authoritarianism, and my overarching explanation is that it is a function of perceived discrimination. More specifically, it is a function of the elevated levels of threat which I think perceived discrimination entails.

Given this, the finding that threat has a greater effect than authoritarianism raises the question of whether this is true among stigmatized minorities in the same way that it is true for the (mostly White) population at large. My theory of racial variation in authoritarianism, RVA, predicts that a perceived threat variable like the one used here — threat to society from new lifestyles — will have less effect among stigmatized minorities than among non-stigmatized minorities. The reason is simple: since stigmatized minorities both experience and perceive more threat on a daily basis, their attitudes should already reflect the effects of perceived threat. While there might be room for additional threat effects, RVA predicts that there should be significantly less room compared to non-stigmatized or privileged racial groups.

According to RVA, the extent to which threat has a greater effect than authoritarianism on support for gay adoption should vary across racial groups as a function of the degree to which those groups are stigmatized. In short, threat should be less powerful relative to authoritarianism among more stigmatized racial groups. This means that stigmatized
minorities should look more like the left side of Figure 4.1 and non-stigmatized racial groups should look more like the right side of Figure 4.1. The key difference between the two is that the relative power of authoritarianism to affect support for gay adoption is much greater on the left side of the figure, which is represented by less fanning, or tighter clustering, over the maximum value of authoritarianism.

Figure 4.2: The Effect of Authoritarianism on Support for Gay Adoption across Different Levels of Perceived Threat. *Data: 1992, 2000, 2004 and 2008 ANES*

These expectations can be tested via the same type of comparison that is presented in Figure 4.1. To do this I use the pooled data to rerun the model on both stigmatized and non-stigmatized or privileged sub-populations, and then compare the two sets of results. Even though it is a coincidence, the side-by-side graphs of this figure — with the stigmatized group on the left and the privileged group on the right — should look similar to the side-by-side graphs in Figure 4.1. In the context of the United States, the best data is available for non-Hispanic Whites (as the privileged racial group) and African-Americans (as the stigmatized racial group). RVA predicts that authoritarianism will have a greater effect among African-Americans than among non-Hispanic Whites in the same way that it had a greater effect for the population at large with the 2004 data than it did with the pooled data.
Results of these analyses are graphically displayed in Figure 4.2. They are exactly as RVA predicts. Since the graphs in Figure 4.2 take the same shape as those in Figure 4.1, I do not have to repeat my entire analysis of Figure 1. Instead, I will primarily discuss the most important takeaway point and its implications.

The main takeaway is that, among African-Americans, (i) when threat is at its highest level the effect of authoritarianism is quite small, and (ii) when authoritarianism is at its highest level the effect of threat is quite small. As discussed above, this is how a negative interaction between threat and authoritarianism manifests in these graphs. However, among non-Hispanic Whites only the first part, (i), is true. In contrast to African-Americans, when authoritarianism is at its highest level among Whites, the effect of threat remains almost as large as when authoritarianism is at its lowest level.

Briefly put, the main takeaway is that threat has a large effect on non-Hispanic White high authoritarians but a very small to almost no effect on African-American high authoritarians. This is exactly what RVA predicts. As discussed above, among members of groups who experience chronic threats, their attitudes should already reflect the effects of perceived threat. I presume that there is a point at which the effects of higher levels of perceived threat on attitudes begin to diminish. If so, then the slopes on the left side of Figure 4.2 indicate that for African-Americans this point has been reached.

This finding helps explain the summary statistics presented in preceding chapters. As I discussed in chapter two, across both (i) a range of political attitudes, and (ii) the range of each attitude from its lowest to highest level, the mean authoritarianism of African-Americans is higher than that of non-Hispanic Whites. Further, as discussed earlier in chapter two, (iii) the distribution of authoritarianism rises monotonically from left to right for African-Americans, but is distributed more normally for non-Hispanic Whites.

These three trends are consistent with a conceptualization of authoritarianism that includes both a chronic and a transient or relatively shorter-term relationship with per-
ceived threat. The average levels of authoritarianism observed among non-stigmatized, non-threatened groups represent a normally distributed baseline. And the higher average levels of stigmatized, threatened groups represent a left-skewed movement away from the baseline, which I attribute to chronically perceived threat.

In the present chapter, I have used RVA to explain why threat interacts with authoritarianism differently among African-Americans than among non-Hispanic whites. This contrasts with the summary statistics chapter, which uses RVA to explain why threat might affect authoritarianism levels themselves. Considered together, these two sets of findings suggest that the chronic perception of threat is able to both (i) elevate authoritarianism itself, and thus (ii) mitigate the effects of additional threats — e.g., novel or short-term spikes in threat from an event like 9/11, or threats related to specific cultural phenomena such as new lifestyles.

4.5 Is Perceived Discrimination Threatening?

One might object, however, that the findings presented in Figure 4.2 represent a facile or even misleading test of RVA. More specifically, one might charge that the independent variable of primary interest (threat from new lifestyles) and the dependent variable (support for gay adoption) share endogenous content. An uncharitable interpretation of this is that it would mean that Hetherington and Weiler’s findings are uninformative or unsurprising because their model uses what is essentially a gay rights attitude to predict support for a gay rights issue. The two variables represent general and specific measures of the same thing, in other words. A more charitable interpretation, in contrast, is that it would mean that Hetherington and Weiler’s findings show that a general attitude can predict support for a specific issue that falls within that attitude’s content domain.

Hetherington and Weiler were able to get away with or bypass this endogeneity issue because they were primarily concerned with the relationship between threat and authoritarianism. And, up until this point, I shared this concern. As discussed above, RVA accurately
predicts that Hetherington and Weiler’s findings are more likely to hold among stigmatized minority groups than among non-stigmatized groups or the population at large. As I also discussed, some of the reasoning behind this prediction is that higher levels of authoritarianism should only mitigate the effects of threat if those higher levels of authoritarianism already reflect the effects of a chronically perceived threat.

This reasoning brings me to a second, bolder prediction of RVA: Without changing anything else in the model, if a chronically perceived normative threat variable — such as perceived racial discrimination — replaces the threat from new lifestyles variable, then it will behave similarly. This prediction is bolder than the first because it removes any possibility of endogeneity between the primary variables of interest. Whereas threats from new lifestyles are likely to be interpreted as threats from non-traditional lifestyle choices such as homosexuality, perceived racial discrimination is conspicuously distinct from, and logically unrelated to, gay rights issues.

These ANES surveys contain a perceived discrimination variable that is generated from self-reported agreement with the following claim: ‘Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.’ Similar to the threat from new lifestyle variable, responses range from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ along a five-point scale. Thus, rather than examining the relationship between two gay rights variables (threat from new lifestyles and support for gay adoption) and authoritarianism, we can instead look at the relationship between one gay rights variable (support for gay adoption), one chronic normative threat variable (perceived discrimination), and authoritarianism.

Figure 4.3 displays what happens when the model is run with perceived discrimination instead of new lifestyles. Though in most cases the trends are weaker, the slopes in the discrimination graph (on the right) exhibit the same general patterns of those in the new lifestyles graph (on the left). For example, the degree of fanning over the lowest level of
Figure 4.3: The Effect of Authoritarianism on Support for Gay Adoption across Different Levels of Perceived Threat. *Data: 1992, 2000, 2004 and 2008 ANES*

Authoritarianism is much greater on the left, new lifestyles graph than on the right, discrimination graph.

The two graphs of Figure 4.3 represent mixed support for my hypothesis that discrimination will behave similarly to new lifestyles in this model. (Recall that I interpret this as evidence that discrimination functions as a threat). On the one hand, new lifestyles has a larger effect than discrimination on probability of support for gay adoption. The spread on the left graph is about twice as large — about .5 for new lifestyles versus .25 for discrimination. On the other hand, however, in both graphs the move from most to least amount of perceived threat passes the 50% mark, which in practical terms translates to a switch from support to opposition.

A second point of comparison is the degree to which the effect of threat decreases as the level of authoritarianism increases. (Recall that Hetherington and Weiler’s theory is that threat primarily impacts low authoritarians because the impact is already in effect among high authoritarians.) Once again, the trends are much stronger for the new lifestyles model than for the discrimination model. On the left graph, the degree of fanning shrinks
from about .5 over the lowest level authoritarianism to about .13 over the highest level of authoritarianism. On the right graph, in contrast, the degree of fanning shrinks from about .25 to about .1, moving from the lowest to the highest level of authoritarianism, respectively. This seems small when compared to the new lifestyles graph, but considered on its own the change is not insignificant. It translates to a change that more than halves the effect of threat on support for gay adoption.

Lastly, the third point of comparison is that in both graphs the predicted probabilities of support at the highest level of authoritarianism are all well below the 50% threshold. Both graphs begin with predicted probabilities that are mostly above the threshold (considering all levels of threat at the lowest level of authoritarianism) and end with probabilities that are all below the threshold (considering all levels of threat at the highest level of authoritarianism). One way to think about this shift is that in the new lifestyles graph 9 of the probabilities remain over the threshold, while only 7 do so in the discrimination graph. This comparison provides another example of weaker trends for the discrimination graph that nonetheless tell a similar story.

A serious caveat is in order for much of the preceding analyses of Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Even when all of the surveys are pooled together, the sample of non-Hispanic Whites (N=4763) is almost eight times larger than the sample of African-Americans (N=601). African-Americans are too under-sampled to power a test of these models using traditional logistic regression. Thus, while the graphs of Figures 4.2 and 4.3 might provide a preliminary picture of the “shape” of the data, they do not display estimates derived from statistically significant results for all three of my variables of interest (threat, authoritarianism, and their interaction).

This is true for both of the graphs that are based on the exclusively African-American subsample. The first graph is displayed on the left side of both Figures 4.2 and 4.3, and it shows how authoritarianism and threat from new lifestyles interact with one another to affect support for gay adoption. In the model that these simulated probabilities are based
on, both of the variables have the right sign (negative) and are statistically significant. Their interaction, however, has the right sign (positive) but is not statistically significant.

The second graph is displayed on the right side of Figure 4.3, and it shows how authoritarianism and threat from perceived discrimination interact with one another to affect support for gay adoption. This graph’s slopes are derived from a model for which both of the variables of primary interest have the right sign (negative), but among them only authoritarianism is close to being statistically significant. Their interaction has the right sign (positive), and it is also not statistically significant.

4.6 Concluding Remarks

While I would not submit these results for publication, for the purposes of this dissertation they are still useful and informative. In many ways, these results suffer from a similar methodological issue that I encountered and discussed in the previous chapter. Poor sampling of African-Americans makes it difficult to have enough statistical power to test many hypotheses using standard regression techniques. In the second chapter, this manifested in much larger confidence intervals for the descriptive statistics based on the African-American subsample than for the subsample of the most sampled racial group, non-Hispanic Whites. In this chapter, the poor sampling issue manifests in models whose coefficients meet expectations with regard to direction, magnitude, and statistical significance when based on either the entire sample or only the subsample of non-Hispanic Whites. When based on the subsample of African-Americans, however, the coefficients of primary interest only meet expectations with regard to direction and magnitude, but not with regard to statistical significance.

Despite these shortcomings, the results displayed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 remain useful in part because they serve an exploratory function. Even if my sample of African-Americans is too small, these models provide an opportunity to take a rough look at the shape of the
data, which provides a sense of whether or not I am on the right track. In the next chapter I use multilevel modeling with post-stratification to overcome the problem of sparse sampling.
5.1 Introduction

In 2008 the citizens of California made national headlines when they voted in favor of Proposition 8, a hotly contested constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. Responding to early reports from exit polls, journalists were quick to attribute Proposition 8’s successful passage to the anti-gay marriage sentiments of the state’s Latino and black populations. These attributions were exuberant and premature, however, and critics rightly deemed them exaggerated (see, e.g., Silver 2008). Subsequent analyses nonetheless confirm that the anti-gay marriage sentiment widely shared by California’s black voters had a large and significant impact on Proposition 8’s passage (Abrajano 2010).

Such findings underline the broader electoral significance of African American voters. In the concurrent national presidential contest of 2008, African Americans played a similarly large and significant role in the historic election of America’s first black president, Barack Obama. According to one estimate, for example, Obama would have only won by 5 points versus 8 had he received Kerry’s raw vote among blacks (Philpot et al 2009).

The role that African Americans played in passing Proposition 8 is of particular note because it exemplifies the pervasive and persistent social conservatism of blacks in America. Yet, this social conservatism is also in conflict with the longstanding allegiance of African Americans to the Democratic Party (see, e.g., Hetherington & Weiler 2009, Carmines & Stimson 1990, Frymer 1999).

Despite being widely noted and frequently observed, the social conservatism of African Americans is understudied and poorly understood. Toward this end, the substantive aim
of this paper is to further our understanding of the social conservatism of America’s black population. This goal has remained elusive in part because traditional statistical tools are not able to overcome limitations inherent to the most widely available data on black public opinion. Toward this end, the methodological aim of this paper is to suggest an innovative solution that allows us to overcome such difficulties. The following two subsections address these complementary aims in turn.

5.1.1 Substantive Contribution

African Americans have the highest authoritarianism\(^1\) levels among racial and ethnic groups in America (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). This is a puzzling anomaly that is, unfortunately, often overlooked in the race & politics literature. Though few studies directly address this anomaly, it is frequently reproduced in research on the gap between the political beliefs and attitudes of black and white Americans (Harris-Lacewell 2007).

Research on this gap is contrastingly plentiful. For example, black Americans tend to be ‘populist,’ i.e., both socially conservative and economically liberal (Zaller 1993, Frymer 1999). This stands in stark contrast to national trends that show an increasingly large positive intercorrelation between the social and economic dimensions of ideology (Jost et al 2009, Benoit and Laver 2006). Further, black Democrats are as socially conservative as Republicans across numerous social and moral issues (Gallup Poll, December 3, 2008). Lastly, black Americans hold more conservative attitudes than white Americans when it comes to school prayer, abortion, homosexuality, and traditional roles for women (Smith and Seltzer 1993).

The gap between the political beliefs and attitudes of black and white Americans creates a unique dilemma for black voters. On economic issues their attitudes resemble Democrats,

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1. The concept of authoritarianism is discussed in a subsection below. For present purposes, I define authoritarianism as a cognitive predisposition toward hierarchy and intolerance that loosely resembles social conservatism.
whereas on social issues their attitudes resemble Republicans. But the two major parties do not, as a result, split the vote. Rather, despite the marked social conservatism of black Americans, they largely identify with and vote for Democrats (Dawson 1994, Harris-Lacewell 2007).

Much ink has been spilled over the odd pairing of social conservatism with Democratic allegiance among black Americans. On the level of psychology, for example, Dawson (1994) provides the black utility heuristic to explain how a sense of linked fate among black Americans forms the (boundedly) rational basis of their relatively homogeneous voting patterns. On the level of party politics and issue coalitions, processes of issue evolution realigned the two major parties along racial lines (Carmines and Stimson 1990), leaving black Americans with little choice and thus electorally captured by the racially progressive party (Frymer 1999).

As these examples evince, the allegiance of African Americans to the Democratic party is well understood on many levels of analysis. Yet, little to no ink appears to have been spilled over the other half of the aforementioned odd pairing of Democratic allegiance, on the one hand, and social conservatism, on the other. This is particularly true in regard to the high levels of authoritarianism among black Americans. Why, this paper asks, are black Americans the most authoritarian racial or ethnic group in America?

5.1.2 Methodological Contribution

Though the primary aim of this paper is substantive, it also seeks to make a methodological contribution. Despite significant advances in the study of African American public opinion over the past decade, the amount of data and thus research on the topic remains regretfully small (Bobo 1997, Harris-Lacewell 2007). Good intentions notwithstanding, almost all nationally representative surveys produce mostly white samples (Smith 1987). Not surprisingly, then, samples of non-whites are usually too small to analyze with sufficient statistical
power to produce reliable estimates (Oliver 2010). As a result, survey-based scholarship disproportionately focuses on the attitudes and beliefs of white Americans (Bobo and Fox 2003), and it is common practice for public opinion researchers to remove non-white subjects from their data (for brief discussion see Hetherington and Weiler 2009).

Traditional approaches taken toward solving the problem of inadequate black sampling usually involve original surveys that generously or even exclusively sample blacks. While such approaches have been undertaken to great effect (e.g., Allen et al 1989, Dawson 1994), they are very expensive and time consuming. As a result there are only a handful of examples, such as the 1984, 1988, and 1996 National black Election Studies, the 1994 National black Politics Study, and a 2000 election study conducted by Knowledge Networks (Harris-Lacewell 2007, Dawson and Brown 1994, Bobo and Dawson 2000). Suffice it to say that there is a severe need for data among African American public opinion scholars.

Luckily, however, multilevel statistical techniques offer new and unprecedented opportunities to analyze poorly sampled subsets of data (Lax and Phillips 2009, Gelman and Hill 2007). They are thus well suited to provide relatively cheap solutions to the problem of inadequate minority group sampling. In fact, in the sections that follow I specifically contend that multilevel modeling with post-stratification allows us to develop reliable state-level estimates for states with as few as five respondents across three nationally representative surveys combined.

Multilevel modeling is not new to the study of race and politics. For example, Quillian (1996) used multilevel techniques to study how white racial attitudes change over time, and Taylor (1998) used them to study how whites react to differences in racial composition in their local population. We seek to build on these pioneering studies by using multilevel modeling techniques to leverage a shift in focus to the political attitudes of black Americans.

On a related point, Gary King (1998) notes that political scientists have been slow to realize that methodological advances in one subfield are applicable to extant problems in
other subfields. This paper aims to make a small contribution toward closing the gap between advances in multilevel modeling and the extant problem of poorly sampled minority populations in the study of race and politics.

I argue not just that multilevel modeling presents a unique opportunity for analysts of African American public opinion, but also for analysts interested in numerous other subsets of data that are too small to analyze with traditional statistical techniques. Still, for race & politics scholars, such subsets could include other minority groups, which would help us get past the white-black paradigm in the study of political attitudes, or perhaps even subsets of these groups, which would provide a much needed step in the direction of an intersectional approach to the study of black political attitudes (Harris-Lacewell 2007, Dawson and Cohen 2002, Cohen 1999, Matsuda 2002).

### 5.2 Theory and Hypotheses

The central contention of this paper is that the perception of black-targeted racism is a core variable responsible for high levels of authoritarianism among African Americans. The theoretical backdrop of this contention consists of three findings in the race & politics and ideology literatures.

First, as mentioned above, African Americans are the most authoritarian racial or ethnic group in America ‘by far’ (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Using the 2004 ANES, they report mean authoritarianism scores of .75 and .55 for blacks and non-blacks, respectively (ibid: 141). This is very close to the means of .7 for blacks and .55 for whites in my dataset, which pools 1992, 2000, and 2004 ANES surveys. Figure 5.1 displays a histogram of raw authoritarianism scores, with side-by-side distributions for black and white respondents.²

---

² To make the graph easier to read the odd-numbered entries have been removed. They represent the small fraction of respondents who answered one or more of the items in the authoritarianism instrument as ‘both.’ Including them makes the shapes of the distributions harder to compare and thus, despite showing more information, less informative.
The authoritarianism scores of whites (light grey bars) are close to normally distributed with a small left skew. In contrast, the scores of blacks (dark grey bars) exhibit a very large left skew, with their proportions increasing monotonically from lowest to highest levels of authoritarianism. In a manner of speaking, Figure 5.1 is a graphical representation of the empirical anomaly that this paper seeks to explain. As the motivation for my investigation, it is the evidential basis of the question: why are African Americans the most authoritarian racial group in America?

The second component of the theoretical backdrop to this paper’s hypothesis is the finding that when a widely perceived normative threat arises – e.g., after 9/11 – it causes a rightward or authoritarian shift in attitudes on social issues in the mass public (Stenner and Feldman 1997, Hetherington and Suhay 2010). Lastly, disproportionately to whites, blacks perceive themselves to be the victims of both past and ongoing racial discrimination (Sigelman and Welch 1991, Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).

Putting these three findings together, I offer the theory that African Americans widely
perceive racism as a chronically present normative threat. This widely shared perception of normative threat induces a longterm rightward shift in policy preferences in the social domain – hence the disproportionately high mean authoritarianism levels of blacks in America. This theory furnishes three primary hypotheses:

\textit{H1:} The degree to which blacks’ authoritarianism levels are higher than whites’ is a function of the extent to which blacks perceive themselves to be the victims of racism and discrimination.

Structured by a simple causal logic, H1 captures the theory that motivates this study in the most general and intuitive manner. Perceptions of racism function as normative threats, which in turn cause rightward shifts in social policy space and hence higher levels of authoritarianism. The same result should only hold for whites to the extent that they also perceive themselves to be the victims of racism or discrimination, which I deem unlikely.

\textit{H2:} On the state level, for states in which blacks perceive higher levels of racism and discrimination (relative to blacks in other states), blacks’ authoritarianism levels will be higher relative to whites in their state.

H2 is more complicated than H1, mostly because it includes state-level considerations. However, even H1 depends on state-level effects. The models I attempted in the early stages of this project that did not contain state-level controls produced null results in a simple OLS multivariate regression context and very weak results in an ordered logit context.

These initial results are not surprising given that the need to account for geography is well established in the race & politics literature. Numerous studies find that attitudes towards other races are profoundly affected by geographic or contextual variables such as local racial composition (see, e.g., Oliver 2010). Within the context of this paper’s theory I incorporate these sorts of findings by controlling for the state level, albeit with a strong assumption that I shall now discuss.

My theory assumes that almost all of the causes of authoritarianism (other than perceived discrimination) apply to everyone equally. More specifically, it assumes that, controlling for
both geographic (state) and demographic (race, sex, income, age, and education) variables, the causes of authoritarianism – e.g., genetic predisposition, social and economic history, non-racial normative threats, etc. – are the same for everybody. This implies that state averages of authoritarianism levels ought to provide something akin to a baseline or reference point for each state (thought of here as a geographic unit). Any independent variable which affects these averages, then, ought to affect them from the reference point. State-level means of authoritarianism scores probably provide the best approximation of this reference point.

The third hypothesis largely restates the second in a different vocabulary with the goal of increased specification and clarification.

*H3*: Higher levels of perceived racism among blacks – understood as a between-states variable – will correlate positively with the extent to which blacks’ mean authoritarianism scores are higher than whites’ – understood as a within-states variable.

To summarize, I contend that (i) higher levels of perceived racism among blacks result in higher levels of authoritarianism, and that (ii) this result occurs relative to state baselines (which are dominated by whites in each state). If these two contentions are true, then (iii) the state means of perceived racism levels among blacks should correlate positively with (iv) the state means of authoritarianism levels among blacks, relative to reference point levels (state means) – i.e., as a movement away from, and hopefully above, this baseline.

### 5.3 Analysis

In this section I introduce and describe (i) my data, (ii) the key concepts of authoritarianism and perceived discrimination and how I conceptualize and operationalize them, and (iii) the model and its other variables.
5.3.1 Data

To test my hypotheses I use data from the 1992, 2000, and 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys. These are the three years in which ANES includes a measure of authoritarianism. For my purposes, they serve as examples of nationally representative surveys that produce mostly white samples. The three surveys combine to form a pooled sample of 4123 respondents, of which 3305 report being white and only 510 report being black. As discussed above, the sampling discrepancy between whites and blacks poses a serious problem for scholars of African American public opinion. Though I advocate the oversampling of non-white populations, I also contend that this paper’s approach lessens the burden that standard survey procedures impose on scholars of African American or non-white public opinion.

While most of the variables used in this analysis are more or less straightforward in their measurement and interpretation, the two of primary interest, authoritarianism and perceptions of discrimination, require more careful attention. The two following sections discuss them in turn.

5.3.2 Authoritarianism

The concept of authoritarianism has a long and tumultuous history in the social sciences that dates back to Adorno et al (1950), who originally formulated the construct in order to study antisemitism in the aftermath of WWII. This marks the beginning of a rich and stimulating history for this embattled construct. However, for the purposes of this paper, the most recent accounts of authoritarianism are most helpful because they avoid the myriad problems that plagued early attempts. Particularly useful is Karen Stenner’s formulation of authoritarianism as an innate psychological predisposition toward intolerance that interacts with changing conditions of societal threat, a process which she refers to as the authoritarian dynamic (2005). A key feature of Stenner’s formulation is that it characterizes the mani-
festation of authoritarianism as a dynamic process which reflects changes in contextual or environmental conditions.

Drawing from Stenner, Hetherington & Weiler (2009) provide a similarly useful formulation of authoritarianism, which they divide into three parts. First, they view it as an underlying orientation that structures views on ‘hot’ issues like race, morals, and hawkishness. Second, authoritarianism serves as the basis of a worldview that helps individuals interpret the world and thus develop a predictable set of political opinions. Third, authoritarianism is motivated by a fundamental desire for order. This results in support for authorities who are perceived to be able to secure that order against threats to social cohesion (2009: 29, 36, 41).

Stenner (2005) and Hetherington & Weiler (2009) disagree about how to explain the rightward, authoritarian shift in public opinion that occurs after widely perceived normative threat levels spike – for example, after 9/11. Stenner (2005) maintains that such events trigger an authoritarian response in persons who are predisposed toward authoritarianism. According to this view, the authoritarian predisposition remains latent in the absence of such threats. Hetherington and Weiler (2009), on the other hand, maintain that authoritarians don’t have much ideological room to shift, and thus the national rightward shift is due primarily to changes among a low- or non-authoritarian subset of the population.

Since both positions are compatible with the theory, hypothesis, and analysis that follows, this paper is agnostic on these competing views. My central claim is that African Americans experience a rightward, authoritarian shift as a chronic response to their longterm perception of the threat of racism. This could be the result of latent authoritarianism being triggered. It could also result from rightward shifts among non-authoritarian blacks. Or it could be a combination of both possibilities. For my purposes it does not matter.

Following both Stenner (2005) and Hetherington and Weiler (2009), I operationalize authoritarianism using a battery of questions aimed at gauging respondents’ childrearing
values. These items query the respondents’ views on the tradeoff between authority and autonomy by asking, for example, whether obedience or self-reliance is a more desirable trait for a child to have. These questions form a reliable and consistent measure that taps a fundamental value orientation that is structured along a libertarian-authoritarian continuum. Responses tend to be only cursorily related to the respondents’ childrearing practices or experiences as a child, instead reflecting their underlying value orientation (Stenner 2005). For this analysis I use the same instrument as Hetherington & Weiler, which is comprised of four items with three possible responses each: the authoritarian option (+1), the libertarian or non-authoritarian option (-1), and the choice of both (0). This yields a nine-point scale that ranges from -4 (most libertarian) to 4 (most authoritarian).

5.3.3 Perceived Discrimination

To operationalize perceived discrimination I use a survey item that elicits responses to the statement: “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” This item is well suited to the manner in which the theory behind my hypothesis conceptualizes perceived racism and discrimination, which ascribes to it the ability to chronically function as a normative threat that is widely perceived among blacks. The wording that this item uses captures both the diffuseness of a broadly and socially persistent force that spans across older and more recent manifestations of anti-black racism (‘generations of slavery and discrimination’) as well as the specificity of a tangible everyday threat (‘conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class’). Responses are re-scored along a five-point scale ranging from 1 (‘disagree strongly’ or lowest perceived discrimination) to 5 (‘agree strongly’ or highest perceived discrimination).
The methodological aim of this paper is to introduce a novel application of what Lax and Phillips (2009) refer to as multilevel regression with post-stratification (MRP). A particularly attractive feature of MRP is that it allows one to produce reliable estimates for poorly sampled subsets of data. The poorly sampled subset that I target in this paper’s empirical analysis is African Americans. Note, though, that the substantive focus represents just one example of how researchers interested in poorly sampled subsets can utilize MRP. Putting my substantive goal in more precise terms, this paper seek to estimate both authoritarianism and perceptions of discrimination at both the state and the race×state level.

The intuition behind MRP has two parts. The first part, multilevel modeling, produces quality estimates of our dependent variable (authoritarianism) for individual intersections of respondent characteristics, e.g., race, sex, income, etc. The second part of MRP, post-stratification, uses existing demographic data to weight the micro-estimates for each bin. Each intersection can be thought of as a single bin in a 9-dimensional array that represents the count of demographic and geographic categories. In fact, this is how it is represented in R. One of the 1,480,500 bins in the array represents, say, individuals who are black, female, in Connecticut, over the age of 75, earning less than $50,000 a year, with a graduate degree, in 1992. The estimated coefficient of authoritarianism for this bin is then multiplied by the number of people in Connecticut who match and then divided by the total number of people in the state. The weighted estimates for each bin can then be aggregated to produce state-specific estimates with comparable quality to that of a much larger sample.

The simplest way to approach MRP is to transform each independent variable into a relatively small number of categories. The observed variables in this model are:
Individual levels of authoritarianism are modeled with a multilevel ordered multinomial logistic regression. The first level of the model is specified as:

$$
\Pr(\text{auth}_i = j) = \text{ologit}_9^{-1}(Z_i) \tag{5.1}
$$

$$
Z_i = \beta_{\text{discr}} d[i] + \beta_{\text{race}} r[i] + \beta_{\text{discr},\text{race}} d[i],r[i] + \beta_{\text{year}} y[i] + \beta_{\text{state}} s[i] + \beta_{\text{age}} a[i] + \beta_{\text{sex}} c[i] + \beta_{\text{educ}} l[i] + \beta_{\text{earn}} e[i]
$$

where \text{ologit}_9 refers to an ordered multinomial logit over the nine possible levels of the authoritarianism measure.\(^3\)

Although \text{discr} is observed in the dataset, I model it as a second level effect. This allows me to make post-stratified state- and race-level estimates of perceptions of discrimination:

$$
\Pr(d[i] = j) = \text{ologit}_5^{-1}(Y_i) \tag{5.2}
$$

$$
Y_i = \alpha_{\text{race}} r[i] + \alpha_{\text{state}} s[i] + \alpha_{\text{race},\text{state}} r[i],s[i] + \alpha_{\text{year}} y[i] + \alpha_{\text{age}} a[i] + \alpha_{\text{sex}} c[i] + \alpha_{\text{educ}} l[i] + \alpha_{\text{earn}} e[i]
$$

Each of the remaining covariates is modeled as normally distributed with possibly distinct variances. For equation 5.1 we have:

---

3. The model does not include a constant or intercept term because it estimates all eight cut-points in the ordered logit regression.
\[ \beta_{\text{discr}}[i] \sim N(0, \tau_{\text{discr}}) \]
\[ \beta_{\text{race}}[i] \sim N(0, \tau_{\text{race}}) \]
\[ \beta_{\text{discr},\text{race}}[i] \sim N(0, \tau_{\text{discr},\text{race}}) \]
\[ \beta_{\text{year}}[i] \sim N(0, \tau_{\text{year}}) \]
\[ \beta_{\text{state}}[i] \sim N(0, \tau_{\text{state}}) \]
\[ \beta_{\text{age}}[i] \sim N(0, \tau_{\text{age}}) \]
\[ \beta_{\text{sex}}[i] \sim N(0, \tau_{\text{sex}}) \]
\[ \beta_{\text{educ}}[i] \sim N(0, \tau_{\text{educ}}) \]
\[ \beta_{\text{earn}}[i] \sim N(0, \tau_{\text{earn}}) \]

And for equation 5.2 we have:

\[ \alpha_{\text{race}}[i] \sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{race}}) \]
\[ \alpha_{\text{state}}[i] \sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{state}}) \]
\[ \alpha_{\text{race},\text{state}}[i] \sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{race},\text{state}}) \]
\[ \alpha_{\text{year}}[i] \sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{year}}) \]
\[ \alpha_{\text{age}}[i] \sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{age}}) \]
\[ \alpha_{\text{sex}}[i] \sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{sex}}) \]
\[ \alpha_{\text{educ}}[i] \sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{educ}}) \]
\[ \alpha_{\text{earn}}[i] \sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{earn}}) \]

The model is estimated using a straightforward Gibbs sampler, which I computed in JAGS using R as an interface.\(^4\) Full results of the estimation are summarized in Table 5.2 in the appendix.

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\(^4\) Our results are based on a sample of 100,000 with an adaptation (or ‘burn-in’) period of 20,000 iterations.
5.4 Results and Discussion

In this section I describe and analyze the model’s results. The first two subsections focus on the model’s estimated effects on authoritarianism (or \( Z_i \) in the model) for three predictor variables of interest. The first subsection focuses on the interaction of race and perceived discrimination (\( \text{race} \times \text{discr} \), or \( \beta_{d,r}^{\text{discr,race}} \) in the model). And the second subsection focuses on the individual or un-interacted variables of both race (\( \beta_{\text{race black}} \) and \( \beta_{\text{race white}} \) in the model) and perceived discrimination (\( \beta_d^{\text{discr}} \) in the model).

The first two subsections make it clear that these data require disaggregation by state, which poses unique challenges. In the third subsection, then, I discuss these challenges along with post-stratification, which is a central part of my solution to them. The fourth subsection discusses the post-stratified results, which I maintain provide clear and strong support for this paper’s hypothesis. Nonetheless, the post-stratified results raise some interesting puzzles; and I discuss these in the concluding subsection.

The Perception of Discrimination \( \times \) Race Interaction

This paper hypothesizes that the perception of discrimination functions as a normative threat and should thus raise authoritarianism levels among African Americans. In the context of this paper’s model, then, the hypothesis predicts that, for African Americans, the interaction variable for race and perceived discrimination (\( \beta_{d,r}^{\text{discr,race}} \)) ought to have a positive effect on authoritarianism that increases monotonically as it moves from lowest to highest levels of perceived discrimination. Moreover, these expected effects are specifically hypothesized to drive authoritarianism levels from a baseline level that is set by state means. Since whites dominate state mean authoritarianism levels, it follows that as \( \text{race} \times \text{discr} \) among blacks moves from lowest to highest, its effects should increase monotonically relative to those of whites, whose analogous \( \text{race} \times \text{discr} \) effects provide a quick and dirty proxy for the baseline. The graphs in Figure 5.2 speak to whether or not the model’s results support these predictions.
The first two graphs in Figure 5.2 plot estimates of the coefficients $\beta_{d,r}^{\text{discr, race}}$ representing the interaction between perceptions of discrimination and race. The $y$-axis shows mean and 25th and 75th percentiles of the estimates, and the $x$-axis shows the levels of perceived discrimination. The coefficients are plotted for black (Figure 5.2a) and white (Figure 5.2b) Americans. In an ordered-logit framework, these coefficients can be interpreted as the race-specific effects of perceived discrimination on latent authoritarianism levels. That is, these plots represent the estimated effect of the $\text{race} \times \text{discr}$ coefficient on $Z_i$ (see equation 5.1), in which $Z_i$ is interpreted as the ‘latent’ authoritarianism for respondent $i$.

Interpreting the $Z_i$ term is, I have found, a common source of confusion. This is in part due to the term ‘latent’, which is more loaded than it should be. In the context of this model, the $Z_i$ term provides a probability for the outcome variable $Y_i$, which fall along a 9-point scale. In other words, it represents the probability that the outcome will fall into each of its 8 bins, ranging from least to most authoritarian. Higher values of $Z_i$ lead to higher expected responses on the nine levels of authoritarianism. The two terms, $Z_i$ and $Y_i$, are not equivalent because $Z_i$ represents the probability of $Y_i$ as a stochastic process; their relationship is not deterministic.

Even though Figure 5.2 only plots the effects of an interaction variable (as a function of perceived racism), these coefficients are estimated from the full model described in equation 5.1. All else equal, then, the plots show that whites are less authoritarian as they perceive less discrimination against blacks. The estimates for blacks, in contrast, show a predominantly increasing trend. That is, blacks who perceive more black-targeted discrimination are more likely to have high authoritarianism scores.

This divergence is especially apparent in Figure 5.2c. Here, the difference between the interaction coefficients for black and white respondents ($\beta_{d,\text{black}}^{\text{discr, race}} - \beta_{d,\text{whites}}^{\text{discr, race}}$) are plotted on the $y$-axis, as a function of levels of perceived discrimination, which are plotted on the $x$-axis. Note that the plot of Figure 5.2c does not provide any information in addition to
Figure 5.2: Coefficient estimates of effects of perceptions of discrimination on authoritarianism by race. Black lines show sample means. Grey lines show the first and third quartiles.

Those in Figures 5.2a and b. Rather, it reorganizes the results for the sake of emphasis. The primary result of these three plots is that, as perceptions of black-targeted racism increase, black Americans become more authoritarian relative to white Americans, who become less authoritarian.

Figures 5.2a, 5.2b, and 5.2c represent national-level coefficient estimates from the full model, which controls for states. As mentioned above, however, these plots only represent the
examination of the coefficient, $\beta_{d,r}^{discr,race}$, which is the interaction of race with perceptions of discrimination. The curves, then, do not show the complete estimated effect of perceptions of discrimination on authoritarianism. They only show the component that is race dependent, i.e., the component that is interacted. It is important to note that the individual components for race and discrimination have a large effect on latent authoritarianism.

It is also important to note that the results in Figure 5.2 do not reflect the impact of post-stratification. The results for black respondents thus reflect the bias due to under-sampling for which post-stratification corrects. This is fortunate because otherwise the results would represent disappointing support of my hypothesis. For, according to Figure 5.2a, the effect of the $race \times discr$ coefficient for blacks who perceive the most amount of discrimination (.11) is not much higher than that for those who perceive the lowest level.

Lastly, even though these estimates control for states, they nonetheless provide national-level estimates. In other words, they do not provide estimates for individual states. As such they cannot provide a direct test of our hypothesis, which is concerned with differences between black and white authoritarianism levels within states. All of the aforementioned shortcomings aside, the directions of the curves in Figure 5.2 are in line with expectations.

The Perception of Discrimination and Race as Distinct Variables

Figure 5.3 provides sample estimates for $\beta_{race}^{black}$ and $\beta_{race}^{white}$ coefficients. The top lines show empirical densities; and the bottom bars show all sampled values. The simple purpose of this figure is to show how large the difference is between the two race coefficients. In a sense, this paper aims to explain the difference that Figure 5.3 exhibits. And, to repeat, my hypothesis is that levels of perceived discrimination can explain why blacks are so far to the right of whites in this plot.

Recall that Figure 5.2 showed weak support for the hypothesis on the national level. Part of the problem is that to see the net effects of perceptions of discrimination on au-
Figure 5.3: Sampled coefficients for $\beta_{\text{race black}}$ and $\beta_{\text{race white}}$. Bottom bars show all sampled values. Top lines show empirical densities.

Tootharianism we need to also consider the estimated effect of perceptions of discrimination not conditioned on race ($\beta_{\text{discr}}$). That is, we need to include both the interaction and the components of that interaction. Although the analysis so far emphasizes the difference in effects between blacks and whites, the complete results are more complex.

Figure 5.4 shows mean estimates of latent authoritarianism without isolating the race–discrimination variable. It plots the estimated values of $Z_i$ (see equation 5.1) for blacks and whites, using the modal value for the rest of the variables. In other words, it shows the relationship between predicted discrimination for an ‘average’ white and an ‘average’ black respondent. These two curves suggest that, for both black and white Americans, levels of authoritarianism decrease as perceptions of racism increase (the trend is weak and almost flat for blacks and stronger for whites). Note that the downward trend in both curves occurs for every ethnic or racial group at the aggregate national level.
Figure 5.4: Estimated values of $Z_i$ for blacks and whites, using modal values for all other variables.

This might seem inauspicious for our first hypothesis. H1 states that the degree to which blacks’ authoritarianism scores are higher than whites’ is a function of the extent to which blacks perceive themselves to be the victims of racism and discrimination. It would seem then that we would expect levels of black authoritarianism to simply increase as perceptions of racism increase. But H1 is a comparative claim about the difference in levels of authoritarianism between whites and blacks. Figure 5.4 thus ought to show a widening gap as the curves representing blacks and whites move from left to right. As expected, they do. Despite their downward trends along the $x$-axis (levels of authoritarianism), the distance between the two curves along the $y$-axis increases as they move rightward (as levels of perceptions of black-targeted racism increase).

Nonetheless, the results in Figure 5.4, like those in Figure 5.2, only provide weak support for H1. The range of the effect on the outcome variable is small, indicating an effect small in
magnitude. Another problem is that the results plotted in Figures 5.2 and 5.4 tell a seemingly paradoxical story. Figure 5.2 suggests that the authoritarianism levels of black and white Americans respond very differently to perceptions of racism. Blacks’ authoritarianism levels go up while whites’ go down. Figure 5.4, in contrast, suggests that they both go down, albeit far more for whites. In this aggregate analysis the overall national effects of perceived discrimination ‘drown out’ the disaggregated effects that I seek. The problem is that the analyses behind these figures do not take into account the role of geography or context that is made more explicit in my second hypothesis.

Recall H2: On the state level, for states in which blacks perceive higher levels of racism and discrimination (relative to blacks in other states), blacks’ authoritarianism levels will be higher relative to whites in their state. Results disaggregated by state are required to test these hypothesized dynamics of authoritarianism. Otherwise put, H2 requires an examination of how levels of perceived racism affect levels of authoritarianism on the state level.

The problem with national-level analyses is that, according to our theory, the ‘reference points’ of authoritarianism are best understood as bounded within discrete geographic units (states here, but in theory smaller geographical units would be even better). Without this qualification, the effects could wash out. To see why, suppose hypothetically that whites (who are a majority in every state’s population) in State A set the reference point higher (say, 5) than those in State B (say, 4). Suppose also that blacks in each state both perceive the same levels of racism, and that our model predicts that this will result in a 1-point increase in authoritarianism above their respective (white-dominated) state means.

This will result in three outcomes. First, in both states A and B the intra-state difference in authoritarianism between blacks and whites will be the same; it will be 1 (6-5=1 in state A, and 5-4=1 in state B). Second, the authoritarianism levels of blacks in State A (6) will be higher than those of blacks in State B (5). Finally, the authoritarianism levels of blacks
in State B will be the same as the authoritarianism levels of whites in State A (5 for both).

As a result, national-level estimates have the potential to shroud a lot of useful information. For example, even though the mean change of +1 is not affected, the magnitude of the mean change is overestimated for states with above-average baselines like state A (an increase of about 18% versus 17%) and disproportionately underestimated for states with below-average baselines like state B (18% versus 20%). Thus, when Figure 5.2 indicates (loosely speaking) a difference in authoritarianism between blacks with the lowest and highest levels of perceived discrimination of only .11, it is not possible to make sense of how this translates or corresponds to specific geographic contexts (to say nothing of the fact that this figure reflects estimates before post-stratification).

The Challenge of State-Level Analyses of Poorly Sampled Data

Overcoming the aforementioned problems of national-level analyses has traditionally posed a challenge. The ANES data available for this study is far too sparse on the state level to gain meaningful results from individual state-by-state estimation from a simple regression. Table 5.1 shows the number of white, black, and total respondents for each state in the dataset, which combines the 1992, 2000, and 2004 ANES surveys. Although many states have sufficient total or white respondent counts, very few have adequately sampled black respondent counts. I use post-stratification to overcome this issue and achieve useful state-level estimates.

| State | WA | ID | OR | CA | CO | CT | DC | FL | GA | IL | IN | IA | KS | KY | LA | ME | MI | MN | MS | MO | MT | NE | NV | NH | NJ | NM | NY | NC | ND | OH | OK | AL | AZ | AR | CO | CT | DE | FL | GA | ID | IL | IN | IA | KS | KY | LA | ME | MD | MA | MI | MN | MS | MO | MT | NE | NV | NH | NJ | NM | NY | NC | ND | OH | OK | PA | RI | SC | SD | TN | TX | UT | VT | VA | WA | DC | WV | WI | WY | All |
|-------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| white | 82 | 30 | 2  | 8  | 3  | 109| 194| 51 | 0  | 157| 97 | 1  | 33 | 96 | 16 | 3305| 153|
| black | 2  | 9  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 12 | 50 | 2  | 0  | 22 | 2  | 4  | 0  | 19 | 1  | 510 |
| Total | 91 | 100| 10 | 13 | 122| 293| 58 | 0  | 219| 114| 5  | 33 | 122| 18 | 4123|

Table 5.1: Respondent counts by state, pooling 1992, 2000 and 2004 NES.
In its simplest form, post-stratification describes the process of averaging estimates for individual demographic subunits (i.e., hypothetical respondents falling into unique combinations of race, sex, age, education and income categories) using empirical demographic counts as weights (Gelman and Hill 2007, Lax and Phillips 2009). MRP or post-stratification mixed with multilevel regression both (i) corrects for selection bias in predicted values, via Bayesian shrinkage or partial pooling (Gelman and Hill 2007), and (ii) weighs against small and insufficiently sampled groups, via demographic representation. Lax and Phillips (2009) show just how well MRP can correct for sparsely sampled data. In their demonstration, a sample of N=1400 analyzed via MRP produces results comparable to those obtainable via disaggregation – i.e., pooling large numbers of samples and then disaggregating the data and analyzing it by state (or or any other sparsely sampled subset) – with a sample of N=14,200 (ibid).

For most of our demographic data I use the ‘1-percent Public-Use Microdata Sample’ based on the US Census and compiled by IPUMS (integrated public use micro-data series), interpolating the 1990 and 2000 data to get population estimates for 1992. Recall that this provides counts of, for example, black women, 17–34 years old, with a high-school education, earning less than $25,000, in California, in 2004. In order to fully post-stratify authoritarianism at the state level, however, we require these counts to also be broken down by degree of perceived discrimination (recall that Equation 5.1 models $d[i]$ as a predictor of $auth[i]$). The Census of course does not have this information, but I was able to impute the relevant information using the second-level model specified in Equation 5.2 above. For each demographic ‘cell’ (such as our hypothetical respondent just described), this model allows me to estimate the proportion that would ‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’, etc. with the ANES item that represents perceived discrimination in the model. This allows an inference of authoritarianism scores at any given level of aggregation, although the inference is better for larger aggregations.
Post Post-Stratification

The results after post-stratification are summarized in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. Figure 5.5a plots perceived discrimination among whites along the $x$-axis; and it plots predicted mean authoritarianism among whites (as deviation from the state mean) along the $y$-axis. As the curves for each state make clear, for whites, as the level of perceived discrimination against blacks increases, authoritarianism levels decrease. This finding is very strong and perhaps interesting, but it does not directly speak to my hypotheses. It does, however, tell an intuitive story, which is that whites who are willing to acknowledge the effects of black-targeted racism or discrimination are less likely to be authoritarian. I include Figure 5.5a mostly to provide a comparison with Figure 5.5b.

![Charts](image)

Figure 5.5: Post-stratified estimates of authoritarianism by perceived discrimination and ethnic group. (Only states with at least 5 black respondents are shown)

Figure 5.5b plots perceived discrimination among blacks on the $x$-axis and predicted mean authoritarianism among blacks as deviation from the state mean on the $y$-axis. The difference between Figures 5.5a and 5.5b is dramatic. For about 80% of the states, the model estimates
that, among blacks, as the level of perceived discrimination increases, authoritarianism levels also increase.

Upon first glance, at least, the results in Figure 5.5b ought to seem highly counterintuitive. According to previous research, authoritarianism predicts and structures opinions on issues such as abortion, gay marriage, immigration, stem cell research, the tradeoff between security and liberty, and the preference for cooperation or force in foreign affairs (Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Weiler 2009). As mentioned in the first section, the general trends in these findings hold true for African Americans, whose attitudes are, relative to other racial or ethnic groups, disproportionately against abortion, gay marriage, open borders, and so on. The curves in Figure 5.5 seem to suggest that higher levels of perceived racism among African Americans result in higher levels of authoritarianism and, consequently, the socially conservative attitudes and opinions that typically accompany authoritarianism once it has been activated by normative threat.

I claim that this story ought to sound counterintuitive because, on the face of it, perceived racism or discrimination does not have any obvious or even logical connection to issues such as abortion or hawkishness abroad. It only begins to make sense in the context of Stenner’s theory of the authoritarian dynamic, according to which a normative threat activates the authoritarian predispositions that are otherwise latent in a population (or, alternately, the authoritarianism that non-authoritarians only exhibit under conditions of threat). This, in turn, manifests in the form of a predictable set of attitudes and opinions on issues implicated by what Stenner refers to as the ‘classic’ or ‘familiar’ ‘triad of racial, political, and moral intolerance’ (Stenner 2005: pp 23, 50, 110).

Explaining the Variation

One puzzling feature of Figure 5.5b is that there is a large amount of variation on the righthand side of the plot, where levels of perceived discrimination are highest. Plots (a)
and (b) in Figure 5.6 help explain this variation. These plots suggest that there is an important difference between states with higher and lower mean levels of authoritarianism. In general, as states increase in mean authoritarianism, there is a stronger negative effect of perceived discrimination on authoritarianism. For blacks, though, perceived discrimination has a negative effect on authoritarianism in only four of the states. As previously mentioned, these comprise about 20% of the available states, and they are generally (in 3/4 cases) the states with the highest mean levels of authoritarianism. This is informative in a few ways that are best understood by comparing the figures in order to better understand what is happening in each of them.

Figure 5.6: Poststratified estimates of ‘effect’ of perceptions of discrimination on authoritarianism. ‘Effects’ are calculated by taking the difference between the estimated authoritarianism of those that ‘strongly agree’ with the survey question and those that ‘strongly disagree’. (Only states with at least 5 black respondents are shown.)

A comparison between Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.6 bolster and clarify the claim that these data require disaggregation by state. Figure 5.4 exemplifies the shortcomings of aggregated, national-level analyses of these data. It shows the relationship for both black and white respondents between levels of perceived discrimination and levels of authoritarianism, with
all other controls held constant at their modal value. From figure 5.4 it is clear that (i) levels of authoritarianism are consistently higher among blacks relative to whites, and also that (ii) as levels of perceived discrimination increase, the gap between blacks and whites widens. However, it also suggests that levels of authoritarianism decrease slightly for blacks as their levels of perceived discrimination increase.

This result would be misleading without the clarification that Figure 5.6 provides. This figure shows that the effects of perceived discrimination on authoritarianism attenuate as the state mean levels of authoritarianism increase. This downward state-level trend holds for both blacks and whites. If these data were aggregated on the national level, the slope would have been the same, but its intercept would have fallen in between the two downward trending clusters. As Figure 5.4 indicates, the mean difference in authoritarianism levels between blacks and whites would have still been evident, but the large state effects driving this finding would have remained hidden.

Lastly, Figure 5.5, which provides the clearest demonstration of the nature of state effects in these data, helps clarify what is happening in the downward slopes in both graphs of Figure 5.6. If we think of Figure 5.6 as plotted on the same graph, then it would appear that the black respondents of each state are plotted about .5 units above the white respondents of their respective states. Figure 5.5 demonstrates that this reflects a positive, linear relationship between levels of perceived discrimination among blacks and the degree to which their authoritarianism levels deviate from their respective state means. The size of those state means attenuate the effect as it increases, but the overall trend is particularly clear when it is graphed by state. This allows us to isolate the smaller portion of states whose baseline authoritarianism means are too large for them to produce meaningful results. Note that in aggregated results the effect of those four states pulls the estimates against the hypothesized trend. Disaggregated by state, though, it is clear that the trends for a majority of the states are in line with my hypothesis.
The plots in Figure 5.5 bring attention to an interesting phenomenon that warrants further consideration. As noted above, the hypothesized effects of perceived discrimination are larger in states with lower mean or baseline levels of authoritarianism. I see a few possible explanations for this phenomenon that are related and perhaps complementary, but these are speculative conjectures.

To begin, this phenomenon might simply represent something real about states with low mean levels of authoritarianism. Perhaps, for example, African Americans who perceive themselves to be the victims of racism or discrimination are inclined to differentiate themselves in ideological space from their perceived oppressors. So, if baseline levels are low, African Americans will seek differentiation in accordance with the authoritarian dynamic. If baseline levels are high, however, the authoritarian dynamic will manifest less strongly. Stated differently, if differentiation acts as an incentive, then less space for differentiation will truncate the incentive.

Alternately, there might be some characteristic that states with low mean authoritarianism levels enjoy that is conducive to the activation of authoritarianism among blacks. Since whites comprise a majority in every state, it is reasonable to expect that states with low mean levels of authoritarianism have fewer white authoritarians. If white authoritarians represent a significant source of threat to their black neighbors, then blacks in these states must experience less threat from their white neighbors. This could make threats that do arise seem more novel and thus more potent, which would explain why blacks from these states who do report high levels of perceived discrimination exhibit an especially acute response to it. This is precisely the sort of situation that a multilevel model is well equipped to capture. It uses information from both national demographic variables and state-specific effects. If the local threat level is low, then threats perceived from national signals might be especially salient. Please note, however, that this is just speculation to which the findings in this paper do not directly speak.
Another possible explanation relates to the ‘strong assumption’ in my theory that I mentioned above in the Theory and Hypothesis section. This assumption is that all causes of authoritarianism levels are applicable to everybody equally, except for the effects of perceived discrimination. The point of mentioning this was not because I simply or literally believe that it is true. In fact, I think that it is almost certainly not true. However, to the extent that it is not true, then my results are even stronger because they are able to overcome all of the noise that the various differentially distributed causes of authoritarianism introduce. In states with high baseline levels of authoritarianism, it is reasonable to expect there to be a relatively large number of non-racial normative threats that affect the population broadly. Given a large set of normative threats, total effects on authoritarianism might go down if one of them is particularly salient. This does not seem too implausible given that Stenner (2005) reports that priming non-normative threats truncates the effect of normative threats on authoritarianism because it distracts subjects from the cause of their dispositional activation. It is then at least clear that distinct threats can compete with one another and that the salience of one over another can differentially affect the activation of authoritarianism.

A final possible explanation, which could be related and perhaps even complementary to the previous explanations, is that these trends in part reflect a statistical artifact. The measure of authoritarianism with an ordinal 9-point scale does not accord perfectly with how I conceptualize the construct. I am inclined to view authoritarianism as a continuous theoretical construct that lacks clear bounds. It is apparent in both plots of Figure 5.5, for example, that the mean levels of authoritarianism fall within a range that is smaller than 2 units (from 5.4 to 7). It might be the case that a move from, say, 5.4 to 5.5, is much more meaningful than a move that is the same size but higher along the scale, such as from 6.9 to 7. Thus, even though our hypothesized dynamics of authoritarianism among African Americans might hold equally for blacks across geographic units, the measurement instrument employed in this analysis might distort the actual phenomena in a manner that
restricts the model from picking up its effects once the state-level ‘reference points’ have been set higher than a certain threshold (which in these data appears to be somewhere in the 6 to 6.5 range). This final explanation seems the most plausible to me, but, like I mentioned, these are just speculative explanations to which these data cannot directly speak.

5.5 Conclusion

This paper hypothesized that high levels of authoritarianism observed among African Americans are a function of perceived racism. The theory behind this hypothesized effect suggests that it ought to occur within geographic units (states) whose reference levels of authoritarianism are determined by their means. This entails the counterintuitive suggestion that perceived discrimination levels affect the activation of a value orientation linked to socially conservative opinions on various moral issues; yet discrimination and opinions about social issues are prima facie unrelated. Consistent with expectations, the findings presented provide strong and clear support for the hypothesis.

These findings are relevant to scholarly and practical concerns in at least four ways. First, they help to elucidate a longstanding empirical anomaly in the race & politics and public opinion literatures. It is a mistake to avoid or look past the uniquely high levels of authoritarianism observed among black Americans. An unfortunate implication is that this empirical anomaly represents an additional negative consequence of racism and discrimination, one that is rarely mentioned and under appreciated. This paper thus militates against recent claims about racial political progress suggesting that Americans live in a post-racial society. Furthermore, it challenges facile attempts to attribute the empirical anomaly of high authoritarianism levels to the unique history, religion, or culture of African Americans. While there is some truth to such narratives, in the final analysis they ought to be viewed as non-explanations because they are unfalsifiable, a-theoretical, and lacking in specificity.

Second, this paper’s attempt to explain the foregoing empirical anomaly demonstrates
the usefulness of what is, to my knowledge, a unique application of multilevel modeling with post-stratification. Future researchers can utilize this approach to analyze poorly sampled sub-populations in nationally representative samples. While this is pertinent to scholars of African American public opinion, it entails numerous other applications such as the analysis of other minority populations in America. Such extensions ought to provide new tools that improve our ability to analyze emerging patterns of intersectionality in American politics.

Third, these findings should be of interest to campaigns which seek to increase either vote share or turnout among African Americans. My analysis suggests that black voters might differ from white voters in regard to which sorts of messages they find compelling or persuasive. Journalists sometimes suggest that the Republican party might look to African American voters for support on the basis of their shared social conservatism. Less obviously, however, the Democratic party might look to the social conservatism of African American voters for improvements in message framing and turnout.

Finally, this paper has normative relevance. It is hard to deny the immense importance of race to American politics. The paucity of research on the political behavior of non-white Americans constitutes a serious shortcoming in the American politics and political sociology literatures. Despite the relatively narrow focus of the present study, I nonetheless hope to have contributed to the amelioration of this unfortunate state of affairs.
### 5.6 Appendix A

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Table 5.2: Sample means and first and third quartiles for each of the variables in the authoritarianism model (Equation 5.1). The $\pi_i^{auth}$ terms describe the cutpoints for the ordered logit.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

6.1 Introduction

In this dissertation I attempted to solve a puzzling empirical anomaly. I attempted to explain why stigmatized minorities report the highest levels of authoritarianism among racial groups. This is counterintuitive because the construct of authoritarianism was originally developed in order to study hostility toward these very groups. In this final chapter I will review the progress I have made (Sections 6.2-6.6) and then conclude by considering some of the questions that either remain or were unearthed from my inquiry and what this says about the future research on the topic (Section 6.7).

6.2 Chapter 1: Theory

In this chapter I laid out my theory of racial variation in authoritarianism (RVA). I began the chapter with a historical account of the concept of authoritarianism. This history ends with contemporary theories that emphasize the need for social cohesion. Next I laid out my theory, which has three main component parts: group identity, perceived intergroup threat, and need for social cohesion. The idea behind RVA is that when the first two parts (group identity and perceived intergroup threat) are high it increases the third (need for social cohesion). While explaining these parts I attempted to show that for all three parts we observe uniquely high levels among stigmatized minorities, and especially among African Americans.

Part theory, part literature review, these sections provided a backdrop to my proposed answer to the puzzle. This formulation of RVA also has three parts. First, the mass public shifts right after salient normative threats. Second, perceived racial discrimination functions as perceived normative threat. And third, since perceived racial discrimination occurs
chronically for African Americans, then they might experience a chronic rightward ideological shift.

**6.3 Chapter 2: Summary Statistics**

One problem that arose while working on this project is that Perez and Hetherington (2014) published a paper arguing that the puzzle of high authoritarianism among stigmatized groups is a statistical artifact. In Chapter 1 I attempted to show that their own evidence did not support this conclusion. More specifically, I attempted to show that their claims lacked substantive support. In Chapter 2 I provided my own evidence of this lack of substantive support.

Chapter 2 is more than just a continuation of my response to Perez and Hetherington. This chapter also provides a statistical portrait of the puzzle that I am attempting to solve. First, I attempted to show that stigmatized minorities report consistently higher levels of authoritarianism across time. Then I showed that the relationship between authoritarianism and several variables of interest are similar across racial groups (African Americans, Latinos, and whites). These variables include religiosity, education, cognitive simplicity, ethnocentrism, perceived discrimination, and gay rights. The resultant graphs almost uniformly challenge the notion that the puzzle is due to a statistical artifact.

**6.4 Chapter 3: Literature Review**

While in Chapter 1 I provided a literature review of the theoretical underpinnings of RVA, in Chapter 3 I provided a review of every study known to me that reports racial variation in authoritarianism. This was important because Perez and Hetherington ground their thesis in a critique of using child rearing values to measure authoritarianism across racial groups. In response, I showed in some detail that the puzzle is not specific to any time period or
measure of authoritarianism. Over five decades of studies using three different measurement scales report the same results: higher authoritarianism levels among stigmatized minorities.

6.5 Chapter 4: Hypothesis Testing

After submitting the first three chapters I faced some skepticism about whether perceived discrimination was in fact a type of perceived normative threat. In my view, this was both true by definition and grounded in the theory literature review of Chapter 1. Nonetheless, in Chapter 4 I attempted to show empirically that the two are functionally equivalent – i.e., that they behave similarly as variables in the context of standard statistical models.

To show this I first replicated a well known model by Hetherington and Weiler (2009). This model shows that perceived threat from newer lifestyles (normative threat) mediates the effect of authoritarianism on support for gay adoption. Second, I reanalyzed their finding by using more data (all four available waves of the survey instead of just one). A successful replication, the first graph showed interactive effects: high threat effects correspond to low authoritarianism effects, and vice versa. But the second graph told a different story, one of additive effects: threat effects just add to authoritarianism effects, and vice versa. Both of these graphs are represented in Figure 1 of Chapter 4.

Third, I reran the model disaggregated by race (African American and non-Hispanic white). This split showed interactive effects for blacks and additive effects for whites. These two graphs are represented in Figure 2 of Chapter 4. Finally, fourth, I reran the African American model with one change: the threat from newer lifestyles variable is replaced with a perceived discrimination variable. If perceived discrimination is a type of normative threat, then both of the graphs should exhibit the patterns of the interactive story. Both did.
6.6 Chapter 5: Testing the Main Theory

Taking stock, from Chapter 1 we know that stigmatized minorities have elevated levels across all three components of a well-known theory of authoritarianism (group identity, perceived intergroup threat, and need for social cohesion). From Chapter 2 we know that authoritarianism interacts with other variables of interest in the same way across racial groups (African Americans, Latinos, whites). From Chapter 3 we know that authoritarianism is uniquely high among stigmatized groups both across time and across different measurements of the construct. And from Chapter 4 we know that perceived discrimination is a type of normative threat.

Taken together, all of these findings point in the same direction: higher authoritarianism among stigmatized minorities is a function of higher perceived discrimination. The only thing left to do was to test this hypothesis directly. But this faced two challenges. The first challenge was sparse non-white samples. I needed a type of statistical model that could produce quality estimates with poor samples. The second challenge was that my theory required me to account for geography. So I also needed a type of model that could handle geographic clustering.

Multilevel modeling with post-stratification (MRP) is well suited to address both challenges. So I set up a two-level ordered multinomial logistic regression model with authoritarianism as my outcome variable and perceived discrimination as my predictor variable of primary interest. This allows me to look at how authoritarianism levels by state (as deviations from state means) vary by levels of perceived racism. My theory predicts that, among stigmatized minorities, perceived discrimination and authoritarianism will rise together (with state means as the baseline). And, as seen on the right side of Figure 5.5, this is precisely what happens.
6.7 Questions and Problems

None of this is to say that the puzzle of stigmatized minority authoritarianism is solved. I think at best I have opened up an inquiry, provided some structure to it, and attempted the first serious attempt to solve it. At each step, however, my attempt to solve the puzzle has produced new puzzles and questions. In this section I am going to highlight some of these in the order that they appear in the chapters.

In Chapter 1 I framed my theory in terms that emphasize the ways in which stigmatized racial groups are unique compared to other groups (e.g., higher group identity, perceived intergroup threat, need for social cohesion, and so on). One inadvertent effect of this framing is that it deemphasizes heterogeneity within stigmatized racial groups. My project focused on the relationship between perceived discrimination and authoritarianism, but there is a lot of work to be done on the many contributing variables that undergird my theory of racial variation in authoritarianism (e.g., group consciousness, racial alienation, linked fate, public regard, etc.).

In Chapter 2 this issue of heterogeneity within stigmatized groups came into sharper focus. The distributions reported in Figures 1-4 show less variation in authoritarianism among stigmatized minorities (normal versus monotonically rising distributions). Despite this, less than half of African Americans fall into the highest category of authoritarianism, which leaves a small but potentially important amount of variation to explain.

This variation is related to a puzzling feature that emerged in almost all of the correlational graphs that followed. In most cases the relationship between authoritarianism and my variables of interest were similar, meaning that their slopes were similar across different levels of these variables (e.g., religious whites and blacks were more authoritarian than non-religious whites and blacks to the same degree). However, the absolute levels were consistently different (e.g., religious African Americans were more authoritarian than religious whites, and non-religious African Americans were more authoritarian than non-religious whites).
The most obvious explanation is that the effects of perceived discrimination manifest across the board for all members of stigmatized groups. Graphs of the perceived discrimination index in Figure 10 support this story. No African American respondents reported being in either of the two lowest categories of the perceived discrimination index; and the third and fourth lowest categories have the highest uncertainty levels due to being sparsely populated. Yet the perceived discrimination graphs in Figure 9, which present the results of only one PD instrument, complicate this explanation. Here the authoritarianism levels are flat across this variable among African Americans.

These puzzling graphs might introduce a new paradox. On the one hand, I want to say that perceived discrimination is normative threat, and thus it causes higher authoritarianism. On the other hand, however, I want to say that it does this via higher need for social cohesion, which is a way to psychologically buffer the experience of threat. If the buffer works completely, then the threat is neutralized, and the effect (authoritarianism) will vanish. Yet, since the threat is external it cannot really be vanished, so it cannot be completely neutralized. In the middle between the two extremes of zero and complete neutralization, there must be some variation among stigmatized group members. This opens up several interesting avenues for further research on variables that might mediate the relationship between perceived discrimination and authoritarianism.

6.8 Further Research

If my theory of racial variation in authoritarianism is correct, then it has the potential to be a fruitful catalyst of new research. For example, we can use experiments to provide more direct tests of many of its hypotheses. Recall that, according to my theory, higher levels of authoritarianism among stigmatized minorities are caused by higher levels of perceived discrimination, which functions as a normative threat.

It should thus be possible to experimentally manipulate minority authoritarianism via
interventions that increase or decrease perceptions of group threat. Toward this end, I assembled and administered a survey experiment. I got null results, but it’s not clear if this is because of problems with my theory, my experiment, or my inability to collect a large enough sample.

The survey contains three treatments: (i) decrease anti-black threat, (ii) increase anti-black threat, and (iii) control. The decrease treatment asks respondents to rank historical events that mark racial progress — e.g., Brown v Board of Education — according to their momentousness. The increase treatment asks respondents to rank historical events that mark racial regress — e.g., the founding of the Ku Klux Klan — according to their momentousness. And the control treatment asks respondents to list the first three physical objects in their living rooms that they can think of.

Next the survey contains measures of ideology, party identification, perceived discrimination (two different measures), authoritarianism via child rearing values (CRV), authoritarianism via right-wing authoritarianism items (RWA), Christian fundamentalism, race, state, age, gender, education, and income.

Using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and solicitations from Facebook I collected 284 responses, with 200 from MTurk and 84 from Facebook. This yielded 28 African American respondents, or 27 after cleaning the data for non-response. Clearly, then, my first problem is that I failed to get an adequate number of African American respondents. The CRV means are basically the same across treatments, but the RWA means showed some differentiation. No statistical significance for either, but they might be worth looking at anyway.

Figure 6.1 contains a plot of all 27 black respondents. Raw RWA numbers are plotted along the $y$-axis, with treatment condition grouped along the $x$-axis. The $x$-axis thus contains three groupings, one for each condition. The first condition, Decrease anti-black threat, contains 13 respondents and is represented by the color black. The second condition, Increase anti-black threat, contains 9 respondents and is represented by the color red. And the third
Figure 6.1: Authoritarianism levels of African American respondents, ordered by treatment condition. Black lines represent Decrease anti-black threat, red lines represent Increase anti-black threat, and green lines represent Control.

condition, Control, contains 5 respondents and is represented by the color green. Horizontal lines are means for each treatment and are differentiated by the same color scheme. So, to repeat, the difference between the first 13, the next 9, and final 5 is that the three groups received different treatments (Decrease, Increase, and Control, respectively).

As the black and green horizontal lines show, mean scores for Decrease and Control conditions are basically the same. This surprised me because I expected Decrease to be easier to manipulate than Increase (but see discussion below). The Increase treatment is slightly more promising: mean = 30 versus 22 for control (range 1:85). It’s not statistically significant, but this is difficult to interpret because I only got 5 black respondents in the control treatment (4 who completed whole survey).

The point of Figure 6.1 is to allow us to compare effects, such as “increase vs. control,” “decrease vs. control,” and “increase vs. decrease”. None of these comparisons are statistically significant, so the point of providing the graph is that it allows us to examine the shape of the data, which might be helpful for determining what to do next, if anything. There is no statistical model behind Figure 6.1. It’s just a graphical representation of raw data – i.e., literally every African American respondent sorted according to the treatment group.
they were randomly assigned.

All of this might be random noise. If it’s not, then I think it shows that via Mturk and Facebook I’ve accessed a highly unrepresentative subset of African Americans. For example, in these data the CRV means of blacks and whites are basically the same (4 versus 3.7, respectively) which is unlike what you find in every representative survey to my knowledge, where the gap is usually quite large (eg, 7 versus 5.5 in pooled ANES).

If that’s what’s happening here, then it reverses my expectations. In representative data, I expect CRV to be nearly impossible to manipulate upward because it is close to maxed out and has little room to move - and vice-versa with manipulating it down. In these data, however, the CRV means of African Americans are average, which leaves me without strong expectations for differences between the Increase and Decrease treatments.

In my view, the data represented in Figure 6.1 are just statistical noise. I was not able to recruit a sufficient number of black Americans to participate in my study. Further, those whom I did recruit were quite different both demographically and ideologically than those typically found in nationally representative samples.

That said, it hopefully represents a first step toward developing direct experimental tests of my theory’s hypotheses. In addition, I think it highlights some of the problems that my use of multilevel modeling attempted to fix. It is difficult to acquire adequately sized samples of black Americans or other stigmatized racial groups.

6.9 Conclusion

The original motivation of this project was a simple puzzle: why do black Americans report the highest mean authoritarian scores among racial groups? Grounded in an extensive and multi-disciplinary literature review, I theorized in Chapter 1 that this anomaly was explained by higher levels of perceived discrimination which functions as normative threat. This theory of racial variation in authoritarianism (RVA) predicts that stigmatized racial groups will
report higher authoritarianism levels consistently across time and that the meaning of the construct is similar across racial groups. Chapters 2 showed that both of these predictions are true.

RVA also posits that stigmatized minority groups will report higher authoritarianism levels across all measures of the construct. The motivating puzzle is thus not an artifact of any of the prominent measures of the construct. Chapter 3 made this case emphatically. Further, RVA states that perceived discrimination functions as normative threat among stigmatized minorities. Chapter 4 supported this assertion. Lastly, RVA predicts that, within bounded geographical units, perceived discrimination accounts for the difference in authoritarianism between stigmatized and non-stigmatized racial groups. This is RVA’s most important prediction, and Chapter 5 provides strong support of it.

These chapters are more than just targeted responses to criticisms and objections. They represent a set of different forms of evidence — including detailed theoretical work, an extensive literature review, summary statistics, a series of logistic regressions, and large multilevel model with post-stratification — that all converge in support of the main tenets of RVA. While many details of RVA remain unknown (e.g., what role does fear or anxiety play in the observed effects of perceived discrimination?), this project provides a structured path forward that is theoretically motivated and empirically grounded.

RVA might have deep and wide-reaching implications for the study of authoritarianism. The theory suggests that authoritarianism is a general cognitive response of humans who perceive themselves as threatened qua group members. This entails that authoritarianism among dominant group members represents a type of paranoid special case. In contrast, members of stigmatized groups are a better fit for the concept because they better satisfy the known antecedents of authoritarianism, such as group identity, perceived intergroup threat, and need for social cohesion. Yet, despite this, the vast majority of research on authoritarianism focuses on the former and not the latter.
Speaking broadly, I expect this to cash out differently for the study of authoritarianism among dominant and stigmatized racial groups. For dominant groups, like white Americans, attempts to understand the role of authoritarianism in American politics will ultimately disappoint. As previously discussed, a notable example of this is the comparison of Hetherington and Weiler’s *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics* (2009) and Kinder and Cam’s *Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Public Opinion* (2010). Both books use similar models to examine closely related questions, and in almost every case ethnocentrism either has larger effects than authoritarianism or makes authoritarianism’s effects disappear. This makes sense for white public opinion in light of RVA.

For black public opinion, in contrast, I expect the opposite to happen. That is, I expect the importance and prominence of authoritarianism to grow among black public opinion scholars. To gauge whether this is happening we have to look to the work of younger scholars who are doing pioneering work in this space. A great example is recent work by Hakeem Jefferson on the politics of respectability among black Americans, a project that overlaps significantly with mine. Whereas solving an empirical anomaly catalyzed my project, Jefferson seeks to explain why “many [black Americans] within the group support punitive social policies that disproportionately target and affect the lives of fellow group members” (Jefferson 2018).

Jefferson’s theory is basically that since black Americans are highly attached to a stigmatized in-group they must monitor and maintain norms to thus maintain a positive self-concept (ibid: 13). The emotional substrate of this process centers on shame (ibid: 15). And the emphasis on “differential tendencies toward conformity and the maintenance of social norms within society” leads Jefferson to describe authoritarianism research as the literature “most proximate” to his project (ibid: 16).

Interestingly, Jefferson also views Perez and Hetherington’s paper on racial variation
in authoritarianism as counter to the wider literature. He writes: “Scholars have puzzled over what existing measures of authoritarianism, namely the child rearing battery, capture for black respondents (Perez and Hetherington 2014), but it seems clear that measures of authoritarianism should correspond with the RPS, as it too concerns itself with the maintenance of norms and behaviors, albeit in a slightly different context.” Regarding perceived discrimination, Jefferson’s theory is agnostic on the direction of the effect it will have in mediating the role of respectability (ibid: 16ff). This is interesting in light of my project since my theory obviously furnishes very strong expectations on this matter.

To test his theory Jefferson develops the Respectability Politics Scale (RPS). As with the Child Rearing Values Scale (CRV) the distribution of the RPS rises almost monotonically from left to right (ibid: 27, Figure 3). Perhaps not surprisingly, the correlate of RPS with the greatest magnitude is authoritarianism as measured by the CRV (ibid: 50, Appendix C). Further, as my theory would predict, Jefferson finds that higher perceived discrimination is associated with higher RPS (ibid: 29). Jefferson thus concludes that “it is at least plausible … that these individuals endorse the politics of respectability as a defensive strategy in response to discrimination” (ibid). And this, of course, is precisely what I have attempted to show.
REFERENCES


