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MUSIC ANALYSIS AS A PRACTICE OF THE SELF
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For Da, who showed me what it means to live curiously
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Abstract

Analyzing music involves figuring out “how it works.” This oft-repeated description is a curious one, for it assumes that the analyst already knows what work the music does. Music, however, “works” only under certain forms of practice: listening, performing, composing, theorizing, dancing, and so on. This dissertation investigates, in both theoretical and historical terms, the sort of work music does under the set of practices referred to as analysis. It argues that analysis can produce not only knowledge about pieces of music—a fact widely acknowledged by both its advocates and critics—but also “selfhood,” a way of being outside the forms of subjectivity that impose themselves on the analyst.

This reconceptualization of analysis as a practice of the self draws on the ideas of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, and Peter Sloterdijk to rethink the ethics of analysis. Rather than working to shape analysts’ relations of power to others, I argue that modern analysis can establish a relationship of mutual resistance between the forms of subjectivity imposed on historical individuals, thereby producing “selves” who are aware of these forces and thus capable of ethical responsibility with respect to them. One of these subjective forms is “music,” which is understood to include not only the experience of specific musical sounds, but also Romantic discourses that construct musical experience as both transcendent and replicable through practices of listening, composition, and performance. The other form of subjectivity consists of institutionalized forms of Enlightenment reason that make equally absolute demands on the individuals such as the law, the state, education, and religion.

Historically, the condition of being subject to music on the one hand and institutionalized forms of knowledge and conduct on the other first obtains in nineteenth-century German culture. The second part of this dissertation examines two influential music theorist-analysts in light of
this thesis. The first is Gottfried Weber (1779–1839), best known for popularizing Roman numeral harmonic analysis of classically tonal pieces and the concept of harmonic ambiguity (*Mehrdeutigkeit*). I argue that Weber’s analytic practice derived not only from the music he studied, but also from his lifelong professional work as a lawyer and judge in the Rhenish territories of Baden and Hesse following the fall of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 and the adoption of the *Code Napoléon* shortly thereafter. I show how the dialectic between these two forms of subjectivity was worked out largely through Weber’s analytic engagement with the music of Mozart.

The second case study focuses on Adolf Bernhard Marx (1795–1866), the first theorist to offer a systematic theory of “sonata form.” I argue that Marx’s theory of form arises not simply from a close engagement with the music of Beethoven, but also through the politics of Jewish assimilation in Prussia in the so-called Age of Emancipation (1781–1871). The culmination of that theory in sonata form, which integrates two different themes into a greater whole, is rooted in a particular manifestation of Jewish assimilation. In turn, Marx’s analytic engagement with Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony illustrates the impossibility of perfect fidelity to both musical and political forms of subjectivity, while simultaneously showing how Marx created a self that could live, however precariously, beyond the reach of either.
Introduction

Can it pass muster as a body of specialized, “professional” knowledge? If so, who and what is this body of knowledge for?
—Jim Samson (1999)

A desultory survey of writing on the topic of music analysis reveals a surprising variety of definitions. It is, *inter alia*, “an embedding of music in a formal theory,” “a direction for performance,” “a simulation,” “the study of patterned sounds and their perceptual interpretation,” “indispensable for rich, imaginative hearings,” “a hands-on activity,” “a way of shaping one’s experience of pieces,” “a means of experiencing music’s … presence effects and meaning effects as acutely as possible,” “ideology.” What ought one to make of such a heterogeneous list? Are these different aspects of the same phenomenon, whose richness is illustrated by the fact that it can carry such a variety of predicates? Or are these divergent descriptions part of the frayed bonds tenuously holding together a discipline that had staked its claim on knowing what music is and how it works? The sheer variety might recall Jorge Luis Borges’s exquisitely baffling taxonomy of animals later cited by Michel Foucault in *The Order of

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Things. According to Foucault, that list gestured toward “the exotic charm of another system of thought,” and thus, “the limitation of our own.”

Without laying claim to exotic charms, this dissertation investigates the limitations of the “system of thought” that have guided discourse about music analysis. Roughly stated, this “system” is one that conceived of analysis through an epistemic lens. Put another way, it has privileged knowledge over other aspects of analysis. Patrick McCreless succinctly captured this emphasis when he wrote, “Contemporary music theory, with its concern for rigor, for analysis, for structure, for the work, has … produced a way of knowing, a knowledge, along with a disciplinary structure to support that knowledge. Its purpose is to produce knowledge about ‘how it works,’ or, in other words, music theory.” The divergent definitions of analysis with which I began, however, indicate that the matter may not be so simple. It is precisely the purpose of analysis that is at stake when one claims that analysis is “ideological,” or a way to shape experience, or a directive for performance. Each of these possible purposes could of course be framed in terms of production: analysis produces ideology, experiences, and so on. There may be a more fundamental production at work, however, something that underlies or precedes the ways in which one defines analysis, and McCreless pointed this out too: “Ultimately,” he wrote, “what it has produced is us, today’s ‘music theorists’; or more appropriately, it is that which has enabled us to produce ourselves.”

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4 Ibid.
Music analysis as a practice of producing oneself—or music analysis as a practice of the self, to use Michel Foucault’s more concise expression—is the central idea of this dissertation. I develop the idea in three ways: First, I develop a general explanation of how analysis may constitute a practice of the self. I propose that under certain circumstances, analysis stages a struggle between different forms of subjectivity that vie for control over the subjected individual. The result of this mutual struggle is a partial, precarious freedom from both. This, I will argue, is what it means to be a self. Second, I argue that the conditions for analysis to be realized as practice of the self are first historically manifested in nineteenth-century German culture. These conditions include the development of aesthetics in general and the elevation of music in particular—in discourse and then in practice—such that music became a subjectivizing force in its own right. At roughly the same time, post-Enlightenment attitudes toward reason were marshalled to reform social institutions in ways that also threatened individual autonomy. Finally, I develop two case studies of influential nineteenth-century German music theorist-analysts—Gottfried Weber and Adolf Bernhard Marx—that show how their projects of self-production can be reconstructed and represented.

In the remainder of this introduction, I shall work to show why a conceptual shift from epistemology to the practice of analysis is timely now. I will suggest that reorienting discussions of analysis around practice can shed new light on debates over the ethics of analysis. Especially helpful in this regard, I will argue, is the late work of Michel Foucault. While musicologists, and historians of music theory in particular, have long absorbed ideas from Foucault’s earlier work—
especially *The Order of Things*—his turn to ethics has had a limited effect on music scholarship. I will try to show the value of works such as his lectures on “The Hermeneutics of the Subject” for our understanding of music analysis as a practice.

**Analysis Beyond Epistemology**

The epistemic focus is everywhere in analytic discourse, once one begins to think about it in those terms. Articles that recount the process of analyzing a piece for example are generally framed in terms of “theoretical payoff.” Such work often begins by examining the music and making observations in order to ultimately construct a theoretical point. This was the modus operandi for which David Lewin was admired. Or, one may begin with a theory, turn to a piece of music that illustrates or poses a challenge to some element of the theory, and analyze it in order to show that either the problem was only apparent or that the theory could be modified in some way to accommodate the anomaly. This is how much American Schenkerian research proceeded in the second half of the twentieth century.

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Let us consider an example of this traditional sort of analysis in order to see how we might begin to reorient the understanding of analysis around practice. The music in Example 0.1 depicts the ending of J. S. Bach’s chorale setting of “Freu’ dich sehr, o meine Seele,” from Cantata no. 32. At the most basic level, we could describe the pitch and rhythmic content of the passage: the pitches that make up the first simultaneity, for example, are B₂, D₄, G₄, and B₄, they last for one beat, and so on. At a somewhat more theoretical level, we might note that the music consists of a progression of three harmonies, which can be labeled G major, D major (with a 4–3 suspension), and G major. These labels are the result of analysis drawing on a theory of triads articulated in the seventeenth century, in which chords are understood as triads constructed from a “root” by stacking intervals of thirds.

![Example 0.1, Final measure of J. S. Bach, "Freu' dich sehr, o meine Seele"

We might go further and ask how these chordal elements function in context. We might say, following Hugo Riemann, that we have a Tonic function moving to a Dominant returning to a Tonic. In addition, we might imagine the chords as occupying specific places within an order of harmonies. That is, each could be labeled with Roman numerals indicating the root, or degree, of the scale on which it is based: I–V–I.
A “problem” with these analyses is that they neither account for the sonority on the downbeat (D, G, A), nor for the eighth-note C in the tenor voice. This can be “solved” by drawing on the theory of suspensions. The harmony on the downbeat is—in theory—“really” a D-major triad, but the G has been suspended from the previous measure. Our sense of it as a triad is confirmed when the note resolves down to F♯. The C in the tenor is simply a “passing tone” between D and B. Or, if one begins with Rameau’s harmonic theory, it is the C that is already implied on the downbeat because the D-major is a conceptually dissonant harmony motivating movement back to G.

These “solutions” continue to privilege vertical triads, even in the face of the fact that for about a third of the short passage, triads are not actually sounding. But we would not have to; one might use a different theory as a starting point for analysis. Historically, before the dominance of “triadic” theory, one would not have called the first harmony “G major” at all. Instead, the sonority would be conceptualized through the basso continuo in terms of intervals above the bass B—specifically a third (D), a sixth (G), and an octave (B). In general, the focus would not be on vertical sonorities as entities in their own right (“chords”); rather, chords would be byproducts of compositional practices that treated the melodic progression of each voice and the prescription and proscription of certain intervals between them as primary theoretical criteria.

Bringing these theories together under a normative structure is the theory of Heinrich Schenker. Schenkerian theory looks back to older contrapuntal practices, but integrates them into normative structures. The soprano’s B–A–G is a “linear progression” (Zug) in which scale degree 3 moves to scale degree 1 by way of the passing tone of scale degree 2. These notes are counterpointed in the bass by the notes of the tonic triad. The constituent elements are not three
chords, but rather four melodies. The whole formation illustrates a paradigmatic unit within Schenker’s theory (the Ursatz).

All of the above, and much more besides, is basic to the toolkit of the professional music theorist today. Theories are tools through which to understand or to know instances of real music. The issue lies in what it means to “know” in this plural situation. Is one of the solutions right and another wrong? In other historical periods, debates over this question raged—Rameau and his interlocutors provide one well-known example. Heinrich Schenker’s sustained polemic against virtually all other theorists is another. After all, he believed that only his theory provided “witness of the immutable laws of music.”Now, however, most theorists accept the idea that analysis using different theories draws out different phenomenological potentialities from the music.

Knowledge thus opens out indefinitely into the future. There may yet be more ways than we know to analyze even a simple passage like the one above. Such new ways may be “discovered” through further analysis of familiar passages. But the analysis that produces new knowledge (theory) would be a different process from what I have been describing. It would not be the application of some theory. Where, then, does such knowledge come from? How is it created?

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8 This was the subtitle to one of Schenker’s journals: Heinrich Schenker, Der Tonwille: Pamphlets in Witness of the Immutable Laws of Music, Offered to a New Generation of Youth, ed. William Drabkin, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

9 Though hardly the first, Lewin’s “Phenomenology” argument is a classic statement of this position. Lewin, “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception,” 2006.
I propose an answer to this question in Chapter 1, situate it historically in Chapter 2, and investigate the process itself in Chapters 3 and 4. For now, I simply want to note that the question itself pinpoints one of the problems with the epistemic conception of music. If analysis is not the pursuit of knowledge that is true in some sense, that transcends the choices made by the analyst, then what exactly is its epistemic status? This question permeates Jim Samson’s essay “Analysis in Context,” from which this Introduction’s epigraph is drawn.\(^{10}\) It is central to Nicholas Cook’s essay “Epistemologies of Theory” in the *Cambridge History of Western Music Theory* and the essay collection edited by Per F. Broman and Nora A. Engebretson, *What Kind of Theory is Music Theory: Epistemological Exercises in Music Theory and Analysis*.\(^{11}\) Such scholarship examines the order that underpins the claims of analysts. “Analytic knowledge” may be grounded in language or cognitive psychology or history or something else, but it is assumed to exist. For all their parsing of paradigms, epistemes, and philosophical and historical models, such studies tend to reinforce rather than undermine the epistemic conception. The same thing holds even for scholars whose view of analysis has taken on board post-structuralist critiques, such as Joseph Dubiel and Judy Lochhead. Analysis, according to Dubiel, involves the process of finding concepts that are representationally adequate in some respect to the analyst’s experience of the music.\(^{12}\) Lochhead problematizes the conception of analysis as saying “how it [i.e., a musical

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piece] works” but maintains that “any piece of music … should be a potential subject for understanding.”

However problematic may be the knowledge analysis produces, then, the reigning presumption is still primarily that one analyzes in order to know—to know, for example, that the famous C♯ in measure 7 of Beethoven’s Eroica symphony first functions as a leading tone to D and then is later enharmonically reinterpreted as the dissonant 7th of V7/IV; to know that Wagner’s “Tristan chord” is a half-diminished 7th chord; or to know that Haydn frequently composed movements in monothematic sonata form. Indeed, if not for analysis we would not know such things at all.

Analysis has also had its share of critics, of course. Perhaps the most famous—or infamous—were the “new” or “critical” musicologists, active in American music studies in the 1980s and 1990s. Surprisingly, such criticisms have also reinforced the epistemic conception of analysis. They accepted the premise that analysis produces knowledge but insisted on framing that knowledge within broader ethical concerns. As Philip Bohlman put it, “By controlling the object music more and more through our knowledge of it we acquire increasing measures of power.” Such power, then, was exercised to ends that were taken to be potentially immoral, according to a set of shared codes generally rooted in some form of liberal humanism. Susan McClary and Fred Maus, for example, argued that analytic knowledge could perpetuate power

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relations embedded in the value systems of patriarchy and heteronormative masculinity. If analysis excluded participation according to such categories of being as gender, ethnicity, nationality, race, (dis)ability, and so on, the answer was not to ban knowledge, but to make politics the foundation on which it would rest.

The main point of difference between critics and defenders of analysis, then, has not been over knowledge per se. Rather, the point of contention concerns whether, or in what sense, the knowledge produced by analysis is true. Put another way, what is at stake is whether knowledge and truth can coincide within the framework of “music itself.” Critiques such as Bohlman’s implied that if it were possible, analysts would have to account for the historical, cultural, and political contexts in which their own work was inextricably enmeshed without projecting their epistemic findings into other contexts. The examples given earlier must be modified accordingly: analysis led Friedrich Rochlitz to understand the *Eroica’s* C♯ as “formally modulating to G minor” in 1807; analysis led Karl Mayrberger in 1881 to understand the famous harmony from *Tristan und Isolde* as “a hybrid chord, the F of which derives from A minor and the D♯ of which derives from E minor”; analysis led James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy to declare

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16 On the professionalization of music theory in America, see A. Girard, “Music Theory in the American Academy” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2007). It is perhaps notable that recent uses of “music itself” are concentrated in ethnomusicological research, where it often remains necessary to distinguish between music-as-sound and music-as-culture.
“monothematic” a misnomer in 2006 because “Haydn normally presents an altogether new theme in the C-zone.”

The moral-cum-political necessity of such qualifications introduces a measure of disquiet into analytic discourse. The logic of contextualization creates a slippery slope at the bottom of which lies a historicism that relativizes virtually any theoretical claim about music. After all, no amount of context—or “thick description,” to use anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s term—can establish the truth of one’s theoretical knowledge. Those whose intellectual inclinations were toward analysis would have to simply become historians or anthropologists themselves.

Enthusiasm for the history of music theory in the 1990s and 2000s may be read in part (and paradoxically) as a way to arrest this movement into the past. This worked in two senses: on the one hand, it prevented the historiographic move into a radically relativized historicism by grounding epistemic claims in historical evidence; on the other, it protected the disciplinary and

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institutional status of music theory and analysis, which had achieved independence from music history less than half a century earlier.\(^{19}\)

Thus, the anxiety persisted in essays such as Samson’s “Analysis in Context.” His essay worries over epistemology. “Just what kind of musical knowledge is analytical knowledge?” he asks; “Is there a single, all-embracing category of such knowledge? What conditions must obtain before we can consider it valid? And how does it relate to other categories of knowledge?”\(^{20}\) Such perseveration registers two intuitions: first, that the moral charges against analysis were (and are) not trivial even if they were subject to countercriticism, and second, that epistemology, or more simply, *knowing*, may not actually provide the intellectual tools needed to respond adequately.\(^{21}\) Indeed, Samson suggests as much. Broadening the concept of analytic knowledge to embrace hermeneutics entails recognition that analysis may be “as much a form of self-analysis (raising all the familiar problems of the ‘I’ describing itself) as an empirical explanation of the other.”\(^{22}\) But then it is no longer knowledge about music.\(^{23}\) Moreover, one might ask: if analysis of music is


\(^{20}\) The centrality of “epistemology” in Samson’s essay is literal as well as figurative, as it is the heading of the third of the essay’s five subsections. Samson, “Analysis in Context,” 43.

\(^{21}\) It has often been pointed out, for example, that critical musicologists still analyze music to support their arguments. See, for example, Adam Krims, “Disciplining Deconstruction (For Music Analysis),” *19th-Century Music* 21, no. 3 (April 1998): 297–324; David Gramit, “Music Scholarship, Musical Practice, and the Act of Listening,” in *Music and Marx: Ideas, Practice, Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 3–22.


\(^{23}\) James Currie makes a related argument regarding the importance of keeping music as the intellectual focus even while remaining politically engaged. See James Currie, “Music After All,” *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 62, no. 1 (2009): 177–78.
really self-analysis, why not analyze the self directly? What can music contribute to the understanding of selfhood generally, and of oneself specifically?

One way to connect music analysis and selfhood is to link analytic knowledge to individual, subjective pleasure. Lynn Rogers, for example, observes that one reason to analyze music is “because it’s enjoyable.”24 Steven Rings finds in “analysis and all of its attendant activities—listening, playing, singing, reflecting, recomposing—a means of experiencing music’s physicality and immediacy, its presence effects and meaning effects.”25 The implied defense is not only that pleasure is its own good (Rings notes that analysts could be accused of hedonism), but also that communicating one’s analytic findings models such behavior. Analytic knowledge thus operates as a form of generosity, teaching readers techniques for increasing the pleasure music can provide. As noted earlier, Kofi Agawu takes this idea further, finding the pleasure analysis itself provides enough to justify the activity.26 Even Agawu, however, explains that he does not want to abandon “knowledge”; rather he wants to free it from the responsibilities of representation by locating it in the embodied experiences of individual analysts, and thus as a manifestation of the analyst’s relative autonomy.

The elevation of pleasure to a principle provides a bulwark against moral criticism.27 Reframing analytic knowledge as personal ("subjective") rather than objective truth, it avoids projecting a false universality that excludes and silences other perspectives. Instead, one comes to

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27 The Freudian overtones of this locution and this discourse to which it refers are manifest. They are not, however, investigated in this dissertation.
know through analysis only what one enjoys about some music while maintaining that what one knows is still, in fact, the music. Articulating such knowledge ostensibly develops greater sensitivity in order to elicit greater pleasure.\textsuperscript{28} Such a view, however, comes close to escapism; in Agawu’s words, the analyst aims to “inhabit temporarily a certain sonic world and … enjoy the sensuous pleasure of so doing.”\textsuperscript{29} As will become apparent in Chapter 2, I think it is no accident that something very close to a resurgent Romanticism is being employed here to safeguard the practice of analysis from political criticism.

The retreat into the analyst’s own pleasure is a half measure with respect to both epistemology and ethics. On the one hand, it is an ethical escape hatch that cannot be integrated into the epistemic framework. On the other hand, the analyst’s enjoyment is an inadequate rejoinder to criticism that demands such pleasure be situated within a broader social-ethical framework. After all, there is no necessary contradiction between one person’s pleasure and another’s suffering. This is not to say that one person’s pleasure is another’s pain—only that the defense of pleasure as such does not protect it from political criticism. Despite the plausibility of historical-cultural critiques of analytic pleasure, such critiques suffer from their own contradictions. Placing analytic knowledge within networks of power does not account for what makes analysts ethically responsible agents rather than mere symptoms of the networks in which they are always already embedded. Moreover, as a number of scholars have argued, some form


\textsuperscript{29} Agawu, “How We Got Out of Analysis,” 274–75.
of analytic activity is necessary if one wants to say anything at all about some specific music.\textsuperscript{30} In the end, Agawu’s observation seems the most perceptive: “The ethics of music analysis (as distinct from theory or criticism) is a subject awaiting proper discovery and comprehensive discussion by Anglo-American music theorists.”\textsuperscript{31}

The arguments developed in the following chapters navigate these problems by linking analytic practices to selfhood and selfhood to agency, with the understanding that agency involves a necessary resistance to beliefs and practices compelled from without. Following Foucault’s suggestion that “freedom is the ontological condition of ethics,” I argue that analysis is a practice that does not simply reinforce the extant network of power relations, but through which the analyst develops agency and responsibility within them. Such an ethics will be neither normative nor applied. It will not—and cannot—take the form of a moral code consisting of prescriptions and proscriptions regarding the way in which (or whether) one ought to analyze music. Instead, I seek to show how analysis may produce the condition of “selfhood,” under which one can hold oneself responsible for one’s beliefs and actions, and thus be held responsible by others on those grounds. First, however, it will be instructive to review what has been said about ethics and analysis.


\textsuperscript{31} Agawu, “How We Got Out of Analysis,” 284n26.
Analysis and Ethics: Ought We Ought?

It follows from the epistemic emphasis of most discourses of music analysis that discussions of ethics tend to assume a descriptive, or comparative, form. Such efforts seek to determine the ethical commitments in the work of exemplary analysts. Alexander Rehding’s study of Hugo Riemann’s musical “logic,” for example, explains that Riemann negotiated “the dialectic of progressivism and classicism in late-nineteenth-century German thought,” a net that is sufficiently broad to include not only aesthetics but also politics.\(^\text{32}\) Riemann’s ethical charge accordingly involves nothing less than knowing the past to enable the future. His “musical thought becomes an aesthetic yardstick for past composers and an ethical guideline for composers of the present and the future.”\(^\text{33}\) Nicholas Cook’s study of Schenker’s “project,” is remarkably similar in approach. Indeed, as far as ethics are concerned, Cook admits that Rehding “may as well have been talking about Schenker.”\(^\text{34}\) Again, the reasoning for the theory, and hence the “ought,” is grounded in fin-de-siècle Viennese culture in general, and in particular Karl Kraus’s axiological imperative to “return to the origin.”\(^\text{35}\) Schenker’s analytic system puts the search for the “origin” into the musical practice, drawing on the rules of strict counterpoint to (re)discover its “originary utterance,” or Ursatz. In both case, analysts’ work is explained—and in


\(^\text{33}\) Ibid., 9.


a sense, justified—through an account of the philosophical and cultural context in which they were developed.\textsuperscript{36}

Descriptive ethics of music theory are broad and thin. Carried to its limit, a descriptive ethics implies that each scrap of knowledge produced by analysis contains its own ethical imperative for which its author must plead the case, and which the historian must explain. This is only to say, as Brian Parkhurst has, that analytical utterances are “fraught with ought.”\textsuperscript{37} Parkhurst usefully distinguishes such imperatives from epistemology. “I hear musical event $x$ as $y$,” according to Parkhurst, is neither knowledge nor even belief; it simply is a normative claim that listeners ought to hear $x$ as $y$. But ought analysts ought in this way? It is not clear that explicitly stating the implied ought adds anything to theoretical accounts of music. Nor is it clear that historians are compensated for tacking this “ought” onto their explanations when they investigate historical figures. That Riemann or Schenker thought that others ought to hear music in the ways their theories demanded is undermined by the very historicization of their arguments. In the end, discussions of normative ethics—past and present—are perhaps what Ludwig Wittgenstein derided as “all the chatter about ethics” (\textit{all dem Geschwätz über Ethik}).\textsuperscript{38}

Kevin Korsyn comes at the problem of analytic ethics from an interdisciplinary perspective. He argues in \textit{Decentering Music} that “ethics will never become a rational calculus that

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
  \bibitem{36} Gleason offers a similar reading of the Princeton school of theorists. His reading of David Lewin, whose work I address below, is more complex. Scott Michael Gleason, “Princeton Theory’s Problematics” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2013).
\end{thebibliography}
might, in effect, eliminate politics and the effects of power.” As I read Korsyn, there simply is no way within the subdisciplinary discourses of music scholarship to prove the rightness of one approach over the others: no structuralist theory that precludes ethnomusicological field work, no theory of feminism that precludes the study of musical structures, and so on. Drawing on the political theories of Chantal Mouffe, Korsyn argues that music scholars ought to work “to construct a shared symbolic space in which differences would be nonoppressive.” The work of ethics, then, falls to individual scholars to “take responsibility for the political implications of our work” by “continually critiquing institutions and questioning their legitimacy.” Despite Korsyn’s admirable candor and commitment to disciplinary generosity, this proposal (which is, incidentally, its own implicit ethical imperative) does not articulate an ethics of analysis (or any other subdiscipline). It remains meta-ethical and thus runs the risk of miring whatever one says in concerns that never “touch” the material basis of the discipline in question. Extrapolating the political implications from the structure of a musical work, the ethnographic study of a musical culture, the historical context of a musical utterance, or a statement about any of these, is, as Korsyn freely acknowledges, continual and infinite. To pursue it to its end is both logically and practically impossible. But even if it were theoretically possible, it would remain counterproductive with respect to the immediate exigencies of specific forms of scholarship.

Korsyn’s argument may partly explain why musicological ethics (analytic and otherwise), which came to the fore at the end of the twentieth century, has been less prominent in more recent scholarship. It is not that ethical questions have been resolved. Rather, the search for


40 Korsyn, Decentering Music, 177.
viable answers has come to be seen as a distraction from the research that specific individual scholars want to pursue. Be that as it may, in a world that is increasingly imperiled by distinctly non-musical threats, the question has perhaps acquired a new urgency.

If neither normative claims in the present nor the history of normative claims provides a grounding for a workable ethics of analysis, how might an ethics of analysis be developed? An ever-expanding catalog of “knowledge” appears to be an increasingly irrelevant answer to this question. What is needed is a way of looking at analysis itself as an ethical practice. More to the point, it is crucial to see how analysts of the past may have constituted themselves as ethical subjects. This would move, on the one hand, beyond ethical prescriptions tied to the presumption that musical truth can be discovered, and on the other hand, beyond the wholesale proscription of analysis on the grounds that analytic knowledge perpetuates unjust relations of power.

Revisiting Foucault

If, as Rehding has proposed, “The history of [music] theory, as currently practiced in the English-speaking world, is unthinkable without Foucault and in particular his Order of Things,” this is because Foucault’s concept of the episteme—a historical period defined in terms of the discursive order that determined what could be thought—was particularly well suited to the epistemic conception of music theory.\(^\text{41}\) Like other forms of historical knowledge, music theory suffered from disjunctions and discontinuities. Carl Dahlhaus and Thomas Christensen have argued

against the prospect of a single, continuous history of theory. There appears to be no historically responsible intellectual thread that would tie it into a coherent whole. Foucault’s theory of epistemes helped to understand the discontinuities of knowledge between different historical periods of music theory and, at the same time, to insure the coherence of “history of theory” in general. If different epistemes could not be reconciled to a transcendent truth, they could nevertheless be compared and their history could be written, through discourse analysis.

The problem is that Foucault’s own thought evolved in response to criticisms of his concept of epistemes. As Rehding put it, Foucault “moved on,” while “the history of music theory … persisted with this model.”

Focusing on the practical features of analysis might compel music theory to “move on” as well, or at least to update the model in ways that take heed of Foucault’s later insights and self-criticism. The concept of a modern episteme may then still have some theoretical life in it. As noted earlier, analysis can be understood as the application of a theory to some specific music. Or, it can be a return to the music in order to generate a new theory from this engagement. Since the early nineteenth century, an emphasis on the latter model has often characterized the

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43 The Foucauldian perspective has been adopted most explicitly by Tomlinson and Moreno. Tomlinson, Music in Renaissance Magic; Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects; See also Blasius, Schenker’s Argument and the Claims of Music Theory.

field of music theory, at least to the extent that analysis of exemplary instances of music (works) is the primary means through which theoretical knowledge has been articulated.

The shift from analysis as applied theory to analysis as origin of theoretical discourse could be used as evidence for a modern episteme, an argument suggested by Jairo Moreno’s study of Gottfried Weber. One could push the line of thinking further, noting, for example, that philologist Franz Bopp’s groundbreaking book on Sanskrit only one year earlier grounded Foucault’s linguistic argument for a modern episteme. Foucault argued that “Language is ‘rooted’ not in things perceived, but in the active subject … We speak because we act, and not because recognition is a means of cognition.” This is the modern episteme, rooted in the act. Evidently, it is the one in which we continue to live. Ultimately, I do not pursue this tack here, and for the same reasons Foucault didn’t in his later work: encasing knowledge within an episteme—a knowledge of knowledge—means it is no longer a human activity. In ceasing to be an activity, it can no longer respond to the demand for an ethics. If, as Foucault infamously wrote, the modern episteme portends the death of “man,” it no longer makes sense to ask how “man” ought to act.

Following *The Order of Things*, Foucault inaugurated intellectual processes of historical “recovery” in an almost literal sense. Drawing on Nietzsche’s sense of “genealogy,” Foucault

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47 Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 289.
looked not at self-contained epistemes, but for histories of the present. In works such as *Discipline and Punish* and the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*—the French edition of which was tellingly subtitled “The Will to Knowledge”—he asked how moderns come to be self-disciplining beings.\(^{48}\) How did we turn our knowledge on ourselves, such that we were “identified” by medical diagnoses and “identified” ourselves according to sexual preferences? It is this genealogical perspective to which the remarks by McCreless on the production of modern music theorists alluded. But if Foucault found it necessary to conduct such inquiries to elaborate, supplement, or correct what he wrote in *The Order of Things*, and if Rehding is right that the history of music theory has been based on this work, then studies in music theory and analysis stand to benefit from a closer engagement with Foucault’s later ethical work and its extensions in more recent scholarship.\(^{49}\)

In Foucault’s so-called “ethical period,” he tried to understand the relationship between “subjectivity and truth … in terms of what may be called a practice of the self.”\(^{50}\) He came to think of ethics not as a set of prescriptions and proscriptions but as a “practice of freedom” where “freedom [is] the ontological condition of ethics.”\(^{51}\) In other words, the freedom to choose one’s actions is the precondition for being held—or indeed, for holding oneself—ethically responsible.


\(^{51}\) Ibid., 282–84.
This, I will argue, is what it means to be a “self.” Practice, ethics, subjectivity, self, freedom: this cluster of terms constitutes the core conceptual vocabulary of the present work. In broad strokes, my argument is that music is a form of subjectivity, in the sense that it is something to which one can be subjected. To be subjected—or subject to—is to be compelled to think and act in ways that perpetuate that very form of subjectivity. At the same time, subjectivity, manifested in its forms of knowledge and conduct, offers techniques for resisting other forms of subjectivity. These other forms, in turn, offer their own forms of knowledge and conduct as means of resistance to domination by music. If “domination by music” sounds hyperbolic, one may consider the notion of the genius as a kind of automaton, and the horror automatons (among other things) generated engendered the work of E. T. A. Hoffmann.\(^{52}\) Or, more directly, consider Heinrich von Kleist’s 1810 story “St. Cecilia, Or the Power of Music,” in which four brothers are reduced to living out their days in an asylum after hearing a mass setting. Out of this matrix of dialectically entwined relations of power and resistance, analytic practice becomes a means of developing a self—that is to say, a free self, capable of ethical agency. This argument, as I have already said, is both theoretical and historical. In the end, these two aspects cannot be entirely disentangled. The theory provides historiographic scaffolding on which to arrange evidence from case studies, and the raw historical data from the case studies are offered as evidence that the theory has explanatory value where previous interpretations have fallen short.

The relevance of Foucault’s own intellectual trajectory is suggested by loose analogues in the conceptualization of music analysis. What I will call the “application model” of analysis—the

idea that to analyze consists of the mechanical application of general music theories to specific musical works—can function very much along the lines of the “games of truth” that constituted Foucault’s focus in The Order of Things.53 “Games” here has a critical valence. As Foucault explained, “When I say ‘game,’ I mean a set of rules by which truth is produced. It is not a game in the sense of an amusement; it is a set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which, on the basis of its principles and rules of procedure, may be considered valid or invalid.”54 One can, I think, recognize the “scientific” (or “scientistic”) view of analysis that predominated in the music theory of the second half of the twentieth century (but was certainly present earlier and, indeed, continues to some extent today) in this use of “game.”55

Finally, the more recent focus of some analysts on the pleasures afforded by analysis suggests an incipient discourse that resonates with Foucault’s work in his “ethical period.” The problematization of pleasures and its relation to practices of the self in Ancient Greece indicates a potential explored in the present project.56 And the recognition by Jim Samson that analysis is “akin to hermeneutics” and “as much self-analysis as an analysis of the other” is tantalizingly

53 This is how Foucault described his efforts in The Order of Things in 1984, in an interview conducted shortly before his death. Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 281.

54 Ibid., 297.

55 More recent studies of individual analysts such as those by Cook and Rehding (on Schenker and Riemann, respectively) bear some resemblance to Foucault’s studies of institutions such as the clinic and the prison. The analogy is loose and is not explicitly thematized, but insofar as Schenkerian and (Neo-) Riemannian analyses have become institutions through which analysts define themselves, it is nevertheless suggestive. There is also an affinity here with Wittgenstein’s concept of language games. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised English Translation (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2001).

close to touching on the “hermeneutics of the subject” that formed the basis of Foucault’s 1981–1982 lectures at the Collège de France.57

This historical perspective leads to one final introductory point about Foucault. As historian and philosopher Ian Hunter points out, it is the historical rather than the theoretical density of Foucault’s writing that accounts for his continuing influence on the widest imaginable range of disciplines, even as other theorists of his generation have become the purview of more specialized discourses.58 Without pushing too hard on this line of thought, I do want to stress that it is as a historian and philosopher that Foucault provides a model. Just as his studies included not only texts, but also historical theories, physical spaces, and accounts of practice, so too, in my view, must a viable articulation of an ethics be articulated through history. In fact, as I will argue, the attempt to develop this very ethics reveals that there exists little scholarship that can properly be labeled “history of analysis.”

**Structure of the Dissertation**

This dissertation is both philosophical and historical. Rather than seeing these as contradictory approaches to the question of analysis as a practice of the self, I see them as two sides of the same coin—but it is a coin minted in the nineteenth century. Analysis, I shall argue (philosophically), involves the attempt to assert autonomy in the face of history. Paradoxically, this practice develops at a specific point in history and must therefore be explained in a historical mode. Fleshing out this dialectic is the aim of Chapter 1. I begin with a closer examination of the

57 Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*.
relationship between music theory and music analysis. In contrast to the widely accepted idea that the difference between theory and analysis is a matter of generality versus particularity, I argue that difference is more helpfully understood as one between knowledge and practice. Theory is a matter of representation—it may be read literally as re-presentation. Its logic is analogical. In theory, the musical event—which may range from a single sound to an entire corpus—is heard as a manifestation of whatever terms the theory posits. It is a form of knowledge about the world. By contrast, analysis is a practice. It exists—and exists only—in being done. Its representation always comes after the fact, and the fact that it is a re-presentation inevitably turns it back into theory.

In order to investigate the dialectic between analysis and theory captured in Ian Bent’s definition—“analysis is the resolution of a musical structure into its relatively simpler elements and the investigation of those elements within that structure”59—I turn to the work of David Lewin, the analyst who perhaps came the closest to articulating the conception of analysis I develop in Chapter 1. I argue there that, over the course of his career, Lewin showed how his epistemological claims were linked to an ethical imperative to be changed by music. Because he claimed that there is no one right way to “know” a musical experience, it becomes possible to continuously change oneself through analytic engagement with music. This was not, as Agawu might have it, a “strategic deferral” of truth, but rather an effort to make truth accessible by acknowledging that it required the subject to change. Analysis ultimately establishes, through the medium of music, a relationship of oneself to oneself. Drawing on his analysis of Karlheinz

Stockhausen’s *Klavierstück III*, I argue that Lewin illustrates clearly the tension between the experience of the musical subject and the knowing subject who seeks to contain music’s power within a circumscribed domain of knowledge.

Behind the relationship of oneself to oneself, I argue, lies the problem of subjectivity, which I define not as the unique but ineffable experience of being a specific body in a historical context, but rather as the state of being subject-to a code of conduct. The compulsion to analyze, I propose, results from being doubly subjected—to the demands of “music itself” on the one hand and to another form of subjectivity that makes exclusive, equally compelling demands on the subject. Analysis, then, is the staging of an agonistic struggle between the mutually exclusive modes of conduct demanded of the individual under different forms of subjectivity. The result, in general, is what I call a “self”—an individual who gains a measure of resistance to that which is imposed on his or her body and, however precariously or temporarily, operates as a free agent. In the specific case of analysis, this self becomes a modern music theorist, able to respond more freely to both the music that compelled his or her initial involvement and the knowledge used to contain that experience (but which is also inflected through the experience of music).

Chapter 2 turns to the historical context in which the particular configuration of subjectivities that generated analytic practices became not only possible, but increasingly common: Germany around the turn of the nineteenth century. The principle forms involved were, on the one hand, Romantic aesthetics and, on the other, the post-Enlightenment rationalization of institutions such as the law, the church, and the state. If, as most scholars contend, Romanticism was a reaction to Enlightenment philosophy in the first place, it soon took on a life of its own in the work of writers such as Wilhelm Wackenroder, E. T. A. Hoffmann, and Heinrich von Kleist, whose work articulated a form of musical subjectivity that could be taken up
by readers, becoming the basis for what Ian Hacking calls historical ontology, or “a way to be.”

Under Romantic musical subjectivity, one gives oneself over to music in order to be a vehicle through which its effects can be perpetuated and disseminated. In return, one is promised transcendence.

The self-subjection and its promise were the essence of Wackenroder’s “The Amazing Musical Life of the Composer Joseph Berglinger,” whose eponymous protagonist sums up music’s essential demand: “Your whole life must be a piece of music.” As a result, Berglinger suffers enormously, but he is eventually redeemed through the composition of a passion setting. There are fewer happy endings in Hoffmann’s work, which brings out the existential terror inherent to subjectivity, and the power of music to fully subjugate the individual is rendered in strikingly literal terms in Kleist’s “St. Cecilia, Or the Power of Music.” I argue that forms of subjectivity always tend towards what Foucault called a “state of domination,” in which freedom (and thus also ethics) is radically curtailed. Giving oneself over to music in order to be redeemed in an act of faith became a narrative reinforced by myths that arose around the biographies of composers such as Mozart and Beethoven.

The forms of Enlightenment rationalism were no less demanding. Kant’s imperative, for example, is also a radical imperative, and Hegel’s freedom is the alignment of the individual will with that of the state. If these ideas were also oppressive in their absoluteness, it was their implementation in institutions that made them effective forms of subjectivity. The Napoleonic Code and the Prussian bureaucracy for example, were not forgiving of idiosyncratic transgressions from the forms of conduct and knowledge they demanded. As Hoffmann’s career

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in the Prussian judiciary and his written oeuvre—both fiction and criticism—attest, one is not set free by becoming a state bureaucrat. But it was precisely the power of these demands that made them adequate tools for responding to the threat of music, an idea that I argue was articulated in Hoffmann’s fiction.

Chapters 3 and 4 together constitute the properly historical portion of this dissertation. Each chapter treats a well-known music theorist-analyst as a case study for the idea that analysis can be a practice of the self. Chapter 3 takes Gottfried Weber (1779–1839), best known for his popularization of Roman numeral-based harmonic analysis, as its subject. I argue that the development of Weber’s analytic practices focused on the Mehrdeutigkeit (multiple meaning-ness) of musical events in the music of Mozart had its basis in Weber’s dual subjection to music and to the law as it came to be understood in the Rhineland under Napoleon’s influence. Beginning with the tension between music and a legal career in Weber’s own writings, I find parallels between the literature Weber enjoyed (e.g., Jean Paul and Goethe) and his experience of himself as split between his traditional, family-sanctioned career path and a life dedicated to music. I speculate, for example, that Weber saw something of himself in the titular protagonist of his novel Siebenkäs, a poor lawyer who escapes his unhappy life with the assistance of his Doppelgänger—the first instance of this enduring Romantic conceit.

The tension between musical and legal subjectivity was worked out not just in theory, but through analysis—a practical engagement with, above all, the music of Mozart. I reread Weber’s famous analysis of the opening measures of the “Dissonance” quartet (K. 465) against his writings on the application of the Code Napoléon. Weber’s questioning of the authorship of Mozart’s Requiem brings to light the existential stakes of his analytic engagement with music.
Chapter 4 turns to the work of Adolf Bernhard Marx (1799–1866), arguably the most influential music theorist of the nineteenth century. Marx's problematization of musical form, which culminated in the codification of “sonata form,” responded to the subjectivity he faced as a Jewish-born convert to Lutheranism in Prussia during the so-called “Age of Emancipation.” Marx’s engagement with music throughout his life, I argue, was bound to the pressure he felt to assimilate. From the narrative of his own conversion, to his consequential choice to move to Berlin, to the very content of his theoretical ideas, Jewish assimilation appears as a determining factor. Analysis became Marx’s means of self-development. It allowed him, on the one hand, to escape musical subjectivity through integration into German culture as a professional—first as a lawyer, then as a critic, and finally as a professor at the University of Berlin. Throughout his career, but most specifically in the Lehre von der musikalische Komposition (4 vols., 1st ed., 1837–1848) Marx sought the means to escape the oppressive demand to abandon his Jewish past and assimilate. Music became the means of doing so, even as the forms of knowledge demanded by Marx’s sociopolitical status kept his Romanticism in check.

The principle musical figure with whom Marx worked was of course Beethoven. Through a careful reading of Marx’s lifelong engagement with the composer’s Ninth Symphony, I argue that Marx’s sympathy for Beethoven’s music was rooted not only in the dynamics of the music itself, but in analogical empathy for Beethoven’s deafness and the resulting lack of discourse with society. The result is a misreading of the symphony by Marx in terms of his own analytic approach that, paradoxically, confirms the place of analysis as a practice of the self.

In the Conclusion, I attempt to connect my two case studies and their theoretical framing back to the present moment and the question of ethics. I suggest that the interpellation of the musical subject into the profession of music theory today is an interpellation into a neoliberal
form of subjectivity, and that this account helps explain some of the directions in music theory and analysis—namely, a focus on the body and on “big data.” I suggest that these may be read as sites of resistance, in which individuals draw on the power of musical subjectivity—transformed, but still essentially Romantic—to resist determination by new modes of subjectivation. I conclude with some observations on the relation between the historical studies of Chapters 3 and 4 and the present state of music theory and analysis, augmenting them with some observations on the work of August Halm, whose engagement with musical experience was shaped by his religious upbringing.

In the end, my aim is not simply to offer a new, better, or correct definition of analysis. Rather, it is to open up a history of analysis as a practice, both for its own sake and to offer a richer perspective on the work of analysts today. In the former, I seek to show how the work of past analysts was not simply determined by historical contexts, but was rather the analysts’ way of pushing back against history and asserting their selfhood and agency against the forces that would dictate their behavior. It is this reclamation of agency, I argue, that has the potential to address concerns in the present. The following chapters argue that only by returning agency to analysts of the past can we accept its possibility today and in the future.
Chapter One

Music Analysis as a Practice of The Self

*Im Anfang war die Tat.*
—Goethe (1808)

Music analysis involves *someone doing something with some music.* While this description is obviously not specific enough to qualify as a definition, it is a useful starting point from which to begin rethinking analysis along the practical and ethical lines sketched out in the Introduction. This pared down, general characterization frames analysis as fundamentally relational—a fact that is obscured when analysis is conceptualized in terms of knowledge production. The grammar and syntax of this simple description offer a reminder that the analyst is embedded in a temporal and material scene. Knowing follows doing, and representations of that knowledge come after that. In the first place, analysis *exists* as doing.

This chapter focuses on the practical side of analysis. I try to understand what it means for analysis to be, as “a pursuit in its own right.” Initially, I propose that analytic practice may be conceptualized in two different ways. The first I call the “application model” of analysis; the second is analysis as a practice of the self. Ultimately, I will argue that these are not two separate, incompatible conceptions—they are both, after all, “someone doing something with music,” and they both have effects on the analyst—but it will helpful to first treat them separately.

The application model of analysis hews closely to the epistemic focus of the analytic discourses discussed in the Introduction. Here, the analyst begins with a form of knowledge—a

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music theory—and applies it to a specific piece or passage of music in order to yield knowledge about that specific piece (“analytic knowledge”). The theory establishes both the units of analysis and the ways in which they will relate to one another within a given musical work. Though the music in question and theories about it vary historically, this conception of analysis is not inherently historical insofar as its hypothesis does not confine analytic practice to a particular era of history. Indeed, the attempt to understand music through theory is part and parcel of the history of music itself. For example, the assembly of tonaries in the eighth through thirteenth centuries fits the model: some modal theory was applied to the repertoire of antiphons to determine the mode of each. Following such analyses, the chants were ordered according to mode.²

As the example of tonaries illustrates, the knowledge produced by the application model of analysis is not an end in itself. Rather, the knowledge is valued because it is placed into circulation in some way. It may organize repertoires, inform performances of musical works, serve as a tool for compositional pedagogy, or sharpen criticism. It can serve commercial ends, as a tool for selling products or advertising. The internet radio site Pandora.com, for example, boasts that it is powered by “the most comprehensive music analysis project ever undertaken.”³ In these cases, analysis is valued as a completed thing—a practice reified in the nominalized form: “an analysis.” The practice itself is largely ignored once it has yielded knowledge that can effectively serve other goal-oriented processes. A corollary is that the act of analysis does not transform the analyst as a subject. He or she simply learns some new facts—indeed, if these facts

depended on the transformation of the subject, they would not serve their post-analytical functions.

The second model of analysis—analysis as a practice of the self—does not begin with theory. Instead the analyst attempts to approach the music directly, avoiding the presuppositions of a theoretical framework in order to seek afresh meaningful patterns. This entails a subjection of the analyst to the “music itself,” such that it can dictate the form of knowledge. The result is not, of course, that music speaks and reveals its own truths in symbolic form. Rather, I shall argue, music draws out other forms to which the analyst has been subject—not, however, so that knowledge and musical experience are synthesized, but rather so that they may resist one another. Analytic practice, in this hypothesis, is a staging of mutual resistance between these forms—music itself, on the one hand, and the knowledge that would contain its power on the other. Crucially, this is not a matter of the two forms being compatible and mutually reinforcing. The specific music that a specific analyst is compelled to analyze is music with the capacity to be described in ways that resist the other forms to which he is subject. It is this process of mutual resistance that produces the act of analysis, and ultimately, produces a form of selfhood.

In marked contrast to the application model, this conception of analysis as a process of self-production over and against forms of subjectivity is historical. It comes to be under specific historical conditions—namely, when music becomes a subjectivizing force in its own right and

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4 Throughout the dissertation, I generally use male pronouns. Music analysts tended overwhelmingly to be men until relatively recently. The reason, I would suggest, is that the forms of subjectivity that manifest themselves as institutionalized forms of reason were gendered. For example, in nineteenth-century Germany, only men were lawyers, professors, government servants, and clergy. The changing place of gender within practices of music theory in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, however, will remain a topic for further research.
institutions are reformed through the consistent application of Enlightenment reason. A more
detailed presentation of these conditions is the focus of Chapter 2, but the historically contingent
nature of my argument should be borne in mind for this chapter as well.

Explicating these two conceptions of analysis requires a fair amount of theoretical
backdrop and explanation of terms. For example, as I suggested in the introduction,
“subjectivity” refers not to “the subject” in a sense of a minimal, or proto-self, but rather to the
state of being subject to a code of conduct and its associated forms of knowledge. By contrast,
“selfhood” is defined as freedom from subjectivity and the capacity to be the author of—and thus
responsible for—one’s own actions and reactions vis-à-vis music. The philosophical background
for these definitions is almost impossibly broad. The potential to produce oneself through regimes
of training has been called different things. For the ancient Greek schools such as the Stoics and
Epicureans, it was simply called “philosophy.” The Christian monastic traditions, particularly
since Ignatius of Loyola, have called it “spiritual exercise.” Pierre Hadot’s recuperation of this
term led him to observe that, “In these exercises, it is thought which, as it were, takes itself as its
own subject matter.”5 Foucault famously called this kind of activity “the care of the self,” and
Judith Butler has focused on the importance of “giving an account of oneself” in the process of
producing oneself.6 More recently, Peter Sloterdijk has lumped these ideas (and more) under the
general heading of “practice.”7 This list is not exhaustive, nor are these concepts identical. In

5 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. Arnold I.
6 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3; Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2005).
7 Peter Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life: On Anthropotechnics, trans. Wieland Hoban (Cambridge,
UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2013).
Hadot’s concept of spiritual exercises, for instance, the practitioner explicitly seeks a transcendental point of view; through practices of reading, meditation, and dialogue, he or she learns to “rise above” local contingency. By contrast, Foucault adapted the term “spirituality” to describe caring for and changing oneself within a politics always already embedded in relations of power.

Given the enormity of the intellectual tradition on which I draw in conceptualizing music analysis as a practice of the self, a caveat is in order: My primary aim is not to contribute new philosophical insights about subjectivity, selfhood, agency, or ethics in general. Instead, I draw in a more or less ad hoc way on other ideas that seemed most useful for establishing a heuristic for addressing ethical and historical questions relevant to analysis. I am most indebted to Foucault, whose late work—the History of Sexuality, lectures on The Hermeneutics of the Subject, and a handful of interviews—developed the idea that ethics had to be grounded not in prescriptions or proscriptions, which are better understood as moral codes, but rather as a relationship of the self to itself, and the need for the self to be transformed. Sloterdijk’s generalized philosophy of practice has also been helpful to me as has been Paul Smith’s negative conception of selfhood, which helps to underpin my argument that selfhood is the theoretical absence of subjectivity. Butler’s insight that the self is paradoxically produced through the process of “giving an account of oneself” is used to as a means to read musical theories as just such accounts—particularly in the case studies in Chapters 3 and 4.

The theoretical framing of analysis as a practice of the self in this chapter proceeds in four parts. In the first part, I critique the application model of analysis and its emphasis on epistemological questions. David Lewin’s attempt to distinguish music theory and analysis illustrates some of the dialectical twists and contradictions brought on by the focus on
epistemology. A focus on analysis as a practice, I argue, eases the internal contradictions of this model. For conceptual clarity, and as a heuristic, I propose understanding “theory” in terms of knowledge and analysis in terms of practice. In the second part, I propose that the distinction between knowledge and practice can be further elucidated in terms of Foucault’s distinction between philosophy and spirituality. The latter, Foucault argues, puts subjectivity “into play” and links truth (as opposed to knowledge) to the transformation of the self. The nature of these transformations is clarified by distinguishing subjectivity (and “the subject”) from selfhood. In the third part, I return to Lewin’s work to illustrate the conception of analysis as “practice of the self.” I suggest that this conception may be an attenuated but persistent strain in modern music theory, understood as a discipline predicated on analytic practices. In the fourth and final part, I discuss how practice, subjectivity, and selfhood inform the methodology I use in the historical chapters that follow.

**Lewin’s Paradox, or Analysis in Theory**

As intuitive as the distinction between knowledge and practice—knowing and doing—may seem, clearly distinguishing these two concepts is not simple. Knowing can be understood as doing something, and being able to do something can be understood as a form of knowledge. Discourses of analysis, however, have tended to be rather one-sided, frequently subsuming analysis into questions of knowledge with little acknowledgement of the practical side of the dialectic. The emphasis on knowledge over practice, as Kofi Agawu has pointed out, is at least

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partly driven by the professional, capitalist structure in which modern music theory has established a place for itself. But the bias is also rooted in the longer history of Western music theory—understood as a history of musical knowledge. Its history can be traced back to Ancient Greece as a more or less continuous, if heterogeneous, field of discourses, while analysis was only explicitly defined at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that analysis was generally recognized as a primary activity of music theorists. The historical priority of theory, then, has shaped the way we tend to think about analysis.

The aims of theory are undeniably epistemic. Etymologically, “theory” is a way of viewing, or, more generally, perceiving phenomena. If the ontology of analysis begins with doing something, the ontology of theory lies in representation and metaphor. Theory consists of knowing A as B. The representations can be as diverse as Greek tetrachords, modal ethos, Klumpenhouwer networks, or feminine sexual desire, but the basic logic of hearing one thing as something else, or at least as an index of something else, underlies each. One can thus think of music theoretical knowledge as a kind of filter that attenuates some facets of phenomena while

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9 Other intellectual disciplines are subject to the same pressures, of course, though the ways in which they respond may differ significantly. Kofi Agawu, “How We Got Out of Analysis, and How to Get Back In Again,” *Music Analysis* 23, no. 2–3 (2004): 276.


drawing attention to or amplifying others in any given musical experience. Analysis, then, consists of applying this filter in order to perceive some features of a musical work more clearly. A Roman numeral, Stufentheorie “filter,” for example, trains one’s hearing on vertical sonorities and the role of those sonorities within a system of harmonies “rooted” in the diatonic scale degrees. A neo-Riemannian “filter” focuses hearing on the voice-leading “moves” that transform one sonority into the next. In a related, but different, way, a Schenkerian “filter” attenuates the perception of vertical sonorities in favor of attending to the contrapuntal lines whose interaction gives rise to an epiphenomenal harmonic weave.

But the comparison of theory to a filter, or to a lens, can be misleading. Filters, once chosen, are passive; they transform perception without accounting for any effort made on the part of the perceiver. The metaphor attenuates the labor of analysis, which may involve, inter alia, checking a given collection of notes against a taxonomy of schemata, recomposing the music in question, or performing the passage for oneself in different ways that draw attention to particular features. Analysis is not a sudden transformation of perception akin to putting on eyeglasses, if only because putting on eyeglasses is relatively effortless. The musical analogue of the latter might be something like playing a major-mode piece in minor, or transposing it to a different key. But even here, there is a level of engagement with the music that is missed in the metaphor of a

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filter. Analysis is closer to physical exercise, effecting a gradual transformation of the practitioner. “Filter” or “lens” is not ultimately a metaphor for the practice, but for the knowledge it produces.

Still, because analysis does produce musical knowledge there is a tendency to link that knowledge with the act that generates it, and even to conflate them. In the latter case, analysis qua act becomes “an analysis.” It is in this sense that one speaks of, for example, Rameau’s analysis of the fundamental bass in the monologue from Lully’s Armide, Schenker’s analysis of hierarchical layers of counterpoint in Beethoven’s Eroica, or Richard Cohn’s analysis of movements in triadic space in the first movement of Schubert’s Piano Sonata in B-flat, D. 690. The slippage of analysis into analytic knowledge or the nominalized “analysis” implicates a pervasive trope in the historiography of music theory: “theory” concerns general knowledge while the “analysis” concerns knowledge of specific pieces. Such a relation has been implied since analysis of musical works began to function explicitly as the ground of theory in the work of Gottfried Weber in the early nineteenth century. Its most influential explicit articulation, however, is more recent: David Lewin’s polemical response to Edward Cone’s contention that a great deal about music lies “beyond analysis,” including such basic ideas as composer intention and listener response.

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Lewin began his effort to distinguish theory from analysis in “substantial agreement” with Cone.\textsuperscript{15} He soon contended, however, that Cone’s exposition was riddled with egregious confusion between music theory and music analysis.\textsuperscript{16} Attempting to clarify the distinction as he understood it, Lewin argued that theory “attempts to describe the ways in which, given a certain body of literature, composers and listeners appear to have accepted sound as conceptually structured, categorically prior to any one specific piece.”\textsuperscript{17} By contrast, during analysis, “one is interested not in a general mode of hearing, but in the individuality of the specific piece under study.”\textsuperscript{18}

Lewin’s views were more nuanced than these quotations suggest. I address the complication below, but it is important to note the half century since he appeared to embrace the idea that the difference between theory and analysis as one between generality and particularity, it has become virtual dogma. The \textit{Oxford Music Online} article on “Theory,” for example, asserts that “analysis often focuses on the particulars of a given composition whereas theory considers the broader systems that underlie many such works.”\textsuperscript{19} Dora Hanninen writes in her recent monograph, \textit{A Theory of Analysis}, “Theory takes a broad view. It establishes fundamental concepts and defines terms that generalize across pieces and applications … [A]nalysis focuses on the particular—on specific moments and qualities, pieces and passages, ways of hearing or thinking

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\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 59. \\
\textsuperscript{16} Lewin also considered music criticism, which concerned value judgments. Criticism, Lewin argued, is separable from analysis and theory, though the latter can and should be used to qualify judgments. \\
\textsuperscript{17} Lewin, “Behind the Beyond,” 61. \\
\textsuperscript{18} Lewin, “Behind the Beyond,” 62. \\
\textsuperscript{19} Bent and Pople, “Analysis.”
\end{flushright}
about musical experience.”\textsuperscript{20} Hanninen’s statement illustrates what I take to be untenable in this view, however; while purporting to distinguish theory from analysis, it in fact entangles them.

What, after all, are “ways of hearing or thinking about musical experience” if not music theory?

Cognizant of the potential for such definitional inversion, Ian Bent has stressed the reciprocity of theory and analysis, while maintaining the general/specific distinction. “If analysis opens up a musical structure or style to inspection,” Bent writes, “inventorying its components, identifying its connective forces, providing a description adequate to some live experience, then theory generalizes from such data, predicting what the analyst will find in other cases within a given structural or stylistic orbit.”\textsuperscript{21} Bent’s verbs—inventorying, identifying, providing—indirectly acknowledge that analysis is essentially doing something, his formulation points to higher unity of analysis and theory as forms of knowledge (“data”). The problem evident in Hanninen’s definition of analysis thus reappears in a slightly different guise. While positing an inventory of analytic data facilitates theoretical generalization, generalization is already presumed in creation of any such inventory. Conversely, theory as prediction is only a meaningful concept to the extent that it is made specific, and then it is once again analysis. Ultimately, Bent’s conception of the relation between analysis and theory is not so much wrong as it is unhelpful for thinking


\textsuperscript{21} Bent’s comment is part of the Preface he wrote for volumes in the Cambridge Studies in Music Theory and Analysis series. See, for example, Adolf Bernhard Marx and Scott G. Burnham, Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven: Selected Writings on Theory and Method, ed. and trans. Scott G. Burnham (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xi; Guides to the practice of analysis, such as those by Cook or Dunsby and Whitall assume the application model, and thus also the general-particular relationship between theory and analysis. Jonathan Dunsby and Arnold Whittall, Music Analysis in Theory and Practice (London: Faber Music, 1988); Nicholas Cook, A Guide to Musical Analysis (Oxford University Press, 1994).
about analysis as practice, for it is forever collapsing analysis back into whatever knowledge it produces.

If the central problem with any version of the application model of analysis lies in the failure to fully distinguish it from theory, ought we then to simply acknowledge that analysis is a form of theory or vice versa? Or that one becomes the other in relation to the goal one pursues at a particular moment? These views strike me as unsatisfying. Even if analysis and theory can never be fully extricated from one another, it may nevertheless be heuristically useful to find a way to deal with them separately. The epistemic knot between theory and analysis can be cut by defining music analysis as a practice and music theory as knowledge about music. The scope of such knowledge is immaterial. Theory/knowledge—whether it concerns one’s knowledge of a genre, a set of works, a specific work, a passage in that specific work, or a single event—allows one to say, “this is that.” Returning to the earlier examples from the introduction, the “Tristan chord” as a half-diminished 7th chord, the *Eroica*’s famous C♯ as a leading tone to D, and Haydn’s supposed monothematicism, are not analysis; they are theories resulting from analysis that pertain to specific musical events, passages, pieces, or repertoires. Each offers a way of understanding, viewing, perceiving, and conceptualizing some music. Analysis describes the actions and process by which one becomes convinced that these are truthful descriptions of the music in question.

What makes Lewin’s attempt to distinguish theory conceptually from analysis fascinating vis-à-vis later statements linking theory to generality, analysis to particularity, and both to forms of knowledge, is that he explicitly rejected the conception of analysis as applied theory. Lewin acknowledged that a theorist may work “to focus his readers’ ears on what he is interested in,” using a specific piece of music as a demonstration. But, he proclaimed indignantly, “TO THE
EXTENT THAT HE APPROACHES THE MUSIC WITH THAT AIM, HE IS NOT ANALYZING IT.”

Lewin’s point was subtler than his typography. The application of theory fails to qualify as analysis because it does not take specificity seriously enough. Ultimately, the specific musical instance cannot be assimilated to the order of general knowledge without losing something of its specificity. Thus, Lewin concluded, “analysis really is antithetic to theory.”

Ultimately, the essential analytic question for Lewin was not epistemic, but ontological: “What is ‘it’?” “It” might be a repertoire, a musical composition, or an event within the composition.

Lewin’s question is paradoxical, for answering it betrays the purpose of analysis as he understood it—namely, to approach the music as a unique event rather than as the exemplar of an idea. Whatever one calls the music under analysis—a motive, a harmony, a rhythm, a sonority, or a phrase, etc.—one has not grasped its specificity. Put schematically, if some musical event $x$ is understood as $y$, and there are other events that can also be understood as $y$, then one has failed to truly grasp $x$. If there is no other example of $y$, then analysis is reduced to empty nominalism or tautology: the music is what it is. Put another way, answering Lewin’s basic analytic question about the specific musical event is already to participate in music theory.

Two implications of Lewin’s antithesis are crucial to conceptualizing analysis in terms of practice: First, analysis is not essentially a matter of producing “answers” to theoretical questions.

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24 Ibid., 62–63.
Second, if it is possible to describe analysis “as a pursuit in its own right,” the language used to do so cannot be that of music theory. Both implications reinforce the proposition that “analytic knowledge” is better understood as theory, and that what are typically called “analyses” are, properly speaking, collections of theoretical statements. Even if such theoretical statements are robust enough to unequivocally describe a specific work—thus appearing to salvage the idea of analysis as a work-specific knowledge—one could always compose new music that would be different, even as it fit the same theoretical criteria.\textsuperscript{26} Though theoretical statements may be preceded by and result from analysis, no \textit{statement} constitutes analysis.

One might still want to insist that analysis really is epistemic and argue that theory is concerned with Platonic ideals whereas analysis deals with what really exists for the analyst—that is, with knowledge of actual music’s presence. Here, one might follow Steven Rings’s suggestion that the aim of analysis is knowledge in the service of experiencing music’s “presence effects” more clearly.\textsuperscript{27} Such a view can be placed within the heuristic framework proposed here. When theory/knowledge operates over experience, whatever the scope of that experience may be, the identities it posits in the form of knowledge subsume differences. It provides means by which things—objects, perceptions, symbols, etc.—may be represented (re-presented). While theory highlights a musical event’s membership in a theoretical category, it also at least partly occludes the specificity of that particular event. Lewin declaration that theory is antithetical to analysis might be understood as the antithesis between a positive and negative characterization. If theory—knowledge—means grasp a thing in its uniqueness, to “know” \textit{what it is}, analysis is the

\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, this is the very principle on which Schenker built his theory of the \textit{Ursatz}.

\textsuperscript{27} Rings, “Mystères Limpides,” 180.
activity of dwelling on a particular musical event in relation to everything it is not. In this sense, analysis cannot abide substitution or analogy. It resists—indeed defies—re-presentation, or language. It defies positive, representational knowledge. Analysis produces such knowledge only by a cessation of the activity—of “doing something.” To analyze is not only to isolate some element from the whole; it is to experience that element specifically. This can only happen in the real-time temporal unfolding of musical engagement. While such practices surely yield knowledge, they must be repeated because the knowledge it produces will always be inadequate, pulling up short of discovering “what it is.” But this repetition has effects beyond epistemology; whatever one comes to know, it also effects who one becomes.

Who Analyzes Music? Distinguishing Subject and Self

Who analyzes music? In the first place, someone who cannot let music be. The analyst, like a composer or performer, is compelled to be actively involved in music. Consider the student Joseph in Johann Joseph Fux’s Gradus ad Parnassum (1725), who tells his teacher Aloysius, “Even before I could reason, I was overcome by the force of this strange enthusiasm and I turned all my thoughts and feelings to music. And now the burning desire to understand it possesses me, drives me almost against my will, and day and night lovely melodies seem to sound around me.”

28 In reality, any given analyst explores a very limited number of possibilities of what the object of some musical experience is (or is not). The particulars of the analyst’s choices will be determined not by an exhaustive search of all epistemic possibilities, but by the knowledge he or she has at hand.

Though Fux was no analyst, his dialogue reveals the power of the desire to understand that would inform the development of nineteenth-century analysts. The compulsion to involve oneself in this way attests to the almost mythical powers ascribed to music since antiquity. (Texts such as Fux’s are themselves part of the mythmaking process, of course.) Music, it seems, “wants something” from listeners. Thus, one speaks of “music itself,” an other to which one is subject. Musical subjectivity, in this sense, is not only a way of referring to some “subjective” (unique, personal, ineffable) experience of music that leads to active engagement, but rather a being subject to music.

To be “subject to” music is to be interpellated into a form of being, knowing, and conducting oneself, in an Althusserian sense: one is hailed by the sound of some music and responds to it as an addressee. One is thereby brought into a discourse or discourses that

30 In the aftermath of critiques in the 1990s, the locution “music itself” has fallen out of fashion in musicology due to its association with Eurocentric ideologies. This has prompted a number of defenses. See, for example Scott Burnham, “Theorists and ‘The Music Itself,’” *The Journal of Musicology* 15, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 316–29; Giles Hooper, “An Incomplete Project: Modernism, Formalism and the ‘Music Itself,’” *Music Analysis* 23, no. 2/3 (2004): 311–29; James Currie, “Music After All,” *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 62, no. 1 (2009): 145–203; Ironically, it is still used in ethnomusicological research, where some distinction between the music studied and its embedment in a socio-cultural context is almost impossible to avoid. The conclusion to Kartomi’s recent article on Indonesian pestle-and-mortar music provides a representative example: “Thus the story of main alu on Natuna has come full circle. Despite the demise of Natuna’s rice cultivation and the exploitation of its offshore natural gas reserves—which could have dealt it a fatal blow, its future seems assured, though in radically altered form. Apart from the unfortunate loss of some repertory, the changes over the past three decades have had little impact on the music itself.” Margaret Kartomi, “From Agricultural Tool to Identity Symbol: Musical and Socio-Political Change in the Pestle-and-Mortar Music of the Natuna Archipelago, Indonesia,” *Ethnomusicology* 61, no. 1 (2017): 110.

describe how one so hailed ought to act, and becomes a subject. As Peter Sloterdijk writes, “a subject is someone who is active as a carrier of exercises.”\textsuperscript{32} The practice of such exercises turns one into a certain kind of person—a musician, perhaps, or an athlete, or a philosopher. But these exercises also work to recreate the conditions of subjectivization itself, such that forms of subjectivity become self-perpetuating sets of relations. Performers and composers are exemplary subjects in this sense as well. They acquiesce to and affirm music’s perceived demands through their own practices in order to recreate the effects with which music hailed them in the first place. Other examples include lawyers and clergy; subject to rules sponsored by the state or the church respectively, their practices enact, honor, disseminate, and perpetuate the goals enshrined in those same institutions.

Analysis, I want to argue, may work differently.\textsuperscript{33} The analyst responds to musical subjectivity, but not in the same way as composer or performer. This is obvious in the sense that these three figures do not do the same things: one plays music, one writes music, and one analyzes music.\textsuperscript{34} But these are not exactly variations on a common theme. The analyst also seeks to understand music, to know the truth about “what it is” (Lewin) and “how it works” (Bent). This truth is ambiguous with respect to musical subjectivity. On the one hand, it is the truth of knowing what musical techniques effect which subjectivizing results. But, on the other hand, it also includes knowing why it has such an effect, and this in turn implicates a certain knowledge of

\textsuperscript{32} Sloterdijk, \textit{You Must Change Your Life}, 156.

\textsuperscript{33} Or, at any rate, I want to claim that analysis worked differently before its own institutionalization. See Girard, “Music Theory in the American Academy.”

\textsuperscript{34} For a disquisition on what they do share, see Agawu, “How We Got Out of Analysis.”
oneself as a musical subject. In this respect, as Jim Samson notes, analysis is “as much a form of self-analysis (raising all the familiar problems of the ‘I’ describing itself) as an empirical description of the other, since the subject can never be abolished altogether nor congealed into fixity.”

Samson’s recognition of analysis as essentially hermeneutic shifts the value of analysis toward a concept of self—what Foucault called a hermeneutics of the self. Before investigating this concept, it is necessary to consider a crucial feature of subjectivity as I have sketched it so far. If being a subject is to recreate the conditions that led to one’s being so subjected, then each act of confirmation reinforces one status as a subject. This is precisely what Sloterdijk’s conception of subjectivity as exercise suggests. Practice, Sloterdijk writes, “is any operation that provides or improves the actor’s qualification for the next performance of the same operation, whether it is declared as practice or not.” Unless there is some way to resist this positive feedback loop, subjectivity will tend toward what Foucault called a state of domination, a condition in which the freedom to act as one chooses is completely curtailed. In Foucault’s words, “When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may be called a state of domination. In such a state, it is certain that practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited.”

The image this may suggest in a musical context is that of the “genius” who cannot help but do what he does, and

36 Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life, 4.
37 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 283.
who is compelled as if by a force beyond his own will to create or perform. I will explore in the next chapter the historical moment in which musical subjectivity acquires the potential to dominate the individual in this way and will argue that it coincides with the advent of modern music theory founded on practices of analysis. For now, I simply want to assert that the potential for this state of domination—or at least a concern for it—is an important part of understanding analysis as a practice of the self. It is a practice of resistance to domination by music—or, less dramatically, to being overwhelmed by musical experience. One cannot simply see analysis as an impulse to understand, for that would universalize what I wish to explore as historically specific. But neither do I wish to conceive it simply in terms of liberation. Rather, analytic practices of the self are caught up in the power relations that obtain between the individual and particular modes of subjectivity—modes whose mutual resistance may culminate in the production of new forms of knowledge.

If subjectivity always implies the threat of domination and lack of freedom, why would one embrace it and take up its behaviors? Butler frames the question in psychological terms. A subjectivizing force appeals to an innate desire to survive and to persist. “‘I would rather exist in subordination than not exist’ is one formulation of this predicament,” writes Butler.38 There is a structure of promise in subjectivity: by exercising one’s body in such and such a way, external threats can be overcome. From the perspective I am proposing here, this is not quite right, however; becoming a subject is not a matter of wanting or choosing. It is simply a drive to

continue. Sloterdijk gets at this unselfconscious taking up of exercises by framing them within a
generalized “immunology,” i.e., a way to ward off attacks from without which then produces the
kind of self one will be.\(^3\)\(^9\) Forms of subjectivity do not present themselves to an autonomous
consciousness that says, “I want” or even “I need,” but rather to a body that has evolved to
persist and to adapt techniques that allow it to do so. The interpellation into a form of
subjectivity is a cognition that is not yet a re-cognition.

The picture of musical subjectivity presented so far is a purified, abstract schema. I do not
claim that this pure form actually exists in history. If it did, and if it were the sole determinant of
analysis, an ethics of analysis would be an impossibility. If “freedom is the ontological condition
of ethics,” the crude determinism of analysis by musical subjectivity would preclude holding
analysts responsible for whatever they might say or do. This is not how I think analysis works,
however, and for a rather simple reason: the knowledge produced by analysis cannot be
determined by musical subjectivity alone because music itself does not posit the means for its own
analysis.\(^4\)\(^0\) More specifically, the means by which the analyst “comes to terms with” music are not
immanent to musical subjectivity.\(^4\)\(^1\)

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\(^3\)\(^9\) Sloterdijk, *You Must Change Your Life*, 334–452.

\(^4\)\(^0\) There are those who have claimed that music does contain its own immanent ability to explain itself. Perhaps the most infamous is Hans Keller, whose “functional analysis” purported to explain pieces of music by recomposing them, but which nevertheless have not generally been regarded as standing without need for further explanation. See Keller, *Functional Analysis: The Unity of Contrasting Themes; Complete Edition of the Analytical Scores*, ed. Gerold W. Gruber (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 2001).

\(^4\)\(^1\) Though I pursue a different intellectual thread, this observation relates to the large body of scholarship on music and metaphor. See, for example, Lawrence M. Zbikowski, *Conceptualizing Music: Cognitive Structure, Theory, and Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Michael Spitzer, *Metaphor and Musical Thought* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
The terms and symbols that mark the conclusion of analytic practices do not issue from some autonomous, authentic self. Rather, they are means by which some other form of subjectivity appeals to the same embodied, immunological instincts as musical subjectivity. As Butler observes, “there is no making of oneself (poiesis) outside of a mode of subjectivation (assujettissement) and, hence, no self-making outside the norms that orchestrate the possible forms that a subject may take.”\textsuperscript{42} This other form of subjectivity has the same general properties. It requires a set of habits, cultivated through exercises, that perpetuate its form. Certain monastic orders provide a conceptual model here, in that they seek to establish a form of life according to an impersonal rule.\textsuperscript{43}

At this point, a new concept of analysis as a practice of the self can be more precisely defined. It is not a simple affirmation—or carrying out—of the exercises entailed by musical subjectivity. Nor is it a rejection of musical subjectivity. Analysis is a staging on the individual body of an agonic, mutual resistance between two (or more) modes of subjectivity, one of which is musical. Analysis arrests the process of reproducing either subjective form by focusing on the encounter and trying to come to terms with it. If, as Foucault argued, knowledge is inextricably linked to relations of power, analysis attempts a reversal of relations implied in musical subjectivity by asserting the power of knowledge over musical experience.\textsuperscript{44} It is not the will of the subject that operates here, but rather the drive of the body to persist. Insofar as the acts of

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\textsuperscript{42} Butler, \textit{Giving an Account of Oneself}, 17.
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analysis tend toward the moment of theoretical reification, they contain music’s power over the individual. But, crucially, the practice of analysis also does precisely the opposite: it resists the individual’s domination by a form of knowledge and its associated exercises or conduct, which themselves indicate and instantiate another form of subjectivity. Where then do the terms of analytic engagement with music come from? The most obvious answer, of course, is music theory. Analysts often do take up terms and concepts from the rich, continuous Western music-theoretical tradition they have inherited. But this answer fails to explain how the terms of theory come to be linked with the music they seek to explain in the first place.

This problem points to an inversion that occurs around 1800. Prior to the nineteenth century, theory tended to concern “music” understood as a whole or in terms of styles rather than individual compositions. The eighteenth century was focused on teaching rules or principles of composition (Satzlehre); analysis was a post-hoc exercise to confirm the validity of such rules. But around the turn of the nineteenth century, however—the very moment, in other words, when Goethe’s Faust famously proclaimed, “In the beginning was the deed!”—the terms of theory began to be used by analysts focusing on specific works. Again, I want to defer discussion of this historical moment; I raise the issue of history here only to stress how words that come to signify musical knowledge are the linguistic markers of another form of subjectivity, and that such forms are always and necessarily historical. Such forms are manifested in discourses and codes

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46 Though I will not do so here, one might adduce cross-cultural support for this claim. Feld’s famous example of Kaluli conceptions of music, for example, would be framed in terms of subjectivity to a given natural environment. Steven Feld, *Sound and Sentiment: Birds, Weeping, Poetics, and Song in Kaluli Expression*, 3rd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012).
of conduct that inform analysis and thus determine the form analysis takes, and ultimately, the form of theoretical knowledge that marks the end of analytic processes. What they do not determine, or determine only negatively, is the sense of self that results from the practice.

The terms utilized in the analytic process derive from the analyst’s being subject to a particular form of knowledge. Ray Jackendoff’s work with Fred Lerdahl on a Generative Theory of Tonal Music, for example, adopted and adapted the framework of a cognitive linguistics Jackendoff acquired from training under Noam Chomsky.47 But the status of such terms at the end of the analytic process as true, I claim, is due to practice of reconciling musical experience to such terms and thereby containing its subjectivizing power.48 This process of knowledge production is at the same time the production of selfhood through which the practice of analysis is retrospectively interpreted as having been an act of will.49 The act concludes in the moment of theory, where neither form of subjectivity has dominated the individual. As Ian Hunter has argued, theory since Hegel—and again, I note that this coincides historically with the rise of music analytic practices—is the performance of transcendence.50

One more point of terminological clarification needs to be addressed before turning to the topic of the self and practices of the self. If a subject is simply the individual (historical body) under a particular regime of knowledge and its associated code of conduct—i.e., if such practices


48 I am not claiming that theoretical knowledge derived from analysis can never be experimentally verified, only that the value of analysis as a practice does not rest on such verification.


50 Hunter, “The History of Theory.”
are not self-consciously chosen—there is no need to posit a prior subject, i.e., “the subject” that precedes any particular subjective content. “The subject” is a projection of the self, produced by practice, onto the conditions that preceded it. This perspective helps avoid confusing language that appears—but in fact fails—to distinguish the subject and the self. This is the case even in the writers whose work I have cited in developing the present conception of analysis. In several of the following quotations, therefore, I point out that “the subject” is used to indicate what I want to define as “self.” To be clear: a subject is an individual (body) subject to a regime of practice in the service of a subjective form. A “self,” on the other hand, is precisely an agent who is not “subject to” such regimes, and therefore someone who can claim agency with respect to their own actions.

The facticity of the body in history makes conflict between forms of subjectivity inevitable. As individual human beings embedded in a complex physical and social world, we are constantly taken up into different formations of knowledge and conduct. One can be a citizen, and a musician, and a believer of a certain faith, and a family member, and a consumer, and so on. Conflicting demands on our bodies appears as the normal state of affairs. But selfhood in the ethical sense I want to develop here consists in becoming aware of oneself as a subject. Indeed, it is becoming aware that one is multiply subjected, and how—even if only inchoately. And this happens when conflicting, mutually incompatible sets of demands are brought into contact. Paul Smith captures this eloquently:

The “subject” [i.e., the self] subsists, as it were amid all this flux, movement, and change through the process of negativity itself. Thus the colligation of subject-positions, far from entailing a fixed … “subject” is effected precisely by the principle which stands against unification—negativity.  

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Paul Smith, *Discerning the Subject* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 156.
To exploit the negativity which, as I’ve claimed, constitutes the links of the “subject’s” colligations is not to privilege the action of resistant or rebellious will. It is, rather, to try to locate within the “subject” [self] a process, or a tension which is the product of its having been called upon to adopt multifarious subject-positions. This is the process whereby the “subject’s” [self’s] contradictory constitution is given over to the articulation of needs and self-interest.52

Smith’s otherwise lucid description continues to exhibit a certain ambiguity through the use of “the subject.”53 But as I think this passage makes clear, a “self” rejects subjectivity—rejects being subject-to some external set of behavioral norms; a “self” exists to the extent that it escapes the compulsion of such norms and thus exists negatively. Butler argues that the act of narrativization, a “giving an account of oneself,” is precisely the mechanism by which this selfhood is produced, and I shall argue the traces of analysis that persist in the representations of knowledge (theory) are just such accounts.54 Smith puts it this way: “An account of subjectivity which recognizes … multifarious subject-positions would appear to be a more flexible one insofar as it allows us … to conceive of the possibility of resistance through a recognition of simultaneous non-unity or non-consistency of subject-positions.”55 It is precisely this re-cognition that constitutes the toeholds of selfhood.

A key word in the quote from Smith above is “self-interest.” The “self” is a negative principle because it is defined in opposition to the positive determinations of forms of subjectivity. To be a “self” is to have the power of refusal. In the case of musical subjectivity, that means the

52 Ibid., 157.
53 Smith’s quotations around “subject” indicate, I think, his awareness of what I argued above—namely, that “the subject” is the retrojection of a self onto an earlier state of affairs.
54 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself.
55 Smith, Discerning the Subject, 118.
refusal to give oneself over exclusively to musical activity. Writ large this is to refuse the myth of genius; writ small, it is the refusal to listen to music passively and to assume responsibility for what one hears. Conversely, the musical “self” recognizes that music exceeds, and thus resists, determination by knowledge. Again, this, I will argue, is what at least some music analysts of the past have done.

“Self” refers to the self-consciousness of one’s autonomy from determination by external discourses and codes of conduct. To be a self is to exist in such a way that one’s choices and actions are not fully determined from without and, thus, can be said to be one’s own. Smith is undoubtedly right that the contradiction between subjects works itself out as a process. With regard to music analysis, my claim will be that it develops out of the matrix of multiple, historically specific subject-positions. Thus, the idea of selfhood for which I am arguing is also historically specific.

The “self,” as a form of consciousness, exceeds any particular form of subjectivity. At the same time, it has no content of its own. The only way to resist a form of subjectivity is via the practices of another form of subjectivity. As Charles Taylor remarks, “the making and sustaining

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of our identity … remains dialogical.”

It is this other subject, making a claim on the same individual or body, that summons the self into being. In other words, music analysis is not informed by a subject whose autonomy guarantees the veracity of knowledge that constitutes an end point. Indeed, I have argued that the opposite is the case: analytic practice has as its goal the production of a sense of oneself as an autonomous subject vis-à-vis “music itself” as subjective form on the one hand, and institutionalized forms of power/knowledge on the other.

To sum up: conflicting, incompatible demands made on historical individuals necessitate choice. Choice, in turn, elicits an agent, the “self,” who must choose. Practices of the self are those practices that seek to expand this space. The space of selfhood is precarious, however; it never remains empty. Rather, it is soon filled with other forms of subjectivity. The “freedom” from musical subjectivity on the one hand, and a form of knowing on the other is only a relative freedom. To attempt to grasp it absolutely is to subject oneself to the knowledge it produces—i.e., to music theory—such that one becomes subject to that discourse. Indeed, this may be where the moral critiques of analysis are strongest, i.e., when they point out theorists’ mis- or unrecognition of their own subjectivity. Ironically, then, the self is never that which is fixed. In order to remain a self, one must practice. One must become other than one is.

“**You must change your life**”: Rilke’s Imperative, Spirituality, and Music Analysis

No writer appears to have encapsulated the view of ethics as an ever-shifting self more succinctly that Rainer Maria Rilke in his famous poem, *Archaic Torso of Apollo*, the text of which is

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given in Table 1.1. Consequently, few poems have been written about in the context of ethics more frequently, or with more conviction, than Rilke’s sonnet. Among the many commentators who have been arrested by the poem’s final lines and attempted in some way to heed its ethical imperative are philosophers and critics such as Hans Georg Gadamer, George Steiner, and Peter Sloterdijk. Closer to the present task are the invocations of Rilke’s poem by musicologist Berthold Hoeckner and music theorist David Lewin. It is the latter whose ideas appeared as a marker of the modern split between theory and analysis and whose work I want to return to in this final section on the practice of music analysis. But first, Rilke’s poem:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archaäischer Torso Apollos</th>
<th>Archaic Torso of Apollo</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wir kannten nicht sein unerhörtes Haupt, darin die Augenäpfel reifen. Aber sein Torso glüht noch wie ein Kandelaber, in dem sein Schauen, nur zurückgeschraubt, sich hält und glänzt. Sonst könnte nicht der Bug der Brust dich blendend, und im leisen Drehen der Lenden könnte nicht ein Lächeln gehen zu jener Mitte, die die Zeugung trug.</td>
<td>We never knew his head and all the light that ripened in his fabled eyes. But his torso still glows like a gas lamp dimmed in which his gaze, lit long ago, holds fast and shines. Otherwise the surge of the breast could not blind you, nor a smile run through the slight twist of the loins toward that centre where procreation thrived.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonst stünde dieser Stein entstellt und kurz unter der Schultern durchsichtigem Sturz und flimmerte nicht so wie Raubtierfelle und bräche nicht aus allen seinen Rändern aus wie ein Stern: denn da ist keine Stelle, die dich nicht sieht. Du mußt dein Leben ändern.</td>
<td>Otherwise this stone would stand deformed and curt / under the shoulders’ transparent plunge and not glisten just like wild beasts’ fur and not burst forth from all its contours like a star: for there is no place that does not see you. You must change your life. 59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1, Rainer Maria Rilke, *Archaäischer Torso Apollos*, from *Neue Gedichte* (1908)

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Rilke’s torso reifies the source from which selves derive. It is something manifestly there and yet unknown, something incomplete. Ultimately, it is sexual, bound to a form of desire that twists toward the organs of procreation. But behind this biological imperative, on which human existence obviously depends, lies something else: a panoptic kind of knowledge that precedes us and makes us who we are. It knows us without us knowing it. “There is no place that does not see you” acknowledges the condition of subjectivity I have been at pains to describe. There is no escaping our dependence on it; subjectivity provides the positive contents of conscious reflection. This is the uncomfortable conclusion confronted directly by Butler’s recognition that “the ‘I’ emerges upon the condition that it deny its formation in dependency, the conditions of its own possibility.”60 The need to get beyond this condition, to find life outside or beyond the internalized moment of surveillance is made just as clear in the final line of the poem: “You must change your life.”

Foucault’s late work proceeds from this insight. “Such as he is,” writes Foucault, “the subject is not capable of the truth.”61 Foucault shifts from a hermeneutics of history to a hermeneutics of self, which is simultaneously a shift from genealogical investigations to an investigation of the conditions of ethics.62 He moves from human beings determined by discourses of economics, linguistics, biology, and madness, to a determination through various forms of discipline, until, in his late work, that discipline is taken up as “care of the self.” In his

62 Both projects are rooted in the insights of Nietzsche.
consideration of the latter, Foucault developed a pair of concepts that are useful for understanding the dichotomy I posited earlier between analysis/practice on the one hand and theory/knowledge on the other. In his 1981 lectures on The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault described what he called “philosophy” as “the form of thought that asks … what determines that there is and can be truth and falsehood and whether or not we can separate the true and the false.”

“Philosophy,” Foucault argues, “asks what it is that enables the subject to have access to the truth and [is the form of thought] which attempts to determine the conditions and limits of the subject’s access to the truth.” Truth and knowledge are one and the same in this view—a philosophical position Foucault attributes to Aristotle.

Though developed as a heuristic with no direct connection to music, Foucault’s notion of “philosophy” accurately describes what I called the epistemic conception of analysis and theory. In this view, theory is a way of structuring discourse about music in order to make claims about specific pieces that can be evaluated not in “subjective” terms of emotion of affect, but in terms of what is true and what is false. Figuring out the theoretical order that underlies specific works is the aim of this kind of analysis. This commitment circumscribes in advance what one may legitimately say about musical works by guaranteeing that the boundary of subjectivism is not transgressed; structuralist principles delimit truth and falsity. The aim of theory, then, is to communicate about music in a way that, as Foucault says, does not require anything of the subject, save that it stay out of the way.

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63 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 15.
Foucault contrasted “philosophy” with “spirituality … the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth.” For Foucault, this includes the “set of these researches, practices, and experiences, which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of looking, modifications of existence, etc., which are not for knowledge but for the subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be paid for access to the truth.”65 (Again, I would like to emphasize that, in my view, the “the subject” is better understood as the “self.”) Here, it becomes apparent that knowledge and truth are not identical, a view Foucault attributes to and derives from Nietzsche.66

The list of practices that modify “the subject” anticipates the desires of those analysts who want not only to acknowledge the intimate relationship between music and themselves, but to use analysis to intensify and indeed even to change it—e.g., Steven Rings’s hedonistic ethics of analysis, Agawu’s open endorsement of indefinite “pleasure,” or, more recently, Roger Matthew Grant’s recognition and embrace of a queer kind of play within music analytic practice.67 One can even see similar goals operating, albeit unwittingly, in the work of scientifically minded analysts like Forte. A book such as The Compositional Matrix, which pointedly excluded all

65 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 15.
66 Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know, 202–23.
subjective language, would not be difficult to interpret in terms of purification, renunciation, and asceticism.\(^68\)

Of particular interest in conceptualizing analysis as a practice are three characteristics of spirituality posited by Foucault: The first is that “in order for the subject to have right of access to the truth”—that is to say, in order to produce a self—“he must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, other than himself. The truth is only given to the subject at a price that brings the subject’s being into play. For as he is, the subject is not capable of truth.”\(^69\) The second characteristic follows from the first, namely that “there can be no truth without a conversion or a transformation of the subject.” This, Foucault argues, takes two forms. One is “love” (eros), while the other “major form through which the subject can and must transform himself in order to have access to the truth is a kind of work.”\(^70\) It seems safe to say that all analysts—anyone drawn to understand—are drawn to analysis by a love of music.\(^71\) But as we have seen, this is a complicated love. On the one hand, it names musical subjectivity itself—the compulsion to work on music’s behalf, bringing others into its fold. On the other, it is a love that takes more than it gives, and that can only be unmasked by the “love” of an other. Resolving this contradiction is the work of analysis: “a work of the self on the self [i.e., two forms


\(^{69}\) Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, 15.

\(^{70}\) Ibid., 16. On “love” as a critical term in the history of analysis, see Chapter 2.

of subjectivity on one another], an elaboration of the self for which one takes responsibility in a long labor of ascesis.”

Finally, Foucault says that “once access to the truth has really been opened up, it produces … effects of truth on the subject, as reward for the act of knowledge as it were, and to fulfill the act of knowledge. The truth enlightens the subject; the truth gives beatitude to the subject; the truth gives tranquility of the soul.” Ultimately, I propose that the analyst seeks this tranquility—not the tranquility of a pre-existing self—i.e., the return of peace to something agitated—but rather the tranquility that comes with the sense of self, a center from which to respond to the demands one faces in the form of subjectivities. More fundamentally, tranquility is the condition of a self that has learned not only to live with the necessary persistence of the subjective, but recognized its own fundamental dependence on subjectivity.

That selfhood requires giving an account in terms that issue from elsewhere, and is thus a form of responsibility-taking, can all be understood and accepted as a response to Rilke’s injunction. “You must change your life” grammatically encapsulates the division of the body according to the forms of subjectivity that impinge on it—as if “you” and “your life” are different. Hence, Sloterdijk’s dictum that “ethics can only take the form of a duel between man and himself.”

If being is a dueling between different forms of subjectivity and there is no way to escape such relations, analysis appears in a rather different guise than its critics have sometimes

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72 Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, 16.
73 Ibid. Emphasis mine.
74 Sloterdijk, *You Must Change Your Life*, 164.
suggested. Its pleasures may indeed be a function of power relations, but these are not indices of ideologies that structure social life as a zero-sum game. Instead, they are the result of an overcoming of forms that could dominate the individual. We can read music theory as a partial record of practices that—at least potentially—resist the same forces that critics contend analysts marshal to subject others to their will. I do not mean this to exculpate any and all music theorists in advance—the moral critiques by, inter alia, feminists and ethnomusicologists are well founded. My claim is that analysis qua act does not take others as its object; rather, its objects are the forces to which the specific analyst is subject.

The preceding exposition has been rather remote from the discourses of music theory and analysis. For that reason, I would now like to return to David Lewin, who explicitly invoked Rilke’s famous injunction in 1986 to justify his conception of music theory and analysis. Lewin’s essay on Stockhausen’s Klavierstück III, originally published in 1993, self-consciously reports, or at least imaginatively reconstructs for the reader, its author’s analytic practice. As Lewin writes, “Since the essay is intended as a methodological model, I shall be quite self-conscious about my methodology in a number of respects.” This essay, I will argue, provides an example of how

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75 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1978), 92–96; Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 142; “It seems to me that power is ‘always already there’, that one is never ‘outside’ it, that there are no ‘margins’ for those who break with the system to gambol in. But this does not entail the necessity of accepting an inescapable form of domination or an absolute privilege on the side of the law.”

analysis could function as a mode of resistance to forces to which Lewin was subject, rather than an exercise of power over others.\footnote{It may be that these are two sides of the same coin. Relations of power are everywhere and unavoidable. Nevertheless, this is a rather different etiology of analytic practice than that suggested by both its critics and defenders—one that, I submit, respects the concerns of both sides.}

In his essay on Klavierstück III, Lewin develops a pitch-class network meant to provide a map to assist in the aural navigation of Stockhausen’s prickly piece. After presenting the score, he immediately represents the temporally ordered pitch-class content of the piece as shown in Figure 1.1. Each pitch is represented by an integer (0–e where 0 = C [10 and 11 are represented by t and e, respectively]), with simultaneous pitch-classes enclosed in parentheses. Below the string of integers, Lewin extracts pentachord sets that he relates through standard transformations such as transposition and inversion. Lewin claims to have discovered most of the pentachord forms “by ear.” The ones that were not discovered that way were the result of finding forms that included pitches not otherwise accounted for, or taken from another published analysis by Jonathan Harvey. This distinction will play a crucial role in Lewin’s conception of analysis: listening is a form of being directly subjected to music as a sonic matter, while the other mode of engagement explicitly applies existing knowledge to that experience.
Lewin proceeds to develop a visual network that shows relationships between the various pentachord forms. He clarifies that his aim is to “use transformational discourse in rendering formal such intuitions as ‘P8 is to p8 as P is to p.’” Standard operations such as transposition (T) link the forms, and when Lewin needs an operation that is not standard, he simply defines it. The operation J, for example, maps a given pentachord form “into the unique form of the pentachord which inverts the given form and leaves invariant the four-note chromatic tetrachordal subset.”

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P and p, for example, are said to be J-related because they are inversions that share \{8,9,t,e\} while mapping 2 onto 5.

Ultimately, on the basis of such transformations, Lewin produces two different diagrams representing the piece. One focuses on an abstract set of possible relations, only some of which are realized by the music. The other is concerned primarily with charting a sensible path through what actually happens in the music. Throughout his exposition, Lewin emphasizes the necessity on the part of the listener to choose a way to hear the piece.

Lewin concludes his essay by comparing his divergent approaches to listening to the results of Jeanne Bamberger’s study of children’s strategies for arranging bells to play “Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star.”\(^79\) While some children placed bells in the sequence required to play the tune, more musically advanced students arranged them by ascending pitch, such that there was an order within which any tune could be picked out. Lewin suggests that these strategies for mapping a pitch space are similar to the ways in which music theories can structure musical experience more generally. He reaches the following methodological conclusion: “I want to urge attention, at all times in the construction process, to both “figural” (narrative blow-by-blow temporal) and “formal” (abstract spatial) aspects of the task at hand.”\(^80\) And finally, he writes, “The methodology of these ongoing processes, rather than the specific shape of this or that specific resultant network model, is what seems essential and characteristic in the art of making a network analysis.”\(^81\)

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\(^80\) Lewin, “Making and Using a Pcset Network for Stockhausen’s *Klavierstück III*,” 53.

\(^81\) Ibid.
In an appendix to the main body of the essay, Lewin meditates further on the purpose served by doing such analyses. That is to say, he speaks directly to the question “Why analyze at all?” and does so in a way that goes beyond the epistemic paradigm. Citing Nicholas Cook’s analysis of *Klavierstück III*, he criticizes the idea that the purpose of analysis is simply to represent what one has heard or to assimilate the music into what is familiar and comfortable. He avers instead that he wants to be changed by music. Indeed, for Lewin, the perception that some music *demands* such change is taken as a criterion of its quality as art.\(^{82}\) This demand opens a space between his perceptions of the music based on ingrained listening habits and his intuition that these perceptions are somehow inadequate. As Lewin admits, “the interesting questions involve the extent and ways in which I am satisfied and dissatisfied when focusing in [a specific] manner.”\(^{83}\)

Lewin’s “I” here responds to the demand that Lewin locates in music itself—a demand that I have characterized as musical subjectivity. What is the source of such a demand? Lewin claims in the case of *Klavierstück III* that the music challenges, provokes, and infuriates. Presumably, he does not mean that the music itself is inherently provocative or infuriating. The provocation seems necessarily to lie on the side of the analyst. The music, it appears, frustrates the habits of thought to which he was accustomed. In other words, the music resists the form of knowledge imposed on it by its subjective other. In order to discern what that form may have been, we can look at the theory that emerges from Lewin’s analytic engagement—i.e., the pc-

\(^{82}\) In fact, Lewin goes further, suggesting that making demands on the listener is the ontological condition of art.

\(^{83}\) Lewin, “Making and Using a Pcset Network for Stockhausen’s *Klavierstück III,*” 44.
network he makes. And here, the source is not concealed: Figure 1.1, for example, exhibits the formal logic indicative of his training in mathematics, presented in a visual language that suggests computer code.\textsuperscript{84} Klavierstück III was not a general provocation, but a specific one; it evidently provoked in Lewin a desire to specify and quantify musical ideas in a rigorous, consistent language. This language is, in a word, “codable,” which is another way of saying that it can be consistently manipulated through defined operations to produce meaningful results.\textsuperscript{85}

Lewin consistently weighs his quantitative representations against the qualitative experience and occasional dissatisfaction with the resulting compromises—an idea he thematizes. He remains ever attentive to the ways in which it is inadequate to the aural experience of the music, even when it succeeds on logical grounds. “We should not let ourselves be seduced by” the elegance of theoretical representation, he argues.\textsuperscript{86} The tension emerges between two forms of subjectivity. One is musical subjectivity, which is practiced through careful attention to qualitative sonic phenomena. The other, which might be called mathematical, is practiced by ordering the world according to quantifiable and formally manipulable representations. Lewin comes close to expressing this himself in a passage making an unexpected historical comparison:

\begin{quote}
I find it useful to regard these matters as recapitulating in modern dress a traditional sort of interrelationship between \textit{musica mundana} and \textit{musica instrumentalis}. [One exists] outside human time in an abstract universe of quasisspace-potentialities; they cannot be manifested in music except through human gestures that move through chronological time. [The other embodies] gestures
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{84} Kane, “Excavating Lewin’s ‘Phenomenology,’” 31.

\textsuperscript{85} This inclination is exhibited most obviously in David Lewin, \textit{Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

[that] might seem arbitrary or meaningless were not their contours and boundaries shaped by the abstract proportions of the given universe.\textsuperscript{87}

Here, \textit{musica mundana}, the music of the spheres governed by mathematical proportion, is contrasted with the messy world of real human bodies and movements. We should also note here the existential anxiety in the phrase “might seem arbitrary or meaningless.” Knowledge is contrasted with experience. Korsyn has critiqued Lewin for effecting a performative synthesis that draws on history as an excuse for disregarding information outside the score, but this can be reframed: music as experienced, even within the representations afforded by the score, becomes a means of resisting that which would impose itself on Lewin as an algorithmically ordered form of subjectivity.\textsuperscript{88} Ultimately, Lewin’s analytic practice puts his humanism in an agonistic relationship with formalism, expressed as mathematical or quasi-AI code.

In the end, Lewin’s analysis of Stockhausen’s \textit{Klavierstück III} is less a struggle between the analyst and his social others than as a struggle between Lewin and himself. Elsewhere, Lewin emphasized the role of choice opened up by theory in other well-known essays such as the widely read essay on Schubert’s “Morgengrüss” and the “Phenomenology” essay. In the end, as Lewin famously claimed in 1986, music—and here we can add, music analysis—is not just something one perceives or knows; it is something one does.\textsuperscript{89} The examination of analysis then—historically and ethically—is a matter of looking at what analysts have done.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 40–41.


Method

In this final section, I want to address a number of the important arguments I have cited; Foucault’s philosophy/spirituality distinction, Sloterdijk’s definition of practice and its fundamentally ethical orientation, and Butler’s ruminations on giving an account of oneself as the quintessential act of self-formation, in order to fashion a method of investigation. How might these insights be transformed into such a method? To begin with, reframing the question of analysis as a practice renders it historically tractable. One need not assume we know what analysis is. If we know that theory—understood as knowledge about some music—is its product, it is possible to begin with a theory and work our way back to the practices and the forms of subjectivity from which they developed. We can examine how it produced a self that was at least partially independent of the subjective forces whose traces can be discerned in historical documents. At this point, value will have been reframed not as a philosophical abstraction, but in terms of what was valuable for the analyst.

The primary methodological issues in the chapters that follow are, first, maintaining a clear distinction between analysis and theory, and second, maintaining a sense of historical contingency. The former is challenging precisely because the practical ontology of analysis means that no historical traces are themselves, strictly speaking, “analysis.” They are usually “theory” in the sense of specific knowledge about some piece or repertoire, or they are representations of analytic practice reconstructed by a self that is their product. The challenge is to reconstruct the conditions that explain the forms to which analysts were subject.

This project is complicated by the historical context that conditions it. How can I insure that the historical horizon of expectation of a given analytical practice is not conflated with the notion of analysis that I hold today? For one thing, I cannot—as this chapter has done—simply
define analysis and then proceed to elucidate the history of events that conform to that definition. The argument here is, as I have said, heuristic—a means of digging into the historical record that will take account of individual analysts and their contexts. My aim is not to “translate” past texts in order to authentically grasp their meaning or render them transparent for readers today. As I argue in Chapter 2, this is, by and large, what has already been done.90

My argument is that focusing on individual selves has the value of reminding us in the strongest practical terms that the past is different. I may identify with actors from the past insofar as we share some common identity as analysts, but I am ultimately interested in exposing their differences from my own point of view. In principle, a full history of the essential figures along these lines would present something like an ethical genealogy. The following chapters seek to show what such a study might look like.

Beyond general heuristic strategies, there are three methodological points that help to ensure a productive difference in horizons of expectation. The first is language. As Christensen urges, the theoretical language used to represent or trace the analytic process must be attended to carefully.91 In the case studies that follow, this is less a matter of words meaning something entirely different today than they did for the analyst in question than it is a matter of having lost the resonances that made the words truthful choices in the analyses of those who used them. Gottfried Weber’s use of Mehrdeutigkeit is as much a reaction to his professional work in law as it is


an endorsement of Abbé Vogler, from whom he borrowed the term. A. B. Marx’s words describing musical passages and the development section of sonata form, *Gang* and *Durcharbeitung*, resonate with the discourses of Jewish emancipation in which he was necessarily embroiled. August Halm, whose writings on the music of Anton Bruckner I touch on briefly in the dissertation’s Conclusion, received theological training in Tübingen, nineteenth-century Germany’s most intellectually progressive seminary; faith was replaced by hermeneutics, which he subsequently rejected in musical thought. Though these terms are not necessarily defined differently today than they would have been for the analysts who found them both useful and truthful, I attempt to discern the valences they had in the discursive fields of these theorists’ respective milieus.

Only when theoretical descriptors are naturalized, and their metaphorical resonances attenuated through use, can words be understood as unmediated signifiers of musical structures—only then does the analysis of music seem to operate in its own terms. But this comes at the cost of history and we find ourselves unable to say how and why we reached the present moment, unable to answer critics who demand such a reckoning, and ultimately unable to account for ourselves as historically embedded beings.

The second methodological point derives from the first but also exceeds the question of vocabulary. I do not focus exclusively on the analytical and theoretical writings of the figures in question. For instance, I rely on Weber’s writings as a legal scholar and Marx’s *Memoirs* and final meditation on the relationship between idealism and reality. In addition to placing “technical” terms in a broader discursive field, such writings give a sense of the forms to which their authors were subject. These can be and are supplemented by other texts to which they relate.
Third, and perhaps most obviously, the case studies contextualize the analyst in terms of historical events that impinged on him and which shaped the institutions to which he was subject. The aim of this methodological distancing is to read analytic practices anew, not only to avoid reading them as inchoate versions of later theories, but also to see them as the products of specific historical individuals and their corollaries—perhaps even byproducts—of self-production. Taken together, the analyst’s language, discursive network, social ties, institutional filiations, and events of which he was aware (or even participated in) comprise the dense historical web woven from both musical subjectivity and its others.

Perhaps the most consequential entailment of historically reorienting analysis around past practices rather than the epistemology of theory is that historical figures become plausible analogues to today’s analysts. We do not have to secure our own autonomy at the cost of denying history. A historiography that finds historical actors determined by suprapersonal historical forces precludes taking their agency seriously. While an analyst today might accept such conclusions on intellectual grounds, he or she is unlikely to accept that his or her own identity is analogously determined. But such a conclusion comes into conflict with the belief that musical knowledge is or could be determined by the music it studies. As Christensen has reminded historians of theory, tradition forms the thread of continuity that makes it possible to relate to past practices at all.92 In part, seeking out such traditions led me to select the case studies I did for this dissertation. Gottfried Weber stands at the head of the tradition of harmonic analysis that makes use of Roman numerals to designate Stufen; and Marx stands at the head of the Formenlehre tradition.

92 Ibid.
August Halm, whom I address briefly in the Conclusion, does not stand at the head of an easily identified tradition; nevertheless, I will suggest that his work, too, may point to some heretofore little recognized forms of subjectivity operating in modern music analysis.

In contrast to the claim that analysis is a subspecies of a general post-Enlightenment “quest” for knowledge available to one without having to change anything about oneself, the image of analysis as a practice of the self is inextricably bound up with the history of selves who have taken up and developed that practice.\(^\text{93}\) At the end of the lecture in which Foucault delineated his heuristic views of “philosophy” and “spirituality,” he made a striking historical point. “Read again all of nineteenth-century philosophy,” he admonished his auditors, “and you see precisely here also that knowledge, the activity of knowing, whether it is discredited, devalued, considered critically, or rather, as in Hegel, exalted, is nonetheless still linked to the requirements of spirituality. In all these philosophies, a certain structure of spirituality tries to link knowledge, the activity of knowing, and the conditions and effects of this activity, to a transformation in the subject’s being.”\(^\text{94}\)

The historical problem posed by analysis, exemplified by Agawu’s remark that “analysis is at its most vital when it denies history and precedent,” is taken up in a focused way in Chapter 2, which examines the conditions under which music theory was reconstituted in modernity on the foundation of analytic practice. In this chapter, my aim has been, first, to provide a conceptual


framework for analysis as a practice of the self, and second, to show that history of analysis cannot but be a history of its practitioners. The inauguration of that history is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Two

The Subject of Music and the Will to Know: Toward a History of Music Analysis

—E. T. A. Hoffmann (1814)

What is a history of music analysis? How might it differ from, say, a history of music theory? The heuristic distinction between analytic practice and theoretical knowledge proposed in the previous chapter implies an answer: the history of analysis would be a history of practice. Unfortunately, analysis is not so easily disentangled from theory. Sometimes the practice does begin with theory applied it to this or that piece of music, thus determining the general form “analytic knowledge” will take. A Roman numeral analysis will show a limited set of fundamental harmonies functioning according to an ordered system of “roots.” A Schenkerian analysis will show that the music is derived through a limited number of diminutions recursively applied to an Ursatz. And so on. But other times, analysis simply begins with the “music itself.” The practice involves listening, experimenting, and bringing to the analyst’s experience to bear. It is this latter process I described as a practice of the self.

These two images of music analysis suggest different histories. A history of the application model may not end up looking substantially different from a history of theory. It would be, in

¹ “Where is he from? Nobody knows. Who were his parents? It is not known. Whose pupil is he? A good teacher’s, for he plays excellently, and since he is intelligent and cultivated one can certainly tolerate him, and even permit him to teach music.” E. T. A Hoffmann, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writings: Kreisleriana, The Poet and the Composer, Music Criticism, ed. David Charlton, trans. Martyn Clarke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 79.
effect, a history of music theories as told through examples of their application to specific pieces. Individuality of analysts would matter only to the extent that they are understood as authors of the essays explaining the application of theories to musical works. Ian Bent’s history of analysis in his monograph *Analysis* works in this way. In examples from Burmeister’s analysis of Lasso’s “In me transierunt” to Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff’s analysis of the St. Anthony chorale as arranged by Brahms in the *Haydn Variations*, op. 56b, “analysis” is presented in the form of theory. The difference between this and a history of theory is superficial insofar as many histories of theory are likely to include analytic examples.\(^2\) Bent’s anthology, *Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century*, takes this historical approach to its logical conclusion by avoiding interpretation and publishing past analysts’ essays to speak for themselves.\(^3\) Each entry is preceded by a brief contextualizing introduction, but there is rarely any strong connection posited between biographical facts and the content of the theory or analysis.

The history of music analysis as a practice of the self is different. In this case, the practice may produce new knowledge (a new theory), but the effort would not be to explain the theory so that it can be understood by the audience of a different time and place—a translation of one form of knowledge into another. Instead, the theory would be understood as the result of the analytic practice by a specific individual. The details of the analyst’s life would be paramount to understanding the theory. A number of recent monographs focus on individual theorist-analysts,

\(^2\) Several chapters in the Cambridge History of Western Music Theory bear out this assertion. Christensen, *The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*.

but the focus is really on theory, which is understood as the product of historical context. The analyst possesses little agency vis-à-vis the development of the theory, and the practice of analysis remains largely incidental. Analysis as a practice of the self, however, is a struggle for precisely that agency. It represents the specifically modern condition of struggling to overcome history through practice. The history of music analysis from this perspective, then, is a history of that struggle.

How is it that music analysis became a struggle to overcome the past? If the previous chapter was about the abstract conception of music analysis as a practice, the aim of this chapter is to elucidate the historical conditions that made possible—or perhaps necessitated—music analysis as a practice of the self. In one respect, this chapter mediates between the abstract, philosophical concept of analysis as a practice of the self in Chapter 1 and the studies of individual analysts in Chapters 3 and 4. It examines in somewhat more detail what I mean by “musical subjectivity” and how this particular meaning was instantiated in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century German culture through a confluence of philosophy, literature, music, and nationalism. Subjectivity came to be—or came to be a “way to be,” to borrow Ian Hacking’s expression—such that it came into conflict with, and elicited the resistance of, other subjective forms.

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Here, I will explore the appearance of historical conditions underlying music analysis as a practice of the self from both recent and historical perspectives, sometimes shuttling back and forth between the two to highlight historical continuity and the genealogical reach of the history. I begin with some further consideration of the limited “history of analysis” as it appears in recent scholarship, and investigate a recent exception: Janet Schmalfeldt’s work on musical form as process. Schmalfeldt’s work both addresses the history of analysis and folds that history into her own analytic practice. Second, I turn to the “subject of music,” a figure which, I argued, is a precondition for analysis as a practice of the self. I claim that the subject first appears historically as a transcendental fantasy of Romantic aesthetics. Music was imbued with a structure of promise such that those who subjected themselves to it could unburden themselves of their own determination under institutionalized forms of rationality. At the same time, these demands, which held out the possibility of transcendence, revealed themselves as threats to individual autonomy. The threat is most clearly articulated not in philosophical works such as Schiller’s *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* or (in a very different way) Schopenhauer’s *World as Will and Representation*, but rather in the stories and criticism of Romantic authors such as Wilhelm Wackenroder, Heinrich von Kleist, and Hoffmann. To be sure, these authors also elevated the status of music, imbuing it with unprecedented power to subjectify listeners, but they also made clear that music’s power was not necessarily benign or benevolent. Finally, I will argue that the subject of music enters into conflict with modes of subjectivity imposed on individuals in institutionalized forms such as government, law, education, and religion. While the institutions themselves were not new in any of these cases, they were each transformed through attempts to consistently apply principles of Enlightened reason. Such transformations were imposed on the
practitioners within these institutions, eliciting forms of resistance that Romanticism articulated with particular clarity, and for which music provided a medium of practice.

**History of Analysis**

In his revision of Bent’s essay published by *Oxford Music Online*, Anthony Pople partially acknowledges the shortcomings of historicizing the application model of analysis. Framing the question of theoretical knowledge in terms of “method”—an implicit acceptance of the application model—Pople asks “whether analysis as a whole can be described by listing and describing its methods.”5 The alternative, he suggests, is to classify analysis along different “axes,” which include the “analyst’s view of the nature and function of music,” the “[analyst’s] approach to the actual substance of music,” the “[analyst’s] method of operating on the music,” and “the medium of presentation of [the analyst’s] findings.”6 As these qualifications once again make clear, it is the *analyst* that constitutes the common thread in understanding analysis. Yet the implications of this shift are not made explicit. These “axes” are lines of thought that direct attention from individual analysts toward more general attitudes, methods, and materials. But they might be read in precisely the opposite way: the axes all lead back to and intersect in the figure of the individual analyst, whose own history must inform the history of analysis.

Writers who have used the specific locution, “history of analysis,” suggest a few possibilities. Michiel Schuijer for instance, writes that “A history of music analysis … is concerned

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5 Bent and Pople, “Analysis.”
6 Ibid.
with degrees of mediation and appropriation [of musical works] in the products of that discipline.” Such work, Schuijer suggests, need not be undertaken (solely) by practitioners of analysis. The writing of the history is a distinctly different skill than those practiced by analysts. Each type of history, Schuijer suggests, “allows us to see the larger culture of which this practice is a part; to see how musical meaning arises from this complex, and is acted out—‘performed’—by the analyst.” This point seems similar to the idea of analysis as practice, but there are a few crucial differences. If historical actors’ agency is entirely determined by context, then they have little agency and practice is merely a mechanical function of context. We are led, in other words to one of the ethical dead ends discussed in Chapter 1. To see analysts of the past as determined by the contexts to which they are subjected is to tacitly, and disastrously, commit to the proposition that all analysis—indeed any practice whatsoever—is entirely deterministic.

A second question concerns the status of “performance” in Schuijer’s history. The implication seems to be that analytic acts are undertaken for the benefit of others, yet his use of quotation marks suggests a certain irony. As Agawu and others have pointed out, analytic engagement with music precedes its representations; only when that work is presented to others do we understand it in terms of performances. Again, the matter comes back to the analyst. The question is not merely one of how “meaning arises,” but also of what Foucault called “rebound effects” of the practice itself. An historical account of analysis needs to take these factors into account.

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8 Ibid.
A third question in Schuijer’s characterization of a “history of analysis”—one that will require careful consideration—involves its focus on musical works. To be sure, no history of analysis could disregard the material with which analysts conduct their practices, and these have typically been “works.” The attempt to determine the specific way in which works are “mediated,” however, indicates a return of epistemic bias and risks once again occluding the very analytic practices he wants to highlight by framing them as performances.

If analysis is inextricably bound to the analyst by dint of both the logic of practice and the facticity of history then, as Zatkalik, Medić, and Collins observe, “The history of music analysis can only exist in the mode of plurality because it reveals the multitude of narrative explanations of musical phenomena.” The history of analysis is the sum not of knowledge, but rather of its practitioners, each of whom offers a unique story about the ways in which one may attempt to come to terms with what music is and how it works. While in principle, these practitioners need not have been theorists, theoretical writings (including “analyses”) are indispensable to the task of writing such a history.

One recent historian and analyst manages to avoid many of the pitfalls presented by epistemic bias toward theory and away from practice: in her book *In the Process of Becoming* (2011), Janet Schmalfeldt posits that the dialectical unfolding of history can be located within musical works by composers such as Beethoven and Schubert. As such, analysis becomes a process of

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historicizing, and history becomes a means of examining analysis. Schmalfeldt has also referred explicitly to a “history of analysis.” Her use of the phrase suggests that the meaning is obvious. “Compared with the history of music analysis,” she writes, “the history of thought among writers in English about the relation of analysis to performance covers a drastically shorter time span.”

It seems at first that Schmalfeldt may have in mind a theoretically-driven activity vis-à-vis music similar to what I critiqued as the “application model” of analysis in Chapter 1 and which is taught in many music analysis courses. But the consideration of her own earlier work at the intersection of analysis and performance as she prepared for a performance of Beethoven’s Bagatelles, and which forms the starting point for her more recent reflection, reveals a more complex conceptual underpinning, which accords more closely with the model I have proposed in this dissertation. Analysis in that account emerges as the site of conflict between differing modes of subjectivity.

Schmalfeldt tellingly describes her earlier work as “an effort to bring two facets of myself into alignment with one another.” She acknowledges the wealth of scholarship on the relationship between performance and analysis that followed her work, some of which was critical toward the antagonistic relation of power she had implied. Particularly galling for some readers, as Schmalfeldt tells it, was the idea that the analyst “seems to have all the answers,” and

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12 Ibid.


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would be more than happy to enlighten the performer whether the latter wanted it or not.\textsuperscript{15} Schmalfeldt’s response to her critics in her book is conciliatory, but I would argue that her earlier work did correctly diagnose analytical practice as a struggle. To be sure, much of what Schmalfeldt presented as “analysis” (and continues to present as analysis in her book) is what I have been calling “theory”—knowledge and representation of music. Her text and the diagrams in Chapter 5 of \textit{In the Process of Becoming}, for example, make clear that she proposes to “know” the opening of the first movement of Schubert’s Piano Sonata in A minor, op. 42 in specific ways, e.g., as a Schenkerian descent from scale degree 5; that a “basic idea” in mm. 1–2 is followed by a “contrasting idea” in mm. 3–4; that a prominent voice exchange characterizes the contrasting idea. Analysis is implied in the presentation of such knowledge but the practice that created it is not itself explicitly thematized.

What emerges from the conflict between Schmalfeldt the theorist and Schmalfeldt the performer is the actual work of analysis, which leads to a new form of knowledge—namely, a theory that the music of composers such as Beethoven and Schubert is best understood not in terms of “structure,” but rather in terms of “process.” The work of analysis for Schmalfeldt, then, appears to have been to recognize the ways in which, for her, “classical formal principles” were inadequate when confronted with the ways in which she was subject to music. The idea of \textit{process} that Schmalfeldt developed through her own analytic practices becomes part of the ongoing

history of theory. Process, too, is now a form of knowledge to which individuals can be subjected, in part through the institutionalized framework into which theory and analysis have been taken up. But the history of analysis would be the one in which Schmalfeldt was interpellated into the institution of theoretical forms of knowledge (e.g., Schenkerian contrapunatal analysis, Caplin’s renewed *Formenlehre*, etc.) and into the role of a musician who “does not … for the sake of a controlling analytic [theoretical] view … forsake the effort to express improvisatory freedom and spontaneity.”

This conflict at the heart of Schmalfeldt’s analysis is irreducible, and this is what makes it productive—not only of the theory of process, but also of Schmalfeldt as a music theorist working in a particular historical context. *In the Process of Becoming* might be read in part as what Agawu called the “post-analytic exercise,” and what Butler, invoking a much more general framework, called “giving an account of oneself.” It is not only a book about musical process, but also a book about Schmalfeldt’s own becoming and the role analysis played in her life as a performer. The following passage captures something of the tension between Schmalfeldt *qua* performer and Schmalfeldt *qua* theorist:

I have rarely chosen a fingering, made a decision about pedaling or articulation, or even considered how I will enter and exit the keys without having arrived at some kind of analytically based sound image, if only a vague one. Conversely, I would not have entered the field of music theory and analysis had I not, much earlier, gained a profound love of music through my efforts to perform it.

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The synthesis at which she seems to arrive is a fragile one. Neither the theoretical knowledge analysis produces nor the “love of music” as such quite dominates. Its maintenance implies the need for further analytic work—a process that is and will be necessary to maintain the sense of selfhood constructed around these two poles. If, as Agawu puts it, “In an ideal world, analysis would go on always and forever,” it is because the ideal is one in which the individual self is never determined by theoretical knowledge or by an overpowering, yet inscrutable, love.\textsuperscript{19} The question now is how it came to be that either of these poles could threaten the autonomy of individuals in the first place.

**The Historical Ontology of Musical Subjects**

“Historical ontology,” according to Ian Hacking, is the study of things that come into being in the course of history, and which at some point may cease to be as well. The range of such things is broad: it includes ideas, objects of study, behaviors, and identities. The latter, in particular, direct attention “toward what is it possible to be or to do.”\textsuperscript{20} Hacking cites examples such as suicide, multiple personality disorder, and automatic writing as behaviors and conditions whose existence is historically contingent. Suicide is perhaps the most illuminating, in large part because its meaning seems clear cut. The simplicity and finality of it would appear to transcend history. And yet, the voluntarism is problematic: on what grounds can we say that someone wanted to die by their own hand? It is possible that one can misunderstand what one wants? A

\textsuperscript{19} Agawu, “How We Got Out of Analysis,” 270.  
\textsuperscript{20} Hacking, *Historical Ontology*, 22.
rich body of philosophy deals with such questions, of course, but I am interested here, as is
Hacking, in its specific *historical* dimension.\(^{21}\) As a matter of historical record, suicide came to be
diagnosed as *suicide* in the nineteenth century as the symptom of a medical condition (insanity). A
whole medical apparatus thus became involved, and out of this, a set of behaviors associated with
the act developed—“an entire ethos of suicide, right down to the suicide note.”\(^{22}\)

I have chosen Hacking’s account of suicide to illustrate historical ontology rather than,
say, Foucault’s thesis that sexual perversion emerged in the nineteenth century, because it
perfectly and concisely illustrates how a specific behavior connects historical ontology,
subjectivity, and the state of domination toward which I argued subjectivity tends. One can be
subject to discourses that compel acts manifestly *not* in the interest of the self (insofar as being
alive is a condition of selfhood). This is precisely what is supposed to have happened in the last
quarter of the eighteenth century following the publication of Goethe’s *Die Leiden des jungen
Werthers*; young men, dressed as the protagonist, threw themselves off bridges with copies of
Goethe’s enormously successful epistolary novel. That Werther was an artist was surely no
coincidence. This is not to assert that “suicide” is itself a way to be, or an identity. The latter are
not limited to such specific, individual behaviors, but rather are constituted by manifold relations
of power, modes of conduct, and forms of knowledge. A significant portion of Foucault’s work—
from his focus on the human sciences in *The Order of Things* to various case studies on the

\(^{21}\) As Camus famously wrote, “There is but one serious philosophical question, and that is suicide.”
Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus: And Other Essays* (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group,
2012), 3.

\(^{22}\) Hacking, *Historical Ontology*, 113.
ontological status of madness, criminality, and sexuality—can be understood as researching such configurations as they manifested themselves institutionally, and thus as an extended argument on the broader theme of historical ontology.23

Language plays a critical role in historical ontology, as its cycles of production and reception give rise to what Hacking dubs “dynamic nominalism.” As Hacking puts it, “Categories of people come into existence at the same time as kinds of people come into being to fit those categories, and there is a two-way interaction between these processes.”24 So it was for multiple personality disorder or sexual perversion. I would like to suggest that this is what happened around the turn of the nineteenth century in Germany with respect to musical subjectivity as well. As the possibility of being subject to music, or of being a subject of music came into being, individuals responded to that possibility by adopting it as their own way of being. In turn, this inaugurated a search by individuals for music that could give this way of being a real existence. As we will see in Chapters 3 and 4, Mozart’s music fulfilled this function for Gottfried Weber, while Beethoven’s music became the lynchpin in Marx’s analytic practices.

The claim that the musical subject came into being in German culture around the turn of the nineteenth century might seem overly narrow. After all, the idea that music has power over listeners—at least in Western culture—is as old as music itself. My claim, however, is more specific than music simply having powerful effects; “music” became a form of subjectivity in two

23 The historical ontology of sexuality has been further developed by Arnold Davidson, among others. Arnold I. Davidson, The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

24 Hacking, Historical Ontology, 48.
critical senses: First, it entailed a set of attitudes and behaviors that constituted a specific “way to be,” or identity. This identity does not have a specific name, but it was certainly bound up with and signified in various ways by the word “genius.”  

Second, these behaviors were self-replicating. The genius might be defined as one who is most able to replicate the structure of subjectivity through musical experience, either through performance or composition. The former mode of musical experience is embodied in figures such as Paganini and Liszt, who enraptured audiences and inspired new heights of performative virtuosity. The latter is perhaps best exemplified by figures such as Robert Schumann and Hector Berlioz, whose “genius” flirted with extremes of emotion and madness. Lying somewhere in the middle, and embodying the genius in both the performative and compositional forms, were figures such as Mozart and Beethoven. 

Beethoven, of course, became the quintessential composer-as-genius, “reconceived,” as Tia DeNora noted, “as a figure who could command unprecedented autonomy and respect.”  

Or, more simply, the genius, Beethoven, became a hero.  

The broader discourse through which musical subjectivity developed was that of Romantic aesthetics—especially as it was articulated in the fictions and criticisms of writers such as Wilhelm Wackenroder, E. T. A. Hoffmann, and Heinrich von Kleist. In these writers’ works, musical experience became linked with the interior identities of musical listeners, who then were compelled to remake themselves in music’s image. Put another way, writers like Hoffmann created the discourse that described and expressed the subject of music.

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26 Ibid., 3.

Many listeners and scholars are inclined to understand at least some music as having powerful effects without, however, necessarily allying those effects with any particular political form. In part, this is because “music,” in the most general sense, includes musics allied with all manner of politics. But it is also because music may be co-opted and put to political uses that have nothing to do with the context in which it was created or the intentions of its creator. Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy,” for example, may be turned to immoral political ends, but immorality has generally not been interpreted as a property of the music itself. Indeed, the very idea of idea “absolute music,” shielded music from politics (if only to make it more politically effective). In any case, the authors who elevated the power of music to new heights, such as Wackenroder and Hoffmann, hardly viewed this power as a source an unmitigated source of pleasure. At best, its rewards were commensurate with its risks. Romantic literature on music is a virtual catalog of experiences like suffering and ecstasy, and if such a characterization is redolent of religious belief, that too reflected the new status accorded to music by Romantic authors.

Wackenroder’s short story “The remarkable musical life of the composer Joseph Berglinger,” published by Ludwig Tieck in 1797, shortly after Wackenroder’s death, made clear that to follow the muse of music was to invite suffering. Its eponymous protagonist, enthralled by

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music as a child, gives up a potential career in medicine to pursue music. For much of his life, however, the joy he experienced listening to music remains a chimera. His pleasure is undermined by having to learn the mechanics of the art, but even more so by the fact that he fails to support the family he abandoned and who die in penury; worst of all, he fails to compose the music that would do for others what music had done for him. Nevertheless, he persists, having admonished himself in a state of musical rapture, “You must remain all your life in this beautiful, poetic rapture, and your whole life must be a single piece of music.”

As the title of the story already implies, Berglinger is eventually rewarded. Having prayed fervently to St. Cecelia, he eventually composes a Passion setting that redeems and justifies the suffering he has endured. The boundary between the art and religion is virtually non-existent in Wackenroder’s story. The comparison with religion constitutes in large part the subjectivizing force of the story’s narrative. Indeed, historians following the coinage of Friedrich Schleiermacher or the later use of the term by Richard Wagner, have called the exchange of art for religion Kunstreligion, or art-religion. I shall return to this concept in the concluding chapter. Here, I simply want to note that in Wackenroder’s telling, music took on some of the practices of religion, including prayer and silent, mindful attention.

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Heinrich von Kleist took the idea that subjectivity to music would lead to a state of domination to a striking extreme in his short story “St. Cecilia, or the Power of Music.”

Published in 1810, it tells the story of four radicalized Protestant brothers in Antwerp who plan to attack and destroy a Catholic church during evening mass. Having gathered a mob in support and marched to the church, however, their plans are thwarted when they hear music emanating from inside the church. The music is a mass setting, supernaturally conducted by St. Cecilia herself. Its power not only turns the brothers away from their violent plans, but also compels them to convert. Following their conversion, they are institutionalized in an insane asylum that functions as an ersatz monastery in which they devote themselves entirely to prayer while murmuring fragments of the music that struck them down. The interpretive possibilities of Kleist’s story are much richer than this sketch indicates, but in any reading, it suggests the reverence music ought to be accorded, for its effects could be both transcendentally rewarding and mundanely horrifying.

Perhaps no writer explored and more acutely diagnosed the bifurcated nature of Romantic musical experience than E. T. A. Hoffmann, whose stories about music and music


33 It is worth noting here, by way of foreshadowing the more detailed historical studies that follow in Chapters 3 and 4, how tight the social relations were that created this network of power relations that flowed through music. Kleist’s “St. Cecilia” was published in Berlin by Julius Hitzig in 1810, the same year as Hoffmann’s famous review of Beethoven’s Symphony no. 5. Hitzig was a friend of Adolf Bernhard Marx and colleague of Hoffmann as well. In fact, Hitzig commissioned Marx’s first published essay, which summarized and eulogized the Romantic vision of music that Hoffmann exemplified not only in prose but also as a composer.
criticism may be read as fundamentally about musical subjectivity and, I will argue, the kind of other against which it rebelled and which made its interpellations effective. A line from Hoffmann’s short story “The Sandman” can serve as a point of departure. Here, Clara, tries to reassure the story’s protagonist Nathanael (whom she loves) that his fear of the Sandman is irrational. She writes, “If, I say, there is such a power, it must assume within us a form like ourselves, nay it must be ourselves; for only in that way can we believe in it, and only so understood do we yield to it so far that it is able to accomplish its most secret purpose.”

The words of reassurance double up as a theory of subjectivity in nuce—a framework in which the power of the other is taken on as one’s own identity with suppressed psychological consequences.

The logic of such reassurance exemplifies the psychological mechanism of subjectivation described by Judith Butler, and it is easily transferred onto musical experience. Though music necessarily comes from without, it becomes a model of one’s inner life—material from which to fashion an identity. For Hoffmann, to listen is to become music oneself (as Wackenroder’s Berglinger had said). Only such internalization, in advance of self-reflection, could lead to the belief in music as essentially self-expressive. But as Butler’s work on the psychological structure of subjectivity indicates, this comes at a cost. One can deny external power by internalizing it, but the result is a sublimated existential fear. This lies, I argue, at the very heart of Hoffmann’s stories about music as well as his music criticism.


Hoffmann’s work, long familiar to musicologists because of his epoch-making review of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5, is worth revisiting in this context. His story “Das Sanctus” bears striking similarities to Kleist’s “St. Cecilia,” and may even have been modeled on it. Both stories are structured around a conversion narrative in which music plays a primary role. Hoffmann’s story begins with the singer Bettina having lost her ability to sing, much to the consternation of the Kapellmeister and her doctor. A passing “enthusiast” then relays the story of a butterfly trapped in a clavichord; its wings brush against the strings and are damaged, eventually killing the butterfly. The implication is that Bettina is like the butterfly: she is essentially musical, and yet to sing will result in her death. Paola Mayer reads the tale within a tale as an allegory of the musician (or, I would say, the musical subject) more generally: “The analogy, like most of Hoffmann’s musical tales, presents the musician as the helpless captive of a force infinitely more powerful than him- or herself, a force which he or she can neither understand nor escape and which will eventually destroy its servant.” At the same time, the musician—particularly in the guise of the composer—is figured as a means of overcoming

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38 Ibid., 247.
subjectivity itself. Hoffmann imagines the composer to be free of the oppressive effects and illusions of being subject to mundane concerns.39

In 1814, Hoffmann introduced his most famous character with the questions in the epigraph at the head of this chapter.40 Johannes Kreisler, the titular protagonist of the Kreisleriana collection of stories and criticism manifested the idea that genius entailed suffering mitigated by the lofty heights of art. How much of Kreisler is autobiographical is difficult to say, but Hoffmann certainly identified with him. The narrator in the final story of Kreisleriana, which is written in the form of a letter to Kreisler, sighs, “Ah, my dear Johannes! Who knows you better than I?” He soon slips into the plural “we,” then catches himself: “I feel as though in modestly using the plural I was actually speaking of myself in the singular, as though the two of us were in fact only one.” And yet, as frequently happens in Hoffmann’s writing, he is aware of the fantasy: “Let us tear ourselves free of this absurd delusion!”41 Behind the masks of irony donned by Hoffmann in Kreisleriana, Kreisler embodied what Hoffmann imagined it would be to live by one’s art—and to die by it, an ideal rendered peculiarly literal when Kreisler imagines stabbing himself in the forest with an augmented fifth.42 That such eminent figures as Robert Schumann and Johannes Brahms explicitly identified themselves with Kreisler attests to the subjectivizing power of this image and its real-world effects, i.e., the production of music that itself would

40 Charlton points out that Hoffmann’s opening parodies Denis Diderot’s jacques le fataliste et son maître.
42 Ibid., 124.
propagate the subjective form. Even though not all analysts would claim such radical effects as the basis for their own practices, Hoffmann’s literary excess provides a striking, even hyperbolic, image for music’s power to compel anything whatsoever.

The constant doubling in Hoffmann’s writing has a specific correlate in his own biography. Whereas Kreisler met his literary end as a “certified” musician, Hoffmann made ends meet as a civil servant while his own musical ambitions met with limited success. The split between reality and fantasy became the signature of his literary work, which plumbs the anxieties and fantasies of a bureaucrat. For Hoffmann, musical subjectivity was almost magical, or perhaps therapeutic: it promised to counterbalance the demands of a metastasizing Prussian bureaucracy to which he was subject, yet it was also carried with it a frightening capacity to oppress and dominate. Hoffmann’s stories often thematize a pitched battle between the all-consuming demands of art confronted by the demands of the Kammergericht, and music always remains an ideal just beyond reach. The narrator of Hoffmann’s “Ritter Gluck,” for example, experiences an impossible meeting with Gluck in Berlin twenty years after the composer’s death, and is treated to a private performance of Armide. The student Anselmus in The Golden Pot must choose between a career as a civil servant—whose highest honor would to become Hofrat and settle into a bourgeois existence—and a fantastic world of magically resonating crystals and seductive serpents controlled by a race of salamanders. The “real world” of civil service is parodied by automatons that uncannily impersonate human life in “Automata” and “The Sandman.” The fantastic doubling of subjectivity, drawn in part from the earlier work of Jean Paul (Flegeljahre and

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43 The literary output that made Hoffmann famous was only written and published in the last decade of his life, and his success with the opera Undine can be attributed in part to his celebrity as an author.
Sibenkäs, for example), creates an atmosphere of existential horror. But it was also the mode of Hoffmann’s literary production, the means by which he, Hoffmann, fashioned a self out of the forces to which he was subject. And it is a structure that is mirrored in the birth of analysis and the forms of knowledge and self-production to which it leads.

Hoffmann could analyze music, too, in the sense of applying theory to a piece of music. Hence, his secure place in the history not only of literature but of the more circumscribed milieu of music criticism. His review of Beethoven’s Symphony no. 5 in the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung in 1810, perhaps the most famous piece of music criticism in the Western classical music tradition, needs no introduction. As Mark Evan Bonds observes, it “established a new standard for written discourse about music by integrating emotional response and technical analysis in unprecedented detail” and he argues that the way of listening articulated by Hoffmann in the review was “assimilated into the most basic assumptions about how to listen to music.” 44 This mode of listening manifested a theory about music’s power over both composers and listeners, expressed in the Romantic language of horror, phantasm, and existential dread. “Beethoven’s instrumental music unveils before us the realm of the mighty and immeasurable,” Hoffmann famously wrote. 45 Identifying with, and grammatically inviting his readers to participate in this realm, he continued, “shining rays of light shoot through the darkness of night, and we become


aware of giant shadows swaying back and forth, moving ever closer around us and destroying within us all feeling but the pain of infinite yearning.”

Hoffmann’s language throughout the review stresses the oppressive power of music, while also recapitulating the payoff as it had been figured by Wackenroder in general terms that again enfold the reader into his point of view.

“Only in this pain,” he writes, “in which love, hope and joy are consumed without being destroyed, which threatens to burst our hearts with a full-chorused cry of all the passions, do we live on as ecstatic visionaries.” Ultimately, Hoffmann writes, “every sensitive listener is certain to be deeply stirred and held until the very last chord by one lasting emotion, that of nameless, haunted yearning.” The infinite longing of Romanticism names the state of domination, from which freedom of self and ethics is no longer a possibility.

This yearning is, perhaps, for a selfhood beyond musical subjectivity even as Hoffmann recognized his dependency on the latter.

In what terms were the demands of musical subjectivity made? Time and again, Romantic writers—again drawing on Christian discourses and practices, as well as discourses of sickness and healing—couched the demands of music in terms of love and devotion.

Wackenroder’s reader learns that Berglinger’s “love of music came to dominate him more and

46 Hoffmann, “[Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony].”
47 Ibid.
48 As Charlton notes, Hoffmann’s mind must have been more orderly than it has sometimes been portrayed to be: he excelled in his work as a judge. Hoffmann, E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writing, 22.
49 One historical precedent for “love” as a Romantic cipher may be the eighteenth-century discourses focusing on the distinction between Kenner (connoisseur), who understands the means by which music is produced, and Liebhaber (amateur) who merely feel its effects. Riley’s account of Forkel’s preoccupation with the distinction and advocacy for an active mode of listening resonates in some respects with the account here. Matthew Riley, Musical Listening in the German Enlightenment: Attention, Wonder and Astonishment (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 87–120.
more.” Hoffmann transfers this same language to real composers. In “Beethoven’s Instrumental Music” (in *Kreisleriana*), for example, Hoffmann writes, “Mozart and Haydn, the creators of modern instrumental music, first showed us the art in its full glory; but the one who regarded it with *total love* and penetrated to its innermost nature is Beethoven.” Musical subjectivity was made more credible by the myths that evolved around real composers, particularly Mozart and Beethoven. The story of Mozart’s nearly superhuman composition of a Requiem Mass for his own funeral for example, or Beethoven’s claim in the Heiligenstadt Testament that only what he had to accomplish in music kept him from suicide reinforced the transcendental trappings of musical discourse. For example, Ignaz Xaver von Seyfried’s edition of *Ludwig van Beethoven’s Studien im Generalbasse, der Contrapuncte und in der Compositions-Lehre* (Ludwig van Beethoven’s studies in thoroughbass, counterpoint and composition), which included the text of the Testament as an appendix, used as an epigraph the final lines form J. F. Castelli’s poem “At Beethoven’s Funeral” (*Bey Ludwig van Beethoven’s Leichenbegangnis*): “Whoever, like him, hurried ahead of time, is not destroyed by time.”

This discourse of love as the foundation of the musical subject’s relation to musical subjectivity continues to resonate today. We saw it in Schmalfeldt’s claim to love music because of learning to perform it, for example. In 1997, Marion Guck forthrightly addressed the topic of “music loving” and the discomfort it engendered. After citing Lawrence Kramer’s claim that “the

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last thing a postmodern musicology wants to be is a neo-Puritanism that offers to show its love of music by ceasing to enjoy it,” Guck argues that “most theorists and musicologists … are uncomfortable with ‘music loving.’” Guck submits that this discomfort stems from professional embarrassment and a desire to be seen as serious. To “love” music, she suggests, is to fail to distinguish between and expert and an amateur—“lover of something” in the etymological sense of the word—and it thus undermines professional status. Recalling the eighteenth-century distinctions between Kenner and Liebhaber, Guck’s argument may seem overblown to scholars who would openly admit to loving music. Ultimately, however, she touches on a point that recalls the Romantic discourses that articulated the possibility of subjection to music: “Experience of music’s power is definitive of music loving.”

The tension between love of music and the ways in which it could be an oppressive force are rarely far from the surface in Hoffmann’s writing. He did not, however, work through this tension by developing analytic practices. Or, rather, he did not come to treat music analysis as a means of resisting that force. Hoffmann seems to have been content to use the music theory available to him to specify what he found remarkable in music where he could. And where that did not suffice he turned to the affordances of literary fantasy. I would submit that Hoffmann’s literary practices are an example of a practice of the self, outside of, but related to, music analysis. The conflict between his work as a jurist for the Prussian court and the interpellation into a


54 Particularly interesting in this regard is Hoffmann’s attempt to articulate the feelings associated with specific sonorities—for example, “A flat minor chord (mezzo forte): ‘Ah! They carry me to the land of eternal yearning, but as they take hold of me, pain awakens and tries to burst forth from my breast by rending it asunder.”’ Hoffmann, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writings, 133–34.
musical order that would have dominated him no less had not the practices of its bureaucratic other provided a means of resistance, led to his thematization of conflicting subjectivities in his fiction and criticism. As we will see in the following two chapters, these tensions could evolve rather differently.

In no concrete historical sense were the questions that begin Hoffmann’s *Kreisleriana* about the modern music analyst. They are nevertheless the right questions to ask, as Hoffmann’s own work evolved out of the same set of historical circumstances and competing subjectivities as theorist-analysts such as Gottfried Weber and Adolf Bernhard Marx. The general answers are the same for Kreisler and the modern analyst-theorist. Where is he from? Like Hoffmann/Kreisler, the analyst is from Germany. His “parents” were—metaphorically—Romantic aesthetics and post-Enlightenment institutions. Who was his teacher? Like the many bourgeois subjects who derived forms of *Bildung* through a literature targeted at them—*für Selbstunterricht* (for self-study) was the subtitular rallying cry of countless books in the late eighteenth and especially the early nineteenth centuries—the modern analyst was essentially an autodidact.55

Theory, once it assumes an institutional framework, eventually became a subjective form. This is what is meant when one says, as Bent does, that “music analysis, as a pursuit in its own right, came to be established only in the late nineteenth century.”56 And this is the moment its own institutionalization is inaugurated, at which the analyst comes to be thought of as a teacher.


But again, the transformation is prefigured by Hoffmann’s observation about Kreisler. It is his (self-)education that validates his value as a teacher, and that remains relevant today, when the music theorist is tasked with teaching neither music performance nor composition, exactly, but rather music theory and, of course, analysis.

The other half concerns the gradual integration of Enlightenment reason and values into institutions such as law, government, education, and religion.\footnote{The bloody repercussions of the French Revolution form part of the essential historical backdrop against which post-Enlightenment German institutions more gradually and heterogeneously developed. Needless to say, each of these institutions comprises a topic for virtually limitless research.} Here, I posit this only as a hypothesis. Chapters 3 and 4 offer more detail on the transformations to law, government, and religion as it pertains to the music analytic and theoretical work of Gottfried Weber and A. B. Marx, while the Conclusion touches on transformations in nineteenth-century Protestantism in Germany and the implications for the history of music theory and analysis. Though Enlightenment was putatively to lead to self-awareness and freedom—“man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity,” as Kant famously defined it—its heterogeneous institutionalized forms could, and did have the opposite effect.\footnote{Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: ‘What Is Enlightenment?,’” in \textit{Kant: Political Writings}, ed. H. S. Riess (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 59. Kant’s emphasis.} As traditional forms of knowledge and conduct were replaced by absolute forms, putatively enlightened individuals became new kinds of subjects, a development exemplified by the virtually absolute authority the Prussian bureaucracy acquired by 1815.\footnote{Hermann Beck, \textit{The Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in Prussia: Conservatives, Bureaucracy, and the Social Question, 1815–70} (University of Michigan Press, 1997), 125–26.} As Adorno and Horkheimer would emphatically contend in the \textit{Dialectic of
Enlightenment, “Knowledge, which is power, knows no limits, either in its enslavement of creation or in its deference to worldly masters.”

The power of post-Enlightenment forms of knowledge went hand in hand with their bureaucratization. The profound effects of this were diagnosed well by Foucault, who argued that people found themselves living in “a different age of the history of relations between subjectivity and truth.” Foucault’s explanation is worth quoting at length:

And the consequence—or, if you like, the other aspect of this—is that access to truth, whose sole condition is henceforth knowledge, will find reward and fulfillment in nothing else but the indefinite development of knowledge. The point of enlightenment and fulfillment, the moment of the subject's transfiguration by the “rebound effect” on himself of the truth he knows, and which passes through, permeates, and transfigures his being, can no longer exist. We can no longer think that access to the truth will complete in the subject, like a crowning or a reward, the work or the sacrifice, the price paid to arrive at it. Knowledge will simply open out onto the indefinite dimension of progress, the end of which is unknown and the advantage of which will only ever be realized in the course of history by the institutional accumulation of bodies of knowledge, or the psychological or social benefits to be had from having discovered the truth after having taken such pains to do so.

It was against this bleaker vision of enlightened forms of knowledge that a romantic imperative to make art of life and life of art took shape. Music became a paradigmatic medium through which the dialectic between two absolute forms of subjectivity unfolded. And, I would

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argue, it was against the forms that constituted the poles of this dialectic that analysis developed as a practice of the self.
Chapter Three
Gottfried Weber and the Problem of Judgment

Ich weiss Was ich an meinem Mozart liebe.
—Gottfried Weber (1832)

The Doubled “I”

Few music analyses conclude with the rhetorical punch of Gottfried Weber’s 1831 essay on the opening bars of Mozart’s “Dissonance” Quartet (String Quartet No. 19 in C, K. 465). “As concerns my hearing, incidentally,” Weber writes, “I freely admit that with sounds such as these I am not able to feel comfortable. I can say this openly and in defiance of the foolish and envious, because I believe I am allowed to declare proudly, I know what I love in my Mozart.”¹ Weber’s closing declaration not only shocks the reader for whom the affirmation of Mozart’s genius is a foregone conclusion, but also, following some thirty pages of methodical observations on harmony, counterpoint, and phrase structure, gratifies the reader’s demand to know what Weber

actually thinks. In the end, his opinion bursts forth almost as if involuntarily. It is both a confession and a boast.²

Weber likely would have been proud had he known the historical reach of his musical ideas. In his music-theoretical magnum opus, the Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst (Essay on a Well-Ordered Theory of Musical Composition), he became the first musician to posit a grid of harmonic relations usually referred to as a Tonnetz—a concept that has continued to develop and spur theoretical inquiry into the twenty-first century.³ The Versuch was also largely responsible for popularizing the use in harmonic analysis of Roman numeral nomenclature, which remains a standard component of modern music pedagogy.⁴ His essay on the opening measures of the “Dissonance” Quartet, which stood as the culminating demonstration of his music theory’s explanatory scope in the third edition of the Versuch, has been called “probably the most closely raked-over passage of analysis in the historical literature.”⁵ In an 1825 essay in his


journal Cäcilia, Weber was the first to question the authenticity of Mozart’s Requiem. His conclusions were largely wrong, but it was a watershed moment in the history of musicology; some of the aesthetic questions he raised continue to yield publications in the twenty-first century.

Connections between Weber’s work—particularly the essay on K. 465—and later developments in music history and theory often provide implicit justification for rereading his work. Kevin Korsyn, for example, sees the use of Roman numeral harmonic analysis in the service of phenomenology in Weber’s essay on K. 465, calling it an “uncanny precedent” to the work David Lewin more than a century and a half later. Janna Saslaw and Vasili Byros find a cognitive science of music prefigured in Weber’s approach. And Jairo Moreno recognizes in Weber’s work an articulation of the “listening subject”—the modern listener who reaches the

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limits of representation in his attempt to understand what he hears as he hears it. In short, twentieth- and twenty-first-century readers have seen in Weber’s work reflections of later attitudes and behaviors avant le lettre. The exception that proves the rule comes from Ludwig Holtmeier. The theoretical continuities between Weber and present-day music theory and analysis, Holtmeier thinks, are not illusory. On the contrary, they are all too real: Weber’s work initiates a decline in the discourse of music theory that becomes divorced from practical music-making. In his view, Weber becomes the very model for today’s professional music theorist.

Yet neither Holtmeier’s perspective nor those of more sympathetic readers reveal much (if anything) about Weber’s reasons for developing his analytic practices or, in what may be a reworking of the same question, why his work took such a recognizably modern form. This interrogative blind spot itself has to do with the attempt to exclude subjectivity from music theoretical knowledge. Because Weber’s analysis explicitly undertakes this same exclusion, it is distinctly and recognizably modern. But the ending of the essay on K. 465 returns to the self just


12 Holtmeier contends that Weber “transferred a scholarly concept familiar to him from (legal) studies to music theory” [Weber überträgt einen Wissenschaftsbegriff auf die Musiktheorie, der ihm aus seinem (Jura-)Studium vertraut war]. This chapter develops Holtmeier’s insight while also arguing that the relationship was more dialectical than his formulation suggests. Ludwig Holtmeier, “Weber, Gottfried,” in Die Musik in Geschichte Und Gegenwart, vol. 17, Personteil (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2007), 574–77.
as explicitly by drawing attention to it. This gesture could hardly meet the standards of professional music theory scholarship today. It hangs in the air, almost as a provocation: “I know what I love in my Mozart.” With this utterance, Weber reasserts his own perspective as a listener who, “with sounds like these [is] not able to feel comfortable.” His discomfort resists assimilation into the theoretical order he has just spent considerable effort establishing; a fortiori it refuses assimilation into the discipline of music theory as it has developed over the past two centuries. His words point to a historical specificity—Weber himself—operating within this seemingly “most immediate” of nineteenth-century analyses.13

Weber was not trying to conceal the point. “I know what I love in my Mozart” has rhetorical weight by dint of its position at the end of the essay, of course. But it was also printed in wide-spaced type (Sperrdruck, shown in Figure 3.1) that forces the reader to slow down just as the essay draws to a close. Lingering slightly on each word can reveal different dimensions of this moment of refusal. I know what I love in my Mozart. But what is the actual content of this knowledge? Can it be located in an analysis that points out what Weber does not like? I know what I love in my Mozart. What is the object of this love if it has no obvious musical correlate in the essay?14 I know what I love in my Mozart. Who, exactly, is Weber’s Mozart? Perhaps most pointedly: I know what I love in my Mozart. How do these two “I”s, the one that knows and the one that loves, relate to one another?

13 Ian Bent writes, “For sheer vividness, for immediacy of descriptive power, there is perhaps nothing in this volume to rival Weber’s account.” Presumably, any more “immediate” analysis would have been included in his anthology. Ian Bent, ed., Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century, Volume 1 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 157.

14 On “love” as a cipher for musical subjectivity, see Ch. 2.
Driven by this network of questions, this chapter seeks to explain the relationship between Weber as an individual—including his understanding of himself—and the particular shape and detail of his music theory and analysis. My argument proceeds in three parts. In part one, I posit that the doubled “I” lies at the origin of Weber’s influential theory and analysis, not in the philosophical sense it had for contemporaries such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, but rather in a practical sense tied to Weber’s biography. He practiced law as a profession; he practiced music in the limited free hours afforded by his career. Yet this clean division does not hold in Weber’s writing in either area. Part two delves into the specifics of Weber’s analytic practices. Returning to Weber’s analysis of Mozart’s K. 465, I read it against his work in law. Framed as a trial, Weber’s analysis exemplified the way music could resist the legal imperative to judge and the mental habits that doing so required. In part three, I argue that Weber’s engagement with Mozart’s Requiem illustrates another way in which legal and musical thought came into conflict with one another. Despite the fact that the Requiem had a profound effect on his own musical

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For an insightful philosophical reading of Weber’s thought from a Fichtean perspective, see Moreno, *Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects.*
development, Weber infamously sought to show that the work was not actually by Mozart. Ultimately, however, he could not avoid the feeling that certain passages bore traces of that composer’s incomparable genius. Consideration of these passages using Weber’s ideas, I argue, reveals what Weber really loved: “Weber’s Mozart” provided a medium for grappling with the irresolvable and ineradicable condition of doubt on the one hand, and the necessity and inevitability of judgment on the other.

That a Person May Have More than One Side

Looking back in 1831, Weber, fifty-two years old and well established as a jurist and as a music theorist, published a short autobiography in Eduard Scriba’s Lexikon of notable Hessian writers. Recalling his years as a young man in Mannheim, he wrote, “Next to Themis, the Muse of Music remained a constant co-ruler [over me], much to the vexation of many a dimwit, who fails to grasp that a person can have more than one side when even the thinnest piece of paper has two.” The low estimation of his contemporaries notwithstanding, Weber was hardly the only musician in Mannheim whose professional demands lay elsewhere. He played in a string

16 “Jurist” here refers to Weber’s multifaceted legal career, which included serving in various capacities as a lawyer, judge, adviser, and, to a lesser extent, scholar. Heinrich Eduard Scriba, ed., Biographisch-literarisches Lexikon der Schriftsteller des Grossherzogthums Hessen im ersten Viertel des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (Darmstadt: K. W. Leske, 1831), 416–23. This autobiography was apparently not authorized by Weber, who points out its erroneous ascription of writings in the “Short Biography” at the end of the Versuch, vol. 4 (1832, 205). That there are several passages in the latter that match the Lexikon verbatim, however, suggests that Weber was the author and that errors were introduced by Scriba in the editorial process.

17 Ibid., 416. “Auch hier blieb, neben der Themis, die Muse der Tonkunst ständige Mitherrscherin, freilich zum großen Verdruss manchen Schwachkopfes, der nicht begreift, daß ein Mensch mehr als seine Seite haben könne, indeß doch das dünnste Stückchen Papier deren zwei hat.”
quartet, for example, with two other jurists and one professional musician. But Weber evidently saw himself differently. Music was not a diversion from, or entertainment for a self defined by profession; it, too, defined him. If music and law were each a part of Weber’s identity, though, they were also apart from him. He characterized both practices not as driven from within—i.e., as the expression of an autonomous subject—but compelled from without, as forms of political subjectivity. Themis and the Muse personified these forms. Each was a “sovereign” (Herrscherin) who inscribed her demands on Weber’s existence like so much writing on a piece of paper.

According to Weber’s contemporary, the jurist Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach, Themis symbolized “the relationship ordered understanding has to the world—the source of legislation, of justice, and of peace.” Feuerbach’s Themis, oder Beiträge zur Gesetzgebung (Themis, or Essays on Legislation) was no meditation on the values of Antiquity, however; it was one of many German books, articles, and pamphlets that responded to legal questions raised by the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars. So strong was the sense that law needed to be rethought in Germany that the legal historian Carl von Savigny wrote in 1814 of “the vocation of our age for legislation and jurisprudence.” More specifically, though, Feuerbach’s treatise responded to the Code civil des Français (French Civil Code) published in 1804 and known after 1807 as the Code Napoléon. Charles Taylor has argued that the French Revolution constitutes the first historical

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19 Weber’s subjectivity to both music and the law in equal measure, as his comment indicates, was apparently rare.
20 Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach, Themis oder Beiträge zur Gesetzgebung (Landshut: Krüll, 1812), III.
moment in which “applying a code without moral boundaries is seriously contemplated.”

The Code Napoléon was the practical manifestation and enshrinement of that idea in law. It aimed to be a complete, exceptionless articulation of the rights and duties to which every French citizen, regardless of rank, wealth, or creed was subject. Napoleon’s military ambitions infamously exceeded France’s national boundaries; so, too, did the legal code bearing his name. When Feuerbach was tasked by King Maximilian Joseph with adapting the French law in Bavaria, the Code Napoléon determined what he could think and write. The Code exercised even more direct control over Weber. As an active lawyer in the court system of Baden, which had adopted the Code in 1809, he was subject to its statutes. The statement that Themis ruled Weber was almost literally true: the goddess’s image appears on the original frontispiece of the Code civil, shown in Figure 3.2.

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23 The Code Napoléon was not the first legal code, but it was the first to be put into effect in the modern era (the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht, for example, was completed in 1794 but never effectively implemented).

24 Technically, the woman carrying a sword in one hand and a scale in the other could also be the Roman goddess Justitia, or perhaps one of Themis’s daughters, Eunomia or Dike; these figures were frequently conflated in literature and iconography of the eighteenth century. Though there was a strong interest in Roman law in the early nineteenth century, Weber’s choice to refer to Themis reflects a widespread German fascination with all things Greek. Code civil des français: éd. originale et seule officielle (Paris: Imp. de la République, 1804), http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k1061517.
The Muse of Music, too, symbolized the demand for a set of behaviors, albeit not one directly precipitated by political revolution or official codification. Rather, music’s ascent to power was enabled by what T. C. W. Blanning has called the “Romantic Revolution.” This revolution’s authors were some of Weber’s favorites. For example, Goethe, whose legal

apprenticeship at the *Reichskammergericht* (Imperial Court of the Holy Empire) preceded Weber’s own training there by some thirty years, told the story of unrequited love in *The Passions of Young Werther*; Jean Paul’s *Siebenkäs* introduced the *Doppelgänger* in order that the novel’s titular protagonist could escape his unhappy station as a poor lawyer. These novels and their authors did not deal directly with music. But their themes were picked up by others who did. E. T. A. Hoffmann, for example, converted Werther’s desire into the infinite longing of musical Romanticism and found its object in the quite real music of Mozart and Beethoven. Such conversions were assisted by powerful myths about these same composers—most pertinently in Weber’s case, as we will see, the story of Mozart knowingly composing the music for his own funeral. To regard music with “complete love” (*voller Liebe*) as Hoffmann put it in his famous review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, or to feel the desire to do so, was to be ruled by the Muse of Music. The most direct imperative of musical subjectivity, as discussed in Chapter 2, was issued by the eponymous protagonist in Wilhelm Wackenroder’s short story, “The Remarkable Musical Life of the Composer Joseph Berglinger” (“Das merkwürdige musikalische Leben des Tonkünstlers Joseph Berglinger”). There, Berglinger famously admonished himself, “Your whole life must be a piece of music.”

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Weber’s two “sides” give specific historical contours to the thesis developed abstractly in the previous chapter: modern practices of music analysis and the theories that support or are derived from them respond to and evolve out of the condition of being doubly subjected. The aim of such practices, I argued, is not knowledge per se, but the exercise of freedom from the totalizing demands of the forms of subjectivity. Knowledge serves as a technique of (self-)control vis-à-vis the totalizing demand of Romantic musicality. To know what one loves is to open up the choice to respond to that love as a free, and thus ethical, agent. At the same time, musical subjectivity resists the increasingly bureaucratic forms of utility that tend to characterize post-Enlightenment concepts of knowledge. To adapt the thesis that analysis pits the demands of musical subjectivity against the demands of another, institutionalized, form of subjectivity is, in Weber’s case, to read his analytic practices as a staging of the demands of Law (Themis) against (the Muse of) Music, such that he develops a self not dominated by either. In order to do so, however, it will first be necessary to see how Weber came to be so subjected, for it is in the cumulative detail of history that the specific demands of subjective forms are established.

Jacob Gottfried Weber was born in 1779 in the town of Freinsheim, about 25 kilometers west of the Rhine River. Before moving to this provincial outpost, his father, Friedrich Ludwig Weber, had been a civil servant in Mannheim. His grandfather also served as an advisor—

29 What I call a “form of subjectivity” is roughly equivalent to a particular configuration of what Foucault called a “regime of truth”; a particular configuration of knowledge and power that disciplines the behavior of individuals. Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (Brighton, UK: Harvester Press, 1980); Michel Foucault, “The Political Function of the Intellectual,” *Radical Philosophy* 17 (1977): 12–14. I prefer “form of subjectivity” or “subjective form” because it retains the sense that being a subject has important phenomenological effects intimately tied to a sense of self. See Chapter 1.
and, after 1776, as deputy director (Vizedirektor) of—the court chamber in Mannheim.\textsuperscript{30} The members of Weber’s extended family were also civil servants, including an uncle and cousin in Vienna to whom he later paid an extended visit. If, as Peter Cahn suggests, the family profession “predetermined the outward course of Weber’s life,” Gottfried’s parents apparently considered a well-rounded, liberal education to be essential to that end.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, before the young boy could even imagine what life as a jurist might entail, he found himself in front of a piano under his mother’s tutelage. As he later recalled, “so abhorrent did I find [the study of music] at the time, that I cried bitterly every time the hour of the piano lesson came.”\textsuperscript{32}

When Weber moved to Mannheim in 1791, the reasons had nothing to do with the glorious musical history of the city, for the twelve-year old had already concluded that he “simply had no talent” for music.\textsuperscript{33} Instead he would begin preparing for a career in law. Mannheim offered better opportunities for a formal education than Freinsheim, and his grandfather, with whom he would live, could supplement classroom instruction with first-hand knowledge about the court. The looming threat of France’s armies furnished another reason to relocate; Mannheim at least offered the protection of the Rhine River. Though Weber never directly


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. The arts and sciences flourished under the patronage of Prince Elector Karl Theodor—particularly the orchestra under the direction of Johann Stamitz (1717–1757) and then Christian Cannabich (1731–1798). Karl Theodor became Elector and moved to Munich in 1778, taking Cannabich and members of the orchestra with him and drawing the era of Mannheim’s musical ascendancy to a close.
mentioned the French military aggression in his own writing, anxiety about it would have been justified; within a year of his move, French armies had taken the Left Bank, including the city of Mainz. Two years later, in 1794, Weber’s father was forced to abandon his home and possessions and flee to Mannheim himself. Ultimately, of course, the Rhine would fail to deter the French armies. Even more consequentially for Weber, it would not deter the political and legal reforms carried out under Napoleon.

Given his early aversion to music studies, perhaps no one was as surprised as Weber himself when, in Mannheim, “the sense for music came alive, as it had not in childhood.” The change of heart might be attributed to his very different experience of music rather than a fundamental change in Weber’s attitude. Whereas his previous musical experience had involved solitary practice at the piano, it was now a social affair. His grandfather often attended performances at the theater, where the works of Mozart reigned supreme. Indeed, Mozart himself had made his final visit to the Nationaltheater in Mannheim just one year before Weber’s arrival, where he assisted with a production of the Mannheim premiere of Le Nozze di Figaro (performed in German). The effect of this exposure on the young Weber must have been profound. When he published his Versuch 25 years later, many of his musical examples were drawn from Mozart’s dramatic works (Le Nozze di Figaro, Cosi fan tutte, Die Zauberflöte, Die Entführung aus dem Serail, and Don Giovanni). By contrast, he did not use a single excerpt from any piano work

35 Scriba, Biographisch-literarisches Lexikon der Schriftsteller des Grossherzogthums Hessen im ersten Viertel des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, 416.
by Mozart to illustrate his theoretical points. During his early years in Mannheim, Weber was also regularly exposed to chamber music in his grandfather’s home. Unlike the programs at the Nationaltheater, there is no record today of what music was played there. If Weber heard Mozart’s Six String Quartets dedicated to Haydn at this time—as is certainly possible—then his famous analysis of the introduction to K. 465 represents the culmination of forty years of discomfort with the piece’s introduction.

Weber became interested enough in music to take up the flute, but he seems not to have taken it very seriously. Though several biographical accounts repeat Arno Lemke’s claim that Weber studied with the virtuoso Valentin Appold during these years, this is incorrect. The mistake stems from an ambiguous sentence following the confession of childhood distaste for the piano, in which Weber writes, “Only later, in Mannheim, did lessons with the most splendid flutist Appold awaken my love for this instrument.” Lemke seems to have assumed that “later, in Mannheim,” referred to Weber’s first residency there, from 1791 to 1796. Yet Appold was born in May 1793, making him just over three years old when Weber left Mannheim to study law at the University of Heidelberg. Weber must therefore have studied with him following his return to Mannheim in 1802, after completing his law degree.

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37 Weber cites very few piano works at all. The only such pieces used in the first edition are short excerpts from Beethoven’s piano sonatas nos. 3, 7, and 13.


The correction is more significant than it might at first seem, for it means Weber’s “sides” came into alignment—he began to practice music and law at the same point in his life. While establishing himself as a lawyer, he added cello and organ to his musical studies. He also contributed to the musical life of Mannheim, founding a musical “Konservatorium” that was assimilated into another musical society called the Museum—itself succeeded in 1814 by the larger society Harmonie—and directing performances in church. He sang bass in a vocal quartet, and formed a string quartet.\footnote{Lemke, \textit{Jacob Gottfried Weber: Leben und Werk}, 26–33.} If Weber had not previously encountered Mozart’s K. 465, it is probable that he encountered it firsthand in this context; he held more esteem for Mozart than any other composer, and the “Haydn” Quartets were considered among the best in the genre. Whether or not he performed it, Weber was familiar with the Quartet by the time he published the first edition of the \textit{Versuch} (1817–1821), since both the Introduction (Adagio) and an excerpt from the second movement (Andante cantabile) appear as illustrations of several theoretical concepts.\footnote{Gottfried Weber, \textit{Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsezkunst zum Selbstunterricht mit Anmerkungen für Gelehrtere}, vol. 3 (Mainz: B. Schott, 1821), no page number (“Notenheft,” Examples 100, 230a, and 230b).} In Mannheim, Weber also began to compose more seriously, mainly setting texts by his favorite poets.

If Weber invested more time and energy in music after 1802 than ever before, he did not neglect his legal career—or, to put it the other way around, his legal career did not leave him ample time to do as he pleased. In 1804, “without my doing anything” (\textit{ohne mein Zuthun}) as he later put it, Weber was appointed to an official post as Fiskalprokurator.\footnote{Gottfried Weber, \textit{Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst}, 3rd ed., vol. 4 (Mainz: B. Schott’s Söhne, 1832), 201.} He held the position, in
which he prepared and argued financial cases in the courts in Mannheim, for the next twelve
years.\textsuperscript{43} The duration of his tenure suggests the kind of stability that might ideally have allowed
him to focus on music, but here we must remember the legal changes mentioned earlier. Weber
began to practice law in 1802, under the aegis of the Holy Roman Empire. The reigning laws
and legal practices were those he had studied as a student at the universities in Heidelberg and
Göttingen, and then as an apprentice at the \textit{Reichskammergericht} (Imperial Court) in Wetzlar. They
were as complex and heterogeneous as the Empire itself: natural law, pandect (Roman) law,
canon (church) law, state law, and feudal law reflected the diversity of political entities that
constituted the Empire, including, \textit{inter alia}, kingdoms, duchies, and imperial free cities, as well as
ecclesiastical territories and feudal estates whose lords’ demands sometimes had the status of de
facto law.\textsuperscript{44} There was no unified legal code and thus no inherent guarantee that the laws were
commensurate with one another. Infamously, cases could drag on for decades or even
centuries.\textsuperscript{45} In 1806, however—a thousand years after its formation but only four years after
Weber began his professional practice—the Holy Roman Empire, and ultimately its whole
convoluted legal system, came to an ignominious end at the hands of Napoleon.\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{43} For a description of the role of the Prokurator in the Holy Roman Empire, see Kenneth F. Ledford,
\textit{From General Estate to Special Interest: German Lawyers 1878–1933} (New York: Cambridge University
\textsuperscript{44} Lemke, \textit{Jacob Gottfried Weber: Leben und Werk}, 22n52.
\textsuperscript{46} Conventional scholarly wisdom has long held that the Holy Roman Empire ended “quietly,” but
recent scholarship has argued that this view is erroneous and is a product of nineteenth-century
Prussian historiography. See Wolfgang Burgdorf, “‘Once We Were Trojans!’: Contemporary
Reactions to the Dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation,” in \textit{The Holy Roman
(Boston: Brill, 2012), 51–76.
\end{flushleft}
To fill the political hole left by the dissolution of the Empire, Napoleon created the Confederation of the Rhine. The Confederation originally comprised seventeen German states consolidated from scores of smaller territories in a process called mediatization.\(^47\) In order to secure these territories’ loyalties—and, importantly, their revenue and conscripted troops—Napoleon elevated the titles and status of their leaders—Baden and Hesse, for example, became grand duchies.\(^48\) Consolidation of formerly independent territories tended to push some member states toward bureaucratic centralization, which in turn necessitated rethinking their legal systems, such as doing away with feudal privileges. They had a ready model in the Code Napoléon.

Napoleon certainly wanted the Confederation’s territories, including Baden and Hesse, to adopt the Code. And though he was not the sovereign of the Confederation, the heads of member states often capitulated to what they took for his desires, lest they themselves lose land or power through further mediatization.\(^49\) For both internal and external reasons, then, adopting the Code

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\(^{48}\) Michael Broers et al., The Napoleonic Empire and the New European Political Culture (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 145–47.

\(^{49}\) In a letter of 1802 Napoleon wrote, “Mon intention est que les villes hanséatiques adoptent le CN et qu’à compter dur premier janvier ces villes soient régies par le code, Dantzig de même. — faire les insinuations légères et non écrites auprès du roi de Bavière, du prince-primat, les grand-ducs de Bade et de Hesse-Darmstadt, pour que le code soit adopté dans leurs Etats en supprimant toutes les coutumes et en se bornant au seul code Napoléon.” Quoted in Paul-Ludwig Weinacht, “The Sovereign German States and the Code Napoleon: What Spoke for Its Adoption in the Rhine Confederation?,” European Journal of Law and Economics 14, no. 3 (2002): 208.
Napoléon, or some version of it, became an urgent question. The Grand Duchy of Baden, which included Mannheim (and thus Weber), formally did so in 1809.

Weber’s legal practice was directly affected by the adoption of the Code Napoléon in Baden. As a lawyer in the Mannheim court system, he had not only to serve the laws codified in the Code, but also to do so according to the terms it set forth. Unsurprisingly, Weber’s later legal publications focused almost entirely on procedure and often concretely illustrated the ways in which the laws dictated his own behavior. His monograph on the French system of “judicial discipline” and its influence on German practices in particular—with its copious citations of the Code Napoléon and subsequent codes such as the Code de procédure civil of 1806 and Code d’instruction criminelle of 1810—as well as numerous individually issued decrees, show the extent of Weber’s studious engagement with French law. His support, even after Napoleon’s defeat, for the French oral and public trial procedure reveals that his diligence was, or at least turned out to be, more than simply political expedience. His expertise in French law was well known when, just

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51 The Code Napoléon was translated into German with minor changes and interpolated commentary.


months after Napoleon’s defeat in 1814 and the dissolution of the French empire, Weber was appointed as a judge in Mainz in the territory of Hesse.\textsuperscript{54}

Of the 2,281 articles in the original \textit{Code Napoléon}, one in particular must have stood out and resonated with Weber as he moved into the next phase of his career, even in a post-Napoleonic era, for it mandated and constrained the very responsibility he was about to assume. Article 4 reads, “The judge who refuses to judge under the pretext of silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the law, shall be liable to prosecution as guilty of a refusal of justice.”\textsuperscript{55} The German version of the \textit{Code} adopted in Baden (the \textit{Badisches Landrecht}; 1809) specified what remained implicit in the French code: where the law provides no direct guidance, it stated, the judge should aim to recognize and act on the purpose of the law, reconcile that purpose with his own decision-making process, analogize from related cases, and draw on his knowledge of natural law. Then, as in the French code, he must render a verdict.\textsuperscript{56} Article 4 was a necessary part of the code’s aspiration to completeness, for it assured that even novel legal situations were covered if they could be brought to a trial. Subject to its mandate, the judge became the means

\begin{footnotes}
\item[56] \textit{Code Napoléon mit Zusäzen und Handelsgesetzen als Land-Recht für das Großherzogthum Baden} (Karlsruhe: C. F. Müller’schen, 1809), accessed July 10, 2017, \url{http://www.koeblergerhard.de/Fontes/BadischesLandrecht1810.htm}.
\end{footnotes}
by which the law continually completed itself. In other words, the order symbolized by Themis was balanced on the backs of the judiciary.

The new position as a judge in Mainz extended Themis’s rule over Weber, but the Muse of Music maintained her hold on him as well. Even with new professional commitments, Weber founded another society called the Musikalisches Museum (after the name of his earlier effort in Mannheim), and he continued to compose. From the perspective of the present study, however, Weber’s tenure in Mainz from 1814 to 1818 was a watershed. He published the first volume of the Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst in 1817. The second volume appeared the next year, as did his first book on trial procedure, the Nachlese über das öffentliche und mündliche Gerichtsverfahren, für und wider dasselbe (Afterthoughts on Public and Oral Trial Procedure, for and against).

In Weber’s writings, each of his sides encounters the other. A “well-ordered” theory recalls the symbolism of Themis, while the Nachlese considers the introduction of orality—which is also aurality, the realm of music—into the physical space where the law is carried out. The most obvious place where his legal and musical sides made contact, however, is the preface to the third volume of the Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst, published in 1821. Noting that three years had elapsed between the publication of the second and third volumes, Weber offered the following explanation:

Where the civil service, with its obligatory duties, claims the mental activity of the civil servant during the largest—and the best part—of his living hours, there moments of recovery and quiet come to him, perhaps, but not good hours for vigorous, scholarly investigation of art. If it is true that the creation of an artwork and so also a work about art, belongs only to the best and mentally most potent moments

of life—if the claim of our Goethe is true, that it is a fruitless, even foolish undertaking to want to create a work of art in one’s meagerly stinted leisure hours—then perhaps I need to apologize less for the late appearance of my work and much more for its disproportionate lagging behind what, under other circumstances less unfavorable to art, it perhaps could have been.58

Weber’s complaint places music and law into a zero-sum relation: energy and time given to one were taken from the other. Indeed, it is a bourgeois cliché to wish to be a musician but to be prevented from doing so by professional and financial responsibilities. But accepting this simple antagonism ignores the subtler internal dynamics of what Weber actually writes. In the first place, he does not write that he has no time for music, but rather that he does not have proper time for scholarly investigation (wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit). He then tellingly elides the difference between the two and appeals to Goethe’s authority. Only then does Weber offer his apology, which in fact addresses something rather different than the publication date of the Versuch: given the conflation of art and thought about art, “what could have been” could allude as much to the music Weber might have composed—but did not—as it does to the resulting theory. His legal side, in other words, had already shaped his musical side.

The Versuch did not begin as an attempt to impose order on what turned out to be the recalcitrant materials of music. In fact, Weber had not even intended to write a book of music theory. He wrote in his short autobiography that the Versuch began as a personal effort to rectify the deficiencies he perceived in his own compositions. With the aim of developing his skills, he turned with a “ravenous appetite” (Heißhunger) to readily available literature. After working through treatises such as Kirnberger’s Kunst der Reinen Satzes (Art of Strict Composition), Koch’s Anweisung zur Composition (Introduction to Composition), and Vogler’s Handbuch zur Harmonielehre (Handbook on Harmony), however, he was disappointed.59 “Rather than guidance” Weber wrote, “[I] found only the contradiction of all against all, and even each individual [writer] with himself.”60 Yet, the fact that the books offered contradictory rules should not really have posed a problem to his original goal. He could have treated such rules as heuristics and continued to trust his instincts as to whether his compositions were thereby improved. The problem of compatibility and the compulsion to develop a “more satisfying theory,” seems rather to have involved his legal instincts. To satisfy them, Weber carried out a virtual cross-examination of the written evidence concerning the state of composition.61 The “attempt” to bring order to what he found—as the title later promised—registered the same impulse exercised by contemporaries who sought to


61 Holtmeier observes that Weber carried a scholarly concept from legal studies over to music theory. Holtmeier, “Weber, Gottfried.”
develop legal codes and constitutions for their newly liberated territories. Put in the most
grandiose terms, Weber’s *Versuch*, like the *Code Napoléon*, would seek to sweep away the
contradictions and inefficiencies of the past.

The preface to the first book of Weber’s *Versuch* (1817) begins by denigrating the existing
music theory literature for its general unhelpfulness to aspiring composers, with the implication
that his own work would prove more helpful.\(^6^2\) It ends by acknowledging the incompleteness of
his work and promises to address it in the forthcoming volumes. When the third volume
appeared, its preface began with the complaint about time constraints quoted above. It ended
with Weber’s explanation of his willingness to attack the work of his theoretical predecessors and
with a quotation from Seneca’s *De vita beata* that speaks to the central claim of this dissertation,
that music analysis is transformed into a practice of the self: “Nothing needs to be more
emphasized than the warning that we should not, like sheep, follow the throng in front of us,
traveling, thus, the way that all go and not the way we ought to go.”\(^6^3\)

By the time Weber revised and reorganized the *Versuch* for a second edition in 1824, he
had recognized the dissonance between his intention, as originally stated, and the work he had
produced. When the original preface was reprinted in the second edition, Weber edited the text
and annotated it with extensive footnotes. The first note—more than five times the length of the

\(^{6^2}\) Weber found thoroughbass treatises—which he did not fully understand how to use—particularly
frustrating. For an assessment of Weber’s misunderstanding, see Holtmeier, “Feindliche Übernahme:
12–16.

\(^{6^3}\) “Nihil magis praestandum est, quam, ne pecorum ritu sequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes,
paragraphs to which it is appended—reaffirms that aspiring composers would do well to avoid books on how to compose. After maintaining that his book is exceptional in its thoroughness, however, Weber concedes that his theory, too, “is much more for those who, without possessing actual poetic talent, want to claim the understanding, judgement, and gain insight into the creative genius.”64 If he had begun to recognize what he was actually doing and the implications of this activity for his own changing relationship to music, he was not yet prepared to fully concede the point. One can almost read his resistance off the page, when he closes the footnote with a half-remembered exhortation affirming a Romantic principle. “Even though I am now simply called a theorist in the world,” he wrote, “no one is more immersed in the truth that our Jean Paul (I no longer know where, or with exactly which words) expressed approximately as follows but certainly much more beautifully: Dear people! Above all, just have stunningly abundant genius; the rest will sort itself out.”65 Genius here is another name for self-sufficiency, or subjective autonomy. The genius grows out of himself and takes care of himself while the contingencies of the world fall away. The Versuch’s subtitle, “for self-instruction” (zum Selbstunterricht), is not only a reference to Weber’s self-guided study of music theory. Its implicit, impossible promise is that the assiduous reader has before him the tools to care for his own musical education out of the spirit


of music itself. Finding that “the rest” had not “taken care of itself” by the time the third and final edition of the Versuch was published six years later, Weber removed it.

Whether or not Weber believed himself to possess the requisite genius for composition after undertaking theoretical studies, he had mostly stopped composing by the time the first edition of the Versuch was published. Yet Weber’s complaint that he had no time to focus on music is hard to believe in light of his immense productivity. To all appearances, as his civic duties multiplied—he held at least four official positions when he moved to Darmstadt later in 1818—so too did his output as a writer on music.66 His musical side had been transformed, but hardly overtaken. A steady stream of publications flowed from Weber’s pen in the 1820s. The Allgemeine Musiklehre appeared as a summary of his basic theoretical principles in 1822.67 The extensively revised and reorganized second edition of the Versuch was published in 1824, and the third edition followed in 1830–32.68 More indicative of the Muse’s continued rule over Weber, was his founding of Cäcilia in 1824. The first piece to appear in the journal, after a general introduction, was a “Prayer to Saint Cecilia,” which echoed the fictional composer Joseph Berglinger’s prayer to St. Cecilia in Wackenroder’s Herzengeissungen eines kunstliebenden

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66 By 1819, Weber was a court adviser (Hofgerichtsrat), Representative for the Attorney General (Vertreter der Generalstaatsamwels), Prosecutor for the Court of Cassation (Generaladvokat am Kassationsgericht) and State Prosecutor (Generalstaatsprokurator) in Darmstadt. Lemke, Jacob Gottfried Weber: Leben und Werk, 21.


The prayer, Saint Cecilia explicitly takes over role of the Greek Muse of Music. Under her Romantic gaze, Weber edited his journal and published more than 150 reviews and articles over the next fifteen years.

In light of his manifest productivity as a writer on music, Weber’s complaints about the insufficient time he could devote to serious musical study may be read somewhat differently. No amount of time and energy devoted to one “side” would satisfy its demands, for the “work” of being a subject cannot, after all, ever be completed. On the contrary, devoting more to the performance of one would have the effect of increasing the perception of pressure from the other. 

Looking back on Weber’s activities—which is of course precisely what he was doing when he made the comment in 1832 about his two sides—the shifting of his energies between the law and music becomes strikingly evident: from music lessons to legal studies as a boy, from preparatory legal studies to evening concerts and dabbling in performance as an adolescent, from the enthusiastic embrace of music to university training in law, from law school to Mannheim where “the urge to compose came ever more to life.” And then from composing to judging, and from judging to writing about music. As the rhythm of this oscillation accelerated, it converged on the

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problem of judgment as a shared conceptual space. Within this space, I would suggest, Weber’s identity as a music theorist developed, largely through the practice of analysis. It was this identity that wrote in 1832 that he had been ruled by Themis and the Muse—and, thus, in a certain sense no longer was.

It appears, then, that Weber’s double rule was a constituent condition of the emergence of his identity as a music theorist, which developed out of the struggle not to be ruled by the law on the one hand, and by a Romantic conception of music on the other. Everything depended on the matter of strategy. I argued in the previous chapter that to be subject to a sovereign is to behave in such a way that one perpetuates the system of sovereignty. To be a subject of the law is to confirm the rule of law. To be a subject of music is to act in such a way—e.g., as a performer, composer, or critic—that music’s power is sustained within the social world. Yet the practices of power are completely different in each case. If a subject adopts strategies from outside its particular system, the very possibility of domination is ceded in advance. For Weber’s legal side to dominate his practices, therefore, it would need to subordinate the musical side from within the repertoire of techniques and habits that constitute its own “regime of truth”: legislation according to natural or positive law, executive strategies, and judicial procedures. Conversely, if musical subjectivity were to have become dominant, it would have needed to overcome the law through its own immanent subjectivizing resources—primarily through the affective responses it

engendered in listeners. Put simply, Weber’s legal side sought to overrule music, and his musical side sought to overwhelm the law.

The general strategies the law would use against music and that music would use against the law are suggested in the Versuch from the start. “All this is grounded in the nature and developmental history of each art,” Weber wrote.\(^72\) This is a jurist’s claim, sitting squarely on the line between Weber’s contemporaries who believed in natural law as the basis for the implicitly universal legislation of social order, and those who supported a conception of legislation grounded in the historical study of existing laws and the people they governed.\(^73\) The essential point, however—whether music was understood according to universal, natural law or according to the circumstances of historical positive law—was that all music would submit to some technique of legal discourse.

What strategy might music have employed? If, as Montesquieu wrote in *The Spirit of the Laws*, “Law in general is human reason insofar as it governs all the peoples of the earth,”—that is, if law essentially coincided with rational (Enlightenment) thought—then what was left to music?\(^74\) Music did not, after all, appear to Weber to be irrational. One possibility, explored by Romantic writers critical of the Enlightenment, was to develop an essentially ironic relation to

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\(^73\) Carl Savigny founded the “historical school” of law, arguing that the study of law necessitated the study of the history of laws as they actually existed as the expression of a people. Savigny’s one-time student Anton Justus Thibaut, who wrote on music as well, continued to believe in the possibility of grounding legislation in the eternal principles of natural law. The latter was the implicit philosophy of any proponent of a universal legal code.

the world, in which any attempt to imagine totality was simultaneously undone by the very tools necessary for imagining it.\textsuperscript{75} Jairo Moreno has argued that Weber’s analytic practices in particular engendered a Romantic, ironic relation to the world.\textsuperscript{76} I shall return to Moreno’s interpretation of Weber; I mention it here only to point out a crucial difference between his interpretation and my own. While Moreno understands Weber’s analytic method ironically, as “analysis to the second power, a self-analysis of the activity of cognition—\textit{in short an exercise in self-doubling},” I am arguing, based on Weber’s own account, that he was \textit{already} doubled, and that his analytic method should be understood as a response to that condition.\textsuperscript{77} Thus, while we agree that analysis played a crucial role in Weber’s development of a unique sense of self in the world, we disagree in our respective diagnoses of why the self emerged as a \textit{problem} at this particular juncture in the history of music theory.

In Weber’s \textit{Versuch}, music’s resistance to the law began not with metaphysics, but with a truism inherited from eighteenth-century aesthetics: “Music is the art of expressing feelings in tones,” he wrote.\textsuperscript{78} This idea, so apparently basic, had the potential to undermine law’s status as the dominant model of subjectivity. Following Weber’s line of thinking, to challenge law’s

\textsuperscript{75} On irony’s tendency to fragment any totality, see, \textit{inter alia}, Daniel K. L. Chua, \textit{Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning} (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

\textsuperscript{76} Moreno, \textit{Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects}. Moreno’s interpretation relies especially on Fichte, Novalis (Friedrich Hardenberg), and Friedrich Schlegel; given the absence of any evidence that Weber himself was familiar with these thinkers, it would seem that Moreno’s interpretation makes Weber the avatar of a philosophical \textit{Zeitgeist}, instead of taking up the relationship between Weber’s thought and specific historical circumstances.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 148.

position vis-à-vis musical subjectivity, one needed only to find an example that broke any given rule and at the same time expressed or elicited an affective state valued by some listener. In fact, it was precisely because Weber found that all the prescriptive music theories he studied were forced at some point to admit exceptions (or, alternatively, censure works by beloved composers) that he ventured the claim that “harmonic truths in no way (as some believe, or pretend to believe) flow from a single independent superior principle as they do in a philosophic science, gathered together and, so to speak, hierarchically ordered in a table.”\footnote{“[W]eil die harmonischen Wahrheiten keineswegs, (wie Manche gemeint, oder zu meinen affektirt,) so wie in einer philosophischen Wissenschaft aus einem einzigen unabhängigen obern Princip fließend, einander sämmtlich und gleichsam tabellarisch untergeordnet.” \textit{Weber}, \textit{Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst zum Selbstunterricht, mit Anmerkungen für Gelehrtere}, 1: “Vorrede” [no page number].}

Weber’s parenthetical dig at other theorists was ironic, at least in retrospect, for it is as absolute as any of the theoretical precepts targeted. For this reason, it too remained a matter of faith; in 1832 he would refer to it as his “music-theoretical creed” (\textit{musikalisch theoretisches Bekenntnis}).\footnote{Gottfried Weber, “Über eine besonders merkwürdige Stelle in einem Mozart’schen Violinquartett aus C,” in \textit{Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst}, vol. 3 (Mainz: Schott, 1832), 202.}

A more fundamental problem remained. If, in the most general terms, rule by law means being subject to reason, and rule by music means being subject to feelings, then it is difficult to see how the two could actually ever be made to confront each another. One may reason about feelings or have feelings about a reasoned conclusion, but each case operates in a different register.\footnote{The failure of these two registers to meet one another on common conceptual ground is theorized in Carolyn Abbate, “Music: Drastic or Gnostic?,” \textit{Critical Inquiry} 30, no. 3 (2004): 505–36.}

The subjective forms are not merely concepts—they are carried out in practice, via bodies for which they have become habitual. As a lawyer and judge actually subject to the law, Weber carried out trials, adjudicated evidence, and issued verdicts. As a musician, he performed
and composed actual pieces. Acting from the legal bench on the one hand, and the piano bench on the other, Weber engaged with both music and law on a case-by-case basis. The theoretical questions that most interested him, therefore, were procedural. This becomes clear when the point about the contingency of harmonic truths, is followed by an explanation that “the parts are be reciprocally coordinated, each conditioning, constituting and engendering the other, while themselves being so conditioned, constituted and engendered.”

When Weber had completed the first edition of the Versuch, he wrote,

The present writing claims only the merit of examining those propositions derived from experience by means of more precise investigation, of augmenting their number through my own observations, and then assembling those that are similar or seem to belong together so that their connection is shown, according to the most comprehensible design possible; that is, not by taking the form of a strictly systematic justification and deduction, but only one presented in the most orderly possible fashion, as an attempt towards a well-ordered theory, so that I won’t use the title “system,” which sounds much too grand to me, and which may appear as a misleading sign.

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82 “[…] sondern zum bei weitem größten Theile einander wechselseitig koordinirt sind, die Eine, die Andere wechselseitig bedingend, begründend und erzeugend, durch dieselbe zugleich bedungen, begründet und erzeugt wird.” Weber, Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst zum Selbstunterricht, mit Anmerkungen für Gelehrtere, 1: “Vorrede” (no page number); Clearly Weber’s empiricism should not be construed in a modern physical-scientific sense; he rejects any link between acoustics and aesthetics as mere pedantry. Weber, Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst, 1832, 3–4:16.

83 Gottfried Weber, Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst, 3rd ed., vol. 1–2 (Mainz: B. Schott’s Söhne, 1830), XI–XII; “Die gegenwärtige Schrift macht nur allein auf das Verdienst Anspruch, jene Erfahrungssätze durch genauere Forschung zu sichten, durch eigene Beobachtungen zu vermehren, dann das Aehnliche und anscheinend Zusammengehörige zusammen zu stellen, in Verbindung zu setzen, und solchergestalt das Gegebene, nach einem möglichst verständigen Plane, also nicht in der Gestalt streng systematischer Begründung und Ableitung, sondern nur möglichst geordnet vorzutragen, als Versuch einer geordneten Theorie, vor welche ich ebendarum nicht den mir viel zu vornehm klingenden Titel System als trügendes Schild aushängen moge [sic].” Though I generally prefer to translate Versuch as “Essay” to convey its more widespread generic meaning, here “attempt” clarifies the sense in which Weber uses the term. It is relevant in this regard to note the similar valences of “essay,” from the French essayer, meaning “to try.”
Again, the language is that of a lawyer or judge. In settling into the examination of “propositions derived from experience by means of more precise investigation,” Weber found a way to set Themis’s rule against the Muse of Music. This was only the first step, but from the perspective of the history of analysis it was crucial. We can no longer “leave [Weber] the jurist behind in order to focus on the musician,” as Arno Lemke put it in his life-and-works monograph on Weber.  

At a minimum, doing so risks distorting or misunderstanding the nature of Weber’s musical thought. More central to the concerns of this dissertation is the point that to separate Weber’s sides in this way is to remove essential grounds for understanding why he developed new analytic practices in the first place. This, I have argued, grows out of the mutual struggle between musical and legal subjectivity.

Music against the Law: The Case of K. 465

Mozart’s String Quartet in C, K. 465 (Example 3.1), has a troubled history. Joseph Haydn, to whom the set of six quartets (including K. 465) was dedicated, is supposed, when asked about the introduction, to have said, “If Mozart wrote it that way, he surely had his reasons.”  

Of course, even then there were devotees, such as the Berlin critic who wrote shortly after the quartets’ publication in 1785, “It is quite unnecessary to recommend these quartets to the public.

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85 A thorough history of the quartet’s reception can be found in Julie Anne Vertrees, “Mozart’s String Quartet, K. 465: The History of a Controversy,” *Current Musicology* 17 (1974): 96–114. I have relied extensively on Vertrees’s work in the following paragraphs.

Suffice it to say they are the work of Herr Mozart.” But despite such public displays of deference to Mozart’s genius, unforgiving criticism of K. 465 was expressed behind the scenes: parts were reportedly returned to the publisher; an angry Hungarian nobleman, Count Grassolkowich, is supposed to have torn up the parts after realizing that the notes were not the mistakes of performers; the composer Giuseppe Sarti wrote a critique that was publicly suppressed until 1832. The quartet’s nickname, “Dissonance,” intimates the widespread and longstanding discomfort elicited by the introduction.

\[\text{Cited in John Irving, Mozart: The “Haydn” Quartets (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 74.}\]

\[\text{Vertrees, “Mozart’s String Quartet, K. 465: The History of a Controversy,” 96–97.}\]
Example 3.1, Mozart, “Dissonance” Quartet, K. 465, mm. 1–8

It was not until 1829, nearly four decades after Mozart’s untimely death, that the Adagio of K. 465 came under direct public attack. In the pages of the Revue musicale, the critic, theorist, historian, and professor at the Paris Conservatoire François-Joseph Fétis accused Mozart of “taking pleasure in tormenting a delicate ear.” Indeed, Fétis made his claims on behalf of the public he addressed, claiming to offer an explanation for what he assumed they already accepted—namely, that the passage is “bizarre,” and “the effect [of the first violin’s A] is

horrible.”90 The fault, according to Fétis, lay in the passage’s breaking of a simple contrapuntal rule explained in his own 1824 treatise, the *Traité de la contrepoint et de la fugue*. In the *Traité*, Fétis states that imitative counterpoint in which the first imitation enters a fifth above and the following entry enters a fourth higher (and thus an octave above the first voice) requires that the delay between the entries of the second and third voices be greater than the delay between the first and second (Fétis suggests “a measure or two”).91 By delaying the entrance of A♮ in the first violin by one more beat, as shown in Example 3.2, the music could be made to follow Fétis’s rule: E♭ in the second violin follows the viola’s A♭ by one beat, while A♮ in the first violin follows at a distance of two beats, thereby attenuating the effect of the cross-relation.

Example 3.2, Fétis’s “correction” of K. 465, mm. 1–3


91 François-Joseph Fétis, *Traité du contrepoint et de la fugue: contenant l’exposé analytique des règles de la composition musicale depuis jusqu’à huit parties réelles: ouvrage divisé en deux parties*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Lafont, 1846), 75. The fundamental difference in outlook between Fétis and Weber is captured by the former’s choice of epigraph on the title page of his *Traité*, from Leibniz: “Musica est exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi” (Music is the arithmetic excitation of a mind that does not know it is counting).
Not everyone agreed with Fétis that the music needed to be corrected, of course. Louis Perne, Fétis’s colleague at the Conservatoire, called his corrections “presumptuous” and suggested that he was merely playing the role of the pedantic counterpoint instructor. Fétis countered that it was not as a professor that he critiqued the quartet, but as a listener, and reiterated his belief that for almost fifty years everyone had been offended by the passage without being able to explain why. Their exchange, which unfolded entirely in the *Revue musicale* under Fétis’s editorship, remained friendly. Soon, though, an anonymous German author writing under the nom de plume A. C. Leduc came to the defense of the passage in the *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung*. After drawing attention to Fétis’s critique and reviewing its claims, Leduc began his lengthy rebuttal by distinguishing between two questions. First, Leduc asks whether the transformation of $A_\flat$ to $A$ which is necessitated by Mozart’s placement of the voices is to be regarded as a flaw; and second, if it is indeed taken to be an error, whether that is on account of Fétis’s rule. On the first count, Leduc argues that the regular entry of the voices is preferable, even though strict imitation must be sacrificed. To the second, Leduc offers numerous examples showing that Fétis’s concerns about the harsh dissonances can be addressed in other ways, such as radically altering the bass part. Leduc argues that, given Mozart’s mastery as a composer, the so-called errors were intentional compositional decisions. Neither Fétis nor any other critic was in a position to declare the results right or wrong.

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94 Leduc, “Ueber den Aufsatz von Herrn Fétis,” 120.
The debate seems almost to have been custom-made for Weber, the music-theorist-jurist who was no stranger to finding himself stuck between the Germans and French. With Fétis in the role of prosecutor and Leduc as the defense for Mozart, the introduction to K. 465 was, at least in a manner of speaking, already on trial. For Weber, who had not only served as a public lawyer and judge, but who had also written extensively on public trial procedure, to see it as such was no déformation professionelle. All he had to do was accept the task for which he was professionally trained.

To a certain extent, Weber seems to have embraced the judicial conceit. The essay’s vocabulary implies a legal subtext: he refers to Fétis’s testimony (Zeugnisse) and to Leduc as Mozart’s defender (Vertheidiger), and he explicitly fashions the musical listener as a judge (Richter). But unsurprisingly, if strikingly, he refuses to carry the implication to its logical end. “I must entreat my readers in advance,” he writes, “not to expect any judgment on the theoretical admissibility or contrariness to the rules of the passage in question.” Two pages later, he repeats himself, “A verdict [Urtheilsspruch] … is not to be expected from me.” Whether music is appropriate to its “artistic

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aims,” he writes, “is, in the end, a question of correct feeling [Gefühl].”

Here, Weber’s Romantic conception of music collides openly with his legal side, and subtly reasserts itself in response. The phrase “in the end” (in letzter Instanz) also bears a juridical trace. The word Instanz also means a court; Weber uses it in his own legal writing when referring to the hierarchical court system, in which cases were taken up in erster Instanz (in the first court), before being considered in zweiter Instanz or Appelationsinstanz (in the second court or appellate court), and so on through further courts. The legal matter could only be settled without further appeal in letzter Instanz (Oberappelationsinstanz or Kassationsinstanz)—in the final or supreme court.  

Weber had been a judge in the court of zweiter Instanz in Mainz when he published his first analytic thoughts on K. 465. When he wrote his famous analysis, he was attorney general at the Kassationsinstanz in Darmstadt—its highest court.  

The framing of the controversy in terms of rules by which the passage should be judged—Leduc did not deny this, arguing instead that Mozart’s passage simply did not break them—seems to have triggered Weber’s anxieties about music and law. His anxiously repeated, typographically emphasized assertion that he will not judge, is supported by shrill echoes from the Versuch, such as “music is … not a system that offers us absolute proscriptive and prescriptive rules, the application of which in each case allows us to determine in every actual case [Fall], in ‘two-plus-two-is-four’ fashion, the worth or worthlessness, rightness or wrongness, allowance or

99 Ibid., 7–8.

100 These courts may be understood as very roughly analogous to the American system of district courts, appellate courts, and Supreme Court. Weber, Nachlese über das öffentliche und mündliche Gerichtsverfahren, für und wider dasselbe, 10, 24, 44; Weber, Pragmatische Geschichte der Verhandlungen der Landstände des Großherzogthums Hessen im Jahr 1827 über die proponirte neue Stadt- und Landgerichtsordnung und die damit in Verbindung stehenden weiteren Gesetze nach offiziellen Quellen dargestellt, 3, 4, 137.
prohibition of this or that conjunction or combination of tones.”

Weber points out that this is consistent with his theory and that he has examined the passage in question before. “If I, nevertheless, in response to a new especially weighty summons [Aufforderung], do now dedicate myself to some new consideration of this much-discussed composition,” he writes, it is “in order to use it as an example of the exercise in the analysis of modulatory passages, etc.” The idea that the analysis of this passage is an analysis like any other—even though, as the title would have it, it is “especially remarkable”—is important. It still serves to illustrate the explanatory scope of Weber’s theory, and to reconfirm Weber’s belief that there are no absolute rules governing music. “What I can offer,” he writes at the end of his introduction, “is the following: […] A complete analysis of the whole harmonic and melodic texture of the passage in question will allow us to recognize the causes, individually as well as together, and thus to account for what it is in these sounds that disturbs us so much, and strikes our sense of hearing as so undeniably harsh.”

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As promised, Weber addresses harmonic progression in the first, and longest, section of his essay, while the following five sections deal with various aspects of melodic texture. Table 3.1 summarizes the structure of the essay in the *Versuch*. The order, as we will see, is no accident. Only after the harmonic analysis is done can non-harmonic tones and cross-relations be determined, and the meaning of parallel progressions ascertained.

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Table 3.1, Outline of Weber’s analytic essay on Mozart’s K. 465 (version in the *Versuch*, 3rd ed.)

104 “Modulation” [Modulation] here is meant in the eighteenth-century sense; it concerns how series of harmonies establish key, rather than the modern meaning that describes changes between keys. For this latter sense—movement between keys—Weber uses the German term Ausweichung.
Weber’s actual analysis begins by introducing two key concepts from his theory. “Right from the very beginning of the piece and up to the second measure,” he writes, “an interesting series of ambiguities [Mehrdeutigkeiten] of key and harmonic progression—charming and very agreeable to the ear [dem Ohre]—is offered to the hearing [dem Gehöre].”105 For those readers familiar with his theory, nothing about Weber’s opening would have been surprising. The distinction between the ear [das Ohr] as an anatomical organ that can find sounds pleasing (or displeasing)—comparable in this respect perhaps to the tongue—is contrasted with hearing (das Gehör), setting up an opposition between any given combination of tones as an acoustic phenomenon and its meaning within the temporal progression of the musical events.106 The attempt to understand the latter leads directly to the most important concept in Weber’s theory: Mehrdeutigkeit.107 Translated literally, the word means “multiple-meaning-ness.” Weber’s first definition in the Versuch reads,


106 “Das Gehör” has been translated as “the ear” by most scholars (e.g., Bishop, Saslaw, Bent); I do not do so here because I wish to distinguish it from the anatomical ear [das Ohr]. As I will show, however, there are other compelling reasons to use the latter translation. Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 212n11.

“Mehrdeutigkeit is what we call the possibility that one thing can be explained in more than one way, or the quality of a thing such that it can count sometimes as this, sometimes as that.”

The kind of “thing” that Weber has in mind is the predicate of a tone or combination of tones derived from a dual framework of key [Tonart] and the seven fundamental harmonies, shown in Table 3.2. The task of das Gehör is to determine each tone in relation to one of the harmonies and thereby to the key. The challenge, as his description of the opening measure of K. 465 indicates, is that the meanings of events may be ambiguous or underdetermined. Rather than construe such underdetermination as a lack of meaning, however, Weber considers it a multiplicity of potential meanings (Mehrdeutigkeit). The understanding of such potential meanings must be worked out through a careful analysis of context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Triads</th>
<th>C</th>
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<tr>
<td>Major Triad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Triad</td>
<td>e</td>
<td>e.g., i/c, ii/B,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diminished Triad</td>
<td>e&quot;</td>
<td>e.g., vii°/D, ii/b,</td>
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| Seventh Chords          |                             |                 |
| Primary                 |                             |                 |
| Dominant 7 (major triad with a minor 7) | C7                          | e.g., V7/F, V7/f |
| Minor 7 (minor triad with minor 7) | c7                         | e.g., ii7/B, iv7/g |
| 7 with diminished 5 (diminished triad with minor 7) | c°7                        | e.g., vii°/D, ii7°/b, |
| Major 7 (major triad with major 7) | C7                         | e.g., I/V7/G, VI7/c |

Table 3.2, Weber’s fundamental harmonies with examples illustrating nomenclature


109 As Moreno points out, these background conditions are inherited from earlier theorists, but for Weber, entities like chords based on roots are simply “part of the way things are.” Ibid., 128–129.

There are in fact several types of *Mehrdeutigkeit* in Weber’s theory. To understand how they work, one may begin by considering a single note, such as the C that begins K. 465. Figure 3.3 illustrates all the possible ways in which a single C could be imagined to fit into a harmonic/tonal context according to Weber’s theory. With respect to the seven fundamental harmonies, C may represent a chord root, third, fifth, or seventh. This is the type of *Mehrdeutigkeit* shown in the second column of Figure 3.3, understood in terms of the note’s distance from an imagined bass. The third column illustrates another layer of *Mehrdeutigkeit*. If C were imagined to be a chord third, the harmony could then represent three possible triads (A♭, a, or a°) or four different seventh chords (A♭7, A7, A minor, or A half-diminished 7). Any other note added to C will limit the harmonies it might represent, but will still leave a number of possibilities. In the case of adding A♭, as happens in K. 465, the possible harmonies would include A♭, f, A♭7, A♭Maj7, f7, and °d7. Because this type of *Mehrdeutigkeit* is due to the absence of the note or notes that would determine the harmony precisely (were they present), Weber calls this *Mehrdeutigkeit* by omission.
Figure 3.3, Types of Mehrdeutigkeit in Weber’s music theory
Figure 3.3 (continued), Types of Mehrdeutigkeit in Weber’s music theory
Even if all the notes that determine a fundamental harmony are present, however, the harmony itself remains *mehrdeutig* with respect to its position within a key. The fourth column of Figure 3.3 shows all of the harmonies C could represent in terms of their dispositions in different keys. If, for example, the harmony represented by C is an A♭ triad, as happens on the downbeat of m. 2, it could represent I in A♭ major, IV in E♭ major, V in D♭ major, VI in C minor, or V in D♭ minor. Returning to the single sounding note C, we can see that, without further musical context, it has 83 possible determinate meanings, *assuming* that it participates in a harmonic context at all, which is not guaranteed by Weber’s theory. C could, after all, turn out to be a non-harmonic tone.

If C can represent any of 83 harmonies, or not, then it could have literally any meaning within the equal-tempered chromatic system Weber took for granted. Weber recognized this problem—effectively, a *reductio ad absurdum* of the fundamental concept in his theory implying that an unadorned C is a hopelessly confusing event for the hearing. Thus, he asks in the *Versuch*，“How and by what means, according to which laws, is the hearing moved to perceive this or that harmony as the tonic harmony?”111 According to the first “law” Weber posits, the hearing (das *Gehör*) assumes and accepts the simplest explanation.112 The opening C is assumed to be the root of a major or minor triad that represents the tonic of the key. Second, a “law of inertia” (Gesetz der


112 Ibid.
In practice, this means that a listener assumes the following event is conditioned by what came before.

In K. 465, the viola’s entry on A♭ offers evidence for, though not complete confirmation of, the provisional supposition of C minor. But the resulting dyad is still mehrdeutig by omission. Weber suggests that C–A♭ could represent an A♭-major or F-minor triad (seventh chords are ruled out by the principle of simplicity). Now, however, the two laws are at odds. The dyad has more determinative force than the isolated C. On the other hand, the inertia from the opening note and the assumption it engendered suggests that the key remains C minor. Weber presents each of these as legitimate possibilities. He writes, “The hearing must, from what will follow, await further information and confirmation regarding the still undetermined key.”114 Weber continues his analysis in a similar fashion. When the second violin enters with E♭, it confirms A♭ as a harmony, but the harmony remains mehrdeutig with respect to key; it could still be either VI in C minor or I in A♭.

A crucial aspect of Weber’s thought, as Moreno has argued in a different context, is the way that it structures experience temporally.115 Musical events flow unidirectionally in time, but the hearing must interpret what came before as well as what is present and what may be coming. Later events, for example, may retrospectively determine a note’s meaning (or meanings). If the C–A♭ dyad on beat 3 of m. 1, for example, is taken to represent a tonic harmony, the meaning of the opening C may be reinterpreted as a chord third. Similarly, when A♭ resolves down to G, it

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113 Ibid., 2:109–110.
115 Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 142–45.
raises the possibility that \( A_{\flat} \) had not been a harmonic tone at all, but rather a kind of
appoggiatura, seemingly confirming C minor as the most likely candidate for key. At least this
interpretation would be viable were it not for the unexpected entrance of \( A_{\sharp} \)—a note foreign to
every key so far entertained. The vertical sonority on beat 2 of m. 2 now consists of \(<C, G, E_{\flat},
A_{\sharp}>\), a minor seventh chord with a flat 5, which cannot possibly be understood in the hitherto
supposed keys. Because it still contains the C, this harmony too can be found in Figure 3.3, which
reveals that it has two possible dispositions: ¹ii7 in G minor or ¹vii7 in B₇ major.

After carrying out his analysis of the mutually determined harmonies and keys for the
remainder of the passage, Weber turns to the consideration of melodic phenomena including
non-harmonic tones (part 2), cross-relations (part 3), and notable parallel progressions between
voices (part 4). The harshness of the passage, he argues, results from discrepancies between these
melodic figurations and the underlying harmonic frame. But this means that they ultimately
depend on that harmonic frame for their meaning. Without the harmony as his point of
reference, Weber could not argue, for example, that the viola’s G in m. 2 is not a harmonic tone
at all, but rather a passing tone that leads to a D7 (V⁷ in G) on beat 3. Likewise, the relation
between \( A_{\flat} \) and \( A_{\sharp} \) (viola and violin I, respectively) in m. 2 is only a cross-relation because of the
harmonic context—Weber himself had already raised the possibility that \( A_{\flat} \) could initially be
heard as G♯. Similarly, the cross-relation between \( B_{\sharp} \) and \( B_{\flat} \) (violin II and violin I, respectively) in
m. 4 might have resolved in such a way that the latter turned out to have been a passing \( A_{\sharp} \) (a
possibility Weber also explicitly considers). In part 4 of his essay, Weber turns to parallel voices,
observing that the parallel seconds between violin II (D–C♯) and the cello (C–B) produce a poor
effect. Beyond this matter-of-fact comment, he remains theoretically silent because the parallel
results not from the harmonic structure but from the counterpoint he has not yet addressed.
Finally, in part 5, Weber summarizes the content of sections 1–4, relating each of the passage’s idiosyncratic dissonances—the unexpected A in m. 2 and B♭ in m. 4, the vertical sonority B-G-C♯-A on the downbeat of m. 3—to his underlying harmonic frame. To demonstrate that these moments are the cause of the perceived harshness, Weber offers six recomposed versions that avoid the pitch combinations he has pointed out. Considering the case thereby proven, Weber then returns to the theme with which he began: “All that technical theory can do, it has done,” he writes, before asking rhetorically whether this means that the bounds of acceptability have been overstepped. He reasserts once again that no one can give a categorical answer. In a flourish worthy of a courtroom lawyer’s closing argument, Weber concludes with another variation on the juridical metaphor:

In the last resort [letzter Instanz] only the musically trained ear [das musikalische gebildete Gehör allein] has to decide as a judge, and in this respect, the supreme judge has decided in its favor. I mean the ear of a Mozart, who dedicated this quartet, as the best of which he was capable, to his best friend and model Joseph Haydn as a token of his admiration.¹¹⁶

At this point, Weber’s original essay, as it appeared in Cäcilia, concludes. He apparently considered it an inadequate representation of his views, however, because in the following issue of Cäcilia he published a “continuation and conclusion” (Fortsetzung und Beschluss). Part of the likely reason for Weber’s need to supplement his analysis concerned his own bald appeal to authority—a strategy he had deemed hardly worthy of comment when Leduc employed it to defend Mozart.

Having examined the passage in detail, perhaps he felt it incumbent on him to do a better job explaining *why* Mozart composed the passage the way he did.

Example 3.3, The “intention” of Mozart’s K. 465 mm. 1–4, according to Weber\(^\text{117}\)

The added sixth section, under the curious heading, “Consideration of the rhetorical meaning of the passage” (*Betrachten der rhetorischen Bedeutung der Stelle*), focuses on Mozart’s intentions. The main point of this new section was to show that the objectionable sonorities in the passage resulted from Mozart’s intention to follow the pattern of imitation shown in Example 3.3. The parallel seconds, for example, clearly do result from the contrapuntal imitation. The upper voice’s entrance on A\(^\#\) rather than A\(_\flat\), Weber argues, results from the desire to avoid an ugly vertical sonority (C–F\(^\#\)–D–A\(_\flat\)) on beat 3. of m. 2 in favor of a clear dominant-7 harmony leading to G. But Weber also resorts to more ad hoc reasoning for some of the other elements in the passage: A\(_\#\) enters on beat 2 of m. 2 rather than beat 3 because Mozart wanted the semblance of regular entries; Mozart did not in fact care about the harsh sounds because he could have preserved the imitation by composing the passage as in Example 3.4 (which, as Bent

\(^{117}\) Ibid., 123.
observes, agrees note-for-note with Fétis’s recomposition in his response to Perne\(^{118}\); B\(_♭\) is introduced in m. 4 in the upper voice instead of B\(_♭\) because “the composer wished to repeat the whole process … a step lower in the key of B\(_♭\) minor.”\(^{119}\)

![Example 3.4, Weber’s sketch of how Mozart might have composed the opening of K. 465](image)

In the end, Weber might actually have agreed with Fétis that Mozart “took pleasure in torturing a delicate ear.” The difference lay in his unwillingness to declare that doing so was categorically wrong. Rather, as the heading of the section suggests, it was simply (ineffective) melodic rhetoric on top of a perfectly comprehensible harmonic framework. After reiterating once more that it was up to each individual listener to decide if Mozart had gone too far, Weber wrote the declaration with which this chapter began: “As far as my hearing, I freely admit that with sounds such as these I am not able to feel comfortable. I can say this openly and in defiance of the foolish and envious, because I believe I am authorized to declare proudly, I know what I love

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\(^{119}\) Ibid., 182.
in my Mozart.” It appears that Weber’s discernment of a compositional grammar, and its separation from a rhetorical overlay authorizes him to pronounce judgment.

Despite his earlier claims, Weber’s closing is a de facto judgment of the piece. True, it is not a ruling on whether or not the piece has categorically broken any rules of composition, but there is still a contradiction. He clearly implies that listeners who have not done the work of analysis (“the foolish”) are not authorized to declare their judgments of the piece. And yet, if Mozart is “the supreme judge,” should that not trump Weber’s own understanding of the passage? How can he be sure that he has not misunderstood?

When Weber revised his essay for inclusion in the third edition of the Versuch, he made two telling changes. First, he retitled the fifth section of the essay “Overview of the grammatical construction of the passage as a whole” (Uebersicht der grammaticalen Construction der Stelle im Ganzen), which makes an explicit contrast with the final section on rhetoric. It becomes apparent that the authority to judge rests on the ability to parse harmonic grammar from melodic rhetoric.120 Weber’s analytic practice allows one to say, for example, “On the downbeat of m. 2, an actually sounding A♭ triad serves as evidence that the music is in C minor,” or, “The A♮ in the first violin in m. 2 is part of a D7 harmony, which indicates an incipient modulation to G.” By contrast, A♮ entering on beat 2 instead of beat 3 is merely rhetoric intended to give the impression of regular entrance.

120 I owe this observation to Brian Hyer, who argues that Weber’s mode of analysis “disciplines” or even does violence to the music itself by sentencing it to life in a prison of Roman numerals. What my argument here suggests is something more specific: Weber’s specific role in a legal procedure that is only partly metaphorical. Brian Hyer, “Harsh Rhetoric. Broken Grammar” (unpublished manuscript).
Weber’s second change to the essay involves only one small word: he no longer calls Mozart “the supreme judge,” (der höchste Richter) but rather “a supreme judge” (ein höchtser Richter).\textsuperscript{121} In so doing, Weber implicitly elevates his own stature as a judge of the passage in question. He is now as qualified to offer his opinion as the composer himself. Given this change, it is notable that Weber does not at any point in the essay before the final paragraph, refer to himself (except negatively, e.g., “no one should expect a verdict from me”).

If Weber is not the listener in his analysis, though, who is? If he does not speak for himself, for whom does he speak, given that the role of listening is so central to his exposition? Attending to and representing musical experience in prose requires a subject, in the grammatical sense: there must be something that represents the locus of experience. This brings us to the second term in Weber’s thought over which scholars have spilled so much ink: das Gehör. In the passages discussed earlier, I have been translating das Gehör literally, as “hearing.” Most English translators of the analysis of K. 465 have used “the ear,” going back to John Bishop’s 1851 translation. As I have already pointed out, this tends to efface the distinction between the ear as a metonym for understanding sounds and the physical ear, but this distinction has not been missed by other scholars. Saslaw, for example, notes that “Weber generally uses the term, the ‘ear,’ das Gehör for the mind’s faculty of perceiving, remembering, and understanding musical phenomena.”\textsuperscript{122} The shorthand does make for effective rhetoric. As Ian Bent observes, the activity of das Gehör is responsible for the “sheer vividness,” of Weber’s analysis of K. 465, which


\textsuperscript{122} Saslaw, “Gottfried Weber and the Concept of `Mehrdeutigkeit,’” 193.
unfolds “almost like an old-fashioned serialized who-dun-it: [quoting Weber:] ‘in doubt, the ear [das Gehör] looks and listens eagerly for what will happen next,’” and so on. This sense of doubt observed by Bent—itself redolent with juridical overtones—is amplified in Jairo Moreno’s philosophical account of Weber’s thought, in which the activity of das Gehör gives rise to the modern “listening subject,” whose “encounter [with music] is decisively shaped by interpretive self-doubt and suspicion.”

But why does Weber use das Gehör? Why not Zuhörer, the German word for “listener,” instead? Part of the answer, as Holtmeier points out, has to do with music-theoretical precedent. Earlier theorists do use the word, but Saslaw was certainly correct in drawing attention to the frequency with which Weber employs it and the unprecedented role it plays in

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his representation of listening. The question might better be put this way: what convinced Weber to make *das Gehör* a central conceptual component in his musical thought? This is precisely where “the ear” as a translation leads the English reader astray. True, it is a rather inert translation that forces the reader to construe it as a metonym for cognition. “Hearing” does better capture the sense of ability or capacity for doing something somewhat better, but it is a felicitous translation in another sense: just as the English “hearing” can mean a legal inquisition, so too can *das Gehör*. For example, a 1931 article entitled “The Two-Sided Hearing [*beiderseitige Gehör*] in Civil Litigation” begins, “The principle that the judge must hear both parties is one of the foundations of justice. It is the essential principle of civil trials.”

During Weber’s lifetime, the use of *das Gehör* was relatively rare, but this is not because the meaning did not exist. Rather, “hearings” were not yet “foundational” for court procedure. Since the *Constitutio Criminalis Carolina* of 1532, legal procedure in the Holy Roman Empire had been conducted almost entirely through written documents—litigants’ arguments were read, not heard. In advocating for oral trial procedure (which is also *aural*, of course), Weber emphasized this meaning of *Gehör* and perhaps, in a small way, contributed to the modern conception of the term in in German law. “One may yet consider,” he wrote,

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126 Circumstantial evidence suggests that Weber’s work gave *das Gehör* a technical place within music-theoretical discourse. For example, the term does not appear in the first edition of Koch’s *Musikalisches Lexicon* from 1802, but does warrant an entry in the second edition from 1865. Heinrich Christoph Koch and Arrey von Dommer, *Musikalisches Lexicon, auf Grundlage des Lexicon’s von H. Ch. Koch* (Heidelberg: J. C. B. Mohr, 1802); Heinrich Christoph Koch and Arrey von Dommer, *Musikalisches Lexicon* (Heidelberg: J. C. B. Mohr, 1865); A. B. Marx, who also studied and practiced law, uses *das Gehör* in Weber’s more robust sense and indicates in several places that the term has currency among musicians. Adolf Bernhard Marx, *Die Musik des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts und ihre Pflege* (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1855), 218.

that in the whole lower court procedure there stands no word of this: that the judge should or may deny a hearing [Gehör versagen] to the claimant. On the contrary, after he hears it, and after he has legally reconciled the facts and the petition to the law, and if after that the result of his legal reflection on that, the claim (in the main, or side issues) is not juridically conclusive, he declares this result and the claimant should thereafter accept the decision.128

Music, too, like the claimant in a court of law, should not be denied a public hearing. Even if a particular passage offends the listener’s ear (das Ohr in Weber’s usage), as K. 465 clearly did his case, it ought to receive a fair hearing.

Bearing in mind das Gehör’s double meaning, Weber’s essay on K. 465 cannot be read as a transcription of purely musical experience. Instead, it reads like a juridical report.129 The debate over K. 465, beginning with Fétis and ending with Weber’s famous analysis, in fact, closely parallels the process Weber himself described in the Nachlese über das mündliche und öffentliche Gerichtsverfahren (Afterthoughts on Oral and Public Trial Procedure).130 In the Nachlese, Weber

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130 The unusual title, “Afterthoughts,” refers to the fact that the thrust of Weber’s argument was largely moot by the time he published the book. Between Weber’s writing and his decision to publish, the Grand Duke of Hesse (Ludwig I) had passed the Lower Court Ordinance for the Grand Duchy of Hesse (Untergerichtsordnung für das Großherzogthum Hessen), which “first introduce[d] public and oral trial procedure on independent German land on this side of the Rhine” (… zuerst die Öffentlichkeit und Mündlichkeit der Rechtsverhandlung auf unabhängig deutschen Boden dieses des Rheinstromes einführt). Weber, Nachlese über das öffentliche und mündliche Gerichtsverfahren, für und wider dasselbe (from the Forward, no page numbers).
claims that all oral trials have six essential parts. The first three constitute what he calls the
“material” part of the trial:

1) The claimant or plaintiff states his case,
2) submits evidence to the judge to verify his claims, and
3) expresses the specifically desired legal outcome.\(^{131}\)

In the case of K. 465, Fétis’s public charge in the *Revue musicale* that the music breaks the
rules and thereby assaults his ear constitutes part one. The passage itself, Fétis’s analysis of it
(based on the contrapuntal rules in his *Traité*), and Fétis’s submission of an “improved” version
can be understood as the evidence required by the second part. And the third part is realized by
Fétis’s implicit demand that his analysis, and by extension his music theory, be accepted as true.
All of this, summarized in the first few pages of Weber’s article, is the “exclusive business of the
litigants.”\(^{132}\)

The next three steps, by contrast, are the exclusive responsibility of the judge, who must
4) examine the evidence in order to determine the claims’ validity,
5) determine whether the desired legal outcome is commensurate with the claims and
evidence, and
6) pronounce a verdict.\(^{133}\)

As Weber makes clear in the first part of his essay on K. 465, he will *not* carry out the
sixth step. But this follows from steps (4) and (5). Pursuant to his own analysis of the “facts” of the

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131 Ibid., 6.
132 Ibid., 7.
133 Ibid., 6–7.
case—that is, Mozart’s music rather than others’ claims about it—Weber rejects Fétis’s claim as neither convincing nor coherent, and without that, the question of legal outcome is moot. In effect, Weber the jurist dismisses the case before it can come to a trial, and there is thus no need to issue a verdict on Fétis’s claim. If the whole point had been merely to refute Fétis, however, Weber would likely never have written the essay, for as we have seen, the two writers substantially agree both that the passage in question is musically offensive and on the ways in which it might have been improved. I would suggest that insofar as his response concerned Fétis at all, Weber was motivated not by musical taste, but by conceptual and procedural failures on Fétis’s part. First, Fétis conflated legislative and judicial function by asserting the rule to which the music would be subservient and then finding the music “guilty” of breaking that rule, all in order to justify his feelings about the piece. Second, Fétis’s rule addressed only the rhetorical aspect of the Introduction; in Weber’s view, Fétis remained ignorant of the underlying harmonic grammar and was therefore not even authorized to declare his own judgment.

But let us return to, and take seriously, Weber’s assertion that his essay is only an exercise in analysis, like any other, with the difference that this passage is remarkable in some way. What,

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134 Weber is curiously ambiguous about the role of the litigants in the trial process, going so far as to say in the Nachlese that “judicial reflection must be based solely on the material evidence presented by the litigants. … Their reasoning is thus in general not an essential part of the process” (7). Weber’s attitude is easy to understand in the case of Mozart’s defenders, such as Leduc, who essentially declares a priori that Mozart cannot have done anything wrong because he is Mozart. It obviates any need for analysis or critical engagement with the actual music. Fétis at least offers an argument. Ultimately, Weber accuses Fétis of misreading the passage according to his own rule—an example of the inconsistencies he decried in other music theorists. See Vertrees, “Mozart’s String Quartet, K. 465: The History of a Controversy,” 106–7.

135 The idea of a legal system based on the separation of powers, derived from Baron de Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, had acquired a renewed popularity among German jurists around the turn of the nineteenth century, when Weber was studying in Heidelberg. That Weber himself read the book and admired its author’s ideas is evident in the fact that The Spirit of the Laws furnished the epigraph for the Nachlese.
we might ask, is remarkable about it? Based on what we have seen so far, two answers suggest themselves. The first is the high degree of dissonance that Weber has explained in terms of a discrepancy between melodic rhetoric and harmonic grammar. The second, which takes more substantial space in the analysis, is the sheer density of *Mehrdeutigkeit*. Though Weber eventually resolves the whole passage, the first two measures contain no harmony that doesn’t introduce new questions for *das Gehör*.

Seizing on phrases such as “Still in doubt as to the key, *das Gehör* now waits to hear what will come next,” and “In this state of continuing tonal uncertainty,” Moreno suggests that *Mehrdeutigkeit*, “which cannot reign in the sensuous manifold of experience,” induces for *das Gehör* a “hermeneutics of suspicion,” which in turn generates the “anxious discourse” of modern music theory.136 To suggest that *Mehrdeutigkeit* as such is a source of suspicion and anxiety, however, ignores Weber’s explicit statements about it. While it is true that several statements in the analysis are not clear about the musical effect of *Mehrdeutigkeit*, numerous statements in the *Versuch* affirm it as a positive, anxiety-reducing musical feature. In the discussion on harmonic progressions in the first edition, for example, Weber writes, “I here need to remark, not for the first time, that the *Mehrdeutigkeiten* of harmonic progression are anything but *flaus* [Fehler] of harmonic progression. Rather, they are often the source of their own charms, richer harmonic versatility, and are an effective means of fusing and polishing harmonic successions which would otherwise be garish.”137 In the third volume, Weber dedicates an entire section to the “palliative” or


“mitigating” effect (*Lindernde Wirkung*) of *Mehrdeutigkeit*—in fact, this very section is excerpted and inserted into the *Cäcilia* version of the K. 465 analysis.¹³⁸

To the extent that Weber was “not able to feel comfortable” with the introduction to K. 465, even after living with it for at least twenty years and analyzing it from numerous perspectives, the problem may have been not an excess of *Mehrdeutigkeiten*, but rather the moments that were *not mehrdeutig enough*. It is the disjunctions between the A♭ triad to the A minor 7 with a diminished 5th in m. 2, for example, and the rapid, unprepared shift to B♭ minor in m. 4 that bother him. In these instances, there is nothing to smooth the transition—no intermediate harmony that might be considered first as one thing, then as another. Instead, as Weber put it, “with B still ringing in the ears [Ohren], the G-minor triad [i.e., B♭], on its own authority, with little reason, *assumes the right to contradict all of them.*”¹³⁹

Responding to this passage, Moreno writes,

> Weber’s *indictment* of deductive methodologies and of systems in general deserves closer scrutiny […] For instance, what *legal foundations* would sanction the invocation of “authority” and “law,” made in reference to the entrance of the B♭⁵ in m. 4 in the first violin? When Weber *levies charges against*, of all things, the note B♭⁵, he unwittingly reveals that this note might be breaking an order of things that, although abrogated from the analytical discourse, nonetheless subtends his interpretation.¹⁴⁰

Moreno’s rhetorical question contains its own answer: it is precisely the “legal foundations” of Weber’s thought that sanction the invocation of “authority” and “law.” And it is Weber’s legal side that suffers from *Mehrdeutigkeit*. If music were akin to a trial in a court of law,


¹³⁹ Ibid., 19. “… indess h noch im Ohre nachklingt, bloß auf ihre alleinige Autorität und überhaupt hier nur wenig motiviert, einführen, will gegen sie alle allein *Recht haben* …” My emphasis.

moments of epistemic rupture, in which an event unambiguously alters the frame of the reigning narrative, are moments that bring the trial closer to its mandated end. A contradiction offers a way toward the goal of determining a verdict. A proposition that cannot be entered into the narrative frame without refutation can be regarded as false testimony or evidence. In music, however, such moments cannot simply be discarded or ignored, however harsh or unpleasant they may sound. There is no sense in saying that the A in the first violin is “false.” Mehrdeutigkeit is the opposite: it marks moments of not knowing and arouses feelings that, at least in part, stem from the charms of not knowing—they are delays or detours, circuitous, surprising routes to the end at which the point, anyway, is not really to say “yes” or “no.” Multiplicity of meaning is precisely what is intolerable to the legal subject, for the way it drags out the proceedings and renders judgment logically difficult and morally fraught. As Weber’s contemporary, the jurist Anton Justus Thibaut wrote in his book On the Necessity of a General Civil Law in Germany (1814), the law must be “unambiguous [unzweydeutig] … according to the needs of subjects.”

Moreno is right that Weber was plagued by doubt, but it was his legal side that suffered from it most acutely. The epigraph for Weber’s Nachlese, from Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws reads, “In a time of ignorance, one has not doubts even when doing the greatest evils; in an enlightened age, one trembles more, even when doing the greatest goods.”142 Certainly there was doubt in music, but lives did not hang in the balance, and it offered a respite from the judicial imperative. The epigraph for volumes 3 and 4 of the third edition of the Versuch reads, “Error

141 Anton Justus Thibaut, Über die Notwendigkeit eines allgemeinen bürgerliches Rechts für Deutschland (Heidelberg: Mohr und Zimmer, 1814), 12–13.
142 Montesquieu, De l’esprit des loix, v; trans. in Montesquieu, Montesquieu, xlv.
never leaves us, yet a higher need always pulls the striving spirit gently up toward the truth.”

The doubt in the application of law makes one tremble the more one understands it because the stakes are high: after 1804, rightly or wrongly, one must judge. Music, on the other hand, relieves one of this burden, such that one can strive for the truth.

But what kind of truth is it? “[D]as Gehör,” Moreno concludes, “encapsulates a new subject, an ‘interpretive subject’ and its jurisdiction over knowledge constitutes a new modality of musical thought.” I believe this is historically correct, but to understand Weber and the reason he (and not someone else) developed a new approach to music theory and analysis, we need to acknowledge that “jurisdiction”—etymologically, “declaration of the law”—was, for him, no dead metaphor. “I believe I am authorized to declare proudly,” he proudly declared at the end of his article on K. 465, and analysis provided all the authorization he needed. But more importantly, no one has jurisdiction over music because music is not ruled by law. The “new subject,” rather, was one who used music to gain jurisdiction over himself.

The Law against Music: The Case of Mozart’s Requiem

In 1825, Weber published his most infamous essay, “Über die Echtheit des Mozartschen Requiem” (On the Authenticity of Mozart’s Requiem). Fully conscious of the cultural firestorm he was about to set off, Weber wrote in the opening paragraph:

143 Weber, Versuch einer geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst, 1832; “Irrthum verläßt uns nie; doch ziehet ein höher Bedürfniß / Immer den strebenden Geist leise zur Wahrheit hinan.” These lines are from Goethe’s poem “Vier Jahreszeiten.”

144 Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 17.
Above all the works by our glorious Mozart, hardly a one is so generally enjoyed with such idolizing adoration as his Requiem.

But this is actually very striking, almost to be called strange, when just this work, to put it bluntly, is his least perfect, his most defective and least complete—really hardly to be called a work of Mozart at all.

I have no doubt at all that saying this will attract general attention, because the fact—I know it well—is generally, as it were, forgotten.145

It is the task of his article, Weber says, to recall that fact and prove it to his readers. And yet, I would argue, just as Weber’s Versuch was for Selbstunterricht (self-guided study) before it became a public object, so too was Weber himself the first consideration in trying to determine the authenticity of the Requiem. Even more than the analysis of K. 465, this could be regarded as matter for legal investigation. As Weber’s opening points out, the incompleteness of the Requiem at Mozart’s death was a well-known, if conveniently forgotten fact. The question was this: how much of it could be considered authentically Mozart’s?

At the same time, this question was deeply bound with Weber’s musical side. What I have been calling musical subjectivity (and what Weber called “rule by the Muse of Music”) does not originate in a single musical work, of course. But that does not mean that Weber did not imagine it to be so. In an article titled “My thoughts on composing a Requiem,” published the same year in the previous issue of Cäcilia, Weber had written that composing his own Requiem Mass became one of his own “most cherished dreams” (Lieblingsträume). He claimed that as a boy he

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had been “[a]wakened by deeply moving, powerfully arresting and harrowing passages in Mozart’s Requiem,” and that “the inclination and preference for this material grew more powerful and more decisive with each passing year.”

Penetrated by the warmest love of the subject [i.e., the Requiem], Weber tried several times to compose his own Requiem setting. Finding his own efforts unworthy of the “highly poetic material,” however, he threw them out or destroyed them. If we assume that it was these compositional efforts to which Weber later alluded in his autobiography at the end of the Versuch, then it would be fair to say that the Mozart Requiem, more than any other work, led directly to Weber’s efforts to develop his “more satisfying theory.”

The Versuch amply testifies to the importance of Mass settings in Weber’s musical thought. Even more conspicuous than Weber’s preference for Mozart’s dramatic works over his instrumental pieces is the preponderance of sacred works cited in the Versuch. The vast majority of excerpts by Haydn, for example, come from Mass settings—Last Seven Words of Christ on the Cross and the Creation. Beethoven appears less frequently than either Mozart or Haydn, usually in short excerpts from the piano sonatas and symphonies, but it is perhaps noteworthy that here too, despite the composer’s comparatively small sacred output, Weber’s attention turns to Christ on the Mount of Olives. And among less famous composers, Mass settings dominate the Versuch. Weber cites examples from Vogler, Cherubini, Hummel, Schneider, Hasslinger, as well as the Requiem


147 Ibid.
setting he did eventually write himself.\textsuperscript{148} Mozart’s Requiem is cited only once in the \textit{Versuch}, in the context of remarks on stepwise harmonic progressions. Here, Weber cites mm. 4–5 of the “Sanctus” (see Example 3.7) as an exception to other theorists’ prohibitions on such movements, and rhetorically asks his reader, “[W]ho has ever heard that passage of the ‘Sanctus’ in Mozart’s Requiem … without being gripped by its majesty?\textsuperscript{149}” This passage, it would seem, was one of those Weber had found deeply moving as a boy and which had inspired his own efforts as a composer. As we will see, Weber returned to the “Sanctus” in his essay on the Mozart Requiem. As for the rest of the Requiem, it is entirely absent in the \textit{Versuch}, as if Weber had already known that it would require separate, extended consideration.

The question that came to vex Weber, and with which he began his article on the Requiem, was not whether the piece ought to be praised or censored, but whether it ought to be considered Mozart’s work at all. As if determined to root out the very source of Weber’s musical side, the full resources of legal reasoning are brought to bear on “the mystery, and even romantic darkness that shrouds the history of the work’s genesis.”\textsuperscript{150} Weber turns first to the accounts of the “honorable and completely credible writers” (\textit{ehrenwerthen und völlig glaubwürdigen Schriftstellern})


Friedrich Rochlitz and E. L. Gerber.\textsuperscript{151} Drawing from both, Weber recounts the well-known details of the Requiem’s composition: the mystery man who approaches Mozart on behalf of a wealthy patron to commission a Requiem Mass; Mozart receiving half the commission in advance; the interruption to travel to Prague to write \textit{La Clemenza di Tito}, Mozart’s return to work on the Requiem and the return of the unknown man.\textsuperscript{152} Weber then takes stock of the ways in which the two accounts diverge. Rochlitz writes that Mozart finished the work before his death, while Gerber writes that the orchestration was incomplete when the unknown man returns to retrieve it. In Gerber’s account, Mozart’s sketches subsequently fell into the hands Mozart’s student Süßmayer. Weber next turns to Süßmayer’s testimony. In a public letter published in the \textit{Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung} in 1800, Süßmayer claimed that Mozart had virtually completed at least the “Kyrie,” “Dies irae,” and “Domine Jesu”; by contrast, he claimed to have written “entirely new” music for the “Sanctus,” “Benedictus,” and “Agnus Dei.”\textsuperscript{153}

After reviewing the evidence from all three sources, Weber wrote, “Admittedly, we now have three rather divergent stories, whose discrepancies appear difficult to resolve.”\textsuperscript{154} Because both Rochlitz and Gerber disagree with Süßmayer’s claim to have completed substantial parts of the Requiem himself, Weber might have suggested— provisionally—that Süßmayer was not be telling the truth. Instead he observes that Süßmayer’s account has the weight of the publisher

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 205–6.

\textsuperscript{152} For an accurate musicological account of the known facts, see Christoph Wolff, \textit{Mozart’s Requiem: Historical and Analytical Studies, Documents, Score} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).


\textsuperscript{154} “Hier haben wir nun freilich drei ziemlich von einander abweichende Erzählungen, deren Verschiedenheit schwer aufzulösen scheint.” Ibid., 210.
Breitkopf und Härtel behind it; and since the publisher would obviously prefer that the work be as authentically Mozart’s as possible, they would only have supported Süssmayer’s claims if they believed them to be true.

“After all these considerations,” Weber concluded, “the authenticity of the work is, to say the very least, highly suspect, and the truth that the major part of it issues not from Mozart but rather from Süssmayer, most believable.” And yet, given his trust in Rochlitz and Gerber, Weber was not content to let the matter rest there. He continues,

*But it is still more believable, and unsuspicious, if even the contradiction itself, which stands against the reports of Gerber and Rochlitz, is removed; and this indeed approaches near certainty. The whole thing can be explained in a way, according to which the accounts of the aforementioned writers as well as that of Mr. Süssmayer can probably be true, and only appear to stand in contradiction; and if such an explanation is possible, one will for the same reason doubtless grant it the highest probability, because the information accords with all three of them.*

The reasoning here is the same as that discussed above with respect to musical *Mehrdeutigkeit*. Each fact need not be proven deductively; it was enough for Weber that the pieces of testimony and evidence are coordinated with one another such that there are no internal contradictions. Moreover, Weber’s invocation of “harmony” here suggests a swing back toward a musical point of view. How, then, does Weber reconcile the evidence? He begins by hypothesizing that Rochlitz was correct in claiming that Mozart finished the *Requiem* but for the last few details, but that the manuscript *had been* received by the unknown man. The few sketches

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155 “Sie wird aber noch glaubhafter, und unverdächtiger, wenn sich sogar der Widerspruch, in welchen sie gegen die Berichte Gerbers und Rochlitzens steht, beseitigen lässt; und dieses geht in der That gar wohl an. Die ganze Sache lässt sich auf eine Art erklären, nach welcher die Angaben der ebenganannten beiden Schriftsteller so wohl, als auch die des Hrn. Süssmayer, nebeneinander als wahr bestehen können, und als nur scheinbar in Widerspruch stehend erscheinen: und ist eine solche Erklärungsart möglich, so wird man derselben ebendarum ohne Zweifel die höchste Wahrscheinlichkeit zugestehen, weil sie mit der Angabe aller drei im Einklange steht.” Ibid., 211. Emphasis original.
that remained behind, he argued, then fell into the hands of Süssmayer, who then essentially composed his own version of the piece.

Despite its internal consistency, Weber’s explanation required remarkable credulity to accept. In the first place, one had to suppose that somewhere unknown, the “real,” complete Requiem still existed. To bolster his contention, Weber noted that Mozart worked on the Requiem for four weeks after his return from Prague; surely, he argued, the great composer would have produced more than the fragments Süssmayer had at his disposal. He adduced the lack of figures in the extant sketches as further evidence, suggesting that they were not even working scores. The full sketches, he reasoned, must also still exist, but like the completed score, had been lost to private hands. In his article, Weber implored the possessor of these sketches to come forward, arguing it is a public duty. Like a tonic resolution that never comes to determine the meaning of an actually existent harmony, though, this music never materialized. As Weber defended his view over the following year in response to questions and critiques, his speculations multiplied due to a lack of further tangible evidence.  

Without being able to see sketches or the final score he imagined must exist, Weber turned instead to an examination of what was available—namely, the version of the Requiem published by Breitkopf und Härtel in 1800. Having committed himself to the argument that this was an ersatz version of the work in question, his conclusions were unsurprising: “But in the end,” Weber wrote, “one also finds in the case of an unbiased consideration of the work [i.e., the

156 Weber’s responses to critics of his hypotheses became increasingly strained, even outlandish. For example, he argued that Mozart’s apparent borrowing of a theme from Handel in the “Kyrie” must have been nothing more than the scrap of a youthful exercise that turned up with the Requiem materials as Mozart went through his papers before dying. Gottfried Weber, “Weitere Nachrichten über die Echtheit des Mozartschen Requiem,” Cäcilia 4 (1826): 270–271.
Requiem] in itself, such as we possess from Süßmayer’s hands, clear evidence for the truth that many things therein cannot have come from our Mozart and rather issued from Süßmayer, as he himself says they did. So, for example, it would cause me pain to have to believe it was Mozart who wanted to burden the choral voices with gurgling like the following.”157 Here Weber is complaining about the fugal passage from the “Kyrie,” shown in Example 3.5. His complaint is indicative of his approach to evaluation of vocal music in general. For Weber, the composer’s first responsibility is to the comprehensibility of the text he is setting—a criterion of which the passage in the Kyrie runs horribly afoul. This was, however, only the grossest kind of error that suggested to Weber the Requiem was not authentic Mozart.

Example 3.5, Mozart Requiem, “Kyrie,” mm. 35–38

In “My thoughts on Composing a Requiem,” Weber had made his prioritization of the text explicit. Because the Requiem concerns the “highest, richest, sweetest interests of the human heart,” Weber wrote, “In the end, one must consider the text above all.”\textsuperscript{158} For this reason, Weber begins with brief summaries of the parts of the Requiem Mass, provided in Table 3.3.\textsuperscript{159} In general, he finds much of the Requiem text to be of “highly poetic-religious worth” (\textit{von hohem, religiöss-poetischem Werthe}), and he singles out the “Tuba mirum,” shown in Table 3.4, as a particularly “splendid image” (\textit{herrliche Bild}).\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{158} Weber, “Meine Ansichten über Composition des Requiem,” 103, 105 Weber describes the Requiem Mass as “die Ausführung dieser, die höchsten, theuersten und zartesten Interessen des menschlichen Herzens”; “Man erwäge zu dem Ende vor allem den Text.”

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 105.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 107.
1. “Requiem,”
a prayer, essentially with these contents: God! give to the dead eternal peace.

2. “Dies irae,”
a *consideration* of the *Day of Judgment*, with this content: A day will come that will transform the world to ashes. How terrible it will be! How will I stand there before the court? Spare me on that day, O Lord! Spare as well the other pious ones! etc.

3. “Domine,”
wieder ein *Gebet* für die Gestorbenen.
again a *prayer* for the dead.

4. “Sanctus,”
ein *Ausruf*: Heilig ist Gott! Hosanna Ihm! Gebenedeit sei, der da kommt im Namen des Herrn!
an *exclamation*: God is Holy! Hosanna to Him! Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord!

5. “Agnus Dei,”
ein *Gebet*: Lamm Gottes! gieb ihm (ihr, ihnen) ewigen Frieden, im Kreise deiner Auserwählten.
a *prayer*: Lamb of God! Give him (her, them) eternal peace in the circle of your chosen ones.

Table 3.3, Weber’s summaries of the sections of the Requiem Mass

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German Text</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tuba, mirum spargens sonum Per sepulchral regionum, Coget omnes ante thronum.</td>
<td>A trombone, spreading its powerful sound through the graves of the lands, will call all before the throne.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mors stupebit et natura, Cum resurget creatura, Judicanti responsura.</td>
<td>Death and nature will be astounded, when creation is risen, to stand and answer the judge’s address.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4, Text of the “Tuba mirum”

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161 Ibid., 105 Italics indicate Weber’s emphasis. I have added the underscore.

162 Ibid., 107 The German translation is provided by Weber. I have added the underscore.
The juridical bent of Weber’s attention is apparent in the texts he singles out for consideration. His description of the “Dies irae,” for instance, is considerably longer than his description of the other movements, and the text he singles out from it—the “Tuba mirum”—essentially describes a court summons elevated to a divine register. It is God—not Mozart nor Weber himself—who is the supreme judge.

Weber’s approval of these stanzas is thrown further into relief as he reveals his disapproval of other parts of the Requiem text. In the “Confutatis maledictus,” for example, Weber calls the penitent’s request that Christ not have suffered in vain (tantus labor non sit cassus) “disgraceful” (erbärmlich); he describes the supposition of special treatment after the damned have been consigned to the flames (Confutatis maledictus, Flammis acribus addictis—Voca me cum benedictus) as “egoistic” (egoistische); and he disparages the prayer to receive the dead (Tu suscipe pro animabus illis, quorum Hodie memoriam facimus) as merely “prosaic” (prosaische).163 We have already seen evidence—in his epigraphs, for example—of Weber’s abiding belief in the fallibility of human judgment and the doubt this entails. His separation of the “good” Requiem texts from the “bad” brings out the theological dimension of this belief: one ought neither presume to know God’s judgment nor to influence it by entreaties. Final judgment is His alone, and it cannot be known in advance.164

Returning to the musical settings with Weber’s interpretation of the texts in mind reveals his sense of music’s role: “Similarly, I would much prefer to grant the honor to Herr Süssmayer rather than our Mozart,” he wrote, “to have expressed in the ‘Tuba Mirum’—according to the

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163 Ibid., 107–8.

164 For a recent exegesis on this problem in relation to music, see Jeremy Begbie, Music, Modernity, and God: Essays in Listening (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
trombone solo—the terribly unearthly consideration of the Last Judgment of the living and the dead with melodies of the following type [see Example 3.6]:”¹⁶⁵

Example 3.6, Mozart, Requiem, “Tuba Mirum,” mm. 1–4

Why, exactly, Weber objects to this melody he does not say. He simply assumes the reader will share his view. But it is possible to imagine what das Gehör would find based on the method modeled in the K. 465 analysis. All features of this melody point unambiguously to the same conclusion. First, he would determine the harmonic frame—in this case, a straightforward movement from I to V⁷, and then V⁷ back to I. The square “2 + 2” harmonic rhythm (grammar) and the overlaid parallel melodic construction (rhetoric) are in complete agreement, pointing the hearing unambiguously toward B♭. It is, in a word, as unmehrdeutig as a passage could be. The passage thus utterly fails to convey the sense of uncertainty and anxiety engendered by the thought of being called to judgment before God.¹⁶⁶ In an instrumental work, it might have been simply boring; here, its utter predictability is the musical equivalent of egoistic presumption.


¹⁶⁶ One could, of course, argue that trombone melody represents the call itself, which should be clear. Weber elsewhere rejects this approach, disparaging composers—including Mozart—who compose a melody meant to imitate the call. Gottfried Weber, “Über Tonmalerei,” Cäcilia 3 (1825): 135.
Weber was similar dissatisfied with the ending of the “Tuba mirum,” where “excessively cloying sounds” and “the overly-sweet, mellifluous interlude of the first violin with the accompanying wind instruments and the mild and the calming closing and aftermath,” are a poor match to the “troubling thought: ‘What will I, the wretched, then say, / Where will I find an advocate, / When the just will barely get by?’”167

If Weber nearly succeeds to his satisfaction in showing that the Requiem is an ersatz work of genius, there nevertheless are passages he finds himself compelled to admit must issue from Mozart. And here, we return to the opening of the “Sanctus,” shown in SATB form in Example 3.7. Weber explains that, though the Requiem may be considered more Süßmayer’s than Mozart’s, some of the latter’s genius cannot fail to shine through—Süßmayer, after all, was
working from Mozart’s sketches. In particular, Weber draws attention to the unadorned C♮ in measure 6, which he calls, “unbelievably effective.” If we carry out an analysis on the model Weber provides in the K. 465 essay, it soon becomes apparent why this moment had such a powerful effect on Weber. C is preceded by a half cadence on A (in D major), but the C does not belong to the key of D major, or even A major. In fact, it seems not to indicate any key. This C may be as close as sounding music could come to the maximally mehrdeutig C in Figure 3.3—it could go almost anywhere. It has a context, but not one that can determine its meaning. This C participates in a mehrdeutig diminished 7 in the second half of measure 6 (Weber would interpret this as an altered dominant), before revealing itself as not harmonic at all (in the terms of Weber’s theory)—that is, as a dissonant 9 to B7, which gradually wends its way back to D through a series of harmonic feints. Taking Weber’s advice to “consider the text above all,” the word it sets is striking: Pleni. Full. Here, the mystery of God’s glory is concentrated in the plenitude of absolute Mehrdeutigkeit.

The irony, as we now know, is that Weber’s ascriptions were exactly backward. The “Tuba mirum” was entirely Mozart’s design—only the orchestration was left to Süßmayer—while the Sanctus was entirely Süßmayer’s composition. But now it is possible to say more precisely what Weber loved in his Mozart. Or, rather, we can see that the critical point involved not so much Mozart, but Weber’s musical subjectivity and the way in which his legal side failed to dominate it. In the end, Weber found no music exemplified better than Mozart’s the potential to resist control by the law. Works such as K. 465 and the Requiem illustrated that uncertainty

168 See Christoph Wolff, Mozart’s Requiem: Historical and Analytical Studies, Documents, Score (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Moreover, Wolff speculates with good reason that the solo C in the “Sanctus” was the result of a misunderstanding on Süßmayer’s part.
and doubt—enemies of the Themis’s legal imperative—could be sources of satisfaction and pleasure. More than any other, Mozart’s music demanded a hearing.
Chapter Four

A. B. Marx and the Politics of Sonata-Form Theory

*Die Künste haben mit der Politik ein gemeinsames Schicksal…*
—A. B. Marx (1824)

**Doubled History**

Adolf Bernhard Marx (1799–1866) appears in two types of histories. In one, he cuts an oversized figure as the nineteenth century’s most influential music theorist—the “founding father of *Formenlehre*,” the critical progenitor of the “Beethoven-Hegelian” tradition, and, above all, the first writer to offer a “codification of sonata form.” As Patrick Uribe writes, “Marx’s ideas are not only at the root of our sense of sonata form but also of our sense of the very value of formal analysis and the aims we wish it to accomplish.” In the other type of history, Marx is an ancillary figure. He is among the thousands of Jews who, in the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German cultures, were compelled to confront and negotiate their liminal and episodically evolving sociopolitical status. In these histories, Marx merits inclusion by dint of his successful academic career and takes his place alongside artistic and intellectual luminaries—and

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fellow Christian converts—such as Felix Mendelssohn and legal historian Eduard Gans whose own biographies are, in turn, part of the larger story of Jewish emancipation in Germany.³

A central claim in this chapter is that music-theoretical and German-Jewish history are dialectically entwined in Marx’s work. In one sense, this is obvious: it was Marx’s success as a writer on music that made him noteworthy in German-Jewish history. The inverse is less self-evident—namely, that Marx’s Jewishness was integral to the way he analyzed music and the theories that he developed. What I propose is that Marx’s theory of form emerged from the way he engaged with music, and that was conditioned by his sociopolitical status as Jewish-born. Stated in terms of the thesis that analysis is a practice of the self, Marx’s music analytic practices, which led to his theorization of form, pitted German-Jewish political subjectivity against Romantic aesthetic subjectivity.

The tension between Marx’s aesthetic and political subjectivity is evident already in the first essay he published, a posthumous evaluation of E. T. A. Hoffmann’s musical legacy.⁴ As Scott Burnham notes, the essay articulates Marx’s “need for a subjective and artistic mode of criticism,” which was “based largely on his personal identification with the dramatic coherence of the music of Beethoven.”⁵ But a sociopolitical problem, which by 1843 would congeal into the

³ The literature on German-Jewish history is enormous. Two examples that mention Marx are Monika Richarz, Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe: jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678–1848 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1974), 51, and Deborah Hertz, How Jews Became Germans: The History of Conversion and Assimilation in Berlin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 208.


semantically, politically, and historically overloaded “Jewish question,” soon surfaced in his essay as well. In a passage praising Hoffmann’s understanding of the relationship between poetic texts and music, Marx states that “things work as they do in physiognomy … Not even an opponent of Lavater would easily be taking Holbein’s Judas for a Christ’s head … In just the same way, no musician would simply set a love song in A-flat major or a funeral dirge in G or A major.” Marx’s reference here is twofold. He refers to the portrayal of Judas Iscariot in Hans Holbein the Younger’s The Last Supper, whose image, Susan Gubar writes, “brings to mind a disheveled and disabled misfit unwelcome at the feast, a desolate figure of grievance and grief.” At the same time, he refers to the use of this image, a line drawing reproduced in Figure 4.1, in Johann Kaspar Lavater’s Physiognomische Fragmente (1775).

Lavater, a poet and theologian who, among other activities, once publicly and unsuccessfully tried to persuade Moses Mendelssohn to convert to Christianity, sought to correlate human beings’ physical features with personality traits and aptitudes. While his aim had not been the stigmatization of ethnic or religious groups, the reception history of Physiognomische Fragmente attests to its potential to be read as an early instance of scientific racism. By 1797 the racialized reading of Holbein’s Judas had worked its way into an English translation:

Had we never been told that this is the portrait of Judas Iscariot, a primitive feeling would warn us at once to expect from it neither goodness, generosity,

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8 Johann Caspar Lavater, Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beförderung von Menschenkenntniss und Menschenliebe, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Weidmanns Erben und Reich, und Heinrich Steiner und Compagnie, 1775); the image appears on an unnumbered page between pages 78 and 79.
tenderness, or elevation of mind. The sordid Jew would excite our aversion, though we were able neither to compare him with any other, nor to give him a name.  

Figure 4.1, “Judas nach Holbein” from Lavater, *Physiognomische Fragmente*, vol. 1 (1775), Tab. III (no page number; follows p. 78)

Marx’s analogy depends on the racialized reception of Lavater’s ideas, which have taken on the appearance of common sense. The comment itself is carefully calibrated: one can disagree with the premise that there is a link between physical appearance and inner character, Marx claims, and still one would recognize Judas as Jewish. The stereotyped portrayal of Jewish physiognomy and associated characteristics, whether one accepted them as valid or not, was part of what one perceived. Marx’s comparison could thus appeal to readers who accepted those very

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stereotypes—without exactly endorsing them himself—in order to explain the extramusical associations of a technical, theoretical feature of music (keys). That Marx would employ such a comparison reveals both his expectations about his readers and his willingness to engage and perhaps even appease those who held anti-Jewish attitudes. Read slightly differently, it betrays Marx’s anxious relation to his own Jewish background and to the sociopolitical context that conditioned that relationship.10

Like other comments and observations in Marx’s writing that I will claim are interesting to consider through the lens of German-Jewish experience, the context of the Hoffmann essay is suggestive. It was commissioned by Julius Hitzig (born Isaac Elias Itzig), criminal counselor at the Prussian supreme court (Kammergericht), where Hoffmann had been a colleague. Like Marx, Hitzig was a convert from Judaism—a so-called “new Christian” (Neuchrist). Both men had studied law in Halle, and it is likely that both converted, at least in part, to be able to practice law in Prussia. Hitzig’s shared background with Marx may even explain why he sought out Marx soon after the latter arrived in Berlin, an event later recalled in Marx’s memoirs.11 Ostensibly, Hitzig wanted to offer help because Marx had fallen ill, but the prospect of a once-Jewish colleague may have been appealing as well. In any case, Marx’s comment about Lavater and Holbein may be read as a defensive gesture to counter in advance the perception that Hitzig’s tribute to Hoffmann was somehow a “Jewish project” bound up with the broader debate over Jewish assimilation and emancipation.

10 On Marx’s Hoffmann essay as a precursor of his later ideas, see Burnham, “Criticism, Faith, and the ‘Idee,’” 184.
This chapter’s argument unfolds in three parts. The first part draws on Marx’s Memoirs and essays in the Berliner allgemeine musikalische Zeitung in order to show that his interest in music was inextricably bound up with the problem of German-Jewish assimilation. I set specific important episodes in Marx’s life against the backdrop of the so-called Age of Emancipation (1781–1871) in which they unfolded; at each biographical turn, from his choice to study law to his move to Berlin to his first forays into music criticism, I illustrate how Marx alludes to the challenges engendered by his Jewish heritage and ties them to music. In the second part, I turn to Marx’s more theoretical analytically oriented writings in the 1830s and 1840s. I argue that, in light of the manifold interactions between his Jewish background and his musical career, his theory of form can be read as working through the conflicting demands of music and German-Jewish assimilation. Marx’s theoretical ideas functioned as a record of his analytic practices and thus as a demonstration of his assertion of self that merited a position in German culture. In their pedagogical form they were a blueprint for bringing about such changes more broadly. They were a means of achieving assimilation—not in the sense that a river flows into the sea (as his friend Eduard Gans put it), but rather as a way of making space for difference within a broader culture. Both point to the central idea that analysis of music, and specifically Marx’s analysis of Beethoven’s music, was a means of producing a self beholden neither to music itself nor to the demands of Jewish assimilation. The third and final section considers Marx’s engagement with Beethoven’s Symphony no. 9, a piece to which he repeatedly returned over the course of his career. Marx’s three essays on the Ninth reveal not only the structure of mutual resistance intrinsic to his analytic practices, but also the limits of his attempt to position himself beyond Romanticism and German-Jewish assimilation.
Becoming A. B. Marx

A. B. Marx’s memoirs, completed two years before his death in 1866, begin with a straightforward account of his birth. “I was born the son of a doctor on May 15, 1799 in Halle an der Saale,” he wrote, “and in fact in the bosom of the Israelite community.” Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Marx’s opening is the directness with which he claims his Jewish heritage. It had been almost fifty years since his conversion to Christianity. He had identified as Christian his entire adult life, and yet, at its end, Marx revisited his Jewish roots. It is not just that he felt obliged to report the facts of his birth. He went on to describe some of the specifically Jewish experiences that shaped his childhood, including visits to the synagogue with his father, Moses Marx, where he observed the gold brocade shrouds worn by congregants; where he listened to Hebrew and saw it recorded in the scrolls of the Torah, not comprehending the words but understanding it as the language of God himself; where he listened with rapt attention to the rabbi’s stories of piety. “One would be wrong to assume,” he remarked, “that religiosity was completely lacking.”

Marx’s transparency about his Jewish background led Jeffery Sposato to conclude that his conversion was based on genuine conviction. Because Marx chose to convert himself, Sposato

12 Adolf Bernhard Marx, Erinnerungen, vol. 1 (Berlin: O. Janke, 1865), 1; “Ich bin der Sohn eines Arztes, am 15. Mai 1799 in Halle an der Salle geboren, und zwar im Schooß der israelitischen Gemeinde.”

13 Ibid., 1:2; “… so wurde man doch irren, wollte man annehmen, daß dieselbe [die Religiosität] ganz gefehlt hätte.”

argues, he had nothing to hide.\textsuperscript{15} Marx’s own words resist such a reading, however. Marx \textit{did} distance himself in his memoirs from the religion and community into which he was born, albeit in subtle ways. He used “Israelite” rather than “Jewish,” for example, which avoided the negative associations the latter could evoke while also signaling the emancipated status of Jews.\textsuperscript{16} He claimed to have had an “eastern imagination” (\textit{morgenländische Phantasie}), which played into nineteenth-century German conceptions of Jews as Eastern others, promoted by writers such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte.\textsuperscript{17} Marx further distanced himself from Judaism by recalling his own disillusion as he came to recognize the hypocritical behavior of congregants, who focused more on their neighbors’ opinions than God’s judgment and surreptitiously broke the fasts ordained by their faith.\textsuperscript{18}

None of this should be taken as an argument that Marx’s conversion was inauthentic. Rather, such evidence points to the fact that Jewish conversion was more complex than an authentic/inauthentic binary allows. In the era known to historians as the Age of Emancipation (1781–1871), conversion was a cause of anxiety for Jews and Christians alike—albeit for different reasons. Some Christians were suspicious of the motives for conversion to Christianity. The most prejudiced among them imagined Jewish plots to seize political power from within the church. Even liberal Germans sympathetic to Jews had to acknowledge that in some cases conversion was

\textsuperscript{15} The obvious counterpoint here is Felix Mendelssohn, whose conversion was chosen for him by his father in 1816. According to one contemporary, Felix was extremely reluctant to recall his heritage. \textit{Ibid.}, 38.


\textsuperscript{17} Marx, \textit{Erinnerungen}, 1865, 1:2.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, 1:5.
simply undertaken to shed the legal, professional, and social disadvantages they faced. Read against such suspicions, Marx’s framing of his Jewish background might be read as a strategy honed over a lifetime of strategic rhetoric. As an opening gambit for his memoirs, it would serve as much to earn readers’ trust by giving the impression of transparency.

We ought not assign too much to Marx’s opening affirmation of his Jewish background. In fact, Marx immediately cast a subtle doubt on its significance. “Oddly, the community had some uncertainty involving the date,” Marx wrote. “It may be that May 15 was not my birthday but rather November 28, and 1795 the year of my birth.” He reported that the later date appeared in the records of the family’s synagogue, while the earlier one was inscribed by his father in the family Bible. Marx’s actual birthdate is less significant than the suggestion that, literally from birth, there were two Marxes. One, whose given name was Samuel Moses, was Jewish. The other, a Christian, would take the German name Adolf Bernhard when he was baptized some seventeen years later.

Marx’s broader strategy for addressing religion in his memoirs involved the appeal to reason that transcended Jewish and Christian contexts. Marx’s ambivalent presentation of his


21 There is a great deal of confusion in the scholarship on Marx regarding his birthdate. In general, nineteenth-century sources—including Françoise-Joseph Fétis’s *Biographie Universelle* (1839 and 1867) and Hugo Riemann’s *Musik-Lexicon* (2nd ed., 1884)—list the date as 1799. The fifth edition of Riemann’s *Lexicon* (1900) gives the date as 1795. Twentieth-century scholars have generally followed Riemann, though the first edition of *Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart* lists the date as “1795?” The *New Grove Encyclopedia*, now *Oxford Music Online*, gives the date as 1795 without further qualification.
birth was perhaps less important than the way he interpreted it. The fact that his father wrote his birthdate in the bible “amounts to nothing,” he wrote, for his father was resolutely secular. As Marx puts it, “He was basically neither Jew nor Christian but rather a true follower of Voltaire.” According to Marx, his father believed fervently that all organized religions, including Judaism, were founded on little more than superstitions. Trained as a doctor at the University of Halle—one of the earliest German universities to admit Jewish students—what mattered to Moses Marx was not faith, but knowledge and reason. His son Samuel, like many Jews in his generation and those that followed, came to see the cultivation of reason and knowledge (Bildung) as a social leveler. As he later wrote, “The basic principle of my father, with which he constantly reproached me—I must learn everything—remained, it seems, not without influence on me.”

In light of his father’s esteem for reason and open disdain for religion, Marx reports that he was perplexed by the fact that he “remained rigidly and unshakably attached to the Jewish community.” He explains that his father “took it as a point of honor not to secede from it, which at that time, even more than now [i.e., the time at which Marx wrote, ca. 1864], was

23 Ibid. “Er war im Grunde weder Jude noch Christ, sondern ein echter Anhänger Voltaire’s.”
24 Richarz, Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe, 47–51.
26 Marx, Erinnerungen, 1865, 1:10 “Der Grundsatz meines Vaters, den er mir unablässig vorhielt: ich müsse Alles lernen, blieb wie es scheint, nicht ohne Einfluß auf mich.”
27 Ibid., 1:1; “Mein Vater blieb bis an sein Lebensende starr und unverrückbar der jüdischen Gemeinde anhängig, ohne die mindeste Neigung zu der alten Kirche zu haben.”
oppressed and deprived of civil rights.”

Curiously, Marx pivots directly from his assessment of his father’s Judaism to the story of his own conversion. He apparently saw no honor himself in suffering under oppressive laws for the sake of a community to which he felt only a loose connection. Yet Marx makes no reference to such difficulties when he explains his decision to be baptized as a Christian. Nor does he claim to have experienced a specifically religious transformation. He had been studying the tenets of Christianity with Benjamin Adolph Marks—a normal course of preparation for conversion—but Marx admitted in his memoirs that it was not theological doctrine that led him to Christianity. Rather, he claimed, music was the catalyst that led him to conversion. Mozart’s Requiem and Handel’s Messiah prompted him to careful study of the Bible. Only then, under the sway of music and persuaded by the “poetic dignity and deep wisdom of the Book of Books,” did Marx resolve to convert.

Describing his youthful encounters with Mozart’s music, Marx wrote, “As for myself, I lived and breathed only in it. The graceful magic of its melodies—so manifold and yet so

Ibid., 1:7–8; “Gleichwohl hielt er es für einen Ehrenpunkt, von derselben, als der damals noch mehr als jetzt unterdrückten und im bürgerlichen Rechte verkürzten, nicht abzufallen.”

There exists a long line of non-religious, or “cultural Jews,” into which Marx’s father would seem to fall. Some scholars have challenged the idea that the religion, culture, and identity can be neatly separated. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, *The Myth of the Cultural Jew: Culture and Law in Jewish Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).


Marx, *Erinnerungen*, 1865, 1:9; “Nicht allein leugnen kann ich, daß was mich zum Christenthum geführt und immer mehr angezogen hatte, nicht sowohl die theologische Lehre war … als vielmehr … von Händels Messias angeregt, das lust- und eifervolle Studium der Bibel bewirkte, von der ich mein ganzes Leben lang nicht habe lassen können, so sehr nahm mich die dichterische Erhabenheit und tiefe Weisheit des Buchs der Bücher ein.”
intimate, so eventful and yet so gently flowing—rocked us into self-forgetfulness and carried us like the barely moving, gently rocking sea surface, into the land of dreams and dreamlike changing feelings.” Marx’s language is pure Romanticism, reminiscent of Wackenroder’s Berglinger or Hoffmann’s Kreisler. His positive assessment of “self-forgetting” entailed by musical experience indicates the giving over of oneself that was part of the perceived demand that music made on its listeners. Marx’s remarks resonate with Foucault’s suggestion that “love” (Eros) is one of the means by which a subject can be “remove[d] from his current state and condition.” Marx’s experience of Mozart’s music suggested a way out of Jewish confinement and into German culture—one that involved “self-forgetting,” followed by a process of Bildung. To claim music as a bridge to Christianity was a more believable story than a sudden change of faith, the ulterior motives of which would simply be assumed. It was even more believable in light of the flourishing career in music that Marx eventually developed. This does not mean that his love of music was mere pretext, of course—only that it is difficult, if not impossible, to fully extricate Marx’s relation to music from his sociopolitical status.

Marx’s comment about the limitations on Jewish rights indicates his awareness that conversion could open social and professional opportunities. This was hardly incidental, for Marx had determined that a career in music would be too financially risky to pursue. Instead, he opted to study law at the University of Halle. It is precisely this move that suggests music was at

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32 Ibid., 1:66; “Was mich betrifft, so lebte und athmete ich nur in ihm. Der holde Zauber seiner so mannigfaltig und doch so innig, so wechselvoll und doch so sanft dahin-fließenden Weisen, wiegte uns in süßes Selbstvergessen, trug uns wie die kaum bewegte Meeresfläche sanftschaukelnd in das Land der Träume und traumhaft wechselnder Gefühl.”

least in part a pretext for his conversion, for Jews were not allowed to practice law in Prussia—at least in a state-sponsored capacity—until 1848.\textsuperscript{34} Had Marx never heard Handel’s \textit{Messiah}, he still would have been compelled to convert in order to secure employment and advance his career.

Marx’s account of his conversion is typical in its layers of self-awareness and strategic deployment of language. As David Conway notes in his recent study, this performative aspect of everyday life was simply part of what it was to be Jewish in the Age of Emancipation. Preceded and prepared by the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn’s vision for a Jewish Enlightenment (\textit{Haskala}) in Berlin in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, the era is usually reckoned by historians to have begun officially in 1781 with the publication of Christoph Wilhelm von Dohm’s \textit{On the Civil Improvement of the Jews}.\textsuperscript{35} It drew to a close with the recognition of Jews’ legal equality as citizens of a newly unified Germany ninety years later, in 1871.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, Marx, whose whole life unfolded between the dates of the period, never knew a world in which Jews were truly equal. To be sure, the historical trend was toward emancipation, and Marx’s own life followed this trajectory. But legally speaking, emancipation proceeded in fits and starts. Marx and other

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Sorkin, \textit{The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1840}, 109.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Dohm was encouraged to write his book by Mendelssohn. Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, \textit{Ueber eine bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden} (Berlin: Friedrich Nicolai, 1781).
\item \textsuperscript{36} The literature on the complex phenomenon of Jewish emancipation in Germany is substantial. Katz provides a useful overview, while Hertz’s account provides a sense of Jewish personalities and first-hand experience. Jacob Katz, \textit{Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770–1870} (Syracuse University Press, 1973); Hertz, \textit{How Jews Became Germans}; Mosse and Sorkin offer influential accounts as well. George L. Mosse, \textit{German Jews beyond Judaism} (Bloomington and Cincinnati: Indiana University Press and Hebrew Union College Press, 1985); Sorkin, \textit{The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1840}.  
\end{itemize}
Jews of his generation experienced not unfettered freedom, but rather political uncertainty and social instability.

The Emancipation Edict of 1812, for example, granted Prussian Jews many freedoms but it effectively left in place the restrictions on Jewish legal practice. When the Congress of Vienna greatly expanded Prussian territory in 1815, the Edict was not extended into the newly acquired territories, which included the city of Naumburg, where Marx worked as a legal clerk following the completion of his studies at the University of Halle. In the 1820s—the so-called Restoration period—even key provisions of the 1812 Edict were rolled back; for example, in 1822, Jews were expressly excluded from any positions underwritten by the state. An increasing number of Jews would choose to convert under such uncertain circumstances.

Apart from legal questions, the push for emancipation complicated and challenged Jewish social life, particularly among those who actively sought political rights and wished to participate in German culture. Anti-Jewish sentiment had long been a feature of German public life, but as freedoms increasingly enticed Jews “out of the ghetto” it brought them into contact with Christians, eliciting new hostilities that focused on the imagined threats they posed. Opponents of emancipation held that Jews were fundamentally opposed to the German nation (or Volk) and would not support the state even if they were given the opportunity to do so. A particularly virulent pamphlet by the Heidelberg professor of philosophy Jakob Friedrich Fries from 1816, for example, indicates both the basic argument and the vitriol with which it could be expressed:

Jews can be subjects of our government, but as Jews they can never become citizens of our people, for as Jews they want to be a distinct people, and so they necessarily separate themselves from our German national community. Indeed, they form not

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only a people, but at the same time they form a state. The basic laws of Jewish religion are at the same time the basic laws of their state, their rabbis are at the same time their chiefs, to whom the people owe the highest reverence and the most blind obedience…

It is not against the Jews, our brothers, but against Jewishness, that we declare war. …Jewishness is a relic of an earlier, uncivilized age, which must not be merely limited, but wholly extirpated. To improve the civil condition of the Jews would be precisely to extirpate Jewry, to destroy the society of conniving second-hand street peddlers and tradesmen.

[...]

Here is the most important moment of this whole affair: that this caste should be extirpated root and branch, since of all societies and states, secret or public, it is plainly the most dangerous to the state.38

Today such passages cannot but call to mind twentieth-century atrocities committed against Jews, but as Jewish historians have cautioned, reading earlier periods through this lens risks distortion and outright misunderstanding.39 Fries’s aim was not the literal extermination of Jews as people, but rather of the features that marked them as Jewish.40 Similar arguments proliferated, leading to such publications as Bruno Bauer’s The Jewish Question, Karl Marx’s infamous response, “On the Jewish Question,” and—best known among musicologists—the anti-


Jewish writings of Richard Wagner. The offensiveness of Fries’s language makes it easy to ignore or miss the fact that even advocates of Jewish emancipation often sought a similar historical outcome. G. W. F. Hegel, for example, argued that Fries’s nationalistic argument “overlooked the fact that Jews are primarily human beings.” Hegel goes on to say, though, that granting rights will lead inexorably to Jews’ recognition of themselves not as Jews but as legal subjects and that “from this root, infinite and free from all other influences … the desired attitude of assimilation in terms of attitude and disposition arises.” In light of Hegel’s arguments that the Prussian state was both Protestant and the apogee of a world-historical dialectic, it becomes clear that he neither expected nor wanted Judaism to survive as a religion.

For Jews themselves the debates were not merely hypothetical or theoretical. They were actually subject to legal restrictions, prejudices, and negative stereotypes. Under such conditions, conversion could be preferable to fighting for recognition as Jews, particularly for those who, like Marx, did not strongly identify with Jewish culture. This very set of conditions, however, engendered anti-Jewish suspicion—most acutely in the case of conversion. Marx knew that his contemporaries would question the authenticity of his conversion. An oft-quoted remark by Carl Friedrich Zelter in an 1826 letter to Goethe that Marx “may have been baptized in saltwater” indicates that such suspicion was indeed at work in Marx’s case.

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42 Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 295n.

Thus the convert would have to perform the authenticity of his conversion. As Conway argues, a Jew who wanted to be accepted in German culture had “to perceive not only his/her ‘performance’ as a member of society, but also to absorb the perceptions of the audience of this performance, who experienced it knowing that it was being given by a Jew.”\textsuperscript{44} This cycle of mutual perception rendered the matter of conversion more complex than the choice between authentic or ersatz faith allowed, for it undermined the very condition on which the concept of authentic belief rested.

German-Jewish assimilation functioned as a subjective force that tended toward a state of domination. Constrained by the double bind of either being too Jewish or not Jewish enough, the convert was forever proving himself.\textsuperscript{45} The harder one tried to shed his Judaism, the more he remained Jewish; the paradoxical conclusion, as the historian Ezra Mendelsohn has pointed out, is that the attempt to escape Jewishness remained “a Jewish agenda, albeit a negative one.”\textsuperscript{46} It was precisely here that Marx’s invocation of music in its Romantic-subjective conception was crucial—infinte suspicion could be countered by infinite longing.

For a time in Marx’s life, music did not prevail. Following the completion of his legal studies at the University of Halle he briefly worked as a law clerk in the small town of Naumburg. It was not a happy experience. As he put it, “The geographic distance between Naumburg and

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{44} David Conway, \textit{Jewry in Music: Entry to the Profession from the Enlightenment to Richard Wagner} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 47–48.
\item \textsuperscript{45} For an account of conversion from a feminine perspective, see Hertz’s account of Rahel Varnhagen (née Levin). Hertz, \textit{How Jews Became Germans}.
\end{footnotes}
Halle was scant, five short miles, but the gap between the two places was to me far wider.”47 Part of the “gap” Marx perceived likely resulted from living in a social environment that, for the first time in his life, had no Jewish element. While Halle had long attracted Jewish students, Naumburg had explicitly denied Jews the rights of settlement following the Congress of Vienna.48 Though Marx does not directly state that he faced discrimination, his descriptions of his peers in legal practice indicate that he felt at odds with them. In a city that was home to “highly honorable” merchants, he found also “numerous throngs of public officials from the regional court, full of that stiff official pride that lodges itself so easily in Prussian civil servants.”49

In Naumburg, Marx felt overworked and consistently misunderstood. In one instance, he was asked to take over a bankruptcy case for an assessor who had been called away. Having done the work and eager to learn more, Marx requested to stay on the case when the assessor unexpectedly returned. The sneering response, he recalls, was “the bankruptcy trial must go back to the assessor, but you shall have work.”50 After another misunderstanding, for which Marx was publicly—and in his view, unjustly—reprimanded, his application for a judgeship in Halle was passed over. Marx lodged a complaint with a justice minister, and to prove his juridical mettle, he included a paper arguing against a recent treatise, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and

47 Marx, Erinnerungen, 1865, 1:121; “Die geographische Entfernung zwischen Naumburg und Halle ist gering, fünf kleine Meilen; aber der Abstand beider Orte war für mich wenigstens ein gar weiter.”


49 Marx, Erinnerungen, 1865, 1:122; “Ihnen stand die zahlreiche Beamtenschaar des Ober-Landesgerichts gegenüber, voll jenes steifen Beamtenstolzes, der sich in den preußischen Staatsdienern so leicht einnistet.”

50 Ibid., 1:141; “Der Präsident winkte mich in der Session heran und sagte: der Konkursprozeß muß an den Assessor zurückgegeben werden, aber Arbeit sollen Sie haben.”
Jurisprudence, by the preeminent legal historian Carl Savigny.\textsuperscript{51} The application seems to have been favorably read; Marx was offered a new position that he gladly accepted. After learning of another opening in Halle from his father, however, he reneged on his acceptance, souring his already fraught relationship with the president of the appeals court (Oberlandsgericht) in Naumburg. As he later wrote, “I appeared (or was represented) as one not satisfied in any position.”\textsuperscript{52} On learning that the president would decide the appointee for the position in Halle, Marx concluded that his best option was to reach higher and seek employment at the Supreme Court (Kammergericht) in Berlin.

Marx’s account of his experiences in Naumburg implies that he was treated differently than his peers. Whether Marx’s experience was due to anti-Jewish sentiment or to other factors such as his personality—or, as seems likely, both—he seems to have suspected the former. The complaint that he was represented or portrayed (dargestellt) as not satisfied with his lot, for example, is consistent with suspicion of Jewish motives and ambitions. Marx’s decision to write against Savigny’s thesis suggests a further Jewish subtext, for Savigny’s opposition to a unified legal code was a de facto anti-Jewish position. In fact, Savigny made this clear in an 1816 article that Marx, as an assiduous student, almost certainly knew, and which would later be incorporated into Of the Vocation of Our Age as an appendix:

Jews are and will be strangers to us [by virtue of] their inner nature, and only the most unfortunate confusion of political notions could mislead us into failing to recognize this: not to bear in mind, that even if this civic and political equalization

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 1:143; Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (Heidelberg: Mohr und Zimmer, 1814).

\textsuperscript{52} Marx, Erinnerungen, 1865, 1:144; “Ich erschien (oder war dargestellt) in dem Lichte eines nicht zufrieden zu Stellenden; und nun wurde die Entscheidung über meine Anstellung vom Ministerium absolut dem Präsidenten anheimgegeben.”
is intended kindly and philanthropically, it will … serve only to preserve the unfortunate national existence of the Jews and even extend it where possible.\(^5\)

As we will see, Savigny was prepared to act on his resentment of Jews. He was a leader in the effort to block the appointment of the unconverted Eduard Gans to the law faculty at the University of Berlin. The point here is that Marx’s essay—and his mention of it in his memoirs—may be interpreted as a response not only to his discrimination within the legal profession but also as a rebuttal of attitudes embodied by Savigny that would exclude him and other Jews entirely.

What, then, of music? Tellingly, Naumburg’s most disappointing characteristic for Marx was its lack of musical opportunities: there were no performances to speak of, Marx had no piano to play, and, he complained, “there were none to rent even if I had the money.” As a result, he wrote, “My life seemed to go to pot.”\(^5\) The single bright spot came in guise of an autodidact named Johann Gottlieb Schulz. According to Marx, Schultz had pulled himself out of the life of a poor farmer by teaching himself Latin and earning a scholarship. He also spoke Hebrew—much to Marx’s amazement, since Schulz was not Jewish—and castigated Marx for not knowing his own language. Perhaps remembering his early experiences at the synagogue, Marx recalled that “for my all-attentive ear, already the sound of the Hebrew words was music from his mouth.”\(^5\)

Schulz symbolized what Marx had given up in pursuing a legal career. “Here stood before me a


\(^5\) Ibid., 1:126; “Für mein überall hinlauschend Ohr war schon der hebräische Wortklang, in seinem Munde Musik.”

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real polymath,” he wrote, “like the one my father wanted to make out of me.” In another sense, Schulz embodied everything to which Marx still aspired: an assimilated Judeo-Christian hybrid, born of pure self-determination. Thus, Marx exalted, “Near him, exiled in Naumburg, I became a man. In Halle I was nothing but the effeminate offspring of an Israelite family—effeminate in body despite the fertile ground, spoiled in spirit because everything I desired came much too effortlessly.” Marx’s new self-assurance seems to have come at the cost of internalizing the anti-Jewish stereotype of Jews as weak and feminine.

Marx arrived in Berlin circa 1822 fifty thalers in debt, with only a few letters of introduction and unbounded optimism. He had come to the city of “der Alte Fritz” (Frederick the Great) and the capital of Prussia, which he considered “the state of intelligence, in which intellectual and spiritual life would find the freest development and most favorable encouragement.” Marx’s optimism may also have been fueled in part by the knowledge that Berlin was the center of Jewish Enlightenment and emancipation (spearheaded by Moses Mendelssohn), or through the secondhand knowledge of women such as Rahel Varnhagen (née Levin) and Henriette Herz, whose famous salons were models of German-Jewish sociability.

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56 Ibid., 1:125; “Hier stand ich nun einem wirklichen Polyhistor gegenüber, wie mein Vater aus mir hätte machen mögen.”

57 Ibid., 1:129; “In seiner Nähe, im Naumburger Exil, ward ich zum Manne, den in Halle war ich nichts gewesen, als der verweichlichte Sprößling einer israelitischen Familie, verweichlicht, trotz des Feuchtbodens, in körperlicher Beziehung, verzogen in geistiger, weil mir alles, was ich begehrte, mühelos zuviel.”

58 Ibid., 1:146; “Dann war aber auch dieses Berlin Preußens Hauptstadt, und Preußen galt mir, wie Allen, als die Schutzmacht, unter deren Führung Deutschland sich zusammenfinden sollte, als der ‘Staat der Intelligenz,’ in dem das geistige Leben freiste Entwicklung und günstigste Förderung finden müßte.”

Or, it may have simply been the musical opportunities he thought the city would offer. In any case, Berlin fueled his enthusiasm.Marveling at the Brandenburg gate and the moonlit buildings along Unter den Linden the night of his arrival, he mused, “Here, architecture had been active as absolutely free art!”\(^{60}\) That Marx remembered freedom in the architecture when writing his memoirs is notable. The buildings he passed on Unter den Linden included not only homes of wealthy Berlin Jews, but also the University of Berlin, shown in Figure 4.2, where Marx would later become the first professor of music.\(^{61}\)

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**Figure 4.2, The University of Berlin viewed from the south side of Unter den Linden, ca. 1830**

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\(^{60}\) Marx, *Erinnerungen*, 1865, 1:154; “[H]ier war ja die Architektur als absolut freie Kunst thätig gewesen!”

Marx sought employment at the Kammergericht, but he also pursued musical contacts in the city. In 1824, he was recruited to become the editor for a new music journal, the Berliner allgemeine musikalische Zeitung. Marx recalls the events leading to the founding and his editorship of the BamZ as almost accidental. An attempt to settle a dispute with a friend regarding the presence of parallel fifths in Gluck’s Armide led the pair to a book store where Marx consulted the score. Having located the parallel fifths (between the flute and the violin), the friends took leave of one another. Two hours later, the friend sought out Marx to excitedly announce that the owner of the shop, Adolf Schlesinger, wanted to found a new musical paper. Indeed, he had wanted to do so for some time but had not found the right man for the job.  

Schlesinger was convinced that Marx was his man. The curiousness of the decision, however, has often been overshadowed by how fortuitous it turned out to be. Marx, by his own admission, completely lacked the typical qualifications. Scott Burnham recast Marx’s inexperience as a strength, noting that it allowed him to “create a new ideal.” But what was that ideal? Marx himself offers no definitive explanation. The idea that his ability to detect parallel fifths convinced Schlesinger is weak—there were certainly other writers capable of that. One possibly pertinent factor in this “new ideal” in criticism cited by Burnham (which goes unmentioned by Marx) is that Schlesinger was also a convert from Judaism. Schlesinger may have recognized in Marx a musically savvy Neuchrist eager to make his mark in music, and with whom he could work closely on a journal that would appeal to both Jews and Christians alike.

62 Marx, Erinnerungen, 1865, 2:49–51.
63 Ibid., 2:52.
Marx, for his part, described Schlesinger in ways that suggest the older man’s Jewishness was on his mind. For example, he wrote that “Old Schlesinger was a curious man; he was, as very few are, a character from a single mold. In his case, one could not speak of a scholarly or artistic education [Bildung].” Yet, Marx continued, “he possessed a certain ability to divine, which in his case amply compensated for factually grounded judgment which told him that here with this thing or that man something could be done—and this in no way refers merely to the monetary advantage he gladly and eagerly earned, but also to the spiritual remuneration [geistige Gehalt] and results that could accrue to his highly valued firm.”

The fact that editor and publisher shared a Jewish background was noticed by no less a figure than Beethoven, who teased the publisher, “It seems you know how to choose your friends.” In light of their good working relationship—Schlesinger published several of Beethoven’s late works and Beethoven expressed admiration for Marx’s reviews in the BamZ—the comment seems not to have been intended maliciously, but it illustrates that Jewishness could occupy the imagination of the journal’s readers. Marx’s apparent eagerness to defend Schlesinger against Jewish stereotypes such as the lack of cultivation (Bildung) and a focus on

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65 Marx, Erinnerungen, 1865, 2:51–52 “Dieser alte Herr Schlesinger war ein eigenthümlicher Mann; er war, was die Wenigsten sind, ein Charakter aus Einem Gusse. Von wissenschaftlicher oder gar künstlerischer Bildung konnte bei ihm nicht die Rede sein.” Emphasis in original.

66 Marx, Erinnerungen, 1865, 1:51–52; “… er besaß eine gewisse Divination, die bei ihm das sachlich begründete Urtheil reich ersetzte und ihm sagte, daß hier mit dieser Sache oder diesem Manne etwas zu machen sei, — und dies bezog sich keineswegs, so gern und eifrig er erwarb, blos auf den Geldvorteil, sondern auch auf den geistigen Gehalt und auf die Folgen, welche für seine ihm hochtheure Firma daraus erwachsen konnten.”

67 Conway, Jewry in Music, 133.

money may have been spurred in part by reactions far less friendly than Beethoven’s. For example, an anonymous writer concluded an 1831 review of Marx’s book *The Art of Singing (Die Kunst des Gesangs)*, published by Schlesinger in 1826, by complaining about its price. The reviewer contends that Schlesinger priced books higher in order to sell them at a “discount” for a normal price, and concludes with a “call to everyone who has a feeling for injustice to help control such troublesome practices [Unwesen]. He [who does so] will be happy if he should contribute substantially to the utter destruction of such ___ish mischief through this public disclosure.”

Given the charges of deceit in business practices, the implied root of the redacted adjective was almost certainly “Jew”; at any rate, it could be read in such a way.

Whether or not such charges against the publisher were factually grounded, there is evidence that Schlesinger and Marx may have actually had the German-Jewish political condition in mind when founding the *BamZ*. Marx’s first essay, which began the first issue, was titled, “On the Demands of our Time on Music Criticism, Particularly in Relation to This Journal,” and it began with a telling idea: “The arts share a common fate with politics.”

Connecting the two domains, according to Marx, was a compulsion to judge without necessarily having established a foundation on which to do so. In both politics and art, judgments reflect a partial view that overlooks “general participation.” In light of Marx’s own past, it is difficult not

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69 “Kritischer Bericht über Gesanglehren,” *Eutonia* 6 (1831): 250; “Ref. ruft hiermit alle, welche ein Gefühl für Unrechtleidende haben, zur Hülfe auf, um solchem Unwesen zu steuern. Er wird sich freuen, wenn er zur gänzlichen Vertilgung dergleichen ___ischen Unfugs durch diese öffentliche Aufdeckung wesentlich beitragen sollte.”

to read this insight as an indictment of specifically Jewish exclusion.\(^{71}\) “Who would demand of a society that all members behave in exactly the same way?” he asks before claiming freedom of its contributors as the raison d’être of the *BamZ*.\(^{72}\) The problem raised by such an ecumenical view concerned the manner in which opinions were to be curated, and here Marx returns to the idea of *Bildung*. Recalling the emphasis placed on *Bildung* in Marx’s own memoirs, and the copious body of scholarship showing how the ideology that promoted it as the means of Jewish emancipation, one may read the *BamZ* as an attempt to put such an ideology into action.\(^{73}\) That the topic was music fit with Marx’s own interest, of course; music could be an effective vehicle for Jewish participation in German culture because it was not restricted in the way that other professions were.\(^{74}\)

The first review published in the *BamZ* also indicates a specifically Jewish perspective. Surprisingly, for a journal that explicitly aimed to edify its readership and elevate musical taste, the first review was not of a work by Beethoven or some other well-known composer. Rather, the anonymous reviewer—possibly Marx himself—examined Isaac Nathan’s musical setting of Lord Byron’s “Original Hebrew Melodies” in German translation.\(^{75}\) In a brief introduction, the

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71 On music criticism as a form of liberal politics, see Sanna Pederson, “Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism, 1800–1850” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1995).

72 Marx, “Ueber die Anforderungen unserer Zeit an musikalische Kritik; in besonderm Bezuge auf diese Zeitung,” 3; “Wer würde wohl an eine Gesellschaft die Forderung machen, dass alle Theilnehmenden sich auf eine durchgängig übereinstimmende Weise benähmen?”

73 For more on the ideologies informing Germany music criticism in the first half of the nineteenth century, see Pederson, “Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism, 1800–1850.”

74 Conway, *Jewry in Music*.

75 The review is unsigned; in the yearly index, he is listed only as “M.”
reviewer is circumspect about the provenance and age of the melodies, but claims that the songs are of “artistic interest.” “In order to more closely indicate this,” the writer continues,

To elaborate, I must go back to the people (Volks) in whose spirit the songs are versified and by whom they are allegedly sung. How short is the period of their greatness against the long series of centuries, in which they labored in bondage and contempt under foreign peoples! And how much more oppressive are these sufferings, because the spirit of segregation and contempt, indeed, hatred of everything foreign has been engrained into the Jewish character since the first formation of its people!76

The reviewer perfectly represented what Salo Baron dubbed the lachrymose view of Jewish history, adding that “we hear the enduring, the ostracized, oppressed [Jew], who cannot rise up to joy, without the feeling of his oppression and his losses bearing down on him doubly.”77 The reviewer emphasizes the implicit plea for mutual understanding, addressed to both Jews and Gentiles, by marveling at Byron’s ability to set aside his own personality and empathize with the Jewish plight. The review indicates not only an abstract idea of mutual understanding, but uses music specifically linked to the Jewish struggle for mutual recognition as a vehicle for doing so.

Taken together, Marx’s essay on the demands of music and the review of Nathan’s Hebrew Songs suggest that he did have in mind an audience attuned the struggles of Jews who wished to participate in German culture—musically, and by extension, politically—and one that would recognize the potential of music as a tool in the struggle for an equitable and just society.


77 Ibid., 6–7; “Wir hören hier den Dulder, den Verbannten, Gedrückten, der sich nicht zur Freude aufrichten kann, ohne dass das Gefühl seiner Unterdrückung, seiner Verluste zwiefach lastend ihn wieder beugt.”
The journal appealed to its readers to recognize music as a vehicle for Bildung, and thus as a tool with which to forge a more inclusive social order with room for Christians and Jews alike. In this sense, the BamZ projected Marx’s personal history and aspirations onto a broader public readership.

Further evidence that the BamZ’s musical mission was at the same time a matter of German-Jewish politics is the publisher’s previous involvement with a project that was more explicit on this count. Just one year earlier, Schlesinger had published the Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft der Juden, the public organ of a group of young Jewish scholars who called themselves the Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden (Association for the Culture and Science of the Jews), and whose purpose was to integrate Jews into the mechanisms of the state.78 Under the leadership of the legal scholar Eduard Gans, the Verein, whose members included such figures as Heinrich Heine, Marcus Jost, and Leopold Zunz took a radical, two-pronged approach to its goal. On the one hand, they tried to exert pressure on the government to grant Jews the right to participate in the civic affairs of Prussia. On the other hand, they aimed to reform Judaism itself, in order to eliminate any conflicts or contradictions between its traditions and the needs of the state, thus assuaging the fears of those who claimed that Jews were, or understood themselves as, a separate nation. As Sven-Erik Rose argues, the means by which they aimed to do so was to adopt the principle from Hegelian philosophy that Wissenschaft—the production of knowledge—was tantamount to participation in or production of the ideal state.79 Ultimately, the Verein

79 Ibid., 75.
succeeded neither in reforming Jewish practice nor the state; for all the erudition and ambition of its members, it simply had no real leverage over the powers they sought to change.\textsuperscript{80}

As the publisher of the Verein’s journal, Schlesinger not only observed but also participated in its strategic failure. If the Bam had a similar purpose, its strategy was less direct. Indeed, it was just such an indirect strategy that Marx had articulated in the first essay when he called for a plurality of critical voices. Though Marx was probably not directly involved with the activities of the Verein—which only admitted Jews as members and dissolved in 1824—Marx became close friends with Gans, whom he describes in his Memoirs as “my immortal friend” (\emph{mein verewiger Freund}) and the “enemy of the famous legal historian Savigny”—a telling designation in light of Marx’s own minor attempt to rebut Savigny.\textsuperscript{81} More to the point, Savigny had, as noted above, led the charge against Gans’s appointment to the University of Berlin on the account of Gans being Jewish—a strategy that ultimately succeeded with the passage of the so-called Lex Gans in 1822, prohibiting the appointment of Jews to academic posts. Gans was eventually compelled to convert in 1825, and though he made no secret of his reasons, he was appointed to the University’s Faculty of Law.

Marx met Gans at the Mendelssohn household, where Gans was “a great leader of talk … especially on political subjects.”\textsuperscript{82} The two thus surely discussed the politics of Jewish

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 128–29.


\textsuperscript{82} Eduard Devrient, \textit{My Recollections of Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and His Letters to Me} (London: Richard Bentley, 1869), 37.
emancipation and their differing strategies vis-à-vis the limitations placed on Prussian Jews. Such conversations are lost to history, but their intellectual exchange is not entirely speculative. On at least one occasion, in 1830, Gans contributed anonymously to the *Bam*—a fact Marx revealed in his memoirs. Moreover, Marx reproduced in full Gans’s essay on the curious success of the singer Henriette Sontag. Gans points out that Sontag’s success was not the result of her unique talent, beauty, or exotic appeal. Instead, he argues, her success reflects the Prussian social demand for conformity (though, curiously in the Berlin context, Sontag was Catholic). “The times have even found an outstanding word to designate the height they can no longer tolerate with a reproach,” Gans wrote. “They call it one-sided [*einseitig*], and rightly so.” Gans’s implicit demand for a more pluralist society that would recognize the contributions of different “sides” without forcing them into a procrustean Prussian mold is of a piece with his work in the *Verein*. And the implication that music was a medium through which society and the state should be improved and differences should be cherished rather than suppressed affirmed precisely what Marx was trying to do with the *Bam*.

**Form in the Age of Emancipation**

In 1830, the *Bam* (and along with it, Marx’s work as an editor and critic) came to an end. In part, the journal had simply run its course, having struggled to find writers; but the more

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immediate reason was Marx’s appointment at the University of Berlin. In the years that followed, he wrote the book for which he is best known, the *Lehre von der musikalische Komposition*, published in four volumes between 1837 and 1848. The book is, as its title promises, a textbook in composition—but it was unlike any previous textbook. Marx self-consciously declared in its introduction that it had “something higher and truer as its task than to absolutely forbid some things as false and absolutely to command others as imperative; rather, as true art, it proceeds from the conviction that *nothing* can be called *absolutely wrong or absolutely right* per se, but rather everything must be in its place to rightly and necessarily pursue its goals, but be wrong and forbidden everywhere else.” The *Lehre* would instead follow the goal of developing the student’s capacities. To that end, the student would begin composing from the start, integrating theory and practice from the outset. Read against the background of Marx’s entangled German-Jewish and musical experiences, and the path he took from a small Jewish community in Halle to the center of Berlin cultural life, the *Lehre* might be read not only as a course of instruction, but also as a record of his own practices and achievements.

Because it aimed not only to elevate intellect and taste but also to instruct, the *Lehre* had to proceed differently than criticism. It could not merely tell and exhort its readers. It had to be, in a word, analytic, even as it consistently sought the forms for the elements it proposed. Marx had already considered musical “form” as a concept in the *BamZ*, but had only done so in isolated

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86 Adolf Bernhard Marx, *Die Lehre von der musikalischen Komposition: praktisch-theoretisch, zum Selbstunterricht, oder als Leitfaden bei Privatunterweisung und öffentlichen Vorträgen*, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1837), 11–12. “Denn die Kunstlehre hat etwas Höheres und Wahrhafteres zur Aufgabe, als nach irgendwelchen Gesetzen Einiges als falsch absolut zu verbieten und Anderes als unerlässlich absolut zu gebieten; sie geht vielmehr, wie die wahre Kunst, von der Ueberzeugung aus, dass schlechthin *Nichts absolut falsch oder absolut richtig* genannt werden kann, sondern *Alles nur an Seinem Orte, zu Seinem Zwecke recht und nothwendig, überall sonst aber falsch oder unzulässig ist.*”
reviews, or indirectly, as the editor of a series of articles by Heinrich Birnbach. Befitting the public for whom he wrote, his writings tended toward the general; “form” was a vaguely philosophical notion that lent art a new intellectual dimension. From his new position at the University of Berlin, however, Marx had to articulate his understanding of music more analytically, specifying musical steps that could be implemented in a pedagogical program.

Still, the *Lehre* treated music as a pedagogical platform for creating not just a composer, but a human being whose freedom encompassed more than art. Indeed, Marx explicitly connected artistic and political concerns in his polemical 1841 defense of his pedagogical method, *The Old School of Music in Conflict with Our Times*: “What we are concerned with here,” he wrote,

is nothing other nor less than the conflict that engages our era and its most noble powers on all sides: it is the struggle of the spiritual against the material, of free understanding against dogma, of irrepresible progress against standstill and stagnation. This conflict is being fought on all sides and in all forms, in politics as in theology, in the sciences and arts as in the foundation of all culture [Bildung], the pedagogical and educational system. Everywhere it is a matter of the spirit becoming free. … [I]ts progress toward freedom cannot be one-sided or partial; the true friend of progress and freedom will not underestimate or neglect any direction or enterprise in which this general and urgent struggle is stirring. And herein rests the claim of the musician for a wider audience, one that transcends the inner circle of his art.

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88 For more on Marx’s work as a critic, see Pederson, “Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism, 1800–1850.”

Marx’s prose has been mocked for its bombast, but Uribe argues that this kind of rhetoric is symptomatic of its age and of Marx’s enthusiasm for his subject. In the context of German-Jewish life, the high-mindedness of Marx’s prose may be read as an attempt to transcend one-sided politics, and in particular, to leave no doubt that, even if the ideas and ideals are put forth by a Jew, they aspire to universality. It is a way of speaking to the concrete aspirations of citizens such that the false distinctions that divided Jews and Germans is overcome. Music becomes not only a metaphor for integration, but the means by which it could become reality. That such passages could be read to make such political claims is suggested by the critical row that ensued over the merits of Marx’s book. Gottfried Wilhelm Fink, whose response ridiculed Marx even with its title—*Der neumusikalische Lehrjammer* (The Wretchedness of the New Musical Teaching)—argued that what was good in Marx’s book was not new and that what was new was not good. “And such wisdom is not yet found in Israel?” he sneered.90

Whereas Fink represented the “old school” of treating musical elements such as harmony and counterpoint separately, Marx’s method was integrative. The *Lehre* consisted of graduated holistic exercises. Each lesson was assimilated into the next level with the ultimate aim, as the passage above suggests, of attaining artistic freedom. It is not difficult to see why this process has often been linked to Hegel’s dialectic philosophy. And Hegelian ideas do in fact appear in Marx’s work. Consider the following statement from his later essay, “Form in Music”: “Gaining shape—

form—is nothing other than self-determination, a Being-for-itself apart from the Other.”

Another comment on Beethoven’s Symphony no. 9, from an 1847 essay (to which I return below), also echoes Hegel’s language from the Philosophy of Right: “The form of an artwork is nothing other than the utterance, the externalization, the taking shape of its content.” At the same time, there is little evidence that Marx read much Hegel. His citations from Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics and the preface to the Philosophy of Right suggest a rather superficial engagement with Hegel’s ideas. Though stronger textual evidence linking Marx and Hegel has proven frustratingly elusive, there is one historical connection that has not been noted before: Eduard Gans. After the dissolution of the Verein, Gans remained a deeply committed Hegelian. Indeed, he became the editor of Hegel’s primary work of political philosophy, The Philosophy of Right, for a complete works edition of Hegel after the philosopher’s death in 1831. I would suggest that Marx’s conversations with his “immortal friend” Gans convinced him of the value of Hegel’s ideas—not for musical but rather for political reasons. This would help explain why Marx never cited Hegel prior to the 1840s, well after the philosopher’s influence was past its zenith. In Marx’s own words, “Hegel was not merely dead; the absolute validity of absolute philosophy also had, it


seemed, suffered a critical blow in higher regions.”94 If Marx wrote that he “felt no urge, and generally no particular inclination, toward speculative philosophy,” but rather, “as a former jurist and abiding artist, desired the secure ground of facts and experience,” Hegel nevertheless provided a vocabulary and loose conceptual structure that allowed him to place music and politics in the same discursive realm.95 Both could be thought as a matter of form.

At the heart of Marx’s theory of music is a simple tripartite gesture: rest–motion–rest. Through a loosely iterative process, this idea is manifested at every musical level, from the simplest motives to the grandest symphonic movements. A single note, Marx claims, has material value. Adding another note—Marx uses the example of the note C moving to D—brings a sense of motion that he will call the spiritual dimension of music. “Only the succession of two or more tones (chords, rhythmic events, etc.) shows the spirit persisting in the musical element,” he writes. Marx goes on to describe the motive in organicist terms. It is like the “germinal vesicle … the primal configuration of everything organic.”96 The organic metaphor is not, however, extensively developed. As Uribe argues, “freedom” is a much more prominent theme in Marx’s work. And freedom had to work through an engagement with the actual “material” side of music.

On the conceptual foundation of the rest–motion–rest gesture, Marx posits two fundamental forms that comprise all music. He called them the Satz and the Gang, respectively.

94 Marx, Erinnerungen, 1865, 2:224; “Hegel war nicht blos gestorben, auch die absolute Geltung der absoluten Philosophie hatte in höhern Regionen, wie es schien, einen bedenklichen Stoß erlitten.”
95 Ibid., 2:225; “Allein ich verspürte dazu kein Verlangen, überhaupt für spekulative Philosophie keine ausgesprochene Neigung; mich, den ehemaligen Juristen und beständigen Künstler verlangte nach dem sichernden Boden der Thatsachen und der Ehrfahrung.”
96 Marx, “Form in Music,” 66.
The *Satz* is a complete utterance, satisfactorily closed on itself. The *Gang*, on the other hand, lacks closure and therefore requires continuation. Crucially, neither term specifies the scope of its object. A *Satz*, Marx argues in the *Lehre*, may be as simple as a scale formed into a four-bar phrase that concludes melodically where it began (one octave higher or lower, of course). But it may also indicate an entire movement (this is, indeed, a normal use of the German term, which is why I, like Burnham, choose to leave it untranslated). Similarly, a *Gang* may be as short as two notes, or a whole section of a musical work; it is defined only by the fact it reaches no satisfactory close. Obviously, a *Gang* cannot stand as a musical work on its own.

*Sätze* and *Gänge*—the plural forms of *Satz* and *Gang*—constitute the basis for Marx’s conceptual hierarchy of forms diagrammed in Table 4.1. The process of deriving each form from the next occupies Marx for more than two hundred pages in the *Lehre von der musikalische Komposition*.97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Rondo</th>
<th>MS G MS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second Rondo</td>
<td>MS SS (G) MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Rondo</td>
<td>MS SS1 G MS SS2 G MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Rondo</td>
<td>MS SS1 G MS SS2 G MS SS1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Rondo</td>
<td>MS SS1 G CS SS2 G MS SS1 G CS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonatina</td>
<td>MS SS G CS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Sonata Form”</td>
<td>MS SS G CS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| MS = Main *Satz*; SS = Secondary *Satz*; G = *Gang*; CS = Closing *Satz* |

Table 4.1, Summary of Marx’s derivation of forms (after Burnham, “Form,” 888)

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97 Marx, “Form in Music,” 66.
To give an example of Marx’s process of derivation, let us consider the process by which the fourth rondo form develops out of the third rondo form. The first subsidiary Satz (SS1), Marx claims, “runs the risk of being forgotten in all the ensuing music.” In order to mitigate this deficiency, the fourth rondo form repeats the subsidiary Satz (SS1) after the third iteration of the Main Satz. But now it must now be transposed to the main key—otherwise it would tend to turn the whole movement into a Gang still requiring tonal resolution. I have chosen this derivation because it is decisive in the progress toward sonata form. With this step, the fourth rondo form becomes a large ternary structure (MS–SS1–G, MS–SS2–G, MS–SS1), thereby manifesting the rest–motion–rest principle on a larger scale.

The three-part structure of the fourth rondo form becomes the familiar sonata form by first eliminating the extraneous middle section. By doing so—eliminating the superfluous repetition of the main Satz and undeveloped subsidiary Satz (SS2)—one creates what Marx calls “sonatina form.” In the next step, “sonata form” proper, what had been excised is replaced with the “second part” in sonata form. Marx describes it as a *Durcharbeitung*, or “working through,” of material from the first part. This second section makes sonata form unique and closes off the development of forms. Marx concludes that sonata form, “of all the stable configurations within the circle of homophonic forms … is the richest.”

Marx’s explanations of his theory occasionally call attention to its political dimension. For example, when discussing polyphonic textures he describes their melodies as “persons or quasi-

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98 Marx, “Form in Music,” 79.
99 Ibid., 83.
100 Ibid., 82.
persons." The reason, as we will see, had to do with the intuition that melody was linked to song and thus to the human voice. The idea is further developed in the section of the *Lehre* dealing with choral figuration. After noting that a choral texture need not be based on the same motive in each voice, Marx writes in a way that suggests an analogy between individual voices and political subjects. The passage is worth citing in full:

> But in what does the unity of such a *Satz* consist? Namely that all the voices, as varied as their motives may be, are called forth from a unified conception of the task and that each voice remains perfectly true to its own precise character and content. In this way, the voices become completely emancipated; none is henceforth forced to receive from the other law and content, but rather each can move in its own way and in its own sense serve the whole, although it also remains free to freely take up the motive of another voice and follow its *Gang*.

> Here there is no longer a formal unity, but also no formal security; and therefore one should simply learn to compose securely with the strict forms first. For with the desire and with the higher life of freedom comes also their danger, as we necessarily discovered earlier; we are no longer bound by the motive, but we are in danger of giving up the unity of the *Satz*.

One can almost feel Marx searching for a form that can function both as a vehicle of social norms and of personal expression. Carrying the analogy between voices and political

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101 Ibid., 83.

102 Adolf Bernhard Marx, *Die Lehre von der musikalischen Komposition: praktisch-theoretisch*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1838), 120; “Worin wird aber die Einheit eines solchen Satzes bestehen? Darin, dass alle Stimmen, wie verschieden auch ihre Motive seien, aus einer einheitvollen Auffassung der Aufgabe hervorgerufen werden und dass jede Stimme ihrem einmal bestimmten Karakter und Inhalt vollkommen treu bleibe. Hiermit werden die Stimmen vollkommen emanzipirt; keine ist fürder gezwungen, von der andern Gesetz und Inhalt zu empfangen, sondern jede kann in ihrer Weise sich bewegen und nach eigern Sinn dem Ganzen dienen, — wiewohl ihr auch unbenommen bleibt, freiwillig das Motiv einer andern Stimme anzunehmen und deren Gange zu folgen. // Eine formale Einheit giebt es hier nicht mehr, — aber auch keine formale Sicherheit; und darum soll man sich eben an den strengen Formen zuvor gebildet und sicher gemacht haben. Denn mit der Lust und dem höhern Leben der Freiheit kommt auch ihre Gefahr, wie wir schon früh (Th. I. S. 96) haben erfahren müssen; wir sind durch das Motiv nicht mehr gebunden, aber wir sind in Gefahr, mit ihm die Einheit des Satzes aufzugeben.”
subjects over to the melodies that comprise Sätze in his derivation of forms, the whole process of derivation becomes a model of greater inclusion. Sonata form, rather than modeling the mere juxtaposition of “persons or quasi-persons” models processes of social interaction. Marx adopts a bit of illuminating Hegelian rhetoric to describe the subsidiary Satz: it is fitting that it be in a different key than the main Satz because it “wants to be an Other.”

Music and identity are virtually equated; Hegel’s “Other” was, after all, a person, not a musical phrase.

One entailment of this analogy is that the “upbringing” engendered in Marx’s educational program is modeled by the very form of what he teaches. The development of form symbolizes the student’s own ability to progressively integrate difference. Indeed, this is what Marx himself did—using music to incorporate his Other. How else to characterize his conversion, which becomes a symbol of his larger self-practice? The aesthetic attitude of greater inclusion—variety in unity—carries over to an ethical attitude in which the civic body becomes richer through its assimilation of greater diversity. Sonata form emerges as both an integrated product and an integrative process. In sonata form, the richest manifestation of Marx’s processual understanding of form, identities are not merely stated and reconciled: they work through (durcharbeiten) their differences in the “second part” such that the subsidiary Satz (the “Other”) is assimilated to the main key, but without losing its identity.

Mapping sonata form onto the stage of history, one could say that Marx lived during the Gang—or, more specifically Durcharbeitung—of German-Jewish relations that demanded continuation and resolution of the German and Jewish subjects that had gone into it, and which could be reconciled in the German state. The analogy may be grounded in both Marx’s own

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103 Marx, “Form in Music,” 79.
experience and contemporary discourse. *Durcharbeitung* was not a common word in musical discourse when Marx used it describe the function of the second part of the sonata. It was, however, used to describe the struggle for Jewish emancipation. In 1845, for example, the same year Marx published his most expansive explanation of sonata form, an author reporting on the state of Jewish affairs in Berlin, reported to the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums* that while individual baptisms were often reported in the press, “a vigorous, spirited working-through [*Durcharbeitung*] of Judaism must first be brought into relation with the tendencies of the day to be found worth mentioning!” Another article, perhaps tellingly titled “On the course [*Gang*] of reforms in Judaism,” closed by noting that

Reform should issue not from a person, but rather should be a general movement; it should not appear as complete, decided, or already at its end, but rather in development. So must it also assume local and historical colors. In its manifold and diligent working-out [*Durcharbeitung*] consists its salvation and guarantee that it takes root and is not the phenomenon of a fleeting time.105

Marx’s “traditional” or “textbook” sonata form, inherited by later theorists and still taught today, thus turns out to be something rather more consequential than the empty container or the quasi-Hegelian metaphysics to which it has sometimes been reduced.106 Sonata form is

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104 “Zeitungsnachrichten,” *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums*, 1845, 120; “Freilich, wenn sich irgend ein unbedeutendes Individuum taufen läßt, so ist das so wichtig, daß ein ausführlicher Bericht durch alle deutschen Zeitungen die Runde macht; aber eine tüchtige, geistreiche Durcharbeitung des Judenthums muß man erst mit den allgemeinen Zeittendenzen in Verbindung bringen, um sie erwähnenswerth zu finden!”


not, however, the end of Marx’s discussion. Like those who would later complain about the procrustean nature of Marx’s forms, he too recognized that musical works rarely, if ever, conform perfectly to the model. Citing numerous examples from Beethoven’s piano sonatas, Marx continues his discussion of form by positing various “mixed forms” and then discusses relationships between movements in multi-movement sonatas. The “last” form Marx posits puts this principle of self-determination into practice. Form transcends itself in the musical fantasy, which Marx introduces in the *Lehre* as follows:

> Overall, we have found, emanating from a basic form [*Grundform*] as the kernel of an entire domain of forms, a series of designs which for manifold reasons detached themselves more and more from that basic form and sought to emancipate themselves even to the limit of another form and then to go beyond it.¹⁰⁷

> Without wishing to lay too much argumentative weight on a single word, Marx’s use of “emancipation” at the culminating section of his theory again resonates with the broader context suggested in his work as a critic and memoirist.

> It has been noted before that Marx’s derivation of forms is not historical, but rather conceptual. In this respect, it appears to mirror Hegel’s concept of history. Yet, as Uribe has pointed out, Hegel’s notion is progressive, whereas Marx’s concept of sonata form does not replace song forms or the various rondo forms. By the same token, though, the fantasy *qua* form does not replace sonata form. Burnham’s conclusion that “it is sonata form, and not the *Fantasia*, which crowns Marx’s derivation and leaves no further problems to be solved” suggests that Marx may

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¹⁰⁷ Marx, *Die Lehre von der musikalischen Komposition*, 1845, 3:325; “Ueberall haben wir, von einer Grundform als dem Kern eines ganzen Formengebiets ausgehend, eine Reihe von Gestaltungen gefunden, die sich von jener Grundform aus mannigfachen Gründen mehr und mehr loszulösen, zu emanzipiren suchten, selbst bis zur Gränze einer andern Form und über sie hinaus.”
have misunderstood his own theory. And yet, the role of fantasy makes perfect sense if the political dimension of sonata form is taken into account: it is the analog of individual freedom. Fantasy is the necessary culmination because it is the form that inheres in the others. The true sonata form (or rondo form or song form, etc.) is fantasy to the extent that it is emancipated self-determination within a socio-historical framework. When Beethoven wrote a sonata, it was done with the freedom of fantasy. This achievement, more than the apotheosis of sonata form per se, allows Marx to identify Beethoven as a fellow human being who operates freely through musical activity, a condition to which Marx aspired and which became a metonym for a more general political condition. Whereas Burnham sees Beethoven’s music as facilitating the construction of Marx’s theory, it is in fact the ideal of emancipation that will define Marx’s analysis of Beethoven’s music—even when, as we will see, the music resists such a reading.

Marx’s theory of forms—from the idea of an initial impulse, to movement, to a final all-encompassing concept of emancipation—had to go through music. The derivation of forms allowed Marx to analyze each musical work in such a way that even though it is a “formed” (gebildet) thing it epitomizes and stands for the freedom of the composer. The conclusion of his essay, “Form in Music” (1856), conveys the idea in terms that double as an articulation in the social sphere. Arguing that discarding past musical forms condemns the composer to a Sisyphean fate of recreating what already exists, Marx wrote, “[The world] has already been created! It is simply a

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108 Burnham, “The Role of Sonata Form in A. B. Marx’s Theory of Form,” 266.
matter of making oneself at home there, of living there.” The same words could describe what it meant to be born Jewish. It is perhaps worth noting that the same year Marx published those programmatic words, the article of the constitution prohibiting discrimination based on religious practice was being reinterpreted to oppress Jews.

Marx’s theory was more than an analogy of social conditions. As pedagogy, it was an integrative method that plunged the student into writing actual music from the beginning. In so doing, it sought to inculcate the very social values that Marx wanted to see disseminated. These could then be projected back onto the music from which they were derived. Analysis was not only the “discovery” of form and value; it was the means by which respect for the truth of such values could be cultivated in individual practitioners, just as Marx had done for himself through the study of music. It is to the specifics of that process that I now turn.

The Last Symphony and the Round Dance

No work fascinated and troubled Marx more than Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. Given the historical baggage that has accrued to the piece, it is difficult to imagine or to reconstruct what someone in Marx’s position thought and heard. We can say this much: Marx heard the piece first at the piano (or in his mind’s ear). His first review of the symphony was written before the Berlin premiere in 1827, and must therefore have been written from an examination of the score. By the time of his second essay, published in the lead-up to the civil unrest of 1847–48, he

had lived with the symphony for twenty years. Marx’s final essay on what he would insist was—and had to be—the last symphony Beethoven would write was a chapter in a monograph on Beethoven. The book was less a “life and works” than a biography imagined through Beethoven’s music. While Marx did contextualize the works with some biographical detail, the “life” of the book was imagined through a psychological hermeneutic. The Ninth was the culmination of the trajectories of both music and Beethoven.

In a certain sense, the interpretive thrust of the Beethoven book places the Ninth at the culmination of Marx’s own imaginative trajectory as well. Two things made the Ninth unique, prompting Marx to return to it three times over the course of his career. First, the hermeneutic Idea that Marx found in it made the link between politics and musical form explicit. Second, the Idea of the Ninth did not need to be irrationally intuited and taken on faith. It could be derived from the words that resound when the baritone enters in the finale: “O Freunde, Nicht diese Töne!”

In what has become a major strand in the reception history of the symphony, Marx interprets the final choral movement as a rejection of not only the preceding three movements, but of instrumental music as such. Marx grounded this in Beethoven’s personal circumstances; it is the pathos-laden expression of the composer’s desire for human discourse after the onset of deafness, and the realization that his mastery of instrumental music could not meet this need. Ultimately, I will argue, it was grounded in Marx’s own circumstances and his desire for a civil discourse among Germans—Jews and Christians.

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For Marx, the “Idea” (Idee) of the musical work was the principle from which its unique form was generated. As Burnham argues, the hermeneutic conceit was essentially unanchored—one had to reject the Idea or take it on faith. Burnham, “Criticism, Faith, and the ‘Idee.’”
Marx’s first essay on Beethoven’s “Symphony mit Schlusschor über Schillers Ode an die Freude” (1826) is, in many respects, a conventional review. He compares the Symphony with its compositional precedents, comments on some notable passages, and offers his general opinion on the work. Brief citations of passages he deems remarkable or important facilitate praise for Beethoven’s orchestral part-writing. In other respects, however, Marx’s review is as singular as the work under consideration. Marx begins by identifying the music with the essence of the composer. “Two times,” he writes, “Beethoven has elevated his own artistic individuality to the level of content of an artwork, surely without being aware of it himself.”\footnote{Adolph Bernhard Marx, “Recensionen. Symphonie mit Schlusschor über Schillers Ode an die Freude, für grosses Orchester, vier Solo- und vier Chorstimmen komponirt von Ludwig von Beethoven,” Berliner allgemeine musikalische Zeitung 3 (1826): 373. “Zweimal hat Beethoven, sicherlich, ohne sich dessen bewusst zu sein, seine eigene künstlerische Individualität zum Inhalt eines Kunstwerkes erhoben.”} Beethoven \textit{qua} human being justifies the work. (If it were merely Beethoven the composer, the logic would be viciously circular.) The significance of the work’s expression, Marx stresses, is important in proportion to the greatness of the individuality it represents. The second work for which Marx claims the status of expressing Beethoven’s individuality is the \textit{Choral Fantasy}. This choice would be unsurprising if Marx were justifying the connection with the Ninth in the obvious musical way—namely, that both works end in a choral movement with similar melodic material. But that will not turn out to be the case.

The divergent stature of the two works is not merely a retrospective valuation, for Marx notes the difference in the two works’ receptions. He felt, however, that the \textit{Choral Fantasy} had been unjustly neglected, arguing that it expresses “how the spirit of the composer elevates
improvisation to free creation and unlimited control over all the orchestral and sung voices.”

Already in 1826, Marx’s nascent idea of freedom as the aim of musical composition was equated with Beethoven’s “flight over the limited and limiting keys,” the physicality of the piano serving as a reminder that Marx is not talking about freedom in general, but Beethoven’s freedom. The whole review is thus grounded in the individuality of the composer. Returning his focus to the Ninth, Marx stresses again that the work is unique to Beethoven’s individuality. Even a cursory glance at the score indicates a “new fundamental idea” (Grundgestalt): an instrumental work and a vocal work are set side by side. This means, however, that the vocal part will tend to be the part that gives order to everything else. In such a conception, Marx notes that the “achievement must appear ungraspable and incomplete; ungraspable because of the long introduction (four large symphonic movements) to a moderately long cantata; unsatisfying and incomplete because of the treatment, indeed the breaking up, of the [i.e., Schiller’s] poem.” Marx next introduces the essential “problem” with the work: how to reconcile the two large halves and how this relates to the particular details of each.

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112 Ibid. “Sein Inhalt is aber, wie schon früher einmal ausgesprochen worden, kein anderer, als die Darstellung: wie sich der Geist des Tonkünstlers an der Improvisation zu freier Schöpfung und unbeschränktem Schalten über alle Orchester- und Gesangstimmen erhebt.”

113 Ibid. “… Flug über die beschränkte und beschränkende Tastatur.”

114 Ibid., 374.

115 Ibid.. “Wer nun bei dieser Beethoven’schen Schöpfung an eine Gesangkomposition in der bisher üblichen Bedeutung dächte: dem müsste die Leistung unbegreiflich und unvollständig erscheinen; unbegreiflich ein so langes Vorspiel (vier grosse Symphoniesätze) zu einer mässig langen Kantate; unbefriedigend und unvollständig die Behandlung, ja schon die Zerstückelung des Gedichts.” Marx writes that there are four movements because he considers the instrumental portion of the last movement of the Ninth a movement.
Marx avers that instrumental music and vocal music are essentially incompatible. Moreover, they are ontologically unequal “because in Song, which encompasses the speech and tone-world innate to man, the human represents itself, in contrast to the instruments, as the extra-human.”

But then, Marx reasons, one must ask what purpose is served at all by the instrumental movements preceding the entrance of voices. The instrumental part of the symphony is too long to be considered an overture to the cantata that follows—indeed, he argues that it is a full symphony in itself.

Ultimately, the answer is that everything is subordinated to man, who finds his expression in song. Beethoven’s crucial introductory line to Schiller’s “An die Freude” is the hermeneutic key: “Oh friends, not these tones!” This, Marx writes, “leads us to Beethoven’s essence.”

Beethoven, the master of instrumental music, returns to song. Why? Marx argues of Beethoven that

finally, he even had to be torn away through the greatest misfortune of deafness that may befall a creative composer—from the living influence of human speech, from all sociability in order to immerse himself entirely undisturbed in the intuition [Anschauung] of the instrumental and in his last works up to now, to fathom and reveal hitherto unknown depths. The infinite, as in the scenic and otherwise extra-human nature, are the shapes and combinations in the realm of instruments.

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116 Ibid. “Sobald Instrumente und Singstimmen zusammentreten, ordnen sich erstere den letztern so unter wie alles, was ihn umgibt, dem Menschen; denn im Gesange, der die Sprache und die dem Menschen inwohnende Tonwelt umfasst, stellt sich das Menschliche dar, im Gegensatz zu den Instrumenten, als dem Aussermenschlichen.”

117 Ibid.

Following the onset of deafness, Marx’s Beethoven no longer lived in the world of instrumental music; instead, he was trapped in it. At that point the fundamentally unsocial nature of instrumental music became clear to him. No matter how Beethoven plumbed its depths and revealed its secrets, the world of instrumental music could not replace human discourse. “One is tempted,” Marx wrote, “to hear human meaning and song-speech from it.” Instead, Beethoven “now dissolves what has been shaped into its element, the simple sound; and the simplest, lost form evolves again in manifold combination to a great meaningful whole, like a tree represents itself to us leaf by leaf. Against this stands the eternally pure song, the highest cultivation in nature, given to man alone, and in its simplicity, with its highest of spiritual content, defeating the protean instrumental music.”

Following his digression on Beethoven’s deafness, Marx returns to the symphony’s earlier movements to reconcile his remarks with the specific content of the instrumental music. The first movement, he claims, represents the instruments’ evolving freedom from the essence of sound. From the raw harmonic fifth that opens the work, a quasi-melody—nothing more at first than a linearization version of the opening sonority—bursts forth. By the second theme, alliances have formed within the orchestra, emerging as factions of strings and winds, now set against one another. At the end of the “titanic utterance [Satz],” at the moment of recapitulation in the sonata form of the work, everything comes together as a whole to restate the first theme. Marx

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119 Ibid. “Jetzt streift das Naturleben an menschlichen Ausdruck und Gesang und man ist versucht, menschliche Bedeutung und Gesangsprache herauszuhören; jetzt löset sich das Gestaltete in sein Element, den einfachen Klang, auf; und die einfachste, verlorne Form bildet sich daran wieder in vielfacher Zusammenstellung zu einem grossen bedeutsamen Ganzen, wie Blatt an Blatt uns den Baum darstellt. Dem gegenüber steht der ewig in sich reine Gesang, der höchsten Bildung in der Natur, dem Menschen zu eigen gegeben, und in seiner Einfachheit mit seinem höchsten geistigen Inhalte das proteiische Intrumentale besiegend.”
addresses the Scherzo and Adagio in a seemingly perfunctory way. The Scherzo is the orchestra responding to the “restless compulsory call of the master” to participate in what Marx calls a “light, inexhaustible new round dance [Reigen].” Marx says very little about the Adagio. “Now, he had first created the [instrumental] world himself,”—recall Marx’s remark from the later essay on form: “[The world] has already been created! It is simply a matter of making oneself at home there, of living there”—Beethoven turns inward to hear the echoing of his “innermost secret song.”\(^\text{120}\) But despite its sweet, consoling nature, this song only produces more Romantic longing (Sehnsucht). “Each movement brought high gratification, but necessitates something still higher”—namely, song. After the recollection and abandonment of each previous instrumental movement, the final choral movement emerges by necessity.

Not these words, not the particular content of the following verse, printed in the introduction, but rather only the concept of prevailing human nature, of the delightful human community in song and singing together, is the content of the following cantata. Even if one were to misunderstand the intentions of the great artist according to our opinions—namely if one were to conceive that recitative not as immediate outcome of the great work, but rather wanted to judge it according to the general rules of declamation for composing recitative, unaware, that it is not, like most others, derived from speech: so little do we seem to have license to lend our ear to the rules of text treatment and song composition before the original intention of the artist. For this intention, for the song, he needed words. Unconcerned about everything else that might lay in them and might be

\(^{120}\) Ibid., 376; “Nur erst hat er sich der Welt erschaffen, der er sein innerstes Gefühl und Leben weihen und eingiessen, in der sein innigster Gesang heimisch wiederhallen kann.”
criticized in them, he used them as material that served only his goal, and should have no other meaning.\textsuperscript{121}

Finally, Marx insists, Beethoven himself recognized this need of breaking into song in the process of composing the work and that he had not begun with the intention of setting Schiller’s ode. “This procedure seems to shine forth so unambiguously from the construction of the whole that we would not give up our interpretation even if one could argue that Beethoven originally would have followed a completely different purpose, namely the actual setting of Schiller’s poem.”\textsuperscript{122}

This is a curious point in Marx’s interpretation: he would insist on his interpretation, even though it is possible that Beethoven had other intentions. Why does he insist on reading the Ninth as an affirmation of genuine human communion and community—especially when he explicitly denies that this communion is not a matter of what the words say? An answer is suggested by Gershom Scholem’s thesis denying the existence of any “German-Jewish dialogue

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 377; “Nicht diese Worte, nicht der besondere Inhalt der nun folgenden, im Eingang abgedruckten Verse, sondern allein die Vorstellung der herrschenden menschlichen Natur, der beglückenden menschlichen Gemeinschaft in Gesang und Zusammensingen, ist der Inhalt der nun folgenden Kantate. So sehr man die Intentionen des grossen Künstlers nach unserer Meinung erkennen würde, wenn man jenes Recitativ nicht als unmittelbaren Ausfluss des grossen Werkes auffassen, sondern nach den allgemeinen deklamatorischen Grundsätzen rezitativer Komposition beurtheilen wollte, unbeachtet, dass es gar nicht, wie die meisten andern, aus der Rede hervorgetreten ist: so wenig scheint es uns erlaubt, den Grundsätzen von Textbehandlung und Gesangskomposition hier vor der ursprünglichen Intention des Künstlers Gehör zu geben. Für diese Intention, für den Gesang bedurfte er Worte. Unbekümmert um alles, was sonst in ihnen liegen möchte, auch etwa an ihnen auszusetzen wäre, hat er sich ihrer als eines Materials bedient, das nur seinem Zwecke dienen, keine anderweite eigene Bedeutung haben soll.”

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 376; “Dieses Verfahren scheint uns aus der Konstruktionen des Ganzen so unzweideutig hervoranleuchten, dass wir unsere Auffassung selbst dann nicht aufgeben würden, wenn man Zweifel begründen könnte, ob nicht Beethoven ursprünglich einer ganz andern Absicht, der wirklich Komposition des schillerschen Gedichts, nachgegangen wäre.”
in any genuine sense whatsoever, i.e., *as a historical phenomenon.*”¹²³ Dialogue, Scholem argued, had to be based on a willingness of each participant to listen to the other on their own terms. Jeffery S. Librett has argued more specifically that the impossibility of such dialogue during the era of emancipation was maintained by a systemic elevation of Christian spirit embodied in the word, and the “dead letter of the law” maintained by Jewish culture.¹²⁴ Such observations dovetail neatly with Conway’s argument cited earlier that Jews who converted were still forever dissembling to avoid social censure.

Though Marx acknowledges Beethoven’s deafness—a terrifying prospect in its own right for any musician—he fixates on the resulting inability of Beethoven to participate in genuine dialogue. He also emphasizes the failure of instrumental music as an adequate replacement for that dialogue. In light of Marx’s own German–Jewish experiences and the rollbacks in the 1820s of Jewish rights that had been granted by the Emancipation Edict of 1812, is it possible that Marx identified with Beethoven *because* of the chasm between the composer and society? It is, at the very least plausible, given Marx’s coded political language elsewhere in the *BamZ*, his friendship with Gans, and the fact that his closest acquaintances were Jewish or converts. To follow the analogy between Beethoven’s isolation and Jewish isolation further, Marx’s own voice—his own discourse with German culture—was built through a new way of thinking about music that enfolded into itself the very assimilation he hoped for in sociopolitical terms. His assertion that instrumental music failed to reconnect Beethoven to society despite the composer’s


mastery, might then signify the limitations of Marx’s own attempt to effect political change through music.

The timing of Marx’s second essay on the Ninth and his resurrection of the same interpretation on the eve of the 1847–48 revolutions, in which Jewish emancipation was an important issue, adds plausibility to the political interpretation.125 Perhaps tellingly, Marx begins the essay noting bitterly that not enough had changed. Twenty years after its Berlin premier, he remarked, Beethoven’s Symphony no. 9 remained misunderstood by the public.126 Worse still, it was misunderstood by performers who not only performed it poorly, but would leave off the finale.127 Marx rejects two possible reasons for this failure of understanding: first, that the work has not been performed because it had not proved popular; second, that it was technically too difficult.128 The problem, he argues, is “the novelty of its form” (die Neuheit seiner Form).129

The question he wants to take up, then, concerns the specific difficulty of the Ninth’s form. Reiterating the claim from 1826, Marx insists that there is an essential difference in kind between instrumental and vocal music. To illustrate, he turns to Mendelssohn’s Lohengang (later

129 Ibid., 492.
published as Symphony no. 2), which bore the title of “Symphony-Cantata,” and which took Beethoven’s “Symphony mit Schlusschor” as a model. Both works began with three instrumental movements and close with large, multi-section choral movement. “The only formal difference from Beethoven’s composition,” writes Marx, “is that Mendelssohn transferred one Satz into the others.”\textsuperscript{130} In the \textit{Lobgesang}, the same musical content is repeated from the instrumental part in the cantata.\textsuperscript{131}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Example 4.1, The motive from Mendelssohn’s \textit{Lobgesang}}
\end{center}

\begin{musicexample}
\begin{music}
\Maestoso
\begin{musicframe}
\begin{musicnotation}
\end{musicnotation}
\end{musicframe}
\end{music}
\end{musicexample}

“The composer says essentially the same thing twice to us,” Marx complains; “he sings a song of praise first in the orchestra and then with human voices.” For Marx, this is a problem “In such doubling there is no artistic necessity,” he writes.\textsuperscript{132} Were the instrumental symphony capable of satisfying the aims of a song of praise, there would be no need for the choral movement And, if the instrumental part were \textit{not} satisfying—which he did not believe they could be—then the truly artistic composer would be driven to find the appropriate means to realize the

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 496. “Die einzige formale Unterschied von der Beethoven’schen Composition ist der, dass bei Mendelssohn ein Satz in den anderen überführt.”

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 497. “Was ist aber dann der Inhalt der Symphonic? —Eben kein anderer, als der der Cantate.”

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., “Der Componist sagt uns also im Wesentlichen zweimal dasselbe … In solcher Doppelhaftigkeit ist aber keine künstlerische Nothwendigkeit.”
aim, i.e., vocal music. In this case, the instrumental part would simply become an introduction and accompaniment.

In the context of human communication, which Marx had stressed, and which I have suggested reflects the larger problems of German-Jewish dialogue, the lack of necessity in Mendelssohn’s Lobgesang might be understood as a matter of poor dialogic form. In Marx’s view, in fact, the Lobgesang is doubly defective. It parrots back what Beethoven had already said without understanding the formal necessity for the instrumental and choral sections to differ, and it imitates itself without reason. Marx figures such imitation as a childish game: “Only the pleasure of composition, driven by purely subjective caprice has prevailed here, and has used the form of Beethoven’s work in order to open up a wider and more varied playground, without being aware of or recalling the idea and deep justification of the model.”133 In terms of broader political dialogue, the complaint carries a subtext that Jewish voices should not simply ape the German culture they aspire to join—that there is no authenticity in forced assimilation. Difference is a necessary part of form.134

133 Ibid., “Nur die in rein subjectiver Willkür sich gehen lassende Lust am Gestalten hat hier gewaltet und die Form des Beethoven’schen Werkes benutzt, um sich einen erweiterten und mannigfaltigern Spielplatz zu öffnen, ohne der Idee und tiefen Berechtigung des Vorbildes bewusst oder erinnerlich zu sein.”; Marx’s denigration of “play,” suggests that he did not have Schiller’s model of aesthetic education in mind. Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. Reginald Snell (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2012).

134 The bitter end to the friendship between Marx and Mendelssohn may also have been a factor, but as Sposato has argued, the very issue of Jewish-German relations may have been part of what led to their falling out in the first place. Jeffrey S. Sposato, “‘For You Have Been Rebellious Against the Lord’: The Jewish Image in Mendelssohn’s Moses and Marx’s Mose,” in Historical Musicology: Sources, Methods, Interpretations, ed. Stephen A. Crist and Roberta Montemorra Marvin (Rochester, NY: University Rochester Press, 2008), 256–79.
After his critique of Mendelssohn, Marx turns back to the Ninth to reiterate his point that the vocal and instrumental necessarily have different content. Indeed, the formal Idea of the piece is stated by the baritone’s rejection of the foregoing music: “Nicht diese Töne.” Thus, Marx restates, “These words express that the cantata will have an entirely different content than the symphony [and] that both halves of the work enter into opposition to one another.”

Underlying this rejection again is instrumental music’s incapacity for facilitating genuine dialogue, both for Beethoven, and as I have suggested, Marx. “Man!” he exclaims—“not this one or that one, not the highly elevated or deeply profound (all this was in him), but rather man, to whom we prefer to sadly attach ourselves in loving trust, humanity in its corporeally alive being and union. That remained the subject of his yearning and his love.” “So emerged the Ninth symphony,” Marx concludes. Beethoven “once more summons up the power of the orchestra

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135 Marx, “Ueber die Form der Symphonie-Cantate: Auf Anlass von Beethoven’s neunter Symphonie”; “Mit diesem Worten ist ausgesprochen, dass die Cantate einen ganz anderen Inhalt haben wird als die Symphonie, dass beide Hälften des Kunswerkes in Gegensatz gegen einander treten.”

136 Ibid., 507. “Der Mensch! — nicht dieser oder jener, nicht der hocherhobene oder tiefsinnige (das Alles war in ihm), sondern der Mensch, dem wir liebend traulich anschliessen, die Menschheit in ihrem leiblichlebendigen Dasein und Verband—das blieb der Gegenstand seines Sehns und seiner Liebe.” Writing again about the Ninth in The Music of the Nineteenth Century, Marx states that, in general, “The wants of man reaches beyond the mysteries of the enchanted world of instruments; he finds no perfect satisfaction but in man himself—in the universal brotherhood of a pious people.” This was Marx’s dream as much as it was Beethoven’s. Marx, The Music of the Nineteenth Century and Its Culture, 87.

137 Marx, “Ueber die Form der Symphonie-Cantate: Auf Anlass von Beethoven’s neunter Symphonie,” 507; “So entstand die neunte Symphonie.”
… them once again into divine freedom [göttlicher Freiheit]. Once more, they proceed in an ever more crowded round dance [Reigen].”

Here we encounter the curious German word “Reigen” again. In fact, as Ian Bent has noted, this word appears frequently in Marx’s writings. What, we might ask, is its significance for Marx? The Scherzo theme Marx had characterized as a Reigen, or “round dance” in the 1826 essay is shown in Example 4.2. While the term does not draw any special attention to itself here, it is, I think crucial, for it is a term that Marx returns to again and again in his writing on music, and it is rare in other writers. While it would be inaccurate to say that Reigen is unique to Marx’s vocabulary, the frequency with which it occurs, both in his early and late work, and the contexts in which he uses it—often in connection with Beethoven’s music—demands interpretation.

138 Ibid., 508. “… [N]och ein Mal rufft er die Mächte des Orchesters auf, die unter seinem Walten vollste, tiefste Herrschergewalt über unsere Herzen üben gelernt. Wie aus dem Urborn der Töne schweben sie, zucken, blitzten sie hervor und er führt sie in göttlicher Freiheit zu einem letzten Hymnus, in dem gebietende Kraft, ein hoheitvolles Wollen und Erringen und erhabene Wehmuth eines nie gestillten Herzensdranges sich wechselnd ablösren und durchdringen, über die Schauer hin, die allgewaltig aus der Tiefe emporzittern, das entlassende Lebewohl flieht — und doch noch der Herrscherwille festhält, was bestimmt war, bis zum Ende. — Noch einmal ziehen in immer gedrängterem Reigen, vorüberschwindend mit Abschiedsgrüssen, die Gestalten eines reichen, wechselvollen und einheitsfest zusammengehaltenen Lebens in rastlosem Zuge vorüber, immer vorwärts treibend bis zu einem Augenblicke schwelbenden Schwindelschwänggangs.”

139 Bent points out Marx’s affinity for the word “Reigen” but does not explain or interpret its use. Ian Bent, ed., Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 2 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 215.
Example 4.2, Beethoven, Symphony no. 9, Mvt. II, mm. 1–34 (strings only)
Another passage that Marx describes as a *Reigen* is the first Allegro theme of Beethoven’s String Quartet, op. 127 a “quiet Reigen” (see Example 4.3). It shares clear musical features with the Scherzo from op. 125. Both are triple meter, dance-like themes featuring dense imitative counterpoint. In each example, the highly independent voices crescendo into a more homophonic dance texture. Still another example with similar features that Marx calls a *Reigen* is the Minuet from Haydn’s Symphony no. 95.
Example 4.3, Beethoven String Quartet in E-flat, op. 127, Mvt. I, mm. 7–22.

The similarities are suggestive, but Reigen does not always refer to a triple-meter dance. Consider, for example, the Finale of the first act of Spontini’s opera Nurmahal, shown in Example 4.4. Here, the meter is duple and the texture is primarily homophonic. But the music does shift from the lament (Klage) of the wounded king to the exuberant dance (Reigen) of his subjects.¹⁴⁰

The libretto refers to a dance, and the singers express this joy. The entrance of the chorus in Beethoven’s *Choral Fantasy*, op. 80, a work that prefigures the Ninth, is also a *Reigen*. The essential measures are shown in Example 4.5. In these last two cases, the musical textures grow out of independent, single “voices”—a solo voice in *Nurmahal*, the piano in the Fantasy.

![Example 4.4, Spontini, *Nurmahal*, "O Qual des Argwohns!" mm. 1–5, a choral *Reigen*]
For Marx, then, Reigen appears to be a metaphor for sociability. Although it seems to be most immediately associated with rustic dances (often in triple meter), it is also related to folklore, where musical voices, like dancers, have a great deal of independence, but cohere into an energetic whole, with frequent exchanges. Marx’s other use of Reigen is more metaphorical insofar as the literal dance falls away. But it is less metaphorical in the sense that actual human voices are engaged in a form of authentic social exchange. Superimposing this distinction onto Marx’s 1826 interpretation of Beethoven’s Ninth, we see both types of Reigen, but the Scherzo would be merely false or imagined—a simulacrum of sociability summoned up by Beethoven in a magical instrumental world in which no humans actually communicate. Reigen thus helps clarify Marx’s distinction between the first and second half of the Ninth symphony.
Example 4.5, Beethoven, *Choral Fantasie*, Op. 80, Mvt. 3, Alegretto, ma non troppo, mm. 7–15.1
But why does he choose this conspicuous metaphor of a “round dance”? In Marx’s earlier review of Beethoven’s *Choral Fantasie* (which is, more specifically, a review of a performance of the work in Berlin in 1825), he wrote “It is he [i.e., Beethoven], who fantasizes at the piano, weaving his ideas from dark [*Nacht*] and light, until he himself, from his spirit, ensouls the sounds of the instruments, one after the other entering in a round dance [*Reigen*], and from his fire finally resounds the whole orchestra and choir of human voices woven into it.”\(^{141}\) Again, we see that it is the joining together of human voices that prompts Marx to use the word. But there is also a clue about Marx’s choice of metaphor: as Ian Bent points out, the weaving of dark and light recalls the book of Genesis. But this does not suggest that Beethoven is God-like, able to breathe authentic life into the instruments.\(^ {142}\) On the contrary, Marx’s Beethoven is all too human. His creative power and control over the instrumental world cannot answer the need for communion with his fellow man. The observation points in the right direction, but *Reigen*, too, has biblical resonances.

In fact, *Reigen*, spelled with a “g”—earlier sources use *Reihen*—entered the modern German language through Luther’s translation of the Bible. The word appears numerous times in one of two contexts—as a form of celebration, and as the result of a transformation or conversion. In Lamentations 5:15, for example, citizens grieving over the destruction of

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\(^{142}\) Bent points out further correspondences with Biblical passage in Marx’s (1859) interpretation of the Ninth. I do not pursue these correspondences here, but they may be read as another instance of Marx performing his German identity. Bent, *Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century*, 2:215–16.
Jerusalem say, “The joy of our heart is ceased; our dance [Reigen] is turned into mourning.”

Usually, however, this emotional conversion goes in the other direction, singing and dancing become a form of praise for God, as in Psalm 149:3: “Let them praise His name in the dance: let them sing praises unto him with the timbrel and harp.” Or, in Psalm 150, which reads, “Praise him with the timbrel and dance: praise him with stringed instruments and organs.” Indeed, Marx used a slightly modified version of this line of Psalm 150 in his oratorio Mose. The Egyptians (not the Jews) cry out, “Singet zu pauken und Reigen, singt in die klingenden Cymbeln, singet zu Saiten und Pfeifen, jauchzt dem Hort unsers Heils!” (‘Praise him with the timbrel and dance: praise him with stringed instruments and organs. Let everything that hath breath praise the LORD.’)

In Jeremiah 31:13, the Lord claims that He will “be the God of all the families of Israel,” as a result of which “shall the virgin rejoice in the dance, both young men and old together: for I will turn their mourning into joy, and will comfort them, and make them rejoice from their sorrow.” Psalm 30 uses the same language but reverses the perspective: “Du hast meine Klage verwandelt in einen Reigen” (“Thou hast turned for me my mourning into dancing”). Marx reiterates such a transformation in his description of passages—for example, in the passage above describing Nurmahal the Choral Fantasy. Reigen, it seems, comes to symbolize the move from the


individual to sociability via various musical means. *Reigen* is thus not only a mnemonic marker left over from Marx’s study of the Bible. It is also a symbol and a celebration of his own conversion to Christianity and his integration into German cultural life via music.

There is more to the story: Directed outward at his readers, *Reigen* and its implicit reference to Biblical passages could function as a public affirmation of Marx’s Lutheran faith. That it was marked for readers is suggested by an entry from a contemporary “critical-philosophical” dictionary whose authors note that *Reigen* was no longer used in high German; however, “to the poet,” the word was one of those “welcome expressions, which move the fantasy into the ancient world, into the simplicity of original time.”¹⁴⁷ For Marx, we might imagine this “ancient time” coinciding with what his father had called the “old church” (*die alte Kirche*). Both Psalm 30 and Psalm 150 are part of the Jewish daily morning service. Psalm 30 in particular, including the line “Du hast meine Klage verwandelt in einen Reigen,” would have stood out by virtue of being the first prayer of the German-Jewish (Ashkenazi) service.¹⁴⁸ Marx would have heard this line *every* time he attended morning services with his father. The word thus pointed inward to Marx’s own Jewish past. *Reigen* appears to function as a bridge between Jewish and Christian practices and beliefs, reflecting both in an image that draws on music for its resonance.

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¹⁴⁸ Services may have been held in Hebrew or Yiddish, but Marx certainly knew the German passages from his study of the Lutheran Bible.
Marx returned to the Ninth one last time, in his 1859 monograph on Beethoven’s music. It picks up where his last essay left off, beginning with its title: “The Last Symphony.” In general, Marx pursues similar lines of thought, but there are a number of notable changes. First, there is much more analytic detail in the 1859 essay; it abounds with musical figures to support his points. (The only notation in the 1847 essay was a two-measure fragment of melody from Mendelssohn’s *Lobgesang.*)

The second, more interesting shift is that the move from *Klage* to *Reigen* is transposed into the first movement of the work. In the coda, violins and bassoons together “lay bare unmistakably the sorrow-laden heart that beats in a mighty breast, unable to find release from this profoundly felt lament [*Klage*]. After this, the flute intervenes with its innocence-laden tones admonishing in fantasia-like freedom. Once again … the instrumental lines pass and re-pass one another in their stately round-dance [*Reigen*].”\(^{149}\) Here, the whole transformation that, for Marx, signified freedom is moved within what many consider the most catastrophic movement in the symphonic repertoire. The despair that many listeners have found in this movement is mapped onto Beethoven’s miserable realization that “to unlock the enigma of his own interior existence there was only the enigmatic language of music—one mystery as solution to another!”\(^ {150}\)

Marx now hears the *Reigen* of the Scherzo as ghostly or uncanny (*unheimlich*)—an inhuman dance that no actual person could keep up with. The third movement is framed as a memory—a happy memory to the extent that one can momentarily forget the disillusionment with the false promise of instrumental music. As in Marx’s earlier essay, only in the final movement, now


\(^{150}\) Ibid., 227.
characterized as a folk song, can Beethoven find peace and satisfaction. Marx concludes by restating the fundamental significance of the Idee in the Ninth Symphony. It is biographical, in the sense that it reflects Beethoven’s actual lived experience (according to Marx). It is artistic: “both halves of the world of musical art are weighed upon a just scale, and are united with equal rights for all, insofar as each does and may partake of them.” And “finally,” the significance of “pure humanity: Man, as distinct from the world outside himself, exerts his highest claim upon his fellow-men.” We are unable to understand anything, Marx emphasizes, “except by means of our humanity.”

**Conclusion**

In the end, Marx’s assertion that “the arts share a common fate with politics” reveals a great deal about his life and work. It helps explain his obsession and excitement over the hitherto relatively unproblematic area of music theory—musical form—and why his practices crystalized in the concept of sonata form. In one respect, this chapter has been an origin story for music theory’s own ongoing fascination with sonata form. While this examination of Marx may not tell us anything that we do not already know about sonata form as a theory, it reveals a great deal about Marx as a person and might encourage further examination of the politics of other articulations of form. In a general way, it may be Marx’s unrealized political vision that constitutes a substantial part of its enduring attraction, even—and perhaps especially—when the

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151 Ibid., 237.

152 Caroline Levine’s recent study offers several productive ways for thinking about form and politics. Levine, *Forms.*
political commitments remain unarticulated. Such work is beyond the scope of this study, but we might at least dimly discern the potential of such research by recognizing the self-oriented nature of sonata form in Marx’s own life. Just because Marx did not explicitly write the struggle of the Jewish Other into his conception of form does not mean that it should continue to be written out. On the other hand, history has a way of persisting, even insisting, on material and symbolic forms that Marx surely would have appreciated; the Kammergericht to which Marx went to find work in Berlin, depicted in Figure 4.3 is now the Jewish Historical Museum, an institution dedicated to remembering the trials and tribulations of German Jews.

Figure 4.3, Johann Heinrich Hintze, Berlin Lindenstrasse Kammergericht, ca. 1850
Conclusion

_Ich kreise um Gott, um den uralten Turm,
und ich kreise jahrtausendelang;
und ich weiß noch nicht: bin ich ein Falke, ein Sturm
oder ein großer Gesang._

—Rainer Maria Rilke (1899)

According to the philosophical and historical arguments developed in the foregoing chapters of this dissertation, music analysis is inextricably bound up with the problem of the individual analyst’s relation to society and history. The argument entailed supplementing the conception of analysis as the application of music theory to the particular musical case with a conception of analysis as a practice of the self, which stages a conflict between forms of knowledge and conduct to which the analyst is subject. The product of this form of practice is not only new knowledge (music theory), but may also be the analyst’s sense of selfhood—a sense of being free from the particular forms of subjectivity that produced it.

It should now be apparent that this view of analysis involves reconceiving music theory as well. Rather than knowledge that leads to certain forms of behavior, theory becomes a body of knowledge that is derived from the analytic practices that precede it, and which is self-consciously recognized as such by the analyst at the end of this process. This inversion in the relation between theory and analysis, I argued, found its initial expression in the work of nineteenth-century German music theorists. It has never been total, of course; theory is still often spoken of, and taught, as the occasion for analysis. Nevertheless, the inversion can be recognized in part by the fact that analysis is the measure of theory’s value. More to the point, analysis as a practice of the self transforms the analyst—a transformation that constitutes or produces the individual’s perception of whether knowledge is true in a transcendent sense. The focus on music as a medium for such practices, I argued in Chapter 2, depended on a discursively constructed
promise of Romantic aesthetics, namely that music, and the experience of it, would transcend the
determination of individuals by institutionalized forms of reason. Once this relationship existed in
principle, through its articulation in fiction and criticism, it became inevitable that some
individuals would be hailed into it through specific musical sounds. While these were not the only
factors, and while musical subjectivity would not be—indeed, is not—always articulated in
explicitly Romantic forms (for example, the aesthetics of Neoclassicism, *Gebrauchsmusik*, or post-
modern irreverence), my argument is that the elevation of music to the status of something that
compels not only involvement but some kind of re-presentation as knowledge involves a latent
Romanticism.

Nevertheless the paradigmatic form of such discourses can be found in the discourses
around the most canonized composers in the European classical tradition—e.g., Mozart,
Beethoven, Schubert, and Schumann—which repeat the idea that their power over music was a
function of their complete subjection to it. Following Foucault’s insight that where there is power
there is resistance, though, it was also inevitable that individuals would resist this new form to
which they found themselves subject. Some of them—Gottfried Weber and A. B. Marx, for
example—would emerge as influential theorists whose ideas would take on a life of their own as
part of an emerging constellation of knowledge and conduct that solidified with the
institutionalization of music theory as a profession, a point to which I will return at the end of this
conclusion.

The upshot of this whole conception, I have argued, is the reclamation of an ethical
conception of analysis—one that at least has the potential to answer moral criticisms of analysis
on their own terms. It forestalls the critique of analysis as ideology, in which a discourse of
“objectivity” merely obfuscates or stands in for suspect relations of power, by exposing the ways
in which analysis itself is already a means of resistance to forms that would threaten to dominate
particular historical actors. This may, of course, become another form of subjection and carrier
of ideology. Indeed, this is probably inevitable. To the extent that a theory is “successful”—i.e.,
becomes a candidate for the application model of analysis—it too becomes an exercise in self-
subjection. Thus, we cannot say that the conception of analysis as a practice of the self
automatically exculpates unethical behavior by music theorists. It is only to the extent that their
practices function to free them from forms of subjectivity that they are practices of the self, and
thus ethical. Put another way, ethics does not lie in a specific form of practice, but in a set of
historical relations under which the analyst is freed from the compulsion of imposed forms of
subjectivity.

The scope of the philosophical argument about analysis implies a broader context than
music. Foucault’s suggestion that “spirituality” reemerged in the nineteenth century after a
period of suppression under post-Cartesian rationalism, for example, is not specific to the study
of music. It is part of a larger historical shift that puts practice before epistemology. Nevertheless,
the concept of spirituality as a kind of labor required in order to forge a relationship to truth, I
argued, helps to explain emergent practices of analysis. I would not be the first to suggest that
music holds a special place in this shift, at least in the nineteenth century and within the cultural
realm that can broadly be described as German. This is attested to in the first place by primary
historical sources; from Schopenhauer and Hoffmann to Schelling’s Philosophy of Art, music lies at
the very center of this epochal shift. More recent work by historians such as Tim Blanning
suggests that the centrality of music in the history of modernity is not merely the wishful thinking
of music scholars. Music emerged as a way of processing a peculiarly modern condition in the nineteenth century.¹

The modern condition of being subject to contradictory forces that threaten individual autonomy also involves a nascent awareness of those conditions and in at least some cases an attempt to overcome them. Whereas earlier ethical systems descended from a specific source—e.g., a moral code promulgated by religious scripture—there were not multiple forms making their claims on the individual. The essential part of this argument is that subjectivity was recognized as a possible threat—and thus in an important sense only came to exist as a threat to freedom—under the condition of being multiply subjected. Only from the perspective of other subjective forms can a subjective form, or “way to be,” be seen as anything other than a normal form of existence, and vice versa. The mutual resistance between subjective forms, worked out in new forms of practice, gives rise to practices of the self.

Artistic subjectivity was an effective form to resist the rationalization of other forms precisely because it did not function as a discursive argument, but rather as an experience that was, somewhat paradoxically, constructed through discourse to transcend the mundane, overdetermined world created by the application of rational models to human institutions. Indeed, these other forms demanded that the musical subject respond to a rationalized discourse in order to constrain its power over individuals. Music could only become an effective medium of resistance to other forms of subjectivity to the extent that it, too, threatened to dominate the individual completely. Hence, the double-sided nature of music in the writings of Romantic

authors—particularly Hoffmann. Only by drawing on the subjectivizing resources of religion could music function in this way. It did so in two ways: First, music as discursively constructed by Romantic authors drew on the history of explicitly sacred music and its built-in association of music with a realm of transcendence. Sacred (or “church”) music was a topic of concern for Hoffmann; it also filtered, as we have seen, into the writings of Anton Justus Thibaut and Gottfried Weber. The second way music drew on religion was functional. In the work of writers such as Wackenroder, Kleist, and (again) Hoffmann, music was made to promise, through adapted practices, what religion had promised. If one gave oneself over to music, it offered the same potential rewards: transcendence, grace, or salvation.

The relationship between practices of analysis and religion is an area of future research opened up by the perspective of music as a medium of self-creating practice. Art-religion (Kunstreligion), defined by Bernd Auerochs as a “variation of religion that was still possible after the acceptance of most important premises of Enlightenment critiques of religion,” is one important thread in this relationship. Abigail Fine has shown how art-religion in nineteenth-century Germany and Austria was not merely an intellectual conceit, but grounded in material practices of composer veneration. Music analysis, too, may function as part of this transfer. But art is not simply or only a functional substitute for religious practices; as we have seen, the question at the heart of Weber’s analytic practices ultimately had a religious grounding. Marx, too, grounded his practices in religion—or, at least, religious discourse—without art being a substitute for religion.

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Marx moved substantially toward a secularized—and politicized—view of music, which shaped his analytic practices and the form of knowledge it produced, but remained underpinned by a Christian theology through which Marx imagined humanity reconciled under a single benevolent God and the sign of “love.” The broad historical trajectory, from music taking on the function of religion in a religious setting, to the transference of the function of religion in a secular setting, to a fully secularized musical theology, may be fundamental to the history of modern music analysis.

The argument for the exchange between art and religion already exists in two forms. One is the secularized version developed by Sloterdijk, who claims “a spectre is haunting the Western world—the spectre of religion,” and argues that “religion” was but one form of self-producing practices in a broader “immunological” history.4 What was called religion, Sloterdijk argues, became “art” in the nineteenth century, and “sport” in the twentieth. Running through these transformations is the common element of practices through which human beings constitute themselves. Clearly, the stories I have developed in this dissertation resonate with the nineteenth-century phase of Sloterdijk’s history. Such a view is relatively easy to accommodate to the prevailing attitude today that analysis is a thoroughly secular discipline. But there is another version of the argument that art, and music in particular, is “religious.” George Steiner has argued that the experience of art itself is underwritten by an unstated—even unacknowledged, or concealed—religious commitment.5 This framing becomes acute, Steiner argues, in the effort

5 George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
to make the world correspond to the word. Accordingly, Steiner often focuses on literature, but his efforts to explicate the relation between “love” and the “word” culminate in music. He writes,

> The meanings of the meaning of music transcend. It has long been, it continues to be, the unwritten theology of those who lack or reject any formal creed. Or to put it reciprocally: for many human beings, religion has been the music which they believe in. In the ecstasies of Pop and Rock, the overlap is strident.6

Steiner, of course, appears to be an outlier in this explicit acknowledgement—and willing embrace—of music’s theological “side,” but this study has implied, I think, that the argument could be made on historical grounds. To trace a genealogy of music analysis that bears within it the traces of religious practice is a promising direction for future work. It would start from an analogy: if art in the nineteenth century picks up where religion can no longer sustain itself, then analysis—the attempt to “read” musical texts—is a form of theology. The historical cross-fade between them took the name “hermeneutics.” We might look, then, at how the practices of theology come to inform analysts, theorists, and listeners’ relations to music.

I shall propose two possibilities here. One is an investigation of the nineteenth-century genre of the commercially successful secular catechism. Like Martin Luther’s *Kleine Katechismus* (1529), on which many of these slender volumes were modeled, musical catechisms sought to instruct, educate, and indoctrinate their users. I write “users” rather than “readers” because catechesis—etymologically, “sounding out”—involves rote, oral (and aural) repetition to learn the fundamental tenets of a domain of knowledge, and crucially, as Nils F. Schott has argued, to convert such knowledge into insight.7 While secular catechisms were available on every topic

6 Ibid., 218.
from algebra to zoology, musical catechisms were among the most commercially successful. Johann Christian Lobe’s *Katechismus der Musik* (Catechism of Music), one of more than forty such books published between 1803 and 1902, went through more than twenty editions and was available in print through most of the twentieth century.\(^8\) Hugo Riemann published a dozen such catechisms at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth. The study of this minor, and generally ignored, genre would provide a case study in the transfer of religious thought and practice into the domain of music. At the level of practice, the catechism was a tool for learning musical rudiments, but its adjacency to religious practice may also have imbued music with a sense of salvific potential.

A second way to address the religious and theological strains in the history of analytic practice is to examine the specifically religious beliefs of influential analyst-theorists, as I have in the cases of Weber and Marx. Bound up with late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century developments in hermeneutics are theorist-analysts such as Hermann Kretzschmar, Paul Bekker, and August Halm. Halm is a particularly interesting case, having received his theological training at the Tübingen seminary in the late 1880s but subsequently abandoning a career in the clergy to pursue music. He eventually established himself as a perceptive writer on Bruckner’s music.

Halm’s work is thus materially and culturally situated at the historical point marking a break between music and religion, and after which the theological strain in music became largely invisible—the historical moment in which truth, as Carl Dahlhaus put it, “passed from the form

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of myth into the forms of art.” As Lee Rothfarb and Alex Rehding have observed, Halm’s writings were permeated by theological concerns; they may therefore be productively compared with contemporary theologians who confronted the same issues. Specifically, the conflicts that arose between traditional matters of faith and the inquiries of critical historicism, which only the subsequent generation of theologians such as Karl Barth and Paul Tillich would find ways to adequately address within theology itself, may already be present in certain musical thinkers. Halm’s work, for example, seems to anticipates the plea of theologians such as Jeremy Begbie, who has suggested that “the practices of music and its discourses can bear their own kind of witness to some of the pivotal theological currents and counter-currents that have shaped modernity.” Music, Begbie continues, “is capable of providing a kind of ‘theological performance’ of some of modernity’s most characteristic dynamics.” In music theory, of course, it is theology that has the capacity to enrich disciplinary history.

Halm, however, explicitly denied that his practices were a substitute for religion, and pointedly derided professional theorists as “musical clergy.” This leads to internal tensions that are in line with the thesis that analysis is a practice of the self, predicated on the conflict between


12 Ibid.

different forms of subjectivity. I would suggest that Halm’s work prefigures a more general split in music studies that is analogous to a split within theology itself. Just as theology split into orthodox and historicist positions—despite the efforts of many theologians to reconcile the two positions—so too would music scholarship split between music theory and (ethno-)musicology. To draw out the analogy, theory would represent those who, at some level, maintained faith in the transcendental capacity of music, whereas musicologists would come to see music as a thoroughly historical phenomenon. Practices associated with analysis here would include the lecture with the overtones of the religion sermon, a genre in which Halm excelled, and which (with echoes of Wackenroder and Kleist) Thomas Mann would memorialize in the character of Wendell Kretzschmar in *Doktor Faustus* (1947).

If Halm was less influential as a music theorist than Weber or Marx—or his contemporaries Heinrich Schenker and Arnold Schoenberg—it is because he developed no systematic theory that could be applied. In the alternative conception of analysis I have developed in this dissertation, of course, this is no liability to considering Halm an analyst. Halm may stand as an example of an analyst that produced no theory but nevertheless produced a self. Moreover, his analytic practices were prescient in certain respects. As Lee Rothfarb has argued, many of today’s music theoretical ideas can be found in some form in Halm’s writings. His explicit concern with “musical logic” not only connects him to earlier writers such as Hugo Riemann and contemporaries such as Schoenberg, it anticipates some of the more rigorous formalisms that developed in post-1945 music theory. Halm’s focus on music’s temporal “drama

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of forces” would fit comfortably alongside developments in the narrative theory and his concern with musical “corporeality” or “body” resonates with recent theorists of musical embodiment. Rothfarb as even cited Halm’s interest in musical movement as an antecedent to transformational theory and analysis, and his desire to use analysis as a tool for criticism as an anticipation of critically-minded theorists such as Edward Cone and David Lewin. More generally, Halm’s antihistoricist and formalist attitudes are characteristic of modern music theory and analysis. He believed that what can be said about music and musical experience must be grounded in music’s formal properties, and would likely have agreed with Bent’s gloss that analysis is “that part of the study of music which takes as its starting point the music itself, rather than external factors.”

Similarities between Halm’s work and today’s discourses can be misleading, however—especially if we do not consider the specifics that drove him to analysis and the epistemic forms his work would take. Halm’s work is dialectically entangled with specifically theological concerns, borne of a clash between the traditional faith of his childhood and his encounter with liberal theology during his seminary studies in Tübingen. Under the pressures of critical historicism, the factuality of biblical texts came into question; insofar as they could not be read literally, the critical questions involved how they might be read allegorically. One of the central problems to

15 For a recent example of embodied music theory and analysis, see Arnie Cox, Music and Embodied Cognition: Listening, Moving, Feeling, and Thinking (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016).
16 These points of contact between Halm and later theory are pointed out in Lee A. Rothfarb, August Halm: A Critical and Creative Life in Music (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2009), 167–90, passim.
emerge was the historical status of Christ—and more specifically, Christ’s body. As a body that was both human and divine, it was the key to Christian belief. By placing the essence of Christ in history, and by reading miracles allegorically, critical historicism deprived Christians of the body of Christ in a divine sense, as its ascension was not naturally believable. At the same time, the historical body could not be recovered. The theologian Adolf von Harnack did not mince words about the theological result. In widely read lectures published in 1883, he wrote, “Today one can no longer believe in the trinity of God, Christ’s harrowing of hell or ascension to heaven in the sense of the old symbols, but conducts oneself in sermons as if one held such beliefs. Out of that grows a damage in the church that is immeasurable.” Harnack tried to avoid becoming embroiled in this line of argument, claiming that it lay too far in the past, but it is a clear diagnosis of the problem with which contemporary theology had to contend.

Music provided the presence and body of which Christianity had been deprived by critical historicism. It is this context in which Halm’s focus on corporeality is most interesting. The body, it seems, made music a more effective medium for religious practice than scripture that relied on the historically unverifiable. This was not the body understood as an object of science—in terms of bones, muscles, nerves, and so on. Rather it was the theological body—a body that could replace what had been lost in historicism. It is this body that provides what Steiner called a “real presence.”

19 Adolf von Harnack, Martin Luther in seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte der Wissenschaft und der Bildung: Festrede (Giessen: J. Ricker, 1883), 34; “Mann kann heut nicht mehr im Ernst an die Dreieinigkeit Gottes, Höllen- und Himmelfahrt Christi im Sinne der alten Symbole glauben, geberdet sich aber doch in der Predigt, als ob man in diesem Glauben stände. Daraus erwächst der Kirche ein Schade, der unermesslich ist.”
The schism between the demands of religious faith and the historicism that moved Halm into music, where it could be solved by music’s presence, would be reconstituted in the world of twentieth-century music scholarship. Just as the nineteenth-century study of theology split into two institutions, the seminary and the divinity school, so too has music scholarship split along similar lines, at least in North America. Music theory is akin to the seminary, predicated on a faith that history can be overcome through textual analysis. Musicology, on the other hand, has tended to move in the direction of divinity studies, in which the various articulations of musical knowledge have been historicized. Halm recognized this possibility, and for this reason rejected “music theory” as a subjectivizing force in its own right. The professional theorist-analyst would find himself in the same bind as the theologian of genuine faith: “music” would tend to disappear in the face of material and historical investigation. What prevents this disappearance is music’s actual material presence. Thus music becomes a “text” analogous to scripture, but with the crucial different that its “claims” are non-discursive, non-representational, self-referential, and can be accessed directly.

The split created by music’s presence has left the history of music theory in a potentially awkward position, having to choose between presentist and historicist positions. Thomas Christensen has offered a cogent critique of this forced choice.20 Drawing on Gadamer’s conception of hermeneutics, he argues that the history of theory must mediate between presentism and historicism, and that its very practice depends on the difference between past and present. I have generally tried to follow this model in the present study, but with the

understanding that practice may take historiographic precedence over knowledge. With this shift, I have argued, it becomes necessary to attend to the human subjects and selves. In practice, hermeneutics becomes, to use Foucault’s phrase, a hermeneutics of the self that reformulates and reinvigorates a history of such practices that includes, among others, the Socratic dialogues, Ignatius of Loyola’s spiritual practices, and the ideal of Bildung in the hands of Goethe.

In the end, having opened up and investigated some instances of historical difference, it may be useful to come back to the question of historical continuity within analytic practices. For example, when we analyze using Roman numerals, are we doing the “same thing” as Weber? When we analyze sonata form, are we “repeating” Marx? I have implied that the mechanical application of this or that theoretical frame is not a practice of the self, but rather a form of subjection. In this sense, we are not doing what Weber or Marx did. But there is, nevertheless, historical continuity, and we should ask what attracts us to these particular forms of musical knowledge. Or, put another way, what makes them seem true? I suggest the following as an avenue for further research: theoretical discourses only exert subjective force on us to the extent that we still live with the institutions that occasioned their development in the first place. Weber’s practices of Roman numeral analysis and fascination with Mehrdeutigkeit and Marx’s analytics of form retain subjectivizing force and attraction because we still live and work under the liberal ideals of universal law and inherent equality among individual people. Thus, they may also retain their capacity for resistance to domination, even as—say, under the disciplinary auspices of the music theory classroom—they retain their own power to dominate.

Finally, this raises questions about the forms of analysis being pursued today. Are they analogous to these earlier practices? For example, does contemporary engagement with bodies as the medium through which music (conception, perception, cognition, etc.) will be understood
constitute a form of resistance to musical subjectivity? Do the variations on the idea of the body effect different forms of resistance and assertion of selfhood—e.g., McClary or Maus’s studies on gender and sexuality, Arnie Cox or Rolf Inge Godoy’s work on embodied cognition, or Joseph Straus’s work in disability studies—effect a resistance to our subjectivity to music? Might corpus studies or digital humanities projects in music be means for not only producing new knowledge, but also for using music to resist the reduction of human to demographic data?

These questions remain for further study. Still, it is worth asking here whether there is any reason to think the model of subjectivity and selfhood I have posited and explored in the work of two nineteenth-century German theorist-analysts would be apropos. I think there are two reasons this may be the case. First, scholarship in music theory and analysis, though shaped by the culture in which it came to be, is also largely a legacy of nineteenth-century theorists such as Weber and Marx. As I noted in Chapters 3 and 4, we still use Roman numeral analysis and we still study sonata form. Thus, even though the focus of these earlier figures was on their self-practices, they are also part of a larger genealogical story. Second, there is the ethical concern: by showing that analysts of the past were not merely products of their context but also that part of their effort was to exercise a form of autonomy vis-à-vis the demands of music and forms of knowledge, then we might claim the same for ourselves. That would not obviate the need to give accounts of what we do and why, but it would satisfy a desire I take to be self-evident: we do not wish to see ourselves as mere pawns in the force of history. However insignificant the decision to practice music analysis may seem within a broader philosophical debate (such as that of

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determinism) or in the face of pressing political issues, it provides a platform for some individuals to create themselves. If we want to understand how to be ethical in the context of musical knowledge, it behooves us to continue to study the history of analysis.
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